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Women in the Middle East and North Africa: A Bibliography
Middle East Abstracts & Index Vol. 20E(i)
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Bibliographic Essay

This bibliography on women in the Middle East and North Africa, defines the region after the Bureau of the Census statistical report Women of the World: Near East and North Africa, of February 1985.¹ That statistical survey includes: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen (North); it did not include: Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Western Sahara or Yemen (South).² Therefore, the area of coverage of this bibliography is: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine (including Gaza Strip, Israel, Palestine and the West Bank), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco (including Western Sahara), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen (including North Yemen, South Yemen and unified Yemen), and General Middle East and North Africa (a regional definition that is reasonably close to the are coverage of Middle East Abstracts). This volume, Women in the middle East & North Africa (1997), is Middle East Abstracts Vol. 20E(i-ii).

The Bibliography has two indicies: an Author Index, and a Subject-Corporate-Named Person Index.

Bibliometric Overview

This bibliography of women in the Middle East and North Africa has three levels of documentation. These levels of documentation can be thought of as focusing, from the grassroots, up, from the data on women in Middle Eastern and North African societies, to studies of the data, and to studies of the studies. The first level is the record of the activities of women in the region, including biography, political and economic activity, dissent and other incidents of daily life that is sublimated into the news. The second level of documentation is broader synthetic studies of women, whether anthropological, historical, sociological, statistical or political. The third level of analysis is that of recursive studies of the study of women in the region or of the study of Women’s Studies that relate to the region. Predictably, the first level includes about 95% of all records in this bibliography; the second level 95% of what remains, or 4.75%, and the third level includes about 0.25% of the records.

The bibliography includes 3115 record in 22 geographic areas. The breakdown by nation-state is (bolding indicates places omitted from the Bureau of the Census statistical study): Afghanistan, 217 records; Algeria, 92 records; Bahrain, 18 records; Egypt, 245 records; Iran, 143 records; Israel-Palestine, 1333 records; Jordan, 58 records; Kuwait, 42 records; Lebanon, 84 records; Libya, 20 records; Morocco, 43 records; Oman, 27 records; Qatar, 12 records; Saudi Arabia, 69 records; Syria, 46 records; Tunisia, 20 records; Turkey, 106 records; United Arab Emirates (UAE), 28 records; Yemen, 124 records; and General Middle East and North Africa, 75 records. Or, looking at these countries by quartile and in order of size (bolded countries are omitted from the Census study):

First quartile: (top five, 2225 records; 71.4%):
- Israel-Palestine, 1333 records;
- Iraq, 287 records;
- Egypt, 245 records;
- Afghanistan, 217 records;
- Iran, 143 records.

Second quartile: (second six, 550 records; 17.7%):
- Yemen, 124 records;
- Turkey, 106 records;
- Algeria, 92 records;
- Lebanon, 84 records;
- General Middle East and North Africa, 75 records;
- Saudi Arabia, 69 records.

²The Bureau of the Census WID Database did not include data from Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Western Sahara or Yemen (South), and the compilers of the volume choose not to include data from Gaza Strip or Israel in this report for unstated reasons.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Introduction

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Kuwait: 648
Third quartile: Iran: 425
(third six, 244 records; 7.8%): Bahrain: 352
Morocco: 323
Jordan, 58 records; Sudan: 322
Syria, 46 records; Lebanon+OSL\(^5\): 300
Morocco, 43 records; Tunisia: 290
Kuwait, 42 records; Algeria: 262
UAE, 28 records; Egypt: 163
Oman, 27 records.

Fourth quartile: Morocco, 43 records; Tunisia: 290
(bottom five, 96 records; 3.1%):
Cyprus, 26 records;
Libya, 20 records;
Tunisia, 20 records;
Bahrain, 18 records;
Qatar, 12 records.

This distribution of coverage is worth comparing to the coverage of the Middle East (defined slightly differently) in the Amnesty International report on Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack (August 1995). The rank order of coverage by word count\(^3\) in that document by area is:

Iraq: 923
Israel+Palestine\(^4\): 901

\(^3\) Counts of subsets of words in sentences and sidebars in the Amnesty report include: Algeria (Berber): 262; Bahrain+Bahrain-Iran: 352; Bahrain-Iran (exile in UAE): 113; Egypt (Cairo)+Egypt-Israel: 163; Iran+Bahrain-Iran-Iran Iraq War: 425; Iraq+Iran-Iraq War+Iraq-Kurds-Turkey+Iraq-Kuwait (occupation, Collaborators): 923; Israel (Tel Aviv)+Egypt-Israel: 221; Israel (Tel Aviv)+Israel and Palestinians (Occupied Territories): 476; Israel (Tel Aviv)+Occupied Southern Lebanon: 470; Kuwait+Iraq Kuwait (Occupation, Collaborators): 648; Lebanon+Lebanon-Syria (Occupation): 83; Lebanon+Southern Lebanon: 300; Libya: 41; Morocco+Morocco and Western Sahara (Polisario): 323; Occupied Southern Lebanon (Israel-Lebanon/OSL-Israel/Hezbollah etc)+Israel-Lebanon (OSL-Israel/I/S?a?): 249; Palestinians (Is-Pal, Syr-Pal, Pal alone): 176; Saudi Arabia: 70; Sudan (Omdurman, Kharfoum, Nuba, Nuer, Bahr al-Ghazal, SPLA): 322; Syria+Lebanon-Syria (Occupation): 154; Tunisia: 290; Turkey (Iraq-Kurds-Turkey only): 80; UAE: 22; Yemen: 63. Generally speaking, Amnesty International (AI) data seems to correlate loosely with two variables (with high attention corresponding to a high rate of human rights abuses as defined by AI): (1) nations that are “rogue states”, that is, designated enemies of the United States, and (2) nations that are more open to AI investigations. So, Saudi Arabia, a state which poorly conforms to the Western Feminist model of women’s rights employed by AI, and which is very closed to AI investigations, has a very low level of attention in this AI report. By contrast, Iraq, given the highest human rights violations rating by AI, even as AI ignores the embargo and its affects. The relatively high ratings of Bahrain, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia are partly the product of openness to AI investigations, and in the case of Bahrain and Israel, a very high level of human rights violations.

\(^4\) Israel-Palestine includes Israel, Palestine, the Occupied Territories (herein Gaza Strip ad West Bank, but not the Golan Heights, which never appears in the Amnesty report) and Occupied Southern Lebanon (OSL).

Subject Coverage: Data

The subject coverage of this bibliography is very broad, including information form hundreds of sources, from newspapers to monographs to government documents to political ephemera. The bibliography includes abstracts, full text documents and a limited number of enumerative entries. The three major clusters of information that are covered are:

Women in Society: gender policy/gender sociology, ethnic policy/multiculturalism, Women’s Studies, rape, violence against women, sexuality, class, child and youth issues, women in religion, women in art, lesbianism, feminism, philosophy, sociology, motherhood, marriage law and marriage sociology, women in combat/revolution/civil war, history, oral history, women’s suffrage, women in business, women in the economy, urban sociology, rural sociology, tribes, poverty, employment, sexual harassment, cultural ideology, ideological evolution, and patriarchy.

Women in Politics: Office holders, policymakers, civil rights, civil rights leaders, women’s international associations, women-centered international political organizations, activism, demonstrations, women’s movements.
rights/human rights movements, women-oriented services, and lobbying.

Women’s Health: public health, abortion, social surgery, psychology, aging, women’s medicine, and AIDS.

This bibliography attempts to provide systematic coverage of many of these subjects, but ultimately is both burdened and limited by the availability of information. For many disciplines that are associated with the study of women in the Middle East and North Africa, there remain significant lacunae. For example, questions are addressed both institutionally and systematically: human rights issues in every country are covered by the bibliography through State Department human rights reports, as well as by other sources (with regional coverage from groups such as Amnesty International Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch, and Minority Rights Group). However, human rights studies are simply data, often very ephemeral data and anecdote, and few include much analysis. At the same time, the growth of indigenous human rights institutions is accelerating, ranging from human rights groups built on Western NGO models to the emergent articulation of an Islamic human rights responses to both that Western model and of the West itself.

As women play a larger and larger public role in Middle Eastern and North African societies, that is, assume visible leadership roles, the volume of information that deals with, for example, women in politics becomes almost unmanageable. When women become prime ministers, is it still a matter of documenting the role of women in politics when a she is the leader of a political party and government? In the future it may not be a subject matter of Women’s Studies to document the role of women in politics, but at present there should be considerable interest in figures like Tansu Ciller; frequently described in the American media as merely an attractive blonde (and therefore pro-Western), she is in fact a central and controversial political figure in Turkey in a time of unknowable, and incomplete, transition. Similarly, there is a growing volume of important autobiography and biography form Middle Eastern women, including: Nawal El-Sadaawi’s Memoirs From the Women’s Prison (1994) [Record 20098], a biography of the indefatiguable Henrietta Szold, founder of Hadassah and the Godmother of Israel, Joan Dash’s authoritative Summoned to Jerusalem; The Life of Henrietta Szold (1979) [Record 60555] or the autobiography of Irgun Zvai Leumi operative Doris Katz, The Lady Was a Terrorist During Israel’s War of Liberation (1953) [Record 60716 seq.].

Similarly, the biography of American women political figures can provide significant data in studying the formulation of American foreign policy and of women in formulating that policy, for example, the intense political commitment of Geraldine Ferraro as described in her Ferraro: My Story [Record 22072], and the odd travelogue/autobiography of Cynthia Helms (wife of former CIA director and then ambassador to Iran Richard Helms, An Ambassador’s Wife in Iran (1981) [Record 22084]. By contrast, the role of civil rights attorney Susan Campos in defending the Iraqis used in the CIA mercenary army in Erbil in 1996 who were imprisoned by the US as potential terrorists after they fled Iraq with US assistance, illustrates the omnipresent role of American women in Middle East issues, in this instance as a attorney [Record 24186], even in rather murky matters. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the record of women leaders as a subject matter for Women's Studies remains problematic: while Georgie Ann Geyer can praise the appointment of Madeleine Albright (a "Skirt") as a triumph for women's rights and praise Albright for the special woman's sensitivity for children that she will bring to the State Department (article not included in this bibliography), Secretary of State Albright's gloating about the death of 500,000 Iraqi children form the US enforced embargo on Sixty Minutes, June 12, 1996 is certainly a matter for a Middle East bibliography of women (even if her comment was never reported in the mainstream United States media as a result of the comments being made in the most ephemeral of all media, television; but see the press release of Dialogue for Just Peace [Record 24192]).

6 The question of how such a broad discipline as Women's Studies can be delimited remains relatively untouched by studies in the method of Women's Studies: even if many are...
uneasy with the role of First Lady Nancy Reagan as a real power broker in the Reagan Administration, the declaration of her astrologer, Joan Quigley, that the Strategic Defense Initiative was "very Aquarian" may have changed history.  

Concurrent with the emergence of women as leaders in Middle Eastern societies is the growth of institutions that address gender-policy and gender-sociology question. UN agencies such as the Division of Palestine Rights [Record 60491 seq.] and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan [Record 12096 seq.] provide detailed authoritative, primary documentation on women in those countries. Documentation form the UN Population and Development Conference in Cairo in 1994, included as part of the entries for Egypt illustrate, the range of discourse in the Middle East on questions affecting women is limitless.

Similarly, coverage of Middle Eastern and North African women at the UN Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995 (and especially at the NGO Forum in Hairou) illustrates the growing range and confidence of Islamic and minorities' women's organizations (including articles such as Farida Mahomed's *Life Style: Experiences of Muslimahs at the Hairou Conference* (1995) [Record 22093], or the *Caucus Statement of the Kurdish Women Delegation--Working Group on Kurdish Women* (1995) [Record 24134]).

Institutionalization of women's NGOs has provided a very large literature of primary documentation that has largely escaped collection by American Universities. The largest published collections of such ephemera are that reprinted in Middle East Abstracts, and that produced by the Peoples Translation Service in its *Connexions: An International Women's Quarterly*. The complete fulltext of the Middle East and North African documents of *Connexions* are reproduced by permission in this bibliography.

In contrast to the massive flow of raw data of news and opinion, the studies of this data are just beginning.

**Subject Coverage: Studies**

Studies of women in the middle East and North Africa are largely anthropological or sociological, with the number of historical studies starting to grow.

Many of these studies are more properly reports of data collection from fieldwork, such as the two gender-sociology, anthropological reports on Oman: Christine Eickelman's *Women and Community in Oman* (1984) [Record 360019] and Unni Wikan's *Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman* (1982) [Record 36025]. However, there are a growing number of gender-policy, gender-sociology and gender-history studies emerging from this inchoate data collection process for the vast region encompassed by Middle Eastern, North African and Islamic studies.

Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that Feminist method in history, sociology, anthropology and other disciplines is primarily a critical apparatus, in the manner of traditional Academic Marxisms or of contemporary environmentalism. While a wild variety of data has been collected in this bibliography from scores of Marxist parties worldwide, ideologically informed criticism of the status of women in Islam by Marxists of various flavors rarely attempts to be more than critical new reports or mere dismissive polemic; one rare exception is the recent essay by Bob Avakian of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party in the United States [Record 20050 seq.]. Excesses in criticism of Muslim societies, often politically motivated, have left Islamic scholars who try to present the Islamic perspective forced with the necessity of arguing that Muslims love their daughters as well as their sons, as in Jamal Badawi's *The Status of Women in Islam*, Muslim Student Association of the United States and Canada [Record 10014 seq.].

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8 A few of the NGO participants at Cairo appearing in the bibliography include, the Women's Caucus, Coordinating Committee for the US Network of Cairo, Sisterlove, Project Azuka, Georgia Women Preventing AIDS Campaign, Action for Youth, Tam Cam Foundation, National Women & HIV/AIDS Project, Boston Women's Health Book Collective, Gathering Place, Women of All Red Nations, One With Creation, Anoka United Methodist Church, African American Future Society, Committee on Women Population & the Environment, International Council on Women, People Sustaining People, National Council of Maubere Resistance]
The best gender-historical studies are those which provide insights into a historical period by the examination of institutions in societies that were overlooked because they were institutions peopled by women: a remarkable example in Mamluk History is the article by Carl F. Petry, "Class Solidarity Versus Gender Gain: Women As Custodians of Property in Later Medieval Egypt," in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries In Sex and Gender (1991) [Record 20183]. Similarly, the ethnic and gender policies of settler colonialism in the Middle East, and its institutional logic, is highlighted no only in Petra, but from Hellenistic History in Sarah B. Pomeroy's Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra (1990), which is a fine work of history with a very classical heft [Record 20185 seq.].

The study of political mobilization of women in the Middle East is highlighted by the powerful presence of women in politics in Iran and Palestine: in both countries women played a critical role in the national struggles for human rights. In Palestine and Israel, many NGOs have been create by women to address women's issues there: a few of those represented in this bibliography are: Women's Organizations for Women Political Prisoners, Women's Zionist Organization, Women's Zionist Organization of America, Women in Black, Women Against Silence, Women's Pro-Israel National Political Action Committee, Women's Union in Gaza, Women's Welfare Society, Hadassah, Women Against the Occupation, Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon.

The interaction between disciplines within feminist social sciences is also starting to yield interesting dialectical exchanges: the application of the theory of public and private spaces in defining women's roles in society in the History of Religion presented in Karen J. Torjesen's When Women Were Priests: Women's Leadership in the Early Church and the Scandal of Their Subordination in the Rise of Christianity (1993) [Record 20211] finds a firm response in the Anthropology field work presented in Mary Elaine Hegland's "Political Roles of Allabat Women: The Public-Private Dichotomy Transcended", in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries In Sex and Gender (1991) [Record 22083]. Such inter-disciplinary dialectics are continuing processes, and are just beginning to lay the groundwork of a more thoroughly grounded study of gender in history and society.

Subject Coverage :Studies of Studies

The studies of studies in Women's Studies of the Middle East and North Africa suffers from the common problem of American academic confusion between method and methodology, exemplified by the collapse of both terms into the single term 'methodology', confusing the discussion of the two very different levels of analysis. Generally in this bibliography, the questions of research methods appear in the Subject Index under the descriptor 'Research Methods'.

The best single volume that addresses the question of method/methodology in Middle Eastern and North African studies of women and by women is Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your Won Society (1988). Eight abstracts appear in this bibliography from that book: the introductory essay [Record 40049]; Suad Joseph's Feminism, Familism, Self and Politics: Research As A Mughtaribi [Record 30057] (Lebanon); Soraya Altorki's At Home In The Field [Record 40008] (Saudi Arabia); Soheir Morsy's Fieldwork In My Egyptian Homeland: Toward the Demise of Anthropology's Distinctive-Other Hegemonic Tradition [Record 20162] (Egypt); Camilla Fawzi El-Solh's Gender, Class and Origin: Aspects of Role During Fieldwork in Arab Society [Record 20101] (Egyptian peasant settlement in Iraq); Seteney Shami's Studying Your Own: The Complexities of a Shared Culture [Record 26051] 9Circassian-Palestinian refugees, of several classes, in Jordan); and Lila Abu-Lughod's Fieldwork of a Difful Daughter [Record 20042] (Egyptian Bedouin). Unfortunately, such self-reflection on method remains "extremely very" rare: there appears to be no significant body of thought on

9 Of course, methodology is the study into the epistemology underlying a body of method and the determining what constitutes meaningful data (i.e., phenomenology or positivism), while method is the specific intellectual tool(s) employed to organize the data required by the method selected (i.e., statistical method, or the method of gendering). The collapse of the terminology of methodology into a monolithic, but, naive, positivism in modern American academic thought.
method in Middle East studies, beyond the debate on Orientalism **stated initiated** by Edward Said. Interestingly, one large body of criticism of the general failure to separate Western ideologies and discourse on the Middle East was that voiced by Middle Eastern women, and especially Muslim women, at the NGO Forum in Beijing.

By contrast, Simon Ford’s manifesto of his Movement for Avant-Garde Librarianship, “The Disorder of Things; Art Libraries, Postmodernism and Hypermedia” in Afterimage (1994) [Record 20104], makes clear why such Post-Modernism has produced little clarity into the discourse of Middle Eastern studies, in a manner more convincing than any criticism of Post-Modernism ever could. His radical statement of post-Modernism would simply abolish books and even history, arguing, for example, that his personal history of ancient Egypt in which he is Pharaoh is more valid than any more traditional historical approach to Ancient Egypt.  

Of course, it may just be the prejudice of a bibliographer arguing that the basis of the study of the Middle East lies in reading and building its literature, rather than, as Simon Ford argues, in burning those books and turning its libraries into museums-of-the-book as an obsolete artifact. But it was for just this purpose of making this vast and growing literature available that this two-volume bibliography, Women in the Near East & North Africa was produced: to make this literature more accessible.

10 Simon Ford was not in fact Pharaoh.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

General

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General-Middle East and North Africa

10000. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 1: Preface. New York: Amnesty International, August 1995. Women in the Middle East are speaking out for their rights. They are also joining human rights groups in growing numbers, determined to make the world a safer place for all humanity. In countries such as Algeria, Israel and Tunisia, women play a leading role in Amnesty International's groups. Their work is dedicated to campaigning against human rights violations in countries outside their own. They have participated in International campaigns to protect people they have never met, nor are ever likely to meet, in countries as far apart as the USA and China. They have joined thousands of other women and men in writing to governments of every political persuasion in all regions of the world on behalf of individual victims of human rights violations. They have sent appeals to armed opposition groups urging them to respect the basic principles of humanitarian law. They have also worked to raise awareness about human rights in general inside their own countries. Amnesty International members and groups always operate openly and within the law, and keep the authorities informed of their peaceful activities. Despite this, in several Middle Eastern countries they have been refused permission to organize and in others they have been facing increasing harassment and restrictions on their activities.

Humankind is precious and every person is entitled to basic human rights. These rights are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many international human rights instruments. Rights are a human necessity and a fundamental property of every human being. Every person has the right to seek and enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, and the right to social security in old age, sickness, and in case of disability, invalidity and unemployment.

Women in the region are organizing in many other ways to defend human and women's rights. Widad Hilwani is typical of many women who have been propelled into activity by personal tragedy. After her husband 'Adnan "disappeared", she helped to establish an organization in Lebanon to search for the thousands of women and men who went missing during the 1975 to 1990 civil war. She testifies: "When 'Adnan was kidnapped, I couldn't believe it... I told all the military authorities... I kept being told he'd be back at any moment... Two weeks passed and 'Adnan didn't return. While looking for 'Adnan, I'd ask if there were others in a similar situation... I don't know how, I became involved with all the families of the kidnapped. The kidnapped list kept getting longer and longer: two or three new cases a day. I thought of getting all the families together. Many came. We set up a committee and we lobbied on a large scale."

In Israel and the Occupied Territories, Palestinian and Israeli women have organized to campaign for the release of political prisoners and administrative detainees and to protest against human rights violations. Many of the most active groups have been founded by women whose relatives— female and male—have suffered political imprisonment or have "disappeared". Maysun al-Wahaydi set up the Committee of Mothers in Solidarity with Political Prisoners after her daughter, 'Abir al-Wahaydi, was held as a political prisoner (see infra). Another woman, Suha al-Barghouti, founded the Committee to End Administrative Detention after her husband, Ahmed Qatamesh, was administratively detained.

In Morocco, too, women relatives of political prisoners helped establish the Association of the Families of the "Disappeared", Political Prisoners, Martyrs and Exiles. The Association subsequently expanded its work to carry out activities on a range of human rights violations.

In Egypt, Dr Susan Fayad runs the El Nadim Centre for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence. The Centre, which was founded in Cairo in 1993, helps women, men and children who are victims of torture, including rape, domestic violence and child battering. Another woman, Dr 'Aide Saif al-Dawla, heads the New Woman Research Centre, which deals with violence against women, rape and other women's issues. Both organizations campaign for the banning of female genital mutilation in Egypt.

In Tunisia, a group of women signed a petition in June 1994 calling on the authorities to respect freedom of expression; several were subsequently questioned by the police and asked to deny that they had signed the petition. In 1995 women human rights activists in the Democratic Women's Association wrote to the Minister of Justice asking him to ensure the fair application of the law for this they later faced prosecution for defamation. The case is still pending.

In Sudan, women regularly stage protests, carrying placards and photographs of relatives who were executed in April 1990 within a day of being arrested on suspicion of attempting a coup. In Algeria, Bahrain and Iraq/Kurdistan, women have taken to the streets to demonstrate for political prisoners. Women are also resisting the discrimination and violence they suffer in their everyday lives. In early 1994 Palestinian women in Kfar village in Galilee set up a shelter for victims of domestic violence—an abuse which devastates the lives of millions of women across every continent, culture and class. The Kfar village shelter was the first of its kind for Arab women in the Middle East. Sahar Dawud, the woman who runs the shelter, said: "In the past Arab women were reluctant to take such drastic steps; today, they have started to understand that they don't have to put up with violence. It's a process of education about rights."

This report calls on governments and armed political groups in the Middle East to listen to the voices of women—voices that are too often silenced by repression and discrimination. It urges them to ensure that women can continue their peaceful activities without fear of intimidation, attack or prosecution. [Caption: 1] A protest organized in 1993 by relatives of Moroccan prisoners of conscience. From left to right: the sister and mother of Mohcen al-Khatib; the mother of Omar Boudaoui; the mother of Abdelhaq Chbada (who died during a hunger-strike in August 1989); and the wife of Said Tabali. (2) The sister and niece of Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd al-Moneim Hassan Al Karrar, one of 26 officers summarily executed in Sudan on 4/24/1990. Despite persistent harassment, the families continue to protest against the executions.][= 10001. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 2: Introduction. New York: Amnesty International,August 1995. Women's human rights are under attack across the Middle East, as they are in every other region of the world. In the violence of wars and conflicts, women are killed, taken hostage, raped and driven from their homes. In peace, they are imprisoned and tortured for opposing the government or simply for being related to political activists. Several of the region's governments openly flout the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which calls for "the universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human persons". Most violate the International human rights treaties under which they are obliged to protect the fundamental rights of all their citizens, and many have refused to ratify relevant International instruments. Despite their International obligations, the region's governments violate human rights with impunity on the grounds that they are protecting national security or have to combat "terrorist" threats—but these can never justify practices such as torture, extrajudicial executions and "disappearances". And when it comes to women's human rights, several governments take a particularly restrictive view, in contravention of the commitment made by governments at the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights that "...the human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights".

For the women whose fundamental rights are being violated, the excuses governments make are nothing but an insult. The women in Syria who are on trial simply for belonging to a political party have had their basic human rights violated—whether or not the Syrian Government has effectively outlawed that party. The unarmed Palestinian women and children shot dead by Israeli security forces have been denied their basic right to life—whether or not the Israeli government believed that national security was under threat. The Saudi Arabian women detained for driving cars have had their basic human rights violated—whether or not the Saudi Arabian government believes such a punishment is necessary to maintain social order. Women's human rights are not only applicable in all contexts and situations. They are also indivisible. The women in Tunisia who are arbitrarily detained without charge, the women in Iran who are tortured, the women in Algeria who are victims of deliberate and arbitrary killings, the women in..."
Iraqi women who are made to “disappear”, the Bahraini women who are forcibly exiled—all these women have no chance of exercising their social, economic and cultural rights. Without respect for women’s fundamental rights, women’s rights to equality, development and peace—the themes of the Fourth UN World Conference on Women to be held in China in September 1995—are also unattainable.

This report covers 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa and presents a series of reports on women in different parts of the world. Amnesty International takes no position on any of the conflicts mentioned, nor on the types of government or legal systems in place. Amnesty International’s sole concern is with specific human rights, which its one million plus members in all regions of the world, including the Middle East, campaign to defend and promote. In particular, Amnesty International believes that no one should be imprisoned as a prisoner of conscience [Amnesty International considers anyone detained for their beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, sex, color or language to be a prisoner of conscience, provided they have not used or advocated violence.] and that no political prisoner should be imprisoned without a prompt and fair trial. Amnesty International also takes action to oppose torture, the death penalty, extrajudicial executions and “disappearances.” Alongside such work, the organization opposes human rights abuses committed by armed political groups, including deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians, torture and hostage-taking.

This report shows that whenever there is conflict, either across borders or within countries, women figure largely among the victims, although their suffering often remains hidden. They are killed in reprisal assaults and other deliberate attacks on non-combatants. They are raped and sexually abused by armed men intent on terrorizing civilian populations or in situations of lawlessness. They face hardship and deprivation as they struggle to support their families, while male relatives having been killed or made to “disappear”. They are forced to make arduous journeys as refugees, often risking abuse on their way or in the refugee camps. In recent years the Middle East has been beset by conflict, often accompanied by widespread human rights violations. Between 1980 and 1988 up to a million people are estimated to have died in the war between Iran and Iraq. In 1990 and 1991 there were thousands of casualties in the Gulf following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The region has also been riven by other prolonged conflicts. Israel and the Palestinians; Morocco and the Sahrawis; the 1975-1990 civil war in Lebanon; and fierce internal wars in Sudan. Elsewhere, in countries such as Algeria and Iraq, there are continuing conflicts between government forces and armed opposition groups.

This report also shows that women in the Middle East are not passive victims of violence and injustice. They are organizing to defend their rights, to protest against violations and to campaign for justice, equality and freedom. Often they are persecuted by both government and armed political groups precisely because they are standing up for their rights. Women activists are subjected to violations such as rape and threats of sexual abuse to which they are particularly vulnerable, as well as other serious human rights violations. Moreover, in several countries they face detention as prisoners of conscience, torture and harassment simply for being related to male activists wanted by the authorities. The human rights violations suffered by women in conflict and peace occur in the context of legalized discrimination against women, including criminal penalties for exercising the full range of their civil and political rights. In many parts of the Middle East, women’s participation in public life is severely limited. Along with men, their rights to freedom of association and expression are curtailed, but the additional discrimination they face means that they are even less able than men to take an active part in determining how their societies are run. Even in the countries where they are allowed into the offices of power, they are grossly underrepresented. Some governments in the Middle East have said they will put women’s rights on their agenda, but nowhere in the region have women been accorded the full rights and protection that they are entitled to under international law.

During the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the exiled Kuwaiti royal family promised to grant full political rights to both women and men if they were resumed to power. Women were praised for risking their lives by joining the Kuwaiti resistance and feeding and hiding male members of the resistance. But when the Iraqi forces were expelled, the Kuwaiti royal family proved reluctant to honour their promises, and even when it did introduce democratic reforms, only some men benefited. The reaction of many Kuwaiti women was summed up by Professor Laila al-Qadhi, a women’s rights activist and teacher: “It’s outrageous in today’s world that we are denied our rights. When the Iraqis came they did not discriminate by occupying only male Kuwait; they took all of Kuwait; all of Kuwait suffered.”

In Tunisia, where the government publicly commits itself to promoting and defending women’s and human rights, women activists and relatives of political opponents have had their human rights persistently violated. In March 1995 the government prevented a celebration of International Women’s Day which had been jointly organized by the Tunisian Section of Amnesty International and the Tunisian Women’s Democratic Association. The following pages highlight the tragic consequences for women when their fundamental human rights are devalued, ignored and violated. [Caption: (1) An Israeli border policeman strikes a Palestinian woman taking part in a demonstration in East Jerusalem to mark International Women’s Day in 1994. (2) Kuwaiti women demonstrating in 1992 for the political rights they were promised by the Kuwaiti royal family and then denied.] [Sidebar: “To all who are concerned about Mansour, to all who know Mansour’s fate, to all who wish for the freedom of Mansour, and to all those, like Mansour, whose fate is unknown: From me, and from all mothers whose hearts are filled with pain...we say: season’s greetings to you all... Eighteen months have passed since our loved one was taken away from us—18 months of grief, of endurance, of hope, and of anger. ‘Eid is coming all of you who are concerned about Mansour’s case. Where is Mansour—and the thousands like him?... Help us. Return our loved ones to us.” – Mrs Baha’ Mansour al-KikhIya, writing an appeal on behalf of her husband, Mansour, and others who have “disappeared”, on the occasion of the Muslim festival ‘Eid al-Adha. Mansour KikhIya, a former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and opposition activist, “disappeared” while attending a human rights conference in Cairo in 12/1993. There are fears that he may have been abducted by Libyan government agents and returned to Libya.] [ ]

10002. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 3: Women and Conflict. New York: Amnesty International, August 1995. The mutilated body of Asrar Qabandi was dumped outside her family’s home in Kuwait by Iraqi soldiers. She had been interrogated for weeks about her work for the Kuwaiti resistance and tortured in front of her father. She was just one of many women who suffered almost every known human rights violation during the Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991, a conflict which still dominates many women’s lives as they struggle to cope without their husbands or search for missing relatives. Hundreds of unarmed civilians, including women, were deliberately killed in Kuwait when Iraqi troops invaded the country. Children were shot in the head at close range by Iraqi soldiers and their bodies dumped outside their houses for their mothers to find. Many women were sexually abused; in particular, foreign domestic servants were raped by Iraqi soldiers. Hundreds of Kuwaitis and other nationals who were transferred to Iraq during the occupation remain unaccounted for. Some are believed to be still held, but there are fears that others died as a result of torture or were executed. Among those still missing are Wasiymiya Fahd Shuwaireb al’Ajmi, now aged 33, and Mansour al-KikhIya, a former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and opposition activist, “disappeared” while attending a human rights conference in Cairo in 12/1993. There are fears that he may have been abducted by Libyan government agents and returned to Libya.
The killing of an estimated 5000 civilians by chemical weapons in the More than 300 civilian women are reported to have been killed by armed Muslims, and Christians—as well as members of prohibited political between government forces and armed groups continues to claim an sign of resistance. The victims included people from a wide variety of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had made major gains in the first round, "disappeared" during the 1980s as the authorities clamped down on any the cancellation of the second round of multi-party elections after the conflict erupted in early 1992. While many of them died in armed operations; some have been taken as concubines or sold into Popular Defence Force (PDF), a government-created militia, during military operations to forcibly resettle civilians in so-called peace villages. A former security official who witnessed assaults on Nuba villages in 7-8/1992 described the government's tactics when clearing villages: "...ground troops entered the villages, shooting indiscriminately and killing hundreds of civilians... Many women were raped by the soldiers... The people were loaded on to trucks each of which could transport about 80 persons. Many had to walk to Kadugli under army guard. The dead bodies were left behind as prey for the animals." Because of the shame attached to rape, few of the victims have talked openly about their experiences. One who did, a woman from the Moro Hills who was raped by soldiers in Kadugli in 10/1992, said: "I was taken on the way home by soldiers and tied down. I was... taken to the barracks. I refused them... Once I was tied up they did a lot of things to me." Women have met a similar fate in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, particularly when troops have been driving people away from the railway line linking north and south Sudan. Women and girls have been abducted by members of the Popular Defence Force (PDF), a government-created militia, during such operations; some have been taken as concubines or sold into domestic slavery. Among those still missing is Apui Majok, aged 12, who was abducted in 1993. Women have also suffered gross abuses as a result of fighting between armed opposition groups. For example, in 10-11/1991 many women were killed, raped or abducted when SPLA-Nasir forces briefly took over land controlled by SPLA-Mainstream in Upper Nile. In 3/1993 SPLA-Mainstream troops attacked the village of Pagau in retaliation; 32 women were lined up and shot in the head. Their only "crime" was to be of Nuer origin and therefore suspected of loyalty to the SPLA-Nasir faction.

In Algeria over 40000 people are reported to have been killed since conflict erupted in early 1992. While many of them died in armed clashes, thousands of civilians are reported to have been extrajudicially executed by the security forces or deliberately killed by armed groups defining themselves as Islamic groups. The violence erupted following the cancellation of the second round of multi-party elections after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had made major gains in the first round, and since 2/1992 a state of emergency has been imposed. The conflict between government forces and armed groups continues to claim an increasing number of civilian lives; during 1994 and early 1995 the number of violent attacks on unarmed civilians by both sides escalated. More than 300 civilian women are reported to have been killed by armed groups since the beginning of 1992. Civilian women are also reported to have been killed and injured by the security forces during raids and at
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check-points. Tens of thousands of women have been widowed as a result of killings by the security forces and by armed groups; others continue to search for their relatives who “disappeared” after arrest. The conflict in Algeria has again seen the use of rape as a weapon of terror. Because of trauma and the social stigma associated with this form of torture, women are often reluctant to report rapes. In Algeria, this reluctance, combined with the absence of independent human rights monitoring, makes it difficult to assess the scale of the problem. However, reports of abductions and rape by groups of armed men, particularly in rural areas, have been increasing. Some women are reported to have been held prisoner and used as forced domestic labour. The victims and their families are often threatened with further abuse if they speak of their experiences. Many have fled their homes fearing further attack; some have been ostracized by their families. Algerian women have also been the victims of widespread campaigns of terror by armed groups calling themselves “Islamic groups”. Professional groups—such as teachers, journalists, magistrates and civil servants—have been targeted, as have students and relatives of the security forces. Death threats have been posted up in public places and sent to individuals’ homes. The sources of the threats are not always clear; the effect, however, is. They have created a climate of fear in which many women are terrorized. Rachida Hammadi, a 32-year-old journalist working for the national television station, and her 36-year-old sister, Hourria, were shot by gunmen on 3/21/1995 on their way to work in Algiers. Hourria was killed on the spot and Rachida died from the wounds some weeks later. Rachida Hammadi was one of 40 journalists killed since 5/1993 in attacks reported to have been carried out by armed groups calling themselves “Islamic groups”.

Groups defining themselves as Islamic groups have increasingly abused women in Algeria for not covering their hair, for going to beaches or for travelling on public transport because male and female passengers are not segregated. Kala Bengana, a 17-year-old student, was shot dead in Bilda in 2/1994, reportedly after receiving threats that she would be killed if she did not wear the hijab (Islamic veil). After her death an anti-Islamist group, the Organization of Young Free Algerians, issued a statement saying that for every woman not wearing the veil who was attacked, they would kill 20 veiled women. Soon after, on 29 March, two young women students wearing the veil were shot dead at a bus stop near their school. Armed groups defining themselves as Islamic continue to carry out attacks on women, including the murder of two girls and a man, who were killed by a suicide car bomber. Hamas described the attack as “legitimate retaliation” for the killing of Palestinians by an Israeli settler in Hebron two months earlier. In yet to mount an adequate investigation into her death.

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Among the Palestinian girls who have been killed was 11-year-old Rana Abu Tuyur. On 12/19/1992 she was sent out by her mother to buy milk as a long curfew had just been lifted. She came across soldiers who were trying to stop a group of stone-throwing youths who were some 500 metres away. She was on the other side of the road to the soldiers, between 50-100 metres away. Witnesses say the soldiers fired at her across the road, killing her. The scale of the soldiers fired and hit Rana Abu Tuyur in the chest. She died before reaching hospital. An official investigation found that two soldiers had deviated from the rules of engagement, but found no connection between the shots fired and Rana Abu Tuyur’s death. However, details of the methods and results of this investigation have not been made public, contrary to international standards.

Women have suffered other human rights violations at the hands of the Israeli authorities during the intifada. For example, many have been made homeless since mid-1992 as a result of a policy of house destruction. Typically, houses in which the Israeli authorities believe suspects may be hiding are surrounded and their inhabitants ordered out and held in nearby houses. The houses are then attacked with heavy fire, including machine-gun fire, grenades and anti-tank missiles. Afterwards, soldiers enter the houses, firing at any place where survivors may have been hiding. In many cases, soldiers blow up the houses with explosives, suggesting that one of the aims, if not the main aim of these operations, is to impose a form of collective punishment on the occupants. In one such operation in Hebron in 3/1994, a pregnant woman was killed in disputed circumstances.

The Israeli authorities denied that these operations were a form of collective punishment, claiming that they were designed to protect their forces from surprise attacks by people inside the houses. They also denied that houses were blown up after soldiers had entered them. However, the authorities have never clarified evidence provided by military experts that the houses were indeed blown up from the inside.

The Israeli authorities have also destroyed the houses of Palestinians who have participated in attacks against Israeli civilians, rendering their families homeless. In November 1994 the house of the family of Salah ‘Abd al-Rahim Nazzal, who was responsible for a bus bomb in Tel Aviv which killed 23 people, including himself, was demolished after the family’s appeal to the High Court of Justice against the demolition order had been rejected. Such collective punishment violating fundamental principles of international law.

Women have also suffered at the hands of Palestinian armed opposition groups. Unarmed civilian women have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed by such groups. Many attacks in recent years have been carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, which continues to oppose the peace process. For example, in 4/1994, four women, two girls and a man were killed by a suicide car bomber. Hamas described the attack as “legitimate retaliation” for the killing of Palestinians by an Israeli settler in Hebron two months earlier. In 10/1994 women were among 23 people killed in a suicide bomb attack on a bus in the centre of Tel Aviv carried out by Hamas.

The wider Arab-Israeli conflict has also threatened the physical integrity of many other civilians, including women and children. In 7/1993 a week long confrontation in south Lebanon and northern Israel between Israeli forces and Hizbullah, a Lebanese armed group fighting against Israel’s continuing occupation of a strip of south Lebanon, led to thousands of civilians in both countries having to flee their homes for safety. Israeli forces carried out a widespread bombardment of villages and Palestinian refugee camps in south Lebanon. Israeli officials stated that the bombardment was deliberately aimed at forcing the civilian population to flee the area and at putting pressure on the Lebanese Government to prevent Hizbullah from carrying out attacks against Israel. Radio broadcasts warned village residents to leave or risk death. Over 200,000 people fled northwards, and over 130 people, including civilians, were killed. During the same period, Hizbullah launched over 270 Katyusha rockets against northern Israel and the “security zone”, killing two civilians and forcing tens of thousands of others to leave their homes to seek safety. Deliberate targeting of civilians by anyone can
never be justified.

In Morocco, the government has used a system of secret detention to punish its political opponents, particularly supporters of the pro-independence movement in Western Sahara. Several hundred women, men and children from the south of Morocco and the Western Sahara have “disappeared” since 1975. They were reportedly arrested by Moroccan security forces and later imprisoned in secret jails. In several cases, whole families “disappeared”. Almost all the victims were suspected of sympathizing with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, more generally known as the Polisario Front. For example, five women were arrested by Moroccan security forces on 3/3/1985 during a wave of arrests in Laayoune. Among them was 40-year-old Saïka ment Najem oudar Oulmah. Police came to her house in the morning, broke down the door and arrested her on suspicion of distributing leaflets in support of the Polisario Front. She has never been seen again. Her children were left to fend for themselves. Magboula ment Boucharaya oud Mohamed Yadhif “disappeared” four years earlier. Security officers raided her house in Laayoune in the middle of the night in 1/1981. They searched the premises but found nothing. Nevertheless, they took Magboula ment Boucharaya away in a police van. For two months her family was able to take food and clean clothes to her in Laayoune prison. Then they were suddenly forbidden to do so, although no reason was given. They have heard nothing of Magboula ment Boucharaya since then. In 1991 more than 300 women and men who had “disappeared” for up to 16 years were released during a worldwide campaign against human rights violations in Morocco. Nevertheless, hundreds of people reported to have “disappeared” since the 1960s remain unaccounted for. The government denies any knowledge of them, just as it had for years denied knowledge of the 300-plus “disappeared” who were released in 1991.

10003. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 4: Women Activists. New York: Amnesty International, August 1995. In the Gulf state of Bahrain, women have increasingly been participating in “pro-democracy” demonstrations, calling on the government to reconvene the National Assembly, which was dissolved by Amiri decree in 1975, and to respect the country’s 1973 Constitution. They have also been protesting against the government’s handing response of the authorities and demanding the release of political detainees. As a result, they are finding out what the inside of Bahrain’s jails look like and some have reportedly been beaten or otherwise ill-treated by security officials. One woman, who joined a protest by women outside the Ministry of Justice building in 2/1995, described how the protesters were treated that day: “We were about 20 women coiling for our relatives to be released. The whole area was surrounded by police. They ordered us to leave the area but we refused. I was beaten and carried by six policemen and forced into a jeep, but I managed to jump out again. One woman had her clothes torn and her chest was exposed. Another woman was pregnant. They humiliated and insulted us.” Some Bahraini women have been singled out for arrest either because of their activities or because they are related to male activists. Zahra Salman Hilal and a 12-year-old girl, Ayat ‘Abd al-Jabber Salman, were rounded up in mass arrests in early 4/1995 and taken to the Juveniles Prison in Madinat ‘Issa. A few days later Zahra Salman Hilal went on hunger strike to demand the right to see her husband, who had been detained since 1/1995. She remained in prison without charge or trial until 29 May. Ayat ‘Abd al-Jabber Salman was released in mid-April. On 6 April 1995, several security forces surrounded the home of ‘Abd al-Amir Mansur al-Jamri, a prominent Shia Muslim religious scholar and member of the former National Assembly, in the village of Bani Jamra. He and 18 members of his family were placed under house arrest without charge, including his wife, Zahra Yusuf, three daughters, three sons and other young children. All were denied access to the outside world and had their telephone lines disconnected. On 15 April Shaikh ‘Abd al-Amir al-Jamri was transferred to an undisclosed location. There was no information on his fate or whereabouts until 9 May, when he was taken to al-Qa’a Prison in al-Manama. There, one of his daughters, ‘Afat, was brought to see him, allegedly in order to tell him that he would be sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. While in the prison, ‘Afat al-Jamri was reportedly beaten by women police officers. She was taken into custody herself later that day and remained held at a detention facility in Madinat ‘Issa until her release on 5 June. She is 31 years old and has two young children. Her father, Sheikh al-Jamri, remains held without charge or trial.

In Tunisia in the past few years, hundreds of women have been detained without charge or trial, harassed and ill-treated. Scores of them have been tortured, sexually abused and threatened with rape in the Ministry of the Interior and in police stations. Dozens have been detained as prisoners of conscience for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, and many have been imprisoned after unfair trials. Some of the women cited in this report cannot be named for fear of further endangering their well-being and that of their families. Most have been targeted because of suspected links with al-Nahda, an unauthorized Islamist movement. However, other political activists have also been subjected to human rights violations.

A woman who was five months pregnant was arrested at her home in Gabes on 11/6/1992 and accused of carrying out political activities on behalf of the Tunisian Workers’ Communist Party (PCOT). Police said that while she was incommunicado detention in Gabes police station, she was partially undressed, beaten with sticks and threatened with rape and further violence if she did not talk about her political activities. One of the policemen reportedly told her: “We’ll bring out what you have in your womb.” She was forced to sign a police statement without knowing its contents. The next day she felt ill and seemed in danger of miscarriage, and was released. A few days later she was rearrested and interrogated while lying on the floor as she was too ill to stand up. On 11/18/1992 she was tried and sentenced to four months imprisonment for belonging to an unauthorized organization and collecting money without permission. Her lawyer requested a medical examination and an investigation into her allegations of ill-treatment, but these were denied. Although she was granted bail pending appeal, she continued to be detained until 1/11/1993, when the appeal took place. Her sentence was upheld, but she was released the following day by presidential pardon. No investigation was carried out by the authorities into the allegations of ill-treatment and those who ill-treated her were not brought to justice.

Women activists in Iraqi Kurdistan have continued to suffer gross violations of their rights since the area came under the control of Kurdish political parties in 10/1991. Some have been detained without charge or trial and subjected to torture and ill-treatment. During a demonstration in the city of Arbil in 8/1992 against the Turkish military bombardment of a Kurdish town in southeastern Turkey, Kurdish security forces shot into the peaceful crowd to disperse the protesters. Among the dead was the six-year-old daughter of Laila Ali Musa, who was herself held as a political prisoner. In prison, she told Amnesty International: “When the shooting started I was immediately hit. Then my daughter Kurdistan was killed as a bullet shot through her head... After the shooting they arrested a group of us and took us inside the Asayish [security forces] building.
They tortured me for about one and a half hours in one of the offices. They beat me on the bullet wound and on my back with a hosepipe."

Another woman, Paymam Sulaiman Hamid, who was also arrested after the demonstration, told Amnesty International: "They tied my hands behind my back and then suspended me from a height against the wall. I was beaten with a hosepipe. The torture lasted for about one and a half hours. I fainted three times and each time they poured water on me. They then burned me with cigarettes on my legs [scars on her legs were still visible at the time of the interview]. All the time I was blindfolded. Then they threatened to assault me sexually in front of my husband."

These two women, along with two other female and nine male detainees arrested at the same time, began a hunger-strike on 21/29/1992 demanding access to their families and a meeting with the investigating judge. This was granted on 12/1/1992 and on 11/11/1993 all were released without having been brought before a court. None of the security personnel involved in either the killing of the demonstrators or the torture of detainees has been brought to justice. None of the victims of torture or the families of those killed has been compensated.

In Iran, women who have peacefully opposed the government since the 1979 revolution have faced severe penalties. Several have been held as possible prisoners of conscience for many years in connection with their alleged activities for organizations such as the Tudeh Party and People's Fedaiyan Organization of Iran. Those suspected of political opposition in Iran are routinely tortured and ill-treated during interrogation. In 1988 thousands of political prisoners, many of whom were already serving prison sentences, were summarily executed. The mother of one of the victims wrote to Amnesty International; her experience mirrors that of many others. Her daughter was arrested in 1982 for alleged possession of leaflets issued by the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and tried by an Islamic Revolutionary Court. For six years the mother was able to visit her daughter regularly in Evin Prison in Tehran. In 8/1988 the visits were suddenly stopped. In 11/1988 she was informed that her daughter had been executed. She has never been told where her daughter's body is buried. To this day the authorities have failed to account for the thousands killed in 1988. One former female prisoner told Amnesty International: "We were aware of the massacre of the men prisoners [in 1988 and 1989] and assumed that the Mojahedin women prisoners had also been executed. We discussed this among ourselves... We could not see the future clearly. We thought at that time that we were in a world of death. There was no contact with the world of the living."

Women political activists in Syria have also been jailed for their peaceful opposition to the government. Doha 'Ashur al-'Askari, for instance, has been in prison since mid-1993. Her trial was still in progress at the end of 1994, but there has been no news of her since. She was arrested for suspected membership of the Party for Communist Lebanon. She had been living in hiding since 1986 when she found out she was wanted by the authorities. Her daughter Kamiya has known nothing but prison life; she was born in Duma Women's Prison in Damascus a few months after her mother was detained.

In Egypt, women have been detained without charge for peaceful protests. On 3/24/1995 Warda Mahmoud and Nawwara Nagm, students at Cairo University and 'Ain Shams University respectively, were among dozens of people arrested after they had peacefully protested against Israel's participation in the International Trade Fair being held in Cairo. The two women were held at al-Qanatir al-Khayria Prison until 3 April, when they were released without charge.

The Israeli authorities have jailed women suspected of opposing the Israeli occupation of West Bank and the Gaza Strip or of being members of illegal organizations. Some of them have been ill-treated. 'Abir al-Wahaydi, a 23-year-old engineering student at Bir Zeit University on the occupied West Bank, was arrested in 6/1992 on suspicion of being involved with activities organized by Fateh, the main faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and of planning to kill an Israeli settler. She was taken for interrogation to the General Security Service wing in Ramallah, where there are reportedly no separate facilities for women. Three days later she was transferred to Moscoobiyyah detention centre in Jerusalem. She testified in a written affidavit: "...I was taken to Moscoobiyyah for interrogation. They took me out to the courtyard on Friday after five days of no sleep with a sock on my head and my hands handcuffed. Above me there was a loudspeaker and it was very cold. I felt as if I would collapse from the sound coming out of the loudspeaker... The interrogation lasted for 14 days without letting me see a lawyer." Her interrogators repeatedly threatened her. She testified that they told her she would go mad and that they would kill her. They beat her with cigarettes on her legs [scars on her legs were still visible at the time of the interview]. All the time I was blindfolded. Then they threatened to assault me sexually in front of my husband."

After 17 days she was brought before a judge, having been forced to sign a statement that she alleged she had not read. For 52 days she was kept in solitary confinement and then transferred to Hasharon Prison. In 4/1994 she was sentenced to 17 years and four months' imprisonment. Two days after she was sentenced the Israeli authorities demolished her house. Her mother recounted: "They came in the morning... and said we should empty the house of all the people. They said someone who was wanted was in the house. We swore there was no one. They locked us into a room at our neighbor's... they started hitting the kids. At 12.30 they brought anti-tank rockets and started shooting the house with more than 16 rockets... The house was new. We'd saved for it for 26 years and only lived in it for 27 days. My daughter had never lived in it." The Israeli authorities told Amnesty International that they had investigated 'Abir al-Wahaydi's allegations of ill-treatment and found them to be false. They also said that when questioned about her treatment, she denied having any complaint. However, in the military court system in the Occupied Territories detainees are subjected to numerous improper pressures to plead guilty and enter a plea bargain. Defendants are reluctant to ask for an exclusion of their confessions if they were obtained under duress as their allegations of torture or ill-treatment are almost impossible to prove, and, if an application for such a ruling is unsuccessful, they are likely to receive substantially longer sentences.

Palestinian women have also reportedly suffered human rights violations in the areas under the jurisdiction of the newly established Palestinian Authority. Several have alleged that they were ill-treated in custody by Palestinian police officers. The new authorities have failed to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into their complaints.

In south Lebanon, at least seven women remain locked up in the Khiam detention centre, which was set up in 1985 by the South Lebanon Army (SLA) with Israeli's assistance and supervision. They are detained outside any legal framework and for years they had no access to the outside world; family visits were resumed in 1/1995 after a gap of eight years. All are believed to be Lebanese citizens; some are suspected of belonging to armed organizations opposing Israel and the SLA inside Lebanon; others may have been arrested to put pressure on their relatives. Among those held in Khiam is Suha Fawwaz Beshara, accused of trying to assassinate the commander of the SLA in 11/1988. She is reported to have been kept in solitary confinement almost continuously since her detention in late 1988. Like the other detainees in Khiam, she has never been charged or tried. Many detainees in Khiam have been tortured or ill-treated. Methods commonly reported include beatings all over the body, sometimes with an electric cable; electric shocks, often applied to the nipple; and threats, including of rape and sexual abuse.

In other parts of Lebanon, women activists have been gunned down while peacefully demonstrating or detained and ill-treated. In 9/1993 women were among nine people shot dead when the security forces opened fire on a peaceful demonstration protesting against the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. The authorities have never revealed the results of the investigation they said they had opened into these killings. In 9/1994, three women—Huda Yamin, Lina Ghurayeb and Muna Shkayban—were detained and charged with security offences before a military court for distributing leaflets opposing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. All were allegedly tortured or ill-treated while held in the Ministry of Defence and may have been prisoners of conscience. Amnesty International is not aware of any investigation into the allegations of torture or ill-treatment. The three women were released on...

Other women in the region have had their basic human rights violated for exercising their rights as trade unionists to peaceful association and expression. In Morocco, for example, Khadija Benamer was sentenced to a year in prison in 3/1995 for joining her fellow workers in a peaceful sit-in at her workplace in Sidi Slimane. They had been on strike since 2/21/1995 and the sit-in was staged to call for Morocco's Labor laws and International labor rights to be respected. In the course of the protest, police arrested Khadija Benamer, the Secretary General of her factory's branch of the Moroccan Labour Union, and five others. Three of them, including Khadija Benamer, were charged under Article 288 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which allows for the imprisonment of people who organize or participate in a concerted withdrawal of labour. All three alleged they were ill-treated in police custody; they reportedly still bore marks of bruising on their faces and hands when they appeared in court. Khadija Benamer was also found guilty of offending the person of the King. She was reportedly accused of having said that her employer should be saluted rather than the King. She denied the charge. On 27 April Khadija Benamer was released on bail pending an appeal, which was due to be heard on 5/30/1995, but was postponed. [6]

10004. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 5: Women at Risk: 'Guilty By Association'. New York: Amnesty International, August 1995. A 35-year-old Tunisian woman, the mother of three children, was repeatedly arrested, tortured and ill-treated in 1991 and 1992. She had committed no crime. She was not a political activist. But she was the wife of a prominent member of al-Nabda, an unauthorized Islamist movement, and that was enough for the security forces. “After my husband left Tunisia, I had to report three times a week to the Ministry of the Interior, where I would be held for several hours at a time, often for a whole day. They asked me about my husband’s whereabouts, but did not believe me when I said I did not know where he was, and threatened me. Once in 8/1992 they kept me for a whole day; they undressed me in front of several male policemen, two policewomen and my brother. Another male al-Nabda member detained there was brought in the room and I was told that they would make him rape me. They stubbed cigarettes on my genitals whilst two policemen held my hands and a policewoman held my face. They suspended me by the hands, beat me all over, and broke my right arm.” Most of the hundreds of women related to Islamist opposition political activists who have been arrested in Tunisia since 1990 have never been charged; they were interrogated solely about their husbands’ activities and whereabouts. Those who have been tried have mostly been charged with illegally collecting money for the families of imprisoned Islamist political activists, and belonging to an illegal association (al-Nabda). The harassment of such women began after the government launched a crackdown against al-Nabda in late 1990. As the repression intensified in 1991, many activists went into hiding and later fled the country. As a result, the security forces focused on their female relatives in order to crack down on them. Wives of detained or exiled Islamist political activists have been put under extreme pressure to give evidence against security forces. "After my husband left Tunisia, I had to report three times a week to the Ministry of the Interior, where I would be held for several hours at a time, often for a whole day. They asked me about my husband’s whereabouts, but did not believe me when I said I did not know where he was, and threatened me. Once in 8/1992 they kept me for a whole day; they undressed me in front of several male policemen, two policewomen and my brother. Another male al-Nabda member detained there was brought in the room and I was told that they would make him rape me. They stubbed cigarettes on my genitals whilst two policemen held my hands and a policewoman held my face. They suspended me by the hands, beat me all over, and broke my right arm.” Most of the hundreds of women related to Islamist opposition political activists who have been arrested in Tunisia since 1990 have never been charged; they were interrogated solely about their husbands’ activities and whereabouts. Those who have been tried have mostly been charged with illegally collecting money for the families of imprisoned Islamist political activists, and belonging to an illegal association (al-Nabda). The harassment of such women began after the government launched a crackdown against al-Nabda in late 1990. As the repression intensified in 1991, many activists went into hiding and later fled the country. As a result, the security forces focused on their female relatives in order to crack down on them. Wives of detained or exiled Islamist political activists have been put under extreme pressure to give evidence against their husbands. Their homes have been regularly visited, especially at night, by the security forces, who sometimes enter by force. Many say they were threatened, pushed or hit. Some were subsequently repeatedly taken in for questioning at police stations, often having no time to make arrangements for the care of their children. Most of these women say they were verbally abused and threatened, but not physically ill-treated, although scores testified that they were beaten, undressed, sexually abused and threatened with rape in detention.

Aicha Dhaouadi, a secondary school teacher from Bizerte and mother of a four-year-old girl, was arrested in 11/1993 and questioned for several days about the whereabouts and political activities of her husband, an exiled supporter of al-Nabda, and about her contacts with the families of imprisoned or exiled al-Nabda supporters. She was then released on bail. At the beginning of 1994 she was tried and sentenced with five other women to two years and three months imprisonment on charges of maintaining a political party and collecting donations, charges often used against women and men suspected of having helped the families of imprisoned or exiled al-Nabda supporters financially. She remained on bail and at the beginning of 1995 her sentence was reduced on appeal to nine months’ imprisonment. On 5/19/1995 she was taken into custody and imprisoned in Bizerte.

Wives of Islamist activists sought by the authorities in Egypt face similar treatment. Many Moroccan nationals have been arrested and detained as substitute prisoners or hostages to force their husbands to give themselves up. Again, they are rarely charged with any offence. They are simply used as pawns, their human rights flouted with impunity. One such case is that of Hana ‘All Farrag, a 17-year-old student, who was arrested at her home in Minya in 7/1990 and interrogated about the whereabouts of her brother, Sayyid, who was wanted by the Egyptian authorities: “They took me to the police station and put me in a room. Three of them asked me where my brother was hiding. It must have been around midnight and I kept telling them I didn’t know where he was. The head of the State Security Intelligence told the others to suspend me and they obeyed. I was swinging upside-down from a bar under my knees and they hit the soles of my feet with a thick wooden stick, and kept repeating the same questions ‘Did you take him food? Did you go and see him? Where is he hiding?’ Afterwards we submitted a formal complaint of my detention and treatment, but it has never been investigated. My brother Sayyid was not wanted in connection with any offence, it was just the usual detention.”

The pattern is repeated in Syria. Wafa Fahmi ‘Abidat has been missing since 11/1986. A fourth-year dentistry student at the University of Damascus, she was 28 when she “disappeared” after her arrest. She was not apparently involved in any political organizations or activities; it appears that she was arrested solely because of her brother, Hani ‘Abidat, who had been detained a month earlier for alleged membership of Abu Nidal’s Fateh-Revolutionary Council, a Palestinian armed group. Wafa ‘Abidat’s family have spent years searching for her, making inquiries at every possible office. So far, they have received not a word of information. Miyaasser Jamil ‘Abd al-Ilsawi “disappeared” after leaving her home in Damascus to visit her husband in prison on 9/3/1985. Ten years later, her family have still received no information about her fate or whereabouts. Her mother told Amnesty International: “I ask every human being who has blood and feelings, sight, taste, speech and a country—I ask them, I appeal to them—i, Daniez Jamil ‘Abd al-Ilsawi, I demand my right to know where my daughter is…”

In Algeria female relatives of members of the security forces have been targeted by armed groups defining themselves as Islamic groups. For example, on 3/10/1995 the Groupe islamique armé (GIA), Armed Islamic Group, issued a statement in which it threatened to kill women members of the security forces or relatives of members of the security forces unless the authorities released all Islamist women prisoners. In the following week, nine women, including relatives of members of the security forces, were reported to have been murdered by the GIA. Among the victims was 15-year old Fatima Ghodbane, who was abducted from her school in Oued Djer, near Blida, by a group of armed men who slit her throat outside the school. The mothers, wives and sisters of thousands of men arrested or killed by the Algerian security forces have been traumatized. Some have seen their male relatives killed before their eyes; others are still searching for their relatives.

Women relatives of suspected Bahraini dissidents have faced another form of human rights violation—forcible exile from their country. In the early 1980s former political detainees—primarily Shi’a Muslims suspected of having links with Iran —and entire families were rounded up, stripped of their Bahraini passports or identity documents, and forced to board boats bound for Iran. Most had no knowledge of Iran or its language and no known relatives to stay with. In some cases the Bahraini authorities gave them false documents stating that they had been born in Bahrain. In recent years Bahraini nationals attempting to return home from abroad have also been forcibly expelled. The victims include the wives and families of political prisoners who had fled Bahrain to avoid harassment. Some of these women and children have been detained for up to a week at Bahrain’s International airport before being
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forcibly expelled from Bahrain. No reasons for the expulsions or details of the legal basis for such measures are given, and there is no appeal procedure. As a result of these policies, several women and their families have been forced to travel around the region in search of temporary sanctuary. A few Bahraini women have been forcibly exiled because they themselves were suspected of opposition. Among them is Badita Hassan Yusuf, who is currently in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with her four children; she had been arrested in Bahrain in 1982 on suspicion of membership of a prohibited organization linked to Iran. [=]

10005. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human Rights Under Attack: Part 5: Women at Risk: Under Attack By Law. New York: Amnesty International, August 1995. In several Middle Eastern countries women face imprisonment, cruel punishments and even death under laws which discriminate against women in many areas of life. They can be prosecuted for the clothes they wear or for the clothes they do not wear. They can be condemned to brutal physical retribution for their sexual behaviour. They can even be locked up for driving a car. In Saudi Arabia, dozens of women staged a symbolic protest for women's rights when they defied a die-facto ban on women drivers by driving a convoy of cars along one of Riyadh's main streets in 11/1990. They were stopped by police who detained 49 of them without charge. They were not released until male members of their families had signed an undertaking that the women would not drive again. Many of the women lost their jobs as a result of the demonstration. A week after this protest, the Ministry of the Interior introduced legislation formally banning female drivers.

In Yemen women and men face sentences of flogging and stoning to death for sexual offences. Stoning to death, which is prescribed by Yemen's Islamic Penal Code for hudoud offences such as adultery, has been used to execute dozens of women since 1979. For example, Mina Kolvat, a married woman, was reportedly stoned to death in Evin Prison on 2/1/1994 for having an affair with her cousin and planning the murder of her husband. Her cousin was executed by hanging. Iranian law states that a woman should be buried up to her chest and specifies the types of stone that should be used. Article 104 of the Penal Code, which refers to adultery, gives some indication of the cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of this form of punishment: "In the punishment of stoning to death, the stones should not be too large so that the person dies on being hit by one or two of them; they should not be so small either that they could not be defined as stones." Scores of women have reportedly been flogged annually in Iran in recent years for various offences, although details have been almost impossible to obtain. Amnesty International has been denied access to Iran to research human rights violations since 1979. Stringent restrictions on freedom of association inside the country have prevented the creation of local independent human rights organizations which could take up such cases and the authorities do not publish information about these issues.

In the United Arab Emirates, too, the laws provide for cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments for certain offences against the moral code. However, practice varies between the different emirates and sentences are sometimes commuted or overturned. In 1994, for instance, a pregnant foreign national, who was tried and convicted of adultery, was reportedly sentenced to death by stoning. The Court of Appeal overturned the sentence, imposing instead a nine-month prison term and 100 lashes to be administered 45 days after she gave birth. In another case, a woman and man were sentenced in 2/1995 to flogging and imprisonment for adultery. It is not known if these sentences were carried out.

In Yemen, women imprisoned for offences against the moral code are kept in jail indefinitely if they have no male relatives to go to or if their relatives disown them because of their offences. By contrast men imprisoned for the same offences are invariably released on completion of their sentence. The government policy of keeping women in prison indefinitely if they do not have male relatives to receive them is based on the perception that such women, if released, would commit further such offences. Scores of women imprisoned for offences against the moral code are believed to be currently held in Yemeni jails, most of them years after expiry of their prison terms. Some of them are held with their children.

In several Middle Eastern countries the clothes that women wear—or do not wear—can result in them being harassed, dismissed from their jobs, arrested and even flogged. In some cases women may have infringed the dress code for conscientious reasons—a non-violent expression of their beliefs. In Iran women risk arrest and flogging if they fail to obey the dress laws: the law provides for 74 lashes for such offences. In 7/1993 the Human Rights Committee, the body of experts which monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a state party, noted with concern the "punishment and harassment of women who do not conform with a strict dress code" and recommended that active measures be taken to "enhance the status of women... and guarantee their equal rights and freedoms".

In Sudan women have been flogged for dressing in ways that infringe the military government's laws on public morality. A woman living in Omdurman was fined and sentenced to 35 lashes after being arrested in late 1991 because she was wearing trousers. She recalled: "I was stopped by the police who grabbed the whip and twisted it. Then two or three policemen grabbed me and tied my hands to my back. After I received 40 lashes ... I gave him a venomous look. He noticed and gave me another five lashes." Another woman, a student at Khartoum University, who was wearing a blouse and skirt, was stopped by a guard in 12/1993 and told to change her clothes. She refused and was punished by 25 lashes.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, the authorities have increasingly put pressure on women, especially students and those working in the public sector, to stop wearing the hijab as this is considered an indication that they belong to or sympathize with the illegal Islamist opposition movement. Many have been threatened with dismissal if they do not comply. A university student who was arrested three times in 1991 and 1992 was threatened with imprisonment if she did not stop wearing the hijab. She complied and was forced to sign at the police station three times a week until the end of 1994, when she left the country. Women wearing the hijab are also systematically stopped at prison gates and prevented from visiting relatives or leaving food for them.

[Caption: (1) Zahrâ' Habib Mansur al-Nasser, a 40-year-old housewife from the village of Awjam, Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia. She was arrested with her husband on 7/15/1989 at the checkpoint on the Saudi Arabian-Jordanian border. Police who searched them allegedly found a Shi'a prayer book and a photograph of the Ayatollah Khomeini. They were held in the Hudaitha check-point detention centre where Zahrâ' Habib Mansur al-Nasser reportedly died as a result of torture three days later.] [=]


[This study was conducted in 1983/84 with the assistance of a sabbatical leave from Wayne State University and a contract with the Arabic Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS) Dearborn, Michigan. The initial version of this was presented in MESA Annual Meetings, 11/1988. Some of the statistical figures have been presented in a lengthier article. (1991)]

It is often said that the married immigrant women in the Southend of Dearborn Michigan cannot get jobs because they do not have skills for an industrial society, including the knowledge of English. This is true to some extent, but they differ little from many of their husbands in this respect. The removal of production processes from the household has historically made it difficult for women to combine childbearing and
domestic functions with employment, both in some highly urbanized areas of non-industrialized cultures and even more so in many industrialized cultures particularly those with basically capitalist economies (O'Kelly and Carney 1986). In the "Southend" of Dearborn, the site of this research, the male dominated nature of the auto industry is also responsible, while two additional factors affect the current employment position of women who have migrated into this Muslim working-class community. The first factor is the belief that women's traditional mentality of their husbands with its associated emphasis upon female modesty which is reinforced by Islamic values. The second factor is the new acceptance of welfare brought about by the combined auto recession on the early 1980s, which resulted in up to 40% unemployment in the community and economic pressures brought by many new immigrants.

The Southend of Dearborn has been a depot for Lebanese, Yemeni and Palestinian Muslims. It was founded when the local Lebanese community in Highland Park which was working in Ford's first auto company, moved to this region when Ford did in the 1920s. The neighborhood was primarily Eastern European and Italian until the 1960s when more and more Arabs came to the area and the Europeans began to move out. It has always had the atmosphere of a primarily close community with a dozen coffee houses, a mosque, numerous stores and bakeries. It is a community where people live close to each other, share and know each other's business. It has had some stormy periods when the city was determined to destroy it (See Aswad, 1974), but it remains today as a lively center for immigrants and a home for up to three generations. The Southend community expanded north and most of the immigrants who were part of the growing influx from the wars in South Lebanon and Beirut entered the new sister community which now exhibits 56 Arab shops in 6 blocks of Warren Ave. (Aswad 1991 b). Many of these recent immigrants from Lebanon have skills and higher educations. They are not the subject of this paper. [=]

10007. Aswad, Barbara C. How the 'Rich Peasant Mentality' and Welfare Affect Immigrant Arab Women and Employment Patterns in Michigan: Part 02: Relevant Studies Abroad. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's Series. Working Paper 1. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-13, 1991. pp. 2-5. Of the many relevant studies of women and work, we can mention several. Abu-lughod writing 30 years ago about migration from rural Egyptian villages into Cairo found a decrease in many wives' functions including a reduced work load, reduced social life and confinement to the neighborhood. She contrasted this to their husbands, whose work typically took them outside the neighborhood and brought them into association with a variety of men (1961). Joseph (1978) and Dorsky (1968) have emphasized the importance of neighborhoods among working-class women in Lebanon and Yemen. Myntti found a similar process occurring in Yemen among migrants that moved from Yemeni villages to Yemeni towns (1984), and certainly these processes have occurred in Dearborn.

In the lower class communities in Cairo, Rugh found women's employment was degrading for their husbands and threatened their masculinity. A husband should provide for his family or his self image would be damaged (1985:279). She found work for women was judged by how protected the work place was, how public the display of family need is, the status of the work, how much was earned and how much it interfered with her homework (1985). Mohsen found that husbands of lower middle class Egyptian working women resented their work and blamed women for many social problems such as juvenile delinquency, and in fact placed more restrictions on these women (1985). In Middle Eastern cities, their are also more chances for piece meal and part time jobs such sewing and cooking in the home, selling, and jobs which might interfere with housework as much as full time jobs in industrial societies. Davis reports even more options in towns where agricultural work is also available (1985). Even working as a cleaning woman in more affluent homes, a commonly regulated job in America, and one Chesley found common among the Alevi in the geccekondus of Turkey (1988) is difficult in Dearborn due to distances, lack of transportation, language barriers and, as Rugh notes in Cairo, it subjects women to the control of another household and protection of women, is felt to be endangered and is discourage. (1985). At the same time as these results were first presented, Cinar also reported that one of the reasons for women to subcontract work in their Turkish homes was the lack of permission by husbands for work outside. (1988).

In the last 15 years, a number of studies of female Turkish workers in Europe have been made, however, most were guest workers who worked in factories where they had been peasant mentality of their husbands with its associated emphasis upon female modesty which is reinforced by Islamic values. The second factor is the new acceptance of welfare brought about by the combined auto recession on the early 1980s, which resulted in up to 40% unemployment in the community and economic pressures brought by many new immigrants. The Southend of Dearborn has been a depot for Lebanese, Yemeni and Palestinian Muslims. It was founded when the local Lebanese community in Highland Park which was working in Ford's first auto company, moved to this region when Ford did in the 1920s. The neighborhood was primarily Eastern European and Italian until the 1960s when more and more Arabs came to the area and the Europeans began to move out. It has always had the atmosphere of a primarily close community with a dozen coffee houses, a mosque, numerous stores and bakeries. It is a community where people live close to each other, share and know each other's business. It has had some stormy periods when the city was determined to destroy it (See Aswad, 1974), but it remains today as a lively center for immigrants and a home for up to three generations. The Southend community expanded north and most of the immigrants who were part of the growing influx from the wars in South Lebanon and Beirut entered the new sister community which now exhibits 56 Arab shops in 6 blocks of Warren Ave. (Aswad 1991 b). Many of these recent immigrants from Lebanon have skills and higher educations. They are not the subject of this paper. [=]
might be due to having fewer relatives around than in the village, although she seems to contradict herself since earlier she mentions that most Lebanese have many relatives in the community. She may be relating this to the decrease of relatives in the home itself. Allredge feels that the women have changed their attitudes towards daughters vis-à-vis sons, supporting daughters more, and uses the rather low percentage of 25% who wanted the same opportunities for daughters as sons to support her contention.

When we look at several studies of other early Arab immigrants to the US, we find that both Naff and Orfalea mention the employment and hard work of women in peddling, family stores and clothing factories in the East. Of course unlike auto industries, these factories primarily employed female laborers. (Naff 1985:175, 274-276; Orfalea 1988:76-79). Naff also reports cases of exploitation of daughters who sometimes gave up or delayed marriage and a family by working to help support or educate their brothers (1985:276). Doumato reports a case of a woman who had been indentured to owners of a New York garment factory at 12 years of age to pay for her passage, (1985:13). I am certain she wasn’t the only such girl.

The nature of the employment is very important. In the early Middle East, women often dominated some slash and burn societies, but as land became more restricted in their work, hired labor takes their place in the family. Women often dominated the family. Aswad (1971), and sometimes under dangerous conditions, since approximately 80 Chaldean shopkeepers have been shot during these years. They were constantly under the watch of male relatives. I feel that another factor affecting early Christian Lebanese women was their participation in the local silk industries in Lebanon. This was reported by Tannous (1954) and others. The Muslim communities in South Lebanon did not participate in this as much in Lebanon.

Thus, both Lebanese and Yemeni women came from villages with little employment history to a region of the male dominate auto industry. Cainkar’s recent study of Palestinian Muslim women in the Chicago area points to the important connection of political attitudes and women’s behavior, stressing that immigrant men didn’t want their wives to become too American or it would be considered disloyal. Outside employment was part of this consideration (1988). Likewise she found middle class women were more assimilated in relation to employment. In a study of Muslim values in America, Haddad and Lummis sampled different classes and occupations and found upper classes and the second generation more flexible about women working outside the home. (1985:108-110). [x]

10009. Aswad, Barbara C. How the ‘Rich Peasant Mentality’ and Women Affect Immigrant Arab Women’s Employment Patterns of Middle Eastern Women in Michigan: Part 5: The Rich Peasant Mentality and Its Relevance. G.E. von Grunebaum Center’s Series. Working Paper 1. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-13, 1991. pp. 8-13. Let us return to the concept of the rich peasant mentality, and why it occurred in the US. A rich peasant is generally defined as a peasant who manages a medium amount of land, has a surplus, and who does little physical labor himself on the land, and neither does his family members. Instead, he hires members of a poorer peasant category who have little land, or sharecroppers who have no land (Wolf 1968:290-1). Increasingly, they have begun to use machinery in the Middle East. (Esther Bosch felt that in a cooperative scheme, women often dominated some slash and burn societies, but as land pressure increased, the plough was introduced and ploughing becomes the first important male task in agriculture. Then, as the wealthy classes become more restricted in their work, hired labor takes their place in the fields. (1970).) They are often recognized in the West as kulaks, the Russian words for them. Endowed with a surplus, they serve as middlemen in the flow of trade and capital to poorer rural peasants in areas of peripheral capitalism such as Lebanon and Yemen (Dow 1973). This is also combined with political and often spiritual factions. Rich peasants generally have extended kin groupings, which they use in a generally corporate political and economic fashion. In the Middle East villages I found that they are more highly patrilineal, are more endogamous and have higher rates of polygamy and first cousin marriage on their fathers’ side than middle or poor peasants (Aswad 1971).

Middle peasants, on the other hand generally till their own plots with family labor, are more bilateral and less patrilineal, have smaller families, and less polygamy than rich peasants. An early study by Peters in a Lebanese Shia village demonstrates the more bilateral relations, that is relationships through both mothers and father’s descent groups, of middle peasants in marriage and landholding patterns (1963).

Poor peasants and sharecroppers with no land usually had nuclear families, are mobile and have no patrimony, have a very limited sense of partiality, virtually no polygamy and marry outside of their kin unit. Poor peasant and sharecropping families work primarily for richer peasants and large landowners, and their major alignment is to their patrons rather than extended kin.

Having lived in and studied a Muslim Arab village of rich peasants, I found that male attitudes towards agricultural and other manual labor is obviously to avoid it at all costs. I clearly remember one of our first conversations in which I asked them how many weeks they worked a year. At first they rather proudly said, “None.” When I protested that this was impossible, they thought and answered, “About 8.” My initial response was, “My God, these people will never give me a straight answer.” But as I sat there month after month and saw no male movement, I realized they were not lying. While they occasionally performed some political, managerial and curing functions, their estimate was not far off. They certainly did no manual labor, sometimes to their economic and certainly to their physical detriment. Many were overweight and there were numerous heart attacks among men in their forties. Leisure was definitely considered a reward.

Second only to their own delegation of labor for themselves, was their desire not to have their wives or daughters be seen in the fields laboring with men and for other persons. The symbolism of power and control over their women greatly affected men’s status and honor. Many times I was told that their wives “didn’t have to work”, even though, of course, the wives were working very hard processing food, washing clothes and caring for children. However, their definition of work meant employment for others outside the home. Women accepted this reduced labor requirement, and likewise looked down on agricultural work outside the home. A change did occur, however, when the boys went off to school in the cities, got urban jobs and often married urban girls, stranding their female cousins. Their sisters and cousins, not allowed to follow the same path, began to pick cotton with apprehension about their futures. Fathers were concerned, but as of last summer are still keeping them in the village and away from urban areas where the schools are.

Standards of morality vary according to the status of peasants. A striking example is revealed when a pregnant wife was murdered because her rich peasant husband suspected he was not the father, and this was accepted by the men of the patrilineage. At the same time a sharecropping father allowed his unwed pregnant daughter to have her baby, in the hope that a rich peasant, suspected of fathering the child, would marry her. In fact he did and the girl’s father got a job with his new son-in-law. Aligned with the pride of unemployed wives and daughters was the fact that women could have more time to produce and care for as many children as possible, for these status seekers used marriages and brideprices to cement power and economic alliances with as many men as possible. I have discussed this phenomenon elsewhere (Aswad 1971, 1981). Even though they have only one job rather than the two or poorer women, they were certainly secondary in terms of political activity to their husbands, and had less than Hegland reports among merchants’ wives in Iranian villages (1986). The middle peasants in the area emulated rich peasant behavior and if they obtained the wealth, as few did, they followed the rich peasant customs and morals. This rich peasant behavior, as we mentioned earlier is found cross-culturally and is associated with various ideologies.

I had another chance to observe a situation in which poorer peasants emulated middle and rich peasant styles when they were given land in a government reform project. They increased their number of
children, continued to put their children to work, but tried to restrict their wives work, and they tried to rent tractors and workers to reduce their own load. In that case, these strategies worked for only one generation, since they had many children, and no additional land from the government. They had individual plots, no economic corporations and acted as individuals undercutting each other rather than developing patrilineal corporate lineages. Most were soon back to their previous positions if not worse, with the exception of a few who had gotten access to credit as individuals and who were primarily responsible for the others’ demise. The successful few totallyimitated the rich peasants, and their wives did not work in the fields. (Aswad 1981).

How does it relate to our study? All the women in the survey moved into a working class community composed primarily of unskilled auto workers and their families. The vast majority came from middle peasant backgrounds. The husbands earned salaries unheard of in the villages of Yemen and Lebanon. The women have been hindered in gaining employment in the US and thereby hindered in gaining control over resources by the attitudes of the auto companies and their husbands. The men couldn’t initially adopt the leisure habits of the rich peasants for themselves due to the nature of their unskilled wage labor jobs, but they could attain the attitudes for their wives. Heads of patrilineages have, however, built political bases similar to those in the Middle East. It should be added that while individual wage labor jobs make patrilineal corporate kin units less viable than joint rural land ownership, urban shop ownership such as that of the Chaldeans is more amenable and we find some persons sitting leisurely in the suburbs when successful. The recent Lebanese immigrants on Warren Avenue have also opened shops and practically monopolize the gas stations in the region, but most have not acquired enough wealth to become leisurely.

Entrance into an alien culture also increased the emphasis upon Islamic modesty and female segregation, particularly since the host culture encourages dating and permit premartial intercourse as part of the process of mate selection. Traditional Islamic concerns over female virginity before marriage required more vigilance and may result in early arranged marriages with consequent retardation of educational opportunity for girls. This further limits employment opportunities and emancipation. The rise of traditional Islamic values in the Middle East has added to these attitudes. The increased religiosity in the community is due both to infusion of immigrants and as an expression of solidarity against the antagonism felt in the US and Dearborn against Arabs and Islam.[=]


The Yemeni women in the survey all came from villages and small towns and have no education, and no job experiences. They do not drive and seldom venture from the Southend. Only one is employed and she teaches English to the others. All are from middle peasant background or have been recently urbanized. The few rich peasants live in a middle class city of Southfield 15 miles away and feel rather isolated. Most Yemeni women have come only in the last 15 years, most are fairly young and have few family member here from 4-10 compared to the 40-200 which the Lebanese listed.

50% expressed a strong desire to work and had a strong desire to learn English to do so. None except the teacher has ever been to school, 50% said their husbands would be strongly opposed to their working anywhere. The other half said their husbands would not mind at all and would welcome the money. Very importantly, in this last group, of those who would welcome work, half were on welfare. 80% said their husbands would be strongly opposed to their working in local factories. They themselves weren’t too anxious to work there either. None had ever been to the bank and all said that their husbands controlled the money in the house. They felt they are losing control of their patrilineal assets in Yemen as well through migration. All said their husbands made the major decisions.

The effect of religion can be seen in the fact that the majority indicated that their husbands used religion and religious authorities to control them. Half of them described themselves as not religious at all and 40% as very religious. Few attended the local mosque because of the high illiteracy rate, few read the Koran. Although there is a small women’s group, they are not as active as Lebanese women in their mosques. Women do veil when they attend the mosque, but seldom do so in the community which they view as their village. In Yemen they veiled when they went to town, but do not do so here when they leave the Southend which is seldom. Their dress is that of the villages.

There is a great sense of boredom among these Yemeni women. With their jobs confined to household chores and raising children visiting, watching videos and TV, and their restriction to the Southend, there seems to be a need for activity. As Hatem mentions, mothering in the extended family in the Middle East is not the exclusive occupation for women. Rather, women combine various jobs such as processing food, sewing, poultry raising etc. Thus, exclusive and intensive mothering is an alien activity to working class families. (1988). For the Yemeni who live in nuclear families, as most do, their is a positive side however, they feel some freedom from kinship pressures. They said they miss their mother and sisters, but not their mother-in-law. The neighborhood has replaced their kin and they exchange many services and visits. See Joseph 1978, Donley 1986.

Most Yemeni men are not active politically in local Dearborn or American issues, rather they are primarily involved in politics relating in Yemen. (Abraham 1983). Likewise their women are less involved, and perhaps due to the fact that they have few relatives here, seem to be cut off from Yemeni village politics also. 50% said they weren’t concerned about Middle East politics but all said their husbands were and they expressed concern about their husband’s anxieties. Only 10% of the women belong to any local Arab American Group.

The fact that there are several hundred Arab women from the local community signed up for English courses given as the local community center, ACCESS, demonstrates several factors. 1) They want to improve their skills, 2) They want to get out of the house to relieve boredom 3) It is an activity their husbands consider legitimate and it is in the community. 4) As welfare recipients, they may take classes which improve their hirability as part of the workfare regulations.

What of their attitudes toward their daughters? 60% of the Yemeni said they would permit their daughter to work if she went in work with other women. They also want them to get a good education, but they are concerned about dating in the high schools, and a number discussed the possibility of sending their teenagers back to Yemen until they marry, especially their daughters. All Yemeni women want their children to marry Muslims and 90% want them to marry Yemeni. The situation presents a mother with a paradox. The fear of scandal, which Nazuzal has so well described (1986) is placed on the mother’s head, and pressures her to cut her daughter’s education and marry her at 14 or 15 years of age. Daughters resistance to this and other controls are one of the primary problems brought to the Family Counseling Center of ACCESS. Of the 60 major cases brought during the first year, 43% concerned mothers having problems with their daughters discipline, 36% of the problems were between mothers and sons, 17% were between fathers and sons, and 4% between fathers and daughter. This also reflects the fact that the major clients were women (80%).[=]
women's participation in employment, particularly in auto factories. It is stronger among the Yemeni than the Lebanese, less for women who work or have worked. Religious attitudes, dynamic and outspoken among the Yemeni, operate differently among the two communities, and are more limiting among the Yemeni.

Women's own attitudes show that the vast majority want to be employed, and would allow their daughters to be employed. Although they may not prefer factory work, some 20% of the Lebanese would allow their daughters to work at Ford. However, some women have experienced a need for more security for their daughters in an alien environment and may themselves limit their daughters potential by removing them from school, pressuring early marriages, or restricting their movement and opportunities for mobility and involvement by constant vigilance. There are numerous informal reports of girls and boys sneaking off in cars when they are supposed to be "in the library". Those who do enter a university, will be encouraged to attend a local university or college so they can live at home. At the university, the girls' brothers assume the surveillance duties, thus it is a place of limited freedom.

We also found that the current high unemployment rates have forced some men to accept welfare and their wives' employment in some form. Is welfare on the increase and what are the implications? Of the 1033 Arabs who visited the Family Counseling Center in 1986, 70% earned less than $10000 and 40% had some form of financial assistance. 188, nearly 20% of the clients were on ADC. In contrast, when Wasfi wrote in 1964, he found one person on AFDC in his sample. (1964). In my survey in 1971 of 200 randomly selected families, I found 13% of the general population, and thus there would seem to be a rise in this status. The reasons other than increased unemployment and the new influx of refugees can be attributed to the new access to the system through the community center staffed by Arabic speaking social workers and secretaries. There are numerous feminists among the younger generations.

Many women feel it is difficult to accept welfare. Two-thirds of the 40 in this study felt this way, and 45% of that group had husbands who were employed. On the other hand, all of the one-third who didn't feel shame had unemployed husbands, as we might expect. In relation to their husband's attitudes, close to 60% said the husband would find it hard to accept welfare and a third were unemployed. Of the other 40%, who felt their husbands do not have problems being on welfare, 83% are unemployed. Therefore, as one expects, among both male and female, more acceptance is found among the unemployed. One of the primary reasons given was the high cost of health insurance, which is paid for those on welfare.

What are the social changes accompanying this? Are we finding more female headed households? Is there a transfer of power over resources? Men in the community are frequently heard complaining that "America is a country for women". They indicated that welfare, custody and divorce favor women here. Although Michigan allows two parent households to receive welfare, it has traditionally been easier or more beneficial to get through separation or divorce, and establishing two residences. Since some may be also cheating, that is putting the wife on welfare while the man continues to work and in fact remains in a family unit, it is difficult to research, but the tentative questions may be drawn.

1. As with other ethnic groups, welfare is being used to supplement low income lives with the family remaining intact, and the money is often in fact still controlled by the husband.
2. It may discourage women from seeking employment. How a woman can contribute to the family income without leaving the area is an important factor affecting the shame of the husband.
3. It is being used to support widows.
4. It is encouraging women to learn English since in Michigan they must register for workfare, which involves either working, education or job retraining. English language classes are the option most satisfactory to the women and their husbands, partially because they are offered in the community. A new job retraining program offered through ACCESS may also involve increased numbers of women.
5. We found that when a husband is unemployed, he is more agreeable to women working and to welfare.[=]

10012. Aswad, Barbara C. How the 'Rich Peasant Mentality' and Welfare Affect Immigrant Arab Women and Employment Patterns in Michigan: Part 09: Conclusions. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's Series. Working Paper 1. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-13, 1991. pp. 21-22. We find that numerous issues operated against women's employment including lack of skills and education, fewer piecemeal or part time jobs than in the Middle East, the rich peasant mentality of husbands with it emphasis on increased female modesty and restricted environments, even though males were restricted in attaining rich peasant habits themselves; increasing Islamic values operating in host country which lacks promarital chastity values, restrictions and sometimes reduced educations placed by some of the mothers an daughters even though they accept concepts of employment and education for them; restrictions of the male dominant auto industry in contrast to family run business. Most women have also not accepted restrictions for themselves in relation to employment and paradoxically through high levels of unemployment and growing acceptance of welfare which provide language and job training programs, may suppress their husbands' marketable skill levels, a situation laying the basis for further gender change.

Differencesfoundbetween Lebanese and Yemeni attitudes are due to the background of immigrants, community and work experiences with the Lebanese presenting more liberal attitudes.[=]

10013. Awwad, Hanan. "Women's Literature in the Arab World", in Al-Fair Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), May 17, 1993. pp. 11, 15 Literary critics and readers alike question the slow growth of the Arab women's literary movement in comparison to that of men. Whereas some critics find a safe reasoning in the dominance of traditional and cultural values, others consider it purely a failure of gender responsibility, i.e., women alone are responsible for this perceived lack of progress.

Literature is art, an expression of natural talent, and has little to do with whether one is a man or woman.

The concept of "feminism," for example, is now part of our global dictionary, its meaning and interpretation both applauded and decried. In modern literary criticism, another relatively new concept has appeared: "so-called" women's or feminist literature. With many definitions and appearances in numerous critical reviews, this issue continues to attract controversy.

I use the term "so-called" women's literature because there has never been any clear-cut definition of Arab women's literature. Most Arab critics, men, define it with vague, nondescript terms. Yet they all seem to agree that it is written by women, or deals with women's issues including emancipation, oppression, and denial of basic rights. However, some of these critics' pronouncements should be weighted with care since they seem strangely unaware of the extent to which their male prejudices taint their appreciation of the writings of women.

The view that male dominance in highly traditional Arab culture is primarily responsible for the slow growth of women's literature holds great sway at first glance. To a large extent, such potent obstacles to self-expression among women did influence women's writing and imposed considerable restrictions on women's freedom within the framework of the extended family.

The wider Arab society holds its own views on such issues. Living under the inhibiting restrictions of an earlier age, women did not have an adequate opportunity to share in the benefits accrued from the inevitable socio-economic changes that have occurred in different parts of the Arab world.
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Such a lifestyle may well have harbored the spirit of change, but at the same time, it undoubtedly goaded women into raising their voices against the rigidity of the social structure and fueled their demands for greater social freedom. Numerous Arab women writers have criticized the position of women in the Arab world. The position of woman, they claimed, has become unbearable, particularly in regard to such matters as education; virginity and marriage; the concept of honor and dignity; and individual freedom, all of which are weighed on unbalanced scales. They called for a rethinking of women's relationships with every form of male authority -- husbands, fathers, brothers and sons -- and for the creation of a new understanding between men and women in our society.

The voice of women was first heard in the latter part of the 19th century with the appearance of essays, stories, poetry and articles on "women's issues" in various magazines and newspapers in certain parts of the Arab world. Writers of note during this period were: Wardah al-Yaziji (1838-1924), Azynab Fawwaz (1850-1914), Labibah Hashim (1882-1952), Salma Sayegh (1889-1953), and Hana Kasbani Kurani (1870-1898). These women paved the way for the next generation of women writers, allowing their successors to take part in the development of the women's literary movement.

It should be noted that journalism played an important role in popularizing these women. Since the early part of this century, other women writers have emerged, displaying even greater resolve and courage in raising and discussing women's issues. Among these authors were Bvathitat al-Badiyah (1886-1918) and Mayy Ziyadah (1886-1941).

The articles of al-Badiyah began to appear in Al-Jaridah newspaper in Cairo as early as 1907. In 1911, she published her most widely known book, entitled "Nisa'yat" (Feminist Essays), a collection of several articles about prominent women in the Middle East. Her work is regarded by many as a landmark in Arab literature.

Ziyadah in particular admired the book, and as a result, wrote a critical study of the life and works of al-Badiyah. In her personal letters to al-Badiyah, Ziyadah advocates encouragement and support to al-Badiyah's defense of women's rights. In one of her letters she writes:

"The days pass and we [women] are still in an unspoken state of confusion. Male struggles in an economic war, he busies himself with many undertakings. When he wants to write literature, he does not reach the level of women's sentiments, for he writes from the viewpoint of his egotistical thinking and hardheartedness, whereas the woman enlivens her mind, emotions and passions."

She then calls upon al-Badiyah to combine her efforts with those of others in attempting to rescue this generation from "perplexity and hesitation," and asks her to help liberate women by making them aware of their rights and responsibilities.

The writings of Zihadah, herself, during this period are considered to be an important contribution to women's literature because of their ringing endorsement of the emancipation of women.

Born in Nazareth of a Lebanese father and Palestinian mother in 1886, she lived for some time in Cairo. Then in 1914, at the age of 28, her home became a literary salon, some of the most prominent writers of the time, including Taha Hussein, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq, Mansur Fahmi, Khalil Mutran and others, were frequent visitors to her salon.

Ziyadah had a great influence on the literary life of the times due to her charm and intelligence and her charismatic personality. Her articles were in such demand by the readers of the Egyptian Al-Ahram daily newspaper that they dominated its front pages. She is the author of a number of books that include "Equality," in which she calls for a society based on equality and justice with the full participation of women.

Ziyadah personified the cause of the Arab woman, analyzing the various significant factors in their lives, such as rights and obligations. Her major emphasis is given to the biological and social problems related to the nature of women. In a letter to the renowned Lebanese writer Khalil Gibran, she wrote:

"I basically share with you some opinions about women's liberation. Like many, a woman should have her own choice of spouse from among young people, according to her own desire and taste and without coercion from any quarter."

Her understanding of the role of women appears more clearly in a letter to the writer Lutfi al-Sayyid concerning the memorial ceremony on the 40th day after the death of Fathi Zaghlul Pasha. In this letter she blames him for not extending invitations to women:

"It is strange that you did not invite women to such an important meeting, which might have a great impact on their way of life, open their minds to the importance of education, and teach them about the greatness of their fatherland and its noble personalities, whereas you do allow them to frequent the opera house."

The women writers of this era wrote in a number of literary forms: articles, essays, anthologies of poetry, and short stories. The output of short stories and novels was not abundant. It appears that most women writers of that day thought it best to deal with specific non-fictional subjects, concentrating mainly on educational and moral issues and confining themselves to traditional social commentary, for which fiction is not the best medium.

Up to the end of WWII, most works by Arab women were dominated by the sad and melancholy characteristics which reflected women's feelings within the context of their subjugation to the prevailing traditional, civic and religious codes. But paradoxically enough, female writers at the time displayed a genuine respect for tradition, coupled with a respect for emancipation.

Such issues are reflected in the work of Widad Sakakini, "Peoples Mirrors," written in Cairo in 1947. Sakakini was a writer who, through her stories, analyzed social events essentially from a feminist standpoint. She may be regarded as a defender of women's rights, but not a strenuous one. The majority of women writers focused mainly on the emotional aspects of women's problems. They did not discuss in depth any other matters related to an individual woman's political, social, or intellectual aspirations, nor did they advocate any real fundamental changes in her life.

Above all, writers such as Ziyadah, Bahithat, al-Badiyah, and Fawwaz seemed to be very much aware of the obstacles they had to overcome and the struggle they had been forced to wage in their attempts to assert the needs and rights of women. These obstacles include social and religious pressures, as well as women's economic and political powerlessness. All these matters were further complicated by the long and hated domination of the Ottoman empire and later by theunsettling impact of Western imperialism.

Imperialism oppressed many parts of the Arab world and its removal demanded continued struggle. It directly dominated the men, and as Qasim Amin states in his 1980 book, "Women's Liberation: "In the East, we find the woman is in man's bondage and the man is in the government's bondage."

"When the women enjoy their personal freedom, the men enjoy their political freedom. The two cases are well-intertwoven."

At the same time, Amin stresses that man has monopolized all rights, leaving nothing for the woman but what the master throws to his animal. The woman has been separated from the means of production and left without any economic independence. Amin goes further and draws a parallel between the women's condition of lagging behind and the dominance of despotic and military regimes.

The spread and influence of imperialism throughout the Arab world preoccupied the people of the Middle East, both in their resistance to its influence and in their struggle for respective freedoms. It led the way to national revolutions in Egypt, Algeria and Palestine. In turn, these countries witnessed national independence heralding dramatic changes of a political, social and economic nature.

The women's literary movement drew momentum from this radicalization of their environment, and drew apace under the impact of Western culture and the development of certain social and educational institutions. It thereby became possible for women to wield greater influence in many parts of the Arab world.

Certain Arab countries succeeded in gaining their sovereignty while others experienced a new form of occupation. Lebanon nurtured a new intellectual openness, while the Revolution of 1952 in Egypt
generated radical social change, whose influence was felt not only in Egypt but also in the surrounding Arab countries. The principles and events of these two national movements, among others, affected the hearts and minds of the inhabitants, especially women.

Palestine, with its particularly rich literary past, was to know foreign invasion and military occupation. The calamity of Israel's establishment in 1948 carried great impact upon all aspects of national and cultural life, sweeping up in its wake the struggle of women and giving fresh material to a new generation of writers.

During the late '40s and into the '50s, many women writers appeared in the Arab world. One of them was the Lebanese writer Layla Ba'albaki, author of "I Live" and "A Spaceship of Tenderness to the Moon." Ba'albaki was strongly critical of Arab social and religious traditions. She portrayed the Arab woman as a weak, conservative creature who could not rise above her role as wife and mother. Ba'albaki wrote openly of sexual politics and virginity.

In 1964, she faced charges of public immorality, and all her books in Lebanon were confiscated. This was the first case of its kind in Lebanon. Subsequently the case was dismissed, however, and her books returned to circulation.

Several other women writers emerged in this period: Collette Chouri of Syria; Lebanese writers Nur Salman, Layla Usayan and Emilie Nasrallah; and Egyptian writers Nawal Sa-adawi and Ghada al-Samman, to name a few. Although their works touch upon the relationship between men and women - portrayed as oppressor and oppressed - some of her earlier works lacked depth.

Ghada al-Samman is a prolific writer with a long list of short stories, articles and novels, all of a high standard. In her novel "Departure from Ancient Ports," she expresses her views on the Arab defeat of 1967 and the Palestinian revolution. Her later novels: "Beirut 75" and "Nightmares of Beirut," define al-Samman as a writer on broad issues.

Critic Ghali shukri admits that in his early critical study, "The Sexual Crisis in Arab Fiction," he deliberately avoided studying al-Samman's writings because he felt that she did not attain her full potential, whereas all the others had reached their peak, including Ba'albaki. "They could not present us with any new revelations... even if they wrote a thousand more pages," wrote Shukri.

However, he emphasizes the distinctive nature of al-Samman's later works, stating that she had "broken away from the association of female authors whose writings are so thematically similar that it is difficult to distinguish one from the other." According to Shukri, the reason for this unfortunate categorization is a lack of experience and awareness, not talent.

Shukri views women's literature as that which is written by modern women with women's issues as their focal point. He described it as "separatist" and created out of social pressure.

On the other hand, Muhi ad-Din ascribes women's literature as promoting rebellion against home, society, school, religion and other pillars of tradition. He considers it "individualist literature."

Literary critic Afif Farraj sees no need to distinguish between one woman writer and another, but rather to distinguish between a female and male writer.

Finally, the Iraqi poet Abdel Wahhab Al-Bayyati commended in 1980:

"I don't agree with this difference and discrimination, because it is derived from the narrow vision of Arab writers. I view with sorrow the fact that it has forced women to write about their social oppression and call for sexual revolt as part of their expression of individual freedom.

But how can we expect these women writers to escape the numerous straitjackets that bind them, be it the label "woman's literature," or male dominance and conservative tradition? The demeaning view held by some is reflected in this passage by al-Samman:

"He screamed at me. 'Your head was not made to think, but to wait for me in my bed. Go there and wait for me.' So I carried my small head and left, and he came in with his big body to begin brainwashing me once more."[=

10014. Badawi, Jamal A.; Ahmad, Anis [preface]. The Status of Women in Islam: Part 1: Preface. [Reprint of Muslim Student Association of United States & Canada, P.O. Box 38, Plainfield, IN 46168.] Riyadh: Islamic Dawah Committee, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) [POBox 10845, Riyadh 11443], April 1980. Family, society and ultimately the whole of mankind is treated by Islam on an ethical basis. Differentiation in sex is neither a credit nor a drawback for the sexes. Therefore, when we talk about status of woman in Islam it should not lead us to think that Islam has no specific guidelines, limitations, responsibilities and obligations for men. What makes one valuable and respectable in the eyes of Allah, the Creator of mankind and the universe, is neither one's prosperity, position, intelligence, physical strength nor beauty, but only one's Allah-consciousness and awareness (taqwa). However, since in the Western culture and in cultures influenced by it, there exists a disparity between men and women there is more need for stating Islam's position on important issues in a clear way. Dr. Jamal Badawi's essay, The Status of Women in Islam, was originally published in our quarterly journal, Al-Ithihad, Vol. 8, No. 2, Sha'ban 1391/Sept 1971. Since then it has been one of our most-demanded publications. We thank Br. Jamal for permitting us to reprint his essay. We hope it will clarify many of the misconceptions. [Jumada al Thani 1400/April 1980] [Anis Ahmad, Director, Dept. of Education and Training, Muslim Student Association of United States & Canada, P.O. Box 38, Plainfield, IN 46168 USA.][=]

10015. Badawi, Jamal A. The Status of Women in Islam: Part 2: Introduction. [Reprint of Muslim Student Association of United States & Canada, P.O. Box 38, Plainfield, IN 46168.] Riyadh: Islamic Dawah Committee, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) [POBox 10845, Riyadh 11443], April 1980. The status of women in society is neither a new nor is it a fully settled one. The position of Islam on this issue has been among the subjects presented to the Western reader with the best objectivity. This paper is intended to provide a brief and authentic exposition of what Islam stands for in this regard. The teachings of Islam are based essentially on the Quran (God's revelation) and Hadeeth (hadith) (elaborations by Prophet Muhammad). The Quran and the Hadeeth, properly and unbiasedly understood, provide the basic source of authentication for any position or view which is attributed to Islam. The paper starts with a brief survey of the status of women in the pre-Islamic era. It then focuses on these major questions: What is the position of Islam regarding the status of woman in society? How similar or different is that position from "the spirit of the time," which was dominant when Islam was revealed? How would this compare with the "rights" which were finally gained by woman in recent decades? [=]

10016. Badawi, Jamal A. The Status of Women in Islam: Part 3: Historical Perspectives. [Reprint of Muslim Student Association of United States & Canada, P.O. Box 38, Plainfield, IN 46168.] Riyadh: Islamic Dawah Committee, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) [POBox 10845, Riyadh 11443], April 1980. One major objective of this paper is to provide a fair evaluation of what Islam contributed (or failed to contribute) toward the restoration of woman's dignity and rights. In order to achieve this objective, it may be useful to review briefly how women were treated in general in previous civilizations and religions, especially those which preceded Islam (Pre-610 CE).CE throughout this paper stands for Christian Era (AD) Part of the information provided here, however, describes the status of woman as late as the nineteenth century, more than two centuries after Islam.

Women in Ancient Civilization: Describing the status of the Indian woman, Encyclopedia Britannica states: "In India, subjection was a cardinal principle. Day and night must women be held by their protectors in a state of dependence says Manu. The rule of inheritance was agraic, that is descent traced through males to the exclusion of females." [Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., 1911, Vol. 28. p. 782] In Hindu scriptures, the description of a good wife is as follows: "a woman whose mind, speech and body are kept in subjection, acquires high renown in
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this world, and, in the next, the same abode with her husband.” [In Mace, David and Vera. Marriage East and West. Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., NY, 1960.] In Athens, women were not better off than either Indian or the Roman women. “Athenian women were always minors, subject to some male - to their father, to their brother, or to some of their male kin.” [Allen, E.A., History of Civilization, Vol. 3, p. 444.] Her consent in marriage was not generally thought to be necessary and “she was obliged to submit to the wishes of her parent, and receive from them her husband and her lord, even though he were a stranger to her.” [Ibid., p. 443.] A Roman wife was described by an historian as: “a babe, a minor, a ward, a person incapable of doing or acting anything according to her own individual taste, a person continually under the tutelage and guardianship of her husband.” [Ibid., p. 550.] In the Encyclopedia Britannica, we find a summary of the legal status of women in the Roman civilization: “In Roman Law a woman was even in historic times completely dependent. If married she and her property passed into the power of her husband . . . . the wife was the purchased property of her husband, and like a slave acquired only for his benefit. A woman could not exercise any civil or public office . . . . could not be a witness, surety, tutor, or curator; she could not adopt or be adopted, or make will or contract.” [Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., 1911, op. cit., Vol. 28, p. 782.] Among the Scandinavian races women were: “under perpetual tutelage, whether married or unmarried. As late as the Code of Christian V, at the end of the 17th Century, it was enacted that if a woman married without the consent of her tutor he might have, if he wished, administration and usufruct of her goods during her life.” [Ibid., p. 783.] According to the English Common Law: “. . . all real property which a wife held at the time of a marriage became a possession of her husband. He was entitled to the rent from the land and to any profit which might be made from operating the estate during the joint life of the spouses. As time passed, the English courts devised means to forbid a husband’s transferring real property without the consent of his wife, but he still retained the right to manage it and to receive the money which it produced. As to a wife’s personal property, the husband’s power was complete. He had the right to spend it as he saw fit.” [Encyclopedia Americana International (Edition), vol. 29, p. 108.]

Only by the late nineteenth Century did the situation start to improve. “By a series of acts starting with the Married Women’s Property Act in 1870, amended in 1882 and 1887, married women achieved the right to own property and to enter contracts on a par with spinsters, widows, and divorcées.” [Encyclopedia Britannica, 1968, Vol. 23., p. 624.] As late as the Nineteenth Century an authority in ancient law, Sir Henry Maine, wrote: “No society which preserves any tincture of Christian institutions is likely to restore to married women the personal liberty conferred upon them by the Middle Roman Law.” [Quoted in Mace, Marriage East and West, op. cit., p. 81.] In his essay, The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill wrote: “We are continually told that civilization and Christianity have restored to the woman her just rights. Meanwhile the wife is the actual bondservant of her husband; no less so, as far as the legal obligation goes, than slaves commonly so called.” [Ibid., pp. 82-83.]

Before moving on to the Quranic decrees concerning the status of woman, a few Biblical decrees may shed more light on the subject, thus your own nature, and has given you from your mates, children and grandchildren, and has made provision of good things for you. Is it then in vanity that they believe and in the grace of God that they disbelieve? (Quran 16:72) The rest of this paper outlines the position of Islam regarding the status of woman in society from its various aspects - spiritually, socially, economically and politically.

(1) The Spiritual Aspect: The Quran provides clear-cut evidence that woman is completely equated with man in the sight of God in terms of her rights and responsibilities. The Quran states: “Every soul will be (held) in pledge for its deeds” (Quran 74:38). It also states: “. . . So their Lord accepted their prayers, (saying): I will not suffer to be lost the work of any of you whether male or female. You proceed one from another.” (Quran 3:195). “Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has faith, verily to him will We give a new life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to the their actions.” (Quran 16:97, see also 4:124.) Woman according to the Quran is not

The position of the Christian Church until recent centuries seems to have been influenced by both the Mosaic Law and by the streams of thought that were dominant in its contemporary cultures. In their book, Marriage East and West, David and Vera Mace wrote: “Let no one suppose, either, that our Christian heritage is free of such slighting subjections of women. It would be hard to find anywhere a collection of more degrading references to the female sex than the early Church Fathers provide. Lecky, the famous historian, speaks of (these fierce incentives which form so conspicuous and so grotesque a portion of the writing of the Fathers . . . woman was represented as the door of hell, as the mother of all human ills. She should be ashamed at the very thought that she is a woman. She should live in continual penance on account of the curses she has brought upon the world. She should be ashamed of her dress, for it is the memorial of her fall. She should be especially ashamed of her beauty, for it is the most potent instrument of the devil). One of the most scathing of these attacks on woman is that of Tertullian: Do you know that you are each an Eve? The sentence of God on this sex of yours lives in this age: the guilt must of necessity live too. You are the devil’s gateway: you are the unsealer of that forbidden tree; you are the first deserters of the divine law; you are she who persuades him whom the devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God's image, man. On account of your desert - that is death - even the Son of God had to die. Not only did the church affirm the inferior status of woman, it deprived her of legal rights she had previously enjoyed.” [Mace, Marriage East and West, op. cit., pp. 80-81.]
blamed for Adam's first mistake. Both were jointly wrong in their disobedience to God, both repented, and both were forgiven. (Quran 2:36, 7:20-24). In one verse in fact (20:121), Adam specifically, was blamed. In terms of religious obligations, such as the Daily Prayers, Fasting, Poor- due, and Pilgrimage, woman is no different from man. In some cases indeed, woman has certain advantages over man. For example, the woman is exempted from the daily prayers and from fasting during her menstrual periods and forty days after childbirth. She is also exempted from fasting during her pregnancy and when she is nursing her baby if there is any threat to her health or her baby's. If the missed fasting is obligatory (during the month of Ramadan), she can make up for the missed days whenever she can. She does not have to make up for the prayers missed for any of the above reasons. Although women can and did go into the mosque during the days of the prophet and thereafter attendance at the Friday congregational prayers is optional for them while it is mandatory for men (on Friday). This is clearly a tender touch of the Islamic teachings for they are considerate of the fact that a woman may be nursing her baby or caring for him, and thus may be unable to go out to the mosque at the time of the prayers. They also take into account the physiological and psychological changes associated with her natural female function.

(2) The Social Aspect

(a) As a child and an adolescent: Despite the social acceptance of female infanticide among some Arabian tribes, the Quran forbade this custom, and considered it a crime like any other murder: "And when the female (infant) is buried alive - is questioned, for what crime she was killed." (Quran 81:8) Criticizing the attitudes of such parents who reject their female children, the Quran states: "When news is brought to one of them, of (the Birth of) a female (child), his face darkens and he is filled with inward grief! With shame does he hide himself from his people because of the bad news he has had! Shall he retain her on (sufferance) and contempt, or bury her in the dust? Ah! What an evil (choice) they decide on?" (Quran 16: 58-59). Far from saving the girl's life so that she may later suffer injustice and inequality, Islam requires kind and just treatment for her. Among the sayings of Prophet Muhammad (P.) in this regard are the following: "Whosoever has a daughter and he does not bury her alive, does not insult her, and does not favor his son over her, God will enter him into Paradise." (Ibn Hanbal, No. 1570). "Whosoever supports two daughters till they mature, he and I will come in the court of the reservation as this [and he pointed with his two fingers held together]." A similar Hadith deals in like manner with one who supports two sisters. (Ibn-Hanbal, No. 2104). The right of females to seek knowledge is not different from that of males. Prophet Muhammad (P.) said: "Seeking knowledge is mandatory for every Muslim." (Al-Bayhaqi). Muslim as used here including both males and females. [Some less authentic versions add "male and female." The meaning, however, is sound etymologically even as it is consistent with the over-all nature of Islamic duties in applying equally to males and females unless special exemptions are specified.]

(b) As a wife: The Quran clearly indicates that marriage is sharing between the two halves of the society, and that its objectives, beside perpetuating human life, are emotional well-being and spiritual harmony. Its bases are love and mercy. Among the most impressive verses in the Quran about marriage is the following: "And among-His signs is this: That He created mates for you from yourselves that you may find rest, peace of mind in them, and He ordained between you love in kindness and retain them not for injury so that you transgress (the limits)." (Quran 4:19). (See also Quran 2:229 and 33:49).

(c) As a mother: Islam considered kindness to parents next to the worship of God. "And we have enjoined upon man (to be good) to his parents: His mother bears him in weakness upon weakness. . . ." (Quran 17:23). A man came to Prophet Muhammad (P.) asking: "O Messenger of God, who among the people is the most worthy of my good company? The Prophet (P.) said, Your mother. The man said then who else: The Prophet (P.) said, Your mother. The man asked, Then who else? Only then did the Prophet (P.) say, Your father." (Al-Bukhan...
...and Muslim). A famous saying of The Prophet is "Paradise is at the feet of mothers." (In Al'Nisa'I, Ibn-Majah, Ahmad). "It is the generous (in character) who is good to women, and it is the wicked who insults them."  

(3) The Economic Aspect: Islam decreed a right of which woman was deprived both before Islam and after it (even as late as this century), [For example, it was not until 1938 that the French Law was unended so as to recognize the ability of women to own property. However, it was still required to secure her husband's permission before she could dispense with her private property. See for example Al-Sibaai's op cit., pp. 31-37.] the right of independent ownership. According to Islamic Law, woman's right to her money, real estate, or other properties is fully acknowledged. This right undergoes no change whenever there is a necessity for it, especially in positions which fit her nature and in which society needs her most. Examples of these professions are nursing, teaching (especially for children), and medicine. Moreover, there is no restriction on benefiting from woman's exceptional talent in any field. Even for the position of a judge, where there may be a tendency to doubt the woman's fitness for the post due to her more emotional nature, we find early Muslim scholars such as Abu-Hanifa and Al-Tabary holding that nothing wrong with it. In addition, Islam restored to woman the right of inheritance, after she herself was an object of inheritance in some cultures. Her share is completely hers and no one can make any claim on it, including her father and her husband. "Unto men (of the family) belongs a share of that which parents and near kindred leave, and unto woman a share of that which parents and near kindred leave, whether it be a little or much - a determinate share." (Quran 4:7). Her share in most cases is one-half the man's share, with no implication that she is worth half a man! It would seem grossly inconsistent after the overwhelming evidence of woman's equitable treatment in Islam, which was discussed in the preceding pages, to make such an inference. This variation in inheritance rights is the position of various religions and cultures on the issue under investigation. Part of this exposition extends to cover the general trend as to recognize the ability of women to contract. A married woman, in the Quran, one Hadeeth of the Prophet is interpreted to make woman ineligible for the position of head of state. The Hadeeth referred to is roughly translated: "A people will not prosper if they let a woman be their leader." This limitation, however, has nothing to do with the dignity of woman or with her rights. It is rather, related to the natural differences in the biological and psychological make-up of men and women. According to Islam, the head of the state is no mere figurehead. He leads people in the prayers, especially on Fridays and festivities; he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making pertaining to the security and well-being of his people. This demanding position, or any similar one, such as the Commander of the Army, is generally inconsistent with the physiological and psychological make-up of woman in general. It is a medical fact that during their monthly periods and during their pregnancies, women undergo various physiological and psychological changes. Such changes may occur during an emergency situation, thus affecting her decision, without considering the excessive strain which is produced. Moreover, some decisions require a maximum of rationality and a minimum of emotionality - a requirement which does not coincide with the instinctive nature of women. Even in modern times, and in the most developed countries, it is rare to find a woman in the position of a head of state acting as more than a figurehead, a woman commander of the armed services, or even a proportionate number of women representatives in parlaments, or similar bodies. One can possibly ascribe this to backwardness of various nations or to any constitutional limitation on woman's right to be in such a position as a head of state or as a member of the parliament. It is more logical to explain the present situation in terms of the natured and indisputable differences between man and woman, a difference which does not imply any "supremacy" of one over the other. The difference implies rather the "complementary" roles of both the sexes in life, [=]
during the present era was not achieved due to the kindness of men or due to natural progress. It was rather achieved through a long struggle and sacrifice on women's part and only when society needed her contribution and work, more especially during the two world wars, and due to the escalation of technological change. In the case of Islam such compassionate and dignified status was decreed, not because it reflects the environment of the seventh century, nor under the threat or pressure of women and their organizations, but rather because of its intrinsic truthfulness. If this indicates anything, it would demonstrate the divine origin of the Quran and the truthfulness of the message of Islam, which, unlike human philosophies and ideologies, was far from proceeding from its human environment, a message which established such humane principles as neither grew obsolete during the course of time and after these many centuries, nor can become obsolete in the future. After all, this is the message of the All-Wise and All-Knowing God whose wisdom and knowledge are far beyond the ultimate in human thought and progress. [=""

10019. Badawi, Jamal A. The Status of Women in Islam: Part 6: Bibliography. [Reprint of Muslim Student Association of United States & Canada, P.O. Box 38, Plainfield, IN 46168.] Riyadh: Islamic Dawah Committee, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) [POBox 10845, Riyadh 11443], April 1980. (1) The Holy Quran: Translation of verses is the Occupation”; and Women in Black is not an organization with a hierarchy or a formal structure, but is only the name given to the protest vigils throughout Israel and in other countries.

The women who started the Women in Black vigil in Jerusalem had a clear political commitment to finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on Israeli recognition of the PLO and on the creation of an independent Palestinian state in all of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. However, they recognized the political importance of encouraging the vigil’s growth by allowing women from the broadest political spectrum to feel comfortable standing side by side.

This goal was achieved in the original slogan, “End the Occupation.”

There were intermittent attempts to add to this slogan over the years. The method for gauging women’s reactions to the suggested changes was to simply “do a round” and ask each woman to present her view. If there were more than one or two objections, the suggestion was dropped.

The many hundreds of women who have taken part in the Jerusalem vigil over the years have all helped in contributing to the mistaken image of Women in Black as an organized political group. In reality, the success of this vigil was due to a core of about 30 women whose commitment to standing in protest was paramount - not one of them would make an avoidable appointment for Fridays at one o’clock, the “sacred” hour. These 30 or so women were all active in other feminist, human rights, or anti-occupation organizations.

Another hundred or so women came to the vigil on a less regular basis. For most of these women, the Women in Black vigil was their sole political activity (apart, perhaps, from the occasional Peace Now demonstration). At its height, these women formed the majority of the vigil, but never showed much interest in taking part in discussions or decisions regarding Women in Black. [=""

10020. Branigan, William. “China Hampers Private Women’s Forum; Hillary Clinton’s Role in UN Conference on Women Is Debated”, in Demonstration). At its height, these women formed the majority of the vigil, but never showed much interest in taking part in discussions or decisions regarding Women in Black. [=""

At the same time there is a growing debate on the wisdom of having Hillary Clinton play a key role in the conference. Delegation chairwoman Madelaine Albright states the ‘US human rights agenda’ will be advanced with or without Hillary Clinton. Albright states the US will lead an attack on the Chinese ‘policy restrictions on the births of females’[sic].

While 36000 have registered for the NGO Forum, the obstacles may reduce the attendance by 10000. One person denied a visa is Julie Berriault, American director of the Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, which represents Australian aborigines, native Hawaiians, Taiwanese and Tibetans [but not Palestinians]; China regards Taiwan as an abreakaway province. More typical is the delay in issuing visas to delegates: the Washington office of Amnesty International USA has not received its visas yet. [TXT]

10021. Cohen, Ruth. “Women in Black Step Down: Part 1”, in Challenge, November-December 1993, p. 11. On Wednesday, October 20th, Women in Black of Jerusalem made the historic decision to end the weekly Friday vigil. I doubt whether a single one of the women who have stood in Paris Square for the past five-and-a-half years did not feel a sense of emptiness and regret on Friday, October 22nd, at one o’clock.

Women in Black has been the most consistently visible and well-known of all the protest groups started in Israel since the beginning of the Intifada. My purpose is not to write the final chapter of the story, nor to relegate the phenomenon of Women in Black to the history pages. It is far too soon for that. What follows is a personal view of the steps leading up to the decision to come down from the wall and leave the view of the flowers in Paris Square unrestricted for passing traffic.

Those of us who have spoken publicly about Women in Black in general, and the unique features of the Jerusalem vigil, have taken care to stress two points: each woman stands as an individual with her own personal and political interpretation of Women in Black’s slogan, “End the Occupation”; and Women in Black is not an organization with a hierarchy or a formal structure, but is only the name given to the protest vigils throughout Israel and in other countries.

The women who started the Women in Black vigil in Jerusalem had a clear political commitment to finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on Israeli recognition of the PLO and on the creation of an independent Palestinian state in all of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. However, they recognized the political importance of encouraging the vigil’s growth by allowing women from the broadest political spectrum to feel comfortable standing side by side.

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The many hundreds of women who have taken part in the Jerusalem vigil over the years have all helped in contributing to the mistaken image of Women in Black as an organized political group. In reality, the success of this vigil was due to a core of about 30 women whose commitment to standing in protest was paramount - not one of them would make an avoidable appointment for Fridays at one o’clock, the “sacred” hour. These 30 or so women were all active in other feminist, human rights, or anti-occupation organizations.

Another hundred or so women came to the vigil on a less regular basis. For most of these women, the Women in Black vigil was their sole political activity (apart, perhaps, from the occasional Peace Now demonstration). At its height, these women formed the majority of the vigil, but never showed much interest in taking part in discussions or decisions regarding Women in Black. [=""
was small. The first of these meetings was an ad hoc gathering of fourteen women who met after the announcement, but before the signing of the agreement. Only one woman took what proved to be a prophetic view of what lay ahead for Women in Black. She believed there would be a steady decline in the number of vigil participants, which would gradually weaken the impact of Women in Black. The rest of us were in favor of continuing the vigil, while adding some sign acknowledging the new political situation. We made a hasty decision to provide a white sash saying "Yes to Peace" for any woman choosing to wear it.

On the following Friday, it was clear that the majority of women who participated did so in the kind of celebratory mood that was prevalent elsewhere after the announcement of mutual recognition and the signing of the agreement between Israel and the PLO. Without any need for a formal decision, all the women, apart from the 30 core activists, were bidding their farewell to Paris Square on Fridays. Nevertheless, two subsequent discussion meetings were held, during which the dilemma over whether or not to Continue the vigil became clear.[-]

10023. Cohen, Ruth. "Women in Black Step Down: Part 3", in Challenge, November-December 1993 p. 13. Without exception, every woman at the meetings understood that the agreement would not mean an immediate end to the occupation, nor to human rights abuses. The few women who, from the start, were in favor of ending the regular vigils were equally certain that events, in the coming months, might prompt them to stand again.

What fragmented the majority was the attempt to retain the broad consensus around the slogan of "End the Occupation." The additional slogan "Yes to Peace" did not make the clear political statement that women were looking for. Adding other traditional leftist slogans (such as "Two States for Two Peoples") would change the broad consensus basis of the vigil and lead to a situation similar to that in Tel Aviv, where the vigil never achieved the breadth of support enjoyed by the Jerusalem group. In the final analysis, what had always been seen as a source of strength for Jerusalem Women in Black became the reason for ending the vigil.

Does this really mean the end of Women in Black? Personally, I think not. What began as a local protest against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has turned into a model for women's political action adopted worldwide. Five and a half years of putting one's political views on the line every week has been an empowering experience for every woman who has participated. In Jerusalem, the vigil has shown many women with no feminist background the effectiveness of a feminist model of cooperative action and decision-making. Each individual in Women in Black knows that she can voice her opinion and make a difference. If the current attempt to find a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not measure up to expectations, we will, one by one, resume our weekly stand against the occupation.

1. The Tel Aviv Women in Black recently decided to continue standing. [Ruth Cohen is one of the founders of Women In Black and of Shani]. [-]


Arab Women's Council
Activities: Registrant arranged a media tour, which included several interviews and appearances by members of the foreign principal, to communicate information to the American public that the principal is seeking peace and the cessation of bloodshed in Lebanon. Finances: $332309 for the five month period ending 11/10/1982.

Political Propaganda: In addition to arranging media interviews and appearances, the registrant disseminated press releases dealing with the Arab Women's Council. [=-]

10025. DPR. "Australian Government Contributes a $300000 For UNRWA Emergency Programmes", in DPR, June 1993. The following press release was issued by UNRWA on 6.16/1993: "The Australian Government has announced a special contribution of A$300000 (about $202000) to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to support the Agency's programme of Extraordinary Measures in Lebanon and the Occupied Territory. The programme covers emergency relief, including food and cash aid as well as expanded medical services to Palestinian refugees. Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, informed UNRWA Commissioner-General Iltter Turkmen of the contributions during their meeting in Vienna on 6/15/1993. The special contribution came in response to urgent Agency appeals to donor Governments to increase their regular and emergency contributions. UNRWA is facing a financial deficit of $28.5 million at a time when its emergency programmes are critically needed, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip where economic conditions have sharply declined since the occupied territory was sealed off from Israel at the end of March. The measure of the occupied territory continues to prevent up to 100000 Palestinian labourers from returning to work in Israel, causing daily wage losses of some $2.5 million. The local economy has also been severely disrupted by restrictions on movement resulting from the closure, which led to millions of dollars of losses in agriculture, industry, transport and commerce. Unemployment is at an all-time high in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Australia is a major donor to UNRWA's regular health, education, relief and social services programmes for more than 2.7 million Palestine refugees in the Middle East. In 1993, Australia is contributing A$2.65 million (about $1.7 million) towards the Agency's regular budget. UNRWA recently built a new preparatory school for girls in the West Bank, using a special 1988-1989 contribution of A$1 million (about $795000) from the Australian Government." [=-]

10026. DPR. "General Assembly Adopts Resolutions On Israeli Practices In The Occupied Territories: 47/70. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories: G", in Division of Palestinian Rights, December 1992. At its 85th plenary meeting, which was held on 12/14/1992, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions:

The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, 2/ Deeply concerned about the continued and intensified harassment by Israel, the occupying Power, directed against educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territory,

Taking note of the relevant decisions adopted by the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization concerning the educational and cultural situation in the occupied Palestinian territory,
1. Reaffirms the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, to the

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Finances: $332309 for the five month period ending 11/10/1982. Organization concerning the educational and cultural situation in the

occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. Condemns Israeli policies and practices against Palestinian students and faculty members in schools, universities, and other educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territory, especially the opening of fire on defenseless students, causing many casualties;

3. Also condemns the systematic Israeli campaign of repression against universities, schools and other educational and vocational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territory, in large numbers and for prolonged periods, restricting and impeding the academic activities of Palestinian universities by subjecting the selection of courses, textbooks, and educational programs, the admission of students, and the appointment of faculty members to the control and supervision of the military occupation authorities, in flagrant contravention of the Convention;

4. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with the provisions of that Convention, rescind all actions and measures taken against all educational institutions, ensure the freedom of those institutions and refrain forthwith from hindering the effective operation of the universities, schools, and other educational institutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the forty-eighth session, on the implementation of the present resolution. [—]

10027. DS. "Lebanon: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Other Grounds", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Joint Committee Print, District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution calls for social justice and equality of duties and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism. In practice, aspects of the law and traditional mores discriminate against women. Only males may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. In some cases, this means that children born to Lebanese mothers and stateless fathers are themselves stateless. The law stipulates that a woman must obtain her husband's approval to open a business or engage in trade. The Parliament has not yet acted on an amendment introduced to change this law. Women may own property but often cede effective control over it due to cultural reasons. The law also accords preferential treatment to males accused of crimes of honor (see Section 1.e.). Religious groups have their own family and personal status laws administered by religious courts. Each group differs in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the concurrence of 11 of their husbands. Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, in business. Social pressure against women pursuing a career is strong in some parts of society. Males sometimes exercise considerable control over female relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or contact with friends and relatives. Violence against women occurs, the press frequently reports cases of rape. However, there are no authoritative statistics on the extent of spousal violence. Doctors and social workers believe most abused women do not seek medical help. The society's emphasis on personal privacy and honor make it difficult for women to seek legal redress. The Government has not expressed an interest in the problem of violence against women nor has it made an effort to combat it. [—]

10029. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 11: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (c) Freedom of Religion", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on International Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Lebanese practice their various religions freely. There are 17 officially recognized sects, including numerous Christian denominations, Muslims (Sunni, Shia, and others), and Druze. There is no state religion, but Lebanese's confessional political system means that a wide range of government positions are filled on the basis of religion. There are no restrictions on any particular religious groups, foreign clergy, or places of worship. Religious groups are free to publish religious material, operate schools, and establish charitable organizations. Lebanese have the legal right to convert from one religion to another, but the confessional character of society makes conversion to another religion difficult. Women however, often adopt the religion of their husbands. Conversion can mean ostracism from family and friends. Local religious leaders often pressure members of their congregations against taking part in the religious activities of other groups. [—]

10030. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 13: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy in which the people have the constitutional right to change their government. However, until the Parliamentary elections in 1992, the people had not been able to exercise this right during 16 years of civil war. According to the Constitution, direct elections for the Parliament must be held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every 6 years. The President and Parliament choose the Cabinet. Political parties may form, and some flourish. Since the emergence of the post-1943 state, a relatively restricted group of traditional and sectarian leaders largely have determined national policy. The unwritten 1943 National Pact allocated power on a confessional basis. The government were allocated on a similar basis between Christians and Muslims. Efforts to alter or abolish the confessional system of allocating power were at the center of Lebanese politics for more than 3 decades. Those religious groups most favored by the 1943 formula sought to preserve it, while those who perceived themselves to be disadvantaged sought to revise it on the basis of different demographic data or to abolish it entirely. The struggle Rave a strongly sectarian coloration to Lebanese politics and to the continuing civil strife in the country. Under the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia in 10/1989. Members of Parliament agreed to alter the National Pact to create a 500 Christian-Muslim balance in the Parliament and reordering the powers of the different branches of government Constitutional amendments embodying the political reforms stipulated in the Taif agreement, which represented a dramatic political and psychological change, became law in 1990. They included an
expansion of the number of seats in Parliament and the division of seats equally between Muslims and Christians and the transfer of some powers from the President to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Parliamentary elections were held in 1992. The elections were not prepared and not carried out in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus. Because the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the body politic in Lebanon, they cast doubt on the ability of the Lebanese people to change their government through truly democratic means. Palestinians in Lebanon, with the exception of the few who have gained Lebanese nationality, have no political rights. An estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in Lebanon, ranging from several characterized as "Islamic" to numerous pro- and anti-Arafat organizations, many built around prominent individual leaders. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps, under the control of one or more political factions. Leaders are not elected, and there are no representative institutions that would permit popular participation in running camps. Fundamental protections and freedoms expected of governments exist in some but not all Palestinian areas. There are no legal barriers to participation by women in politics, but the culture discourages it. Three women were elected to Parliament in 1992. Two were related to deceased politicians, and the third is the sister of the Prime Minister. Very few women hold policy-level positions in the Government. [2]

10031. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Sixteen years of civil war blocked progress in many social fields, including laws and practices on discrimination. In 1993, the Cabinet and Parliament considered amendments to laws that discriminate against women, children, and the disabled but no action was taken. [2]

10032. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Lebanese women, many of whom have professional degrees, can work outside the home and increasingly do so out of necessity. The idea that women should be supported by men prevails, however, and many, including those with professional training, remain home with their families or until their children are grown. Males exercise considerable control over female relatives, often restricting such activities outside the home as travel or contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but may not be able to exercise control over it due to legal and cultural restrictions. The law stipulates that a woman must obtain the prior approval of her husband to open a business or engage in trade. The Judicial Institute refused to accept 200 female law graduates in November, offering no grounds for the decision. Violence against women occurs, and the press reports frequent cases of rape, but judicial authorities have no statistics on the extent of the problem. Doctors and social workers believe most abused women do not seek medical help. The society's emphasis on personal privacy and honor makes it difficult for women to seek legal redress, suggesting that cases reported in the papers are but a fraction of the total number. The Government has neither expressed an interest in the problem nor made an effort to combat it. Each confessional group in Lebanon has its own family and personal status laws administered by religious courts, and each group differs in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although Muslim men can easily divorce, Muslim women can do so only with the approval of their husbands. Divorce is difficult for Christians following Catholic rites, including Maronites. Many seeking divorce convert to an orthodox faith. Parliament approved in November a law that allowed women to testify in matters related to land registry. Previously, a woman's testimony had carried only half the weight of a man's. [2]

10033. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 17: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government has not placed priority on children's rights and welfare. There is no evidence of government spending to protect children, although Lebanon has ratified the Children's Rights Charter. The area of children's rights is one of many demands made on a state that is just emerging from years of social and financial chaos. The plight of children is a growing concern in Lebanon. A huge number of children are neglected, abused, exploited and even sold to disreputable adoption agents at a rate of $5000 for an infant, according to children's rights monitors. Hundreds of abandoned children are found in the streets, begging and cleaning car windows; others are hired illegally at low wages. Juvenile delinquency is rising. There are 428 cases before the delinquency court in north Lebanon alone, and many delinquents wait in ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. [2]

10034. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (c) Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. While not prohibited by law forced labor is not practiced or condoned by the Government. However, children, domesticics, or other foreign workers are sometimes forced to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor. [2]

10035. Hsu Kuang; Chi Pen [editor]. "Women's Liberation Is an Integral Part of the Entire Revolutionary Movement: Part 02", in Chinese Women in the Fight for Socialism. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977, pp. 7-11. Running the Country: Since liberation, and especially since the Cultural Revolution began, the Party and government have made special efforts to train and promote women leaders. More and more women have been admitted into the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. Increasing numbers of outstanding women from worker or peasant families are taking their place in leading posts at all levels, some becoming Party or government leaders.

In the Cultural Revolution, Wu Kuei-hsien, a textile worker, showed outstanding political and organizational ability in unifying and leading the masses in the struggle against the counter-revolutionary revisionist line. She is now an alternate member of the Party Political Bureau and a Vice-Premier of the State Council. Li Su-wen, a clerk in a Lebanese women, many of whom have professional degrees, can work outside the home as travel or contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but may not be able to exercise control over it due to legal and cultural restrictions. The law stipulates that a woman must obtain the prior approval of her husband to open a business or engage in trade. The Judicial Institute refused to accept 200 female law graduates in November, offering no grounds for the decision. Violence against women occurs, and the press reports frequent cases of rape, but judicial authorities have no statistics on the extent of the problem. Doctors and social workers believe most abused women do not seek medical help. The society's emphasis on personal privacy and honor makes it difficult for women to seek legal redress, suggesting that cases reported in the papers are but a fraction of the total number. The Government has neither expressed an interest in the problem nor made an effort to combat it. Each confessional group in Lebanon has its own family and personal status laws administered by religious courts, and each group differs in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although Muslim men can easily divorce, Muslim women can do so only with the approval of their husbands. Divorce is difficult for Christians following Catholic rites, including Maronites. Many seeking divorce convert to an orthodox faith. Parliament approved in November a law that allowed women to testify in matters related to land registry. Previously, a woman's testimony had carried only half the weight of a man's. [2]

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Many women were active organizers of China's first agricultural and stock-raising cooperatives and later the people's communes. They are pace-setters keeping the Chinese countryside on the socialist road. Lu Yulan, 33, is a member of the Party Central Committee, a member of the NPC Standing Committee and a deputy secretary of the Hopei...
In trying to break down male supremacy, women lash out at such Confucian ideas as "women and slaves are hard to manage," the "three cardinal guides and five constant virtues" and the "three obediences and four virtues." [The "three cardinal guides" meant the sovereign guided the subject, the father guided the son, and the husband guided the wife. That is to say, the sovereign, father and husband had absolute authority, while the subject, son, and wife could only obey. The "five constant virtues" referred to the so-called immutable principles of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge, and sincerity. They were the reactionary ethics the Confucians used to support the "three cardinal guides and regulate society. The "three obediences" meant obedience to the father when young, obedience to the husband when married, and obedience to the sons when widowed. Women were thus placed under the rule of men from the cradle to the grave. The "four virtues" were women's virtue, speech, appearance, and work. Specifically, women's virtue meant that a woman must know her place and act in complete compliance with the feudal ethical code. Women's speech meant that a woman must not talk too much. Women's appearance meant that a woman must adorn herself according to the feudal ethical code. Women's work meant that a woman must do all the household work well, and willingly serve her husband and parents-in-law. They hit hard at the counter-revolutionary idea that "women are backward" and "women should devote themselves to their husbands," spread by Lin Piao and his followers. Criticism has raised the women's political efforts of those two Middle East personalities. Rawhi Al-Khatib, the mayor of Arab Jerusalem, died in 7/1994. Hind Husseini, the founder and chairwoman of Dar At-Tifl, died in 9/1994. Both dedicated their long lives to the better application of the policy of equal pay for equal work. Work Hind Husseini was no different. She also dedicated her life to the women's liberation movement. }
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helped spread knowledge and understanding among her people. Like Rawhi Al-Khatib, Hussein did this work alone, with the support only of a few friends in Arab states and in Europe. Both of these civic leaders call on Arabs and Muslims around the world to support East Jerusalem. They traveled, talked, urged and warned. If they had gotten the support they had asked for, they would have saved more of the besieged city and assisted more of its needy residents.

Both leaders were totally dedicated, determined and self-sacrificing. Both worked for others, not for themselves. Both built important economic and social institutions in Arab Jerusalem. They donated their own lands and properties and turned them into public works for the benefit of future generations. They did not amass wealth for themselves. They gave all they had so others could live an honorable and dignified life in Jerusalem.

Today, we need leaders like Rawhi Al-Khatib and Hind Hussein. We need leaders who will give rather than take, who will build for the public good and not for themselves, who will care for all needy Palestinian children and not only for their own. The people of Arab Jerusalem will forever remember good deeds, the public services and the humanitarian work of Rawhi Al-Khatib and Hind Hussein. [=]

10037. Issroff, Judith. "Council For Children and Youth", in Biladi-Jerusalem Times Palestinian Weekly (Occupied Territories), October 14, 1994. pp. 13-14. The Jerusalem Council for Children and Youth in a non-political organization whose sole aim is the advocacy and advancement of youth and children in all Jerusalem, regardless of sex, race or religion. The council studies the problems of children and determines their needs, in order to direct attention to neglected issues, and to improve the availability, efficiency and quality of existing services. With the help of donor agencies, attempts are made to set up projects which will address these needs.

In 8/1994, a comprehensive study prepared by Sarah Hirshkowitz, Asher Ben Arie and, Jaffa Tsionit was published, which deals with the status of youth and children in Jerusalem. The statistical evidence portrays just how great the needs of children are in both sectors of Jerusalem. The council has information for the Arab sector available in Arabic, and welcome phone calls on any issues related to the welfare of children and youth. Every effort is made assist in all matters, whether in reference to education, health, or cultural issues.

Several different types of task forces have been set up on various topics, including: safety and accidents involving children; children's health and health care; early childhood; parenting; children at risk; and children and economy.

East Jerusalem lawyer, Awni Habash, a council member, has specialized in representing children in courts of law. Like his colleague, layer Philip Marcus, he is interested in issues relating to the rights of children.

Ideas for projects would be welcomed by the council. [=]

10038. Keddie, Nikki R.; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]: Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 01: Introduction: deciphering Middle Eastern Women's History. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 1-22. The position of women in the Middle east has aroused much interest but little scholarship; there is even less on women's history in the Middle East. Most historical studies of the Middle East are male oriented. Gender inequalities are ancient in the region; many "Islamic" customs pre-date the rise of islam. Veiling first appears in an Assyrian legal text of the 13th century BC, noting that it is restricted to respectable women and is prohibited for prostitutes. Asserting rather glibly that the Quran was written [sic: and therefore, in Islamic terms, is not revelation, and in turn that Islam is a false faith] (p. 4), Keddie notes that it is a matter of controversy as to how much of an impact the Quran had on women, although did bring some reforms (affecting dowry, inheritance and banning femaleinfanticide). However, much of Islamic gender policy owes more to patriarchy that to the Quran. Generally, Keddie observes, Islamic gender policy toward women is an "atrocity", although somewhat less so than the Hindu gender policy in India. (p. 7) In any event, "Islamic trends will not necessarily continue strong far into the future" and only Iran is turning back the clock on women's rights. (p. 19)

10039. Kostelnky, Kathleen Lenore. The Psychological And Behavioral Effects Of Political Violence On Palestinian Children Living In The Israeli-occupied West Bank (Trauma, Violence). Loyola University Of Chicago, Dissertation, 161 pp. AAC 9326167. An increasing number of children throughout the world are growing up in the midst of war, insurrection, revolt, and occupation. Children subjected to violent experiences relating to political conflict exhibit a variety of responses and symptoms, ranging from mild stress to severe trauma. Most of the research on the impact of war-related violence on children addresses single acute episodes of warfare. The literature of children exposed to chronic violence is less well developed. This study investigated the effects of the ongoing political violence on Palestinian children living in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank. Additionally, risks relating to maternal and family functioning, and protective factors relating to maternal mediation were examined in light of children's experiences with political violence. A sample of 150 Palestinian children and their mothers was recruited from cities and villages in the West Bank in 9/1990. Psychological and behavioral symptoms of children were measured using the Child Behavior Checklist administered to the mother. The Conflict Tactics Scale, Parenting Stress Index, Cornell Behavior Description, and Violence Questionnaire were used to measure the variables of political violence, family violence, problems in maternal functioning, and child rearing strategies. The results demonstrated that Palestinian children who experienced a serious Intifada-related injury, an Intifada-related arrest of a family member, or a recent violent Intifada event, displayed significantly more psychological and behavioral symptoms than children who did not have these experiences. Moreover, children who experienced both violence within the family and political violence achieved significantly higher scores on psychological and behavioral symptomatology than children who did not experience both types of violence. Additionally, the accumulation of risk factors in children's lives was significantly related to increased psychological and behavioral problems. Furthermore, mothers were found to be important mediators of stressful experiences for their children. While mothers who were depressed could not protect their children from negative developmental outcomes, mothers who engaged in high levels of verbal reasoning with their children had children who had lower levels of psychological and behavioral symptoms. Finally, boys were more susceptible to negative outcomes from family and Intifada risks than were girls, and younger children (aged 6-9) were more vulnerable than were older children (aged 12-15). [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [=]

10040. LCOME; Bruskin, Gene. "Intifada, US Unionist Report", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter 1990. KFARNNAMEH IS A SMALL mountain village of 4000 inhabitants in the West Bank on the outskirts of Ramallah which sits close to the end of a long twisting road to the mountain top. In January, I visited the village with a US delegation following the international 1990: Time for Peace" demonstrations in Jerusalem. As our bus struggled to climb the mountain I wondered why we were visiting this village which seemed too isolated to be part of the intifada, let alone a threat to the Israelis. Nearing the village, a partially destroyed home, the Intifada, became a reality. The literature of children exposed to violent experiences relating to political conflict exhibit a variety of responses and symptoms, ranging from mild stress to severe trauma. Most of the research on the impact of war-related violence on children addresses single acute episodes of warfare. The literature of children exposed to chronic violence is less well developed. This study investigated the effects of the ongoing political violence on Palestinian children living in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank. Additionally, risks relating to maternal and family functioning, and protective factors relating to maternal mediation were examined in light of children's experiences with political violence. A sample of 150 Palestinian children and their mothers was recruited from cities and villages in the West Bank in 9/1990. Psychological and behavioral symptoms of children were measured using the Child Behavior Checklist administered to the mother. The Conflict Tactics Scale, Parenting Stress Index, Cornell Behavior Description, and Violence Questionnaire were used to measure the variables of political violence, family violence, problems in maternal functioning, and child rearing strategies. The results demonstrated that Palestinian children who experienced a serious Intifada-related injury, an Intifada-related arrest of a family member, or a recent violent Intifada event, displayed significantly more psychological and behavioral symptoms than children who did not have these experiences. Moreover, children who experienced both violence within the family and political violence achieved significantly higher scores on psychological and behavioral symptomatology than children who did not experience both types of violence. Additionally, the accumulation of risk factors in children's lives was significantly related to increased psychological and behavioral problems. Furthermore, mothers were found to be important mediators of stressful experiences for their children. While mothers who were depressed could not protect their children from negative developmental outcomes, mothers who engaged in high levels of verbal reasoning with their children had children who had lower levels of psychological and behavioral symptoms. Finally, boys were more susceptible to negative outcomes from family and Intifada risks than were girls, and younger children (aged 6-9) were more vulnerable than were older children (aged 12-15). [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [=]

VILLAGE TELL STORY: We were greeted by smiling children and economy. were girls, and younger children (aged 6-9) were more vulnerable than were older children (aged 12-15). [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]
village without even a single telephone? What I understood from their explanation was that Kflameh was being punished for being defiant, for its residents maintaining their dignity; they flew Palestinian flags, wore freedom slogans on the village walls and hung posters of Yasser Arafat from their lamp posts. Afterward, we visited a women’s clothing production cooperative in the village where approximately 20 women produce shirts and jeans of impressively high quality. The co-op was organized with the help of the Womens’ Action Committee with Israeli army, was first published in Jordan in 1985. In it Tuqan recounts her struggle to become a free and creative person in a society in which women have not been allotted any independent role whatsoever. “In this house, enclosed by its high walls that exclude the entire outside world from the scrutiny of the women buried alive inside it, my childhood and my adolescence and much of my youth were stilled” (p. 27).

The story of her life is interwoven with the account of the struggle of the city of Nablus against its occupiers and the deepseated identification of Tuqan with the fate and the heroes of the Palestinian people. Fadwa sees herself as a Palestinian poet who has been greatly influenced by her closeness to the revolutionary poets of her people, including her brother Ibrahim Tuqan, whom she considers her spiritual mentor. There was always a strong link between the Palestinian poet and the movement conducting the national struggle, since the Palestinian poet was the product of the struggle as it evolved while at the same time also influencing that struggle.” But as a woman, not allowed to take an active part in political life, Fadwa finds it difficult to write political propaganda poetry.

Fadwa had the good fortune of not becoming an obedient and submissive woman, as was expected from females of the bourgeois class to which her family belonged. Instead she rebelled against societal norms and attained her emotional and intellectual aspirations. Yet the non-Arab reader cannot fail to realize what a high price she was obliged to pay for this. She has remained too vulnerable and sensitive, and for most of her life she has preferred isolation to the society around her.

Mifras Publishers, pioneers in translating Arabic literature to Hebrew, deserve much credit for enabling us to make the acquaintance of this remarkable woman. Perhaps the time has come to translate her poetry as well.[=]

10042. Levy, Howard S. The Lotus Lovers: The Complete History of the Curious Erotic Custom of Footbinding in China: Part 2: Curious, Buffalo, N.Y.: Integral Publishing; Prometheus Books, 1992. After the abolition of footbinding in the twentieth century, it is easy to forget that footbinding was advocated and practiced for a millennium. Respected writers, such as Fang Hsun, the self-styled ‘Doctor of the Fragrant Lotus’ wrote essays advancing the lotus foot that were read for centuries. In his work he enumerated 58 kinds varieties of the human lotus, listed in nine categories of quality (‘from Divine Quality’ to the ‘False Article’ that resembled a ‘climbing monkey’). Fang Hsun detailed the etiquette necessary for women with the Lotus Foot, games that focus on small feet, and cited poems and folk sayings that condemned the large-footed woman; Fang Hsun also detailed the conduct required of men towards ‘ladies whose feet were so finely bound that they seemed to give rise to lotuses with every step”. (p. 112) Fang Hsun lived in a time when footbinding was unquestioned (while Manchu officials publicly legislated against footbinding, they privately conceded the “superior merits of the tiny foot”), and even more modern apologists for footbinding observe: “Permanents and plucked eyebrows were imported from abroad. If China were now the greatest power in the world, wouldn’t every foreign woman today be studying footbinding?” (p. 127) Modern apologists also dismissed the role of imperialism, feudalism, private and public possession, economic dependence or even the influence of men for footbinding, noting that “since it was instinctive for women to use adornments to win the male, binding served this instinct. By destroying a part of their bodies women caused men to love this part even more, to the point of madness.” “The poor copy the rich; the rich copy the courtesans.” (p. 128) Foreign observers noted that footbinding was desirable due to the sexual attraction of footbinding (illustrated in a vast pornography of lotus-foot manipulation supplemented with special training manuals for sexual techniques involving the tiny-footed) and
putative (and medically unconfirmed) effects of footbinding on female genitalia. At the same time, rubbing the arch of the bare tiny foot was widely described as very erotic by women and was seen as a special intimacy; even prostitutes routinely refused to unwrap their feet. Men found the smell and taste of tiny feet to be erotic, even to the extent of drinking the water used to wash the feet of the tiny footed women. Women would use their tiny feet to masturbate their male partners, and women often shared their tiny feet with other women so that they could participate constructively and profoundly in shaping the life of the country." In this paragraph of the 1962 National Charter, the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser laid down the principle of Egyptian women's equality with man. Six years earlier, the man who had led the 1952 revolution, had taken the bold step of giving Egyptian women the right to vote, a right that had been withheld from them despite several decades of campaigning. Soon afterwards women were enabled to stand for election to the National Assembly and to membership of Egypt's political organization, the Arab Socialist Union. In 1962, a woman, Haknet Abu Zeid, was nominated to a cabinet post as Minister of Social Affairs and, for the first time since it was established more than a thousand years ago, the Al-Azhar University extended its instruction to girls students. But women continued to be deprived of many basic human rights: the Charter reflected Nasser's determination to break down the persisting social prejudices that kept so many of them, still, on the fringe of society.

This year, International Woman's Year, Egyptian women have been measuring the ground covered since the movement for women's emancipation started, early this century. Women from many international organizations have joined them, to compare notes with what is happening elsewhere in the world and exchange ideas. The picture that has emerged is a tribute to the Egyptian woman's courageous struggle for equality during the first half of the century and to the ease with which she adapted to the dramatic change in her prospects after 1952. The last twenty years have witnessed a veritable invasion by girls and women of male stronghold - universities, the administration, professions, industry, the business world. After 1952, all stages of education were opened to women, free of charge. In that year there were 3490 girls in university colleges against 37821 boys. According to the latest available figures, those for 1970-1971, 43255 girls and 109027 boys were by then attending universities. The girls' proportion of the total number of students had thus increased from roughly 8% to over 28% eighteen years later.

The urban Egyptian man is reconciled to the presence of women in nearly all his places of work, from offices and factories to hospitals, laboratories and law courts. Rural man has also revised his views. Country women have always worked with their menfolk. The problem in rural areas was to overcome male objections to daughters attending school (and university) and training for work other than handicrafts or helping in the fields. There too, there was a breakthrough after 1952. But, if Egyptian man has bowed to the granting to woman of the right to study and work, he is still holding out stubbornly against recognizing the personal and social rights that are hers by virtue of Islam and the country's constitution. Masculine prejudices are still stronger than rulers and legislators, even than the revealed word.

According to Mrs. Seza Nabawari, one of the leaders of the feminist movement in Egypt, it was in 1908 that women began to act collectively for their emancipation: a group of them, appalled by the alarmingly high rate of infant mortality, founded the first free women's welfare organization - the Muhammed Ali clinic. In 1910 a woman, Malika Hefni Nassif, submitted to the National Congress the first written report. She observes, "Overall, the children of if Egyptian man has bowed to the granting to woman of the right to study and work, he is still holding out stubbornly against recognizing the personal and social rights that are hers by virtue of Islam and the country's constitution. Masculine prejudices are still stronger than rulers and legislators, even than the revealed word."
later, in 1926, an intensive press campaign by the ulama (religious pundits) thwarted the Egyptian woman's attempts to secure reforms of Islamic law governing her personal status. The proposed reforms, submitted to the government, were: (i) that polygamy be allowed only in special cases such as the wife's sterility or incurable sickness; (ii) that divorce should be made more difficult and all divorce cases be heard in court in the presence of two relatives, trying to reconcile the couple; (iii) that the Bait el Ta'a (House of Obedience) under which a divorced woman has custody of her children should be extended up to the time of a daughter's marriage or a son's age of puberty; (iv) that the Bait el Ta'a (House of Obedience) regulation should be abolished. This regulation, intensely humiliating to women, empowers a husband to compel his estranged or runaway wife to return home and cohabit with him, resorting, if necessary, to the police to drag her back by force.

In 1929, Mrs. Nabawwai recalls, "woman was granted a small consolation"—the right to ask for divorce on grounds of ill-treatment by the husband. On the other hand his obligation to pay alimony was reduced from three years to one. Little progress has since been made with regard to woman's personal rights and status. Mrs. Aziza Hussein, who is chairman of the Cairo Family Planning Association and who has represented Egypt for many years on the United Nations Status of Women Commission, attributes this primarily to the fact that industrialization and economic development have been given precedence over social reforms. Mrs. Amina Said, the dynamic chief editor of a leading Cairo women's magazine and the first woman director of the Press Syndicate Board, blames the fact that the personal status law reforms are still blocked, after years of discussion, on "reactionary groups fighting progress".

In 1974, students and members of the staff of Al Azhar marched through Cairo to the People's Assembly waving religious banners and posters and shouting "No to Socialism, no to Nasserism, yes to Islam". The demonstration was not, as the slogans suggested, against an ideological trend in the country, but in protest against the long-debated reforms to grant women greater security and dignity in marriage. Three representatives of Al Azhar, who had approved the reforms during debate took part in the demonstration. "This could never have happened in the days of Nasser", Mrs. Amina Said commented. One of the arguments used by those who oppose the restoration of woman's rights is, she explained, that woman's emancipation "opens the door to communism, socialism and foreign ideologies". When I met Mrs. Amina Said recently, she had just written an angry reply for publication in her magazine to an article in Al Ahram, the leading Cairo daily, in which the Sheikh of Al Azhar condemned family planning, stating that it was forbidden by Islam. Such a statement by the highest religious authority in the country could, by a stroke of the pen, wreck years of uphill work by women's organizations and the official Family Planning Association.

When the government launched the family planning campaign in the mid-sixties, the previous Sheikh of Al Azhar helped to overcome misgivings by affirming that Islam did not oppose birth control but even advocated it when it was a question of saving a woman's life or health, and ensuring the happiness and welfare of the couple and family. Family planning has already had some impact on the birthrates and in releasing women for work outside the home. Women today make up over 48 per cent of a total work force of about 11.5 million.

Women in the feminist movement argue with apprehension that regression in family planning would mean regression in all fields. It would drastically weaken the important role Egyptian women have come to play in society in the past twenty years. They point out, too, that it could have a devastating effect on the country's economy, currently in a state of acute crisis, and on plans for future development. The proliferation in Egypt, in the past few years, of extremist groups advocating the reposition of what progressive Muslims view as erroneous interpretations of Islam is causing grave concern. Emancipated women are arguing that it is not a feminist movement that is needed so much as a movement for the liberation of man from the complexes and false values that distort his judgment. Women, they say, prove every day and everywhere that they are equal to men. It is men who have to be made to see. [↩]
Arab world, despite the fact that even in permissive Beirut non marital sex is almost unheard of and casual dating is by no means the norm. Abortion is punishable with imprisonment and although contraception is socially acceptable among the middle class; it remained forbidden by law, a rather lamentable situation in a country whose density of population is higher than that of any other area of South West Asia.

Of the total Lebanese work force 17.5% are women, 60-70% of whom work on small plots of land. Muslim women tend to lead more reserved lives within the family circle and are under little pressure to pursue professional careers. Ultimately the position of women in Lebanon, as in any country, hinges on their rights under the law. Lebanese law, particularly when it concerns the personal status of the individual is so complicated that in the past it has proved too baffling for the majority of women to understand, let alone challenge. Today however Laure Moghaizal, lawyer and militant feminist, is battling no] only to clarify Arab country to send women delegates to the United Nations. In its tribal areas there were two famous women judges. Before the 1958 revolution education for girls in schools, universities and a number of training colleges was already firmly established, and all education was free for boys and girls alike. Facilities for girls were again expanded after the revolution. The Baath Baath Socialist government - in power since 1963 expressed its intention of further improving the position of women in its National Action Charter of November 1971. This provided for "the liberation of women from feudalist and bourgeois concepts and from the conditions and bondage that had rendered her a mere means of entertainment or second-class citizen."

10047. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 07: Iraq. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Modern Iraq has always been a country where the exceptional woman could rise to the top. After the Second World War it was the first Arab country to send women delegates to the United Nations. In its tribal areas there were two famous women judges. Before the 1958 revolution education for girls in schools, universities and a number of training colleges was already firmly established, and all education was free for boys and girls alike. Facilities for girls were again expanded after the revolution. The Baath Baath Socialist government - in power since 1963 expressed its intention of further improving the position of women in its National Action Charter of November 1971. This provided for "the liberation of women from feudalist and bourgeois concepts and from the conditions and bondage that had rendered her a mere means of entertainment or second-class citizen."

For the purpose of this report Dr. Al Attia Fawzia, head of the department of sociology at Baghdad University, was asked what progress women had made. She replied that during the past ten years they had made great advances, not in their "political and economic organization but in social relationships, particularly those between men and women". She provided much of the following information:

The most striking evidence of women's emancipation is in their wide range of employment. They form 30% of the country's doctors and pharmacists 30% of its teachers and university lecturers 34% of the staff of government departments, 26% of workers in industry and 45% of those on farms. Equal pay in government service is normal. Married women get the same pay as single men and are allowed 40 days maternity leave before delivery, 43 days after, and can then, at once, return to work if they wish. Their infants cared for in creches until they are three years old. Of course there is much to be done before reforms make their mark on rural areas. An Indian observer who recently toured some villages found them much like Indian villages, the women "backward, uneducated and lethargic". On government farms, however, women work as tractor drivers, mechanical engineers and agricultural technicians. Some of the modern farms are run entirely by women. As in Egypt and Syria, veiling is rare either in town or country but in Iraq the abaya (black cloak) is customary among less educated women and outside Baghdad is thrown on even by women teachers when they come out of school. An important development in the breaking down of sex barriers is the government's encouragement of many more mixed schools and colleges. This is of special value in primary schools, where most children were formerly segregated and so, at an early age, received an enduring impression that boys and girls were ordained to exist apart. At universities and other institutes of higher education women make up 24% of the total number of 45910 students.

The legal status of women seems likely to be improved through the work of a special committee, recently set up by the government with the object of bringing women nearer to equality with men. It hopes to abolish polygamy and strengthen women's divorce and inheritance rights. Dr. Fawzia maintains that the only outstanding distinction between men and women is the exceptional importance attached to a woman's pre-marital virginity. In this respect, she says, social attitudes have not changed at all. "Therefore", to quote her own words "men enjoy many more privileges than women in every section of society. Speaking, emancipation of women is limited and women in our country are still subject to discrimination. Such discrimination offers from one country to another."

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The 1956 law replaced the Koranic law with a unified legal system for all Tunisians (Moslems, Christians and Jews), and placed them under the jurisdiction of the common law courts. It forbade polygamy and repudiation. It gave women equal rights in asking for divorce and the right to choose their spouses rather than accept the family's choice. The law was ambiguous on the question of Tunisian women marrying non-Muslims. In theory a Muslim woman was allowed to marry outside her religion, but it was left to a judge to decide whether the difference in religion was an impediment. In practice, the judge often ruled that it was. The law laid down that women could not be married before the age of 15, and put to work before 17. Since then Tunisian women have had the age of marriage raised officially to 17. In practice, however, girls do still get married before this age. According to the law, men and women must receive equal pay for equal work and any man or woman convicted of adultery is liable to 5 years in prison. The law has, of course, only created an atmosphere, and not yet brought about deep country-wide changes. This is particularly so because it was far ahead of entrenched male attitudes.

There are also two Tunisiens. The division lies between Tunis and the rest of the country, with the one qualification that the coastal areas are less conservative than the interior. The relatively prosperous Tunis wife has 3-4 children. By contrast, her rural sister, with 5-6 children, finds life rough and hard. Medical care in the countryside is sparse and housing often grim. In visual terms, the streets and cafes of the villages are male preserves (as they are in the older parts of Tunis). Inevitably, the programmes of education and family planning have made less impact in the villages. The concept dies hard that there are more working hands available and greater security in having many children. More sacrifices are made for boys than for girls.

Some progress has been achieved, but Tunisian women feel that not enough is being done. Statistics show that for every five jobs created for males, only one is created for women.

Currently there are only four men members of the national assembly, and no ministers. In 1973, of 4325 directors or senior engineers in government projects 182 were women, at university 2514 out of 10992 were women; at primary level 362,000 out of 935000 children. A survey of 340,000 women in jobs showed that 73.5% were in agriculture, 12 per cent in textiles and leather work, 3.5% in administration, 2.3% in business, and 8.7% in other jobs. Experience has shown that equal pay is observed in the breach when recruiting is done for women at all, often not observed on the factory floor, and hardly at all in the countryside.

The active Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisienennes (UNFT) which has played a major role both in forwarding women's rights and also family planning education, makes the point that the statutory one month's pregnancy leave is a medical minimum, and that while family planning is welcomed its application has to be careful as well as practical. One set of figures shows the uneven way in which some methods are applied. In Tunis the proportion of abotions to the irrecoverable tying up of the Fallopian tubes was 110 to 31, while in Jendouba it was 6 to 38, and in Kairouan 6 to 25. The family planning programme has been conducted vigorously in the press and on radio and television. Since 1964 it has received a credit of 4.8 million from the International Development Association as well as assistance from European countries. The IDA credit provides the foreign currency for the whole $7.7 million programme. This included, apart from raising the level of technical instruction, the building of maternity hospitals at Bizerta, Tunis, Sousse and Sfax, and many centres for mother and child care.

In Tunisia itself, the sexes mingle easily inside and outside their places of education, but open dating in pairs is still frowned on. Parental approval is required. The spousal is prevalent. The public debate in Tunisia about women's rights shows that the question is being handled on a sophisticated level. Some inroads are being made in the distant governorates, where women are becoming head mistresses, professors, teachers and doctors. But for further advances, more economic development—as well as improvement in educational and medical facilities—is needed, particularly in the countryside. Tunisia has made a creditable start on the core of the problem of women having equal rights in a Muslim society, practice has yet to catch up with the theory for which legislation has been made. [=]

10048. Minority Rights Group; McDermott, Anthony; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 08: Tunisia. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Advanced legislation, considerable investment in education and President Bourguiba's drive - from the earliest days of independence - have brought Tunisia to the position of having one of the more enlightened approaches in the Arab world towards women's rights. Almost 20 years since the promulgation of the seminal Personal Status Code of 1956, the results can be seen in the streets of Tunis. There almost as many women throng as men. The veil is a rarity except in the poorer and older parts of the city. Chic, western-dressed women can be seen in shops, offices, buses, and behind the wheels of cars. In the country's newspapers and magazines there are lively debates about women's rights and responsibilities and such subjects as the merits of sex instruction in schools.

10049. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 09: Algeria. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. When Algeria became independent a group of Algerian heroines of the resistance made a tour of the Arab capitals and were feted everywhere. On arriving at Kuwait and smilingly descending from their aircraft, they found themselves greeted by a row of expressionless faces. The Kuwaiti women, lined up at the airport to welcome them, were blacked out by heavy veils. At the close of their visit a transformation scene took place. The same Kuwaiti women, before driving to the airport to see of their Algerian guests, received instructions from their government to go unveiled. Since then no young educated Kuwaiti woman has worn a veil. Thus the women of Algeria, who by their exertions did so much to liberate their country, helped their Kuwaiti sisters by their example. The twist in the tail of this story is that visitors to Algeria today are always struck by the extent to which the veil is retained there, outside the small educated class.

Under French rule women clung to the veil in defiance of French attempts to westernise them. They are encouraged to wear it still as a mark of the Algerians' intention to develop along their own non-western lines. The chosen lines are socialist and Islamic, but whereas socialist Algeria, with its planning of heavy industry and admirable social services, is essentially forward-looking, Islamic Algeria looks backwards to reinforce Arab traditions. It is women who suffer the brunt of this; but hope for their future lies in Algeria's steadily expanding educational programmes. In 1962-1963 there were 14346 girls in secondary schools compared with 36868 boys. By 1970-1971 the numbers had increased to 66570 girls and 236884 boys. In 1962-1963 only 579 girls went on to higher education as against 2230 boys. By 1970-1971 the numbers had risen to 4938 girls and 19213 boys. If girls have not increased their proportion of places, it is because, under France, the "boys themselves were so exceptionally deprived. At the close of their visit a transformation scene took place. The same Kuwaiti women, before driving to the airport to see of their Algerian guests, received instructions from their government to go unveiled. Since then no young educated Kuwaiti woman has worn a veil. Thus the women of Algeria, who by their exertions did so much to liberate their country, helped their Kuwaiti sisters by their example. The twist in the tail of this story is that visitors to Algeria today are always struck by the extent to which the veil is retained there, outside the small educated class.

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commit suicide rather than to submit to such marriages. In her book, La Femme Algerienne, (Maspero, 1969) Fadella M'Rabat recorded 175 such suicides (or attempted suicides) in 1964, the figure having been given by a doctor on Algerians radio as applying to cases brought into a single hospital in Algiers. The wave of suicides took place in the immediate aftermath of independence, when so many women were disappointed at the new Algeria could not offer them a better deal. Fadeda M'Rabat records that Algerian religious leaders, who had thought it too black a general picture but her specific documentation from press and radio is careful. Algerian women are forbidden to marry foreigners (non-Muslims) and birth control is discouraged (but not, as in Lebanon, prohibited) since Algeria hopes to support a population much larger than its present 15 million when its economic plans mature.

The lot of the vast majority of Algerian women—those in rural or poor urban areas - has recently been described by an Algerian sociologist, writing under the pseudonym "Maht" in People, the organ of the International Planned Parenthood Association (Volume 2, Number 1, 1975): "Their fathers, brothers, or paternal uncles, and later their husbands and sons, decide everything for them and manage their property. If the man abuses his authority, the woman will become his slave, in the strictest economic sense of the word... If he is good, she will have to give thanks every day of her life for the good fortune that has placed her in the hands of such a good master. For it is from her master that she derives her social legitimacy. A woman alone—a widow or a single woman without male relatives—finds it almost impossible to obtain recognition from ubiquitous authority, for example in getting a flat through the state bureaucracy. ... Many such women lost their men in the liberation struggle but others are similarly placed as a result of repudiation, which allows a man to send his wife away without giving her freedom to remarry and thereby regain legitimacy by means of a legal divorce."

This description might have been written about the backward areas of some other Arab countries except that it is not common Islamic practice for a man to repudiate his wife without setting her free. In Algeria confusion has existed because a law, new in 1959 and which should have been helpful to women, required that all divorces be decided in court. Repudiation, however, was such a deep-rooted custom that men went on with it, regardless, since legal procedures are so intricate, particularly to the illiterate. (70% of Algerian men are illiterate and 91% of women). Those women, unaware of their rights, were always getting cast into limbo. In recent years, however, divorce cases, including suits for custody, have vastly increased in number and it looks as if the divorce laws are at last taking proper effect. A new family code that would further improve women's rights in marriage has been under debate for some years but runs into opposition from the ulema and indifference in high places. The men who underpin Colonel Boumedienne's regime, whether as technocrats, soldiers or party leaders, have many of them, risen from peasant or workerbackgrounds, where men and women alike take the subservience of women for granted. Older women are as tough as the men in wanting to keep women in their place. Today's young educated women describe themselves as the "sacrifice generation" because they have gained so little personal liberty from Algeria's own liberation but believe that their daughters - perhaps even their younger sisters - may reap fuller benefits. This belief may well be shared by President Boumedienne, whose policies are always gradualist. While the regime pours all its energy into creating in Algeria an industrialized socialist state designed to give all Algerians a decent standard of living, he asks for patience from men as well as women; men wait for jobs just as women wait for rights. [=]

10050. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 10; Saudi Arabia. Ramphlet. London: Minority Rights Group December 1975. In Saudi Arabia women's place is in the home and their life is more circumscribed than in any other Arab country. This is the heartland and bastion of Islam, the centre from which the great Arab expansion originated. It was the home of the Prophet Muhammad and is the custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Perhaps even more relevant from the point of view of social life today, it was the homeland two centuries ago of the puritanical reformer, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, who found his most enthusiastic followers among the Bedouin of Nejd and the Saudi family. When their descendant, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, conquered the Hejaz half a century ago his followers brought their fanatical religious views to the west coast as well. They have not taken such deep root there however, and society in Jeddah is more permissive than in Riyadh.

Social life is completely regulated by Sharlyah law and the strict Saudi interpretation of it ensures that women's life is secluded and lived largely within the family. Most marriages are arranged by the family, and a first cousin on the father's side is the preferred match. As one educated young woman, happily married to her own first cousin, said: "If there is a 'nice cousin, why bother to look farther afield. The family will be happy too, since such a marriage keeps the inheritance intact". The prevalence of cousin marriages might be expected to produce an undue proportion of handicapped children. Educated Saudi girls seem aware of this, but remark that it is second and third cousin marriages which are dangerous; first cousin marriages, the preferred match, are considered safe.

Polygamy is not likely to disturb the marriages of the educated young today. It was common among the older generations, particularly in the royal family. Both King Abdul Aziz and King Saud produced dozens of sons, the offspring of many wives, but this was probably as much for political as uxorious reasons. Among the ordinary people today the desire for consumer goods and a comfortable home, and to some extent the influence of the west, have made polygamous marriages rare. Where they do occur in unsophisticated society they can be happy in a way which is quite incomprehensible to western minds. "Of course my neighbour and I are close friends" one middle aged woman remarked, "our daughters had the same father" (who incidentally divorced both mothers after). Another pair of young wives lived inseparably as sisters, cared for each other and each other's children, and were openly gleeeful when their lorry driver husband went off on one of his long trips, leaving them in peace together.

Women go out little unless accompanied by their husbands, and their company consists of women and children. In the shops most purchases are made by men, and it is absolutely usual in the towns to see not a single woman in the street. When women do go out they are always veiled to some extent. Among the most evoluee this may be just a token bit of black material thrown over the hair. But for the majority veiling consists of a long black gown, the abaya, which covers them from head to foot and over the face a black veil whose thickness depends on their husband's strictness. Some veils are now so diaphanous as to hide nothing; and an increasing number of women are abandoning face veils altogether. In the south eastern desert, bordering the United Arab Emirates, the nomad women still wear face masks, hung in some districts with silver coins. The discomfort of wearing them in the great heat is considerable.

Though home life is still secluded, and in the larger houses the women live mostly upstairs and do not even seem to have the run of their homes and garden, it has acquired several added pleasures in the past few years. Among these are television and the telephone. The latter is an extraordinary boon to the better off Saudi women who can thus chat for hours with the friends whom they cannot often see because they are forbidden to drive cars (though many hold international driving licenses) or to go about much alone. The birth rate is still high but family size has for some time now been widely limited by all classes who have grasped the boon of family planning. The government's ban, this year, on the import of contraceptives because of the recent low census returns has not been greeted with dismay.

Outside the close social circle few pastimes are available. Some women's societies were opened a dozen years ago, two in Jeddah and one in Riyadh. They provide a little social life on a strictly segregated basis but much enjoyed for all that, they do some welfare work with orphans and poor families, but their main task is educational, offering classes to women and girls over school age.
Indeed since female education was introduced it has become the main outlet for the women of Arabia, in the towns at any rate. Starting from scratch 15 years ago, and in the face of considerable opposition (King Faisal had to bring out the troops to open a girls' school in Buraida), schooling for girls now seems totally accepted. There are currently school places for about half as many girls as boys (264,000 girls to 527,000 boys in all), but the proportion of girls drops sharply after primary. In secondary schools there are 27,000 girls to 78,000 boys and at university level there are only 1,000 girls to 13,500 boys. The quality of girls' higher education is lower than that for boys. The university in Jeddah has a separate, smaller library for girls; that in Riyadh offers no library access to girls and books are brought out to them. Many of the girls' classes in Riyadh are given by television for lack of suitable women teachers; in Jeddah no first year students were admitted last year because the women's university was under threat of closure. But girls do take the same exams as the boys so their final degree is completely valid.

The labour market was virtually closed to women up to a decade ago, except for some domestic servants who were born slaves and stayed on contentedly in the families in which they were brought up. For indigenous Saudi women the scope was non-existent, and it is still severely limited. Only 1% of women now work outside the home (surely the lowest participation rate in the world, but double the figure of 5 years ago). Labour regulations prohibit women from working in close proximity with men. But the government now encourages girls to work as teachers in girls' schools, nurses in women's hospitals, and doctors and social workers caring for women and children. Currently some 50% of primary teachers are Saudi women, but only five teach at university level. Work in offices has been frowned on and in 1973 companies were asked to dismiss their women staff and employ men instead. Several Saudi girls lost their jobs with foreign firms at that time, but with remarkable persistence have quietly found similar jobs since. There are now an increasing number of girls working unobtrusively in offices. A senior official in the Labour Department recently commented that soon there would be thousands of educated Saudi girls and that it would be better from the economic point of view to consider utilizing “this portion of the labour force through ideal methods and in accordance with the traditions, customs and labour laws, instead of resorting to recruitment from abroad.” If his words are heeded they should herald a breakthrough for Saudi women.

Women who do work are free of one of the major handicaps of working women in the west. They have no problem of reconciling a family with a career. Living in the extended family system and in a country still well endowed with domestic servants, the working mother can go out with no worries about her children. And pregnancy is taken as such a normal state that it causes no disturbance to a career. Socially, restrictions have eased noticeably over the past three years. One can point to more mixed social life in the wealthier classes, less veiling, less of the mixing with men.  But the government now encourages girls to work as teachers in girls' schools, nurses in women's hospitals, and doctors and social workers caring for women and children. Currently some 50% of primary teachers are Saudi women, but only five teach at university level. Work in offices has been frowned on and in 1973 companies were asked to dismiss their women staff and employ men instead. Several Saudi girls lost their jobs with foreign firms at that time, but with remarkable persistence have quietly found similar jobs since. There are now an increasing number of girls working unobtrusively in offices. A senior official in the Labour Department recently commented that soon there would be thousands of educated Saudi girls and that it would be better from the economic point of view to consider utilizing “this portion of the labour force through ideal methods and in accordance with the traditions, customs and labour laws, instead of resorting to recruitment from abroad.” If his words are heeded they should herald a breakthrough for Saudi women.

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10051. Minority Rights Group; Petran, Tabitha; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 11: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Since their country became independent under the leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1967, South Yemeni women have come to the forefront of the Arab women's emancipation movement. They have already achieved the most advanced family status law in the Arab world. The Marxist NLF is committed to women's emancipation because it believes development and use of this latent resource essential to construct a socialist society. The Women's Union, founded in 1968, shares the task of women's political education with the Student and Youth Unions, encourages women to become literate, to participate in campaigns for women's rights and helps with marriage and divorce problems. Although underrepresented in higher NLF and government councils, women's leaders have proved to be militant and independent fighters for more radical advance. Preparation of the Family Law of 1/5/1974 shows the NLF's manner of winning popular participation in, and acceptance of, radical change. The Women's Union, trade unions and NLF cadres first discussed, amended and applied to themselves the provisions of a draft family law—later rejected by the People's Supreme Council—so as to be more radical. The government meantime reorganized the courts dealing with family law, replaced traditionalist judges with modern younger men and limited the husband's right to unilateral divorce by ordering all divorce cases to be adjudicated by the Women's Union. Experience gained in handling such cases contributed to members' political education, increased their self-confidence and helped to create a climate favorable to reform. In rural areas, women encouraged by NLF cadres—began to demonstrate against polygamy and compulsory marriage and publicly to burn their veils. Their activities soon coalesced with the peasants' crash struggle against the feudalists and the drive to implement the land reform. By 1973 the social climate for nationwide discussion of a new draft family law had been created. Over a four-month period a committee of judges, officials and religious and Islamic learned men discussed the draft in open meetings, attended by hundreds, sometimes thousands, in almost every district of each governorate. Popular demands rationalized the law: most notably in establishing a woman's right to marry the man of her choice and so also the man's since traditionally the father often selected his son's bride.

Among other important provisions the law forbids parents to betrothe a daughter without her consent, limits exchanges of pre-marital presents and the dower paid by the bridgroom to prevent “buying” of daughters of the poor, outlaws child marriages and unilateral divorce, underlines “equal rights and obligations” in marriage and gives both partners the right to divorce on grounds of incompatibility, desertion and cruelty among others. The law did not respond to the many demands from both men and women to outlaw polygamy but did make taking a second wife impossible except in extreme cases. In matters of custody the mother is favoured even if she remarries; the court retains absolute discretion at all times to determine custody in the child's best interests.

Between 1967-1973 the number of girls attending primary school increased almost fivefold. Completion of the Five Year Plan (1975/4 to 1978/9) should increase the number of girls at all levels from primary through university by 150% from 24% of all students to 31%. The official Anti-illiteracy Movement (including numeracy, general and political education) involved almost 53,000 people, of whom more than half were women, in 1973/4, far exceeding plan projections. Trade unions, mass organizations, cooperatives, government departments, public corporations and projects wage their own anti-illiteracy campaigns. The plan aims to eliminate illiteracy by 1978/9.

In the past working women were mainly unpaid agricultural laborers or servants. Agrarian reform, organization of fishery and agricultural/cooperatives and state farms are altering this division of labour. To speed this process a school accommodating 3,000 girls (300 from each governorate, hence a majority from the countryside) started this year to teach women to drive and repair tractors, trucks, fishing boats, etc. and to learn carpentry, masonry, building, mechanical and other skills. Women are also encouraged to work in light industries, as teachers in girls' schools, nurses in women's hospitals, and doctors and social workers caring for women and children. Currently some 50% of primary teachers are Saudi women, but only five teach at university level. Work in offices has been frowned on and in 1973 companies were asked to dismiss their women staff and employ men instead. Several Saudi girls lost their jobs with foreign firms at that time, but with remarkable persistence have quietly found similar jobs since. There are now an increasing number of girls working unobtrusively in offices. A senior official in the Labour Department recently commented that soon there would be thousands of educated Saudi girls and that it would be better from the economic point of view to consider utilizing “this portion of the labour force through ideal methods and in accordance with the traditions, customs and labour laws, instead of resorting to recruitment from abroad.” If his words are heeded they should herald a breakthrough for Saudi women.

estimated 360000 in 1975. The increase is due to the influx of foreign laborers and specialists who make up as much as two-thirds of the population in the towns of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Only a few bring their families. This accounts for the imbalanced population structure in the UAE, where males outnumber females by almost 3 to 1. This article is concerned only with the locally born women.

Until the impact of oil was felt in the very different parts of the UAE, the seclusion of the local female was remarkably uniform throughout the region and all strata of society. For most women the essence of their way of life is still unchanged although there are many material innovations. Every woman's daily life is governed by the fundamental rule that the local household has two sections. The harem (sasracsect) is reserved for the head of the household, his womenfolk, including mother, sisters, aunts and the children. Only the closest male relatives are allowed to cross the threshold of this part of the family compound.

The majority of local women wear a mask of canvas dyed purple, covering part of the forehead and reaching just below the mouth. The burqa is taken off only for prayer performed at home, since women do not go to the mosque, and in the harem. But the custom is dying out - in most families now girls reaching puberty are no longer expected to don the mask.

The age of marriage for girls - 12 years upwards - is being postponed because the majority of girls are enrolled in school. The bride-price—consisting of a sum paid to the girl's father, money to buy jewellery and clothes and a fixed sum which the woman receives if she is divorced - is limited by a new law to £100. But for reasons of prestige most families will still not give their daughters away unless gifts and wedding festivities costing much more have been arranged. The less well-to-do and the elderly look for wives among poor girls from India and Egypt. The educated young men, too, often find a girl from a northern Arab country a more congenial partner. Thus for reasons of either price or the lack of formal education a great number of the local girls remain at present unmarried.

With the exception of some members of the ruling or the merchant families, little use was ever made of the provision in Islamic law for a man to have as many as four wives at a time. Most men could not afford to maintain more than one family. The common reason for having a second wife was if the first one was infertile. Most local men now favour monogamy as a matter of principle and a part of life portrayed as 'modern'. There are some who use their newly found wealth to establish and maintain several families - often in different towns. The few cases where girls of former slave origin are taken as concubines are vanishing. Divorce rather than a further marriage has in the past been the usual way out of childlessness or incompatible marriage. The girl returned to her parents and no stigma was attached. Hardship only arose if the woman had no family to go to, or if through age or illness she was unlikely to marry again and became a burden to her family. Divorce is practiced less readily by the educated and is discouraged by the religious authorities. Legally, only a husband can seek divorce, but there are instances in which young women dissatisfied with their arranged marriages, often wanting to continue at school, have deliberately driven their husbands to seek divorce.

No woman can be compelled by her father or guardian to enter into a marriage contract without her consent. However, out of shyness, ignorance and deference, young girls rarely oppose arrangements made by their fathers with the prospective husband whom they may never have seen before. It would mean an intolerable loss of security for the girl to risk cutting the closest ties she has in life - those with her own family.

The present generation of girls will experience fundamental changes in their lives as women and in the upbringing of their own families. While previously only a few girls learnt to read and recite the Koran, most girls now go at least through primary education, even in remote desert and mountain areas. Because the first girls' schools opened (in Sharjah) only in the 1950s, there are still very few females who have completed secondary education or a professional training. At present there are local girls students at Arab and European universities. Only in Dubai and Sharjah is it acceptable for veiled women to drive cars.

In the process of social change the original uniformity of social standards has given way to regional differences in the adaptation of new and alien standards. Among the merchant communities there are more families in which some fundamental changes in the lives of women have already accompanied the material ones. Efforts are being made through women's societies, television, evening schools and mothers' councils in schools to bring the older generation into contact with the changing environment which their children are experiencing. A small percentage attend courses offered in literacy and domestic sciences. In the new towns and villages women no longer need to fetch water and firewood or tend gardens and animals. They are separated from their relatives and tribal neighbors by communities of expatriates in blocks of flats and by streets full of foreign men. Therefore many women confine themselves to their own houses than before.

Previously women were fully aware of all the facets of the family's economic activities and its place in society. In this transitional period women are no longer in tune with the world in which their male and their young relatives live. But few women are even aware of this predicament. Their daughters will have to cope with the full range of changes such as reducing the number of family members living together and adjusting to women's role in professions and in public. [=]

10053. Minority Rights Group; Ingrams, Doreen; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 13: Oman. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Every morning - except Friday - groups of young girls, laughing and chatting, can be seen making their way to school in the towns and villages of Oman. They wear long trousers, tight at the ankles, a tunic and a veil thrown loosely over their heads and shoulders. Some of the older girls wear the abaya. Each girl carries a brief case, either in her hand or on her head. All books have to be carried to and from school as owing to lack of staff and buildings there are at least two shifts every day. Many school buildings are brand new with up-to-date equipment, but in rural areas tents may provide temporary accommodation. Considering that in 1970 there were only three primary schools, attended by 900 boys, and by the end of 1974 there were 110 schools with some 35,000 pupils, of whom nearly 8,000 are girls, development has been amazingly rapid.

The only education available for girls prior to 1970 was in a Mission school in Muscat, or privately. When the first government girls' schools opened the demand for places was so great that first-year classes consisted of girls from six to sixteen, and the impact of educating girls soon had its effect on the women, some of whom began attending evening classes in order to keep up with their daughters. For the most part, however, Omani women have had no formal education at all. Unlike other countries of the Arabian peninsula many of them do not veil, but they maintain the traditional custom of seclusion. In spite of this the women have been quick to take advantage of the excellent free health services, which have expanded as rapidly as the education services. They have their children in hospital and confidently take their sick children to be treated as inpatients. Mothers are allowed to stay with their children and the hospital provides their food.

Television only came to Oman in November 1974, but already aeri als have sprung up all over Muscat and neighboring towns, not only on villas and modern blocks of flats, but on the small stone-built houses of the poorer families, and even on the barastis, the palm-frond huts. It is too soon yet to know what influence western films and international news pictures will have on the women who hitherto have been shielded from the outside world.

Not all Omani women are secluded, however. There are many who are playing a prominent role in public life, in government offices, in the business world, or in the medical and educational services. These are the Omanis from Zanzibar who lost their homes after the revolution in that island and who returned to their original homeland. They have had a different background to the women brought up in Oman. They have never been secluded. Many of them have had a good education, although some have only a smattering of Arabic as Swahili was their mother tongue. Whether as matron of a large hospital, an inspector of schools, a
policewoman in the Immigration department, or a secretary, the Zanzibar Omani woman is a great asset to this rapidly developing country.

Expatriate women - Egyptians, Jordanians, Indians, Pakistanis, are also prominent in the expanding social services as teachers, doctors or nurses. Oman has always absorbed people of other races and it may be this which gives it a relaxed air of tolerance. The fact that so few women are veiled is proof of that, and it will be surprising if, when the first generation of educated Omani girls leave school, they do not begin the change which eventually will lead to all the women taking a fuller part in Omani life. [=]

10054. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 15: Other Countries: Libya. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. LIBYA, like Algeria, practice Islamic socialism but the Islamic impact on women is cushioned by the country's exceptional oil riches. These ensure well-paid work for men and social security provisions on a generous scale. For example, in 1973 President Qaddafi raised widows pensions from 4-20 diners (about £35) a month. Not many women of the poorer class need to work but work exists for them, making cigarettes in Tripoli, or textiles and rugs in Benghazi. The arranged marriage, more or less de rigueur, tends to be stable, again because financial sufficiency makes for domestic peace. Few women are seen in public. Those who must go out to work or shop are wrapped in the all enveloping baracan, covering all but one eye. Richer women move about by car and young educated women are beginning to drive themselves. The one area where the rules against women meeting men are lifted is the university, where the sexes mix. The number of girls at university rose from 222 in 1967 to 948 in 1972. Most women graduates hope to stay on for postgraduate studies, partly because their student days have been so happy and partly because there are few outlets yet for their talents outside academic life. There are a handful of women doctors, some women lawyers working for the government and various university lecturers and headmistresses. Women are also working in quite large numbers as nurses, radio and television announcers, secretaries, telephonists and receptionists, sometimes replacing Palestinians or Egyptians who used to do all these jobs. But the average Libyan woman, marrying at 16 and having a lot of children (the government encourages large families since Libya is underpopulated) is still content with her role. If anything it is a small minority of sophisticated travelled young men who are beginning to turn against the traditional type of marriage, with a home always cluttered with visiting female relatives, and opting for a more private life with a wife from Egypt or Palestine, or, often enough, from Europe. [=]

10055. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 16: Other Countries: Kuwait. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. KUWAIT has a small group of women of singular intellectual distinction but in such a small country it is hard to find posts for its gifted women to fill. Some work in television and radio and administrative government positions and there are excellent women physiotherapists. One of these, who trained in England, has opened a first class hospital physiotherapy department and set up a school for handicapped children. Few girls work as nurses or secretaries (these positions are mostly filled by Indians, Egyptians and Palestinians), and no Kuwaiti woman does menial work. Since 90% of Kuwaiti men work for the government and social security looks after every contingency— even giving a monthly pension to any girl who, at eighteen, is still unfortunate enough not to have found a husband - everybody lives comfortably: the minimum wage is the equivalent of £3500. In such a contented atmosphere a small "women's lib" group that seeks to reform the Sharia, laws and give women the vote and more opportunities at work, makes only a little headway, but may gather more support as more girls with good education find time hanging heavy on their hands. Education is compulsory for all children and at Kuwait university 60% of the students are women. Kuwaiti's special contribution to women's emancipation is in all the schools and universities it has paid for in poorer countries and the extent to which girls in those countries have benefited. [-]

10056. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 17: Other Countries: Bahrain. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. BAHRAIN - with less money, but enough - has been able to give a fuller life to a greater number of its women. Many are doing the jobs that are done in Kuwait by foreigners. There are 39 government officials, 718 teachers and 197 nurses and girls are pouring into secretarial work as the need for their services arises in government departments, the oil industry, and new industrial projects. A considerable step towards breaking down social sex barriers was taken in the 1960's when several mixed social clubs were founded. There has never been a Bahraini feminist movement. Emancipation has been coming about gradually in response to economic requirements and thanks to a steady educational process that began much earlier than Kuwait's - that is, when oil was first found forty years ago. Dr. Ali Hassan Taki, from whose monograph, published this year, The Changing Status of Bahraini Women, much of this information has been taken, also mentions the attitude of Bahraini men as "quite flexible and tolerant". Less privileged women still lead the traditional life and, unlike the others, are veiled. The regular Shariah laws remain in force but the new facts of life are changing their impact. The marriage dowry, still obligatory, now places such a burden on men that the age of marriage has advanced for both sexes. Many women do not marry until they are over 20. A man university graduate earns, initially, only the equivalent of £1140 a year and the cost of living is only a little lower than in Britain. He therefore often chooses a wife who herself is earning. In such cases, as elsewhere in the Arab world, the woman waives her Islamic right to keep her earnings to herself and contributes to the family budget. Thus the idea of equal partnership in marriage is gathering strength. [=]

10057. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 18: Other Countries: Qatar. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Conditions for women in QATAR are much the same as in Saudi Arabia, since Qatar also belongs to the Wahabi sect of Islam. Nearly all women are veiled and have their separate quarters in the household. Education for girls is, however, coming on apace: in 1974 there were 10000 girls at schools compared with 12000 boys. Girls will be able to attend the university that is now being built in Doha. Instruction will be separate but the sexes will mix in the library common rooms and canteen. (The same system prevails in Kuwait). Few women are working as yet but the Emir of Qatar has recently expressed himself "confident that women will be able to play their full part without our social customs being in any way affected". Cable and Wireless Magazine, No.9 1975, which reported this statement, also tells of a revolutionary breakthrough having come with television: "For the past 18 months or so Qataris have been treated to the nightly sight of Qatari girl announcers, unveiled and wearing western dress and make-up, on the small screen." After an initial shock, Qatari viewers accepted this new dispensation with equanimity: "Oh, that is just television" they say". [=]

10058. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 19: Other Countries: Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Because of its poverty the YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (NORTH YEMEN) is one of the world's least developed countries. It is only in the last five years - since its civil war petered out - that it has been able to think about social reform. School education for girls is still in a pilot stage. A nursing college has been set up and girls, when up to it, will be able to attend the new university, which already has some women students. A number of these are refugees from South Yemen, who are comparatively emancipated. Women's work is mainly on farms. Some have learned to handle textile machinery at the Chinese built factory in Sanaa. Girls at university tend not to think of careers but, rather, of improving their chances to marry well. For the most part North Yemeni women are submerged in deepest tradition. Towns women are swathed from head to foot in cumbersome drab coloured wrappings; thick black or dark blue veils hang down from the tops of their heads, thus covering the whole
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10059. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 20: Other Countries: Morocco. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Women in MOROCCO hold many high positions in business and the professions and abound at the secretarial level. They shine in diplomacy. King Hassan's sister, Princess Lalla Aisha was ambassador to London from 1965-1969 and had on her staff a most gifted woman cultural attachée. Social changes have come very rapidly since independence, for which women fought alongside men. The same generation gap as exists in Algeria is felt between the neat trouser-suitied modern Moroccan girl and her conservative parents. But Moroccan restrictiveness is less harsh than Algeria's. Most middle class families disapprove of night clubs and night entertainment generally but Saturday afternoon parties of unchaperoned young men and women are much in fashion. In all classes girls are urged into an arranged marriage only if property interests are at stake. (But the same might be said of Christian Italy or Spain.) The strong Berber strain in Morocco's ethnic make-up produces unusual nuances in local customs. An exceptionally tentative attitude towards marriage among simple people is described in Vanessa Maher’s study of life in the Middle Atlas, Women and Property in Morocco (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Unril rural areas” she writes, “marriage for the girl is merely one of a series of temporary unions...” The main object of marriage is to procreate legitimate children; the woman's commitment to her husband is much slighter than that to her own family, to whom she returns when divorced. “The matter of importance is not that a girl should remain married but that she should have married status, thus safeguarding the family nif (honour)...” In the rural hinterland women marry many as often as six times. In more prosperous urban areas, however, marriage is more stable—because a man can give his wife greater economic security and, in return, has stronger claims on her—and divorce, though it happens, is deplored. Mme Halima Embarek Warzasi, who has served her country with great distinction at the United Nations, makes the point that while emancipation is not discouraged by men in Morocco, they do not help to promote it; and if women are to end the everyday discriminatory customs that depress their personal status, it is up to them to make their own stand for a full and firmly drafted reform of family law. [≡]

10060. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 21: Other Countries: Jordan. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. In JORDAN educational standards for women are high and women make up more than 30% of the country’s work force. They are prominent in all the professions and have responsible posts in various branches of government, including the police. King Hussein's modern style of life is reflected in urban society generally. Women in army uniform are a common sight. The formation of a women's army corps caused no public outcry since the major hurdle results. In Egypt and Algeria it is said that while so much concentration

10061. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 22: Other Countries: Palestine. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. Mention has already been made of PALESTINIAN women as torchbearers for women's emancipation. Scores of thousands are citizens of Jordan and thousands more are dispersed all over the Arab world. The fathers of better-off families who went into exile after the creation of Israel no longer put all their savings into land and property but paid much more attention to educating their daughters - as they had always educated their sons. To poorer refugee girls the schools provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency have given a sound education and high standards of proficiency are attained in UNRWA vocational training schools. So everywhere in the Middle East Palestinian women are serving as doctors, headmistresses, school and university teachers, administrators, nurses, secretaries and in the less advanced countries are providing living example of how, in a Muslim society, women may lead useful outgoings lives without loss of dignity or principle. [≡]

10062. Minority Rights Group; Dearden, Ann [editor]. Arab Women: Part 23: Other Countries: Conclusion. Pamphlet. London: Minority Rights Group, December 1975. The Arab woman in professional work is at present better placed than her European counterpart. If she is married, her children are usually well looked after by their grandparents, aunts or kindly domestic servants. Once established, she is highly respected and encounters little sex discrimination. At lower levels of work Arab women meet the familiar western type of discrimination - they are given the poorest jobs and, in most work, lower rates of pay. Arab women in the privileged classes freely exercise their Islamic right to conduct their own business. This applies even in the Arab Emirates where masked and illiterate, but perspicacious women from the leading families may be running anything from a fleet of taxis to a farm. In village society the same right cuts little ice. The village woman may well be talked out of any small inheritance she has by her brothers and could probably not run a business if she tried. These are the penalties of being an ignorant peasant, not of being a Muslim.

Wherever the Shariyah laws run, women of all classes are liable to have their marriages broken up at their husbands' whim and, in consequence, to lose custody of their older children. Great difficulties, both emotional and legal, are put in the way of their instituting divorce proceedings themselves and, should they succeed in a suit, they still stand to lose their children. The fact that in many countries there seem to be fewer divorces among middle class people who have been married for a reasonable time, than occur in similar groups in the West does not justify the preservation of discriminatory legislation—such legislation lowers the worth of a wife in her husband's eyes. and affects the way he treats her. In poorer circles women are often repudiated simply for being ill or for some other reason unable to pull their weight. In this sense repudiation is a form of staggered polygamy. Polygamy itself is hardly a burning question but, so long as it is permitted, it equally, by inference, debases the status of a wife. Only two countries (Tunisia and South Yemen) have reformed family status laws to give equal rights to women. Tunisian women owe their improved position to the vision of one man, President Bourguiba, who has continually backed up the law with personal exhortation. (He used to call the veil "that odious rag".) South Yemen has delved deeper into the grass roots and obliged men and women to re-think their problems together—with some remarkable results. In Egypt and Algeria it is said that while so much concentration is needed on economic development, to embark on any radical reform might cause too much popular unrest. Yet Tunisia and South Yemen are two of the poorest countries and have carried out reform without serious repercussions. It is true, however, that economic underdevelopment puts a major brake on women's liberation.

Sufficient educational, medical and family planning services cannot be provided—nor women be given—through work and welfare benefits—an alternative depending completely for their security on pleasing their male relations. An Example of this has recently come from South Yemen itself. The wife of a charmingly liberal young man was asked why she still wore a veil, when her husband did not require
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her to. She replied, "Because of my father. If I were to be divorced he might not take me back if he knew I had unveiled". As in Tunisia, it will take a long time for practice to catch up with the theory of South Yemen's new Family Law, though South Yemen is doing more to force the pace. What cannot be gauged in a country where all opposition is suppressed is the true state of public feeling.

Religious opponents of social reform in Egypt are unlikely to be impressed by South Yemen's pioneering efforts since they are being carried out by a Marxist government. In ideological argument women, it seems, cannot win. For socialist countries, such as Algeria, Iraq and Syria, women have been liberated along "western bourgeois" lines. This, at first sight, appears discriminatory since the higher up men in these countries, many of whom have risen from worker-backgrounds, are permitted to indulge bourgeois tastes, wear bourgeois clothes, drive bourgeois cars, live in bourgeois villas and encourage their wives to have domestic servants in bourgeois style. And, indeed, it is difficult to see how higher standards of living can be achieved except along some such lines. It may be that, in considering women, what Arab socialist governments condemn as "western and bourgeois" is the latter-day permissiveness in North America and North West Europe with its easy acceptance of premarital and extra-marital sex. But here Arab women, even the most emancipated, themselves draw the line. Of the many who have been consulted in the preparation of this report, nearly all have acknowledged their debt to the West in having provided an example (more or less) of the independent status and equal partnership in marriage they wish to have. But one and all have said that they want to achieve this status without loss of their most precious Arab traditions. Among these a strong family base and a certain Islamic decorum rank high. As far as sex is concerned, Islamic law includes penalties for adultery and fornication and these are retained, for example, in Tunisia's reformed legal system, but with prison sentences the same for men as for women. Legislation about such matters would not be acceptable in the West but may give Islamic society the safeguards it requires. In any event, it is impossible to conceive that the Arab people, who have imprinted their culture so indelibly on so many other races, could themselves suffer loss of identity in conceding to women the dignified personal status that many Islamic scholars believe was envisaged in the scriptures. Customs will change for all classes, as they have for the privileged class, with fuller economic development; but the psychology of equality cannot be established until women have equal rights before the law. [=]

No one could have been as surprised and unprepared for the collapse of the USSR as the leaders of the Central Asian successor states: this explains the strong support by theses leaders for the creation of some new umbrella group, such as CIS. There are longstanding ethnic tensions between Russians and Central Asians: Russians see Central Asians as superstitious, disease ridden, and as having large families that need Russian welfare payments (many share the sentiment of Solzhentsyn who argues that Russian settled areas of Kazakhstan should be annexed by Russia, and the rest of Central Asia be cast away); Central Asians see Russians as uppstart, near barbarians who imposed a crude Communism on their ancient cultures. The Brezhnev years were ones of relative prosperity (Gorbachev dismissed the period as stagnation), and this era was appreciated by the leaders of the Central Asian republics. The era saw broad development programs, even if their implementation was incomplete (numerous rural hospitals were built, but few had indoor plumbing). After Brezhnev's death, Andropov tried to implement reforms in Central Asia by taking on the old, corrupt Republic leaders. In Kazakhstan Yegor Ligachev and Gorbachev tried to reform the corrupt cotton industry, removing Muhammednazar Gapuroy (Turkmenistan), Rahm fool Nabie (Tajikistan), and Usbaliyev (Kirghizstan), each the head (first secretary) of their respective republic Communist parties. In 12/1986, Dinmuhammad Kunaev was forced into retirement in Kazkahstan in favor of Gennadi Kolbin: this was followed by riots that left 2-168 dead; the re-thinking of policy reform in Central Asia that followed merely allowed the revival of the boss system. However, the collapse of the USSR left the republics bereft on their longstanding subsidies from Moscow: the Central Asian republics remain the poorest in the USSR. Central Asia has a high birth rate, very high infant mortality (many women are pregnant every year and end up burying their infants), very poor health, high unemployment, worker shortages, and shortages of skilled workers and technicians (which will grow worse as Russians and Ukrainians leave Central Asia). The breakdown of the Communist Party has allowed the emergence of local factions: in Kirghizstan, three groups have emerged: clans from Naryn (led by party boss Turdaluk Usbaliyev and Pres. Askar Akaev, terming themselves the 'Democratic Bloc'), the Talas clans (deposed CP leader Absamat Masaliyev), and those from Osh (tied to the Ferghana Valley Uzbek party); in Tajikistan two groups: the Leninabad (Khojent) group, and the smaller Kulaib faction; in Uzbekistan five oblast based factions (Ferghana Valley, Bukhara, Samarkhand, Jizzak and Tashkent); in Kazakhstan four groups (the Great Horde group led by Pres. Islam Karimov who controlled the old Communist Party, the Middle Horde faction, the Lesser (Small) Horde faction, and the ethnic Russians who seek alliances with one of the Kazakh factions); and in Turkmenistan two factions (divided along tribal lines, with the faction led by Pres. Saparmurad Niazhov having predominant power from having been entrenched for so long). The current elites hope to remain in power long enough to select their successors from a new, more worldly generation. For the foreseeable future, popular participation in Central Asian government remains blocked.

10064. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. “Introduction”, in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 2, October 1, 1981. pp. 2-3. “Immigrant," "refugee," "guest worker," "bracero"-labels freely used to describe tens of millions of the world's people. But these are often inaccurate, arbitrary and deceptive. A Cambodian crossing into Thailand to flee hunger and political upheaval is regarded as a "political refugee" by the US government.A Haitian woman driven by the lack of food, work and housing to risk her own and her children's lives by escaping in a flimsy boat, is considered an "immigrant," a term suggesting a willful decision to flee from home. Yet the distinction between refugees (political refugees) and immigrants (economic refugees) is increasingly ambiguous. Is an Italian worker who has left home, family and friends to live in squalid conditions to work in exchange for West German marks really a guest worker? Are the Palestinians in their own land refugees?

Displaced Persons: According to the United Nations, there are 16 million refugees in the world. It is a figure many feel can only increase in light of the volatile international situation, a situation characterized by rivalries over land and resources and by the unequal distribution of wealth. Of the 16 million displaced persons, the majority are women, many of whom are widowed or heads of households.

For women, refugee life is particularly hard. They are often victims of rape, assault or abduction, not only in international waters, but also in remote areas and in the over-crowded refugee camps. Additionally, women are often the sole supporters of their families. It is the women who stand in line for food, fuel and water, who cook and clean, and who take care of the children.

Women suffer from a variety of health problems including shock and malnutrition. Many have amenorhea (disruption of the menstruation cycle) which can lead to sterility. Consequently, women bear few children in the camps. Those children who are born have little chance of survival because their mothers are often unable to breastfeed, a result of poor health which causes them to stop lactating within a few months after giving birth. Normally, many women would nurse their children until the age of two.

Overburdened by taking care of the family, women refugees have a minimal amount of time to receive training, counseling or learn another language. But the problems continue even after they are resettled in a new country. Isolated and with little opportunity for paid work, the women

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become more dependent on their husbands and further cut off from the outside world.

International Attention: It was not until the 1980 UN Mid-Decade Conference on Women that the particular situation of women refugees was addressed in an international forum. At the conference, the committee concerned with the condition of refugees, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), was pressured to acknowledge the majority of refugees as women. Specific aid and education programs for them. Nonetheless, there are still millions of women who do not even qualify for the limited aid the UN has to offer.

Who Defines, Who Decides: According to the UN, a refugee is defined as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Refugee status gives people the fundamental right not to be sent back to the country from which they fled.

However, refugee status is arbitrarily awarded or denied; ultimately it is determined by the countries on the receiving end of refugee flows. The UNHCR specifically states that "reasons of a purely economic character may not be invoked" in claiming refugee status. As a result, the US has been able to assert that Haitians are "economically motivated" immigrants. Yet the arrival of Haitians coincided with governmental acceptance of about 12400 Cuban refugees, only a handful of whom met the requirements for political asylum. The Salvadorans are the latest group to be subject to this double standard. Honduras, El Salvador's neighbor, and the Reagan Administration have labeled them immigrants in search of economic gain, although they are people trying to escape the ravages of war.

The differentiation between economic and political refugee status is based on the "voluntarism" of the migration. Severe unemployment has an effect similar to military turmoil and it has caused millions of people to seek jobs and higher wages in Western Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Yet, those refugees fleeing poverty and starvation are called "voluntary" exiles, those fleeing war are "involuntary."

The Price They Pay: Emigration is regarded by the refugees' home countries as a panacea for unemployment and a much needed source of foreign currency. Many immigrants send a large portion of their salaries to their relatives or bank accounts back home. It has been estimated, for example, that undocumented Mexican workers in the US support an average of 5.4 dependents in Mexico.

But the benefits are not one-sided. Immigrants have been the backbone of the agricultural sector of the US and France, while the manufacturing, construction and service industries in most of Europe and the Middle East are heavily dependent on immigrant labor. This untold number of people do the work no one else wants to do. Most important, immigrants can be used and discarded at will; many have only "guest worker" status which means they can be asked to leave in the advent of an economic slump.

Immigrants pay a heavy price for a few years of employment. They have become the scapegoats of their host country, blamed for its every social and economic ill. For many women migration has meant an alteration in their traditionally binding roles. Bombarded by a new culture, economically forced to work outside the home and to witness the change in their children who, in school, learn the values, language and way of life of the host country, women who have been forced to take on a different role in a newly adopted society. As one Turkish woman now living in West Berlin puts it; "We hope that we will return one day. But we know that we have changed and we are not the same as when we came. We can't pick up our lives as if we had never left. Return is no longer possible."

and that women play voluntarily or involuntarily, not only help to justify but also motivate soldiers to play theirs.

Besides its mobilizing function, propaganda in its less direct forms provides an even more subtle yet equally vital service for the military, and thus militarism. Suffused throughout the society at large, propaganda at this level is designed to construct a social reality in which the presence of the military is seen as a normal, essential and familiar point of reference in daily life. Absorbed throughout the society, militarism as a “mindset” appears in language, fashion, games, etc.

If the militarization of a society, economically, psychologically and ideologically, is a concrete reality of militarism, it is also then a state of war. Indeed actual combat is but one facet of war. Seen this way, there are very few countries that are not in some way “at war.” For example, can a nation, whose policies spawn war or whose power enables it to wage war by “remote control,” boast of being a nation at peace?

Similarly, can it be considered a state of peace when a nation must maintain internal order by systematically torturing or “disappearing” its own population?

And is the war really over when the gunfire has stopped? Can the remnants of broken cultures, families and landscapes, the lingering health, psychological and social disorders be what we shall call peace? Can children reared in refugee camps amidst the anger and despair of homeless people be expected to bear within them the promise of future peace? Only when we begin to understand the complexity of war can we effectively challenge it in all its disguises.


10066. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. “Women in Exile At Home and Abroad: Introduction”, in Connexions. An International Women’s Quarterly, n. 26, June 1, 1988, p. 1. Millions of women around the world live in exile. In fact, the majority of the world’s exiles are women, yet often these women are referred to as migrants, refugees, or immigrants. In this issue, we have redefined them as exiles. This terminology is not a matter of semantics, but one of politics. The word exile evokes the idea of a complex human being who is making an implicit political choice by refusing to submit to repression. Being an exile means having a rightful claim to an identity, if not to a country. Refugees, on the other hand, are seen as an anonymous mass of bodies being shuttled from one country to another. And even if they are mistreated, refugees are supposed to feel grateful for having been given asylum. Thus refugees are thought to be victims; exiles, however, are not simply acted upon—they resist.

Exile takes many forms. First, there is “exile” in the conventional sense of the word: the political oppression that induces women to leave their native country and seek asylum elsewhere. One woman’s escape from and subsequent return to Chile highlights both the larger political issues and the sexist immigration laws women often face.

There is also an expanded sense of the word: “de facto” exile in which borders segregate or exclude entire peoples. Caught between the boundaries of four countries, twenty million Kurds are a nation without a country. Although unrecognized as a nation, they are singled out as a people for discrimination and used as pawns in disputes between countries that encompass them. In this collective exile, however, Kurdish women have become more actively involved in deciding the future of their people.

Palestinian women living in refugee camps in Lebanon are also essential to the future of their people—they risk their lives to ensure the survival of their children. In refugee camps, trying to make ends meet, women often suffer from malnutrition, ill-health and physical exhaustion. As mothers, they are both more vulnerable and more courageous in an environment of deprivation and death.

Migration because of economic depression is another kind of exile. And since economic depression is politically conditioned, economic exile is also politically motivated. Many women migrate and emigrate because their country of origin does not offer them a chance to earn a living. Once they arrive in their new country, regardless of their qualifications, immigrant women often end up working as ill-paid and harassed domestic servants or prostitutes on the brink of deportation. Yet immigrant women are beginning to resist such powerlessness. In Norway, for example, Third World women immigrants have started a self-help group which produces its own radio program. The Filipina women’s organization, GABRIELA, successfully protested against the imminent execution of four Filipinas who had been raped by their Kuwaiti employers. GABRIELA also demanded bilateral laws protecting migrating women.

In this expanded sense of the word, exile is not necessarily expressed in geographical terms. Invetorate sexism and racism can mean institutionalized exclusion and internal exile. In Switzerland, gypsy mothers and children were systematically institutionalized in order to alienate them from their identity. White Australian society dehumanizes Australian Aborigueans; women in particular are sexually harassed and raped. Women activists such as Mariella Mehr and Helen Boyle have responded by organizing resistance among Swiss Gypsies and Australian Aboriguine. Their courage and strength in face of these systematic genocidal attempts serves as an inspiration to women everywhere. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]


Q: How did you become a filmmaker?
A: As a child I was not allowed to dance, play the piano or even to draw. I was sent to a French school, which punished me if I spoke Arabic, but I didn’t want to express myself in the coloniser’s language. Lebanese is a merchant society, a sectarian society. I was born in a Jewish community. Jews in Lebanon, being a minority without parliamentary representation, are obsessed with respectability. Being an artist wasn’t respectable. The model was Einstein. But my parents themselves unconsciously were good artists. My mother’s drawings are great and my father is one of the best singers in the Jewish community. And despite themselves, they helped me. Without that cultural background, I would not have been able to create those marriage scenes, songs and dances in the film.

Q: How did the sectarian society hinder you as an artist?
A: I almost conformed and nearly became a chemist, but my teachers told me, “Be a good artist, and not a bad chemist.” At the age of 15, I became a self-help group which produces its own radio program. The Filipina women’s organization, GABRIELA, successfully protested against the imminent execution of four Filipinas who had been raped by their Kuwaiti employers. GABRIELA also demanded bilateral laws protecting migrating women.

Q: But film is a very exclusive and visual medium, and you’re...
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The patterns of women's lives in all the above situations are nearly the same. And in all these situations, if women don't bargain for themselves from the beginning, they will be the ultimate losers, like in the French, the Russian, the Iranian Revolutions.

I want women to invade men's empires, their political, economic bases, not like Indira Gandhi or Golda Meir, but to change men's laws, change the game of politics, and to say the hell with your rules, games. We want to set different rules, and play different games. I want my films to express this intervention.

Q: How has your film been received in the Jewish community?
A: I am a freak in the Jewish community. I think all Jewish thinkers and artists become so when they make a decision to leave the Jewish community, because the community is warm and supportive but stilling and self-destroying.

There is a tradition of Jewish radicals being expelled from the community which I benefited from. But most of all I benefited from the cosmopolitan life in Beirut which, before the Civil War, was culturally very fertile and exciting. Being Jewish was a hindrance because your family didn't want you to mix with gentiles in case you married them.

Q: Can you tell us specifically how Jewish women are oppressed in Arab countries?
A: I don't like the trend of thought among Zionists that your Jewishness is your first identity. I feel I am first a woman, then an Arab, Lebanese and Jewish. I fight viciously against antisemitism and all types of racism. I hate Zionism and what Israel has done to the Jews as well as the Palestinians. I don't think Jewish women in Lebanon are more oppressed than Arab women. I don't think this is true of any Arab country that I know of. The Jews in the Arab world have suffered less than any other minority; the Drouse were butchered, Christians, Armenians and Kurds were massacred. And this is not because Arabs love Jews but because Jewish communities were smaller and they didn't join the power struggle. At the time of my grandmother, the Jews allied themselves with the Drouse who were strong. During my time, they sided with the Christian Maronite rulers, and it will change. The rising power is now Islam and they will side with them.

I am at odds with Western feminists because I am prepared to understand their special condition in their society, but they are rarely prepared to meet me half way to understand my special condition in my society and my right to struggle for women's liberation in my society the way I want to. My hope is that there will be more Third World women filmmakers.


10068. UN Division for Economic & Social Information; DESI. Strategies To Improve the Status of Women Over the Next 15 Years 1985-2000: Introduction: Part 1. UN Division for Economic & Social Information (DESI), Backgrounder, n. 29, September 13, 1985. 15pp. At the conclusion of the Nairobi World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for Women (7/15-16/85) the major document on strategies to improve the status of women during the next 15 years was adopted without a vote by consensus. Called "The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the advancement of Women", the document included revisions and amendments to paragraphs bracketed in earlier versions of the strategies.

The document contains strategies covering a wide range of issues: for governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others to follow after the UN Decade for Women ends in 1985. It sets out the historical background to the Decade and the current and future trends. Its information is based on replies sent by 124 Governments that reviewed the achievements of the Decade for Women and identified talking about Arab women being silenced throughout history. How can you break that with films?

A: The power of patriarchal fascism hasn't been challenged for something like seven thousand years, and it is so totalitarian that any woman who challenges it gets crushed. I'm happy that I developed and started working at the time when the women's movement started to develop and gain strength. Until now my father has never recognized that his daughter is a filmmaker, and I just received a letter from my mother telling me, "I hope that now you can behave and think of finding another job."

But you have to know that in the Arab world, the moral terror and the pressure on women is terrible. In the Carthage film festival (Tunisia), my film was very well received, and I was really surprised because before me an Algerian filmmaker, Assian Djehan, who is a very famous writer in Algeria, made a beautiful film about Algerian women called The Feast of the Woman for which she was abused and insulted in a most horrible way.

Q: Why did you want to show women's struggle in Arab history through Palestinian women, in Leila and the Wolves?
A: And through Lebanese women, because part of the film is on Lebanon. Because I was born in Lebanon, where you have half a million Palestinians out of a population of about three million. During very crucial years of my life the Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil was a very big issue. Even in the Arab world, the Palestinian woman, the token Palestinian women, were made a cause celebre. These token women are used by political parties institutions and states to hide the daily lives of the majority of women. These women are made to be symbols to compensate the reality. I respect them. They are brave, but I'm saying that these women are being used.

My film is precisely about the silent, unglamorous sacrifices of the women in Lebanon. During the Civil War, each militia had its token woman. Incidentally, the Phalangists had more token women than the rest of them.

If sectarianism is guiding the gun, women had better not use the gun. In the Palestinian part, it is a just war. Women should participate, but at this moment we are not getting anything out of it. In the Lebanese part of the film, I am saying that it is an absurd war. It is a power struggle between the Christian Maronites and Muslims, and women make enormous sacrifices.

The Western-made image of Lebanon under the Christian rule was that it is the only democratic country in the Middle East. Let me tell you about this democratic land; the same Islamic rules that have governed Saudi Arabia have governed Lebanon. The "honour" killing of women (for allegedly bringing dishonor upon the family) continues; two women are killed by the male relations in a week in a country of only one and half million women, and the killers go free. But there is a law if a man kills his neighbor's dog, he will be imprisoned for three months.

Q: When did you think of making the film? And how long did it take?
A: Ideas came to me very early on. Since I was a kid, I heard my mother saying, I am the only servant who is not paid and doesn't have a job." Q: How has your film been received in the Jewish community? A: I am a freak in the Jewish community. I think all Jewish thinkers and artists become so when they make a decision to leave the Jewish community, because the community is warm and supportive but stilling and self-destroying.

There is a tradition of Jewish radicals being expelled from the community which I benefited from. But most of all I benefited from the cosmopolitan life in Beirut which, before the Civil War, was culturally very fertile and exciting. Being Jewish was a hindrance because your family didn't want you to mix with gentiles in case you married them.

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obstacles that were encountered during that time.

Each of the Conference themes—Equality, Development and Peace—is analyzed in the context of the obstacles still preventing attainment of equality for women followed, in each case, by basic strategies needed to overcome these obstacles and measures to implement the strategies at the national level. The chapter on Equality identifies the obstacles still hindering women's equality and the basic strategies to deal with them. The chapters on Development and Peace include constitutional and legal measures, equality in social participation and equality in political participation and decision making.

In the case of Development, areas for specific action are identified which include employment, health and education (the three sub-themes of the Decade), as well as food, water and agriculture, industry, trade and commercial services, science and technology, communications, energy, environment, social services, housing, settlement, community development and transport.

In the chapter on Peace, obstacles remaining after the Decade and basic strategies to deal with them are likewise enumerated. Measures to implement the strategies at national level state that women should participate in peace negotiations, and that all communities should introduce education for peace. [=]

10069. UN Division for Economic & Social Information; DESI. Strategies To Improve the Status of Women Over the Next 15 Years 1985-2000: Introduction: Part 2. UN Division for Economic & Social Information (DESI), Backgrounder, n. 29, September 13, 1985. 15pp. The items "Women and children under apartheid" and "Palestinian women and children" are now contained in the section on Peace. Previously these were contained in the chapter on Areas of Special Concern. In the paragraph on apartheid, the international community is called upon to give assistance "to the most oppressed groups under apartheid—women and children". With help from their governments, women are urged to "strengthen their commitment to the eradication of apartheid and support to their struggling sisters." "The special and immediate needs of Palestinian women and children should be identified and appropriate provisions made" the document states, and "United Nations projects should be initiated to help Palestinian women in the fields of health, education and vocational training." A third new item in the chapter on Peace is entitled "Women in areas affected by armed conflicts, foreign intervention and threats to peace." This section was previously in the chapter entitled Areas of Special Concern. The "constant fear, danger of displacement, destruction, devastation, physical abuse, social and family disruption and abandonment" experienced by women and children living in such areas creates particular problems which could be ameliorated by implementing the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which provide guidelines for the protection of the civilians "in times of hostilities", and the 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict.

A separate chapter is devoted to "Areas of Special Concern." These areas listed as: women in areas affected by drought, urban poor women, elderly women, young women, abused women, destitute women, those in detention, and women victims of trafficking and involuntary prostitution. The list also includes women deprived of their traditional means of livelihood, women who are the sole supporters of families, women with physical and mental disabilities, refugee and displaced women and children, migrant women, and minority and "indigenous" women.

The Nairobi World Conference took place at a critical time. As the Forward-Looking Strategies points out, ten years ago when the Decade was launched, there was hope that accelerated economic growth, sustained by growing international trade, financial flows and technological development, would allow more women to participate in their country's economic and social development. These hopes have not, however, been realized. Moreover, the economic crisis has prevented setting up new programmes for women and the maintenance of those that were already under way. [=]

10070. UN; Department of Technical Cooperation for Development.

"Chapter VI: Attendance and Organization of Work: A. Date and Place of the Conference", in Report of the International Conference on Population, 1984. Mexico City 8/6-14/1984. New York: UN, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, 1984. E/CONF.76/19. (205) The International Conference on Population was held at Mexico City from 8/6-14/1984 in conformity with General Assembly resolution 38/148 of 12/19/1983. During that period the Conference held 12 plenary meetings. [=] 10071. UN; Department of Technical Cooperation for Development. "Chapter VI: Attendance and Organization of Work: B. Pre-Conference Consultations", in Report of the International Conference on Population, 1984. Mexico City 8/6-14/1984. New York: UN, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, 1984. E/CONF.76/19. (206) Pre-Conference consultations open to all States invited to participate in the Conference were held at Mexico City on 8/5/1984 to consider a number of procedural and organizational matters. The pre-Conference consultations were conducted under the presidency of Mr. Geronimo Martinez (Mexico) Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. The report on these consultations (A/CONF.76/L.1) was submitted to the Conference and was accepted as the basis for the organization of its work. [=]


(208) The United Nations Council for Namibia represented Namibia at the Conference. (209) The Palestine Liberation Organization attended the Conference in the capacity of observer. (210) The following national liberation movements were represented by observers: African National Congress (South Africa), Pan African Congress of Azania. (211) Members of the Secretariat of the following United Nations offices were present throughout or during part of the Conference: Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation Department of International Economic and Social Affairs Department of Technical Co-operation for Development. (212) The secretariats of the following regional commissions...
managed charity to assist Palestinians. Today, UPA stands out as the only Palestinians charity independent of any political affiliation or ideology whose mission is purely humanitarian. Its main objective is to help alleviate the suffering of Palestinians living in the West bank, the Gaza Strip and other Arab countries.

Health Care: Each year, UPA allocates a significant share of its resources to critical and acute health care needs of Palestinians in the areas of medical supplies and emergency relief. Since the Intifadah began in 1987, UPA has contributed over $1 million to health care institutions and rehabilitation centers.

Community Development: UPA funds the development of quality projects that help the largest number of people at the lowest cost. UPA emphasizes indigenous solutions to local needs and encourages projects in which people are involved at every stage of program development, implementation and administration. Priority is given to projects serving particularly deprived communities.

Education: Through its Scholarship Program, UPA offers educational opportunities for promising students with limited means. Each year, partial scholarships are provided to needy and qualified Palestinian students studying at local universities and abroad. UPA also seeks to find projects that improve and modernize Palestinian education and schools.

Child Sponsorship: In response to the escalating number of injured, handicapped, deprived, and orphaned children, UPA's sponsorship program matches caring sponsors with the neediest children. Today, hundreds of children receive monthly allowances through 27 institutions. In addition, many more children benefit from projects supported by UPA's Childrens Fund.

were represented at the Conference: Economic Commission for Europe Economic Commission for Latin America Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Economic Commission for Africa Economic Commission for Western Asia.


(217) At its first plenary meeting on 8/6/1984, the Conference, by acclamation, elected as its President H.E. Mr. Manuel Bartlett Diaz, Minister of the Interior and head of the delegation of Mexico.

(218) In a statement after his election the President, after thanking the Conference for the honour done to him and to his country, said that Mexico upholds the principles of human brotherhood and equality of rights without distinction as to race, sex or origin. Mexico was, therefore, an appropriate setting for a Conference that was concerned essentially with the conditions of life of human beings.

(219) Tracing the demographic evolution since 1974, he stressed that the history of population changes should not be reflected only in statistical data: social and economic phenomena should also be taken into account, as was stressed in the World Population Plan of Action. At the same time, the position of the individual woman and man was primordial. It was the task of the Conference to contribute, by its recommendations, to the betterment of the equality of life of these individuals and to the full development of their capabilities.

(220) He stressed that while considerable progress had been achieved since 1974 in the realization of the objectives of the Plan of Action, a great many inequality still remained between countries and regions, and even within countries. He expressed the hope that the deliberations of the Conference would lead to a better understanding of the problems that remained and to their solution.

(221) A message from the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the participants in the Conference was read by the head of the delegation of the USSR. [–]
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12002. ------. "Bitter Fruit of Washington's Anti-Soviet Dirty War: Afghanistan; Hell for Women, part 1", in Workers Vanguard, October 25, 1996, pp. 1 and 3. On 9/27/1996, Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, fell to the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic militia. Four years of horrific rule under a shifting "coalition" of warring factions of reactionary Islamic mujahedin ("holy warriors") had already brought Kabul to the point of famine and devastation. Now, the Taliban killers have begun to wreak bloody vengeance against any vestige of social progress overlooked by the vultures who preceded them. One of their first targets was Najibullah, the pro-Soviet Afghan president ousted by the mujahedin in 1992, who was dragged from his sanctuary in the city's United Nations' compound and beaten, shot and hanged, his body left strung up on the street for several days. Justifying this atrocious act of savagery, a member of Kabul's Taliban council railed that Najibullah "was against Islam. He was a criminal, and he was a Communist." Without question, the chief victims in the consolidation of Islamic fundamentalist reaction in the aftermath of the Soviet military withdrawal in 1989 have been Afghanistan's miserably oppressed women. While the civil war has now resumed, with ethnically based militias which supported the former mujahedin regime launching an offensive against Taliban positions outside Kabul, all the contending forces are deeply reactionary. Among the first acts of the Taliban after seizing Kabul were to bar women from all work, to close down all girls' schools and to order women to remain locked in their homes in purdah (social isolation) unless accompanied by a man. As a result, almost all educational facilities have been shut down, since seventy-five percent of teachers are women, overwhelmingly any and all forces opposed to the Stalinists in power--from sadistic butchered by the Afghan fundamentalists is also on the hands of those leftist organizations internationally which lined up behind United States' imperialism's anti-Soviet dirty war in Afghanistan!

For years, groups like the social-democratic International Socialist Organization, United States' supporters of Tony Cliff's British Socialist Workers' Party, marched in lockstep behind Washington's drive for the defeat of Soviet troops by the mulish-led forces who were openly fighting for the enslavement of women in Afghanistan. Now, they have gotten what they wanted. These self-styled "socialists" contributed, to the extent their limited means allowed, to bringing about the horror which is today being inflicted upon Afghan women. In the nineteenth century, utopian socialist Charles Fourier observed that social progress can be gauged by the status of women in society. This is unambiguously clear in the case of Afghanistan. For Marxists, as indeed for all opponents of women's oppression, taking the side of those fighting the United States' backed Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan was as clear and obvious a position as was the support of Karl Marx's First International for the Union forces led by Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War against slavery. How then, could self-styled socialists like Cliff's International Socialist Organization/Socialist Workers' Party line up with those fighting for the enslavement of women in Afghanistan? The answer lies in their virulent hostility to the Soviet bureaucratically degenerated workers' state. From the moment the Bolshevik Revolution toppled capitalism in Russia in 1917 until the capitalist counter-revolution led by Boris Yeltsin several years ago, the imperialists' central aim was focused on restoring capitalist exploitation in the Soviet Union and overturning the social gains which remain despite decades of Stalinist degeneration. That is why the entire apparatus of political indoctrination in the United States and West Europe was geared to producing hatred for and fear of the Soviet Union. Because groups like the International Socialist Organization bought into the anti-Soviet program propagated by the bourgeoisie, they lined up with any and all forces opposed to the Stalinists in power--from sadistic Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan and Iran to the Vatican-backed anti-Communist, anti-Semitic and anti-women Solidarnose movement in Poland. [=]

12003. ------. "Bitter Fruit of Washington's Anti-Soviet Dirty War: Afghanistan; Hell for Women, part 2", in Workers Vanguard, October 25, 1996, p. 3. Historic American Trotskyist leader James P. Cannon, in waging a factional struggle within the then-revolutionary United States' Socialist Workers’ Party against the Shachtman/Burnham minority which argued to abandon the Marxist position of military defense of the Soviet Union, said in 1939: "The question of the Russian revolution and the Soviet state which is its creation has drawn a sharp dividing line through the labor movement of all countries for twenty-two years. The attitude taken toward the Soviet Union throughout all these years has been the decisive criterion separating the genuine revolutionary tendency from all shades and degrees of wavering, backsliders and capitulators to the pressure of the bourgeoisie." In the case of Afghanistan, this dividing line not only separated revolutionaries from reformists, but the opponents of social progress from those who backed, openly or otherwise, medievalist barbarism. Uniquely in modern history, the rights of women were a central issue in the civil war which raged in Afghanistan from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. After coming to power in an April 1978 coup, pro-Moscow intellectuals and army officers in the

1970s, to, most recently, the Taliban cutthroats. Even as women were being beaten and brutalized in the streets of Kabul, Clinton's administration spokesmen rushed to meet with Taliban representatives, hailing the efforts of these medieval killers and torturers to "liberate Afghanistan." The unspeakable hell which has descended on women, teachers, doctors, working people, ethnic and religious minorities and all secular elements in Afghanistan is the bitter fruit of United States' imperialists' unrelenting drive to undermine and destroy the former Soviet Union, whose military presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s was the chief bulwark against Islamic fundamentalist reaction. For over a decade, Washington armed the mujahedin murderers to the hilt, building them up to wage a proxy war against the Soviet Army and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. But the blood of very unveiled woman butchered by the Afghan fundamentalists is also on the hands of those
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan sought to implement some minimal reforms to bring the country closer to the twentieth century; land distribution, freeing women from the burka (the head-to-toe "veil"), reducing the bride price to a nominal sum and providing education for girls. However, such basic democratic reforms can be explosive in a cruelly backwards country like Afghanistan, not least because women's subordination in the family has decreed them as the "bearers" of the tradition. But they had the next generation in mind for a withdrawal in the 1980s. The mullahs launched a ferocious jihad (holy war), burning down schools and flaying teachers alive for the "crime" of teaching young girls to read.

When Moscow airlifted Red Army troops to Kabul in December of 1979 to prevent its People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan client regime from falling to the Islamic reactionaries and to protect its southern flank against imperialist incursion, the "Russian question" was posed pointblank. Democratic president Jimmy Carter's savage proxy war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and his retaliatory embargo against the Soviet Union were the opening shots of Cold War Two. Under Carter's successor, Republican president Ronald Reagan, the United States spent hundreds of billions of dollars on high tech "Star Wars" weaponry aimed at facilitating a first-strike nuclear attack against the USSR. And over two billion dollars worth of equipment was lavished on the Afghan mujahedin in the biggest Central Intelligence Agency's operation in history. Meanwhile, the capitalist media kept up a hysterical propaganda barrage against the Soviet "evil empire." As consistent defenders of the gains of the October Revolution, we Trotskyists of the International Communist League (then the international Spartacist tendency) proclaimed: "Hail Red Army in Afghanistan! Extend social gains of October Revolution to Afghan peoples!" We warned that the Kremlin bureaucracy reluctantly intervened simply to stabilize a strategically placed client state and might well cut a deal with the imperialists. Nonetheless, sending troops into Afghanistan was an ambigiously decent and progressive act, cutting across the grain of the reactionary Stalinist-nationalist dogma of "socialism in one country," which renounced Lenin's fight for world socialist revolution in favor of a futile quest for "peaceful co-existence" with imperialism. Moreover, we recognized that it was only the Soviet military intervention which offered the possibility of opening the road to emancipation for the hideously oppressed peoples of Afghanistan. If liberation was to come to Afghanistan, it had to come from without. The tiny prolletariat was dwarfed by a far more numerous Islamic clergy, the urban population was surrounded by a sea of nomadic herdsmen and peasants beholden to the khans, the forces of social progress were outweighed by reactionary forces for tradition and the status quo.

The conservative Brezhnev leadership in the Kremlin did not send one hundred thousand Soviet troops to Afghanistan to make a social revolution. But the very presence of these troops brought with it the possibility of social liberation, as did Napoleon's military drive through Europe in the early 1800s in the wake of the Great French Revolution. As Trotsky noted in "The Revolution Betrayed", his definitive analysis of the Stalinist bureaucracy, "In the sphere of national policy, as in the sphere of economy, the Soviet bureaucracy still continues to carry out a certain part of the progressive work, although with immediate overhead expenses. This is especially true of the backwards nationalities of the Union, which must of necessity pass through a more or less prolonged period of borrowing, imitation and assimilation of what exists." Under the Soviet military umbrella, Afghan women were liberated from the veil and trained and brought into the workforce as teachers, nurses, doctors and government functionaries; thousands served as soldiers and commanders in the Afghan army and self-defences militias. The vast gains which were potentially open to the Afghan peoples were visible in the stark contrast between Afghanistan's backwardness and the massive advances in living standards, education, health care and women's rights north of the Amu Darya River in the Soviet Central Asian republics. These achievements were the result of the working-class revolution led by Lenin and Trotsky's Bolshevik Party in October 1917 and extended to Central Asia largely through armed intervention by the Red Army against the mullahs and tribal khans and a campaign by heroic Bolshevik women who even donned the veil as part of a tactic to bring social progress to the women of that backward region.

Following Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan, the imperialists and their "left" hangers-on rallied against "Soviet expansionism." But far from seeking to incorporate Afghanistan, the Kremlin oligarchy fought the war half-heartedly, despite the fact that Soviet troops were winning the war on the ground in the early 1980s. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he immediately began talking of a "liquidation of the war." Soviet troops in the hope of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States, wrote to the Afghan government in February 1989, offering to organize international brigades to help fight the Central Intelligence Agency's fundamentalist cutthroats. Though this offer was declined, the Partisan Defense Committee and fraternal organizations around the world responded to an appeal by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's regime for funds, raising forty-four thousand dollars in the hope of financing a "peaceful" withdrawal.

12004. ------. "Bitter Fruit of Washington's Anti-Soviet Dirty War: Afghanistan; Hell for Women, part 3", in Workers Vanguard, October 25, 1996, p. 4. As an expression of solidarity, we dispatched a "Workers Solidarity" SolidarcorrespondentitoKabul and Jalalabad. As we wrote at the time: "Jalalabad besieged was the focal point of imperialism's jihad (holy war) against social progress and the Soviet Union. Jalalabad victorious can inspire revolutionary struggle throughout the region, from India to Turkey. That requires above all the program of Leninist internationalism, the banner of the International Communist League." "Front Line Afghanistan", "Workers Vanguard" number 482 (7/21/1989). Our Jalalabad campaign struck a chord among class-struggle fighters everywhere. Contributions poured in from tens of thousands of people around the world: immigrant workers throughout West Europe, Asia and North America; trade unionists; students eager to take a stand against the Central Intelligence Agency; and everywhere from women, including in Muslim communities. It was in the course of this campaign that we decided to launch the International Communist League, underscoring that our tendency, uniquely, fights for the communism of Lenin and Trotsky. The Cliffites responded to the 1979 Soviet intervention by retailing the line of every imperialist government in the world: "Soviet troops out of Afghanistan!" The British "Socialist Worker" (1/12/1980) tried to whitewash the Central Intelligence Agency-backed mujahedenoopposition, saying "it speaks the rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism. But in this time and place that tells us little." It didn't take a Marxist to know what the "rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism" and, on the other hand, the Soviet intervention meant for Afghan women. This was recognized even by some Western bourgeois journalists, notably women. Writing as the last Soviet troops were pulling out, Mary Williams Walsh reported in the "Wall Street Journal" (1/19/1989): "The plight of Kabul's women is a poignant reminder that the West's vicarious victory over communist expansion here isn't without its ambiguities. In a backward country where the female peasantry still toils like medieval serfs, Kabuli women have managed to hold on to many twentieth century freedoms.... Instead of
staying at home behind purdah walls, they emerge each day and work in offices, hospitals and schools."

The Cliffites opportunistically pose as "revolutionary" opponents of the capitalist rulers, but they take their cue from the reformist leader, who are themselves (in Lenin's words) "social-imperialist" lackeys of the bourgeoisie. But over Afghanistan, the Cliffites even surpassed their reformist Labourite big brothers in abject treachery. The British Cliffites were actually able to make even the artificial border controls of the imperialists' anti-Soviet drive by making common cause with...right-wing Tories. In 1980, Socialist Workers' Party leader Paul Foot, writing in his column in the bourgeois "Daily Mirror", attacked the virulently anti-Communist Conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the right by denouncing the possibility that British meat exports to the Soviet Union might be going to Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. The incendiary "reveals" in Foot's column provoked an anti-Soviet frenzy on the floor of Parliament, helping to justify an escalation of imperialist support to the Afghan mujahedeen. Though particularly flagrant in their embrace of imperialist anti-Sovietism over Afghanistan, the Cliffites were far from unique on the left. After some initial zig zagging, the fake Trotskyist United Secretariat of the late Ernest Mandel issued a statement in 1981 toeing Reagan/Thatcher's line, with the call "For an End to the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan!" The political bandits of David North's Workers' League and its "International Committee" screamed along with the United States' imperialist rulers that the Soviet intervention was an attack on "the national rights and feelings of the Afghan people" ("Bulletin", 7/8/1986). Somewhat more contradictory was the centrist Workers' Power group in Britain, which arose as a split from Cliff's organization. In response to the imperialist uproar over the Soviet intervention, Workers' Power took a step to the left, breaking from Cliff's absurdly anti-Marxist theory that the Soviet Union was "state capitalist" (without either a capitalist class or a capitalist economy) and announcing its formal adherence to Trotsky's analysis of the Soviet Union as a bureaucratically degenerated workers' state.

But while not calling for an immediate Soviet withdrawal at the time, Workers' Power joined the rest of the anti-soviet Stalinophile left in "condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" as "counter-revolutionary" ("Workers' Power", February of 1980). When the Kremlin later pulled out of Afghanistan, Workers' Power turned around and denounced the withdrawal. And all the while, they vituperated against our call, "Hail Red Army!" Behind Workers' Power's insistence that the eminently progressive Soviet intervention was counter-revolutionary lay a deeply ingrained anti-Soviet prejudice inherited from their Cliffite origins. But the Cliffites themselves showed no such qualms, consistently supporting the imperialist left. As Gorbachev was preparing the Soviet withdrawal, the International Socialist Organization gloated: "Just as socialists welcomed the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, we welcome the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan" ("Socialist Worker" [United States], May of 1988). This comparison is truly grotesque! The International Socialist Organization sees no essential difference between medieval fundamentalist killers coming to power in Kabul and the victorious social revolution—which the International Socialist Organization forebears refused to support—that drove United States' imperialism out of Indochina! With the fate they welcomed having come to pass and its horrendous consequences daily described in the bourgeois press, Cliff's Socialist Workers' Party can only wring its hands and hypocritically moan about the "long series of tragedies to beset the Afghan people" ("Socialist Worker", 10/5/1996). Even now, with the Soviet Union gone, the Cliffites continue to whitewash the role of the Islamic fundamentalist anti-woman terrorists and their Pakistani and United States' backers, writing that "the Taliban's success comes from popular disenchantment with the leaders who oppose it" and complaining that "the Taliban has no answer to the terrible crisis of the country." These fundamentalist reactionaries do have an "answer"—a program of all-sided reaction and extermination of even the most modest social advances for women!

Again borrowing from Western imperialist propaganda, the sole fig leaf that the Cliffites and the rest of the anti-Soviet camp offered for their line was that the Soviet intervention violated Afghan "national self-determination." For Marxists, the question of self-determination is subordinated to over-riding class considerations—in the case of Afghanistan, defense of the Soviet Union against imperialism and the struggle against feudal reaction and women's oppression. Moreover, Afghanistan is not a unitary nation, as the Cliffites assert, but a caldron of distinct, feuding nationalities (as well as tribal and other ethnic groupings) that has been artificially bordered by the imperialists to split the Afghans and the Uzbeks into the former Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, while the Tajik people overlap the border with both Tajikistan and Iran. The hue and cry about the "national rights" of "poor little Afghanistan" had about as much validity as the cries of "stated rights" raised by the Confederacy during the American Civil War and again one hundred years later by die-hard Dixie segregationists. Precisely because the Soviet Union was not capitalist/imperialist, the Red Army intervention into Afghanistan, rather than deepening oppression and reinforcing the forces of reaction as imperialism does in its semicolonies, posed the possibility of bringing progress to that backward land of fragmented peoples. As Afghanistan demonstrated, the Cliffites' ludicrous "state capitalist" analysis and their posture as leftist opponents of Stalinism were simply a cover for their profound programmatic hostility to Trotsky's analysis of the Soviet Union as a bureaucratically degenerated workers' state.

12005. ------. "Bitter Fruit of Washington's Anti-Soviet Dirty War: Afghanistan; Hell for Women, part 4", in Workers Vanguard, October 25, 1996, p. 5. Opposition to Stalinism from a revolutionary, Trotskyist standpoint meant defense of the social foundations of the Soviet Union--centrally the existence of a planned collectivized economy, a necessary precondition for the creation of an international classless, communist society. The Trotskyist call for proletarian political revolution to oust the Stalinist usurers was premised on our defense of the gains of October, including our unconditional military defense of the Soviet Union against internationalevolutionary and imperialist attack. In his 1939 speech, "Workers Vanguard" number 181 (11/11/1977). Stalinist treachery and imperialist terror have left Afghanistan devastated, with a total breakdown of transportation, trade and economic life. The country has been turned into a patchwork of regional fiefdoms ruled by ethnically based warlords, with the Taliban, based on the predominant Pashtun grouping, controlling the gutted capital and two-thirds of the country in the south, while the Uzbek region in the north is ruled by Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ahmed Shah Massoud's militia lords over the Tajiks. While Dostum and Massoud's forces are today painted as supposed "moderates" relative to the Taliban, Massoud remains allied with Gulbuddin Heikal, one of the most savage fundamentalist leaders during the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan regime.

The martyrdom of Afghanistan is a direct product of the counter-revolutionary cataclysm which resulted in the restoration of capitalism in East Europe and the former Soviet Union. This has emboldened reactionary forces not only in backward areas like Afghanistan but in West Europe and the United States as well. While various bourgeois commentators are now wagging their fingers over the horrors being carried out by Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, "family values" Christian fundamentalists in the United States also aim to drive women back into the home. This is revealed not only in attacks by "right to life" terrorists on women seeking abortions but in the growing barbarism of
the racist capitalist "justice" system (see "California Castration Law," above). The horrors being played out in Afghanistan today are the starkest expression of the choice which has been posed, with increasing sharpness and urgency, throughout this century: socialism or barbarism. Young fighters against social oppression must study and learn the lessons of past struggles and defeats, including the world-historic defeat represented by the destruction of the remaining gains of the October Revolution. Group after group is going forward to win new victories. The International Communist League fight for a new October, both in the United States and around the world. We fight to forge Bolshevik parties internationally to lead the workers--standing at the head of all the oppressed--to power and to a society in which capitalist oppression and enslavement of women are relics of a barbaric past. [9]

12006. --------. "Cruel and Barbaric: California Castration Law," in Workers Vanguard, October 25, 1996, p. 5. California has now become the first state in the country to mandate castration as a form of punishment. On 9/17/1996, Governor Pete Wilson signed a bill, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in the state legislature, which would force any man convicted twice of "child molestations" to receive injections of the drug Depo-Provera while on parole. Those refusing the injections could be "voluntarily" surgically castrated--having their testicles cut off. Judges will also be able to order chemical castration after a first conviction. Underlining the barbaric character of this legislation, an editorial in the "San Francisco Examiner" exclaimed: "What's the next step? Demanding that robbers have their hands hacked off and liars their tongues cut out?" Usually used as a contraceptive for women, when injected in men Depo-Provera causes the testicles to shrink. The side effects include elevated blood pressure, increased blood clotting and higher risks of diabetes, as well as nightmares, fatigue and severe weight gain. Any doctor who agrees to carry out this treatment won't be practicing medicine but torture, like Hitler's Doctor Mengele, who subjected inmates in Nazi death camps and concentration camps to grisly "experiments" involving sterilization and castration. Republican assemblyman Bill Hoge, author of the bill, railed: "I am sending a message to child molesters of the world that you are not welcome in California." Sheila Kuehl, one of two Democrats in the Assembly to oppose the measure, grotesquely argued that castration was not enough to stop "molesters," insisting that they "need to be kept out of society." The "Examiner" (9/15/1996) reported that "the sole organized support for the measure came from the Women's Coalition, an advocacy group in Hoge's district." In the 1980s, "castrate all rapists" was the battle cry of right-wing feminists--and now it seems they've got their reactionary wish. The concept of mutilating and torturing "sex offenders" belongs in the Dark Ages. And in this deeply racist society, it represents a ghastly return to the worst horrors of the Jim Crow South. As we wrote in 1983 after a South Carolina judge gave three young black men convicted of rape the choice of thirty years in prison or surgical castration: "The American rulers' willingness to snatch up the ancient bloodstained knife, who had taken drugs while pregnant eight years ago, although her child is still a prisoner in the county jail, was arrested in the South Bronx as the "war on crime," a terrifying extension of the legal lynching and racist repression that the capitalist injustice system has unleashed against blacks and the poor. The return of chain gangs, the Congressional ban on education for prisoners, the expansion of the racial death penalty and a host of other measures reflect a sinister impulse to genocide against a layer of the black population. In the past decade, California alone has spent ten billion dollars on new prisons. The authorities are not only doing away with education for prisoners, but are trying to eliminate physical exercise and anything approaching a healthy diet. As a result, prisoners can be expected to grow overweight, weaker, more disease-prone and likely to die earlier. This is a conscious attempt to make the prison population flaccid and controllable. Of course, violent assaults on children are truly terrible crimes, but the California castration law has nothing to do with protecting women and children. Another bill passed by California legislators--one of a series of so-called "Megan's law" being proposed across the country--would incite harassment of "sex offenders" who have been released from prison, by opening up their records and addresses to the public. These viciously punitive measures are the latest installment in a ruling-class drive over the past fifteen years to criminalize sex, and particularly sex with or among youth. The demented lengths to which this hysteria has been taken are seen in the recent "sexual harassment" suspensions of six-year-old kids for kissing their classmates. Many sexual encounters now deemed "illegal" in this violently repressive and anti-sex society are entirely consensual. We are in favor of replacing reactionary "age of consent" laws with the principle of effective consent, applicable to people of all ages. Will someone whose boyfriend or girlfriend is simply considered "too young" now be castrated? California already deems sexual relations between an adult and someone thirteen or younger--and in some cases even seventeen years old--a felony offense that counts under the state's "three strikes" law. In Connecticut recently, school bus driver Kerri Lynn Paterson was sentenced to a maximum of one hundred and fifteen years in prison after a fourteen-year-old male student claimed she had seduced him by casting a spell on him.

The government-engineered witchhunt over "child sexual abuse" has destroyed the lives of hundreds of innocent people who have been prosecuted and imprisoned on the basis of lurid and demented "satanic possession" and "recovred memory" fabrications (see "Satan, the State and Anti-Sex Hysteria," "Women and Revolution" number 45, Winter-Spring 1996). Meanwhile, the deadly anti-welfare bill signed by Clinton in August completely eliminated federal aid providing a minimal lifeline for some twelve million people, more than two-thirds of them children. The bizarre theory that an over-abundance of male hormones causes sex crimes has sinister implications for women. In countries dominated by Islamic fundamentalism, like Afghanistan or Iran, women are forced into stifling head-to-toe "veils" when not confined to the home, ostensibly to prevent men from being driven to rape and to curb the supposedly insatiable sexual appetites of men. In fact, this reactionary institution is aimed at enforcing women's role as the property of their fathers or husbands. And in large parts of Africa, young girls are subjected to the barbaric practice of female genital mutilation in order to supposedly ensure docility and "faithfulness." In the United States as well, women are the ultimate principal target of the anti-sex witchhunt. This is reflected not only in the assault by right-wing bigots on the right to abortion, but in the escalating persecution of women over supposed fetal and child "abuse." Since the 1980s, over two hundred pregnant women in thirty states have been prosecuted for acts as trivial as having a drink, or on the grounds that this could harm their fetuses. In a recent case in Wisconsin, Deborah Zimmerman, a thirty-five-year-old waitress, faces up to fifty years in prison on attempted murder for giving birth to a baby with a high blood alcohol level. In July, the South Carolina Supreme Court reinstated an eight-year prison sentence on "child abuse" charges against a woman who had taken drugs while pregnant eight years ago, although her child is perfectly healthy.

The character has also been an epidemic of "child abuse" prosecutions against poor and minority women who have left their children home alone for a few hours. In October, Carmen Santiago, described by neighbors as a caring mother of nine children, was arrested in the South Bronx along with her boyfriend when she was forced to appear in court to fight an eviction notice and couldn't find a baby sitter. Meanwhile, the courts have torn children away from mothers who are lesbians. In a recent Florida case, Mary Frank Ward's twelve-year-old daughter was taken from her and placed in the custody of her former husband, a convicted murderer who killed his first wife! Behind the gambit of measures criminalizing sex, and the imprisonment of wider layers of the population--under increasingly inhumane conditions--is the drive by the capitalist rulers to enforce social conformity as they seek to increase the exploitation of working people. Meanwhile, masses of ghetto youth deemed "expendable" to the profit system are locked away in prison hellholes. It is a mark of capitalist society in terminal decline that these efforts lead to ever more irrational and byzantine measures reaching back to practices which proliferate before the bourgeois revolutions. Only the destruction of
the bourgeoisie’s rule through socialist revolution will put an end to the barbarism exemplified by the “California Reich” castration law. [=]

12007.  ------.  "Economy in Numbers: Rural Poverty Explosion", in Dollars & Sense, June 1993. p. 23. More people now live in cities than in rural areas, for the first time in history. However, this movement has been accompanied by a massive impoverishment of rural populations. The International Fund for Agricultural Development with Islamic The dress code and behavior, President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani condemned Israeli barbarism in Lebanon during the meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization in Tehran on May 14. Founded by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in the eighties, its members now include the Central Asian Republics as well as Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. [=]

12010.  ------.  "News in Brief: "Islamic Republic Of Iran", in Crescent International, June 16-30, 1996. p. 2. Rabin Raphel, the US secretary of State for South Asia, told the US senate foreign relations committee on 6/6/1996 that Afghanistan was the source of most "terrorist" activity in the Middle East. Raphel had returned from a visit to Afghanistan on 4/20/1996 where she was warmly welcomed. [=]

12013.  ------.  "Nearly 4 Million Children Have Died in Afghan Wars [in past 15 years; UNICEF reports that most of the deaths could have been prevented, since most resulted from famine and lack of basic health]", in Seattle Times, October 13, 1994. p. A14. [TXT]
Providential protection of the Mosque has come as a fresh message of hope and cheer. It has filled them with the conviction that this Mosque is destined to play a distinct role in the spiritual reconstruction of Berlin that now lies torn and bleeding, materially as well as spiritually. The German people stand rudely shaken and disillusioned — just the mood of mind to receive the message of universal human equality that Islam is. That is what the Hand of Providence has preserved the Mosque for.

Another item appeared shortly afterwards in The Light of 12/8/1945 on page 1. It gives some details of the damage sustained by the Mosque due to "the war that was fought even within its sacred precincts", and reports that the Mosque now lies situated in that zone of divided Berlin which is "under the British Army of occupation". It further reported that Dr. S. M. Abdullah was ready to resume his work in Berlin, and that "the Anjuman has moved the Government of India to get the benefit of priority for a sea passage from India to England and an air passage from England to Berlin."

Imam back in Berlin. Under the above heading, a report appeared in The Light of 2/8/1947 on page 3 which is reproduced below:

Dr. Shaiikh Muhammad Abdullah, M.Sc., Ph.D., Imam of the Mosque, Berlin, it will be recalled, had to quit Germany at the outbreak of war. At the termination of war, this Anjuman was anxious that the activities at the Mosque should be resumed as early as possible. Military occupation, food condition and general dislocation of life in that once Naziland, however, made the prospects of reopening the Mosque and its allied missionary activities extremely gloomy. Even in December last, when the Anjuman decided to take the first step in this direction at any cost and sent Dr. Abdullah to England to study conditions from that quarter, the prospects were none too bright either. It was a leap in the dark and it was almost a settled fact that for sometime to come the Imam will have to mark time and keep himself occupied with some sort of missionary work in England.

God, however, comes to the help of those who move in His way. Dr. Abdullah has been afforded every facility to visit Berlin by the authorities of British occupation. Life in Berlin being still in military control, he has been invested with the Honorary rank of a full Colonel which will enable him to enjoy all the facilities associated with that position.

Beneath this is a report headed Berlin Mosque's S.O.S., which is reproduced below:

Maulana Muhammad Ali, Head of the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, has issued an appeal for funds for the repair of the Berlin Mosque, which was damaged in the last phase of the war when Nazi resistance took the form of street fighting. When after victory the Allied forces entered Berlin, the Mosque was found littered with the dead bodies of Nazi youth.

According to the estimate received from a Berlin architect the repairs will cost Rs. 92000, prices and wages having risen four times as compared to pre-war rates. The appeal gives two photographs — one showing the Mosque as it originally stood, the other in its present damaged condition. Should this S.O.S. from this House of God bestir the heart of any son of Islam and he would like to see this sole beacon of Light Divine in the dark heart of Christian Europe restored to its original dignity, he may send his contribution to the Financial Secretary, Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam, Lahore.

Reuter's report. In The Light of 5/24/1949 on page 19, a report from Reuter's Berlin correspondent is reproduced regarding the Berlin Mosque which had appeared in the Pakistan newspapers. It contains a brief history of the Berlin Mosque which we quote below: "The foundation of the Berlin Mosque was laid in 1922 by Maulana Sadr-ud-Din who was deputed by the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam to deliver the message of Islam to the people of Germany. At the same time, he laid the foundation of the Islamic Mission. Within a couple of years there stood in the heart of the German Capital, with all its grandeur and beauty, a huge building of the Berlin Mosque possessing a fascinating charm. A quarterly magazine in German under the title Muslimische Review was also started which rendered valuable services in disseminating the light of Islam in Central Europe. The strenuous work and the devoted efforts of the Islamic Mission attracted the attention of Germans, and by 1925 about forty people of high reputation embraced Islam. The opening ceremony of the mosque was attended by a large number of new converts to Islam as well as by a distinguished gathering of Muslims from Egypt, Syria, Persia, Afghanistan and India, including Allama Lufti, the leader of Muslims in Russia. In his inaugural speech, Allama Lufti said with a sense of pride that he had studied each and every word of the books of the Mujaddid recommended to him by Maulana Sadr-ud-Din and had found in them the light of truth in abundance which showed that he was in fact the Mujaddid of the time. Besides, Egyptians, Syrians, Iranians and Afghan-delivered lectures and each of them expressed his love and appreciation for the mission. All Muslims were brought under one banner. Dr. Marcus, Dr. Grieffelt and Dr. Banning were among the renowned personalities of the time who, realising the magnetic force of Islam, embraced it and devoted themselves to further the cause of Islam. Dr. Marcus' personality needs no introduction. He is the man whose essays on the Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, left a deep impress upon the mind of Dr. Iqbal who, by way of compliment, observed: "Many a Muslim thinker and philosopher have written a great deal about the Holy Prophet, but none comes up to the mark of Dr. Marcus." His way of presenting the Prophet is unmatched in its beauty, his force irresistible and his sincerity very convincing." Until 1938, the Muslim Mission's work went on smoothly and uninterrupted, but with the outbreak of the war the whole thing was upset. Professor Dr. Abdullah, the then Imam of the Mosque, as an Indian national had to leave Germany. A German doctor and his wife offered their services to Professor Dr. Abdullah to take care of the garden, the Mosque and the house adjacent to it. They decided also to bear themselves the expenses of running the Mosque. Sometime later this doctor joined the army and was killed in action. His wife also left the place. A new convert to Islam, Fran Moslar, then came forward to take care of the Mosque and the house. This magnificent Mosque was built at the cost of Rs. 150000. During the war it served as a spiritual centre not only for hundreds of German converts to Islam but also for the thousands of other Muslims who were drawn to Berlin — Russians, Turks, Egyptians, Afghans, Indians and others. During the war, Muslim prisoners of war from India who happened to be in Germany also went to this Mosque for Id prayers. In the final stages of the war, when Berlin was attacked by the Russian forces, the Germans dug trenches in the Mosque garden and it, therefore, became a target for the invading army. Although the Mosque survived the war, it suffered heavy damage. The dome itself was hit and damaged. One of the two minarets, 95 feet high, was practically destroyed. Its repair cost the Anjuman more than 80000 Rupees. The Mosque is situated in the most fashionable locality of Berlin. Well laid out roads on its three sides with a footpath running side by side, lovely hedges and flower plants with a beautiful lawn in front add to the charm of the Mosque. [–]
and a teacher, most of whom were released.


12022. "Workers Freed, UN Resumes Afghan Aid [Taliban frees four workers; seven women aid workers were forced from their jobs]", in New York Times, December 12, 1996. p. A5. [TXT]

12023. Afghanistan: The Revolution Continues: Photobook: Part 1: Introduction. Moscow, RSFSR: Planeta Publishers, 1984. Every day the people of Afghanistan are making confident strides along the road of defending their revolutionary gains, raising their living standards and combating illiteracy, poverty and backwardness. They are scoring ever new victories in their efforts to achieve prosperity and build a life free from social injustice. With every passing day we are consolidating the positions won in our heroic struggle. Every new day brings increasingly humiliating defeats to the enemies of Afghanistan, and our people are determined to hold high the banner of revolutionary struggle. -- BABRAK KAFMAL (General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA).

In January 1985, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan will mark its 20th anniversary. Its record of glorious and selfless struggle testifies to the Party's wholehearted devotion to its people, its determination to promote the independence and progress of the mother country, friendship with all nations of the world. The PDPA was formed on 1/1/1965, in conditions that were favorable both within the country and internationally. Its aim was to lighten the hard lot of the suppressed peoples of Afghanistan. A successor to the advanced movement of the Afghan people, the Party had a rich new revolutionary content, based as it was on the transforming ideology of the working class and on unshakeable loyalty to proletarian internationalism. The formation of the PDPA was a major event in the political life of Afghanistan. The Party opened a possibility, for the first time in history, of emancipation of the Afghan people from oppression and exploitation by the pro-imperialist ruling classes and indicated the way to achieve this aim. Through ceaseless struggle the PDPA managed to rally an organized movement of the Afghan people round the young working class, to impart to it an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist bent, to infuse it with a spirit of proletarian internationalism and unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union, which represents an invincible bulwark of peace, progress and socialism. The PDPA has exercised a tremendous influence on all aspects of the life of the Afghan people. Convincing testimony to this is provided by the spread of progressive ideas among the working masses, the establishment of an advanced press (publication of the newspapers Khalk and Parcham), the formation of mass organizations of workers, peasants, young people and women, the introduction of progressive international customs and traditions to the country's revolutionary movement such as celebration of May Day and of the anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution and other memorable dates commemorating important events in the struggle of the working class; and consistent and selfless support for the struggle of all revolutionary forces the world over. The scientifically substantiated documents of the PDPA—its Rules and Programme—have played an immense guiding role in the entire revolutionary movement in Afghanistan.

The PDPA has based its activities on a precise knowledge of the actual conditions in Afghan society and chosen various methods and means of struggle corresponding to the needs of the time and the political situation in the country. The Party combined peaceful, legal forms of struggle (strikes, marches, demonstrations, electoral campaigns, the parliamentary rostrum) with illegal ones (setting up an underground military organization) It was able to correctly analyse the actual situation in the country, to head the revolutionary movement of the people and to lead it to the victory of the April Revolution. Reaction and the imperialists, with the help of their agents within the revolutionary movement of the Afghan people and in the ranks of the PDPA, were able to deal severe blows at the unity of action of the national and democratic forces, at the unity of the Party. Hafizullah Amin and his criminal gang, by their treacherous actions, disrupted, for a time, the Party. However, the concerted demand of all members of the PDPA to restore unity was a powerful factor in opposing the attempts of the splitters. At its historical conference of 1977 the Party restored iron-tight unity of its ranks. The experience of the PDPA is yet another confirmation that unity constitutes a pledge of great victories. The restoration of its unity enabled the Party to centralize the leadership of the popular struggle to overthrow the despotic rule of the feudal, comprador bourgeoisie and the corrupt bureaucratic ruling clique and achieve the victory of the April National-Democratic Revolution of 1978. The April Revolution fully met the objective needs and aspirations of the broad classes and strata of Afghan society. From the very beginning it was given all-round support by the population of the country. Because of the backwardness of Afghan society, the intrigues and provocative actions staged by regional reaction and international imperialism, the path of the Revolution proved a thorny one. There have been mistakes and deviations from the course mapped out by the Party and the revolutionary government. Amin and his criminal gang bear full responsibility for these deviations.

The inherent vitality of the April Revolution predetermined the victory of the correct, revolutionary line. With the beginning of a new stage in the development of the Revolution at the end of 12/1979, the course of events turned in the right direction. The present and future generations of Afghan people will never forget the great role of the fraternal assistance rendered by the great Land of Soviets in support of the revolutionary course of the PDPA and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in restoring the revolutionary gains and defending its territorial/integrity, independence and national sovereignty. Despite the undeclared criminal war unleashed by reaction and imperialism against the people of Afghanistan, which continues to this day, the April Revolution guided by the PDPA has achieved considerable successes within a short period. A democratic Land Reform in the interests and with the participation of landless and small-holding peasants has been launched in the country. This is the chief victory of the National-Democratic Revolution. The economic life of the country has been placed on a planned foundation. Unification of all national, patriotic and democratic forces of the country, which has been one of the principal goals of the PDPA from the moment of its formation, found its expression in the setting up of the broad National Fatherland Front. Consolidation and resumption of the activities of the democratic organizations of young people, women, and the trade unions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the establishment of peasant cooperatives and organization of unions of creative intelligentsia have provided favorable conditions for broad participation by the popular masses in the administration of the country and exercising democracy. Adoption of The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a provisional constitution for the country, and of the Law on Local Government Bodies were important landmarks on the path to further democratization of social and political life in Afghan society.

At present a cultural revolution is firmly under way in Afghanistan. In carrying it out account is being taken of the ethnic, religious, language and tribal specifics and the customs and traditions of the various peoples inhabiting Afghanistan. In the Programme of Action of the PDPA it was noted: "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is the first state in the history of our glorious homeland determined to ensure full and real equality and equal opportunities for the growth of material prosperity and spiritual development of all peoples, ethnic entities and tribes in the country. All peoples, ethnic entities and tribes are ensured and guaranteed equal opportunities for participation in social and state affairs, in effecting revolutionary transformations and defending our beloved homeland." A nation-wide campaign to combat illiteracy has become an essential part of the country's cultural revolution. A growing number of
Afghans are mastering the skills of reading and writing. Over one million Afghan citizens have learnt to read and write since the 4/1978, and over 500000 are presently attending literacy courses. Thanks to the active support of the popular masses the ranks of the defenders of the April Revolution are swelling. The republic's Armed Forces have registered an unprecedented qualitative and quantitative growth in the last few years. Never before in its history has Afghanistan had an army which, in terms of its conscience, conviction, loyalty to internationalism, and the will to serve the working people, could equal the republic's present-day heroic Armed Forces. That is a new trend in the political life of Afghan society, which strengthens the ties between the Army and the people and is proof of their active participation in defending the Revolution, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRA. Under the guidance of the PDPA, the international prestige of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being enhanced, and the support of all revolutionary, progressive, and peace-loving forces is growing. These forces are led by the Soviet Union, a sincere friend and protector of the Afghan people and the April Revolution. Speaking about the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, said, "We are marching in line with all the peace-loving forces of the planet, and together we will fight militarism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, fascism, racism and apartheid.*

A principled and consistent stand as regards the Afghan Revolution has become a touchstone in judging proletarian internationalism in action. The PDPA has close ties with many workers' and revolutionary-democratic parties and national liberation movements. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan maintains diplomatic relations with 80 countries. Its fraternal relations with the Soviet Union have successfully developed during the past years. The Party is concentrating its efforts on consolidating unity within its ranks, which is confirmed by the decisions of the National Conference of the PDPA held in 3/1982, and of subsequent plenary meetings of the PDPA Central Committee. The Party has evolved a precise organizational structure both in the centre and in the provinces. At the present moment there are 31 provincial and 26 city Party committees, which have an equal standing; there are also 36 regional and over 200 district Party committees. The growing membership of the PDPA, which is now 120000-strong, is a confirmation of the unity and cohesion of its ranks, and of its firm ties with the masses. "The members of Party committees, Party functionaries, and Party-activists as a whole, said Babrak Karmal, General Secretary Of the PDPA Central Committee, make up a mighty force, which can and must bring new life into Party work and make it more effective, enhance the influence of the Party among the working people, and achieve an atmosphere conducive to creative and constructive labour at the local level in conditions of peace."

The position of the Party as the leading and guiding force of Afghan society is constantly strengthening. The unity and solidarity of all classes and democratically-minded strata of the population, ethnic minorities, the clergy and the ulama are growing stronger in the DRA with every passing day. And with each day their implacable hatred of the counter-revolutionary forces, both inside and outside the country, is mounting, for these forces express the class interests of the big landowners, comprador bourgeoisie, and reactionary bureaucracy overthrown by the April Revolution, and the interests of imperialist powers with the United States in the lead. The people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, inspired by their faith in the bright future of the Revolution, are working to realize the Programme of Action of the PDPA, to build a new, humane society in Afghanistan and ensure equality and happiness for all women, men and children. The Revolution, the hope and stanchion of Foundations have also been laid for gas and oil production, coal mining, and all the toilers of the country on the basis of the will of the vast masses, profound respect and strict observance of the historical, cultural and religious traditions of the people with definite adherence to the principles of Islam as a sacred religion, respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through policies of peace, friendship and cooperation with all peoples of the region and the world. -- The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. [Extract]

The Democratic Organization of the Women of Afghanistan works for equal rights for Afghan women in all spheres of the country's public life, for peace, against reaction and imperialism. The organization is also working to eliminate illiteracy, raise the political, professional and cultural level of Afghan women and help them become more active in bringing up the rising generation.

Despite all the efforts of internal and external reactionaries to make our people suffer, the Party and revolutionary government confidently pursue their policy aimed at resolving the country's economic, social, national and cultural problems, the policy of securing a lasting peace in the country. The present military and political situation in Afghanistan can be described as a continuously growing supremacy of our revolutionary forces over counter-revolutionaries. The inevitable outcome will be the latter's complete surrender. The PDPA's leading role in state affairs and public life is increasing steadily, and its ranks are growing strong and numerous. Party committees and organizations have gained a certain organizational and political experience of working with the masses. As a result, they have become more efficient in dealing with current affairs in the provinces, cities, districts, areas and work teams. The influence of the Party bodies, in which the people see an active part in state affairs and defending national interests, is also growing continuously. The Party and revolutionary government place a great emphasis on fighting against counter-revolution, building up the Armed Forces, making Army political bodies, Party committees and organizations more active; developing and reinforcing local self-defence units and extending the links between the Armed Forces and the people. -- The Resolution of the 14th Plenary Meeting of the PDPA Central Committee. [Extract] [+]

12025. ------. Afghanistan: The Revolution Continues: Photobook: Part 5: Birth of Industrial Afghanistan. Moscow, RSFSR: Planeta Publishers, 1984. The working class strides in the first ranks of the revolutionary movement to build a new Afghanistan. The April Revolution has liberated the workers from the exploiters and made them co-owners of the means of production at state-owned enterprises. In alliance with rural folk they now constitute the main bulwark of state power. The qualitative and quantitative growth of the Afghan working class is taking place against a breakdown of old social relations and the consolidation and expansion of the state industrial sector. This is being furthered by the economic policy of the PDPA, which is working for creation in the country of a firm and dynamic industrial base. In recent years the metal-working and engineering industries have been given priority development. Foundations have also been laid for gas and oil production, coal mining, electrotechnical engineering and other branches. The road haulage system, which accounts for 95% of all freight transportation in Afghanistan, is being further perfected. Of the 200-odd big and medium-sized state-owned and mixed industrial enterprises in the DRA more than half were built with the USSR's economic and technical assistance.

The textile industry has come on considerably in the DRA. Its largest enterprises are situated in Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, Jabad-us-Siraj, and Pul-i-Khumri. Some belong to the state, some are managed by
the mixed company Afghan Textile. They produce practically a full range of factory made cotton and woolen textiles, as well as rayon fabrics, yarn, thread and knitted goods.

With each year the assortment of products of the Kabul House-Building Enterprise is expanded. Today it includes elements of apartment houses, schools, kindergartens, boarding schools and industrial buildings. There are many women employed at the enterprise in various jobs that were formerly only accessible to men such as bricklayers, drivers of special cars and trucks. Constantly expanding housing and industrial construction requires large quantities of cement and other building materials. They are produced at the cement works in Pul-i-Khurmi and Jabal-us-Siraj, the Kabul Ashton Works and a number of smaller enterprises.

The truck today is the main type of transport in the DRA. Its prevalence and the development of the highway network in the republic has been due to the landscape of the country with its predominantly mountainous or desert regions. Perfecting the territorial distribution of the productive forces in the country and levelling out the economic and social development of the province demands a novel approach to transport. Here, too, the republic receives help from the Soviet Union, which sends experts in road construction and road-construction machinery and big trucks. A big role in transportation is played by the Afghan-Soviet Transportation Co. (AFSOTR) which is responsible for cross-border road haulage and transit haulage across the territory of the DRA. The work of transport and communications in the republic is at present hampered by the sabotage activities perpetrated by bands of hirelings infiltrating the country from abroad. The government is necessitated to detail large forces to protect roads and other communication lines. [=]

12026. --------. Afghanistan: The Revolution Continues; Photobook: Part 6: Road to Knowledge and Progress. Moscow, RSFSR: Planeta Publishers, 1984. The April Revolution has opened broad prospects for the Afghan people in the sphere of cultural development. Among the first measures of the revolutionary government was development of a new comprehensive programme for restructuring the entire system of education, which envisages, among other things, introduction of free universal compulsory elementary education and expansion of the network of educational establishments. A nation-wide campaign against illiteracy has been launched on the initiative of the PDPA. Numerous courses for adults and evening schools for young workers have been opened. Instruction of adults is completely voluntary. It is planned to teach people to read and write and to interest them in active public life, to help them understand the significance of the measures taken by the PDPA to build a new society in the country and to defend the gains of the Revolution. The Soviet Union is helping Afghanistan train qualified personnel. Soviet staff teach in Afghan higher establishments and many Afghan young men and women are sent to receive a higher education at Soviet institutions of higher learning. The Party pays unflagging attention to the mass media and use them in ideological work. Favorable conditions have been provided in the country for the development of national literature, theatre and art, for the spread of physical education and sports. Care for working people’s health, especially of the rising generation, is a law for all Party and state bodies. [=]

12027. --------. Editorial: “Algeria’s Long Night Of Agony”, in Crescent International, January 1, 1995. Algerians go through the third anniversary of military rule this month. This is one anniversary the Muslims, especially those in Algeria, can well do without. Since the cancellation of elections and annulment on 1/11/1992 of the first round (held on 12/26/1991) which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won hands down, the people of Algeria have faced the junta’s heavy boot. At least 30000 people have been killed. Even Amnesty International (no friend of the Muslims!) has admitted that 20000 people have died in three years, most shot by soldiers. The junta’s brutal crackdown has not only been supported but also applauded by the west. France is in the forefront of this campaign. The west’s anti-Islamic animus is revealed in every action, big or small, that it takes. From the expulsion of outspoken imams to the clampdown on wearing of hijab by young Muslim school girls, the policy is clear: no manifestation of Islamic sentiment will be tolerated in France. The west’s threshold of tolerance is extremely low. It is for democracy so long as it likes the winner. It will tolerate Muslims in their midst only when they live as docile, helpless creatures on reservations (witness the plight of Muslims in Bosnia). Any demand for their rights will be put down ruthlessly. This, however, should not surprise anyone. It was naive of the western powers during the elections, through their silence, to be allowed to assume power in Algeria peacefully. No ruling elites, especially those in the Muslim world, have ever or will ever give up power voluntarily. They have to be driven out of office through the street power of the Islamic movement. Even if one tyrant is thrown out, as was done in Iran, there is enough residual resistance in the bureaucracy as well as the armed forces, that will make the functioning of the Islamic government very difficult. Iran has paid heavy price for this. Others will go through a similar process. There are, unfortunately no short-cuts in this struggle. We had cautioned in these columns (Editorial, 5/16/1991), seven months prior to the elections in Algeria, that the electoral route is a minefield for the Islamic movement. The ruling elites have a number of options at their disposal that they can and will use to ambush the Islamic movement. These include manipulating electoral boundaries, rigging the elections and if all else fails, to call out the army to frustrate the aspirations of the people. This is exactly what happened in Algeria. The only choice left for Muslims is armed struggle to defeat the army or more precisely, to create a breach between the lower and upper ranks. When the soldiers get fed up of killing their own kith and kin, they will turn their guns on the officers giving out the orders to shoot. Iran’s example again springs to mind during the struggle to overthrow the shah in 1978/79. This stage may be fast approaching in Algeria as well. There are already reports of mass defections from the rank and file. An added factor is what is called the ‘Afghan veterans’, committed Algerian Muslim youths who had served with the jihad in Afghanistan and become seasoned guerrilla fighters. These battle-hardened veterans have liberated large parts of the Algerian countryside. In Algeria, the FIS has operated at two levels - the political party as well as the movement. Clearly, the political party route proved limited in usefulness even though it demonstrated the support the FIS enjoys among the masses. Despite this demonstration, the movement has had to fight the military-backed junta in the streets. It means the FIS will have to offer something more. Naturally, it will demand sacrifices but without offering a hundred thousand or more martyrs, the back of the junta will not be so easily broken. The martyrs’ blood will create a permanent barrier between the corrupt elites, their western backers and the ordinary people of Algeria led by the Islamic movement. The FIS must intensify the struggle and move on to the next, and hopefully, the final stage. There is no turning back. Allah will, insha’Allah, reward their sacrifices. The people of Algeria may yet become the catalyst for change throughout the Arabic-speaking world. [=]
media (New York Times, 10/8/1996, for instance) have asked for three things from the Taleban: "stop the export of drugs, weapons and terrorism." Floodling Afghanistan with weapons is, presumably, all right. As long as the Afghans kill each other with weapons supplied by the west and paid for by Saudi Arabia, it is welcomed. By "export of terrorism," the Times really means preventing Islamic activists, being hunted down by the Arab regimes, from seeking shelter in Afghanistan. It is on the question of drugs that the west will find that their own "fundamentalists" are the real culprits. According to the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) for 1996, opium production in Helmand and Nangarhar provinces increased by 80% over last year (Helmand has been under Taleban control for two years and Nangarhar just fell to them). Similarly, opium production in Oruzgan and Qandahar has also gone up. So much for the Taleban's restrictions on drugs. There is quick money to be made in drugs and the Taleban are not likely to pass such an opportunity.

The Taleban have achieved one thing though: they have united all other Afghans for a common purpose. The only other time the Afghans were united was when they faced the Red Army in Afghanistan. The Taleban have brought such disparate groups as Abdul Rashid Dostum's Uzbek militia, Burhanuddin Rabbani/Ahmed Shah Masoud's Tajiks and the Shias of Hazarajat, together. Afghanistan is now divided along ethnic lines: the Taleban (Pushthuns) on one side and all the rest on the other. It may be asked: what is in all this for Pakistan? Islamabad's exacerbation with the bickering Afghan leaders was real but little effort was made to patch things up. Pakistan wanted a puppet regime in Kabul. This is an impossible dream which ignores history. Even the Taleban are not likely to play Pakistan's puppets for long; this is not the Afghan character. Recent developments have resulted in splitting Afghanistan along the north-south fault-line. It will frustrate Pakistan's desire for a road link to Central Asia. In fact, the Central Asian republics have already reacted with anger and alarm to developments in Kabul. The other, more serious, danger is the spill-over effect of the Taleban's victory onto the sectarian conflict in Pakistan. At present, it is at a low level but if the Parachinar experience in the Kurram Agency along the border with Afghanistan is any guide, it will have serious consequences. Sectarian passions, once aroused, may be difficult to contain. Pakistan may be playing a dangerous game for dubious economic gains and to please Uncle Sam. [=-]

12029. -------. Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic: Part 16: Bonds of Friendship. Moscow, RSFSR: Novosty Press Agency Publishing House, N.D. [1968]. The mountains of Kirghizia are high, but they do not create a barrier to the outside world. Kirghizia has stable international economic ties. Kirghiz goods are sold in more than 50 countries. This includes electrical and agricultural machines, metal cutting lathes and instruments, non-ferrous metals and pumps, melted fat, dried fruits, cotton fibre, fermented tobacco, silk thread and other goods. Kirghizia imports various machines, equipment, machine-tools, and consumer goods. Thus, Czechoslovakia supplies her with equipment for the cement, meat and dairy industries and canning plants; the GDR, with sugar refining apparatus, and printing presses; Hungary, with equipment for an electric lamp works; Poland, with machinery for the primary processing of wool; and Italy, with cotton-printing machinery, etc. The country's workers in science and the arts maintain friendly ties with their foreign colleagues. Thus, the Central Scientific Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR exchanges books and periodicals with more than 100 libraries of academies and institutes in dozens of foreign countries. The books exchanged deal with technology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, medicine, history, philosophy, literature, language, geography, economics, etc. The Botanical Gardens of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences have extensive ties with their counterparts in dozens of foreign countries, exchanging catalogues, plants and seeds. The works of Kirghiz scientists and the books of Kirghiz writers are sent abroad and are translated into the languages of many nations. The paintings of Kirghiz artists S.Chuikov, G. Aitiev, A.Usubaliev and others have been on show in India, Italy, Afghanistan, Burma and Ceylon. Every year, more and more Kirghiz travel abroad, some to make a study of industrial production and farming, others to attend scientific conferences and recitals, compete in athletic contests or simply to have a look. Kirghiz athletes probably travel most, and have been to the United States, Britain, Afghanistan, Brazil, Hungary, the GDR, Italy, Mongolia, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the FRG, France, Japan and other countries. There are many foreign visitors to Kirghizia, among them scientists and scholars, writers, statesmen and public figures, and they are all given a most heartfelt welcome by the people of Kirghizia. [=-]

12030. -------. Press Release: NGOs Do Less in Kabul until Clear if Women Can Work. Reuters, March 2, 1997. NGOs are slowing down their work in Kabul until the issue regarding their female employees can be settled. Due to the gender policies of the Taleban Islamic Movement, women have not been allowed to go to work. Though the Taleban ministries have authorized women aid workers to return to the medical and health sectors, the Taleban militia is still punishing those who do so, according to Ross Everson of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan. Everson is asking for the ministers to make their authorizations public in order to avoid any miscommunications or misunderstandings with the militia. [TXT]


Algeria: 150.
Bahrain: 78.
Egypt: 170.
Ethiopia: 162.
Iran: 150.
Iraq: 111.
Israel: 25.
Jordan: 102.
Kuwait: 55.
Lebanon: 52.
Libya: 130.
Oman: 186.
Pakistan: 145.
Qatar: 85.
Saudi Arabia: 140.
Somalia: 162.
Sudan: 156.
Syria: 107.
Tunisia: 138.
Turkey: 153.
UAE: 85.
North Yemen: 186.
South Yemen: 186. [=-]
The colonial imposed system in Muslim societies. Support of the heroin trade, bribery, assassinations and the manipulation of the people's will, were all taken to task for bringing misery to the Muslims. In his welcoming remarks, Brother Ismail Kalla, a prime force behind the conference, pointed out that if Muslims committed themselves to the way of Allah and did not compromise with the forces of kufr and taghoot, Imam Muhammad al-Asi talked about the struggle in Palestine. With so much happening there in recent days and weeks, it was a stirring performance in which the Arab rulers, Yassir Arafat and the Zionists as well as their American masters were all taken to task for butchering Muslims while crying about the plight of a handful of Zionists.

He rejected the nonsensical notion that Muslims were being offered peace. He said that there was no peace for Muslims, only brutality and collective punishments. Peace meant that the Zionists should be allowed to enjoy their ill-gotten gains made through the dispossessions and slaughters of innocent Muslims. Imam Abdul Alim Musa, no stranger to South Africa, like the other imam from Washington DC, was his usual eloquent self. Imam Musa has been recognized by Allah to present the most serious issues in such a humorous way as to penetrate the heart of the audience. He addressed the issue of the west's exploitative policies and why America feared Islam. He said that America and its leaders were all thoroughly corrupt and on their deathbed. They fear Islam because it forbids fornication, usury, robbery, drugs, alcohol and other evils that are rampant in the American society.

In the evening, Dr. Kalim Siddiqui delivered the keynote address. Emerging from his serious illness in 6/1995, Dr. Kalim's arrival was eagerly awaited in South Africa. Muslims around the world, especially in South Africa, had prayed for his health. Allah, in His infinite mercy, answered their prayers and restored Dr. Kalim to health when many others had become quite apprehensive. He spoke on the conference theme, "Creating a new civilization of Islam." Despite his illness and now admittedly not so good health, he gave a stirring performance. He held the audience in thrall. For many, his writings and speeches have been their constant sources of understanding the issues confronting the world of Islam. His ideas have stood the test of time and have been proved correct. At the conference, his latest book, "Creating a new civilization of Islam," Muslims once again demonstrated the unity of the Ummah by attending in record numbers. There was great excitement as speakers outlined what had gone wrong in the Ummah and how to restore it to health. The attendance of thousands of people - men, women and children - had surpassed the estimates of the organizers. Those who attended were not disappointed. Interestingly, much publicity for the conference was also presented when the Zionists and their Arab allies launched a propaganda campaign to discredit the conference. It totally backfired on them and in the process helped publicize the conference more than it would have otherwise been possible.

Aside from the conference there were workshops and seminars dealing with such topics as the Global Islamic Movement, Developing the Islamic Media and getting on the Electronic highway, "Women in the Middle East and North Africa - Afghanistan." www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

Turkey: 76.
UAE: 32.
North Yemen: 120.
South Yemen: 120.

Afghanistan: 9000.
Algeria: 300.
Bahrain: 300.
Egypt: 800.
Ethiopia: 5000.
Iran: 1200.
Iraq: 2300.
Israel: 100.
Jordan: 1100.
Kuwait: 200.
Libya: 400.
Morocco: 900.
Oman: 800.
Pakistan: 10500.
Qatar: 500.
Saudi Arabia: 700.
Somalia: 2500.
Sudan: 1400.
Syria: 1400.
Tunisia: 1000.
Turkey: 1200.
UAE: 400.
North Yemen: 3400.
South Yemen: 800. [m]

The largest conference ever held in South Africa got off to an electrifying start with a stirring khutbah by Imam Muhammad al-Asi from Washington DC. The presence of thousands of Muslim men, women and children, was a remarkable sight. The overall theme of the conference, organized by the Crescent International from 4/5-7/1996 in Pretoria, was "Creating a new civilization of Islam." Muslims once again demonstrated the unity of the Ummah by attending in record numbers. There was great excitement as speakers outlined what had gone wrong in the Ummah and how to restore it to health. The attendance of thousands of people - men, women and children - had surpassed the estimates of the organizers. Those who attended were not disappointed. Interestingly, much publicity for the conference was also presented when the Zionists and their Arab allies launched a propaganda campaign to discredit the conference. It totally backfired on them and in the process helped publicize the conference more than it would have otherwise been possible. Despite the immense suffering to which Muslims have been subjected from Srinagar to Sarajevo and from Palestine to Chechnya and as far as Mindanao and Acheh-Sumatra in Southeast Asia, there was no feeling of dejection at the Developing the Islamic Media and getting on the Electronic highway, "Creating a new civilization of Islam." Despite his illness and now admittedly not so good health, he gave a stirring performance. He held the audience in thrall. For many, his writings and speeches have been their constant sources of understanding the issues confronting the world of Islam. His ideas have stood the test of time and have been proved correct. At the conference, his latest book, "Creating a new civilization of Islam," Muslims once again demonstrated the unity of the Ummah by attending in record numbers. There was great excitement as speakers outlined what had gone wrong in the Ummah and how to restore it to health. The attendance of thousands of people - men, women and children - had surpassed the estimates of the organizers. Those who attended were not disappointed. Interestingly, much publicity for the conference was also presented when the Zionists and their Arab allies launched a propaganda campaign to discredit the conference. It totally backfired on them and in the process helped publicize the conference more than it would have otherwise been possible. Despite the immense suffering to which Muslims have been subjected from Srinagar to Sarajevo and from Palestine to Chechnya and as far as Mindanao and Acheh-Sumatra in Southeast Asia, there was no feeling of dejection at the conference. Repeatedly speakers pointed out that if the Muslims are undergoing a difficult phase in their lives, it is a test from Allah. What is in South Africa already but had to rush back to Sarajevo after receiving an emergency call. The issue of Bosnia, however, was not forgotten. More than any other crisis, Bosnia has made Muslims aware of the deep animosity the west harbors towards Islam and Muslims. Dr. Yequab Zaki, formerly visiting professor at Harvard and member of the Muslim Parliament, Janghang Muhammad, deputy leader of the Muslim Parliament, and Iqbal Siddiqui, research fellow at the Muslim Institute, also spoke. A large number of other speakers, both local as well as from overseas, presented their ideas. Other topics discussed were the situation in Algeria, the Arabian Peninsula, the era of political parties and the continuing war in Afghanistan. The west's vicious propaganda war against Islam was also analyzed and discussed at length. A number of workshops dealing with such topics as the Global Islamic Movement, Developing the Islamic Media and getting on the Electronic highway, "Women in the Middle East and North Africa - Afghanistan." www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

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Iran: 1200.
Iraq: 2300.
Israel: 100.
Jordan: 1100.
Kuwait: 200.
Libya: 400.
Morocco: 900.
Oman: 800.
Pakistan: 10500.
Qatar: 500.
Saudi Arabia: 700.
Somalia: 2500.
Sudan: 1400.
Syria: 1400.
Tunisia: 1000.
Turkey: 1200.
UAE: 400.
North Yemen: 3400.
South Yemen: 800. [m]
performance of Amb. Jeanne Kirkpatrick who shed crocodile tears as she related false Soviet atrocity stories. At that time, Najibullah was reporting the distribution of farmland to 335000 landless peasant families in the land reform, with 47% growth of the state and cooperative sector, and with industrial production up 25%. Literacy programs had educated 1.5 million people to read and write, with the fullest equality of women possible. Now, the US-backed Taliban is reversing every advance brought by the Communists to Afghanistan. The photograph of Najibullah’s body on the front page of the New York Times was a deliberate warning to anyone in the world who would struggle to create a better life for the people. [TEXT]

12036. CWS. Afghanistan Emergency First Alert. Church World Service, October 4, 1996. Hundreds of residents of Kabul are fleeing the Afghan capital following last week’s victory of the Taleban militia, which seeks to establish a strict Islamic state. Taleban fighters seized the capital from the relatively moderate Islamic government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani last week.

Many of those fleeing Kabul are members of the educated middle-class who fear imposition of strict religious rules, including the banning of non-television, movies and music, and public separation of the sexes. As a result, schools and colleges in Kabul, where 70% of teachers are women, have yet to reopen a week after the Taleban takeover.

Women doctors and nurses are still working at city hospitals assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, but not all have returned to their posts for fear of harassment. They may care only for female patients.

The scene in Kabul is a chaotic mix of people and horn-blaring minibuses, according to news reports. Many of those leaving are headed for Pakistan. The militia have stopped some Kabul residents from leaving with their household goods and families.

Last week, Ashe Michael of the CWS Pakistan office, and Lonnie Turnipseed, former CWS director who is now providing ongoing consultation, entered Afghanistan and remained there three days before returning to Pakistan. They reported heavy fighting and said people were "in a panic."

Call the CWS HOTLINE for updates: (800) 456-1310. [ ]

12037. Crossette, Barbara. "Half the World Lacks Sanitation, Says UNICEF; Cause of New Plagues, Resurgence of Old Diseases and Deaths of Children", in New York Times, July 23, 1997. p. A9. Nearly three billion people have no access to even minimally sanitary toilets; this is the major cause of 2.2 million deaths among children from diarrhea and related diseases. The number of people lacking such access has risen 300 million from 1990. Akhtar Hameed Khan, lead of conference under United Nations auspices at which all parties to the Gulf War to Pakistan. They reported heavy fighting and said people were "in a panic."

Call the CWS HOTLINE for updates: (800) 456-1310. [ ]
the illegal colonizing settlement of Israelis in the occupied Palestinian Territories with the escalation of the continuing process of the alienation of the indigenous Palestinians and the annexation of their land, and attempts to expel them out of their national homeland. We demand the immediate cessation of the construction and expansion of all Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine as a precondition to any peace process.

We draw attention to the fact that Jewish immigration poses a great threat to Palestinian survival on their land and is an obstacle to the resolution of the Palestinian problem due to the ensuing demographic changes. This is especially true while the Palestinians continue to be denied their right to return. We call upon new immigrants to Israel and all Israelis to refuse to settle in the occupied Palestinian Territories, and thus contribute to the efforts for a just settlement of the question of Palestine. We furthermore call upon the Soviet Union to refrain from facilitating Jewish immigration to Israel.

We denounce the double standard of the United States Government, characterized by its attitude with respect to the Palestinian right of self-determination as compared to that of Israel. We also condemn the United States Government’s attempt to evade the need to convene the International Conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations, and its reluctance to take the necessary measures in order to overcome Israel’s refusal to accept the principle of “land for peace” and bring a halt to its settlement activities in the occupied territories of the Golan, West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

We oppose the massive and unconditional aid to Israel provided by the United States and other States which underwrite the continuing occupation. We call upon all Governments to condition all aid, loans and guarantees to Israel on the cessation of Israeli settlement construction and expansion in the Occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. We call on all Governments and the United Nations Security Council to institute sanctions against Israeli occupation. We unanimously recognize and support the intifadah as a national liberation struggle for the achievement of the State of Palestine and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

We condemn the United States and Israeli endeavours to bypass the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the proposed regional conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. We insist that Palestinians as all other peoples have full right to choose their own political representatives in any peace process. It is unacceptable and illogical that Israel be permitted to choose both the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations. Israel should have no say in naming or vetoing any representative chosen by the Palestinians - whether on the basis of his or her political views, place of birth, present whereabouts or for any other reason.

The issue of the status of Jerusalem should not be excluded from negotiations, nor should Palestinian residents of that city be excluded from participation in the negotiations.

We consider it most urgent that the United Nations provide immediate and sustained protection for the Palestinians under occupation, and that the United Nations Security Council establish in East Jerusalem an authority responsible for the monitoring of human rights violations in contradiction with the Fourth Geneva Convention. We urge the establishment of a subcommission of the United Nations Security Council to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their inalienable rights. We call for the establishment of a United Nations force to protect the Palestinian nation and to stop Israel’s attempts to destroy it.

We also observe that the Palestinians in Israel are subjected to a discriminatory policy of continued confiscations of Arab lands and destruction of Arab homes for the purpose of settlement of Soviet immigrants inside Israel. We alert the NGO network to monitor and publicize these injustices.

We condemn the actions of the Government of Kuwait in forcibly relocating more than 300000 Palestinians who had lived in Kuwait prior to 8/2/1990. We further condemn the collective punishment of an entire community based on the alleged actions of some of its members. Furthermore, we remain concerned about the fate of the 50000 Palestinians still residing in Kuwait, especially the 25000 who carry Egyptian refugee documents. It is incumbent upon the Government of Kuwait either to allow these Palestinians to stay and work in Kuwait and to facilitate their admission to a country of their choice, including the country in which they or their families were born. We NGOs hereby notify the Government of Kuwait that we are monitoring its actions concerning these Palestinians and those still detained in Kuwaiti prisons and detention centres. We NGOs will bring violations of their rights to the immediate attention of the international community through all possible means.

We conducted work together in workshops and specific recommendations for actions are appended here. We consider these practical, action oriented proposals to be the central focus of our collective agenda for the coming year. To enhance our effectiveness we are organizing task forces among NGOs worldwide to concentrate our energies on specific projects. A number of special interest group meetings were also convened within the context of the international meeting and their proposals for actions are also appended. We believe that the implementation of these projects by NGOs world wide is a step on the path to a just and realistic peace in the Middle East.

We express our strongest protest against the action of the Israeli Government in preventing the distinguished experts, Mr. Sa’eb Erakat of Al-Najah University and Mr. Raji Srour of Gaza from attending. We know of other Palestinians living under occupation who were denied the possibility of participating in this meeting by the Israeli Government, such as Ahmed Hatibbi and Rezeq Shuqeir, and we most forcefully denounce this action.

We warmly thank the Committee for convening this international meeting and we greatly appreciate the presence of the Committee delegation. We thank the DPR and all others of the United Nations Secretariat including the interpreters who so valuably assisted us. We express our appreciation to the distinguished experts who spoke here and added valuable information to our deliberations. We express our thanks to the Austrian Government for making available the Austria Centre for our Meeting. We wish to express a special note of thanks and appreciation to Mr. Guido de Marco, President of the General Assembly, for his important and insightful comments. We all consider his participation in our meeting to be a distinct honour. [=]

12039. DS. “Europe and Canada: Tajikistan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (b) Disappearance”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The disappearance of Garmi- and Pamiri-origin men continued, although at a lower rate than in 1993. The number of returned refugees who disappeared greatly decreased. In many cases, those thought to have disappeared had in fact been conscripted as part of a government policy actively pursued in August and September in response to increased fighting both on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and in the Tavildara district. Young men were rounded up on the streets and in night raids on their homes. Several Dushanbe newspapers estimated that at least 60 men and women had disappeared, aside from any conscripted, in the first half of 1994. The Government has been unwilling to investigate claims of disappearances seriously, asserting that the Procurator General’s office does not have sufficient resources for the purpose. In 12/1993, unknown assailants abducted Tagobek Shukurov, a sitting judge and Supreme Soviet member from Kolkhozobod, who had been a member of the People’s Front during the war and had supported the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan. He remained missing throughout the year and is now
presumed dead. The 1993 disappearance of Dr. Ayniddin Sadykov, a noted surgeon and chairman of the Dushanbe branch of the Democratic Party, remained unsolved throughout.[=]

12040. DS. "Europe and Canada: Tajikstan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation". Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government has stipulated that Tajikistan citizens and foreigners alike are prohibited from traveling within a 25-kilometer zone along the Republic's borders with both China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, however, international aid workers and diplomats travel freely in these regions without prior government authorization. Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers wishing to remain longer than 3 days no longer need to receive a permit, although they must still register with central authorities. Due to the state of emergency which was in place until August, all citizens were obliged to carry their identification cards at all times. There are no legal restrictions on changing residence or workplace. Current regulations require registration at the local Interior Ministry office upon arrival and departure. Tajikistan nationals who wish to travel abroad must obtain an exit visa. There is no evidence that these are withheld for political reasons. Tajikistan does not yet have a law on emigration. Currently those wishing to migrate within the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of the Interior of their departure. Persons wishing to emigrate beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's embassy in order to obtain their international passport. Persons who settle abroad are required to inform the Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate. Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may do so freely by submitting their applications to the Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-case basis. There is no indication that persons, other than those who fled Tajikistan following local reasons after the civil war, are not freely permitted to return. A refugee law passed in June guarantees a person granted refugee status the right to work and move freely throughout the country. Following implementation of the law, the Government created a central department for refugees, under the Ministry of Labor, which worked actively with the UNHCR. One unresolved issue pertains to the right of returnees who married in Afghanistan to bring their spouses with them to Tajikistan. Credible reports claimed that the Government maintained an unofficial policy of denying residence permits to Afghan spouses of returnees, thereby allowing the Government to deny any official status to these persons or their children. Due to better cooperation with the Government and an increased level of security the UNHCR increased the rate of return among Tajik refugees in Afghanistan in 1994, leaving only approximately 22000 refugees there and another estimated 16000 internally displaced persons in Gorno Badakhshan. Representatives of the armed opposition in Afghanistan continued their efforts to dissuade Tajiks from turning, using threats and disinformation in the refugee camps. One of the significant impediments to refugee repatriation remained the occupation of returnees' homes by those loyal to the victorious special battalions, special battalion members, and ethnic Kulyabs. The Government is working slowly to evict occupiers. Several factors limited progress on this issue, including lack of will among local officials, fear of revenge by those who protest, and lack of power among officials to act against often armed or well-connected occupiers. There is no legal basis for forcible repatriation, nor is there any evidence to suggest that it was practiced in 1994.[=]

12041. DS. "Europe and Canada: Tajikstan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government initiated a campaign to disarm the local militias operating outside its control in southern Tajikistan. Kulyabi security forces, who were conducting the campaign, engaged in numerous beatings and illegal searches aimed mainly at the Uzbek minority. Human rights groups protested charging that the security forces were employing inhumane tactics in searching for weapons and that in reality Kulyabi forces were using the campaign to disarm their ethnic rivals, the Uzbeks. Another disarmament campaign was launched in December after the presidential election, but it did not target Uzbeks in particular and relied on voluntary surrendering of weapons. The Rahmonov Government, like governments before it, discriminated against Afghan nationals by not giving Afghans who are the victims of criminal elements any official status and thereby allowing them to escape criminal police protection. Although the Government signed the 1951 Convention on Refugees and passed a national law on refugees in 1994, international groups, in particular the UNHCR, charged with the protection of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan, lodged frequent protests with the Government over its treatment of Afghan refugees. The UNHCR registered some 600 Afghans as refugees in Tajikistan during 1994. An unresolved problem stems from the unofficial government policy of denying official status to the Afghan spouses of returning Tajik refugees (see Section 2.d.),[=]

12042. DS. "South Asia: Afghanistan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Repet for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Armed factions reportedly employed torture and ill-treatment frequently to extract information from prisoners or break their will. Mulia Rockett's forces hung some foreign captives (see Section 1.b.) upside down and beat them to force them to write letters urging that ransom be paid, according to media accounts.

Due to the lack of a functioning national judicial system the Dowers that be reportedly imposed traditional laws and punishments, such as the amputation of hands of those convicted of theft.

Marauding militiamen abused many women in Mazar-i-Sharif in January and in Kunduz in March, according to international media and other sources. The UN Special Rapporteur reported that in 1994 there were innumerable cases of rape and that in some instances women had been "hunted down." In March armed men repeatedly raped a 15-year-old girl in Kabul after breaking into her family's house and killing her father for allowing her to attend school, according to an AI report issued in December. The report added that thousands of women and children had been raped in Afghanistan since 4/1992, when the mujahedin groups took power in Kabul. [=]

12043. DS. "South Asia: Afghanistan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (g) Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Ten armed factions, aligned in two loose blocs, fought for power in Kabul and the provinces, causing widespread destruction and indiscriminate killing. Command and control of armed men was often haphazard and informal, a condition that obscured the relationship between the perpetrators of human rights violations and the political leaders with whom they were nominally affiliated.

On 1/1, General Dostam's troops in Kabul, theretofore aligned with President Rabbani, switched to Prime Minister Hekmatyar's side and attempted to oust the President in a coup d'etat. The President's forces quickly countered and the ensuing fighting engulfed much of the city and other parts of the country. A significant number of civilians were killed in the northern cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz during heavy fighting. Fighting raged in Kabul's old business district with both sides employing heavy weapons and air strikes which took a heavy toll of civilian life and wreaked destruction on much of Kabul. As intense fighting in Kabul continued for most of January, hundreds of thousands fled to safer areas of the country. Most of the belligerents received outside assistance, despite UN calls to halt the influx of materiel to the warring factions.

In February Prime Minister Hekmatyar imposed a food blockade on northern Kabul, the area controlled by President Rabbani's troops. The UN Security Council and the United States Government condemned the food blockade and asked that it be lifted. In March General Dostam's militia briefly captured the northern city of Kunduz from the forces of Ahmed Shah Masood, President Rabbani's de facto Defense Minister. Amid widespread pillaging by the victorious troops, local people revolted and assisted Masood's fighters in retaking the city, according to a Western journalist who visited the area.

Sharp clashes broke out in Kabul in late June, when Masood launched an attack against Dostam's and Hekmatyar's forces and drove them from key strongholds in central Kabul. They reacted by launching nearly daily rocket attacks on the city, which took a heavy civilian toll.

In September the relatively quiet Shi'a quarter of Kabul erupted in intense fighting between rival Shi'a factions, which were quickly backed by other armed groups. In the last half of September alone, some 2650 people, mostly civilians, were reportedly killed or wounded in this fighting. On 9/27 a rocket hit a Kabul wedding party, killing 40 people and injuring 70, according to UN and media sources. In November armed religious students known as the "Taliban" (disciples) movement took over Kandahar and neighboring areas in southern Afghanistan after defeating local commanders in battle. The Taliban cleared roadblocks from the main highway and implemented a strict social code. According to media accounts, the Taliban limited the use of videotapes, prohibited public music and dancing, and restricted other forms of public behavior. The Afghan countryside remained plagued by an estimated 10 million land mines sown during the Soviet occupation. The UN sponsored mine awareness, detection, and removal programs, but the mines will pose a threat for years to come. [=]

12044. DS. "South Asia: Afghanistan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Local administrative bodies and international assistance organizations undertook to look out for children’s welfare to the extent possible. Maltreatment of children as a result of the food blockade was reported in Kabul, and the general disruption of health services countrywide due to the civil war put many young people at grave risk. [=]

12045. DS. "South Asia: Afghanistan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Afghan custom and tradition imposes limits on women's activities beyond the home. Under the Communist regime of the 1980s, a growing number of women, particularly in urban areas, worked outside the home in nontraditional roles. This trend was reversed with the ouster of the Communist regime in 1992, and in 1994 women were increasingly precluded from public life. In many nonconservative areas in 1994, many women appeared in public only if dressed in a complete head-to-toe garment with a mesh covered opening for the eyes. In Faryab Province the local warlord's forces reportedly directed unmarried women over age 12 to get married or face the prospect of rape by the warlord's gunmen.

The UN Special Rapporteur noted a series of 21 ordinances governing the behavior of women in Afghanistan, reportedly issued by a nine-member committee of the High Court. These ordinances specified, inter alia, that a woman's veil must cover her whole body, that perfumed disruptions of health services countrywide due to the civil war put many young people at grave risk. [=]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Afghanistan

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Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO. February 1995. Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the country and to travel abroad, but the Government occasionally prohibits movement of persons within Pakistan through "externment orders" when it believes their presence will lead to a threat to public order. Travel to Israel is legally prohibited. Government employees must obtain "no objection certificates" before traveling abroad. Students are also required to have these certificates from their institutions. Pakistanis have and regularly exercise the right to emigrate. Exit control lists are used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals. The resumption of civil war in Afghanistan in early 1994 created a new wave of refugees. In response to this new influx, the Government closed its borders with Afghanistan and officially admitted only those Afghans who were properly documented or in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite these restrictions over 66000 new refugees arrived in the first 9 months of 1994 Approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. They have limited access to legal protection and depend on the ability of the leaders of their groups to resolve disputes among themselves and with Pakistani society. Women and girls have obtained better education and health care as group leaders gradually secured such services. Many refugees have found employment but are not covered by the labor laws. Traffickers in women bought or lured hundreds of women from Bangladesh with promises of a better life. They transported the women across India and placed them with families as domestic servants or as prostitutes in brothels. The authorities detained some of the women for prostitution under the Haddod Ordinances. Few are able or willing to return to Bangladesh. Many are released into the custody of their exploiters, who set them to work as prostitutes again. Efforts to repatriate Bangladeshis in 1994 were mostly unsuccessful. The "repatriation of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue. The Biharis are Urdu-speaking people from the Indian state of Bihar who went to East Pakistan now Bangladesh, at the time of partition in 1947. Since 1971, after Bangladesh gained its independence, approximately 250000 Biharis have been in refugee camps in Bangladesh. The repatriation of these people is tied to Pakistan's various ethnic problems. While the Mohajir community, made up of Pakistanis who emigrated from India during partition, supports the repatriation, the Sindhi community opposes the move. In 1993 the Government flew 342 Biharis to Pakistan and placed them in temporary housing in central Punjab. No further repatriation has occurred. [–]

12047. DS. Report To The Congress On Proposed Refugee Admissions For FY 1993 Submitted With The World Refugee Report On Behalf Of The President Of The United States To The Committees On The Judiciary, United States Senate And United States House Of Representatives. In Fulfillment Of The Requirements Of Section 207(E) (1) - (7) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act: Part 09: Resettlement Needs in FY 1993: Near East and South Asia. District of Columbia: Department of State, June 30, 1992. The Near East/South Asia region has the largest concentration of refugees and displaced persons in the world: five million Afghans, four million Palestinians, and smaller numbers of other nationalities. There are an estimated three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and two million in Iran, and several hundred thousand Iranians in neighboring Turkey. An estimated 20000 Iraqi Kurds who entered Turkey in 1988 and another 10000 Iraqis from the Gulf war period remain in that country. Over 280000 Iraqis remain in Saudi Arabia as a result of the Gulf war. Voluntary Repatriation: Most refugees from the Near East would like to return to their homeland. The recent collapse of the Communist regime in Kabul and establishment of an interim leadership council in anticipation of free elections offers hope for continuing massive voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. The positive response of the international community to the difficult situation of Iraqis who fled to Turkey, Iran, and other neighboring countries at the end of the war enabled the vast majority to return to their homes in northern Iraq. In recent months UNHCR, in consultation with governments such as the United States, has initiated an international resettlement effort for those who cannot remain in the region. Resettlement in the Region: Few countries within the region are willing to offer permanent resettlement to refugees from neighboring countries, but many have been generous with long-term asylum. Pakistan and Iran have offered asylum to over five million Afghans who are permitted to engage in many economic activities and are not restricted to their camps. Several countries in the Near East have extended work permits to Palestinian, Iranian, and Afghan refugees for long periods of time. Most of the Iraqis in Turkey are permitted to remain without a threat of deportation. However, many live under difficult conditions and are unable to obtain permanent residence. Saudi Arabia does not intend to provide permanent resettlement to Iraqis presently residing within its territory. Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war has led Kuwait and the other Gulf Coalition Countries (GCC) to reexamine their policies on Palestinian guest workers. Iraqis appear to have the most difficulty in obtaining resident status in countries of first asylum or other countries in the region. Third Country Resettlement: While third country resettlement is not the preferred solution in most cases, it is the only option for certain refugees at risk in countries of first asylum. For example, UNHCR considers third country resettlement to be the preferred solution for most Iranian refugees in Turkey and Pakistan. From FY 1980 to FY 1991, some 71000 refugees from the Near East/South Asia, mostly Iranians and Afghans, were resettled in the United States. Other major resettlement countries for refugees from this region are Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Turkey has accepted refugees from the Turkic ethnic groups in Afghanistan and Bulgaria. Additionally, many other refugees reside in Western and Southern Europe.

US Admissions: Proposed FY 1992 Ceiling. The proposed ceiling For FY 1993 for refugees from the Near East and South Asia is 7000. This is an increase of 1000 over the level authorized for FY 1992. While US assistance to the vast majority of persons who fled Iraq in 1990-91 does not involve resettlement, UNHCR believes that members of certain groups risk refoulement and has asked for international aid in resettlement. In response, we have agreed to accept for interview 1,500 Iraqis in Turkey with temporary residence permits and 1000 Iraqis in camps in Saudi Arabia. We expect 1000 non-Kurdish Iraqi admissions in FY 1992 and, with additional groups who may be determined to be in danger during the following year, perhaps as many as 3000 non-Kurdish Iraqis admissions in FY 1993 if sufficient fiscal resources and admissions numbers are available. It has proven difficult, however, to accurately project the timetable in which admissions processing for Iraqis in the first asylum countries of the region can be accomplished. The difficult situation of Iraqi Kurds in first asylum in Turkey since 1988 has been recognized by the international community. In 1/1991, the United States initiated a program to process resettlement to 3000 individuals, most of whom have ties to the US. 400 were admitted in FY 1991, and we anticipate admitting 1000 in FY 1992 and 1000 in FY 1993. In recent months, applications from Iraqis have declined somewhat and we expect about 2000 Iraqi admissions in FY 1992. With the same level of activity predicted For FY 1993, we estimate perhaps 2000 admissions. On 4/12/1991, the US limited new applications from Afghans to those who fall within priority one. Even so, Afghan admissions will continue for the next two fiscal years, with an estimated 15000 admissions in FY 1992 and 1000 in FY 1993. Designated Nationalities. As in FY 1992, designated nationalities For FY 1993 will be Iranians, Afghans and Iraqis. On a case-by-case basis, nationals of other countries may be processed with prior approval from Washington. Processing Priorities. FY 1993 processing priorities for the region are: Iraq, priorities one through five; Iran, one through four, including the expanded definition of priority four; and Afghanistan, priority one only. In special circumstances, adjustment in processing priorities is possible with prior approval from Washington. [–]

12048. DS. Report To The Congress On Proposed Refugee Admissions For FY 1993 Submitted With The World Refugee Report On Behalf Of The President Of The United States To The Committees On The Judiciary, United States Senate And United States House Of
Representatives, In Fulfillment Of The Requirements Of Section 207 (E) (1) - (7) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act: Part 14: Domestic Impacts of Refugees: Democratic Impact. District of Columbia: Department of State, June 30, 1992. Population Composition: The demographic characteristics of refugees to be admitted to the US in FY 1993 are likely to be similar to those of refugees admitted in FY 1991 and FY 1992 while varying somewhat from those of refugees admitted in the 1980s. For example, the higher proportion of refugees from the former Soviet Union in the flow since 1989 has meant more adults and fewer children compared to the 1980s, when refugees from Asia predominated. At the same time, refugee populations will continue to vary in age and sex composition from the resident American population as well as from each other. Indochinese refugees, for example, are younger on average than the resident US population. The median age of the Indochinese arrivals from 1975 through 1991 was between 20 and 21 years. Nearly 40% were under age 15, compared to 23% of the American population. In this same period, the percentage who were age 65 and over remained roughly constant at less than 2%. About 55% of the arriving Vietnamese in recent years were males, in contrast to the general US population in which about 49% are males. Because of the large proportion of children among the Indochinese refugees, the ratio of dependents will continue to be higher than in the general US population, although the low proportion of elderly Indochinese is a significant mitigating factor. The young age structure means that a large number of young children from these refugee families will be entering the schools each year for some years to come. Refugees from the former Soviet Union were the largest single nationally group to arrive in FY 1991 and one of the oldest, with a median age of 31. New refugees from Ethiopia and Eastern Europe averaged in their middle twenties in 1991, while those from Afghanistan and Iraq were only 20 on average. Cuban refugees were the oldest, with a median age in FY 1991 of 33. Male refugees outnumber females in most groups, but the former Soviets are an exception, with a slight female majority. Because these nationality groups differ from each other in their background characteristics, any change in the source countries of the refugee flow means a corresponding change in the demographic impact of the refugee population.

Geographic Distribution: During FY 1990, 73.1% of newly arrived refugees and Amerasians were placed in ten States. Ten leading States received 71.6% of the FY 1991 placements. Four of these ten leading States (California, Texas, Washington and Georgia) received a higher share of the arrivals in FY 1991 than in FY 1990. The most notable trend is the decline from 19% to 14% in the proportion of refugees going to New York coupled with the increasing share going to California. The California proportion fell from 45.6% in FY 1988 to 29.1% in FY 1989 and to 25.3% in FY 1990, before rising slightly to 28.9% in FY 1991. Much of this change occurred because the large numbers of Vietnamese refugees, who arrived in FY 1988 and settled near relatives in the Los Angeles area, have been replaced by Jews from the former Soviet Union settling in New York and other cities in the East. Together, California and New York continue to receive more than 40% of all newly arriving refugees. Generally, refugee communities in areas of current resettlement will continue to grow with admission of additional family reunification cases. As Table V shows, the geographic distribution of the Indochinese refugees is now well established, with nearly 40% living in California, and the rest distributed widely. The more than 43000 refugees who have arrived since FY 1980 from areas outside Southeast Asia have a residential distribution different from the Indochinese. This has tended to diffuse the impact of refugee arrivals upon local communities. Large numbers of these other refugees have been resettled in cities in the Northeast and the Midwest. California received the largest number, over 87000, with New York in second place at nearly 77000 and growing rapidly. The shifts in this table show the wide variations in ethnic composition of States’ refugee populations. While 44% of the arriving refugees were non-Indochinese, 17 States resettled a refugee population composed of more than 50% non-Indochinese; and three States and Guam resettled a population of 90% or more Indochinese. Among the States with the largest refugee populations, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York have majorities of non-Indochinese refugees. As the ethnic composition of the arriving refugee population shifts in response to new needs, so will the geographic placement patterns of the new arrivals. In FY 1991, only 34% of the arrivals were from the former Soviet Union, compared with 41% during FY 1990. Other refugees arrived in about the same proportions as in FY 1990. This means that States that were slated to receive large numbers of refugees from the former Soviet Union saw their FY 1991 arrivals fall below expectations.

SECONDARY MIGRATION: Secondary migration is the term used to describe movement by refugees from the location where they were initially resettled upon arrival in this country to some other place. California is the favored destination of the Indochinese, and they are much less likely to leave California, once there, than are other residents. States in the Northeast and North Central regions have also received significant refugee in-migration. Secondary migration seems to be influenced by several major factors, including a desire to find improved employment opportunities, live in an area with a supportive ethnic community and perhaps near relatives or, in some cases, to have access to public assistance. ORR has developed a system based on reports from the States for compiling and maintaining data on secondary migration. These data are important not only for general program planning, but also for the accurate computation of formulas for distribution of funds to States. Results of the State reports are contained in ORR’s Annual Reports to the Congress.

Economic Impact: The net economic effect of refugees in the US derives ultimately from their contributions to the American economy and from the Federal, State, and local government taxes they pay. In the short term, the primary question is whether or not refugees are obtaining employment which enables them to become self-supporting members of American society. ORR conducts an annual native-language survey of Southeast Asian refugees who have come to the US during the five previous years. The most recent of these surveys was conducted in 1991 and included 608 refugee households with which interviews were completed. Results from the survey indicate that the labor force participation rate (those working or seeking work) for refugees 16 or older was 36%, compared to an equivalent rate of 66% for the overall US population. As in previous years the labor force participation of refugees varied with length of residence in the US. The most recent (1991) arrivals had a labor force participation rate of 23%, while the 1990 arrivals had a labor force participation rate of 35%. This rate increased gradually with time in the United States. The 1991 survey also provides data on unemployed refugees (those who are in the labor force, but not working). In late 1991, the overall US unemployment rate was 6.4%, while the unemployment rate for refugees age 16 and older was 14%. Significant changes in unemployment occur for refugees over time. Those who arrived in 1990 had an unemployment rate of 28% by late 1991. Unemployment declined to 18% for 1989 arrivals and reached lower levels for earlier arrivals. [=]
selectivity of those who do participate according to their socioeconomic characteristics.

For those projects with or without a specific women’s component, we need to know in addition what percentage of those who have direct access to goods and services such as loans or training are female. In three of the four projects for which the percentages can be ascertained at least approximately, there appears to be some slippage between the anticipated representation of females and the actual participation in projects and their actual participation as measured in project annual reviews or other documents. In the Thailand sericulture scheme (number 2), 85% of expected participants were reported in one document to be female, whereas another reported actual enrollments in a 1978 sericulture training course of 103 men and 107 women [USAID, Thailand Sericulture/Settlements Project: Joint Mid-Term Evaluation, Jan. 1979.].

The Nicaragua credit cooperatives for market women and agricultural producers, food processors, and artisans included 55% women among their 1,400 members at the time of review—a significant accomplishment, but less than anticipated in a project titled “Rural Market Women’s Cooperatives.” The primary school construction project in Afghanistan (number 20) was unable in some regions to fulfill its quota of 15% of spaces in new schools reserved for girls. Only in the nonformal education project in Ethiopia (number 21) did the actual percentage of female participants (80% of those responding to a questionnaire) appear to meet or exceed expectations.

Six projects did not report percentages of female beneficiaries in documents retrieved for this analysis. Two are rural infrastructure projects aimed at increasing agricultural productivity—soil conservation in Lesotho (number 4) and rural water supply in Kenya (number 5)—for which figures on female participation may be available in World Bank documents cited in Table 2 but are not reported in AID summaries. Two are vocational training programs. In El Salvador (number 7), although women were 45% of the target group of marginal urban service workers, data from the follow-up questionnaires of trainees showing their current employment status and incomes are not disaggregated by sex. Similarly, the Paraguay project (number 13) included specific targets for intended trainees (300 women and 160 men in the first year) but not actual female participation rates in the Project Evaluation Summary (Nov. 1978).

The final two projects are the agricultural radio programs for peasant farmers in Guatemala (number 22) and the integrated development project of Pespire Valley in Honduras (number 32). The Guatemala radio campaign was aimed at two populations: illiterate highland Indians in subsistence agriculture and Spanish-speaking Latinos in the southeast. Symbolized by the radio messages called “Let’s Talk, Mr. Farmer,” the complex experimental scheme to change agricultural knowledge, attitudes, and practices did not once identify in a major summary document whether women participated as farmers, radio listeners, forum discussants, community change agents, or questionnaire respondents (Davidson, 1976). Women’s role as agricultural producers appears to be completely ignored. The Pespire Valley scheme in Honduras included explicit references to a women’s component in the Project Paper (women were to make up 50% of community council members in the 10 village clusters, for example), but according to the Elliott and Sorsby summary of the evaluation, the major income-generating activity for women was a cooperative mango puree plant employing 19 women during harvest, with an uncertain future [The Project Evaluation Summary cited in Elliott and Sorsby p. III-27 could not be obtained for this review.]

The tentative lessons that can be gleaned from the documents regarding conditions that facilitate or impede women’s direct access to project activities include the following:

6. Women have more direct access to project benefits when planners explicitly recognize the prevailing sexual division of labor and design activities that build on women’s work and enable them to control their earnings. In the Cameroon, for example (number 1), men traditionally cultivated coffee and cocoa while women cultivated food crops. Whereas an effective cooperative marketing system was available for both coffee and cocoa, food crop marketing (mostly corn, beans, and potatoes) was left to small itinerant traders (Jackson, 1979, p. 3). It was to solve this problem of unreliable markets and low returns that the members of the women’s palm oil purchasing cooperative decided to organize a marketing system of their own, selling food primarily to the plantations from which they purchased palm oil and using the same transport for both transactions. A plan for marketing food crops through the male-dominated coffee or cocoa cooperatives would undoubtedly result in lower food crop production as women lost control over their earnings. In the Thailand sericulture project (number 2) was explicitly designed to reach girls and women who carried out most of the principle tasks connected with traditional methods of sericulture. In the Philippines sewing project (number 8), women recognized that their needlecraft skills formed a natural basis on which to build income-generating activities.

The strategy of building on women’s work reduces the likelihood that resources will be co-opted by men, but the danger always remains that once an enterprise becomes profitable, men will be interested in taking it over. In the Gambia, for example, about 4,000 women were successfully growing onions as a cash crop when male farmers decided for the first time to ask the government for similar assistance (Tinker, 1979, p. 13). Although their onion schemes were apparently not successful (in part because their wives refused to work on them), the importance of control over earnings as an incentive to production remains central.

7. Project activities that fit with prevailing cultural norms and the allocation of household responsibilities attract higher rates of female participation by reducing resistance from the women themselves from their husbands or fathers, and from the community at large. Although this approach is a conservative one, it appears to offer a valuable means of providing larger numbers of girls and women with direct access to benefits, while at the same time acting as a sort of “wedge” with which to introduce more comprehensive changes in a phased sequence. The Bolivian income-generating project for peasant women (number 12) is a good example:

Women are ... receptive to certain types of participation. What we attempt to do is build upon those areas of participation which are acceptable in order to generate others. Their husbands tend to feel the same, in that they support activities which don’t detract from normal time usage, chores, etc. (New TransCentury, June 1978). Similar experiences are reported in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Costa Rica.

In Bangladesh, one of the problems of the rural woman in Bangladesh is that she has no opportunity to earn an independent income and thus contribute financially to the welfare of her family. Because of the system of Purdah, she is often isolated in her compound with little chance to learn income generating skills, gain educational qualifications or participate with other women in social activities (New TransCentury, Jan. 1978). In its organization of women’s cooperatives, the Bangladesh project (number 16) worked within these restrictions by offering women new possibilities for earning independent incomes in rice cultivation, seed distribution, oil pressing, etc. while providing an acceptable mode of association with other women. Women in the Philippines (number 18) expressed similar concerns: Income-generating women’s projects to be engaged in [poultry, pig fattening, mushrooms, floriculture] are home-based and small scale entrepreneurial/pursuits since the majority of rural Filipino women express a desire to combine their family household roles with new, compatible means of attaining higher levels of living (New TransCentury, Jan. 1978). In San Jose, Costa Rica (number 6), women reported that “... their husbands did not want them to leave the immediate area to seek employment or training because of family and household obligations” (Project Evaluation Summary, Nov. 1978). Participants decided to locate an industrial sewing facility and baking cooperative within their residential area; evaluators recommended that “An orientation of the project be provided to husbands and fathers of participants.” Some constraints can be overcome. Some simply by redesigning projects to include child-care or dormitory facilities or by adapting the timing or duration of training and employment to women’s daily and seasonal round of work. The Costa Rican women, identifying the complete lack of child care as a major impediment to their participation in training sessions, established a
temporary facility with plans for a permanent one. Village women in Bangladesh were able to attend training classes in silkworm production when a dormitory for non-commuting students was constructed. Evaluators of the El Salvador vocational training program recommended that certain courses be offered in smaller communities by mobile teams rather than in larger towns or cities requiring extended absences from home. Policies such as these would certainly facilitate women's access to training. However, due to cost, this option would be excluded from budgets dedicated towards distributing domestic responsibilities among all household members to reduce the weight of women's double burden in the home. [——]

12050. Dixon, Ruth B.; AID; DS; Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination; Office of Women in Development; WID. "Part 04: Current Evaluations of Women in Development Projects: A Review and Analysis: Access of Women to Project Benefits: Part 2", in Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women. District of Columbia: Department of State, AID, Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination, Office of Women in Development (WID), May 1980. 8. Women's direct access to project goods and services is frequently limited by customary or legal restrictions on their right to resources such as land, credit, or schooling. Forming the core of a complex system of social stratification based on age and sex (among other attributes), these structural and cultural barriers can sometimes be penetrated with the permission of higher status individuals or groups if the latter can be mobilized to support the project.

Lack of independent land rights can be a severe impediment. Women in the Cameroon cooperative, for instance, receive permission for land use through their husbands who petition on the women's behalf to the village chief. In the land conservation scheme for subsistence farmers of Thaba Bosiu in Lesotho (number 4), women's access to training in animal husbandry or to decision-making positions on range management committees is restricted by the traditional practice of granting grazing land at the age of majority to every Basotho male. In Upper Volta (number 10): At the village level men must be consulted and support gained if women are to participate [in new income-generating activities], because a male head of household usually has authority over the allocation of time and labor of his female members. Also, if the land is needed for an activity since males control access rights to land their consent must be obtained. Further, the involvement of men may be necessary to undertake activities, such as construction of buildings and fences, since according to social norms certain functions are performed by men (Barnes, n.d., pp. 6-7). Projects frequently require that credit be granted to males even when production is based on women's work. In the Thailand sericulture project, for example, each family is entitled to a loan through the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives to get the project started. Although the available documents do not say whether women can apply as individuals, the family unit is usually represented in formal transactions by the male household head.

Even the basic right to receive certain kinds of training may be denied to women by local tradition. In the Upper Volta project, female regional coordinators and national staff in the domestic economy units are under the direct supervision of men; "hence, the consent of these men is essential for project success. For instance, these officers have to be willing to permit the female staff to participate in training sessions" (Barnes, n.d., p. 7; emphasis added).

The most extreme example, however, comes from Afghanistan (number 20), where only 10% of primary school students in rural areas are girls. Most rural parents refuse to send their daughters to a coeducational school, yet two provinces have no village schools for girls at all. According to the Project Paper, ... "traditional Afghan values dictate women trained by the National Community Development Service and assigned to communities based on the type of project solicited. The poorest village women in the Cameroons were also largely excluded from the palm oil and food marketing cooperatives, in part apparently because some could not buy a share or the membership fee (Jackson, 1979, p. 6). Reaching the poorest of the poor may require bypassing traditional community associations or informational networks, an approach that raises additional difficulties of recruitment and communication.

10. Shortages of volunteers and of trained female staff pose major obstacles to the recruitment of more women as beneficiaries. Although such shortages are likely to pervade most types of development projects, women-specific projects are particularly hard hit because the trend to rely more heavily on volunteers due to funding limitations. In addition, women working in the field as volunteers or as paid project staff members face special problems.

The first issue is the heavy reliance of some projects on volunteers. Although several evaluations report high levels of enthusiasm among volunteers, others hint at their lower incentive to work (e.g., Lesotho number 9). In either case, the capacity of projects to reach large numbers of beneficiaries is constrained by the number of volunteers. The Costa Rican vocational training program, for example, "Currently has more requests for training from government agencies than it can provide, and thus the possibility of reaching the desired number of women exists, but is limited by the current number of available volunteer trainers (9) and research aides (3)" (Project Evaluation Summary, No. 1978, p. 2).

Although the use of volunteers permits women's projects to operate on a larger scale than would be possible if all staff positions were paid, the practice raises serious questions regarding the motivation of governments or donor agencies to provide serious funding for women's projects. It is doubtful that a large-scale project aimed at training men in agricultural techniques or industrial skills would expect male staff members to contribute their labor. The funding of staff positions on women's projects would also permit more active recruitment of women trainees from the target population of beneficiaries, rather than relying on volunteers from a different social stratum. Grants to PVOs for leadership training of volunteers (e.g., Ghana number 25 and number 26, Upper Volta number 27, Latin America number 30, Costa Rica number 31) tend to support middle and upper-class women who may or may not translate their training into genuine advocacy for the poor.

The second issue relates to the working conditions of paid female staff, especially those working as promoters in rural areas. The model of training rural women to teach other rural women, clearly a cost-effective approach to community development, is followed by a number of the projects in Table 2. In Bolivia (number 12), promoters are peasant women trained by the National Community Development Service and assigned to communities based on the type of project solicited. The promoters are all literate although the female community leaders may not be. One of the major problems with the program, according to one evaluation, is that the personnel live under difficult, isolated conditions with low salaries. The social isolation of outsiders in villages is often acute. In Afghanistan, for example: Qualified teachers have been reluctant to work in remote rural areas where motivation is difficult to maintain and urban incentives are non-existent. There have been no houses for rural...
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Afghanistan

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"where it is not accepted culturally." The expansion of women's workload, whether in unpaid agricultural labor or in paid employment, sometimes results in daughters being kept home from school to help in the fields or at home. Project administrators should be prepared to counteract this tendency with alternative plans for labor allocation. With the altered rice cropping patterns of a land resettlement scheme, for example: girls are now performing more weeding and assist their mothers in weeding and exchanging labor. They can also be seen working on the subsistence plots. Boys, on the other hand, are now freer of labor commitments than previously. This has a recognized effect on the relative attendance of boys and girls in the schools (Palmer, 1979, p. 54).

The benefits of vocational skills training can also be unequally distributed within and across households. Has the project opened up new opportunities for women as well as men, extending their vocational skills into areas formerly closed to them? Is the skills training likely to result in paid employment? How can constraints against female participation be overcome? Many training programs funded by international agencies perpetuate sexual stereotypes. Typically, community extension programs train local women in tasks related to home maintenance and child care, or in handicrafts, failing to prepare them for employment in modernized agriculture, industry, services, sales, or clerical/administrative and technical/professional occupations. Thus women's skills are largely lost to these sectors and the benefits of training accrue disproportionately to males.

One could also consider the impact of the project on women's general knowledge, or world view. In societies placing severe restrictions on women's physical mobility, the limits of their social world are likely to be narrow and their social and political dependence on men is intensified. How does a project affect their access to knowledge and experience of the outside world? Are there deliberate efforts at "conscientization" among beneficiaries, that is, of stimulating a critical understanding of the dynamics of household and community social structures and of possible strategies for change? Do these reach women as well as men?

13. Power. The capacity of directing one's own and others' behavior can be considered as the sum of separate elements: autonomy, as measured by the degree of self-reliance, belief in the efficacy of one's actions; independence of others; freedom from coercion by others; and freedom of physical movement; participation in household and community decision making, including an ability to produce desired outcomes; and mobilization for group action, measured by the number and strength of linkages among individuals and groups, the degree of shared self-interest or group consciousness, and the capacity for effective group action.

Women's autonomy in the household and the community differs widely across and within societies according to social class, ethnic or tribal background, age, and other social factors. The question here is whether development projects expand or constrict women's capacity for autonomous action in either absolute terms or relative to men. An income-generating program can increase women's social and economic independence, while another type of program may undermine it. A family planning project that requires the husband's consent for his wife's sterilization or abortion, for instance, greatly reduces her capacity for autonomous action. Depending on the type of project, investigators could select appropriate questions from among the following possibilities:

How does the project affect the pattern of decision making within the household about important choices such as the timing and number of births, the education of children, the timing of children's marriages and the choice of a mate, what to produce for sale or exchange, how to market it, when to plant and harvest, whether to buy or sell land, and so on? Similarly, what role do women play in the formal and informal decision-making processes in the community at large? In what proportions are they found in formal governing bodies, and with what effect? What social class do they represent?

Knowledge of women's role in household and community decision making should form a central ingredient of development planning (see Mickelwait, Riegelman, and Sweet, 1976), both at the point of baseline data collection to determine project design, and at the point of social

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impact assessment. Projects can undermine women's current role in decision making, or fail to take advantage of structural opportunities to expand it. In the large Amul Dairy Cooperative in India, for instance, the majority of shareholders are low-income male household heads (owners of one or two milch animals, usually buffalo) who attend meetings, from the board of directors of village societies, and receive the shares of yearly profits (Dixon, 1978, pp. 50-56). Women, who typically care for and milk the animals, do receive daily cash payments when they take the milk to village collection centers. Although this is a valuable source of independence and prestige, women are denied the opportunity for cooperative leadership roles that serve as a training ground for higher level political office in the community and district. Changes in membership rules requiring each household to enroll a female as well as male member, and a quota of half the places on boards of directors reserved for women, could help to correct this inequity.

The third dimension of power refers to the mobilization of groups for collective action. How do males and females in the household differ in their access to informal and formal social networks based on kinship, landholding status, occupation, residential location, caste or ethnic or tribal identity, religious affiliation, personal friendship, and other bases of identity and loyalty? How does membership in such groups differ across social classes and other categories? To what extent does the development project facilitate or impede the capacity of women to organize formal or informal groups engaged in collective action?

At the most basic level, failure of planners to recognize the importance of indigenous patterns of group activity can prevent the completion of a project. Women in one Indian community subverted a scheme for piping water into each housing compound because it would deny them their only legitimate opportunity for visiting together around the village well. In Nepal, failure to organize workers into a viable producers cooperative doomed some women who had gone through a training program in machine sewing to non-competitive hand sewing or inactivity because they could not individually afford to buy sewing machines (Dixon, 1978, pp. 155-6).

Even assistance directed specifically to the support of women's organizations can have adverse distributional effects. The evaluation of one program to train middle- and upper-class women volunteers in leadership skills and organizational development concluded that "there are more benefits to volunteers than to poor people," thus widening the resource gap between the classes. Project designers will need to pay special attention to the means by which women denied access to most material and social resources can be mobilized to form an independent power base for articulating their needs and working toward collective solutions.

14. Prestige. Prestige refers to the honor or esteem accruing to persons as individuals or groups members, of which both subjective and objective aspects are important. Self-esteem can be measured by the person's subjective belief in his or her own value as a person; the esteem of others is measured by the degree to which a person or group is "objectively" valued by other household or community members.

Who within the household, and in the community, appears to have the highest levels of self-esteem? Do women value their own contributions as highly as men, or do they tend to be self-deprecating? Preliminary talks with poor women by one community organizer elicited a typical response: "We have no special skills; nothing we do is worth selling [Interview with Sister Michael of Holy Cross, Dacca, Bangladesh, Feb. 1976]." How does the project affect women's feelings about themselves?

Although most development efforts are likely to increase women's pride and self-esteem, especially if women are defined as primary beneficiaries of training or income-generating projects, situations such as the failure of a handicraft center to find a steady market for its goods, or the arrogance of some extension workers, can have the opposite effect. Young girls in a newly opened school who are told repeatedly by the male teacher that they are not as smart as boys quickly become discouraged from learning and drop out, a self-fulfilling prophecy. The loss of self-esteem can act as a major impediment to future risk-taking behavior. Apart from women's feelings about themselves, do other members of the household and community value their contributions more highly? Of course the two are closely interrelated, since self-esteem is so dependent on the esteem of others. Vocational training and income-generating projects for women should—at least in the long run—visibly raise their status within the household and community. But some jobs are viewed as "status-depressing" rather than "status-enhancing" even if they provide badly needed cash incomes, especially when the jobs expose women to possibly dishonorable contact with men. In one project in Bangladesh, although the young women themselves were extremely proud of their skills and ability to earn money as government agents visiting women's cooperatives throughout the district, conservative residents disparaged them loudly for their immorality in breaking purdah restrictions (Dixon, 1978, pp. 47, 162-3). In the absence of strong program efforts to counter such criticism, female workers and their families were under considerable personal strain. Other families, fearing their daughters would be unmarriageable if they engaged in such work, refused to permit them employment.

The shift in northern Belize from corn production to sugarcane has had some interesting implications not only in nutritional standards and women's ability to earn independent incomes from raising chickens and pigs (as discussed previously), but also in the sources of prestige: Because food production has always been woven socially and ideologically into the culture, the change in production patterns has ramifications throughout society. One of the most significant has been the removal of the source of male prestige from the domestic household activities of producing good food and good children and the creation of a new "public" sphere of activity which is western and modern in structure, characterized by material goods. The women's activities are relegated almost totally to [the] domestic sphere, whereas, the acquisition of prestige and status, once accessible to both men and women, is now largely relegated to the public sphere where women cannot compete.... The women were left with domestic activities of devalued social status and responsibility (Stavrakis and Marshall, 1978, pp. 162-3).

This case clearly cries out for some strong programming to create new income-generating opportunities for women that will increase their social value and prestige as well as their economic contribution. Although this discussion of the differential effects of projects on males and females may appear to have dwelled unnecessarily on the negative, it illustrates how even the best intentioned projects can have unanticipated deleterious consequences if women's social and economic roles in the household and community are not fully understood. The more positive side is that projects can almost always be designed to achieve their goals—expanded agricultural output, for instance, --in a way that recognizes women's access to resources such as control over the economic returns to their labor, technical assistance to increase their productivity, or active participation in community decision-making bodies, while minimizing the costs. Palmer's analysis of a land resettlement scheme suggests an alternative design for meeting production goals and satisfying basic human needs of the entire settlement population that allocates productive resources between men and women more equitably at the outset, resulting in a cumulative sequence of more beneficial consequences (Palmer, 1979, pp. 78-80). The actual and alternative strategies she outlines, which are presented in Table 4, are applicable in principle to a wide range of integrated development projects where such comprehensive decisions are made.

Some trade-offs are probably inevitable in any development project; one cannot usually move effectively on all fronts at once. The major issue here is to ensure that the costs are not paid disproportionally by those least able to pay them. [=]
Projects [Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in Section III of Elliot and Sorsby (op. cit.)]

- Formal:
  - Secondary school for girls in Uganda (12).
  - Primary schools and teachers' hostels in Afghanistan (31).

- Nonformal:
  - Literacy & community self help in Ethiopia (5).
  - Radio programs for highland Indians in Guatemala (26).
  - Community development project in Sri Lanka (30). [=]

12053. Dixon, Ruth B.; AID; DS; Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination; Office of Women in Development; WID. Table, "Part 09: Table 2: Women in Development Projects, With Intended Beneficiaries, Major Inputs, and Participation of Women: Construction of 170 Rural Elementary Schools & 40 Teachers' Hostels in Afghanistan (AID)", in Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women. District of Columbia: Department of State, AID, Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination, Office of Women in Development (WID), May 1980. Intendedbeneficiaries: Rural children and teachers; 15% of places in newly constructed schools reserved for girls.

- Major Inputs: Physical infrastructure.
  - Participation of women in project decision making: Not stated.
  - Access of women to project benefits: Quota of 15% girls met in Parwan but not in southern zones; percentage teachers female not known.
  - Effects of project on status of women: Not stated.
  - Source of information: Project Paper 1975; Evaluation cable, May 1976. [=]

12054. Gannon, Kathy. "Under Islamic Talib' Rule, Kabul Is a Tense, Fearful City", in Seattle Times, October 6, 1996. p. A17. Kabul is unusually deserted after Talib' capture of the war ravaged city. Ethnic minorities and many widows are continuing to flee the city. Former Communist Pres. Najibullah has dragged from his sanctuary in the UN compound and hung, after four years in that domestic exile. Some 750,000 people remain in the city. The Talib' have ordered all women to terminate their employment and have closed girls' schools. Women have virtually disappeared from the city. The mullahs of Kandahar appear to be in control of the Talib' in Kabul.


12056. General Assembly; UN. Summary Record Of The 25th Meeting. [Official Record]. 47th Session. Third Committee. 25th Meeting Held On Monday, 2 November 1992 At 3p.m. New York. A/C.3/47/SR.25. General Assembly, November 27, 1992. Speakers: Mora Godoy, Jorge Ivan [Cuba]; Raven, Martin [UK]; Kuehl, Craig [USA]; Linjucu, Ruth [Philippines]; Yuan Shoucheng [PRC]; Babadoudou, Berin [Benin]; Arias, Maria Francisca [Colombia]; Cure, Patrice [Martinus]; Sahraoui, Hocine [Algeria]; Ramsh; Villamnez Otavich [Russia]; De Brito Cruz, Humberto [Brazil]; Fenn, R. [UK]; Teranshi, Chiyoko [Japan]; Rata, P. [New Zealand]; Urtasun, Juan Jose [Spain]; Smagulon [Kazakhstan]; Arungu Olende, Rose [Kenya]; Melamed, Moshe [Israel]; Thompson, Wayne [Jamaica]; Lissidini, Adriana [Urugau]; Sharp, Martin Philip [Australia]; Ramirez, Noris Elena [Panama]; Zindoga, Chipo [Zimbabwe]; Moreno Fernandez, Abelardo [Cuba]; Hong Yongan [China]; Tsepow, Boris Anatolievich [Russia]; Lopes Da Rosa, Manuela [Guinea-Bissau]; Kim Jae Hon [North Korea]; Al Majali, Saja [Jordan]; Eldeeb, Abdel Gaffar [Egypt]; Seljuki, Aria [Afghanistan]; Barghouti, Somaia [Palestine]

12057. Goodwin, Phil. "Talib' Win End-Game As Last City Falls", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 1, 1997. p. 1. After 20 years of civil war, the Talib's military victories put Afghanistan on the verge of unity, albeit a unity of exhaustion. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the stronghold of Gen. Abdul Raahid Dostam, marks the capture of the last major northern city outside Talib' control. The Talib's new sociual order has become immediately obvious in Mazar-u-Sharif, with men abandoning traditional clothing and women's education being banned. However, few Afghans understand the refusal of most countries to provide relief aid to Talib' Afghanistan.


- Article 1: No one shall engage a girl or give her in marriage in exchange for cash or commodities.
- Article 2: No one shall compel the bridegroom or his guardians to give holiday presents to the girl or her family.
- Article 3: The girl or her guardian shall not take cash or commodities in the name of the dower [mah] in excess of ten dirham according to Sharia, which is not more than 300 afs. on the basis of the bank rate of silver.
- Article 4: Engagements and marriage shall take place with the full consent of the parties involved: (a) No one shall force marriage; (b) No one shall prevent the free marriage of a widow of force her into marriage because of family relationships [iewirate] or patriarchal ties; (c) No one shall prevent legal marriages on the pretext of engagement, forced engagement expenses, or by using force.
- Article 5: Enagamet and marriages for women under 16 and men under 19 are not permissible.

- Article 6: (1) Violators shall be liable to imprisonment from six months or three years; (2) Cash or commodities accepted in violation of the provisions of this decree shall be confiscated. [=]

12059. Greenberger, Robert S.; Cole, Jeff; Bussey, John. "Pakistan Is Considering Taking Jet-Fighter Business Elsewhere; Bhutto May Boost Pressure On US To Lift a Ban on delivery of F-16s", in Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1995. p. A14. PM Bhutto has stated he would turn to France or Russia for military aircraft if the US refuses to allow shipment of F-16 fighter jets long ago paid for by Pakistan ($658 million for 28 F-16s). France and Russia have offered to sell comparable aircraft to Pakistan. The issue of US refusal to honor its contract is a major problem in US-Pakistan relations. Lockheed Martin Corp., which manufactures the aircraft, supports the Pakistani position. Bhutto makes the point that the US must either ship the aircraft or return the money. The ban is causing intense bitterness in Pakistan, with many believing that the US used Pakistan in the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, then immediately turned against Pakistan after years of loyal partnership. Bhutto, in the United States, observes: "Our relationship [with the United States] has been more or less frozen. I'm really here to tell President Clinton that Pakistan is an old friend and ally... The US outlook toward Pakistan should not be fixated on one issue." [TXT]
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apart from the technical impossibility, it seemed to me better for practical reasons to describe separately two aspects of the same historical process which, though they coincided in date, were yet different in character—the process actually accomplished in the Soviet Union of equalizing the position of men and women. The fundamental difference lies in the fact that the Russian women were Europeans, who had been seized by the current of western culture long before the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, indeed, in the middle of the 19th century, and had often played a leading part in the general emancipation of women, whilst the women of the Russian East took part in a movement which started with elemental force after the end of the World War in almost all the hitherto intensely patriarchal peoples of the East. For it is no accident that almost simultaneously in Turkey, in Persia, in Afghanistan, and in other countries, the women of Islam were roused and endeavoured to break completely with a past unworthy of human beings, hitherto forced upon them, with the slavish life they had led for centuries. Undoubtedly the war, but no less the great social upheavals and changes that followed it, prepared the ground for what was to come. But naturally the speed of the process differed very much in different countries. The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, with its tendency towards social equalization that was particularly vigorous at first, did much to hasten the process of equalization of the sexes. Nevertheless, it is not only here that we must look for the great contrast to the parallel process in the non-Soviet countries. For amongst the millions of women, for the most part Mohammedan, in the Soviet East we have a threefold emancipation: as belonging to their nation, to their social class, and to their sex. And, moreover, without restriction to a relatively small upper class, a regenerative mass movement embracing all classes from the bottom upwards, a real uprising of the masses. And it really is a transformation in a single night from a creature hardly distinguishable from a domestic animal to a full member of the community, self-reliant and conscious of her strength, progressive and capable of development; it is a true attainment of human stature, a new creation. What confronts us, then, is a phenomenon that places immense masses of women in the foremost ranks of the "Europeanization" and emancipation of the East, the mobilization of vast forces, hitherto passive, which promise wholly new contributions to the enrichment of human culture, and we must recognize its bearing as gigantic, its significance as worldwide. And, whatever may have occurred in the past two decades in the immense territories of the Soviet Union, stretching across two continents—whatever attitude one may assume towards it—the fact remains that reconstruction is nowhere more clearly to be seen; nowhere is the gulf between yesterday and today wider. One thing, therefore, is now placed beyond question: a new leaf has been turned in the history of the ancient continent of Asia, and half of it at least will be written by the awakening women of the Russian East. In this sense, then, we are doubtless justified in detaching the liberation of women in the Soviet East from the complex whole—alike from that of European Russia and that of women in the non-Russian East—and treating it separately. In this book I shall endeavour to show in what manner and on what historical foundation, under what conditions and with what success in each separate case the transformation of women in the Soviet East has hitherto been accomplished. In the present book, unlike its predecessor, it has been impossible to attempt, much less achieve, any exhaustive description, in view of the extreme variety of the material. I have been obliged, therefore, to trace the main lines of development in the various territories of the Soviet East, which is inhabited by nearly two hundred peoples, and to report on the state of affairs up to the end of 1936. The material treated in the following pages, of which no systematic study has hitherto appeared, has been drawn from very many sources, and it has often been necessary to devote much labour to testing their reliability, since many questions had either not been raised at all previously, or had been treated in a thoroughly uncritical way. But I have also drawn from my own experience, acquired on repeated lengthy journeys in recent years, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journeys which often brought me to exceedingly remote spots, to the Persian, Afghan, and Chinese frontiers, and not far from the Indian frontier; some of these places are, as a rule, barely accessible to Western Europeans. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the many scientific and cultural authorities and institutes in Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Tiflis, Mashhak-Kala, Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Ferghana, Ashqabad, Merv, and Stalinobad, and to their branches in many other places, which cannot be enumerated here, and further to all those persons who frequently gave me the most friendly and generous assistance. More especially I thank the Voks (Society for Cultural Relations of the Soviet Union with Foreign Countries), which was always most kind in securing for me the opportunity of getting into contact with all the requisite authorities, and of investigating, extending, and improving my material. I owe, further, warm thanks to Dr. Andreas Gaspers, of Vienna, who has rendered me the most valuable help in situating and arranging the material. 

12061. House International Relations Committee; House Asia & the Pacific Subcommittee. Drugs in Asia: The Heroin Connection: Questions for the Panel: Part 05. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia & the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, First Session, June 21, 1995, pp. 27-29. Mr. KIM. I am just a little concerned that it’s Burma today. Tomorrow, it will be some other country. I mean, as long as there is a demand and buyers, it will continue.

How are you going to control this thing? I think we should really focus while continuing to have strong measures on human rights and all the other broad, general policies that I have been concerned about.

Dr. BROWN If you ask how the President’s strategy differs from previous strategies, we are placing greater emphasis on requesting more resources to go to reducing the demand for drugs.

I speak to you as a career law enforcement officer. When I was the police commissioner of New York City, we would arrest up to 100000 people every year just for narcotics violations alone. That is a number that is bigger than the population of most cities in America. But did we make a difference? No, we did not.

I am convinced, as is the case with most police officials in this country, we have to try to do something different. That is why one of the major initiatives in our National Drug Control Strategy is to fund treatment slots in order to treat the chronic, hard-core drug user population.

If we had, as we do have in this country, 20% of the drug users consuming three-quarters of the drugs, it makes good sense to focus on the drug users.

The only way I know to do that, which is in agreement with your proposal, is through a treatment program. And it works. In your state, for example; the State of California funded a treatment program for 1992 and invested $209 million and after 1 year, they saved the taxpayers of California $1.5 billion. That is a pretty good investment.

The RAND Corporation looked at all the modalities for addressing the drug problems in the US. How best can you reduce the use of drugs? They came out with the conclusion that treatment is the best way to reduce drug use in this country.

We are now concerned, because we are seeing, Mr. Chairman, our young people using more drugs—particularly marijuana, which is not the object of this discussion, obviously—but all of our hardcore drug users were at one time casual users. Younger people are now using more drugs, and have more liberal attitudes about drug use. And that is why we are requesting more funds for prevention programs, to stop the first-time drugs users.

All of that is to say that the President’s 1995 National Drug Control Strategy is a comprehensive approach. We want to reduce the demand for drugs, prevention, education, and treatment, while at the same time attacking the supply of drugs through aggressive enforcement through interdiction at our borders and ports.

But equally important would be our international programs. And that is why I am greatly concerned to ensure that we get adequate funding for that. And we certainly request your help in addressing appropriations for that funding.

Mr. MANZULLO. Let me bring up a point. When the International Relations Committee considered the request to fully fund the International
Narcotics Account at $213 million, it was Mr. Obey, a Democrat, in the Appropriations Committee that led the charge to help reduce that account. Dr. BROWN. That is why we need your help.

Mr. MANZULLO. But we did that last year also because the President had cut back on the number of INS, FBI, and DEA agents. The Republicans worked very hard on the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations bills and added back the money on it.

You know, I appreciate what you are doing, Dr. Brown; but I take umbrage with any suggestion that the Republicans are holding back on the financial resources to fight this drug problem in this country.

Dr. BROWN. Well, if you recall --

Mr. MANZULLO. I just wanted to let you know that I worked very closely last year with the DEA. They are doing a tremendous job around the Chicago and Rockford, Illinois areas. It is an extremely high priority.

What I would also suggest is that one of the greatest incentives to stopping this is what Judge Reinhart of Rockford, Illinois was doing. He had a bunch of those guys in his court. Half of them got life. One was a 20-year-old man. And he said that: If I had known that I would be able to get life imprisonment because of dealing with drugs, I would not have been involved.

That was the headline of the Rockford newspaper, and that is what has to get out there. These bums are going to jail. They are going there to be locked up for life, period. We know who they are. They were robbing the streets.

I would just leave you with Judge Bonner’s quote, who is, as you know, the former director of the DEA and has done a tremendous job there, according to his records—and this is a tribute to professional law enforcement officers, who are non-political, such as yourself, who have been involved in this for years, who have an intense passion to make sure that the children of this country are not killed by the drugs that are coming from overseas and domestically. His perception has showed that between 1985 and 1992 there had been a substantial reduction, from 5.8 million in 1985 to 1.3 million in 1992, in marijuana users.

That may have been true for that period of time. This, again, does not depend upon who the President is. But, unfortunately, I understand that there has been an increase in the use of marijuana by young people that started probably around 1990 or something like that.

Dr. BROWN. Just one observation, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that I think is important for all of us who are concerned, such as yourself, is that this is not an issue that is a Democratic issue or a Republican issue. This is an American crisis. This is an issue that has an impact on Americans all over the country. No state, no county, no city, no township is immune from this problem.

Just in response to one of your observations, the President’s budget request was cut by the Congress--$300 million from Defense and $200 million from State. So it is a half a billion dollars that was cut from our programs.

So in terms of my observation about what we need, it is not stated in partisan terms. We need the support of the Congress. We need your continuous support to give the State the funds necessary to carry out our mission. If we do not, we are going to continue to have hearings such as this talking about a very, very serious problem for this country.

You know, as well as anyone in this room, that the drug problem prevents us from having the things we want in life: family and community and work. They are all impacted negatively by the drug problem.

What we have to do right now is get ahead of the heroin problem before we do have the epidemic which we just talked about earlier. We can get in on the ground floor. But for us to be able to do so, we have to have, first of all, a sound strategy; and I think by working with all the government agencies in the Federal Government, we have that strategy.

What we must have right now would be the funding.

Mr. MANZULLO. We are doing that, Dr. Brown. But it was not the Republicans that decimated your staff.

Dr. BROWN. Well, that is the point I am making. This is not a partisan issue.

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand. The sword goes both ways. Let me just assure you of my continued commitment in whatever areas there are. And we have worked with the agencies in the past to try to get the funding that is necessary. But, you know, sometimes getting extra money is not the answer. It is really just that we are reallocating the resources.

You have been very patient, Dr. Brown. I appreciate what you are doing for this country. I appreciate the passion that you have, especially for the children.

Dr. BROWN. Thank you. And I will call on you for your continued support for our efforts.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you.

Dr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANZULLO. Let us have Mr. Gelbard and Mr. Greene. If you could please come to the table. And forgive us for taking so long, but there was a 45 minute vote, where both Republicans and Democrats voted.

Mr. GELBARD, please. [=]


It is my pleasure to be here with you today to have the opportunity to discuss narcotics production and trafficking in Asia. And equally important, if not more important, is the effects on us here in the US.

With your permission, I would like to just summarize my prepared statement, and the prepared statement will be submitted for the record. Mr. MANZULLO. Without objection.

Dr. BROWN. Over the past year, we have tackled and tracked an increase in the availability of heroin on our streets as a result of lower prices, greater purity, and bumper crops coming out of Asia, as well as South America.

It is imperative that we respond aggressively to this increase in heroin availability and heroin use on the streets of our cities. Our failure to do so will lead to increased health care and criminal justice costs, as well as an incalculable human cost.

I have held, Mr. Chairman, in my arms babies born to drug-addicted mothers. And I know firsthand the devastating impact that heroin abuse has on communities throughout our nation.

President Clinton’s strategy to address the heroin threat is a targeted, comprehensive, and cost-effective way of addressing the problems of trafficking, production, and use and to prevent the spread of this deadly drug throughout our nation.

My office’s quarterly review of national drug trends, a report we call the “Pulse Check,” shows that high purity heroin continues to be a major drug threat in many areas of the country, particularly the Northeast and the South. Reports from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, California, and Georgia, indicate that heroin is being purchased by younger users, under 30, as well as by those not traditionally seen in inter-city areas, suburban middle-class users.

Data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, which reports on drug-related activities in our hospitals, shows a sharp increase in heroin emergency room incidents. Between 1992 and 1993, heroin-related episodes increased 31%, from 48000 to 63000 mentions. This continues to be a trend that began in 1990.

In addition, data shows that since the mid-1980’s, there has been a substantial increase in reported admissions to treatment programs where heroin is the primary drug of abuse.

Mr. Chairman, here is the current worldwide heroin situation.

Worldwide opium production has more than doubled in the last decade. Poppy growing areas are expanding in Afghanistan and the new republics of the former Soviet Union.

Heroin addict populations, particularly in Asia, are increasing. The cocaine cartels in Colombia are now shipping heroin into the US.

And in the US, higher purity heroin is being marketed in a smokable form, thus avoiding the stigma associated with the use of needles and the consequences of contracting HIV/AIDS through injection.

Today at least 11 countries produce a total of 3400 metric tons of illicit opium for the international drug markets.
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O ur recommended international heroin strategy has four major goals. First, expanding and intensifying contacts with foreign leaders to mobilize greater international cooperation against the threat of heroin. Second, dismantling the illicit heroin trafficking organizations by prosecuting their leaders and seizing profits and assets. Third, by treating heroin trafficking as a serious national security threat. And, fourth, reducing the supply of heroin entering the US. Our proposed heroin strategy seeks to optimize our limited counternarcotics resources to carefully target those countries and the regions that pose the most direct threat to the domestic health and national security interests of the US. Approximately 80% of the heroin sold in the US comes from Southeast Asia, particularly Burma. Our primary heroin control priority will be to reduce this flow. We will continue to employ a range of activities to address US counternarcotics concerns without undermining other vital US objectives, including efforts to promote political reform and reconciliation and curb human rights violations. Fortunately, the Burmese regime is continuing to hold discussions with Aung San Su Kyi, who has been held under house arrest since 1989. We hope these discussions continue and lead to some accommodation. I have recommended to the President, that the US take the following steps First, to continue a general dialog with appropriate Burmese authorities regarding counternarcotics strategies. Second, to exchange information with appropriate officials to support the use of unilateral counternarcotics operations. Third, to provide in-country counternarcotics training to specialized units on a case-by-case basis, subject to the same safeguards observed in other countries in which the US has a counternarcotics relationship. And, fourth, to continue support for critical United Nation's regional narcotics control efforts that affect Burma. In addition, China and Thailand should be encouraged to exert more narcotics-controlled pressure on Burma by emphasizing the regional threat of the heroin trade, while the US will address increased heroin movement through China and Taiwan. We have also recommended that support to UNDCP's subregional project be increased to reduce opium production and enhance regional cooperation. For example, Laos, with the help of the UN, has developed a comprehensive drug control plan that could serve as a model for other producing countries. This plan seeks to significantly reduce poppy cultivation and drug addiction by the year 2000. In view of Afghanistan's importance as a major opium-source country, the US has established the principle that assistance to major drug-producing areas should be in the context of a plan to reduce opium growing and processing. We will encourage Pakistan to continue a serious effort to reduce production and increase investigative efforts of high-level trafficking. The US policy will continue to encourage Turkey's political will and commitment to improve investigative and prosecutorial capabilities, target well-established drug syndicates, and assist with the technical expertise required to undertake this task. While initiatives included in our international heroin strategy will not require an immediate increase in funding, we have asked agencies and departments to make a realistic appraisal of their counternarcotics resource requirements for fiscal year 1996. In light of the Appropriations Committee's decision last week to cut the President's request for the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters for fiscal year 1996 by 47% and to reject a proposal to consolidate the ESF and FMF counternarcotics efforts within the State Department, in my view, it is critical that this Committee demonstrate its support for the President's international drug control strategy when the bill comes to the House floor later today or tomorrow. The overwhelming proportion of our resources, programs and activities are directed toward reducing the supply and demand for cocaine in the US, because cocaine remains the principal drug threat to us. However, if the supply and purity level of heroin has risen, so has use. If left unchecked, these conditions can produce another drug use epidemic in the US that will create more health problems, more drug-related crime and staggering social and economic costs. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my summary remarks, and I will be happy to respond to any questions that the Committee might have. [The prepared statement of Dr. Brown appears in the appendix.]

M ANZULLO. Dr. Brown, Congressman Rangel just came in; and what I would like to do is--Charlie why don't you have a seat--is to take his testimony and then--you can just stay right there--and then when Congressman Rangel finishes, then we can just let the questions come.

Congressman Rangel. [--] 12063. Hua Guofeng. "Speech At The Third Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress (9/7/1980): Part 1: Introduction", in Main Documents of The Third Session of The Fifth national Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. Fellow Deputies, This session has been going on for nine days now. Entrusted by the State Council, Comrade Yao Yilin and Comrade Wang Bingqian delivered reports on our national economic plans and our state final accounts and budgets respectively. Comrades Peng Zhen, Jiang Hua, Huang Huoqing, Wu Xinyu and Gu Ming delivered reports or made explanations on the work of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the work of the Supreme People's Court, the work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and several draft laws. I would now like to put forward some ideas mainly concerning the work of the government. With regard to planning and finance, it is generally held that the rate of economic growth and the targets for this year and next proposed in the report on the economic plans are quite appropriate and that they will be conducive to the continuing readjustment of the national economy and to better economic results, while the report on the state finances has explained the 1979 deficit and the projected deficits this year and next, and it has put forward measures to be taken to reduce and eventually eliminate them. All of us believe that it is possible, if we make an effort, gradually to restore the balance between revenues and expenditures. Every endeavour has been made to ensure that both the national economic plans and the budgetary plans for this year and next are practicable. To realize them, however, will still require united efforts of the people, peasants, People's Liberation Army commanders and fighters, intellectuals and cadres of all our nationalities, and all patriotic personages. Since last year, serious natural calamities have occurred, and they are still occurring in some areas, and I hereby extend my deep sympathy to all our elders, brothers and sisters in the afflicted areas and pay my warm tribute to the cadres and masses of the PLA commanders and fighters who are heroically combating these calamities. Together with all our fellow deputies here assembled, I am firmly convinced that the people of our country can overcome the difficulties caused by these calamities as well as other transient difficulties to score brilliant new successes in our march forward. In the discussions of the past few days, you have expressed your appreciation of what has been achieved in the work of the government and in other fields over the past year, while at the same time calling attention to existing problems and offering many valuable criticisms and suggestions. On behalf of the State Council, I sincerely thank you for your trust in us. The State Council and the departments concerned should carefully study your criticisms and suggestions and must try hard to do what needs doing and correct what needs correcting. The last session of the Fifth National People's Congress was held over a year ago. Since then, the focus of all our work has been progressively shifted to socialist modernization. We have continued to deal with the political and social problems left over from the past and have further consolidated and promoted a lively political situation of stability and unity. In spite of the many problems still awaiting solution, the political and social environment for modernization is basically sound. Thanks to joint efforts by the public security, judicial, educational, ideological and cultural departments, the Youth League and society as a whole, better public order has prevailed and there has been reassuring improvement in our moral standards. The government departments at all
levels have consequently begun to focus their attention on economic adjustment, and by analysing the new conditions and solving the new problems, they have made real progress in exploring the specific road to socialist modernization in our country. Our economy has taken on a fairly new look in the past year or so as a result of the process of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement. The major sectors are progressing towards balance. Agricultural production, which has long lagged behind, has now turned for the better in the past two years. The rate of growth in light industry has surpassed that in heavy industry, and the restructuring of the product mix of heavy industry serving agriculture, light industry and the people’s daily needs has made some headway. The scope of capital construction depending on appropriations from the state has been brought under control, and the excessively high rate of accumulation has begun to fall. There has been some improvement in the living standards of the majority of the urban and rural population.

Preliminary structural reforms of the economy have been initiated. The power of the people’s communes, production brigades and production teams to make their own decisions is being secured. The powers of industrial and commercial enterprises for operation and management are being expanded. The practice of combining regulation by planning and regulation by the market has been introduced to a certain extent. Competition between enterprises and combined operations by them in conditions permissible under socialism are being encouraged. The growth of collective economy in cities and towns is being fostered, and legitimate individual economy is permitted to exist and grow within limits in both town and country. A two-level financial system with the central and local authorities apportioning responsibility for revenues and expenditures is being implemented. As a result of all this, the over-centralization of production, circulation and distribution is beginning to change and the entire economy has become more lively. Progress has been made in consolidating enterprises, the leadership of many enterprises has been strengthened, and there have been advances in their democratic management. The technoeconomic indices have been improved. Cases of loss caused by poor operation and management have decreased. Relatively good results have been achieved in creating more wealth for society with the use of less manpower and materials. Many localities, departments and enterprises have improved the training of managerial cadres, technicians and workers and are educating them by various ways in business administration, enterprise management and science and technology. Technological reforms and innovations focused on conserving energy are getting under way in some places. Organization and management have been improved and the technical level of production raised. All this work is still in its initial stages, and we must resolutely carry it forward. The introduction and implementation of the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement mark the beginning of a radical change in the guiding principles for our country’s economic construction. For a fairly long period in the past, a Left-deviationist tendency prevailed in many aspects of our economic work.

We went against the fundamental thesis of Mao Zedong Thought, divorced ourselves from reality and flouted objective laws, recklessly setting and blindly chasing high targets. As a result, investment in all sectors of heavy industry with the exception of energy and transport was too heavy and capital construction was over-extended. This has not only led to low speed and efficiency, but seriously hampered the growth of energy, transport, agriculture, light industry, commerce, science and technology, culture and education, and the improvement of the people’s living standards. Moreover, it has often gravely affected and even wrought havoc on the environment and the ecological balance. Over-rigid and excessive control inhibited the initiative of the grass-roots administrative offices, the enterprises and the workers, and obstructed the flow between the different links in production and circulation. There were also many serious defects in our methods of investment, in the apportionment of the earnings of industry, in labour management and in the principles of distribution, which actually fostered waste and not economy, lower and not higher quality, the backward and not the advanced and laziness and not diligence. All this served to smother the superiority of the socialist system and even distort the fundamental principles of socialism. In essence, carrying out the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement means eliminating the influence of Leftdeviationist thinking on our economic work and adopting the principles of Mao Zedong Thought—starting from reality, seeking truth from facts and doing things within the limits of our capabilities—in economic construction, so that economic activity may better conform to economic laws. Practice has proved that the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement is correct and timely, and led it to obtain the expected results of development. In the past year or so, there has been some improvement in the conditions for scientific research, which yielded a number of important results, and further efforts have been made to popularize science. In education, some progress has been made in the quality of instruction in primary and secondary schools and in universities.

Certain reforms have been initiated in the structure of secondary education, and secondary vocational schools are being restored. The number of TV, correspondence and evening universities has increased. Significant successes have also been scored in culture, health work and physical culture. All this could not have been achieved without the strenuous efforts of comrades working in the fields of science, education, culture, public health and sports. In the past year or so, further progress has been made in the development of socialist democracy and the socialist legal system. Guided by the four fundamental principles of upholding the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Party and Marxism-LeninismMao Zedong Thought, cadres and the masses have emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts, dared to air their views and make criticisms, and had the courage to do what they ought to and wanted to do but had hitherto dared not do. Many government organizations have had closer contact with the masses, heeding their criticisms and suggestions and placing themselves under their supervision. The enforcement of the seven laws adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress is contributing greatly to the full play of the people’s socialist initiative, to combating criminal offences, to the protection of the people’s interests and to the smooth progress of modernization. Economic legislation and economic judicial administration are being introduced step by step to meet the requirements of economic development. The State Council and the departments concerned have already promulgated more than 40 economic statutes, with about two dozen more presently being drafted or being worked on. We are only beginning our work in this field and much remains to be done. Here I wish to say a few words in particular about the question of protecting the democratic rights and economic interests of the minority nationalities and cementing the unity of all our nationalities. Owing to shortcomings and mistakes in our work, and particularly to the serious sabotage of our Party’s and government’s policies on nationalities, religion and other related matters by the two counter-revolutionary cliques headed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing during the ten chaotic years, the right of many minority nationalities to regional autonomy and other democratic rights were trampled on, their economy and culture damaged and the people’s life impoverished. In order to bring about a radical change in all this the Party and the government are taking a series of effective measures to enable the people in the minority nationality areas to recuperate and to institute genuine guarantees for their political, economic and cultural rights, especially the right to regional autonomy. We are all convinced that through the joint efforts of all our nationalities, we will be able to heal past wounds and bring about an unprecedented consolidation and development of close friendship and unity among the people of all our nationalities in a relatively short period of time. In the past year or so, we have actively developed friendly co-operation and expanded economic, scientific, technological and cultural interchange with many countries, thus promoting friendship between the Chinese people and the people of those countries. We have persisted in opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace and have supported the just struggles of the people of various countries, thereby creating favourable internal conditions for our socialist modernization. In view of these developments in the political, economic, scientific, educational and diplomatic fields, we are justified in saying that, thanks to the joint efforts of the people of all nationalities, governments at all levels and personages in different circles, the resolutions adopted at the Second
Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and the principles and policies it laid down either have been, or are being, carried out. Our major task this year and next is, in brief, to continue to build on the present favourable situation and implement the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement of the economy and, in accordance with the plans put forward by the State Council at the present session, further to advance the cause of modernization on the basis of the principles of sound, long-term planning. This is a complex task with much to be done and many problems to be solved. I would now like to put forward my views on five points of your deliberation:[=]

12064. Hua Guofeng. “Speech At The Third Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress (9/7/1980): Part 2: Map Out a Long Term Programme”, in Main Documents Of The Third Session Of The Fifth national Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. This is a prerequisite to the development of the socialist planned economy. After the founding of the People’s Republic, immediately after the three-year period of economic rehabilitation, we successfully formulated and fulfilled the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy. The content of the Second Five-Year Plan was also fairly good, but to our regret it failed to play the role it should have played, as it was frustrated because of the mistakes of being boastful, stirring up a “communist wind” and giving arbitrary directions which were made in 1958, and because of “the struggle against Right opportunism” which began to unfold in 1959. For a few years after 1961, the readjustment of the economy progressed smoothly with marked successes in every field, and rich experiences were gained. However, as this was essentially a period of economic rehabilitation, no new five-year plan for the development of the economy was mapped out. From 1966 onward, our economy as a whole and the work of the State Planning Commissisn itself were sadly disrupted by the “cultural revolution.” Both the collection of information required for planning and the organs in charge of it were seriously impaired, and it became almost impossible to carry on the work. Thus, during the 15 years between 1966-1980, since it was impossible to work out detailed plans, we only produced outlines for the Third, Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans. Consequently, over a long period there was no long-term and comprehensive programme combining lofty with clear-set aims, far-sightedness with carefully planned steps and taking past experience into account with foreseeing future developments. Still, by their diligent efforts our workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and cadres overcame a multitude of difficulties, put in a lot of hard work and registered quite a number of remarkable successes. Nevertheless, because we have not been able to escape blindness in one form or another and to achieve proper planning in economic construction, a number of grave and avoidable losses were incurred. Under such circumstances, the socialist economic system could not very well demonstrate its superiority. Without doubt, socialism is by far superior to capitalism, but economic growth is highly unbalanced between different regions of the country with widely differing natural conditions. China is a vast country with rich natural resources, but economic growth is highly unbalanced between different regions of the country with widely differing natural conditions. We have a huge population. Our people are diligent, courageous and intelligent, but their scientific and cultural level is low. We already have a fair-sized economy, which is independent and relatively complete in itself, but the per capita national income is very low, commodity economy is underdeveloped, and technology and management are backward. In mapping out our long-term programme, we must be thorough in summing up experience, liquidate the influence of Left-deviationist thinking as well as other forms of idealist and metaphysical thinking and work strictly in accordance with the objective laws of socialist society. We must proceed from realities and work within the limits of our capabilities. China is a vast country with rich natural resources, but economic growth is highly unbalanced between different regions of the country with widely differing natural conditions. We have a huge population. Our people are diligent, courageous and intelligent, but their scientific and cultural level is low.

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Afghanistan

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and studies of the current national situation, of the resources, including manpower, that can be utilized and developed in the next ten years, and of the course we should follow, so that our draft outline of the ten-year plan may as far as possible be placed on a scientific and practical basis. We must devote our full attention to improving the living standards of the people. Our fundamental aim in modernizing the country is gradually to raise the level of the material and cultural life of the people on the basis of increased production. The State Council is prepared gradually to improve the material and cultural life of the people, we have to work in many spheres. Some of our work seems to have no direct connection with improving the people's living standards but such work is actually in dispensable to a better life for the people. For instance, the further strengthening of the People's Liberation Army to consolidate the defence of our great motherland and to protect our peaceful construction is an indispensable task. And so is the study of certain basic sciences. All this is not hard to understand. In any case, we must see to it that the final results of the growth of production are manifested in appropriate and genuine improvements in living standards for the entire people. Thus, by studying the outline they can envisage how much our socialist economy will grow and how much their living standards will rise over the next ten years, and thus arrive at an understanding of the connection between the cause of modernization and their own immediate and long-term interests as well as the interests of the part and those of the whole. Then everybody will continue to display the spirit of arduous struggle and devote themselves to the cause heart and soul, knowing that it is their own. We must pay special attention to the use of our intellectual resources and energetically develop our scientific and educational institutions. The level of development of a country hinges largely on the extent of its use of intellectual resources. The modernization of science and technology is the key to the three other modernizations. Scientific research must anticipate the needs of our economic construction and help solve the scientific and technological problems arising in the course of modernizing our country, and particularly the crucial ones. We must take the necessary measures in connection with management, such as the benefits and ideological matters to facilitate the extensive and prompt popularization and application of the results of scientific research. The development of schools of all levels and categories has a direct bearing on the scientific and cultural standards of everyone working for the cause of modernization, and on the knowledge, skills, proficiency, discipline and moral qualities of manual and mental workers in town and country. It is the key to the development of our science and technology. Science is a productive force and so is education, which is indispensable as a means of training and raising the workers' knowledge and skills. We can never effect modernization if they remain illiterate or semi-literate. All levels of government and indeed the whole of society must stress and promote the cause of science and education, and respect our kindergarten, primary and middle school and university teachers and our scientists. We must respect their noble and arduous labour and raise their social status. On September 2, Ye Shengtao and seven other N.P.C. deputies wrote a letter to Renmin Ribao, severely criticizing some of the staff of two hotels in Dalian for their bad behaviour in slighthing some primary school teachers, and called on people of all walks of life to respect primary school teachers. I fully agree with and support this letter. I hope all government personnel will join with the people throughout the country in creating an atmosphere in which all teachers and scientists are held in esteem by all members of society. The neglect of science and education, the failure to regard them as indispensable, is an important aspect of the Left-deviationist thinking of the past. It has cost us dearly and must be rectified at all cost. Therefore, the importance of science and education to the cause of modernization must be duly reflected in the draft outline of the ten-year plan. The State Council is prepared gradually to devote more funds to science and education in the coming decade and hopes that the governments of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions will do likewise. We shall strive in a multitude of ways to bring about more and better results in our scientific and educational work, so that in the course of time we may train generation after generation of workers with socialist consciousness, knowledge of science and culture, occupational skills and good health, as well as large numbers of specialists in all fields such as science and technology, social sciences, organization and management, literature and art, political science and so on. The State Council is prepared to consider the draft outline of the ten-year plan. The population problem is one of universal concern. In mapping out our programme, we should plan the size of our population as well as the growth of material production, so that the two can fit in with each other. For a long period in the past, chiefly in the 1960s, we slackened our efforts with regard to family planning. As a result, our population has grown too rapidly and will continue to grow substantially in the coming years. Young people under 30 years of age account for about 65% of the total population, or around 630 million. Some have already reached the age of fertility and the majority of the remainder will do so within the next 10-20 years or so. If population growth is not controlled, there will be a dizzy peak, making it virtually impossible for the economy and all our social institutions to cope. Upon careful study, the State Council deems it necessary to launch a crash programme over the coming 20-30 years calling on each couple, except those in minority nationality areas with sparse populations, to have a single child, so that the rate of population growth may be brought under control as soon as possible.

Our aim is to strive to limit the population to a maximum of 1200 million by the end of this century. It is very common for one couple to have only one child in the developed countries. But for people in our rural areas, it is truly an important matter of transforming social customs and traditions. In our effort to achieve this, we rely chiefly on publicizing and implementing the policies of the Party and government and on ideological and political work, not on compulsion and arbitrary orders. It should be noted that since the early 1970s and in the last few years in particular, our promotion of family planning has achieved notable results both in town and country. Cadres at all levels, especially comrades in the women's organizations and the health and family planning departments at all levels, who are directly engaged in the work, have done a great deal. We should give them full credit. However, we must not shut our eyes to the policies and measures we take in this connection must be appropriate. We must make full use of persuasion and education and guarantee safety in applying birth control techniques. It is our hope that after painstaking publicity and education the whole people, and particularly the young, will be able to see that this is in the nation's interest and will warmly respond to this important call. The mass line is the essential way to map out our policies and measures which we take in this connection must be appropriate. We must make full use of persuasion and education and guarantee safety in applying birth control techniques. It is our hope that after painstaking publicity and education the whole people, and particularly the young, will be able to see that this is in the nation's interest and will warmly respond to this important call. The mass line is the essential way to map out our policies and measures which we take in this connection must be appropriate. We must make full use of persuasion and education and guarantee safety in applying birth control techniques. It is our hope that after painstaking publicity and education the whole people, and particularly the young, will be able to see that this is in the nation's interest and will warmly respond to this important call.
and April this year, we invited specialists in all fields, including economists, techno-economists, technologists and natural scientists, to join in the discussion, thereby making full use of our specialists in all fields in drawing up the draft outline of the ten-year plan. This practice must continue in the future. [=]

12065. Hua Guofeng. "Speech At The Third Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress (9/7/1980): Part 3: Carry Forward The Structural Reform of Economic Management", in Main Documents of The Third Session of The Fifth national Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. Our present system of economic management, including the relevant systems of finance, labour and wages, prices and materials control, consists mainly of what we inherited from the practices prevailing under the special historical conditions of the years of revolutionary wars. It has never undergone the reforms needed in the light of the specific course of development of China's socialist construction and in conformity with the scientific and democratic principles of socialism, and consequently more and more problems have piled up. The shortcomings and defects of our system of economic management show themselves mainly as follows: over-concentration of power; excessive and rigid control; denial of appropriate independence to socialist enterprises in their operations; improper use of government authority, both central and local, to take decisions directly and intervene administratively; and failure to distinguish either between the Party and the government or between the government and the enterprises in the sphere of management, thus making it very difficult for the enterprises to establish independent systems of production control and of operation and management. For a considerable period, we regarded as socialist principles certain methods in the system of economic management which hindered or even disrupted the growth of the productive forces. Instead of reforming them, we cherished and clung to them. At the same time, we denied the legitimacy of independent functions and rights of the trade unions. As a result, enterprises ranging from industry, communications and transport, commerce, services, to state farms and the collectively run agriculture which involves the bulk of the population, lacked inducement to develop their production and improve their operations; the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the working people were dampened; and the superiority of the socialist system was by no means given full play. We neglected the education of the cadres, staff and workers in production techniques and in operational and managerial know-how on the one hand, and failed to assign people with professional knowledge to important posts on the other, with the result that arbitrary directions were widespread, making it very difficult to raise technical, operational and managerial levels.

During the ten-year upheaval, some systems and policies that had been gathered together through long experience and had proved efficient over the years were disrupted and all but destroyed by Lin Biao and the gang of four. Their ultra-Left line in economic work and their corresponding policies and methods sought to monopolize the economic system, which was already beset by numerous problems. After over three years of consolidation, the general economic situation has markedly improved, but many problems still remain. In a word, the shortcomings and defects in the system of economic management seriously impede the progress of modernization and must be eliminated in a thoroughgoing reform. The general orientation for this reform is to transform over-centralized management by the state (central and local authorities included), extend the decision-making power of the enterprises and the power of their workers and staff to participate in management, transform regulation through planning alone into regulation through planning combined with regulation by the market, and transform management relying mainly on administrative organs and methods into management relying mainly on economic organs as well as on economic and legal methods. The reform in process for the past year is only a small first step in this direction. From now on, we must conserve what has proved effective in the reform, improve it and perfect it and, on the basis of our initial successes, carry it out unswervingly. It must be pointed out, however, that as structural reform is a very complicated matter with many ramifications, we must give it careful thought and make adequate preparations. We should draw up a programme for overall reform, conduct experiments, and put it into effect prudently and step by step. The reform of the economic system is essentially aimed at making the maximum use of the superiority of socialism. Naturally, new problems will inevitably crop up in the process. We should make prompt provision of research and study and be prepared for the problems that will arise. We must not panic or halt or fall back. The personnel, especially the leading personnel, at all levels of government, should further emancipate their minds and carry forward the reform by working enthusiastically with the masses, daring to innovate and acting prudently after investigation and study and on the strength of collective wisdom, and thus bring about fresh progress in socialist modernization.

This reform will help raise economic efficiency, expedite modernization, consolidate and perfect the socialist system and, in short, improve living standards. We are convinced, therefore, that it will win the support of the whole people. [=]

12066. Hua Guofeng. "Speech At The Third Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress (9/7/1980): Part 4: Eliminate Bureaucracy and Improve Government Work", in Main Documents of The Third Session of The Fifth national Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980. In restructuring our economic system, we must improve the work of the government at all levels. At present, widespread bureaucracy in our government offices at various levels is a very serious problem. In many of its manifestations bureaucracy is tied up with the irrational economic system and the two reinforce each other; restructuring the economic management system will help to eliminate a good deal of bureaucracy, but bureaucracy in its turn will impede the restructuring of the economic system or even continue to do harm after the reform of the system. The elimination of bureaucracy, therefore, must be carried out together with structural reform of the economy. Bureaucracy hampers not only the restructuring of the economic system and the progress of modernization, but all our other work as well. It has already aroused and continues to arouse strong popular discontent. Unless our administrative structure is thoroughly purged of bureaucracy of all descriptions, the governments at all levels will not be able to build an administrative system of high efficiency and prestige and give full play to the enthusiasm of their personnel and of the masses and consequently to the superiority of the socialist system. So I would like to speak at greater length on how to overcome bureaucracy effectively. Bureaucracy is a social phenomenon with a long history. While the bureaucracy of today and the bureaucracy of the old society have many things in common, the two are nevertheless essentially different. The bureaucracy of the old society served to exacerbate the exploitation and oppression of the working people by the ruling classes and could not possibly be eradicated by the old society itself, while the bureaucracy as exists in our society makes it hard for the socialist system to display its superiority, goes against its interests, and can and must be overcome by our socialist society. Apart from and more important than the surviving influence of the pernicious habits of the old society, the emergence and growth of bureaucracy in our government organizations has its social roots in the fact that our socialist system is still far from perfect and that our understanding of the laws of socialist development is still far from complete. We tried many times in the past to counter the manifestations of bureaucracy, but our efforts did not achieve much. Why? The main reason is that, in the past, we relied chiefly on ideological education, seeing it merely as a vestige of the old society and failing to look for the causes of bureaucracy in the various systems and the ways to overcome it. While the present socialist system is still far from perfect, our government organs are improperly managing almost every aspect of social life by administrative methods, thereby burdening themselves with a complex, back-breaking and unparalleled job. This irrational state of affairs is in fact the crux of the matter. If it remains unchanged, it will not only prevent us from concentrating on eradicating the old-type bureaucracy, but will inevitably produce other kinds of bureaucracy under new conditions. I do not intend to dwell on the
evil practices of old-type bureaucracy and the well-known bad work style of the bureaucrats in their dealings with the people. I wish to focus on the serious defects: md faults engendering bureaucracy in our present administrative system. They fall mainly under the following categories.

1. Over-concentration of power. The individual enterprises and production units are not granted the power to engage in economic activity independently, and a lot of vital power is concentrated in the multiple echelons of administration above them. The result is that those higher up become far removed from actual production and enjoy ever greater power, the echelons of administration multiply, and work becomes increasingly difficult. The power which should belong to the enterprises and production units is improperly concentrated in the government departments, that which should belong to the local authorities in the Central authorities, and that which should belong to the government departments in the Party committees. This state of affairs is becoming an increasingly formidable obstacle to the progres of socialist construction. Things are more or less the same in undertakings outside the economic realm. True, a certain degree of centralization of management is necessary in our socialist state, especially in its early stages. In point of fact, an important manifestation of the superiority of socialism is the proper centralization of management in accordance with the plan for developing the economy and the centralized leadership of the government and the Party in co-ordinating the interests of all social sectors. But excessive centralization of power produces the opposite results, which are not unfamiliar to us—those at the lower levels who know how things stand often have to take decisions without the time to get to know the situation. This not only reduces efficiency and dampens the enthusiasm of those at the lower levels, but it also lowers the standard of leadership of functionaries at the upper levels, making mistakes inevitable in their work. They become deeply entangled in trifles which they ought to be rid of and consequently do not have time to study and consider carefully more important matters, so as to tackle them properly. As they are far removed from the complexities of real life, they unavoidably tend to simplify matters, think in absolute terms and find a single solution for diverse problems at the lower levels. This is an important reason for many bureaucratcatic practices in our real life.

2. Confusion with regard to the limits of powers and responsibilities. At all levels of government, from the State Council down to the local administrations, there are no systematic and practicable administrative rules and regulations by which to define or specify the scope and limits of powers and responsibilities and lay down the working procedure of departments, local administrations, units and individuals. This has often resulted in the departments and units having no rules and regulations to go by when there are no precedents to follow. They are not clear about their duties and responsibilities and consequently have no alternative but to report to the higher authorities and seek instructions, with the reports passing from one echelon of authority to another. Hence the odyssey of official papers and the deluge of reports and meetings, the endless disputes over trifles and the dilatory style of work.

3. The incompatibility of the present cadre system with the requirements of socialist construction. The different levels of government haven’t a sound system for selecting, appointing, assessing and training cadres, or for culling out the incompetent and meting out rewards or disciplinary sanctions. The departments and units seldom recruit and employ cadres through advertisement and examination or use them in accordance with their abilities. Instead, cadres are mainly appointed by the organizational and personnel departments. This system has its historical roots and has played a positive role. But it is becoming more and more inadequate to meet the tasks of modernization. There is no practical plan for training cadres, and the system is often out of keeping with the requirements of our work. Regular and strict assessment of cadres is lacking, as are rewards and disciplinary measures. No distinction is made between those who do a good job and those who do a poor one and between those who are qualified and those who are not. Once a person becomes a cadre, he has a lifelong job, an “iron rice bowl.” Even if he proves really incompetent or seriously negligent of his duties, he remains a cadre until he is dismissed. Actually, although this system can prevent unemployment and guarantee a secure life for some people, the cost of achieving these things is too great. If this state of affairs is not thoroughly changed, how will we be able to realize modernization?

4. Overstaffing, overlapping, the proliferation of deputy and nominal posts and low working efficiency. The three phenomena of over-concentration of power, clear-cut responsibility and impropriety of the cadre system inevitably result in overstaffing. And overstaffing, in its turn, leads to a worsening of the maladies of bureaucracy. The fact that there is often duplication in our administrative setup and that the numbers of permanent and provisional organs and of the functionaries they employ exceed all previous records testifies to the gravity of the problem. We must now seriously study and tackle it without delay. Here I must stress that most of our administrative organs have done a lot of work indispensable to socialist construction. All our achievements are inseparable from their efforts. In future, we will still need a powerful state apparatus and a government with full authority. And this government will have to take up all kinds of necessary administrative work which is ultimately in the service of the people. I would also like to stress that most of our government functionaries are hard-working, uncomplaining and devoted to their duty and that many of them are rather proficient and experienced in practical work, often conduct on-the-spot investigations and keep close ties with the masses. In criticizing the bureaucracy in our work, we are mainly referring to the need to find out its causes and improve our system. The present undesirable system often leaves many of our devoted functionaries little room for the full exercise of their abilities or involves them in a lot of fruitless work. The responsibility certainly does not lie with them. It is true that there are some functionaries whose thinking and style of work are not good. But without a change in the system it will be difficult to overcome their shortcomings effectively. The key to the eradication of bureaucracy lies first of all in a thorough eradication of the irrationalities in the system of state administration, the system of office work, the cadre system and the administrative setups. The specific measures to be adopted are as follows:

1. Delegate powers to the enterprises and other units. Under the centralized leadership of the state, the enterprises and other units should have the necessary power to make genuinely independent decisions concerning their management and operations. Experiments to this effect were undertaken in a number of enterprises last year with generally good results. In future, such experiments should be extended step by step to cover more enterprises, and we should continue to expand their decision-making powers. Only a few other units besides enterprises have conducted experiments. It is necessary to sum up their experience and steadily extend our experiments. Once the enterprises and other units have more powers to take their own decisions, the work of many administrative departments will greatly diminish. Some of these departments may be transformed into enterprises or establishments, while others may be amalgamated. Thus, with the large-scale simplification of administration the room for possible bureaucracy will be immensely reduced. Of course, the power to make independent decisions should not be handed to only a few leading members of enterprises and other units. They must also be invested in the appropriate democratization agencies and supervisory organs which are genuinely representative of workers and staff. The delegation of power must be linked up with democratic management. All enterprises and other units should establish congresses or conferences of workers and staff. The congresses or conferences enjoy the right to discuss and decide on important matters within their purview and to elect their leading administrative personnel or make recommendations for their appointment or removal. In day-to-day work, all matters affecting the vital interests of the workers and staff should be handled with the consent and co-operation of the trade unions. The delegation of power should in no case weaken the necessary centralized control. But such centralized control of enterprises should be exercised mainly by using economic methods instead of administrative methods as in the past. But beyond any question, along with democratic management, there must be necessary
centralized management and centralized direction within the enterprises, whether in the field of production, technology or economy. This is also true in principle of the different institutions.

(2) The functions and duties of each administrative organ and its subordinate units and individuals should be clearly defined by administrative statutes. This work should be approached simultaneously from two directions. First, each department and unit should arouse the masses to abide by the rules, regulations and procedures, and work so that each person is clear about his specific duty and each job has someone responsible for it. If there are more people than needed, they may leave their posts to receive training or be assigned other jobs. This is now being done by some units and has yielded satisfactory results. Second, the levels of government from the State Council right through to the local authorities should organize specialists to formulate systematic administrative statutes that clearly define the functions and powers of the departments and units and the principles guiding their exercise, as well as the methods for solving certain special problems. When such statutes exist, the routine of reporting and seeking instructions from above can be reduced to a minimum and many things can be settled independently by the related departments and units within the context of their respective powers and working principles. After the functions and powers are specified for each unit and person, a rigorous system for checking up on their performance should be established so that both merits and demerits will be duly recorded, rewards conferred and disciplinary measures taken. Those who seriously neglect their duty should be dealt with according to law.

(3) Efforts should be made to reform the cadre system. After conscientiously summing up historical experience and making thoroughgoing investigations and study, we should work out a viable system for cadres at all levels and of all categories with respect to appointment, examination, assessment, rewards and disciplinary sanctions, training, promotion, transfer, retirement, dismissal, and so on. Ours is a socialist country, so we must try as far as possible to ensure a secure life for all who work and to make proper arrangements for them when they should retire or are relieved of their posts.

(4) We must establish and perfect a system of inspection and supervision. By taking the three measures mentioned above, we will be able not only to remove over-concentration of power, confusion over the limits of powers and responsibilities and the weaknesses of our inspection system, but also eliminate overstaffing. This will greatly lessen the manifestations of bureaucracy. However, bureaucracy is a historical phenomenon, and naturally sustained and relentless efforts are required to combat it. It is necessary to carry out regular and strict inspections and supervision over government organs at all levels and their functionaries. At present, the forms, channels and procedures for popular inspection of and supervision over government functionaries at all levels are still imperfect; in fact, the exercise of supervisory power by the masses is far from easy or universal. This state of affairs must change. In addition to supervision by Party organizations and the Party committees for inspecting discipline at all levels, letters and visits from the masses should be handled in earnest and newspapers and magazines should properly be utilized for exposure and criticism in checking up on and supervising the various levels of government organs and their functionaries. It is necessary to give more support to such activities. Supervision by people's deputies and by government organs at higher levels and exposure by government organs at lower levels exert a powerful influence and should be extensively encouraged. Mass recommendation, appraisal and selection of cadres are now being tried out with good results in some government organs and may also be popularized. In short, governments at all levels must continue to pool the wisdom of the masses and strive to create additional methods of inspection and supervision which are by?th more efficient and easier to carry out. This will facilitate, in accordance with the people's will, the timely commendation, rewarding and promotion of cadres who have distinguished themselves in the cause of socialism on the one hand, and, on the other hand the exposure and correction of the faults and errors of government functionaries and the replacement and recall of bureaucrats who are guilty of serious dereliction of duty. I wish to point out that I have covered neither all the sources of bureaucracy nor all the methods of overcoming it. Moreover, while some of the methods of overcoming bureaucracy mentioned above may be carried out fairly soon, others, and a considerable proportion at that, cannot be carried out at once because it will require a fairly thorough-going and all-round reform of our work system and even of our organizational system, and so adequate preparation is necessary. But since we are determined to strive for reform, we must, in our minds to carry out such reforms. Otherwise our modernization programme will definitely be held back by the aforesaid irrational systems. Of course, bureaucratic habits left over from the old society are related to the level of the productive forces and to the educational and cultural level of the people and cadres. That is why the complete overcoming of bureaucracy in all its manifestations is a protracted and arduous task. But the major bureaucratic maladies and other maladies connected with them can surely be overcome provided that government organs at all levels fully recognize the danger, grasp the four key links—reform of the state's management systems, reform of the administrative work system at the various levels, reform of the cadre system, and improvement of the system of inspection of and supervision over cadres and solve these problems in a planned and systematic way while intensifying education and training. Bureaucracy is by no means an incurable disease under socialism. Socialism will assuredly develop into a vigorous system. At least in China it certainly can and will. This is a requirement of the basic tenets of Marxism and, what is more, with our long revolutionary tradition of the mass line we can rely on the broadest masses. This ensures our eventual success in overcoming bureaucracy.

We should steadily and effectively hand over to the grass-roots units and to the masses the portion of our power that ought to be delegated. They will surely be able to help and supervise our government in carrying out all the necessary reforms so as to enable it to adapt itself to the needs of modernization and build itself up and become a modern socialist government: a fairly streamlined, responsible and efficient government in our history, a government which maintains close links with the masses. [+]
in this regard. The Constitution is the fundamental charter of our country and the basic guide for all spheres of government work. The First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress made some amendments to the Constitution. But we did not have enough time then to sum up comprehensively the experiences and lessons gained since the founding of the People’s Republic, nor did we have enough time to size up and eliminate the influence of certain aspects of Left thinking during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, there are quite a number of places in the present Constitution which are inappropriate. Moreover, many of the provisions of what is the fundamental charter of our country are not free from flaws, nor are they as well-defined as they should be. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has proposed that the present session consider and begin an overall revision of the Constitution, so that it can better reflect the interests and will of the people of all nationalities in the new historical period and better meet the needs of socialist modernization and the democratization of the state. The genuine rule of law is required not only for consolidating and enhancing the stability and unity of our country but also for ensuring the smooth progress of modernization. To this end, we must continue to improve the work of legislation and the administration of justice. We should first formulate laws that are much more complete than those we have now and, in particular, we should devote much of our energy to legislation concerning economic affairs. We, therefore, suggest that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress enlist the services of an adequate number of qualified personnel to draw up one by one such important laws as the civil law, the law of civil procedure, the law of minority nationality regionality autonomy, the planning law, the factory law, the labour law, the contract law and the energy law. The State Council shall take an active part in the drafting of the relevant laws and shall institute and successively promulgate rules and decrees, especially administrative regulations governing the terms of reference and responsibilities of different organizations and the reform of the system of personnel placement. The provincial, municipal and autonomous regional people’s congresses and their standing committees should draft and promulgate local statutes in conformity with the principles laid down by law. Only in this way can our cadres and other citizens have laws and regulations to abide by in all spheres of their work and their other activities. As for laws, rules, regulations and decrees already promulgated, all levels of government must see to it that resolute measures are taken to enforce them. In recent months, counties all over the country have had deputies to their people’s congresses directly elected by voters in accordance with the electoral law and have had their leading personnel chosen by these deputies. This is an event of far-reaching significance in the political life of our people, an indicator of the further development of people’s democracy. The governments at different levels must do a conscientious job in this connection. Our cadres, and senior cadres in particular, must set an example in observing discipline and abiding by the law. They must never think that they can flout laws and discipline on account of their authority or past meritorious services. Anyone who does so, comrades, is going to commit grave errors! The greater our cadres’ authority and meritorious services, the greater their political and moral obligation to set an example to the people, their subordinates their children and posterity and to lead the entire people in creating an entire generation imbued with revolutionary spirit. Comrades! We must resolutely do away with all bureaucratic airs and the exercise of “special privileges” and foster a revolutionary spirit of utter devotion to the people. This is our sacred duty to the people and youth of our country. People who concern themselves only with the pursuit of their own private interests or those of their children, relatives and friends at the expense of the interests of the state and the people will eventually be brought to justice according to law and discipline. Our cadres must resolutely fight against the evil practice of tailoring the law to suit one’s selfish ends and against bureaucrats shielding one another in wrongdoing. We must always keep to the principle that “all are equal before the law,” and there must never be any “special citizens” who can violate laws and discipline with impunity. We must see to it that the public security organs, the people’s procuratorates and the people’s courts independently exercise their respective powers in investigation, prosecution and passing judgment, allowing no illegal interference whatsoever by any organs, mass organizations or individuals. Only by so doing can we guard the sanctity of socialist legality and make it a truly powerful revolutionary weapon in the defence of socialist democracy. To ensure the correct and effective implementation of the present reform in our economic and political systems, we must strengthen ideological and political work as well as the necessary party and state supervision. Against the backdrop of the socialist legal system and the communist attitude towards labour among cadres at all levels and the broad masses. We must strive to eradicate the influence of the remnant feudal ideology, and of such nonproletarian ideologies as bourgeois and pettybourgeois thinking. It should also be noted that with the expansion of contacts with foreign countries, the corrosive influence of foreign bourgeois ideas is beginning to tell among certain people and such disgraceful behaviours as worshipping and having blind faith in things foreign and forfeiting national dignity are on the increase. We must be on our guard and oppose this tendency. To eradicate the influence of the ideologies of the exploiting classes and other non-proletarian classes is a major task for us, which is indispensable to the development of socialist democracy not only at present, but for a fairly long period of time to come. [6]
departments have paid no heed. What a big loss to the state this is! This again shows the importance of continuing to eliminate the evil influence of the long-prevailing Left-deviationist thinking which despises knowledge and intellectuals. More than 40 years ago, in speaking of the selection and promotion of cadres for economic work, Comrade Mao Zedong said, "Discard this mistaken view and you will see cadres all around you." This remark is well put and is still apposite today. The important task of training and selecting young and middle-aged cadres rests especially on the older generation.

Large numbers of our old cadres braved untold dangers in the prolonged revolutionary struggle and have striven with might and main for the cause of national construction. They have made great contributions and deserve the respect and love of the people as valuable assets of our Party and our country. To reduce the average age of leading cadres means to increase the percentage of younger people in leading groups at different levels so that they gradually become the majority. It does not mean the removal of all older people from leading posts. Besides, age requirements for leading cadres should vary at different levels. Older cadres who are able to carry on their work remain the mainstay of our leadership. But some are now quite old and lack the necessary health and vigour; after all you cannot resist the laws of nature. We might ask these comrades to act as advisers, but it would be too much to ask them to continue to shoulder the heavy tasks at the front line. Thus we should conscientiously make arrangements for large numbers of older and trailer comrades who have made contributions to the state and the people to stay at the second or third line so that they may continue to make contributions in their remaining years while enjoying as before of what is due to them politically and materially. The older cadres have rich experience in judging, selecting and training people. History has entrusted them with the important and glorious duty to actively find and promote outstanding young and middleaged cadres, voluntarily to let the younger and more energetic comrades take their places, and to encourage, support and help them boldly carry on their work. This is a best and most valuable contribution our senior cadres can make to the cause of the four modernizations. We are convinced that they will certainly live up to the eager expectations all our people! The necessary conditions should be created to help large numbers of government functionaries and cadres in all fields of work to study full- or part-time and to acquire and increase the general and specialized knowledge they need to work for the four modernizations. "These include regular specialized schools and training courses for cadres either at their posts or while on special leave. We have both positive and negative experience in this connection. In the early years of the People's Republic, we used varied methods in training cadres of worker, peasant and soldier origin and helped them raise their cultural level and increase their professional knowledge.

This highly important work which had yielded notable results was later regretfully discarded. We should now resume and improve it in order that all such cadres fit for further studies will be able to pursue their studies in various specialties through all possible forms of training, arming themselves for the four modernizations. The leaders and functionaries at different levels of government must study tenaciously and untringly. It is our belief that from them will emerge more and more socialist-minded experts in all trades and professions. In his report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Mao Zedong said, "If we know nothing about production and do not master it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general is improved, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fall." After nationwide victory, we accomplished that task with resounding success. In the new circumstances of today, we face a similar task in realizing modernization. It is imperative for us to accomplish it, and we certainly can. Fellow Deputies! All the questions I have just dwelt upon most deeply concern all our people. They have arisen from the new conditions and our understanding of them is still rather superficial. We now invite you, our fellow deputies, to discuss them so as to reach a common and correct understanding. It must be noted that we are merely posing these questions here and that arduous efforts will be needed for their solution. After the conclusion of this session, the State Council and the local governments should proceed from reality and investigate and study problems thoroughly so as to put forward effective and practical guidelines and specific policies and measures to this end. The governments at all levels should, first of all, initiate rigorous reforms in order to overcome bureaucracy and become active organs that can truly lead the cause of modernization and serve the people. Now, as entrusted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, I shall explain the changes in the leading personnel of the State Council. In order to strengthen and improve the Party's leadership to meet the needs of socialist modernization, a number of important measures were proposed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Party not long ago, measures such as making an effort to appoint to leading posts at all levels those comrades who unservingly carry out the Party's line, who are able to work on their own and who are in the prime of life, measures designed to strengthen collective leadership and put an end to the practice of providing lifelong posts for leading cadres.

The basic spirit underlying these measures is likewise applicable to the strengthening and improvement of government leadership. Learning from historical experience, the Central Committee of the Party has decided that, as a rule, the first secretary of a Party committee should not concurrently be head of a provincial people's government, chairman of an autonomous region, or head of an autonomous prefecture, or of a county or city. This was aimed at preventing the over-concentration of power and the concurrent holding of too many posts by one person, and at truly and clearly separating Party work from government work. Such comrades will thus be able to concentrate their time and energy on solving the Party's major problems, while all levels of government under the State Council will have a complete and efficient administrative system from top to bottom. In line with the above principle, I proposed to the Central Committee that I cease concurrently holding the premiership of the State Council. The Central Committee has taken a decision to this effect. It has also decided that five veteran comrades of our Party who are now Vice-Premiers of the State Council, namely, Comrades Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian and Wang Zhen, cease concurrently holding vice-premierships of the State Council. Comrade Wang Renzhong, who already holds an important Party post, will also cease concurrently holding his vice-premiership. I now submit all these requests to this congress for examination and approval. In addition, Comrade Chen Yonggui has asked to be relieved of or while on special leave. We have both positive and negative experience now submit all these requests to this congress for examination. In addition, Comrade Wang Renzhong, who already holds an important Party post, will also cease concurrently holding his vice-premiership. I now submit all these requests to this congress for examination and approval.

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Liberation Army is the staunch pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the loyal defender of the socialist motherland and the four modernizations, and it is also fin important force in safeguarding world peace. In the near future, it will not be possible to increase the expenditure on national defence by a big margin. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we should strengthen our defence. The People’s Liberation Army must continue to step up its political and military training and the training of cadres, strengthen its political and ideological work, expedite various kinds of preparations against aggression, carry forward its fine traditions, and consolidate and heighten its combat effectiveness. We must continue to do a good job in building up the militia and in the work of supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to the families of the armymen. The people’s representatives of all circles, governments at all levels and people of all our nationalities must care for and cherish our own army, actively support it and help it fulfil its various tasks. We must make concerted efforts to make our army an impregnable Great Wall. We shall work energetically for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, fulfilling our lofty aim of unifying our homeland at an early date.

The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by the N.P.C. Standing Committee on New Year’s Day 1979 has had a growing influence on the people in Taiwan from the top to the grass roots, and on our overseas compatriots and people of other countries. Over the past year or so patriotic fellow-countrymen in Taiwan and our overseas compatriots have striven for the unification of the motherland. Compatriots on both sides of the straits, in particular, desire to establish postal, transport and trade relations between the mainland and Taiwan at an early date. We are convinced that the unification of the motherland is an irresistible historical trend and that our lofty goal will be attained. There is but one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of China—this is the immutable stand consistently taken by the Chinese Government and people, and this is a basic principle governing the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and all other countries. Any argument for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” is bound to be unanimously opposed by the Chinese Government and Chinese compatriots at home and abroad. Comrades, Friends! The situation since the smashing of the gang of four proves that a bright future lies ahead for China and its people, a fact that has become more and more obvious. We have been able to win victories primarily because all our patriotic compatriots are closely united under the guidance of the correct line laid down by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The unity of our great People’s Liberation Army, our whole people and the local people’s governments has been, is and will always be the most reliable guarantee for the triumph of our revolutionary cause. All our nationalities will always be closely united in the family of our great motherland and no force whatsoever can undermine our long-tested lofty fraternal feelings. In recent years, the democratic parties and democratic personages without party affiliation have made new and significant contributions to our motherland’s prosperity and progress. They will continue to play an important role in our endeavour for the four modernizations. The slogan “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong will always be the principle governing the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the democratic parties. Patriotic leaders in religious circles have made valuable efforts in leading religious adherents to preserve the freedom of religious beliefs on a patriotic basis. Now that the cause of our motherland is advancing victoriously, we must exert ourselves even harder to consolidate and expand the united front formed by all our socialist working people, all patriots who are in favour of socialism and all who support the reunification of our motherland. We must rally more closely around the Chinese Communist Party and the people’s government, hold aloft the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and unswervingly carry out the lines, principles and policies laid down by the Party and state. Let us work together and strive for greater successes in our socialist modernization! =

12069. Hussain, Zahid. “Afghan Children Dying In camps While World Heeds Others’ Needs”, in Seattle Times, August 30, 1994. p. A12. At Sarshani Refugee Camp, outside Jalalabad, 32 people (mainly children) died in one week. The 300000 people of the camp were new refugees from fighting at Kabul. UNHCR notes it is impossible to meet the needs of the refugee since world interest has now mainly shifted to Rwanda. The new round of fighting is systematically destroying the medical infrastructure and making the educated class refugees.

12070. Hussain, Zahid. “Afghan Children Dying In camps While World Heeds Others’ Needs”, in Seattle Times, August 30, 1994. p. A12. At Sarshani Refugee Camp, outside Jalalabad, 32 people (mainly children) died in one week. The 300000 people of the camp were new refugees from fighting at Kabul. UNHCR notes it is impossible to meet the needs of the refugee since world interest has now mainly shifted to Rwanda. The new round of fighting is systematically destroying the medical infrastructure and making the educated class refugees.

12071. Jasiwicz, Z.; Akimer, Shirin [editor]. “Professional Beliefs and Rituals Among Craftsmen in Central Asia: Genetic and Functional", in Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia, Central Asia Research Forum. London: Kegan Paul International, 1991, pp. 171-180. The smithies of northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, Balkh, Mazare-Sharif) developed their crafts over centuries of interaction with agrarian communities and with nomads. Craftsmen were organized into guilds, exist as ‘non-food-producing’ nomads (such as the low social status Haydariha around Qaysar, in Faryab, Afghanistan, who were subordinated the the Qipchaps in an arrangement reminiscent of domestic slavery), are scattered among other populations in various ways (domestic slavery, craftsmen members of communities working for barter, monetarized craftsmen, craftsmenorganizened in kolkhoz of sovkhoz), and in towns developed certain organizations, ceremonies and beliefs (such as women potters in Tajikistan who produced pottery without a potter’s wheel or kiln for firing). In Central Asia, guilds developed ‘religious-cum-magical’ beliefs, associated with cults of saints, and informed by Islam: the purpose of these beliefs and rituals was to confirm and cement group cohesion. The status of the guilds now in the USSR is unknown, but they were formally abolished. In Afghanistan, the guilds are gradually shedding their traditional practices of meetings and rituals, since the individual craftsmen are too busy.

12072. Keen, David. Refugees: Rationing The Right to Life: The Crisis In Emergency Relief: Part 2: Hunger and Death. Refugee Studies Programme (endorsed by Medecins San Frontieres, OXFAM, Save the Children). London: Zed Books, 1994. pp. 6-15. [Book derived from the symposium entitled ‘Resondo to the New Round of Fighting: Refugees: The Need for New Approaches’, held in Oxford in 3/1991.]. WHO has determined that refugees must have 1900 calories per day to survive; yet everywhere the children of refugees, such as those of the Kurds on the Iraqi border, are stunted and starved. Women, either pregnant or lactating have larger requirements. Populations with poor nutrition often have parasites. While a few refugee populations, such as those in Hong Kong or Thailand have adequate nutrition, more common is the experience of refugees in Sudan or Ethiopia, where nutrition is compromised. Refugees: The Need for New Approaches’, held in Oxford in 3/1991.]

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400000), but "at the same time, the establishment of a 'safe haven' for the Kurds within Iraqi territory broke important new ground in offering protection for internally-displaced people." The unnecessary concern about Sudanese "sovereignty" has allowed the central government to use famine as a weapon against rebel regions in the south.

12073. Keen, David. Refugees: Rationing The Right to Life: The Crisis In Emergency Relief: Part 7: An Agenda for Action. Refugee Studies Programme (endorsed by Medecins Sans Frontieres, OXFAM, Save the Children). London: Zed Books, 1992. pp. 69-79. [Book derived from the symposium entitled "Responding to the Nutrition Crisis Among Refugees: The Need for New Approaches", held in Oxford in 3/1991.] A system that ensures the survival of refugees must begin with sufficient resources to assist them and with a clear delegation of responsibility for refugee relief to a specific agency. Refugee needs that are to be met must be actual refugee needs, not some theoretical substitute for their needs; this assessment must also begin before the crisis emerges and requires the creation of an early warning system for such disasters. Relief must be coordinated and evaluated. In addition, rations must be improved, clients need to be consulted on the rations (women, who usually prepare foods, must be given input into ration selection), and the needs of self-settled and domestic refugees must be addressed. Worldwide, economic development and respect for human rights must be cultivated to prevent the creation of new refugee flows.

12074. Klimovich, L. I. Islam, Yego Proskhozhdenie i Sotsial'nya Sushchnost (Islam, Its Origin and Social Content). Moscow: February, 1956. This pamphlet was produced by the all-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge in 2/1956, with an impression of 138000 copies. In it, it is stated that in the Soviet Union Islam exists as a survival without any social roots. By implication the object of the pamphlet is to help the Communist party to do away with it entirely by showing that it is a negation of scientific theory and a drag on social progress. The pamphlet begins by asserting that Islam, like other religions, was the outcome of historical causes and not miraculous. It explains its origins as follows: Prior to Islam, Arabia was in a very unsettled state owing mainly to tribal rivalries, the competing influences of Judaism and Christianity, and certain social changes. Among the Arabs there developed a tendency to unite. It was headed by the prophet Muhammad, whose ancient god was Allah. It was supported by certain so-called prophets, among whom was Muhammad. They advocated monotheism and were xenophobic. Meeting with opposition, they moved from Mecca to Medina where they eventually headed a new confederation of tribes. The religion they preached was called Islam because it signified submission and loyalty. Having begun in a period of transition when feudal relations were growing, although there were survivals of slave-owning society and also of primitive communal society, Islam, as a religious instrument of social oppression, supported the interests of slave-owners, feudal aristocracy, and merchants. After the Arabs had embarked on conquest, the dogmas of Islam were developed. In the interests of the feudal class Islam adopted the cult of personality. Its origin was ascribed to the miraculous activity of the prophet Muhammad and the Arab feudal Caliphs were called his successors. Thus a religious veneer was given to Islam's historical development. The second part of the pamphlet describes the spread of Islam and the growth and decline of the Caliphate. It seeks to show from an analysis of certain chapters of the Koran how the Arabs made use of Islam to reinforce their conquests. Islam, it says, taught that the Caliph was God's representative on earth. The Sunna and Shari'a bolstered up the privileged position of Muslims. Even after the idea of the divine origin of the Caliphate had been exploded the system was continued in order to serve the ends of the exploiting class. The last part of the pamphlet entitled "The basic antithesis of Islam to science and progress" begins by pointing out the extent to which the legal systems of Islamic countries are dominated by the Koran, Sunna, and Shari'a at the present day. It then examines the basic principles of Islam and draws the following conclusions. The Koran claims to be of supernatural origin but there is no evidence of this. Its account of how the world began shows it to be a hash of myths and legends borrowed from the Arabs, Judaism, and Christianity. The idea of the Koran's infallibility was disseminated in order to prevent any questioning of it. The Koran, the Sunna, and Shari'a condone harsh features of feudal society, such as the unequal status of women and polygamy. Present-day society in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq still has the imprint of feudal survivals hallowed by Islam. Islam diverts attention from the future to the past and induces a fatalistic mood.

In Eastern Europe, the imposition of class society and the resistance of workers with its stories of hell. It defends exploitation and private property. Its discrimination between faithful and unbelievers leads to intolerance which has been exploited by the West as happened in India. Islam's claim to have no class distinctions is lying propaganda which has been made use of in support of pan-Islamism. Islam, beginning as "a social movement, is based on exploitation of man by man, which is why its roots have been eradicated in the Soviet Union." [From: "Part II: Arabs and the Arab World: Islam: 1945-1954", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. pp. 40-41.][c]

12075. Korgun, Victor G.; Eickelman, Dale F. [editor]. "Afghanistan and Iran: The Afghan Revolution: A Failed Revolution", in Russia's Muslim Frontiers. New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis. Indian Series in Arab & Islamic Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993. pp. 101-113. In 4/1978 there was a revolution in Afghanistan that brought a Communist party to power: this coup overthrew the government of Muhammad Daud, which had itself come to power in a coup in 1973 following the growing social and economic crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This crisis had resulted from the failure (much due to corruption) of the large scale economic development projects the monarchy had embraced to establish its legitimacy. Daud had nationalized banks and several trading companies, unbending the economic faction allied to the King, and implemented some modest social reforms; the land reform efforts started early by the regime were never fully implemented. The Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), repressed by Daud, prepared for the coup by recruiting among the officer corps. On 4/27/1978, Nur Muhammad Taraki came to power with a program of: land reform, liquidation of feudal and prefeudal relations (for example, Decree 6 of 6/1978 freed 11 million peasants from 25% rents on their landlords and money lenders), democratization of public life, solution of the nationalities question, equality of men and women, and the abolition of illiteracy. These reforms failed since they had no real mass support (the PDPA was entirely urban and had no ties to the villages); the goals were also very unrealistic, hoping to transform Afghan society overnight. So, while the peasants were freed from debts to moneylenders, the failure to create an alternative agricultural credit system forced the peasants back to the moneylenders. Factionalism within the PDPA, with struggles between the Parchem and Khalq factions, also weakened the ability of the regime to implement reforms. Bu 10/1978 there were outbreaks of mass resistance to the PDPA in Qandahar. Hafizullah Amin became PM in 4/1979, and Minister of Defense in 7/1979. In this environment the Soviet military intervened to save the Kabul regime; Brabak Karmal ruled in 1980-1986 with Soviet assistance; his first measures were to moderate the previous policies. The policies were general failures: only 28% of peasants given land under the land reform still had those lands. In 1989, the Soviet forces withdrew. Just as in Eastern Europe, the imposition of revolution from above failed in Afghanistan: modernization is now most likely to begin with a reconstruction of traditional structures as the basis for social and political development.

12076. Lukhtitsky, Pavel. "Part 20: Pamir", in Soviet Tajikistan. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954. The first traveler to call Pamir by its proper name and to give a brief description of that country was the Chinese monk Hsuan Tsang who in the seventh century crossed from Badakhshan into Tash-Kurgan, the domain of Tzeban-To. The next one to leave us a description of Pamir was Marco Polo, the Venetian traveler who passed through this country about the year 1270. It was a dreary country that Hsuan Tsang land Marco Polo described, but for all
that conqueror after conqueror came to possess it. It was conquered by the Tibetans and the Uighurs. In the thirteenth century Genghis Khan came close up to it, as did Tamerlane in the fourteenth century, and Abubekr-mirza in the fifteenth century. In the sixteenth century Sultan Babur included it in the Grand Mongol Empire he formed. In the latter part of the sixteenth century (1572) the Pamir regions of Vakhân, Shugnan and Kushtan, together with Karategin, fell under the sway of the Emir of Bukhara, Abdurahim, and were governed by his stepson, Shaa-Kirghiz of Darvaz. In the seventeenth century the Jungars invaded Pamir every now and again, but the invaders were exterminated by the Chinese. The native highland people rose in rebellion against the invaders and expelled many of them. In Western Pamir—Vâkhân, Iishkashtîm and Gorân—on the ancient trade route along the Panj, there are the ruins of the castles and forts of the ancient Shâ-Posh peoiple, or black-robed kafirs, who inhabited that region. These people were fire-worshippers and wore black woolen garments. The ruins of the castle of the Shâ-Posh king Zengibo in the kishlak Isor, in Vakhân; the fort Zamir-Otash-parast near the kishlak Ptp; the fort of the legendary Siah-Posh king Kaakhâa below the kishlak Namágtut and others, have not been thoroughly investigated by archeologists to this day, although time has not destroyed their mighty walls. Associated with those castles are many legends about the fire-worshippers, about the conquest of the country by Ali, and about religious wars. After Ferghana was transformed into the Khânate of Kókand, the hâns strove to extend their dominions to the Hindu Kush and Kasghar, and in 1832-34, Madrid-Khan of Kokand subjugated Pamir and occupied the entire territory up to Sârykolt and the right bank of the Panj. In 1869, the western part of Pamir (Badakhshân) was occupied by the troops of the Emir of Afghanistan, Shir-Ali-Khan. At that time the English were already making strenuous efforts to gain possession of Pamir, but in 1876 the Khânate of Kókand was abolished and its territory was annexed to Russia as the Ferghana Region. In that very same year the first Russian exploration expedition was sent to Pamir. Colonels Lebedev and Bonsdorf made surveys of routes and defined heights and astronomical points: Kasterko and Korostovtsev made surveys of Pamir and Aïla. In 1877-1878 the country was explored up to lake Yashil Kûl by the zoologist Severtsev; up to Lake Kara Kûl by the geologist Mushketov; and in Badakhshân by Colonel Matveyev. Later, up to 1891, explorations were made by the astronomer Futýata, by the mining engineer Ivanov, by the topographer Bendersky, by the botanist Regél, by Count Grombchevsky (who reached Kanjut and Kafiristan) and by the geographer Grum-Grzhimalo. In those years Pamir was still an enigmatic country wrapped in mystery and legend. In 1891-1892 detachments under the command of Colonel Ionov annexed Eastern Pamir to Russia, and from that time the region was called the Pamir District, Ferghana Region. Pamir was annexed to Russia as the Ferghana Region. In that very same year the first Russian exploration expedition was sent to Pamir. Colonels Lebedev and Bonsdorf made surveys of routes and defined heights and astronomical points: Kasterko and Korostovtsev made surveys of Pamir and Aïla. 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The local rulers and clergy were subordinated to the beks, while the Russian military administration merely exercised general supervision. In 1895 a Russo-British boundary commission established the frontiers between Russia and China, Afghanistan and—beyond the "Afghan corridor"—India. These frontiers have remained unchanged to this day. In that period numerous Russian explorers visited Pamir, but except for a few main routes and separate districts, the region was still entirely unexplored. Utter confusion reigned even as regards its geography. In spite of all the difficulties Russian travellers pushed forward with their explorations and gained more knowledge about the region, but it was the October Revolution that created the possibility of making an extensive and all-round investigation, as a result of which the "blank spaces" were entirely removed from the Soviet map of Pamir. Only the people reared by the October Revolution could convert the perilous mountain tracks into convenient motor roads. In 1940 it was decided to build the Great Pamir Highway from Stalinabad to Horog 567 kms long. The technical difficulties connected with the laying of that road were unprecedented, and the work was estimated to take five years. It was to run over steep creeps, through snowy mountains, across hundreds of dizzying precipices and scores of gigantic, creeping boulder stones in places never before trodden by the foot of man. Without this road the economic development of Darvaz and Badakshân would have been impossible. The cost of transporting a single telegraph pole from Stalinabad to Kalai-Humb by pack-horses was a 1000 rubles! Even school desks had to be transported in parts by aircraft. Every year the fruit crop in Kalai-Humb remained in the district owing to the lack of transport facilities. Enthusiasm ran high for the prospect of a road: "The construction of this road the inhabitants of Darvaz and Pamir came forward with a counterplan: to make this a people's undertaking and to complete it not in five years, but in 120 days! In May 1940 twenty-two thousand collective farmers went out on to the track to help the workers and technical specialists. Six thousand tons of freight—explosives, provisions and building materials—were transported to the scene of operations by aircraft and pack-animals. In 3.5 months 2 million cubic metres of monolithic crags, two million cubic metres of flat rock, and a million cubic metres of boulders were blasted and cleared away. On September 1 the first automobile passed through the Darvaz Gorge, and six days later the builders reported to Stalin that the whole road was open for traffic. The fable told by the Tajik highlanders about the giant Palavon who shifted mountains with his shoulder came true. The road was laid in 110 days! The journey from Stalinabad to Horog became easy and safe, and it takes not a month, but 2-3 days! And this legendary country formerly isolated by wild mountains has become a cultured and flourishing region. Eastern and Western Pamir differ sharply from each other in topography, climate and population. The mountains of Eastern Pamir are smooth, their contours are soft, they have numerous deep hollows with no outflows, and between the mountain chains stretch wide, smooth valleys which had been ploughed down by now vanished glaciers. In these rocky valleys there are scarcely any trees, for in Eastern Pamir there is no point lower than 3600 metres above sea level; here only dry teresken and different varieties of "cushion" plant grow, and only the floodlands of the rivers are enlivened by grass. Many of the valleys are filled with rocky piles of moraine. In those valleys there are numerous lakes formed by melted glaciers. In some places the ice has remained under the soil. The ice does not melt evenly and as a result the ground is covered with hummocks and pits. The only area where no glaciers have been is that of the Muzkol Range. Scarcely divided by watersheds, the East Pamir Mountains are smooth, their contours are rounded. A similar topography is to be found only in Tibet. In these valleys at a height of four kms above sea level and only half a kilometre below the snow-line Kirghiz nomads lived from ancient times, driving their herds from one sparse pasture to another, for not one of them could feed a large herd all the year round. The total number of East-Pamir Kirghiz families fluctuated between 1000-2000. Teits, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kadyrshes, Ottuz-Oguly and other Kirghiz clans were in constant strife over pastures. The local, high-mountain breed of long- maned Kirghiz ponies, extremely unextacting and wiry, helped the nomads to move very quickly—a hundred and more kms a day—and their tents and other baggage were carried not only by horses, but also by asses, camels, and above all by humped and shaggy yaks, which are adapted to the climate and rarefied air. These strong and intelligent animals can obtain their food from under the snow which they kick aside with their hoofs, and they are able to find subsoil water in desert areas and dig for it without the aid of man. Conditions of life in Eastern Pamir are more severe than in the Arctic, where the air is less rarefied. In 1934, at the Bash-Gumbez Pass, a temperature of 51.2C. below zero was recorded. The daily fluctuation of the temperature is extraordinary. On 7/8 1934, the temperature at the Pamir Biological Station at 13:00 hours was 33C., but at 16:00 hours it was 6.4C. below zero. Such sharp changes in temperature crack stones and crumble rocks. In addition to wild sheep, the constant habitants of high mountains, in Eastern Pamir there are also numerous mountain goats, and in the lower valleys there are marmots, hares, martens and foxes. Enormous vultures with a stretch of wing of as much as three metres soar slowly in the air, or sit on rocks, dark and motionless, like statues. The nomad Kirghiz clans always strove to drive their herds from Eastern Pamir to the lower levels—northward, across the Zaali Range to the luxuriant alpine pastures of the Alai Valley; eastward into China,
and south-westward, to the upper pastures of Vakhan, Shugnan and Bartang. The rivers which flow from Eastern Pamir to the Panj, breaking up, as it were, the topography of the mountains, gradually deepen their beds and transform them into gorges of increasing depth and steepness. The watershed ridges tower three to four kms over the bottoms of the gorges, and the streams that flow from these waterways, in their turn, cut narrow and deep gorges for themselves, running at right angle to the main courses. The entire topography thus becomes extremely rugged, cut up by innumerable precipices and chasms, some of which have a sheer drop of one and a half kms. The ranges of Western Pamir were created by rivers and are therefore called not tectonic, but orographic. Their ridges are sharp and rugged; their summits—rocky peaks—are covered with snow and hanging glaciers. The rocks in the medium height zone are the haunt of the fierce snow-panthers, which attack goats and sheep.

In the rugged mountains there are also the small Himalaya bears and wolves; there are also vultures and eagles, and falcons which the local inhabitants often tame. Exceptionally plentiful in the mountains of Western Pamir are various breeds of partridges and of mountain turkeys, which the inhabitants make so tame that they follow at the heels of their owners. In the upper reaches of the Western Pamir rivers there are many alpine meadows; lower down juniper-trees appear, sometimes bird, and still lower down there are birar, honeysuckle and currant. Here and there the rocky slopes are enlivened by rhubarb; on the river banks there are thickets of tall Sila buckthorn and small poplars. More and more often plots of land are met with planted with Himalayan gymnnoasperms,barley, beans, peas, rye, millet and flax. Still lower down, in the orchards of the small kishlaks, the first apple, apricot and mulberry trees are growing. Here wheat is already grown. Every narrow valley in Western Pamir is taken up almost entirely by a river which in its onward rush does not leave on its banks the earth it washes away, but carries it down to its estuary and thus constantly deepens its bed. For that reason the inhabitants of these valleys can settle only at the estuaries of these tributaries which heap their silt in conical piles at the exits of the gorges. All the small mountain kishlaks are exceptionally beautiful and picturesque. The settled clans which have inhabited Western Pamir since the days of antiquity have always been known for their industriousness. With extraordinary courage and perseverance they overcame the seventy of nature, dug canals, laid tracks, built bridges across rivers, and won from the rocks every patch of ground fit for cultivation. In their tireless labours they strove only for peace, as every toiler does. Those clans which long inhabited Badakhshan, each in a separate area bordered by mountain chains—Vakhan, Ishkashim, Goran, Shugnan, Rushan, Bartang and Yazgulem—and each speaking its own dialect, collectively called themselves Highland Tajiks, differing from the other Tajiks only with regard to language. The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region is divided into seven districts: Shugnan, Ishkashim, Rosht-ala, Kushan, Bartang, Murgab and Vanch, which formerly belonged to Daravz and now unite the basins of the rivers Yazgulem and Vanch and the adjacent bank of the Panj up to the river Darai-Pshikhvar. Horog, the administrative centre of the region with a population of several thousand, is situated in the narrow valley at the junction of the rivers Shah-Dara and Hunt, both of which fall into the Panj. The climate of Western Pamir varies considerably, depending upon the height above sea level of any given area, but on the whole it is less severe than that of Eastern Pamir, and in places, in the deep valleys protected from the wind at heights ranging from 1700-2500 meters above sea level, it is relatively warm and beneficial. Fruit-trees—apple, pear and apricot—fruit well in Western Pamir. Mulberry-trees are plentiful, and, as was the case in Zeravshan, Darvaz and larategin, in the past mulberries were one of the staple foods of the highlanders. Since ancient times the Pamir Mountains have been famous for their mineral deposits—gold, pink spinel (the so-called Goran "ruby mines"), mountain crystal, garnet, asbestos and iron ore (mined by primitive methods in Vanch). Many of the deposits were known all over the orient ten centuries ago, but in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century they were either abandoned and forgotten, or were so little exploited that they lost practical importance. Soviet expeditions have discovered in Pamir many new deposits of non-ferrous and rare metals, piezoquartz and mica. In 1930 in the upper reaches of Badom-Dara, a tributary of the Shah Dara, above the little river Lyajar-Dara, in the region of Mayakovsky Peak discovered by the writer of these lines in 1931, he, in conjunction with the geologists Yudin and Khabakov, after long and persevering search, found the legendary deposits of lapis lazuli which according to tradition were exploited over a thousand years ago. In Pamir deposits have been discovered of salt, lignite, peat, sulphur, saltpetre, graphite.

The area of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region is large—61140 square kms—but valleys account for only a fortieth part of this area, all the rest are mountains. Severe natural conditions permit the development of only that part of this area in which it is possible to build roads and engage in economic construction. That is possible primarily in the valleys and gorges of Western Pamir; Eastern Pamir is suitable for the development of livestock farming and of the mining industry. The whole of North-Western Pamir difficult of access, enveloped by glaciers, and uninhabited because of the severe climate—is still uninhabited. Here on those enormous heights live only a few brave and self-sacrificing workers at the meteorological stations and at the hydroglacial-meteorological station on the Fedchenko Glacier. In Eastern Pamir there are several big high-mountain lakes. The biggest of these is Kara Kul, situated in low desert shores at a height of 3910 meters above sea level and covering an area of 900 sq. kms. The eastern part of the lake is bordered by ice, the remains of a huge glacier. The ice is invisible for it is beneath the soil. That lake is being studied by the staff of a hydro-meteorological station which functions there all the year round. The most interesting of the big lakes in Pamir, however, is undoubtedly Lake Sarez situated at a height of 3400 meters above sea level. It was formed in February 1911 as a result of a gigantic landslide, and at the present time it is 70 kms long. Many other lakes in Tajikistan were formed as a result of landslides, but those occurred in times unknown. The biggest of those lakes are Zor Kul which lies at a height of over 4000 meters above sea level and from which flows the river Pamir, and Yashkil Kul, 40 miles deep, from which flows the broad river Hunt. At one time there was a similar lake on the Vyaz-Dara, which flows into the Shah-Dara. Examples of such lakes in Kukhistan are Iskander Kul and the chain of Marguzor lakes. In 1952 a lake three kms long was formed as a result of an avalanche on the river Hingouj near the Tavil-Dara. Characteristic of the geology of Pamir is the fact that the lakes Zor Kul, Yashkil Kul and Vyaz-Dara sprang out in a chain along the line of fractures which serves as the border-line between Eastern and Western Pamir. Those lakes were formed as a result of earthquakes which occurred from time to time, causing the landslides. The most ancient of these was the Zor Kul landslide, the next in time was the Yashkil Kul landslide, and the most recent was the Sarez landslide. [=]
the gorges, caves and fissures in the rocks served to shelter them from the rain, wind and snow. Before the revolution, the Badakhshan highlanders never had enough rain or other provisions; for several months in the year the poorer section of the population starved, their only food consisting of “attal,a,” a soup made from grasses and peas, with the addition, on rare occasions of a handful of flour. The majority had to be content with bread made from mulberry flour. Only the boys and the local aristocracy were able to buy wheat. In addition to haberdashers, a pottery and cloth from the Afghan and Indian merchants who came here with their caravans. There were no bazaars or shops anywhere in Badakhshan. In Horog there were only shops kept by Afghan merchants. Even before the arrival of Konov’s Russian detachment, the Badakhshan highlanders repeatedly appealed to Russia asking to be joined to her, and when Konov arrived with his forces to Pamir, the local population rendered him vigorous assistance. The following is an excerpt from the report written in 1893 by Captain Vannovsky who led a detachment of soldiers down the Bartang:

“The local inhabitants joyously welcomed the Russians, provided guides and porters, and rendered necessary services; and everywhere they begged to be accepted as Russian subjects.”

The local khans cruelly oppressed the population. In Badakhshan there were castes: the highest caste was the Shana to which the local rulers, the khans, belonged. The net highest was the Seid [Sayed] caste. The Seids were “the servants of the living God;” the Piris and Caliphs, who were regarded as “God’s shadow on earth.” In every village there were also the representatives of the khan; they belonged to the Mir caste. The fourth caste consisted of the Akobyrs, from among whom the Khan’s guard was recruited; and the fifth and lowest-caste, the Ryots or Fokirs, consisted of all the tillers of the soil who laboured on their tiny, stony fields to provide all the higher castes with wheat, barley, millet, peas, mulberries and apricots, while remaining hungry themselves. Yuussuf-Ali-khan sold girls from the lowest caste in the bazaars of Kabul, Chitral and Peshawer. In the kishlaks Viyar and Dishor he sold to some Kirghiz to the natural talent of the Pamir artists. Diverse handicrafts supplied the Badakhshan people with clothing, foot-wear, leather, pottery, knives, sickles, horseshoes, paper made from mulberry-tree root, and other articles needed in the home and in the fields. There were, and are today, skilled smiths, potters, turners and dyers in all the gorges in Gorno-Badakhshan. Before the October Revolution, however, there were no handicrafts developing the gifts of the people of Western Pamir; amidst the hard struggle for existence and frightful oppression, the creative forces of the people were repressed. The hard life of the Tajiks in Badakshan differed in no way from the life of the people in the neighboring khanates—Afghanistan and North-West India. The October Revolution put a sharp dividing line between the life of the Soviet Tajik highlanders of Badakhshan and the life of the peoples of the foreign countries adjacent to Pamir. The first news of the February revolution was received in Horog on 4/3/1917, in a letter to the commander of the Pamir Detachment brought from Osh by courier. The Governor-General instructed the commander of the detachment to appoint a Commissar. A Commissar was appointed, but the Soviet of Soldiers’ Deputies that was set up by the garrison refused to recognize him and informed the local population about the revolution. Next day a Volost Soviet Executive Committee was elected in Shugnan. The Volost Executive Committee proclaimed the abolition of the rule of the Emir of Bukhara and ordered that the vacant lands of the Shah Dara beys be confiscated and transferred to the poor dehans of Rushan and the Hunt Valley. In 9/1917 a new military detachment under the command of Colonel Fenin arrived in Horog. The local ishans and beys at once became his faithful servants. With their assistance an “Emergency Committee” and a “rural Committee” were set up, but between them endless friction arose. Aziz-khon, the Volost ruler, in conjunction with the ishans made a treacherous attempt to establish contact with the Emirs of Bukhara and Afghanistan and to break Shugnan away from Russia. Their letters, however, were intercepted by dehans; the enemies of the people were exposed as traitors, but with Fenin’s assistance they managed to escape to India. Supporting and heading the local clan leaders and the reactionary clergy, Colonel Fenin and his counter-revolutionary officers were the actual rulers of the region for a whole year.
In the autumn of 1918, fearing the Communists, Colonel Fenin and his officers fled to India, where the English intelligence service employed them for the purpose of preparing intervention. After the flight of the military detachment, however, power in Badakhshan passed to the people; the local activists managed to establish contact with Tashkent. In 1/1919, a number of Communist political leaders arrived in Horog and organized the struggle of the poor section of the people against the local reactionaries. A vigorous campaign had launched against the command of Lieutenant Colonel Timofeyev who invaded Horog from the north and seized power in Pamir. In 3/1920 the Basmach bands of Madamin-bek, organized by the English in Ferghana, appeared at Post Pamir which was held by a Whiteguard detachment consisting of former Austrian and German prisoners of war and commanded by an ex-tsarist officer. Religious strife broke out between the Basmachi and the garrison in the course of which the latter was completely wiped out. On learning of this, Timofeyev deemed it wise to follow Fenin and escape with his detachment to India. On 3/26/1920, the inhabitants of Badakhshan celebrated their liberation and elected their representatives to the Soviet governing bodies; but on March 30, an armed detachment of Bukharniks, following the Panj track, appeared in Horog, captured the post and proclaimed Pamir a dominion of the Emir. Reprials began. The local Tajik youth, however, managed to organize, and on 6/27/1920, they captured Pamir Post, disarmed the Emir’s forces and proclaimed Soviet rule in Pamir. On July 14 the People’s Assembly decided to send an armed delegation to the Soviet leaders to request the latter to send a military detachment to Pamir to guard the frontier against the encroachments of the British imperialists. The detachment consisted of young Badakhshaniens succeeded in breaking through the Basmach front, and passing through Eastern Pamir and Alai it arrived in Tashkent and carried out its mission. In 11/1920 the delegation returned to Horog together with a detachment. This detachment, however, had been hurriedly formed without due discrimination and was found to include undesirable elements.

Consequently, in 1921 on the demand of the population it was replaced by a genuine Communist Red Army detachment. With the arrival of that detachment Soviet rule was finally and definitely established in Pamir. In 10/1924, when the new Soviet republics were being formed in Central Asia, Pamir became an Autonomous Region, and in front of it a small wooden platform. The rest of the town consisted of a labyrinth of narrow, crooked alleys with tiny stone-built houses in which cotton cloth was stretched and mutton fat into open wounds. The women did not know the use of scissors, and many of the highlanders had never seen window glass. People with huge goitres wandered about in Vanch and Yazguilem. The equipment for a printing plant, the first to be set up in Horog. On 9/2/1931, the detachment brought with it a small diesel engine which was planted. Party organizers went to the most remote kishlaks and rallied the poor peasantry for the fight against their class enemies, organized assistance of every kind for the population, and disbursed long-term loans to the needy to enable them to improve their husbandry. One after another, crossing difficult passes, horse and camel caravans carrying food and manufactured goods wended their way to Eastern and further on to Western Pamir. The cargoes of wheat of the first caravan carried goods to the value of 60,000 rubles; the value of the second consignment was 400,000 rubles, and that of the third already amounted to 1 million rubles. The first shops and co-operative stores were opened. In 1928 the inhabitants of Horog and Rosht-Kala saw a cinema film for the first time; it was demonstrated by a travelling cinema.

In the following year the inhabitants of Horog went out to welcome an aeroplane that had landed on the bank of the Panj. The five hundred half-boxes of grain were distributed among the people of Badakhshan started the development of silkworm breeding in the region. The State Trading Agency began to buy furs and skins from the trappers. Seed loans granted to the dehkans enabled them to plant cereals even in the most remote gorges. Soviet scientific expeditions penetrated the most inaccessible corners of Pamir, conducted immense cultural work among the inhabitants, healed the sick and gave the people the first scientific information they had ever heard about their extraordinary country. Horog, the administrative centre of the region, the kishlak with two thousand inhabitants situated on the rocky bank of the Hunt and surrounded by wheat, barley, millet land pea fields, and apricot, mulberry and apple orchards, grew into a small town. It had only one street that was really a street, lined with tall poplars and whitewashed houses. In the square outside the building of the regional Executive Committee there was a fir tree, the first in that region unveiled on 6/7/1927, and in front of it a small wooden platform. The Russian Government had launched a vigorous campaign against hunger, organized assistance of every kind for the population, and disbursed long-term loans to the needy to enable them to improve their husbandry. One after another, crossing difficult passes, horse and camel caravans carrying food and manufactured goods wended their way to Eastern and further on to Western Pamir. The cargoes of wheat were unloaded. The detachment brought with it a small diesel engine which was placed. Party organizers went to the most remote kishlaks and rallied the poor peasantry for the fight against their class enemies, organized assistance of every kind for the population, and disbursed long-term loans to the needy to enable them to improve their husbandry. One after another, crossing difficult passes, horse and camel caravans carrying food and manufactured goods wended their way to Eastern and further on to Western Pamir. The cargoes of wheat were unloaded. The detachment brought with it a small diesel engine which was planted. Party organizers went to the most remote kishlaks and rallied the poor peasantry for the fight against their class enemies, organized assistance of every kind for the population, and disbursed long-term loans to the needy to enable them to improve their husbandry.
Afghanistan 30 kms away. Bread, tobacco, domestic utensils, soap, matches, agricultural implements and school books were now plentiful in the Pamir co-operative stores. The first tractor arrived in a dismantled state and was assembled here. There were already over a hundred schools in the region. A women’s college was opened in Horog. The beating of drums of Young Pioneer squads began to be heard. Smuggling was stopped, and so also was opium smoking. Scores of doctors and midwives performed their beneficial functions in newly-built hospitals and dispensaries in Ishkashim, Murgab, Kalai-Valmar, Bartang and Vanch. They restored sight to the blind who came from Afghanistan. Smallpox vanished; malaria declined; there were no new cases of leprosy. Veterinary surgeons and zootechnicians were working even in the most remote pastures.

Everywhere new irrigation canals and firm bridges were built. The narrow mountain tracks were widened with the aid of dynamite and ammonal. Even the most remote mountain kishlaks were supplied with seed, fertilizers, agricultural implements and materials for exterminating pests. In 1932 another six one-and-a-half ton trucks belonging to the Tajik complex expedition arrived in Pamir, and the first motor road through the Pamir began to be laid. In the spring of 1934 four Missiaad Mirshakar which he himself recited in the Hall of Columns in Moscow during the Tajik Literature Decade in 1949. In this Soviet age a man grew up in Pamir capable of telling the whole world about his country in simple, but vivid verse. On the way home from school two girls discuss what they are going to be when they grow up. One says she will be a biologist, the other is determined to be an actress. They will have every opportunity to follow the careers they have chosen. Since 1948 seven hundred and ten middle-school graduates in Badakhshan have gone to big cities to receive a higher education. Talk about friends who have gone to college in Stalinabad, Leninabad, Moscow, Leningrad and Samarkand is heard not only in Horog, but at all the collective farms and in all the kishlaks in Pamir. And everybody wishes they would come back soon as geologists, botanists, doctors and zoologists. This is not 1923, when only thirty people in the whole of Pamir could read and write. Today 96% of the population is literate, and there are two hundred and forty schools attended by thirteen thousand children; over two hundred students attend the theological school in Horog, and the young geographer from Horog, Kurbansho, and historian Iskandarov, are both in Moscow doing postgraduate research work at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The main thing is—let them come back to their native kishlaks and gorges soon, for there is lots of work for them to do. Work is waiting for them at the Pamir Botanical Garden and Biological Station at nineteen hospitals and polyclinics, at three malaria dispensaries at several meteorological stations, at the offices of the two regional newspapers and of the district newspapers the Kushani Sufkh, the Kakikali Vanch, the Barakdi Surkh, and others published in the Tajik, Russian and Kirghiz languages.

Work is waiting for them at fifty kishlak tea and reading-rooms and at a hundred and fifty collective-farm libraries, the shelves of which will contain books written by themselves. And at the fifty recreation clubs in Pamir they themselves, the young scientists from Ishkashim, Vakhlan and Barbang, will deliver lectures. At night the people in Horog go to their cinema theatre to see the latest films; and in the fifteen other cinemas scattered over the high mountains the latest films are shown. In the garages in Horog the mechanics are preparing scores of motor trucks for their journeys. At dawn columns will set out in three directions: East, North and West. One column will go to the Roshkhal District; another will go to Rushan and further on to Stalinabad; the third will drive up the narrow gorge of the Hunt, past the International, Orpikindiz and many other collective farms to the heights of Eastern Pamir and still further, through gigantic passes to Osh in the fertile Ferghana Valley. Only recently a kishlak with 2000 inhabitants, Horog, the centre of Gorno-Badakhshan situated at height of 2030 metres above sea level, lives a new and full life. When work was begun to transform the Gorno-Badakhshan region from a food-importing to a food-producing region, when the Bolsheviks decided to develop grain and livestock farming, a bold idea arose—to make fit for cultivation the barren land that lay beyond the agricultural line at heights ranging from 3500-4200 metres above sea level. This work was begun in 1933 by the Pamir Expedition organized by
the Central Asia State University in conjunction with the Plant Institute of the Soviet Union.

The expedition was led by the celebrated biologists Professors P. Baranov and I. Raikova. In 1934 a biological station was set up at the Pamir State Farm in Jaushangoz, in the upper reaches of Shah-Dara, 3500 metres above sea level. Its experimental fields occupied five hectares. Six sub-stations were set up in different zones of Pamir. Six kms from Jaushangoz was a lofty terrace at the junction of the Hoti and Shahr-Dara. Six sub-stations were set up which in 1940 was transformed into the Pamir Botanical Garden. Here in the experimental fields, ninety kinds of perennial fodder crops were planted. In the kishlam Porshinov, at a height of over 2000 metres above sea level, seven hundred specimens from the world crop collection were planted. In the marches of Bash-Gumbez, in the Alichur Valley, at a height of 4000 metres above sea level, a geobotanical station was organized, equipped with thermostats, microscopes and a photo-laboratory, for the purpose of studying the high-mountain meadows. On the shore of lake Yashil Kul, at a height of 3600 metres above sea level, an ichthyological and hydro-biological station was set up. At the biological station in Jaushangoz the search began for varieties of grain crops that would yield a crop under the severe high-mountain conditions. In the first year the wheat and rye grains failed to ripen. The barley perished from frost. In Horog the potatoes brought from other parts produced such a miserable tasteless crop that it seemed of no use bothering with this land here. On the other hand, buckwheat grew man-high and ripened quickly; maize came up splendidly too, and even fodder beets, turnips, radish and swedes produced big yields. In Horog, cucumbers grew well. In the fresh water of Yashikul every cast of the net brought up about 50 kilograms of fish—different kinds of carp called osman and marinka—some of them weighing three or four kilograms each. This was proof enough that fish was plentiful in Pamir, enough to supply not only local requirements but also Ferghania. The livestock experts ascertained that if meadow grasses were developed it would be possible considerably to increase the flocks and herds in Pamir. As soon as the field work was finished the first Gorno-Badakhshan Regional Agricultural Exhibition was organized. This was a great event in the life of Pamir. Dehkans came from all the gorges to see the new crops. This marked the beginning of enormous creative agricultural work. Plant-breeding and agrotechnical work was continued in the following years. In Horog turpins reached a weight of 2.5 kilograms, swedes and beets as much as 3 kilograms, Mongolian cabbages four kilograms, and Chinese radishes grew to a length of 20 centimetres. New varieties of potatoes began to produce splendid yields. The most astonishing thing is that in Eastern Pamir the crops strengthened by the operation of ultra-violet rays are not only capable of withstanding 15-19°C of night frost, but also of retaining their leaves. Gymnosperous barley, beets and Chinese cabbages can withstand even 18°C of frost. It was found that in low temperature, plants in Pamir very intensively absorb carbon dioxide, and that micro-organisms which perish in dry soil under Pamir conditions are capable not only of living in the soil, but also of absorbing nitrogen under artificial irrigation.

No longer satisfied by these wonders the Pamir collective farmers actively set to work to cultivate these new crops everywhere. The biological station was transferred to the Murgab District and in 1952 - Stanyukovich was appointed director. Following the advice of the station staff, the Pamir collective farmers made excellent progress, and today the Socialism, Karl Marx and Stalin Collective Farms, as well as many others, are able in July to send to market in Shugnan cucumbers, tomatoes, potatoes, radish and other early vegetables. The talented agronomist Sukhobrus, who was killed in the Great Patriotic War, had lived in Pamir for several years before the war; he did enormous work in improving the local varieties of wheat and barley and shifted the agricultural limit to a higher altitude. In 1939 barley was sown for the first time ever at a height of 4200 metres above sea level—in the Murgab District a crop was harvested from a hundred and twenty hectares. In Badakhshan the "surkhak," "sadefak," and in Ishkashim the "mamadal" and other varieties of wheat, improved and adapted to high-mountain conditions, are now being grown by collective farms which formerly grew only gymnosperous barley. Already in 1947 in Pamir, where in the past the dehkans were glad to get a miserable yield of 2-3 centners per hectare, the average grain yield was fourteen centners per hectare, and in 1948 the advanced collective farms obtained yields that seem incredible in these parts.

Thus the Kirov Collective Farm harvested an average of 28 centners per hectare; the Orjonikidze Collective Farm in Shugnan, in the Hunt Valley, 2450 metres above sea level, harvested an average of 52 centners per hectare; and in 1949 an average of 34 centners per hectare. Some of the collective farmers perform real miracles. Thus in 1948 Karim Gulberdyev of the Kalinin Collective Farm in the Rosh-Kalin District, a veteran well over seventy, obtained from the section he was in charge of 39.2 centners per hectare, and in the following year he obtained 45 centners per hectare. Team leader Muromadov, of the Bolshevik Collective Farm in Bartang, obtained a yield of 42 centners per hectare; and a brigade led by Mirzoyev at the International Collective Farm harvested 38 centners per hectare. Such achievements became possible because here are now seed-growing farms in Pamir; the farmers plant only tested seed, and many collective farms vernalize their seed before sowing. Another reason is that the Pamir grain-growers now possess numerous up-to-date farm implements—ploughs, reapers and threshers—and they have learned to make thorough preparations for the spring field operations. The return the Pamir farmers now get for their labour is such as their fathers and grandfathers could not even dream of. Thus in 1948 the family of Sabzali Chustaliyev, of the Kirov Collective Farm in Shugnan, received over five tons of grain, five tons of potatoes and 15000 rubles in money. In 1949, on the twentieth anniversary of the republic, Sabzali himself was awarded the Order of Lenin for the excellent results he achieved. In 1949 the family of Arabsho Asalshoyev of the Orjonikidze Collective Farm in Shugnan received five tons of grain, two tons of potatoes and 450 kilograms of meat, besides their share of the farm's money income. That is the income of the average collective farm family. In 1950 the whole of the Shugnan District overfulfilled its plan for grain and cocoon deliveries. At their co-operative stores the Pamir collective farmers buy motorcycles, gramophones, sewing machines, radio sets and domestic electrical appliances. There are still some collective farms in Pamir which are regarded as backward, but that is because for the time being it is difficult to reach them along the perilous mountain tracks on the edges of bottomless chasms, because the crags and rocks have not yet been vanished, they have still to be removed, earth has to be put in their place, and the earth has to be irrigated. But ammunitions are blasting roads to these farms too. During the past eight years sixty new canals have been built of a total length of 250 kms. Over 1300 hectares of formerly barren land now get water. The canals are hewn out of the rock. Horog is proud of its new main canal which in some places runs through semi-tunnels cut into the rock. The granite, gneiss and marble walls of narrow ravines are widened out to allow a freer flow for the mountain streams. And during the past twenty years the cultivated area in Pamir has been considerably enlarged. In a beautiful gorge above Horog at a height of 2320 metres above sea level there is the Pamir Botanical Garden. There is only one botanical garden in the world higher than it—the one in Darjeeling, India. Making extensive use of the wild flora and the local varieties of fruit-trees—the result of the plant-breeding done by the highland Tajiks long, long ago—the staff of the Botanical Garden headed by the botanist A. Gursky is providing practical proof of the great possibilities of developing fruit-growing under the severe conditions prevailing in Pamir. The staff have achieved the early ripening of Samarkand apricots and of imported varieties of apple, plum, peach and cherry. In this mountain climate these trees began to fruit 2-3 years after they were planted. In the garden, bird cherry blooms, raspberries, strawberries and other berries ripen, and the tobacco varieties "dubuk," "tazpeuzund" and "samsun" grow excellently. Of twenty varieties of grapes never grown here before three have a yield of eleven kilograms per vine; these are grown by the young fruit-grower Shaker Shamirov. Thousands of seedlings of fruit and other trees raised by the scientific workers have already been transplanted in the collective farms and are thriving there. Thanks to the work of the Botanical Garden scores of new orchards have sprung up at numerous collective farms all over Badakhshan.

The Pamir Botanical Garden is also planting willow-trees on the
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Afghanistan
www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

pebbly river beaches. Seven-year-old willows have reached a height of 7-8 metres and a thickness of 19-20 centimetres. The Regional Afforestation Station is employing similar methods for the afforestation of the upper reaches of the Shah-Dara in Jaushangoz and in the upper reaches of the lill. Already tree planting is going on at scores of Pamir collective farms—in Shugnan Kushan, Vanch and Ishkashim, where as yet the houses in the small kishlaks are surrounded only by fruit-trees. Of great importance for the economy of Afghanistan is the breeding of yaks. Twelve kms off the Eastern Pamir Road on the shore of the light-blue high-mountain lake Bulunkul there is a state yak farm. The fat, shaggy yaks grazing on the shore achieve a weight of 500-600 kilogramms. The yellowish milk of the yak is rich in fat—as much as 10%—and is delicious to The livestock collective farms in Eastern Pamir raise yaks, horses and particularly the Kirghiz fat-tailed sheep, and they are constantly improving the breeds. The Murgab District has become the premier livestock district in the region. The number of commonly-owned livestock in the district averages 80 per collective-farm household, and the number of individually-owned livestock averages twenty per household. During the past eight years the number of large cattle in Pamir increased 8-fold, and the number of sheep and goats increased 34-fold. By the end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan period the number will have increased over and over again. This is guaranteed by socialist emulation in which are engaged 154 collective livestock farms, 27 horse ranches, and 8 camel ranches. Davlyatkadam Asanshoyev, a veteran shepherd at the Kanganovich Collective Farm in the Roshit-Kalin District, out of a flock of 500 fat-tailed sheep reared 130 lambs from every hundred ewes, the average living weight of the lambs being 37.5 kilogramms. Iamchikbek Ihzhamkulov, senior shepherd at the Molotov Collective Farm in the Murgab District, out of a flock of 408 sheep reared 115 lambs from every hundred ewes, the average living weight of the lambs being 32.3 kilogramms. The daily catch of marinka and osman of the fishingbrigades in Murgab, fishing in Yashil Kul, Zor Kul, Karadung, Bulun Kul and other lakes in Pamir is thirty, forty and even fifty centners each. Nobody has any doubt now that there is plenty of fish in the lakes; that there is adequate pasture and grass for hay; that severe frost and wind are now no hindrance to shepherds land herdsmen; that the new breeds of livestock will adapt themselves to the severe high-mountain conditions; that the new varieties of fodder crops: alfalfa, maltot, lentil and various northern grasses will cover many of the bare slopes of the Eastern Pamir Mountains. The new forms and methods of husbandry are successful everywhere in Pamir because the alliance between the scientists and the collective farmers is invincible, because the people of high-mountain Pamir, who with the people of the whole of the Soviet Union are marching towards communism, want to work that way, are working that way, and know how to reach their goal! In the description of Pamir given by the ancient Chinese traveller we read: “Po-Mi-Lo (Pamir) stretches between two snowy mountain ranges and for this reason fruiful cold reigns here and gusty winds blow. Snow falls summer and winter. The soil is impregnated with salt and is thickly covered with small stones. Neither bread grains nor fruit can grow here. Trees and other vegetation are rarely met with. A wilderness spreads all around with no sign of human habitation.” That description now sounds like a fantastic legend. The Pamir is called “the roof of the world.” A more suitable name would be: “The foothills of the sun!”

12079. Lyon, David. “Afghan Victors Put Mercy to Flight: Fanatical Taliban Will Impose Stabillity Through Islamic Justice”, in Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 6, 1996, p. 7. Kabul remains scarred by the fighting when the city fell to the taliban, even as the rotting bodies of Najibullah, his brother and two aides remain hanging in the center of the city. After a rapid capture of Kabul, Taliban forces have not pressed on to initial goals of DOAW were to eliminate illiteracy among women, the elimination of forced marriages, and the banning of brideprice. In 1970, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the traditional role of women in Afghanistan has beenconditioned by the survival of a traditional patriarchy and weak central governments. War, the fundamentalist backlash and a hostile international setting led to the loss of whatever advances had been made by women in Afghanistan: the collapse of the communist regime in Afghanistan and the assumption of mujahideen control, for the foreseeable future, the question of women in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, in the heart of what some term the “Patriarchy Belt” of Asia, is a strictly patriarchal society, conditioned by tribalism and political fragmentation (Afghanistan is often seen as the prototypical “weak state”), and the ideology (among the Pashtun) of Pashtunwali. Gender segregation and female seclusion exist, but vary from group to group within the complex ethnic mosaic of the country: women are seen as the property of men in many groups, and in such groups their earnings are the earnings of the man. Purdah is characteristic of urbanpopulations and their is a rigid sexual division of labor that confines women to the house. As Tapper notes of the Durranis: “Men do all the work of agriculture and house construction, and tend, shear and butcher animals; they market produce and buy all foodstuffs and other supplies. Women rear young children, cook and clean, process milk, spin and weave... Women's involvement in cooperation outside the household is by contrast very limited. They may act as domesticservants for women in other households, but most often only an incidental consequence of an economic contract between the husbands. In short the women's productive activities all take place within the domestic sphere and the fruits of their labor are destined almost entirely for domestic consumption or use.” Women particularly complain of sickness and restrictions that limit their movement. A typical form of female resistance is extramarital affairs: a form of resistance that does nothing to challenge gender status ranking.

Reforms in the status of women began in 1880 under Abdur Rahman Khan who ended the practice of the longstanding customary law that bound a wife not only to her husband but to his family (resulting in remarriage to her husband's kin on his death); he also allowed women to refuse marriages planned when they were children, and allowed women to sue for alimony. Royal advisor Mahmud Tarzi called for compulsory education of girls, although it was never implemented. In 1902, Habibullah Khan attempted to limit the ruinous brideprice and tried to limit the number of wives to four (he had divorced all but four wives in 1902). In 1924 King Amanullah gave girls the right to choose their husbands; in 1928 he worked to abolish purdah and the veil and by year end 100 women had abandoned the veil in the capital. In 1928, a group of female students were sent to Turkey for higher education and the Association for the Protection of Women's Rights (Anjoman-i Hemayat-i Neswan) was established. A ban on polygamy led to a revolt by Tajik leader Bacha-i Saqqo, which led to the cancelation of most of his reforms (including requiring the veil and recall of the girls from school in Turkey). In 1965, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan was established; in the same year the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was also established by six women activists. The initial goals of DOAW were to eliminate illiteracy among women, the elimination of forced marriages, and the banning of brideprice. In 1970, two conservative mullahs protests public evidence of women's liberation such as miniskirts, women teachers and schoolgirls by shooting at women's legs and splashing acid on them (one of the mullahs was Gulbeddin Hekmatyar). In 4/1978, the PDPA came to power and immediately passed several decrees, including Decree No 7 [q.v.] that
reformed the marriages of women. Decree 7 and the national program for women's literacy directly led to a surge of refugees into Pakistan and the beginning of the insurgency against the central government. While under the PDPA women held high position, including four of seven regional militia commands, as the civil war dragged on the regime weakened its stand on women's rights in the name of reconciliation. In 1986 DOAW was renamed the All-Afghan Women's Council and was transformed into a social service agency for poor Afghan women. Yet in 1988, article 38 of the constitution granted women equal rights with men.

12081. Mohammed, Jan. Letter: "Human Face of the Taliban", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 6, 1997. p. 2. [Pashawar, Pakistan] Pamela Collett alludes to the isolation and alienation of the Talibam from Afghan society, and particularly Afghan women (June 22). I had an opportunity to see the other side of the coin while recently in Afghanistan.

Returning to the capital Kabul from the province of Logar (a trip which would have been most hazardous for men, women and children before pax Talibanica), I was stopped by a young Talib at an official checkpoint. "Do you see those women and children walking ahead?" He pointed to a group in the distance. "Please give them a lift to Benhsissar [a village on the outskirts of Kabul]. It's up to you, but you will receive a great reward from God if you do so." The Talibam may not be perfect. But they are human, and they have mothers, sisters, cousins and aunts like anyone else. [=]


12083. Organization for Sexual Communism; OSC. Manifesto: The Movie "Rising Sun" Uses Sexual Insecurity to Cultivate Anti-Japanese Hatred. Pamphlet. Seattle, Wash.: Organization for Sexual Communism (OSC), August 11, 1993. At the very beginning of the movie we meet our first two characters. A sexy white woman who has no identity outside of her sexuality and later on her status as murder victim, and her domineering, asshole Japanese boyfriend, who doesn't seem to have any affection for her and only wants to fuck her. This is a good metaphor for the overall portrayal of US-Japanese relations in the movie. The US being dominated by an arrogant Japan, and the US is too stupid to leave the relationship. More importantly here is the image of a white woman in a sexual relation with a Japanese man. This has the same dual nature as all the KKK propaganda about black men stealing white woman. First, whites are supposed to be roused into protecting white women from the horrible fate that surely awaits them at the hands of those bestial, rapacious non-whites (in "Rising Sun" she is strangled to death). Secondly, white men are really afraid that maybe the non-whites are going to rape and dominate them, as non-whites from the movie. The white woman is needed to stand in for the whole non-white race. The viewer is given the strong impression that their relationship is influence on people that they themselves are unaware of. It is not surprising that the murderer wasn't necessarily Japanese, but the woman was still murdered as part of some sort of Japanese corporate plot to blackmail a US Senator. Near the beginning of the film is the sex-strangulation scene. This cleverly directs hatred against the Japanese in the following way: Because people are brought up in a sexually repressive society people develop very deeply ingrained (often not even conscious) feelings of frustration in regard to sex. These feelings of frustration are due to a person inability to achieve full sexual/emotional arousal and release with another person as easily and often as one would like. This frustration finds its extreme form in a tendency towards sexual violence. This violence in a primitive way has developed as a rebellion against the ingrained sexual inhibition. It manifests itself in two forms: sexual sadism and sexual masochism. Sexual sado-masochistic tendencies exist in everyone who grew up in a sexually-repressive atmosphere, although very few people are more than vaguely conscious of this in themselves. This is because if the sexual sado-masochistic part of the personality were to become the dominant one the individual would either destroy themselves or be destroyed by others defending themselves. Thus when the person is still very young they develop a mechanism to repress these sexual sado-masochistic feelings. This mechanism is a sort of emotional pretense which is most obviously manifested in things like politeness and respect. A person can hate someone's guts but still feel obligated to pretend like they like them. This repressive mechanism represses sexual sado-masochism almost completely out of the conscious mind. Fear holds it out of the conscious mind. When you try to bring it into the conscious mind feelings of anxiety, which again in most people will be unconscious, come up and create all sorts of reasons why this sexual-sado masochism cannot exist within you. For this reason the vast majority of the readers of this text, yourself probably included will write this off as a bunch of bunk. Because you are afraid to face what's within you. I'm not afraid of it. we want you to face it because we have confidence that the world will be a better place if we get this all out in the open. This is not small matter. People have very strong feelings about sex and sexual relationships. By manipulating these feelings political propaganda such as "Rising Sun" can have strong influence on people that they themselves are unaware of. It is not necessary for those involved in writing the story or producing the movie to be conscious of the above psychological dynamics in order for them to utilize them in the way described above. In fact they probably are not. They have merely produced a film that corresponds to their world view and feelings based on their own social-economic sliding.

"Rising Sun" Is Anti-Japanese War Propaganda: Japanese are portrayed as authoritarian, rigid and militaristic. It is true that Japanese culture is more authoritarian and rigid than our own, but this movie focuses on and exaggerates this to the exclusion of compassion or empathy with Japanese people. There is a constant stream of comments in the beginning of the movie alternatively criticizing the Japanese and talking about how they're taking over the US This and the above outlined sexual-political propaganda is happening to prepare the US population for war with Japan.

The Collapse of the The East Bloc and the 'New World Order':
Since the collapse of the East Bloc it seems pretty likely economic rivalry between the major powers will replace the ideological confrontation of the Cold War as the central aspect of international relations[,] as it was prior to WWII. “The eastern alliance system cannot survive the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the United States cannot simply retreat into the western hemisphere...” [The Coming War with Japan by George Friedman and Meredith Lebardi p.254] The major aspect of this question in the present world is the three way economic competition between the US, Japan, Germany and their various alliances which are only beginning to be sorted out now. NAFTA and the EC being the clearest examples. This competition was going on quietly behind the scenes all during the cold war, but it was never allowed to become too acute because all three major powers agreed the challenge represented by the East Bloc was more threatening to them all. Now that fear of the East Bloc and its associated political movements in other countries has disappeared we expect the economic competition between the major powers to escalate into military conflict or an eventually war as was the rule up to WWII. The “Cold W2” is best not viewed as a 4-year period of peace but as its title says, but as a 45-year war between eastern and western alliances in which their were numerous, bloody, protracted battles: Korea, Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan, numerous African conflicts and to a certain extent the Arab-Israeli wars. “Many have argued that war was made obsolete by nuclear weapons. If so, history has not heard of war’s obsolescence. Quite the contrary, the history of the world since 1945 has been a h story of war. What has been most striking is that even though several nuclear powers-the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Israel-have all fought wars, not once have nuclear weapons been used. Indeed, the United States and the Soviet Union were each defeated in major wars, and permitted themselves to be defeated without recourse to nuclear weapons. “There is something odd about a weapon that is said to be absolutely powerful, yet is never used as an instrument of statecraft. One is left with one of two suspicions: that nuclear weapons have had almost no impact on it. War has been limited by the mutual interests of the Soviets and the Americans, and where these interests collided, there was war. The constancy of wars against Israel and the willingness of the Syrians and Egyptians to attack Israel even though the face of overwhelming evidence that Israel was nuclear-capable, shows the limits of nuclear weapons and the ubiquity of war.” [ibid;p.340] “The idea that war has ceased to serve a function in the nuclear age simply does not bear up to historical scrutiny. War HAS continued to serve a function in the nuclear age, and one suspects that with the end of the Cold War this function can only increase.” [ibid; p.341]

US Economic, Political and Military Strategy in the Post Cold-War World: “The western alliance system cannot survive the collapse of the Soviet Union, and...the United States cannot simply retreat into the western hemisphere...” [ibid; p.254] With the emphasis in world politics changing from ideological to economic competition, the US “…must convert its massive defense establishment into something productive. The conventional understanding of this is to demobilize the armed forces, store the weapons and the ships, and rebuild a civilian industry. There is another version. “Converting from defense to economic growth does not have to mean abandoning the military. Rather, it can mean utilizing it in a different way, adopting a different national strategy. Domination of the oceans can be used for economic gain. Control of the oceans is control of trade, of the flow of minerals, oil, automobiles, and tape recorders. The price, destination, even the origin of those goods is in the hands of the navy that rules the oceans. “Using military power for economic ends is an old story. The history of Europe’s borders is the history of war for profit. An empire can be quite blatant about it. Nations that wish to trade must pay fees or tariffs or taxes to the protecting force. It can be dressed as “burden sharing,” or dues to an alliance, or contributions to catastrophe, the” or dues to an alliance, or contributions to catastrophe, the “national security” fund. This is how the diplomats frame the reality is unimportant. The power of the US to impose tolls on trade and punish traders that cut into US markets is a starkly real power.” [ibid; pp.255-256] “It is utterly inconceivable that the United States will not use its vast naval power to try to gain economic advantage. The stakes are too high and the power too great for any other outcome.”[ibid., p.256]

‘Culturalism’ As The New Nationalist Ideology:
In the coming international political struggles the government will not try to win our support so much on the basis of ideological reasoning like in the cold war (“democracy” vs. “totalitarianism”), but more on the basis of nationalistic propaganda. Although many other countries are called upon to adopt their ideology in a very racist way (as can be seen in many parts of Europe, especially eastern), the nationalism of the US is more likely to develop on the basis of a kind of culturalism. This is the idea that it is not some kind of racial superiority or sense of pariahship that binds one to one’s own state, but a sense of cultural superiority. On this basis the US ruling class can carry the loyalty of much broader sections of the population, especially blacks and Hispanics. Expect to hear a lot more about the ‘American fee spirit’, ‘American ingenuity’ etc... They will not try to convince us that the US is politically and economically superior to the rest of the world, but that the US is culturally superior to the rest of the world. This has always been an aspect of US ruling-class propaganda but now it will be much increased in order to draw people’s allegiance away from former US allies (Europeancountries, Japan, and to a lesser extent some third world countries), who fall within the category of ‘good guys’ in the old ideology, to prepare people for the coming economic, political and eventually military struggles which will be much more blatantly based on the drive for global US corporate dominance then was evident during the cold war. This is because the US’s main economic competitors’ political systems are very similar to the US’s. In fact, of the major economic powers in the world the US has one of the least democratic political systems. England is less democratic, but France, Japan, Italy, Germany etc. are all more democratic. This new US nationalism, although utilizing racism to build itself up, is not likely to develop in an extremist racial direction. This is because the ruling class, although almost exclusively white, does not want extreme racial antagonisms within the US (the Rodney King riots, and other massive anti-racist riots in Miami and D.C.). Because the US is so racially heterogeneous extreme racism within the US will mainly serve to weaken the US’s ability to compete globally. Thus the ruling class is not likely to try to increase racism in the US and may take some small steps to weaken it. Large steps taken against racism seem very unlikely because racist ideology does justify the large income disparities between rich and poor, since any of the very poor are non-white. To create real racial equality in the US would cost the upper classes a lot of money and social position which their not likely to give up unless the struggle against foreign competitors becomes really desperate. This idea of trying to get the oppressed races of the US on board the anti-Japanese bandwagon is very apparent in the film whose main character, a US hero fighting to keep Stealth bomber technology from falling into the hands of the Japanese, is black. His character is developed as someone sensitive to racism in order to undermine the audience's awareness of the anti-Japanese tone of the film. He is even called a racist in the film in order to present the idea that anyone who sees the anti-Japanese ideology as something detestable is just ignorant of how those sinister Japanese are trying to get their hands on our Stealth bomber technology, and take over our country.

Where Do Your Interests Lay?
The massacre in Bosnia is a picnic compared to what's going to happen when the world’s economic powers drop the pretense and let their fangs show. If you believe that humans cannot live together cooperatively and that your only hope for a better life is to try to accumulate material things at the expense of other and to align one’s self with narrow, sectarian, ruling class, racist, nationalist interests, then all my hatred to you. But if you despise this dog-eat-dog world of pretense and manipulation and believe that their can be no happiness as long as the world is filled with misery and pain and headed for even worse catastrophe, the,” or even to us in the struggle against these future wars of nationalist slaughter which are going to cause ‘so much misery to the world.[This leaflet produced 4/11/1993 by the Organization for Sexual Communism (OSC); PO Box 95473, Seattle, WA 98145-2473. We want to hear you comments, criticisms, questions and suggestions.]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Afghanistan

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Indochina(Kampuchea,Laos, Vietnam): 983000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: United States, Peoples Republic of China, Canada, Australia, France.

Pakistan: 55000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: Bangladesh. Peoples Republic of China: 183500 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: Hong Kong, Macao, United States, Philippines: 90000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: Malaysia. Tibet: 78000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: India, Nepal, Bhutan, Switzerland.


A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by death-bed, when it has become even more a fetter on the development of society as a whole and therefore becomes all the more necessary. A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. "This expresses in concentrated form a fundamental truth of human history. Since classes first emerged with the development of slavery out of the old primitive communal stage of capitalism, means war-war to suppress the resistance of the new ruling class and reorganize society accordingly. But in doing so it comes directly up against the fact that the old form is enforced by the political domination of the ruling class, and that this ruling class, whose political institutions and ideas correspond to the old mode of production, cannot and will not recognize that its time has past and that its system must be replaced by a higher one. Thus, in such periods the new and rising class assumes the leadership of the resistance of the oppressed masses and carries out in this way the revolutionary overthrow of the old system by a new one which corresponds to the outlook and interests of this rising class and, for the time, to the further development of society. Such has been the actual history of human society and its advance from one epoch to the next. And it is a universal truth that never has the old ruling class willingly stepped aside, but on the contrary it always used the most vicious and desperate means to preserve its dominant position and could be swept aside only by violent revolution.

In short, all forms of governing class-divided society, whatever their outer shell, have always in essence represented the dictatorship-the-political domination backed up by armed force of one class or another, and the forward, upward march of humanity has, since the time classes and states emerged, taken place only through the overthrow of the old state-the-dictatorship of the old ruling class and its replacement by a new state-the-dictatorship of the new ruling class. This fundamental principle certainly applies to the revolution of the present epoch-the-proletarian revolution. The capitalist class, which arose within feudal society and ultimately led the struggle to overthrow it in past centuries, has beyond all doubt outlived its historical usefulness and can only act in this period as an obstacle to further progress-its mode of production suffocates and strangles the development of the productive forces and repeatedly hurts society into ever more paralyzing and destructive crisis. Yet the capitalist class certainly does not recognize or accept this-it not only regularly brings down murderous repression against any serious resistance and systematically terrorizes especially those from whom it most fears rebellion, but it time and again plunges millions of people into war in the attempt to save its system and protect its dominant position. What is the history of the United States of America, if not this? And this has become all the more pronounced with the development of capitalism into its highest and final stage since the turn of this century-imperialism-capitalism which has come to be marked by the domination of monopolies and international finance capital, not only living off the exploitation of the working class in its own country but parasitically sucking the lifeblood out of peoples and whole nations throughout the world. Imperialism is capitalism in decay and on its death-bed, when it has become even more a fetter on the development of the productive forces and society as a whole and therefore becomes all the more violent. Imperialism, even more than the earlier, competitive stage of capitalism, means war-war to suppress the resistance of the colonial peoples and oppressed nations, to enforce imperialist plunder to ensure imperialist superprofits; and war among the imperialists themselves, who have already carved up the world and must repeatedly hurl the entire world into military conflict in the battle to re-divide it. How can reforms or "peaceful change" bring an end to all this? Where or when have they ever done so? Right now, with the imperialist system back in the ditch of severe crisis and once more dragging the world's people to the brink of world war, can anyone seriously believe that there is any way to abolish such terrorizing evils, any way to break the stranglehold of the imperialists on society and the world except through violent revolution? Only the imperialists themselves and their allies and flunkies have an interest in holding and spreading this illusion and those among the people who cling to it will be jolted awake to reality in the coming years!

The revolution of this era, the revolution led by the proletariat, though it will assume different specific forms and proceed through different stages in different countries, depending on the concrete conditions, can and will succeed only through the mobilization of the masses of people to carry out an armed uprising to overthrow the dictatorship of the imperialists (and allied reactionaries) and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, the one class which at this stage can reorganize society in every sphere in conformity with the development of the productive forces. This need to violently overthrow and replace one
class dictatorship with another is true of the proletarian revolution certainly no less than any other, previous revolution. But the proletarian revolution is, on the other hand, fundamentally different from any previous revolution: it aims not at the replacement of one system of exploitation by another, though higher, system of exploitation, but at the abolition of exploitation in any form; and its historic mission is fulfilled not merely through the overthrow and replacement of one class dictatorship by another, but through the final abolition of all exploitation, with the elimination of class distinctions themselves. All prior transformations of society, though they advanced it from a lower to a higher level and made possible the further development of the productive forces, nevertheless took place on the foundation of relatively backward and more or less slowly changing productive forces. But capitalist society, within which the proletariat emerges as the main productive force itself and the revolution of this epoch is unprecedented in human history and leading it to a whole period of socialism, all during which the proletariat must maintain and continue to transform -society in every sphere, material and ideological, and must transform itself-develop its own class consciousness and scientific outlook in opposition to those of the bourgeoisie and all other classes-in the process. As Marx and Engels expressed it in The Communist Manifesto, the proletarian revolution involves the most radical rupture with all traditional property relations and with all traditional ideas as well. The first step of the proletariat, once having won power, is to take into its hands, through its state and the leadership of its Party, the decisive levers and lifelines of the economy. It quickly expropriates the factories, land, machinery, etc. of the overthrown bourgeoisie, beginning with the largest concentrations of capital, and exercises firm control over finance and trade. On -this basis it is able to move rapidly to rationalize the productive process and begin eliminating the mad anarchy of capitalism with its frenzied chase of a competing handful for profit and such criminal absurdities of capitalism as unemployment. In short, it socializes ownership of the major means of production, and institutes overall planning of the economy in accordance with this, through the proletarian state. And all this constitutes a tremendous leap forward, laying the basis for and opening the way to both tremendous development in the economy and further transformation of society in its economic foundation and its political and ideological superstructure. But this is precisely the beginning, not the end, of socialist transformation. With regard to the many small producers and traders, the intellectuals of various kinds and others-the middle strata of society-the proletariat in power must apply a long-term policy of both unity and struggle, with the aim of transforming their economic position, political stand and ideological outlook through a protracted, step-by-step advance. While the proletariat can and must exercise ruthless dictatorship over the overthrown bourgeoisie and other outright enemies of the revolution and socialize their vast holdings almost in one stroke, it cannot and must not apply this policy to the middle strata. Instead, it must lead and organize them to develop forms of cooperative ownership and collective labor-through which to progress to socialized state ownership-and to take part in the political movements launched by the proletariat and remodel their world outlook in accordance with the socialist revolution and the ultimate advance to communism. Because of all this, and more generally because upon overthrowing capitalism and the bourgeoisie the proletariat will inherit the divisions and inequalities left over from the old society-between mental and manual labor, between the city and the countryside, between mental and manual labor, between the city and the countryside, between men and women, etc.-for all these reasons, it is impossible to make the advance to communism in one leap or in a short period of time. Rather, between-capitalist and communist society there lies a long transition period of socialism, all during which the proletariat must maintain and strengthen its dictatorship and the socialization of ownership of the means of production, strike at, restrict and move toward eliminating the differences and inequalities left over from the old society and transform the thinking of the people according to the scientific principles and outlook of Marxism. Further, communism can only be finally realized on a world scale, and therefore in coming to power in country after country the proletariat will still find itself surrounded by hostile imperialist and reactionary states which will attempt every means to crush, subvert or otherwise destroy the socialist state. Thus the socialist transition period is not a smooth, broad freeway leading directly and quickly to communism, but a tortuous path, full of twists and turns and marked by sharp struggle. Within each socialist country, the remnants of capitalism will continually give rise to a new bourgeoisie that will repeatedly attempt to seize power from the proletariat and restore capitalism; and in so doing it will seek to make use of the contradictions within socialist society to mobilize a social base of more privileged strata and play upon backward sentiments within the working class itself, as well as seeking support from and alliances with imperialist and reactionary states. The experience of the proletarian revolution and the socialist societies, both the historic victories and advances as well as the temporary defeats and setbacks, has shown not only all this but even more specifically that the heart of the new bourgeoisie engendered socialist society lies within the party of the proletariat itself, especially at its leading levels. The contradiction between the party
and the masses, the leadership and the led, especially when the proletariat is in power and its party is the central force in exercising political power and economic control, is a concentrated expression of the contradictions left over from the old society. This can be resolved in the interests of the proletariat only by developing the forms of mass struggle and mass organization to draw the millions of working people into the administration of society and the determination of political questions and affairs. As culture and the rest, as capitalism has been accustomed to "run the country," or to put it more accurately, to put the working people into a social and political heaven which has been prepared in accordance with the revolutionary outlook and interests of the proletariat, while involving the intellectuals, and especially party officials, in mass political struggle as well as productive labor and other activities together with the masses and developing mass movements to promote the study of Marxism and the remolding of the world outlook of the people. But inevitably, until the transition to communism is carried through world-wide, there will be repeated attempts to restore capitalism by bourgeois elements, and most dangerously by leading party officials who have betrayed the proletariat and turned their position of leadership into private capital but continue to claim the mantle of Marxism and communism. This emphasizes all the more that the proletariat cannot rest content with the first great steps of seizing power through armed force and then socializing ownership, beginning with the major means of production. It must continue the struggle under these conditions to revolutionize all of society and not only defeat attacks, subversion and pressure from external enemies but actively assist and support the revolutionary movements of the workers and the oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world against imperialism and reaction. Further, as a crucial part of this continuing class struggle within socialist society, the party itself must be continually revolutionized—which means driving out those die-hard party members, especially within its top ranks, who are determined to take the road of capitalist restoration, but more fundamentally it means linking the party as a whole with the masses in the continuing and deepening struggle to transform all of society, including the thinking of the people, and advance along the socialist road toward the historic mission of communism. That the new conquerors and supersedes the old, and that this happens only through repeated and intensifying struggle—this is a basic law governing the development of all things. It is a fundamental truth in the history of human society no less sudden breaks and leaps in the situation, they will be forced more and more to reveal their true nature and to more nakedly rely on the decisive edge of their political domination—their armed dictatorship over and violent suppression of the masses.

Even now, the imperialists use their armed forces and weaponry not only to suppress mass rebellion but to intimidate the masses from rebelling in the first place. But the more social upheaval deepens and spreads, and especially the more that the crucial element of the class-conscious workers becomes a growing force and influence within this, the Achilles heel of the bourgeois armed forces will be further exposed—for, despite its awesome arsenal, it must still rely on its basic military units to occupy territory and put down rebellion, but these units are drawn overwhelmingly from the youth of the proletariat and the oppressed masses generally and are forced, through all kinds of degrading methods of indoctrination and intimidation, to fight against their own interests and their own class brothers and sisters. As the old authority begins to be seriously challenged and to break down, many will come over to join the armed ranks of the revolutionary proletariat. This emphasizes all the more that the proletariat cannot rest content with "normal routine" of life will be disrupted throughout society by political strikes; when big sections of the working class and other struggling masses not only are engaging in large demonstrations, marches and outbreaks of street battles with the police but finally go over to various forms of armed struggle which are organized by the Party into a coordinated uprising and revolutionary warfare, defeating and dismantling the bourgeoisie's armed forces and winning over large numbers of their rank and file soldiers in the process. As yet, of course, the imperialists still are able to maintain the great majority of the people in a state of relatively passive submission and routine subordination to the established order and authority. But as things develop, punctuated by sudden breaks and leaps in the situation, they will be forced more and more to reveal their true nature and to more nakedly rely on the decisive edge of their political domination—their armed dictatorship over and violent suppression of the masses.

In the US the first great step of the proletarian revolution—the seizure of power through the armed overthrow of imperialism and the bourgeois state—remains and demands urgently to be taken. Not only has there been no proletarian revolution in this country, there has before now been no serious attempt at or even preparation for it. This has been due both to the remaining strength and reserves of the imperialists, especially since World War 2, and importantly, if secondarily, to the weaknesses, errors and outright deviations from Marxism on the part of the communist and revolutionary forces. Now, however, we are on the threshold of a period in which there is the real possibility that the objective conditions necessary for revolution may develop—the weakening and desperation of the imperialists and the accompanying unrest and upheaval in society, stirring revolutionary sentiments among the broad masses and driving them to seek a radical way out. And there is a party, the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA which is actively preparing its own ranks and the masses for that day of reckoning. While this country has never seen a revolutionary struggle for power led by the proletariat, it has certainly witnessed revolutionary mass movements shaking the foundation of this country if not yet capable of overtaking it. And today there is not only the profound and deepening economic and political crisis and the imminent danger of world war, but there are, increasingly, minor political shocks that jolt society and awaken growing numbers to political life. These are but tremors before a gigantic earthquake. In all these events the embryo of a revolutionary crisis can be discerned. When, for example, in the thunderous rebellions of Black people and other oppressed peoples that have erupted, the police and then the national guard are unable to enforce "law and order," when even the power of the affluent as culture and the rest, as capitalism has been accustomed to "run the country," or to put it more accurately, to put the working people into a social and political heaven which has been prepared in accordance with the revolutionary outlook and interests of the proletariat, while involving the intellectuals, and especially party officials, in mass political struggle as well as productive labor and other activities together with the masses and developing mass movements to promote the study of Marxism and the remolding of the world outlook of the people. But inevitably, until the transition to communism is carried through world-wide, there will be repeated attempts to restore capitalism by bourgeois elements, and most dangerously by leading party officials who have betrayed the proletariat and turned their position of leadership into private capital but continue to claim the mantle of Marxism and communism. This emphasizes all the more that the proletariat cannot rest content with the first great steps of seizing power through armed force and then socializing ownership, beginning with the major means of production. It must continue the struggle under these conditions to revolutionize all of society and not only defeat attacks, subversion and pressure from external enemies but actively assist and support the revolutionary movements of the workers and the oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world against imperialism and reaction. Further, as a crucial part of this continuing class struggle within socialist society, the party itself must be continually revolutionized—which means driving out those die-hard party members, especially within its top ranks, who are determined to take the road of capitalist restoration, but more fundamentally it means linking the party as a whole with the masses in the continuing and deepening struggle to transform all of society, including the thinking of the people, and advance along the socialist road toward the historic mission of communism. That the new conquerors and supersedes the old, and that this happens only through repeated and intensifying struggle—this is a basic law governing the development of all things. It is a fundamental truth in the history of human society no less sudden breaks and leaps in the situation, they will be forced more and more to reveal their true nature and to more nakedly rely on the decisive edge of their political domination—their armed dictatorship over and violent suppression of the masses.

12087. Sciolino, Elaine. "State Department Becomes Cooler To The New Rulers of Kabul; An Islamic Government Loses Favor in Washington; Discrimination Against Women and Worries About Opium Cause a Chill", in New York Times, October 23, 1996. p. A8. [TXT] The Clinton Administration, after a flirtation with the Taliban rulers of central Afghanistan, has started distancing themselves from the government they had so recently embraced. One 'senior Administration official involved in Afghan policy' characterized this reversal as 'politically correct'. Similarly, Unocal International Energy Ventures had initially seen the Taliban seizure of Kabul as a positive development, but under
Administration pressure, the firm has backed away from supporting the new Taliban government.

12088. Shalinsky, Audrey C. "Women's Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad", in International Journal of Middle East Studies, November, 1993. pp. 661-675. This article examines women's ideal roles in the Jihad as explained in taped stories relating tales of the Prophet Muhammad. These tapes were used by the Farghanchi Uzbek refugees to facilitate discussions. Women's changing roles and shifting expectations at the time of Jihad are explored.

12089. Sisterhood Is Global Institute. Religion, Culture and Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World. An International Conference Presented by the Sisterhood Is Global Institute, Co-Sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Global South, 9/9-10/1994, American University, Washington DC. AIMS AND AGENDA: Religion, Culture, and Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World will bring together activists and academicians to identify issues that have priority in Muslim women's struggle for rights and to develop effective strategies to empower women in Muslim countries. The Conference will present to those interested in women's human rights in the Muslim world a unique opportunity to review problems that are specific to Muslim societies, discuss them in detail, and voice their concerns prior to the 1995 UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. The Beijing Conference will address key issues relating to obstacles and opportunities in the global development of women's human rights. This Conference will provide a forum for non-governmental women activists from the Muslim world to have significant and effective input in the debates and decisions of the pivotal Beijing Conference. Recommendations formulated by participants, as well as conference documents, will be circulated at Beijing. There will be an exhibition of books, photographs, and art by and about Muslim women throughout the conference. Participants will: (1) Discuss ways to involve Muslim women leaders in interpreting religious texts and international Human Rights Documents. (2) Discuss how to present such interpretations in a way that will encourage governments and legislators to implement changes in order to improve the status of women. (3) Consider methods of interacting with grassroots women by interpreting issues of interest to them using appropriate Islamic and the people are Russians (although Kazakh majority areas may be part of the republic of Kazakhstan must remain a part of Russia: even a majority of the three Baltic Republics, the three Transcaucasian Republics, four Central Asian Republics and Moldova will seek to leave the disintegrating USSR. While the Soviets approached Republic borders with disinterest, the arbitrary and irrelevant Nagorno-Karabagh a case in point, the artificial republic of Kazakhstan must remain a part of Russia: even a majority of the people are Russians (although Kazakh majority areas may be an illusion)." [Rebuilding Russia was first written in 7/1990 and was published in 1991. pp. 3-58. "Time has finally run out for communism". Now it is the time to determine how the transition from Communism can be managed without the destruction of Russia. After seventy years Russia lies in ruins, from the Great Patriotic War, from nuclear disasters (even importing Western nuclear wastes for money), from deforestation, from massive environmental degradation. Russian cities are ruined, health care is neglected, millions lack adequate housing, women have been saddled with backbreaking labor. Millions of Russians cling simply to their 'unlimited drunkenness'. Even the name 'Russia' has been degraded, loosely connected to the imperialism of the USSR. The massive ethnic conflicts that simmer in the Soviet periphery can only be forestalled at the cost of Russian blood: as many as the three Baltic Republics, the three Transcaucasian Republics, four Central Asian Republics and Moldova will seek to leave the disintegrating USSR. 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REPORTS AND PAPERS:

12090. Smith, Nancy DeWolf. "Afghanistan’s Chance For Peace: You Do Not Have To Approve of the Behavior of the Taliban To Appreciate Their Opportunity At This Moment In Afghan History", in Wall Street Journal, October 3, 1996, p. A14. [Smith has covered Afghanistan for Radio Free Europe.] The Taliban victory in Afghanistan has brought an orthodox Muslim government to power, allowing the West to hope that the pan-Islamists of Afghanistan may finally be crushed. The triumph of Mullah Mohammad Omar, King of the Believers, represents a great defeat for the USSR, Russia and Iran. The triumph of the Taliban also ends the threat of an Islamic menace to the government of Pakistan. While some are ‘squashmen’ over the killing of Najibullah and the oppression of women, the Taliban represent a meaningful stability. The ‘Taliban have already done their country a favor’ by ending the possibility of any Afghan Tajik link with Tajikistan and Russia. Bad relations with Iran are another happy product of the Taliban triumph, since their only tie is their role in the heroin trade. Far deeper is the permanent hatred of the Sunni Taliban for Shiite Iran. Sooner or later the evil forces of Russia and Iran will mount a new attack on Afghanistan: unless the Taliban have established their power by then, "it will be too late". [TXT]
KGB must be eliminated, and Russian moral restoration can begin with public confession of its crimes by the Communist Party. Overthrowing the Soviet yoke will be a greater challenge that overthrowing the yoke of Tataar.

12092. Steinfield, Peter. Neo-Conservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. The American intellectual elite is 50% Jewish and 50% lives in New York, according to Jewish researcher Charles Kadushin’s study of the American intellectual elite: they are born leaders and at least moderately wealthy. [p. 202] When not actually Jews, they are by definition fiercely Zionist, such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan [p. 119]. Although the term “Zionist” is not included in the index to this book [the author Steinfield is reportedly himself a Zionist], the book focuses on Zionism as the core political ideology of the American elite, which is seen as essentially a Zionist Jewish elite. The identification of the intellectual elite with Jewish publications is the basis for much of this claim that only Jews are intellectuals in any meaningful sense: so having an article published in Commentary (edited by Norman Podhoretz, a noted supporter of Sen. Joseph McCarthy [with Nathan Glazer, Podhoretz saw McCarthy as a champion of civil liberties, pp. 30-31; this judgement is possibly based in the fact that while many of the people targeted by Sen. McCarthy were Jews, the Jews so targeted were anti-Zionist Jews; and that while the list of such Jews to be targeted were provided to Sen. McCarthy by the Anti-Defamation League, the ADL was also able to rehabilitate anti-Zionist Jews if they were willing to renounce their opposition to Zionism)] of the American Jewish Congress or the Public Interest (founded in 1965 by Kristol after being editor of the secretly CIA-financed Encounter and while controlling Basic Books and Freedom House; Kristol would later move the American Enterprise Institute where he would hone his message that “urban mob” [p. 103] The “necessary strength of will” of this Jewish elite is 50% Jewish and 50% lives in New York, unifying source of neo-conservatism [pp. 278-279]. Of course this intense Zionism is rooted in the “lesson… the Jewish intellectuals… learned from the Holocaust” [p. 277], that lesson was that the “brilliance” of Jews would be forever confronted by intense anti-semitism of the type found in Nazi Germany and the United States [p. 278]; the dual threat to Jews of the racially degenerate American anti-semitic masses remains: “the threat to Israel and the shadow of quotas” [p. 279]: in the section “Fear of Anti-Semitism” [pp. 277-279], Neo-Cons are virtually identified as Jewish. Even the “fervently pro-Israel” George McGovern cannot win their support since he would be hesitant to use military force to advance Israeli interests. [p. 51] The overriding concern of Neo-Cons is the “threat to Israel” [p. 68], a threat rooted in the “precarious situation of Israel” [sic: p. 69]; other geopolitical issues such as Angola or Afghanistan are irrelevant since they do not advance the interests of Jews. [p. 69] Thus, the Neo-Con elite (“an ideologically armed and intact elite” of Zionist Jews and their non-Jewish Zionist allies [p. 69]) are confronted with a two front war: resisting “external pressure” from the enemies of Israel [p. 69] (including OPEC [p.68]) and “internal disintegration” of the control of the Jewish elite within the United States. [p. 69] This “Internal disintegration” is a product of the deep racial decline of [White] Middle America into “decadence”, and implicitly argues that only the new Jewish elite can preserve America from this degenerate “urban mob”. [p. 103] The “necessary strength of will” of this Jewish elite [p. 69], and the political legitimacy of this Jewish elite is based in its “willingness to employ American power swiftly and decisively” to protect Israel, since only the security of Israel is an inescapable national interest. [p. 69]

12093. Tapper, Nancy; Akiner, Shirin [editor]. “Women and Power: A Perspective On Marriage Among Durrani Pashtuns of Afghan Turkistan”, in Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia. Central Asia Forum. London: Kegan Paul International, 1991, pp. 181-197. Formal constructions of gender relations in the islamic world tend to focus on disabilities suffered by women; in real life, women have considerable informal power. Ortner and Whitehead have argued the central sultural construction of gender is prestige: male prestige is heavily dependant on women in terms of female productive or reproductive labor and on women’s general comportment. Among the Durrani Pashtuns, women come into conflict with their prescribed roles through spirit possession, illicit sexual relations, and by their (rare) open defiance of female subordination and passivity. In each of these ways, women come into direct conflict with the interests of their family in a way that demonstrates the measure of women's power. Formally, women are according lower abilities to 'reason' (that is exercise self-control and discipline needed to make rational decisions), and are therefore excluded from public worship; are excluded from formal decision-making; and, are denied control over economic resources of any kind. At the same time, Durrani recognize the variability among individuals, realizing that a man can be unusually fearless, and some women can be very wise. Among the Durrani, gender distinctions are particularly elaborate around questions of honor and shame: these provide the principle idiom through which social activities are managed. In addition, Durrani society is based in the idea of conflict; beginning with the conflict of Durrani with other ethnic groups, and reaching down to the conflict between individual households. There is also a continuous tension between the rights of women to property recognized by Islam, and the complete lack of women's property rights in Durrani practice; but while women have no property rights, women can threaten the prestige and property or men, gaining a measure of power from this capability. While women's rights and expectations in marriage cannot be articulated in any manner the society finds to be acceptable; at the same time the failure of women to
The reaction of the Taliban regime that recently overran two-thirds of the country, including the capital city of Kabul, has banned women from families to Herat. Conditions in the camps are apparently reasonable, but weather has stemmed the usual daily influx of between five and nine IDP women, and imposed heavy censorship on music, literature and edible oil to Shahidahi and Minaret Two Camps.

Afghanistan, 9/23/1996, demanding equal rights for women and men. The Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. Over the past week, wet, cold snowy weather has stemmed the usual daily influx of between five and nine IDP families to Herat. Conditions in the camps are apparently reasonable, but there is a need for fuel and warm clothing. WFP distributed wheat flour and edible oil to Shahidahi and Minearet Two Camps. Between 19 January and 2 February 687 shelters were completed in Kushki and Rabat Sangi. 144 MT wheat was distributed. ACF will support four mother and child healthcare clinics in 1997. The first of these opened in Bagrami last week. –

Five hundred women demonstrated at Balkh University in Mazar-e-Sharif, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, April 30, 1997. On 21 April, Dutch Development Minister Jan Pronk convened the first meeting of an Afghanistan Support Group -- a group of donor authorities, with the participation of UN representatives, committed to maintaining the momentum and sustaining the consensus reached at the Ashgabad Forum in January this year. This meeting, which was held in Geneva, focused on the relationship between UN political efforts to achieve peace in Afghanistan and its relief and development work. The majority of participants remain eager to bring both aspects of UN activities closer together.

Discussions also took place on progress since Ashgabad. There was widespread support for the ongoing formulation of a Strategic Framework for Assistance to Afghanistan and for efforts to enhance coordination among all those working to assist Afghanistan.

On human rights, all participants agreed to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination and to establish and continue effective dialogue with Taliban authorities and Afghan women.

The next Support Group meeting will take place immediately after a Group of 21 meeting and will include high-level representatives from donor governments, international government organisations, the ICRC, International NGOs and the UN system. –

12099. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Aid Efforts in Jalalabad", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. WFP launched a poultry project for women in New Hadda; around 1400 women will be trained. At the end of the course each woman will be provided with six chickens to start poultry farming.

WHO distributed medical supplies to Laghman Public Health Hospital and clinics in Nagarhar. UNICEF completed social mobilization work in 9 villages in Surkhrod and distributed biscuits to clinics in Rodat and Moafid. The Fund also provided diesel for drilling rigs.

WFP distributed wheat to food-for-work and bakery projects in Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar.

On 28 January a UN convoy transported 210 MT wheatflour from Jalalabad to replenish food stocks in Kabul. –

12100. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Assistance in Herat", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. "Over the past week, wet, cold snowy weather has stemmed the usual daily influx of between five and nine IDP families to Herat. Conditions in the camps are apparently reasonable, but there is a need for fuel and warm clothing. WFP distributed wheat flour and edible oil to Shahidahi and Minearet Two Camps. Between 19 January and 2 February 687 shelters were completed in Kushki and Rabat Sangi. 144 MT wheat was distributed. The UNOPS Kerat women's poultry training programme is

12096. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "$33.3 million for PEACE", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 213. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, April 10, 1997. UNDP has allocated US$33.3 million to this ambitious new programme to assist women, the poor, the disabled and the disadvantaged in Afghanistan (see Update 211). –

12097. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "ACF Women Return to Work", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 217. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 28, 1997. Action Contre la Faim has obtained written permission to employ female Afghan staff: 70 women went back to work on nutritional programmes in Kabul last week. ACF will support four mother and child healthcare clinics in 1997. The first of these opened in Bagrami last week. –

12098. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Afghanistan Support Group", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 213. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, April 30, 1997. On 21 April, Dutch Development Minister Jan Pronk convened the first meeting of an Afghanistan Support Group -- a group of donor authorities, with the participation of UN representatives, committed to maintaining the momentum and sustaining the consensus reached at the Ashgabad Forum in January this year. This meeting, which was held in Geneva, focused on the relationship between UN political efforts to achieve peace in Afghanistan and its relief and development work. The majority of participants remain eager to bring both aspects of UN activities closer together.

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ongoing, as are IAM's women's tailoring and embroidery project in the IDP camps. [=]

12101. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “CARE Women Beaten”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 217. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 28, 1997. On 26 May, a CARE minibus transporting five women was stopped by the religious police, the women were taken out and beaten. CARE had previously obtained written permission from the Taliban authorities for these women to work. CARE has suspended its women's programme. [=]

12102. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Demining Update”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 207, March 11, 1997. Mine busting: Thomas Carlsen Weber of Danish Demining and Development Associates is currently investigating the potential for using "mine busters" in Afghanistan. The mine buster, a comparatively simple mechanical device invented by Mr. Carlsen Weber, detonates mines in situ by percussion. The technique, which reduces the need for manual prodding of suspected mines, can make the demining procedure considerably safer. 7 new demining teams: 40 additional deminers will complete training and be ready to work in the field by the end of April. Awareness raising: Over the past week, two mine awareness teams operating in the western region have trained more than 2000 people, about half of them children. Mine awareness curriculum support materials including notebooks, silkscreens, posters and brochures were distributed to participants. [=]

12103. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Demining Update”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 211, April 8, 1997. Jalalabad Explosion: Following the 19 March ammunition store explosion in Jalalabad and the UN Coordinator's letter to the Taliban authorities conveying the UN's concern about the location of such stores in residential neighbourhoods, UNOCHA demining officials have written to the authorities offering advice on ways to store explosives safely.

    Herat: The demining programme is acting on requests to step up activities to clear battlefield areas of mines and unexploded bombs in Herat. The requests came as a result of concern about the large numbers of people who continue to enter the city from Badghis. [=]

12104. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Donations”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 205. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 25, 1997. The Government of Switzerland has contributed US$4,444 towards the 1997 Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan. The donation will be used to support training of traditional birth attendants under the UNHCHR 1997 Repatriation Programme. The Government of Egypt confirmed its pledge made in Ashgabat to donate US$4500 worth of medical supplies to UN agencies. The UN has been asked to identify specific health-sector needs for Egypt to consider. [=]

12105. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Education Survey”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 221, June 24, 1997. A quick survey of information available in UN field offices paints a bleak picture of the plight of Afghanistan's schoolchildren -- particularly girls. Girls' school attendance has always been low in southern and central regions: now it stands at zero. In the west and around Kabul, where attendance had traditionally been high (in 1996, girls made up 30% of all school children in Herat and 40% in Kabul), female attendance is also zero -- apart from a few girls who go to schools in Herat in the IDP camps. In the north, levels remain unchanged, with girls making up 25% of the school population.

    The ban on women working has impacted negatively on boys' schools in the west, where shortages of teachers are reported. Women teachers in Kabul are said to be being paid to stay at home. There is also reported to be a reduction in numbers of male teachers in Kabul. However, NGOs have managed to continue to employ around 60 women and educate some 5000 girls under different projects in southern and eastern regions. A small number of UN and NGO-run skills and literacy programmes are reaching out to women in the southern and western regions. Training programmes for women in the eastern regions focus exclusively on health -- the one sector in which women are still permitted to work in Taliban-controlled areas.

    The only teacher-training establishment to survive is in the north, where there are reports of severe shortages of textbooks and other materials. The survey, although not exhaustive, highlights the diminished role of women in Afghan society -- both now and in the future. Elsewhere in the world, women have played a very important part in rebuilding countriesence conflicts have been resolved, particularly in local and national reconciliation processes. If the current trend is confirmed and strengthened, their absence from the public sphere and their lack of education will mean that, would they ever be authorized to fulfil such a role, the women of Afghanistan will be poorly equipped to do so. [=]

12106. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Education Workshop", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 216. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 20, 1997. Last week's UN/NGO/Taliban workshop on education revealed that the Taliban are not prepared to change their position on girls' education at present. Nevertheless, there was a frank exchange of views and both sides expressed their intention to continue the dialogue. [=]

12107. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Focus on Women", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 213. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, April 30, 1997. On 24 April, male and female Afghan NGO representatives in Peshawar were briefed on the PEACE initiative, with particular emphasis on ways to involve women. [=]

12108. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Food Crisis Accelerates", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 215, May 13, 1997. Aid workers in Kabul report that people are begging in the streets for bread rather than for money. The continuing shortage of wheat coupled with the plummeting exchange rate is pushing bread prices up out of the reach of many families who survived the winter on bread and tea. Some parents are said to be so desperate that they are trying to give away their children because they cannot afford to feed them.

    Very little wheat is coming into the country from abroad (some comes from Iran and a very small amount from Pakistan) and the next Afghan wheat harvest is not expected until July.

    UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC have stepped up food relief activities. WFP reports that a US food-for-peace donation of 16220 tonnes of wheat will arrive in Afghanistan within two weeks and a consignment of 21543 tonnes of wheat from Canada is expected to arrive shortly. Additional supplies purchased with cash donations from Australia, ECHO, Finland and the UK are also on their way.

    But aid agencies agree that food handouts are not enough: there is a need to bring wheat to the market at prices people can afford. In response to the authorities' request for help, the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan has asked Pakistan to facilitate the transport of food to Afghanistan.

    Meanwhile the Kabul authorities have fixed the price for one 110g loaf at Ats 1000: bakers violating this rule will be punished. [=]

12109. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "From the Frontline: Mazar-i-Sharif", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 219, June 12, 1997. Contradictory assessments of the security situation in Mazar-i-Sharif are coming in, with some aid workers saying that conditions are almost back to normal and others recommending that UN international staff members adopt a cautious approach to returning to the city.

    The UN Coordinator and Field Security Officer have asked for a series of meetings with the authorities to discuss the situation and will visit Mazar as soon as these have been arranged.

    A note from the Department of Foreign Affairs instructs foreign aid
agencies to dispense with Afghan women employees, despite General Maillik's insistence that he and his supporters would defend women's rights to work and education.

There are also reports that Balkh University has begun segregating some classes, although there are apparently no restrictions on women teaching all-male classes. [ ]

12110. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 199, January 2, 1997. HERAT: On 21 December around 20 women were reportedly arrested in Herat when 150 women demonstrated against the closure of bathhouses for women. In support of the women, most shops remained closed.

MAZAR: Under food-for-training, 8250 tonnes of wheat were distributed to 50 widows and 50 female home-based literacy teachers in Balkh province, where 1638 women are under training.[ ]

12111. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. Speculation continues as to whether or not girls will be able to go back to school after the winter recess ends on 6 March.

On 2 February Mullah Hamdulla Nomani reportedly announced that Kabul University would reopen in March, but only for male students.

The UNHCR Kabul office has written to Mullah Mohamed Qah and protesting the deletion of all references to girls' education in the joint UN/Afghan initiative to rehabilitate schools in Kabul. UNHCR reminded Mullah Mohamed that "No UN assistance can be provided to the education sector unless the benefits go to both boys and girls".

Meanwhile work on the UNCHS Oxfam water project at Logar is to be put on hold after completion of the first phase, pending further developments on the women's rights issue.

Following the attack on an international staff member of IAM in Herat on 22 January, aid agencies have sent a letter to the Governor conveying their concern about the incident. Staff have been advised to avoid walking alone in the town, and international staff are recommended to carry walkie-talkies whenever possible. The UN agencies meeting of 30 January noted the need for security arrangements for local staff. Afghan staff have been asked to provide suggestions for these to be forwarded to heads of agencies in Islamabad.

Herat's women's bath houses remain closed (bath houses are also reportedly now closed to boys under 18). Girls will not be allowed back to school until there is "peace and stability" and a curriculum drawn up by the central shura. Nevertheless, Afghan women continue to walk about Herat, sometimes alone, more often with a male family member. [ ]

12112. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 206, March 5, 1997. NGOs have met with Dr. Paktis, Acting Deputy Minister for Public Health, to discuss concerns about the security of female staff working on women's health-care programmes. Three NGOs have downscaled healthcare activities in Kabul and will reportedly not resume full programming until they receive a letter authorizing local female staff members to travel between their homes and clinics in agency vehicles. Other NGOs are working normally. [ ]

12113. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 207, March 11, 1997. Kabul University opened on 9 March, but only for male students. "In the future if we have enough resources, we will have separate education for women", said Maulavi Hamdullah Numani, acting Minister of Higher and Vocational Education. He explained that women's attendance was conditional on segregation and that they would only be allowed to study "medicine, education, moral and other social subjects". [ ]

12114. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: Education", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 209. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 26, 1997. Boys went back to school in Afghanistan this week, but their sisters remain at home. Female teachers have not been allowed to go back to work, creating a shortage of teaching staff.

Maulavi Sayyed Riasuddin, acting Minister of Education, insists that "It is an obligation in Islam for both boys and girls to go to school," but that schools must be segregated to avoid "corruption". He said that: "The issue has been put to the Islamic scholars and hopefully soon they will reach their decision". He also cited lack of funds and the continuing military conflict as impediments to the opening of girls' schools. [ ]

12115. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: German Caution", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 204. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 18, 1997. A German parliamentary delegation to Afghanistan warned Sunday that the west should be cautious about recognizing them as the legitimate government in Kabul. "We would like the Taliban to not only talk about relaxing their curricula for women, we would also like them to do something about it," said Ulrich Fischer of the Alliance 90/Greens party in the German Parliament. [ ]

12116. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: Herat", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 201. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, January 29, 1997. A UNOPS-approved women's and basic health training course in Giza district could not be implemented due to lack of female trainers. On 22 January, a female international staff of IAM was beaten by member of the Taliban for not wearing the veil. IAM suspended its activities for two days and a UN/NGO meeting was held to decide on a joint strategy and to prepare for future eventualities. The governor subsequently apologized for the incident. [ ]

12117. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: Kabul", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 201. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, January 29, 1997. The Ministry of Public Health granted SCF-US permission to continue with its landmine education project to be carried out in 17 clinics and hospitals. Permission was granted on the basis that segregation between male and female staff is maintained. [ ]

12118. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: Mazar", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 201. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, January 29, 1997. UNOPS completed 60% of a non-formal education programme for 2000 women. [ ]

12119. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: NGO Woman Released", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 205. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 25, 1997. Handicap International, which runs a community-based mine awareness programme in Kandahar, reports that one of its female national staff members has been released from jail. The woman, a physiotherapist, was imprisoned last December for alleged prostitution after visiting a female staff member in the Handicap International office. [ ]

12120. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Gender Issue: Sweden Stands Firm on Girls' Education", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. Issue No. 204. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 18, 1997. During a recent meeting (7 February) between UN Under-Secretary General Yasushi Akashi and Ms Malin Karre, Director of the Department of Global Cooperation, Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Ms Karre reportedly advised that Sweden could not agree with the perspective that it was better to proceed with the education of boys when this in effect meant that girls were denied schooling. [ ]

Ahmad Motawakkil, member of the Taliban Shura Council, is leading a delegation to the US and other western countries. Its goal: international recognition of the Taliban government. However, women's rights issues continue to dominate western attitudes to the regime, and are a major feature in media coverage of the mission. The Taliban have yet to voice concrete plans on women's education and right to work. Mullah Wakil told the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Wasat: “Although it is true that Muslim women and men are equally entitled to education, what is important for us, however, as a movement is the fact that women should adhere to the Muslim dress code. Although Afghan women are entitled to have education, what we are demanding from some women is that they abide by the precepts of Islam and the shari'ah.” "Does this mean that you will allow women to return to their jobs if they adhere to the [Islamic] dress code?" queried the Al Wasati reporter. “In some government circles and hospitals, there is a need for women. We need women to work at our airports because we want them to perform some tasks such as searching female travellers and others. We also need both male and female doctors and nurses.” Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, is quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle as reiterating that women “will be educated”, but for the time it wasn't "safe for females to be out of the house." [=]

12122. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender Issue: UN Education Project Proposal”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 204. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 18, 1997. Mullah Rabbani has informed the UN team leader in Kabul that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education are still discussing the UN's proposal for a joint education projects, and will continue to liaise with the UN on the subject. They will reportedly invite UN agency heads to return to Kabul to discuss possible options. The UN maintains its position that the project must benefit female students as well as males. (=)

12123. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender Issue: Women Must Observe Dress Code”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 205. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 25, 1997. Latest reports from numerous sources in Kabul (including the BBC) indicate that some 60 women have been beaten in the streets. The women had reportedly disobeyed warnings to dress accordingly to strict Islamic prescriptions. (=)

12124. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender Issues: HERAT”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 200, January 14, 1997. Mrs. Kouwein, Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance and members of the Netherlands mission to Herat, visited a female poultry project assisted by UNOPS in the vicinity of Herat city, where she could meet with Afghan women. This project provides poultry training, incubators and financial incentives to widows and other vulnerable women. (=)

12125. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender Issues: JALALABAD”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 200, January 14, 1997. UNOPS received a formal clearance from Mowlawi Ihsanulla Muhsan, Head of Foreign Relations, for UNOPS and one of their international NGO contractors, the Moslem Youth Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (MYARA), to carry out health and veterinary sub-projects for women. The authorities have also granted written permission to WFP and its implementing partners to hire female monitors for the bakery project, which resumed its activities on 9 January. Thus far, six female staff have been hired to monitor the distribution of bread to female beneficiaries. However, a gathering held on 6 January in Jalalabad, the authorities formally announced the re-opening of the Jalalabad Medical College for male students only, banning female students from the college. (=)

12126. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender Training”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 218, June 3, 1997. UN agencies are currently putting together a gender training programme for all UN staff working to assist Afghanistan. The programme will also be open to NGO staff members who wish to participate. (=)

12127. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender issue: Education”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 208. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 19, 1997. UN and NGO representatives are receiving contradictory information as to whether or not girls will be allowed to go back to school later this month when the new Afghan academic year begins. Attempts to obtain written confirmation either way have been unsuccessful. (=)

12128. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender issue: Female Aid Workers May Travel”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 208. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 19, 1997. The Taliban authorities have given Medecins du Monde and Terre des Hommes written permission for female staff members to travel on agency vehicles -- so long as there are curtains between the driver and passengers and also on the windows. NGOs had asked for such letters because there were concerned about the security of female staff members when travelling to and from work. The authorities have provided an office for women to work in one of the Kabul children's hospitals. (=)

12129. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender issue: Girl Scouts Bring Refugees Gifts”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 208. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 19, 1997. On 24 March, a group of six Japanese girl scouts began distributing “peace packs” containing an assortment of educational items, clothing and other gifts to Afghan refugee children in Pakistan. Over the past year, the Girl Scouts of Japan have collected a total of 13536 peace packs. The project is part of a worldwide joint initiative between UNHCR and the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts which has so far collected a total of more than 260000 peace packs for refugee children in 34 countries. Last year, more than 12000 packs were divided equally between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Kabul, distributions took place in bombed-out schools where pupils and teachers were in desperate need of all types of educational materials. This year, uncertainty as to whether or not girls will be allowed to return to school in Afghanistan means that it has not yet been decided if some way can be found to distribute packs to children inside Afghanistan. (=)

12130. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Gender issue: Repatriation”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 208. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 19, 1997. Figures received from UNHCR reveal that 803 individuals returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province in the month of January. Last year, a total of 120770 people returned to Afghanistan: some 1.2 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. Repatriation from Iran is even slower: just over 200 people have gone back to Afghanistan this year. Last year, 8367 individuals returned. There are around 1.4 million Afghan refugees in Iran. Refugees cite the country's continuing instability, economic hardship and the absence of education opportunities for girls as reasons for not returning. (=)

12131. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Herat", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 216. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 20, 1997. Herat UNCHS has held several meetings with communities to identify their problems and requirements. A new women's embroidery and knitting project is to be launched in District 8. Work on culvert repair and construction, garbage bin construction and solid waste disposal continued. UNICEF has distributed medical supplies and office equipment to contractors, the Moslem Youth Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (MYARA), to carry out health and veterinary sub-projects for women. The authorities have also granted written permission to WFP to hire female monitors for the bakery project, which resumed its activities on 9 January. Thus far, six female staff have been hired to monitor the distribution of bread to female beneficiaries. However, a gathering held on 6 January in Jalalabad, the authorities formally announced the re-opening of the Jalalabad Medical College for male students only, banning female students from the college. (=)

Commission on Human Rights has passed a resolution urging all Afghan parties to observe international human rights standards, with a special focus on the rights of women. [=]

12133. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Human Rights", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 218, June 3, 1997. On 30 May, the Advisory Group on Gender Issues in Afghanistan appealed to Member States and the Credentials Committee of the UN to take careful account of the human rights record of the Taliban Islamic Movement when considering the movement’s application for UN recognition.

The Advisory Group is made up of female and male Afghan and foreign nationals working for NGOs and UN agencies implementing programmes in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in other countries. [=]

12134. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities: Herat", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 200, January 14, 1997. On 8 and 9 January, a delegation from the Netherlands Government visited Herat province and held talks with Mullah Abdul Razaq, Governor of Herat, and with heads of UN agencies and NGOs on humanitarian issues, including female education. The mission also visited a tile making factory funded by WFP and a shelter programme for street children funded by UNICEF. UNHCHR Herat reports that 19 families arrived from Qala-i-Now, the capital of Badghis province, mainly because of the cold weather and food shortages. WFP distributed 168 tonnes of wheat to WFP assisted projects, including roads rehabilitation, feeding centres and female projects. UNICEF distributed medical supplies to health centres in Herat and Badghis provinces. WHO provided 200 blood bags with 200 sets of transfusion to Herat Regional Blood Bank and 20 litres of developer and WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP started an office management and administration course for 84 people and formed a committee to manage the bakery project. Wheat prices have risen dramatically: shortages in Pakistan have caused the authorities to ban the export of wheat to Afghanistan. A multi-agency technical coordination committee has been formed for the National Immunization Days in April and May. FAO has run orchard management courses for 128 participants in Jalalabad, Logar, Ghazni and Kandahar. A week-long crop improvement training course for participants from all over Afghanistan has taken place in Peshawar.

Mazar-i-Sharif: WFP distributed 630 MT food aid in northern Afghanistan in early March and provided 534 MT wheatflour to bakeries. WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP started an office management and administration course for 84 people and formed a committee to manage the bakery project. Wheat prices have risen dramatically: shortages in Pakistan have caused the authorities to ban the export of wheat to Afghanistan. A multi-agency technical coordination committee has been formed for the National Immunization Days in April and May. FAO has run orchard management courses for 128 participants in Jalalabad, Logar, Ghazni and Kandahar. A week-long crop improvement training course for participants from all over Afghanistan has taken place in Peshawar.

12135. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities: Jalalabad", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 200, January 14, 1997. WFP received 9 convoys of UN and commercial trucks carrying 3174 tonnes of wheat and wheat flour from Peshawar and despatched 500 tonnes of wheat and wheat flour from Jalalabad to Kabul. WHO distributed medical supplies to clinics and hospitals in the eastern region and continued work on its warehouse. UNHCHR completed the rehabilitation of primary schools in Qalai Janan Khan and Mia Omar No.2 girls’ school in Nangarhar and donated 60 blankets to the Orphan Association Centre in Jalalabad. UNOCHA distributed 400 quilts to widows and vulnerable persons in New Hadda camp. [=]

12136. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 208. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 19, 1997. Herat: IDPs arriving in Herat will now find only temporary shelter at Shahidai camp. All families that have arrived in the camp since 20 February are being rehoused: ICRC and the local authorities have this week moved 400 families to Rashwan, with assistance from UNHCHR. UNHCHR received a 12-MT consignment of kerosene from Turkmenistan this week. WFP provided just over 300 MT wheat to 1430 families who have finished water Department work in Musa Qala, Helmand. Health sector activities are ongoing: on 16 March, WHO started a training workshop on basic development needs/quality of life in Gazarah. Jalalabad: WHO distributed 600 kg of medicines to clinics and hospitals in the eastern region. The organization also investigated an outbreak of typhoid in Nizarian, which affected 46 people and killed two and identified the spring from which polluted water was coming. UNOPS completed work on the Parwayne Canal in Alining, Laghman. UNICEF social mobilization teams from Laghman and Jalalabad have started work in villages in Qarghyee district. Alongside its ongoing crop enhancement work, FAO prepared land for planting sweetcorn and surveyed land for vegetable planting.

Kabul: UNHCR, UNICEF and AREA continued to distribute assistance to vulnerable families in District 10. UNICEF completed work on five boreholes and nine handpumps, providing clean drinking water to 4000 people. UNICEF continued EPI activities in 92 fixed locations and cooperated with AVICEN to treat 98 children from the Tarana Maskan Orphanage. A 47-truck convoy carrying wheat flour, edible fat and pulses has arrived from Peshawar. A food-for-work flood protection project in District 6 is providing food for 44 men. UNCHS met with the Chancellor of Kabul University and Ministry of Power to discuss future rehabilitation programmes.

Kandahar: WHO launched a new “healthy village” project at Karte Molim. This will include water supplies, health education and sanitation. The US$96000 project will take six months to complete and will benefit 5000 people. WFP is contributing 27MT wheat. UNHCR has approved five vocational training projects for the disabled. UNHCR has also carried out missions to remote parts of Helmand and Ourzegan with the aim of assisting returnees in these outlying areas. WFP started an office management and administration course for 84 people and formed a committee to manage the bakery project. Wheat prices have risen dramatically: shortages in Pakistan have caused the authorities to ban the export of wheat to Afghanistan. A multi-agency technical coordination committee has been formed for the National Immunization Days in April and May. FAO has run orchard management courses for 128 participants in Jalalabad, Logar, Ghazni and Kandahar. A week-long crop improvement training course for participants from all over Afghanistan has taken place in Peshawar.

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12137. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 209. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 26, 1997. Faizabad: WHO and a shelter programme for street children funded by UNICEF. UNHCR Herat reports that 19 families arrived from Qala-i-Now, the capital of Badghis province, mainly because of the cold weather and food shortages. WFP distributed 168 tonnes of wheat to WFP assisted projects, including roads rehabilitation, feeding centres and female projects. UNICEF distributed medical supplies to health centres in Herat and Badghis provinces. WHO provided 200 blood bags with 200 sets of transfusion to Herat Regional Blood Bank and 20 litres of developer and WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP has also supplied wheat to food-for-work projects in the provinces of Baghlan, Saripul and Balkh. WFP started an office management and administration course for 84 people and formed a committee to manage the bakery project. Wheat prices have risen dramatically: shortages in Pakistan have caused the authorities to ban the export of wheat to Afghanistan. A multi-agency technical coordination committee has been formed for the National Immunization Days in April and May. FAO has run orchard management courses for 128 participants in Jalalabad, Logar, Ghazni and Kandahar. A week-long crop improvement training course for participants from all over Afghanistan has taken place in Peshawar.

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Afghanistan

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Peshawar. UNCHS has signed a contract with the Municipal Road Construction Department to rehabilitate secondary roads and up-grade drainage.

Kandahar: A temporary shortage of milled wheat stalled WFP's bakery project for three days but supplies have been replenished and bakeries are functioning again. Almost 100000 loaves have been baked so far, and bread sales have generated just under 4000 rupees.

FAO is conducting herbicide tests in the district of Dand, and has distributed fruit tree saplings in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgon and Zabol. FAO also reported an outbreak of rabies between Grishk and Dilaram.

WHO is training 1800 people to take part in the Mass Immunization Days. UNICEF sent just under half a million polio vaccine doses to Herat, and received more than half a million doses for the southern region.

Mazar-i-Sharif: UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and Oxfam together provided food and basic household equipment to 82 IDP families in Hairatan. WFP distributed 655MT food to ongoing projects in the north of the country.

FAO ran a series of training workshops on technical guidelines for orchard-management. Workshop participants included representatives from MADERA, ISRA, IRC, MCI and ADA.

UNCHCR, UNICEF, WFP and the local authorities reached agreement on plans for construction of a maternity hospital in Maimana, Faryab province. UNICEF and MSF vaccinated more than 3000 children against measles in IDP settlements in Mazar and Pul-e-Khumri. UNICEF and SCF-US ran a public healthcare workshop for senior health-workers in Jawzan.

A UNICEF mission to Maimana reported that 62 women were generating income through bakery and carpet weaving projects.

An Oxfam-led project to repair irrigation systems in Kilagia, Baghlan province, has been completed, providing water to several thousand hectares of farmland. Oxfam has also completed reconstruction of a school in Khulum town. The school will provide education for 600 girls.

UNCHS planted more 1250 trees of different varieties in Mazar, as well as carrying out road, drainage, waste disposal and water supply projects. UNOPS is providing skills and income-generation training for 45 people in Samangan province. [=]


UNCHS carried out road repairs, among them work on a ring road to the north of Mazar city. Five schools -- two for girls, three for boys -- are being built or rehabilitated. Other activities include well-drilling and the repair and installation of water pumps, in cooperation with beneficiary communities.

A preliminary report on the National immunization Days indicates that 1.96 million children from eight provinces were immunized against polio.

UNCHS has provided health kits and medical equipment to IAM and MSF. UNICEF is also cooperating with the Balkh Rehabilitation Association, an Afghan NGO headed by a female engineer whose projects include water supply activities.

New NGO, Motivation, has arrived in Mazar as an implementing partner of CDAP, the UN's Comprehensive Disabled Afghan's Project. Motivation is to conduct a training workshop for the disabled in Mazar. [=]

Kandahar: WHO has enrolled 22800 beneficiaries for its subsidized bakery project, as a result of a joint UN/local authority registration initiative. It has also approved three hospital feeding projects for 560 patients and staff for a six month period, as well as two income-generating projects benefiting 220 women in Kandahar and Lashkargah. Emergency food supplies will be distributed to some 6400 poor residents of Lashkargah city.

WHO provided 300kg of essential and anti-TB drugs to Mir Wais Hospital in Kandahar. WHO and UNICEF report that the April National Immunization Days exceeded expected targets in Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgon provinces.

FAO reported an escalating bird problem: in some parts of Kandahar birds have destroyed 30% of the wheat crop.

Mazar-i-Sharif: WFP distributed a total of 875 tonnes of wheat to the bakery project, wheat-for-training and food-for-work activities.

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New NGO, Motivation, has arrived in Mazar as an implementing partner of CDAP, the UN's Comprehensive Disabled Afghan's Project. Motivation is to conduct a training workshop for the disabled in Mazar. [=]

12139. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 217. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 28, 1997. Gardez: UNOCHA has this month reopened its office in Gardez. One of the principal aims is to help provide support during the summer repatriation season. So far this year, a total of 7408 people have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, but repatriation is likely to pick up over the summer.

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New NGO, Motivation, has arrived in Mazar as an implementing partner of CDAP, the UN's Comprehensive Disabled Afghan's Project. Motivation is to conduct a training workshop for the disabled in Mazar. [=]
WHO plans to rehabilitate Rabia Balkhi, Ibni Sina Emergency, and the Infectious Disease Hospitals. As a first step, it has helped repair the transmission line that provides power to the hospitals. The organization also ran two TB training courses for 24 doctors and 24 nurses.

UNICEF staff visited Logar with representatives from the Ministry of Public Health, AMI, and SCA. The mission met at the AMI hospital in Baraki for discussions on primary healthcare in the province.

UNCHR distributed loans to 100 widows under its revolving fund project.

WFP distributed 253 tonnes of mixed food. A 22-truck convoy brought 454 tonnes of wheat and wheatflour, plus non-food items. WFP expects 25 food convoys to arrive in Kabul over the next month.

UNCHS and the Kabul Municipality have rehabilitated a pump station to irrigate the park in Wazir Akbar Khan Mina. UNCHS is currently involving 160 local workers in neighbourhood upgrading/rehabilitation activities. Including drainage improvements, up-grading of access (e.g. repairing the steps leading up Kabul's many steep hills), and gabion wire weaving.

Kandahar: The recent polio immunization campaign reached 60119 Sentinel village lives in Kandahar.

Reports from other provinces and outlying districts have still to come in.

WFP distributed 404 tonnes of wheat to bakery and food-for-work projects.

UNICEF established two fixed vaccination centres in Nimroz and distributed tarpaulin and high-protein biscuits to primary schools and mother and child healthcare clinics in Jaguri district, Ghazni.

UNDCP has begun meetings in target districts for its anti-poppy initiative. The aim is to provide farmers with incentives to stop growing opium poppies. These include offers of assistance to start growing fruit, vegetables and other crops.

After lengthy negotiations, the UNCHR-supported Grameen Bank micro-credit project has now definitely been closed by the local authorities. [=]

12140. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 224. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, July 15, 1997. Gardez: CARE International has planted apricot, pear, and almond trees in Melan village, with a view to reducing soil erosion as well as providing food and income. CARE is currently working on 10 water-related projects which will benefit over 1000 families in the Melan area. Between 26 June and 11 July, 92 returning refugee families received repatriation cash hand-outs. The cash is provided by UNCHR and channelled through the International Rescue Committee.

Herat: FAO distributed 3 tonnes of chemicals to combat the sunnepust outbreak in Herat and Badghis. Ten hectares of fodder seed were harvested. Threshing and weighing of various trial crops continues. UNCHS this week removed 186 cubic metres of solid waste from Herat city. The programme has made a new agreement with WFP under which WFP provides 887 tonnes of wheat for food-for-work projects. This will enable UNCHS to expand activities such as waste removal. WFP provided 25.4 tonnes of wheat at Minaret Two camp, and gave 10 tonnes of food as food-for-work payment for IDP management staff. WHO ran a five-day training course for 20 participants, who learnt how to identify and treat minor ailments, and how to refer more serious problems to higher authorities. WFP provided food for 365 traditional birth attendants who participated in a WHO training course. Over the past week, WFP has donated 600 tonnes of food to different projects in the region. Communities in Sorkhrud have provided labour and materials to support UNICEF's mine construction work. Work was completed on two handpumps in Sorkhrud. Work is also ongoing on well construction in Quargha. Preparations are underway for the upcoming oral rehydration therapy campaign.

Kabul: WHO distributed 5000 mosquito nets to Health Net International to help prevent and control leishmaniasis. UNICEF and the MoPH chlorinated a further 11500 wells. Work is beginning on analysing data on the psychosocial assessment of children in Kabul. WFP has agreed to give UNCHR 700 tonnes of wheat for projects in the Azro district, Logar. WFP this week distributed 174 tonnes of mixed food and approved three food-for-work projects to be carried out by UNCHS. Mine awareness and clearance activities continue, but the continuing conflict north of the city makes it impossible for clearance teams to operate beyond Shakardar district. The Ministry of Interior and ICRC have asked for Pull-i-Charki jail to be cleared of mines and other unexploded bombs.

Mazar-i-Sharif: The Afghan/Uzbek border is still closed, making it difficult to get supplies into the region, with the result that some essential commodities are becoming scarce and transport is very expensive. UNICEF distributed medicines to Maimana. WHO took 2.5 tonnes of medical, surgical and laboratory supplies to health clinics in Mazar, Aybak and Shibarghan. Tajik and Afghan authorities have met with UNCHR to discuss repatriation of Tajik refugees through Shirkhan Bandar. Repatriation from Tajik refugees currently in Kunduz will begin on 17 July, when a group of 250-300 refugees are expected to return. Repatriation will take place on Tuesdays, Thursday and Saturdays until all those who wish to go home have done so. Consultations about the possibility of returning refugees from Mazar are also taking place. The joint UN/ICRC/NGO relief taskforce estimates that there are 200000 vulnerable people (including increasing numbers of IDPs) in the region. Conditions for IDPs and other vulnerable groups are deteriorating due to the cumulative effects of the fighting, the closure of the Uzbek border and the fact that the harvest was badly affected by the spring floods. MSF reports an increased level of malnutrition, especially children in the former IDP camp in Kamaz, a suburb of Mazar. [=]

12141. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 225. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, July 22, 1997. Gardez: WFP is providing food-for-work to support an Austrian Relief Committee (ARC) project to carry out irrigation work, grafting, and pruning in the Terra Gardens. ARC has some 1500 trees (including acacias and Russian willows) to plant next spring, and around 5000 fruit trees for planting in spring 1999.

A UNCHR mission is surveying areas where returners have already established homes, and looking at others where new returners may settle. UNCHS reports that one refurbished community centre has been handed over to local residents, and building work on more four centres is progressing well.

WFP distributed wheat and sugar to IDPs in Rawza Camp. A further consignment of wheat is expected to arrive this week.

FAO Livestock distributed 127000 doses of anthrax and black quarter vaccines to veterinary field units (VFUs).

FAO Crops distributed maize, fertilizer and black gram in districts where the P.E.A.C.E. initiative has been launched in Farah. FAO also investigated the crop disease situation in Zindahjan, Ghorian and Kohsan districts and discussed control measures with farmers. Melon fly
control experiments were carried out in Kushk and Khuja Mula villages.

Jalalabad: FAO activities have focused on improving maize, bean and rice cultivation. WHO has cleaned a total of 1.5 km of ditches so far this month. A further 10 latrines have been constructed (in Reg-Shah Mard Khan) and another 15 are being constructed. Medical supplies were distributed to health clinics and food provided to 32 TB patients.

UNCHR met with representatives from five villages in Kunar and Nangarhar to discuss the needs of returnees. UNICEF installed four hand pumps in Surkh Rud district.

Kabul: UNCHR is looking into the possibility of launching another four revolving fund project cycles in Kabul.

A battlefield clearance team is to clean the interior of Pul-i-Charki jail, in response to requests from IRCR and the acting Ministry of Interior.

WFP is to provide almost 2000 tonnes of food-for-work for three projects that will be carried out with UNCHS: water supply, the recycling of materials from destroyed houses and sanitation improvements.

WFP will also provide 268 tonnes of food-for-work to support WHO in the rehabilitation of hospitals in Kabul.

A convoy bringing 300 tonnes of wheatflour arrived in Kabul this week.

UNCHS has completed repair work on 780 square metres of asphalt road. A variety of UNCHS projects are providing employment opportunities to some 7500 local workers.

UNCHS has supported middle-management training for Ministry of Public Health EPI staff in Ghazni. The organization is carrying out extended immunization activities in 113 fixed and outreach centres.

Radio Shariat continues to broadcast public service announcements on health and hygiene issues.

Mazar-i-Sharif: Two convoys took around 400 refugees from Kunduz province back to Tajikistan. Numbers in each of the three-weekly repatriation exercises will, in future, be restricted to 150 returners, to relieve pressure on the barge that takes them across the Oxus river.

The refugee transit centre at Shir Khan Bandar has now been vacated by the Jumish forces that have occupied it for the past six months, and is once again being used by refugees.

UNCHS and the municipality, this week, inaugurated a public toilet switch to other income generating initiatives, UNDCP has carried out a participatory planning survey of villages in Ghorak, Khakriz and Maiwand and identified priority requests for engineering and agricultural activities.

The ongoing conflict makes mine action activities impossible.

UNCHS has surveyed streets in Area 2 and met the mayor to discuss solid waste disposal activities.

UNICEF reports that female Afghan staff, who had been prohibited from working following the political changes in May, are now back at work at UNICEF and UNOPS.

UNCHS and the municipality, this week, inaugurated a public toilet in Mazar's central commercial area. The facility is for use by men and women, and access for disabled people has been provided.

UNCHS is also working with the Mazar water laboratory and public health department to ensure that locally made carbonated drinks are safe for consumption.

UNCHS has distributed literacy materials to 50 school classes in Mazar, and taken medical supplies to provincial hospitals and health centres in the north.

FAO Livestock supplied 350 chicks to 34 women. The women, who are participating in a livestock improvement/income generating programme, were also given 720 kg of feed.

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UNCHS is also working with the Mazar water laboratory and public health department to ensure that locally made carbonated drinks are safe for consumption.

12142. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 229. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, August 20, 1997. Gardez: The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, assisted by UNOCHA, has vaccinated 1800 children against measles. The vaccinations were provided by UNICEF via the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee. The MoPH vaccinated a further 400 children.

IRC has now provided technical training for 89 farmers. A further 70 farmers have been trained as community trainers in the field of pest management.

A WFP mission from Kabul monitored WFP-funded projects in the Gardez region, including the Afghan Disabled Society's footwear workshop in which 40 handicapped people produce 30 to 40 pairs of shoes per day. It was agreed that funds generated by the centre should be reinvested to enable trainees to continue to manufacture shoes once their apprenticeship has been completed.

Herat: WFP received 1035 tonnes of wheat from the EU via Turghundi. FAO was given 175 tonnes to exchange for improved wheat and barley seed -- this week 30 tonnes of wheat was traded for 24 tonnes of improved seed. Wheat was also supplied to some 3800 IDPs and to workers involved in UNCHS city sanitation activities.

FAO Livestock has supported veterinary services association in Herat. FAO this week, distributed 10 tonnes of wheat that was no longer suitable for human consumption to poultry farms.

UNCHS has surveyed streets in Area 2 and met the mayor to discuss solid waste disposal activities.

WHO distributed medical supplies to hospitals and clinics, and is working on a sanitation project for the city.

UNCHS water supply projects are ongoing in Lashkar Gah, Dand and Panjwai. A three-week-long EPI refresher training course for 20 participants has been completed.

UNICEF provided IAW with teaching materials for use in IDP camps and distributed office supplies to EPI units, fortified biscuits to Gosalah Health Clinic, and essential drug kits to IDP camps. Work began on improving 126 wells and 300 dry vault latrines in Enjil District.

Jalalabad: In preparation for launching P.E.A.C.E. programme activities in areas to which refugees are returning from Pakistan, a joint UNCHR, UNDP, FAO (Crops and Livestock), UNOCHA, UNOPS and UNCHS needs assessment mission visited Tezeen district in Sorobi and Azra district in Lagar.

WHO has repaired X-ray machines in Wazir Akbar Khan and Ali Abad hospitals, as well as the Chest Clinic. Two new X-ray machines have been installed in MoPH's radiology institute.

The refugee transit centre at Shirkhan Bandar has now been vacated by the Jumish forces that have occupied it for the past six months, and is once again being used by refugees.

UNCHS and the municipality, this week, inaugurated a public toilet switch to other income generating initiatives, UNDCP has carried out a participatory planning survey of villages in Ghorak, Khakriz and Maiwand and identified priority requests for engineering and agricultural activities.

Under its pilot shelter project, UNCHS has distributed doors and windows to 40 returning families to enable them to rehabilitate war-damaged houses in District 3.

The ongoing conflict makes mine action activities impossible.

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training course for 27 participants. GBR activities are to begin in Pakiwi, Arghandab, Shegi, Dand and Kandahar.

Mazar-i-Sharif: WFP distributed 165 tonnes of food aid to just under 10000 beneficiaries in Balkhi. Recipients included refugees in Sakhi camp and people involved in food-for-seeds projects and other identified as being in need of assistance.

A WFP-supported road rehabilitation project in Dawlatabad district, Balkh is almost complete. Some 950 people have received food in exchange for working on this project.

UNCHS is launching a beekeeping and honey production project as part of its drive to build up income generating capacity.

UNCHCR has so far helped 2500 refugees return to Tajikistan from Kunduz via Shirfkan Bandar. A further 150 people are expected to leave Sakhi Camp and return home via the Shirfkan Bandar route.

UNOPS is working to establish sub-offices in the norther areas, as part of its preparations to launching the P.E.A.C.E. programme here. A base has now been set up in Yakawlang, but efforts to establish a station in Faizabad are being thwarted by transport problems.

WFP is carrying out a rapid assessment of IDPs in Pul-i-Khumri wishing to return to Charakar. The Halo Trust is expected to start mine awareness training for IDPs returning to Charakar, Shomali and Ghorband. [=]

12143. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 207, March 11, 1997. Herat: ICRC has begun distributing food blankets and plastic sheeting to IDPs in Badghis and has sent five trucks from Herat to Qala-i-Nau for further distributions. UNCHR provided 14 school tents for new arrivals at Shahidi Camp and supplies 56000 litres of kerosene to 2800 families in all the camps around Herat except for Rawza Bagh. UNICEF supplied Shahidi with 14 hand pumps and has also distributed medical supplies, high-proteinbiscuits and posters. FAO procured and processed 3MT green gram and 25MT wheat seed in western regions, as well as carrying out irrigation work.

Jalalabad: FAO has distributed just under 1600MT wheat seed in eastern Afghanistan and procured rice, mung bean and maize seed for summer crops. As well as distributing animal vaccines to veterinary clinics, FAO provided eight small motorbikes to different veterinary centres. WHO is to this week run a training workshop for doctors and nurses on clinical treatment of malaria. The organization is to establish a TBA laboratory in Jalalabad public health hospital and will be working with other UN agencies on the complete rehabilitation of the city’s water supply network. There are also plans to rehabilitate drainage ditches and construct improved ventilated pit latrines in some parts of the city. UNCHR handed over three completed school buildings to local Kabul, UNCHS has helped draft water supply/sanitation guidelines for people living in Microraian. 3 have been given a small UNCHR grant to restore electricity to just over 900 homes.

As well as its ongoing work to repair municipal infrastructure in Kabul, UNCHS has helped draft water supply/sanitation guidelines for future programmes. Also involved in the drafting: the water department, CARE, Solidarites, IAM, and OXFAM. UNCHS is soon to begin work on the complete rehabilitation of the city's water supply network. There are also plans to rehabilitate drainage ditches and grant to restore electricity to just over 900 homes.

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Kabul: Radio Shariat has agreed to broadcast twice-daily alerts about UNICEF's EPI programme. UNICEF and AREA are carrying out a joint distribution of assistance to just under 6000 vulnerable families in District 10. UNICEF is also working with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to provide safe drinking water to 2000 people. WFP Peshawar sent 62 trucks with 1400MT wheat flour, edible oil and pulses. Approval has been given to the Muslim Sisters' Association to run a quilt-making project for 1600 widows and for the International Assistance Mission to teach English as a foreign language to 260 students. Medair is to clean the Zoo Canal.

Kandahar: FAO has trained staff in horticulture and pest management and sent them out to pass on their knowledge to local farmers. The WFP bakery project got under way on 6 March and distributed 268MT wheat for the first phase. WHO distributed 400kg essential drugs to Maiwand and Khasuruzgon Health Centres. The organization has identified three doctors and one nurse who will go to Jalalabad to attend a three-month training course on district health practices. [=]
FAO started a course for 21 veterinarians as part of its programme to maintain regular contact with farmers and veterinary field units. FAO has distributed vaccines to pre-empt the seasonal anthrax outbreak and provided eggs to graduates from a previous poultry production course in Dehday and Balkh.

UNOPS is supporting the production of health-related audio-visual materials and videos via SERVE. A film on TB is shortly to be aired on Mazar TV. Another programme on diarrhoea is being produced. Oxfam ran a two-day leadership training workshop for 30 women from Baghlan and Samangan. The women are all members of the Women's Management Group, the workshop was a component of Oxfam's programme to promote good governance at village level. [=]


Herat: ICRC has provided a two-month supply of food to more than 4500 IDPs in Maslorgh and Rawashan camps. Jalalabad: A two-week WHO training course for 11 anaesthetists ended on 8 April. Ten latrines have been built in Reg-i-Shamat Khan district.

WFP has identified 7500 families for addition to the lists of those eligible to benefit from the subsidized bakery project. UNICEF reports that progress has been made on water supply work in the Quarghaye district of Laghman province. Kabul: After consultation with the local authorities, WHO plans to embark on income-generation projects in Shakkardara district.

The installation of two new handpumps and repairs to twelve more will ensure supplies of safe drinking water to 8000 people. A further 4000 will benefit from rehabilitation of the Qalau-i-Bakhtyar piped water system carried out by UNICEF and the Department of Rural Rehabilitation.

UNCHR is working with the Ministry of Repatriation to survey and monitor women's income generation activities aimed at returnees, displaced people and local widows. A quilt-making project, which supports 1600 widows, has now delivered just under 8000 quilts for distribution by UNHCR.

UNHCR is also to support an ASCIANA basic education and vocational training project for street working children. This will assist 250 children in Share Naw and Khaier Khana.

Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal (SGAA) officially opened its new orthotic, prosthetic and physiotherapy centre on 10 May. The new centre merges the two centres previously located in Charikar and Hatabad (Pakistan). Apart from a small liaison office in Peshawar, all SGAA activities are now based in Afghanistan.

ICRC food-for-work programmes in Kabul this week involved 180 workers who gathered up combustible materials and plastic bags for recycling; some 2340 families headed by disabled and handicapped people and 78 ARCS volunteers who helped distribute food.

In rural areas, ICRC is providing food for some of the poorest residents of the Shomali valley in exchange for spraying fruit trees and vineyards with insecticides. Canals and other irrigation channels were cleared in Kabul province under other food-for-work programmes.

Kandahar: UNICEF this week completed work on the Qalat water supply and distributed health kits and drugs to mother and child healthcare clinics in Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and Uruzgan. WHO provided 1 tonne of drugs to the Lashkar Gah hospital.

The Norwegian government has given FAO new storage facilities for community seed growers in Helmand/Grishk. Two similar Rubb-hall structures will be installed in Kandahar soon. FAO distributed fruit tree mother stock and apple rootstocks, monitored nurseries and arranged pruning demonstrations in private orchards.

Mazar-i-Sharif: FAO held a week-long workshop with GAA/EU on horticulture for government employees, NGOs and farmers from Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan and Faryab. UNCHS constructed five municipal garbage bins in Mazar city and experimented with new latrine cleaning technology. UNHCR, UNICEF and the local community in Maimana (Faryab) are to carry out a joint water supply project. UNHCR and the Department of Culture have opened a new public library in Mazar. WFP distributed 467 tonnes of wheat and WHO delivered supplies to medical centres. [=]

12146. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 218, June 3, 1997. Gardez: WFP is supplying cash and wheat to AMRAN in support of a women's programme which involves some 880 women in gem processing, embroidery, carpet weaving and making nylon shopping bags. The women work at home but meet together from time to time to discuss progress.

IRC and FAO activities focusing on seed production, poultry rearing and forestry are ongoing. Herat: FAO distributed 1 tonne of maize seed and 1.5 tonnes of fertiliser in Farah. Chemicals were also provided to combat the sunnpest outbreak in Kushk, Gulran and Kuski-Kona.

UNCHS removed 190 tonnes of solid waste from the city over the past week, with assistance from IDPs. In cooperation with the Municipality, UNCHS produced almost 100 concrete slabs for upgrading culverts and worked with community groups to construct garbage bins. WFP gave wheat, oil and sugar to 286 widows and other vulnerable women working on home-based training projects being carried out by ARCS.

Who distributed malaria medicines to Shindand Hospital and the Herat Malaria Department, and provided reagents for Herat Regional Hospital.

Jalalabad: Wheat and vegetable harvests are in progress, with some of the wheat being kept for seed next year. Two truckloads of agricultural machinery have been sent on to Kandahar and Ghazni, and another two truckloads remained in Jalalabad for use by FAO here. WHO reported that the health situation in the region is "stable". WHO has carried out drainage and sanitation activities and distributes medical supplies to clinics and village health volunteers.

UNHCR has completed work on road repairs in Achin District, Nangahar, benefitting 1000 people and on a water supply network in Spinghar District, benefitting 700 people. At the request of the public health authorities in Laghman, UNICEF visited the Rural Rehabilitation Development Department's health clinic in Laghman. UNICEF has agreed to support the clinic in activities which benefit women and children.

UNICEF also funded and provided technical support for a three-day training course on hand-pump installation and drilling, run by the Rural Rehabilitation Development Department.

A 20000 litre water tanker was delivered to the municipality to provide water to areas of Jalalabad that do not have access to safe drinking water.

Kabul: On 31 May, around 500 local residents joined 1000 municipal workers, 10 UNCHS supervisors and 70 labourers employed by CARE and UNICEF in cleaning rubbish off streets and excavating and repairing ditches and roads in central Kabul.

UNHCR has completed its cash loan distribution to 100 women in District 16 and is currently identifying 100 more women in District 10 who will benefit from the next phase in the scheme. UNHCR's ongoing blanket-making project for 50 returnees and IDPs has so far produced 1500 blankets.

UNICEF supplied oral rehydration therapy kits to Aide Medecine Internationale to enable them to establish rehydration therapy outlets in 10 mother and child health clinics in Kabul. WHO provided training in TB microscopy to 13 lab technicians and ran a course in diphtherial diseases for 20 participants.

WFP received three convoys of wheat and wheat flour over the past week and distributed 970 tonnes of different foodstuffs to projects in the region. In addition, 106 tonnes of wheat were sent to WFP-assisted projects in Ghazni.
Kandahar: UNICEF handed over the Qalat Town Water rehabilitation project to the Kandahar/Qalat municipal authorities on 27 May. The project, which was supported by WFP and UNOCHA, will provide water for 15000 people.

UNICEF also distributed supplies to mothers and child health clinics and hospitals in Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz and Zabul.

WHO supplied drugs to Maiwand District. Mazar-i-Sharif: UN programmes in Mazar have been temporarily suspended, although efforts are under way to send 126 tonnes of wheat to Tajik refugees in the Sakhi camp.

International NGOs including MSF, Oxfam and Save the Children are working in what they described today as “improving” security situation. [=]

12147. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Humanitarian Activities”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 219, June 12, 1997. Gardez: Between 35 and 40 families are estimated to have returned to Pakistan over the past week. UNHCR had issued each family with a repatriation handout of 5000 Pakistani rupees and 300 kg wheat. UNHCR also helped cover transport costs. Herat: FAO surveyed pests and natural enemies of aphids in Farah, and held demonstrations of powdery mildew of grapes and wheat smut.

Jalalabad: WHO assessed work on drainage ditches in the city and produced about 100 concrete slabs to cover ditches. Twelve latrines were also completed. More than 100 concrete rings for use in wells have been produced in Surkhund and Qarghaie under UNICEF’s water and sanitation programme. The social mobilizer for these districts reports that local committees are to be formed in two more villages in Surkhund.

Wheat and lentils are being harvested and threshed on FAO demonstration plots. FAO also inspected seed production activities in Nangahar and Kunar.

WFP distributed 207 tonnes of wheat to bakeries and supplied 108 tonnes of food to other projects.

Kabul: UNHCR has identified 100 vulnerable women in District 9 who will benefit from its revolving fund project. Staff continue to assess women in Districts 8 and 10; another 100 women from these districts are to join the project.

WFP distributed 1070 tonnes of wheat and wheat flour in Kabul and sent 106 tonnes of wheat to Ghassani.

WHO continued work on the Ibn Sina Infecions Diseases Hospital in Kabul and distributed medical equipment and drugs to hospitals and clinics.

Around 500 municipal and local workers are benefitting under UNCHS/WFP food-for-work schemes. UNCHS worked with local communities and the municipality to repair almost 800 square metres of asphalt road and to upgrade 5 km of secondary road in District 10. Secondary roads were also gravelled in District 16. In addition, UNCHS watered parks in the city and planted saplings.

On 7 June, UN representatives and senior Taliban authorities attended a workshop organized by the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Kandahar: WHO has now completed around 45% of the water supply component of the Healthy Village Project and plans to launch its Zaraj water supply project next week.

UNICEF has signed agreements with DACAAR and the RRD to provide 400 wells in Dand.

WFP distributed 49 tonnes of wheat to 162 returnee families and started up two food-for-work projects and two vulnerable groups feeding projects. WFP estimates that it is helping to feed almost 130000 people in the Kandahar area. [=]

12148. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Humanitarian Activities”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 220, June 20, 1997. Gardez: UNHCR is supporting IRC’s income generation programme which includes activities such as tailoring, soap making, embroidery and training in mechanicals. The programme targets returnees, widows and orphans.

SV Holland is funding an IRC initiative to establish three poultry farms in Zormat district, Pakila and Logar.

UNOCHA, with funds from Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan, has been helping construct two primary schools, one in Koli Khil, Zormat, which was completed and handed over to the authorities on 12 June, and one in Rohani Baba. Two deep wells are currently being dug in Rohabi Baba and 60 houses are under construction.

UNOCHA has completed work on repairing the Gardez airstrip, an activity that provided temporary employment to 30 unemployed people.

IRC reports that 55 families returned to Gardez via Khost this week.

Herat: UNHCR and UNICEF have cooperated to provide temporary shelter to four young boys who were deported from Iran. The case is being followed up in Herat and Mashad.

UNHCR distributed fire extinguishers to Shaidai, Rawza, Minarets, and City Centre IDP camps. ICRC is relocating IDPs from Shaida 2 camp to the new Mazlarkh Camp. WFP distributed 177 tonnes of wheat to more than 11000 IDPs at Shaidai Camp.

UNCHS completed its survey of the main drainage system in the city of Herat and in cooperation with the municipality, removed 154 cubic metres of solid waste.

FAO distributed 500kgs of green gram seeds in three districts of Farah, levelled 5 jerib (about 2 hectares) of land at Falhat Farm, and dispatched pesticides to control the sunnest outbreak in the districts of Gulran and Kushik.

Jalalabad: The FAO Crops programme is preparing the final report of its research programme. The organization has selected four sites for maize demonstration plots in three districts in Nangarhar and Kunar and continued to harvest wheat from demonstration plots.

The FAO Livestock programme trained 110 widows in a poultry raising and distributed 400 doses of vaccines to different veterinary clinics in the region. Twelve trained female basic veterinary workers are currently working in Behsoud.

90 trainees from the IDP camps graduated from UNOCHA/WFP - supported carpentry, welding and masonry courses. WHO awarded certificates to the 24 participants in a three-month course on district health practices in Surkhud.

UNICEF reports that the social mobilizer from RRD Jalalabad has surveyed and helped set up a local shura for Gazak village in Surkhud. The shura will assess and prioritize the health and sanitation needs of the village’s 2430 inhabitants.

WFP provided 15 tonnes of mixed food to AGHCO to support its supplementary feeding programme which benefits 500 malnourished under-fives. WFP estimates that its bakery project is providing food for one-third of the population of Jalalabad.

MADEERA embarked on a drainage project in Mohmandara. The project is being supported by WFP which is providing 900 labourers with food for work.

UNOPS is closing its Jalalabad office and transferring staff to focus on areas covered by the P.E.A.C.E. programme.

Kabul: WHO distributed anti-malarial drugs in Sarobi following a joint mission with the Ministry of Public Health to investigate a reported outbreak of malaria and leishmaniasis. Drugs were also distributed to hospitals in the Kabul region.

Radio Shariat has broadcast public service announcements about UNICEF’s extended immunization programme. UNICEF is making arrangements to carry out polio immunization in Azro district, Logar province, which could not be covered by the main campaign because of flooding. UNICEF is also supporting a regional management team of MoPH staff to plan and carry out intensive primary healthcare and mother and child healthcare programmes in Logar.

Girls are now able to take part in sporting activities in the Tahea Orphanage: 64 girls are taking advantage of this possibility. Initial monitoring of the UNHCR microcredit scheme for vulnerable women indicates that 90% of the participants have embarked on animal husbandry activities.
Aschiana and Wetco have both launched vocational training courses for children to promote self sufficiency. The Aschiana programme is targeting children who work on the streets of Kabul while Wetco focuses on orphans.

WFP estimates that it is providing vulnerable people with almost 295000 subsidized loaves of bread each day.

UNCHS continues to provide fuel for 40 municipal trucks which remove solid waste from the city. Under this project, which is run in conjunction with WFP as a food-for-work scheme, almost 3000 cubic metres of waste were removed. UNCHS has also continued work on repairing asphalt roads and upgrading secondary roads in District 10.

12149. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Humanitarian Activities", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 221, June 24, 1997. Gardez: MSF has agreed terms with the deputy governor under which it will take over responsibility for running the in-patient department at the Gardez hospital. A UNHCR mission from Jalalabad is currently reviewing the returnee situation in Pakta and Khost.

Herat: WFP lent ICRC 300 tonnes of wheat for distribution to displaced people who have arrived in Herat over the past four months.

UNCHS began constructing a public sewerage pit in District 7 and excavated 125 cubic metres of sludge. The programme also completed construction of a generator house for the Sultan Aghan water supply improvement project.

UNICEF provided fuel for cold chains in Herat, Saghar district in Ghor and Badghis. The organization also distributed essential drugs and furniture to the Shahiadi IDP camp; food and other supplies to the Regional Malnutrition Ward; timber to the Abu Hanifa emergency shelter project; as well as providing nutritional supplies in Farah and medical goods to the Ghor Provincial Hospital.

Jalalabad: UNHCR has identified the need for three quick-impact projects in Laghman: providing safe drinking water to 30 villages, the construction of a road bridge over the Kabul river, and rehabilitation of a road bridge on the main road to Kabul. Some 50 families are reported to have crossed the border from Pakistan at Torkham this week.

Who is providing traditional birth attendance training for 14 course participants. 20 people received village health visitor training in Chardi district, Nangarhar and another 20 are now being trained in Kunar.

Kabul: OMAR is staging a series of exhibitions to promote mine awareness in densely populated parts of the city: so far more than 5000 people have visited exhibitions in five locations.

UNCHR has signed an agreement with MedAir to provide technical and material assistance to help 1000 returning refugee families rebuild their homes. The first area to be targeted will be in the Mohammed Agha district of Logar.

UNCHS has begun to recycle materials from damaged buildings in District 3, making contact with project beneficiaries via district rehabilitation shuras and municipal district offices. Norwegian Church Aid provided US$17000 to help UNCHS carry out emergency sanitation activities over the summer.

A WHO mission to assess mother and child healthcare departments in Kabul visited Rabia Balkhi Hospital and reported that this needs overall rehabilitation and reconstruction.

As part of UNICEF's ongoing water supply programme 1000 wells were chlorinated this week, in association with the MoPH. Two UN convoys brought 500 tonnes of mixed food to Kabul. WFP distributed 378 tonnes of wheat to different food-for-work and food-for-training projects in Laghman: providing safe drinking water to 30 villages, the WFP distributed 383 tonnes of wheat-flour to the bakery project, 224 tonnes of wheat to different food-for-work and food-for-training projects and 4 tonnes of mixed food to hospitals.

A UNHCR team assessed the need to construct a bridge over the Kabul river in the Shahiadi area of Qarghaee, Laghman - an area regarded as one likely to attract a large number of returning refugees. The team also looked into the need to supply safe drinking water in Qarghaee and decided that this should be addressed.

UNCHR also met with representatives from Kach and Selani to discuss reasons why refugees are not returning to these villages. The team was told that problems included shortage of irrigation water, shelter, schools and health facilities.

Kabul: UNCHS started recycling rubble from destroyed houses in areas that had previously been demined. German Agro Action is working on reconstruction as part of the same initiative. The activity is so popular that people are beginning to move into areas that have not been demined, so emergency mine awareness training is being carried out to reduce the risk of their being harmed.

On 25 June UNCHS, with the National Olympic Committee, involved 250 sportsmen in cleaning up the stadium.

Kandahar: UNICEF is running a public awareness campaign encouraging people to collect bags of chlorine to treat their wells.

WFP distributed 529 tonnes of wheat.
Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 223, July 9, 1997. Preliminary work on the joint WFP/FAO food production survey has now been completed for most of the country, and a full report will be prepared shortly.

Herat: WFP distributed 53 tonnes of wheat in Minaret One and just under 6 tonnes of edible oil in Shaidahi. WFP has also provided 30 tonnes of wheat to 286 women and 44 men engaged in skills training programs implemented by ARCS.

UNICEF has supplied material to enable construction of eight slow sand filters in Enjil district. In addition, UNICEF has provided 2000 doses of measles vaccine to MSF to use with refugees along the Turkoman border.

Over the past two weeks, UNCHS has removed 378 cubic metres of solid waste from Herat city, in conjunction with the municipality. A four day training course on clinical management surveillance of diarrhoeal disease was given by WHO to 21 doctors and nine nurses. Meanwhile, medical and surgical supplies continue to be distributed.

FAO harvested and threshed 22 hectares of improved wheat seed, and 20 hectares of improved black gram and distributed 25 MT of green gram seed.

Kandahar: WFP has proceeded with the distribution of wheat to 1066 families in Kandahar and to 624 IDP families, and has completed the construction of four clinics.

UNHCR distributed beans and tenets for shelter in five districts. Some 40 young boys and men participate in the project.

There are many women who need assistance which can best be given through small-scale and low-profile community-based projects. Herat: Some 45 male and female physicians and nurses participated in two WHO training courses on diarrhoeal control. Together with UNICEF and the Ministry of Public Health, WHO is preparing an Oral Rehydration Therapy action plan.

While the construction of garbage bins for various communities continues, UNCHS has removed 250 cubic metres of solid waste from the city.

This week, WFP distributed 177 MT of wheat at the Shaidi IDP camp, and fumigated 400 MT of wheat against insects. FAO harvested and threshed 22 hectares of improved wheat seed, planted 20 hectares of improved black gram and distributed 25 MT of green gram seed.

Jalalabad: WHO has completed two of the 15 latrines in construction, and 282 slabs for the coverage of drainage ditches are now ready to be placed. A survey of the Laghman water supply system has been completed and water samples are being analyzed.

UNHCR has held meetings with local authorities in Azra district, Logar Province and Sorobi district to discuss the repatriation of refugees back to their villages.

Chlorination of wells has been started by UNICEF, two handpumps were installed and four platforms of wells have been completed in Surkrod district.

Apart from harvesting sweet corn and planting maize, FAO continue their trials on fertilizers in Sheshamgh research farm.

Kabul: Despite the tense military situation, the inaugural ceremony of the rehabilitation of war devastated hospitals took place in Kabul on 20 July. It was attended by Dr. Sarar Salem, WHO sanitary engineer, plus representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and government authorities. The project, which will be completed in nine months, will cost US$434739.

A quilt project involving 1600 vulnerable women has been awarded by UNHCR to an Afghan NGO. Some 8000 quilts will be delivered to UNHCR for 1997/98 relief distribution.

WFP distributed 183208 MT of mixed wheat through various WFP assisted projects. As for its bakery projects, WFP will continue to cover an additional 25% beneficiaries.

While UNICEF continues the health campaign against diarrhoeal diseases and cholera detection with the Ministry of Public Health, a round-table session was organized on Radio Shariat to talk about the goals of the Oral Rehydration Therapy campaign.

UNCHS continues its urban rehabilitation activities including the upgrading of public services in four districts, the construction of flood protection walls, and the improvement of the irrigation system.

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Mazar-i-Sharif: UNHCR reports that on 27 June, 161 Tajik refugees returned to Tajikistan from Mazar region, bringing the total number of returnees to 715 persons since 17 July. Repatriation from Kunduz is currently going on as well.

A four day training course on clinical management surveillance and prevention of diarrhoeal disease was given by WHO to 21 doctors and nine nurses. Meanwhile, medical and surgical supplies continue to be distributed.

As fuel supplies for UN operations have reached a critical stage in Mazar, UNOCHA has utilized 97556 MT of food aid through food-for-work and institutional feeding projects this week.

During a visit to Pul-e-Khumri to distribute medical supplies, UNICEF discovered that hospital equipment as well as two ambulances had been looted. UNICEF is now trying to recover them.

SCF-UK has begun a needs assessment and survey of child labour in Mazar. They are also working with the local media to emphasize the importance of education.

12153. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Humanitarian Activities”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 227, August 5, 1997. Gardez: A UNOCHA As fuel supplies for UN operations have reached a critical stage in Mazar, UNOCHA has utilized 97556 MT of food aid through food-for-work and institutional feeding projects this week.

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SCF-UK has begun a needs assessment and survey of child labour in Mazar. They are also working with the local media to emphasize the importance of education.
Herat: During the past week, WFP has distributed 167 MT of food, including 295 MT for IDPs and 100 MT for the FAO food-for-seed projects.

UNICEF distributed medicine and other commodities for the Herat regional hospital and the emergency shelter. They also conducted a teacher training course for the IAF education project in IDP camps.

WHO continued its assistance by providing various medical supplies to the Herat regional hospital, the badghis provincial hospitals and basic health clinics in Karogh and Gozara.

Under the food-for-arrangement, FAO received 26.8 MT of quality seeds. They also reported that 23 MT of foundation seed was harvested.

Jalalabad: WHO, under their healthy city project, has completed the construction of 15 latrines, 105 slabs for drain coverage, and is cleaning the city drains. They also continue to distribute medical supplies and equipment to hospitals in the area.

UNICEF has been active in their ongoing water and sanitation projects, chlorianting 180 wells, casting 81 rings for dug wells and installing a hand pump in Qargaig. They also delivered some accessories and basic equipment for these projects.

WFP used some 481 MT of food through bakery projects, institutional feeding, and food-for-work training projects.

At the Sheeshamgah research farm, FAO planted corn and beans, cultivated germplasm, irrigated sweet corn and mug beans, and weeded rice and Mug beans.

Kabul: UNHCR has signed agreements with a number of NGOs for the rehabilitation of facilities to assist the repatriation of returners from Pakistan. Four clinics, four primary schools and one gravity feed water supply are included in the plans for Azro district, Logar province. It is anticipated that 60000-80000 refugees will return to this district in the next few months.

WHO distributed 1200 booklets on AIDS information to various hospitals and donated X-Ray films to Kabul hospitals. WHO is also assisting the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) to monitor diarrhoea cases in the central region.

WFP distributed 1060 MT of mixed food to different WFP assisted projects and have received 856 MT of wheat flour.

Through the MoPH, UNICEF has established two mobile teams for the monitoring of diarrhoeal diseases and detecting cholera suspected and positive cases. They handed over 98 million AfS worth of drugs for cholera control including oral rehydration salts to the MoPH. UNICEF has also delivered education kits to NGOs who are able to support education for both boys and girls.

Due to security restrictions, UNCHS has suspended its solid waste disposal and collection programme as the dumping area is situated 15 km north of Kabul. Other UNCHS activities, including the upgrading of public services, are continuing.

Kandahar: Four organized group repatriations, some 140 families, have taken place with the assistance of UNHCR. The local authorities have requested assistance in the provision of education material which has been approved, but the authorities have prevented UNHCR from supplying material to Hazara populated areas in Maleston and Jaghrooz.

WHO has provided training for 16 women in control of diarrhoea and cholera in central Logar province. Training courses on the subjects are ongoing for 18 men. They have also provided construction supplies for the rehabilitation of the Khas Urozhan hospital, Zararan.

UNICEF’s drilling programme for the Dand Water supply system is under way. A shipment of supplies is being delivered for the Lashkar Gah water supply project this week.

FAO staff have conducted further missions to supervise and monitor this year’s crop and plant protection programme. They have also conducted an apricot drying training course in Kabul. 21 personnel from seven NGOs attended the course.

UNCHS has updated the city map and has signed two projects with local authorities for a solid waste disposal scheme and for a base line survey of infrastructure and capacity in Kandahar city.

UNCHS has completed the formation of 220 village development committees and 45 cluster village development committees in Kandahar and Farah provinces.

Mazar-i-Sharif: WHO distributed 400 manuals on guidelines for treatment of malaria for doctors and health worker reaching 140 health centres in the north. 4.2 MT of medical and surgical supplies have been distributed to hospitals in Puli-Khumri, Kunduz, Takhar and Faryab.

UNCHA is transporting 10000 litres of urgently needed fuel for UN activities in the region and an additional 10000 litres will be transported through Turkmenistan and Temez.

During the last week of July, WFP provided 207 MT of food aid for on-going projects, benefiting 12420 persons. The masonry and carpentry project funded by WFP in Aqcha district has seen its first 30 graduates this week.

UNCHS inaugurated the water supply system for District 3 in Mazar. Drinking water is assured for 3000 people through this scheme.

12154. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. “Humanitarian Activities”, in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 228, August 13, 1997. Gardez: UNICEF, in conjunction with the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC), contributed 10000 doses of measles vaccine to the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) which is expected to benefit about 2000 children.

FAO assisted the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) with insecticide for 30 gerbils of apple orchards. Some 18 gerbils of improved variety of different seeds were reaped. Also, threshing machines were loaned to three villages, benefitting about 120 farmers in Pakhta Province.

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) provided food for about 36 malnourished children per day in their nutrition centre based in Gardez Hospital.

Herat: WFP received 829.5 MT of food commodities at Toorghundi donated by the European Union. Some 150 MT were distributed this week through their ongoing projects in the area.

UNICEF provided medical supplies to the Herat Regional Hospital, the Afghan Red Crescent Society and Medecins du Monde (MDM). About 165 male and female workers are being trained in Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) and health awareness.

Through a food-for-seed scheme, FAO Crop exchanged 37.5 MT of WFP wheat for 30 MT of quality wheat seed.

FAO Livestock distributed 48000 doses of animal vaccines. Incubators, eggs and chicken feed were handed out to support 11 newly trained vet staff in chicken hatcheries.

UNCHS (Habitat) collected 236 cubic metres of solid waste. They are also constructing large and small garbage bins in four districts of the city.

In Guzarah, WHO provided US$6000 as interest free loans to 23 beneficiaries under their basic development needs project.

Jalalabad: This week, WHO conducted 12 new latrines, 117 slabs for the covering of drains, and continued to clean drainage ditches under their Healthy City project. An orientation training course on hygiene and sanitation was attended by 80 mailahs from Jalalabad. WHO also distributed medical supplies and equipment in the eastern region.

UNCHCR completed its prisoners’ training project in the Jalalabad central jail for 40 prisoners. UNCHR also supported the construction of side ditches and latrines. A mission was sent to Paktia and Khost to assess the repatriation flow.

In cooperation with the community, UNICEF constructed seven latrines, casted 60 concrete rings on dug wells, and chlorinated 142 public and private wells.

Among other activities, FAO continue their research to improve crops, irrigated rice trials, weeded maize trials and threshed sweet corn. Kabul: UNHCR, together with WFP and UNCHS, undertook a joint field trip to Azro District of Logar Province in connection with UNHCR’s integrated initiatives for planned voluntary repatriation of refugees from Pakistan.

WFP completed a needs assessment and UNCHS completed a feasibility study for the installation of 70 deepwell handpumps in 16 villages.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Afghanistan

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In response to cases of diarrhoeal diseases and cholera in Pul-i-alam and Charakh districts, WHO, in collaboration with UNICEF and the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), distributed medical supplies for the control, prevention and treatment of these diseases to health facilities. UNICEF sent two missions to support health facilities and set up four Oral Rehydration Therapy centres in Logar Province. Emergency drugs have been provided to the MoPH for the control of cholera. In Kabul city, UNICEF delivered education kits to street children.

A total of 414 MT of food commodities were distributed by WFP to the survey of new beneficiaries for its subsidized bread sales in both general and widow bakeries was completed.

Mazar-i-Sharif: Since the beginning of August, WFP distributed 1895 MT of food to 15000 project beneficiaries through food-for-work projects and assistance to vulnerable persons in Balkh Province. WFP, in collaboration with WHO and UNHCR, is funding an emergency ward in Mazar Hospital through a food-for-work project.

UNCHS is installing handpumps and the construction of two deep wells was completed.

With the participation of the Rural Rehabilitation Department (RRD), UNICEF rehabilitated 10 handpump platforms in Mazar town, targeting 1800 habitants. [=]

12155. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities:Kabul", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 216. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 20, 1997. UNHCR is preparing an integrated project proposal for Azeo district in Logar: between 60000 and 80000 refugees currently living in the Peshawar area have reportedly expressed a willingness to return to their homes in Azeo provided infrastructural rehabilitation work is carried out.

UNCHS held a three-day "Do no Harm" workshop with Norwegian Church Aid: 25 representatives of 14 agencies and the Ministry of Planning attended.

UNCHS also continued handpump installation and repair work and completed two boreholes in District 2. UNICEF and AVICEN treated 30 girls and 101 boys at the orphanage and involved 165 boys and girls in handicraft and artistic activities.

WFP distributed 525 tonnes of wheat and 272 tonnes of wheatflour through the bakery project, as well as continuing institutional feeding projects. WFP distributed 4.55 tonnes of wheat via its food-for-seeds project. [=]

12156. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities: Mazar-i-Sharif", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 216. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 20, 1997. UNOPS last week completed weaving and embroidery training programmes in Samanghandistrict of Samanghan province. SCF US now has 96 classes running in the non-formal education project it is carrying out on UNOPS' behalf in Dehdadi, Tokhta and Ali Chopan (Balkh). The scheme has just set up a mobile library in Ali Chopan.

Oxfam's vocational training and production centre in Kaologai (Dushi district, Balkh) has completed a six-month kilim weaving and non-formal education programme for 24 young women.

German Agro-Action distributed 33 tonnes of wheat to village communities in Balkh and Charbolak districts under a food-for-drainage excavation scheme. [=]

12157. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Activities: Mine Action", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 228, August 13, 1997. Afghan Technical Consultants finalised a twelve month contract with the EU for US$2.3 million. The money will fund nine mine clearance teams and three site offices. This much needed injection of funds will ease the mine action programmes' funding crisis. However, US$7.6 million is still required to ensure continuity of the programme beyond September 1997.

The Austrian Government provided US$16000 to support an ICRC eye clinic in Mirwais Hospital in Kandahar. The medical expertise required will be supplied by doctors employed within the mine action programme by the Demining Agency for Afghanistan. UNOCHA has contracted CIET International to conduct a national evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan. The evaluation, aims to determine the overall effectiveness of mine awareness in Afghanistan and to make recommendations for future developments in mine awareness.

Statistics recently available have shown that for the first time in many years mine awareness teams of the Organisation of Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) reached more adult women than men during the month of July 1997.

Mine action teams have completed clearance of the inside of the Puli-Chakhi jail in Kabul. The area surrounding the jail has been surveyed and clearance will proceed following discussion with local authorities. Also in Kabul, clearance of agricultural land, including several irrigation canals, in the villages of Qala-e-Muslim and Gul Bagh were completed allowing residents to return to cultivation of the previously barren areas.

Efficiency measures currently being introduced by the mine action programme include the restructuring of mine field survey teams, combining resources from both the Minefield Clearance Planning Agency and the Mine Dog Detection Centre. The new survey procedures are designed to improve minefield boundary reduction and hence increase speed and safety of clearance. [=]

12158. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan: Norwegian visit to Kabul", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 228. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, August 6, 1997. Norway's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Jan Egeland, visited Kabul on 13-14 August. Mr. Egeland, the highest-ranking western official to visit the city since the Taliban took over last September, was accompanied by the head and deputy head of the Humanitarian Affairs Department, an executive officer and the Norwegian Ambassador to Pakistan.

The delegation met with the Kabul authorities to discuss Taliban edicts on gender, and the issues of females' access to education and their right to work. A Norwegian/Taliban commission is to be set up to discuss education programmes for boys and girls in Kabul. Mr. Egeland said Norway was prepared to provide funding for ten schools immediately, if the Taliban could agree that boys and girls would have equal access.

Norway, which has donated nearly US$200 million to Afghanistan over the past 18 years, is currently chair of the Afghan Support Group. The next Support Group meeting is scheduled for October. Mr. Egeland said that he would not recommend donors provide any extra funding unless there was progress towards equality in the coming weeks. [=]

12159. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan: Pledges and Contributions", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 219, June 12, 1997. The Government of Norway has pledged US$316000 towards UNDCP's drugs demand reduction activities, on condition that the funds are spent on activities that do not discriminate against women or girls. [=]

12160. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Assistance", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 204. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, February 18, 1997. Faizabad: Approval of the launch of the WFP bakery project has been well received and has apparently brought down food prices.

Herat: The Eid holiday disrupted reporting from Herat but UNICEF has distributed furniture to clinics and kerosene to people in emergency accommodation.

Jalalabad: WFP distributed food to Sjadows, ARH and Serve. The Programme also monitored the NADA state farm project in Ninkhangan. The project, which had been suspended, restarted at the end of January. Pulicing, fertilizing, and cultivation are all under way. NADA was given 15MT wheat as an incentive to 300 IDPs and 400 NADA workers. WFP food stocks in Jalalabad stand at just under 590MT.

The MCI bakery project is progressing satisfactorily, with around 2000MT wheat flour having been distributed so far. UNHCR monitored

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quick impact projects in parts of Ninhharhar, Khost, and Paktia, and held a succession of meetings with local elders. FAO carried out irrigation, weed control, and fertilizer dressing, and observed wheat and legume trials as well as visiting wheat demonstration projects.

**Kabul:** UNHCR is to provide winter relief to 5910 families in District 10. WFP received two convoys of commercial trucks carrying more than 300MT wheat-flour. UNICEF and WHO continued regular health activities over the Eid Period.

**Kandahar:** UNICEF announced plans this week to carry out a wide-ranging survey, which will include the nutritional status of children, at the end of February. The Fund will also join forces with WHO on a mass polio immunization campaign in April and May, and has asked other agencies to help out by loaning vehicles and providing other support as necessary. UNHCR's Grameen Bank Project has disbursed its first five small-scale loans and has begun receiving repayment. FAO gave out 55MT wheat against the summer crop of maize and mung beans in Grishk. WFP distributed 489MT food to 18 ongoing projects, benefitting some 9000 people. Over this reporting period WFP received 22MT wheat from Quetta: current stocks stand at 585MT. UNHCR reports that the drinking water situation in Zaranj is very bad and requires urgent attention.

**Mazar-i-Sharif:** A group of 18 future trainers of traditional birth attendants are themselves being trained by Balkh Public Health Department under the auspices of UNHCR. They will, in turn, train 155 women in nine provinces in northern Afghanistan. The Programme, which started on 13 February, will be completed in late April. [—]

12161. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Situation and Operations", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 199, January 2, 1997. HERAT: UNHCR Herat reported a total of 2718 IDP families (15861 persons) residing in different camps in Herat city. The daily influx of IDPs to the camps in Herat is around nine families per day. It also distributed kerosene (funded by the local authorities), kerosene heaters and jerry cans (UNHCR) and soap (MSF) to IDPs in Shahidahi Rawza and transit camps. WFP distributed 237 tonnes of wheat and one tonne of sugar in the western region. UNICEF distributed hospital and emergency health kits to Herat regional hospital and medical supplies to IDPs in Rawza camp.

**JALALABAD:** WHO organized a meeting of all NGOs and UN agencies working in the health sector to discuss the 1997 work plan for consolidating health activities under a Regional Plan of Action. The Acting Minister of Public Health expressed his appreciation for the excellent contribution of NGOs and UN agencies and expressed concern over the scarcity of reliable information concerning the health sector. He suggested the use of standardized reporting format and the establishment of epidemiological surveillance system. The NGOs requested further support for local authorities. WHO delivered miscellaneous medical items to Laghman provincial hospital and anti TB drugs to Khogyanzan hospital in Nangarhar. After several meetings organized by UNICEF on District Development Pilot Projects, a national committee was formed; its members will undertake a mission to Kamesh district of Nooristan to conduct a base-line survey.

UNOPS completed two irrigation and four water supply projects in Jaji Maidan district of Paktia province; currently it is implementing 38 sub-projects in different districts of eastern region. UNICEF delivered a miscellaneous set of items to clinics in the eastern region. UNHCR completed the construction of three primary schools in Khogyani and Chaparhar district of Nangarhar and two schools in Tani Dish and Ali Sher districts of Paktia.

**KANDAHAR:** The authorities in Kandahar established a special department to combat drug smuggling in the areas under Talibain control. They declared that some 45 Kg of heroin and 3 Kg of hashish have been seized by the said department in Kandahar. Two training and five food-for-work projects jointly supported by WFP and UNHCR have been completed in Kandahar, Zabad and Helmand provinces. 80 persons were trained in improved traditional masonry in Lashkargah and Kandahar cities and 123 km irrigation system were repaired. A Kishmish Khana (a place of drying raisin) project started in 1995 has been completed and 180 rooms for drying raisins have been constructed in Dand district of Kandahar. 2065 labourers benefitted from the project's food, while 14454 persons (7227 male and 7227 female) benefitted from the distributed food.

**MAZAR:** UNICEF provided 400 Kg of drugs and medical equipment to the Department of Public Health in Mazar, and 2000 doses of measles vaccines and other EPI supplies to MSF in Takhar and Kunduz. MSF recently reported a suspected epidemic of measles in Burji Sherqat refugee camp with a death toll of 15 children. UNICEF sent EPI supplies to this camp. UNICEF supported the education department in Faryab to repair the Afghan Koot girls school and rehabilitate the Kohi Khana and Arab Khan schools in Maimana district. It also supported the department of education in Balkh to repair the Ayesha Afghan girls school, and financed the training undertaken by the department of education in Balkh for upgrading the skills and capacity of primary school teachers and administrators. Moreover, UNICEF distributed 3250 MT of wheat and other food items to 33 kindergartens in Balkh. In cooperation with Kamaz kindergartens and financial support by UNICEF, Balkh television produced a 1 hour and 40 minutes programme for International Children's Day, which was later broadcast by Baglhan and Sheberghan TV stations. Finally, UNICEF led a joint inter-agency mission to baghlan province to collect data on District Development Pilot Project.

WFP approved the distribution of 100 kg of wheat to each identified IDP family and distributed 257 tonnes of wheat between 18 and 23 December 1996 in several northern provinces. An expanded bakery programme for the northern region is being prepared in consultation with local authorities, UN agencies and NGOs, providing direct food aid to 300000 beneficiaries during the winter. Women operated bakeries will be encouraged. A WFP mission visited Tala-o-Barfac area and recovered 11 trucks loads of wheat, which were off-loaded by unknown commanders. Negotiations are undertaken to recover the remaining wheat. [—]

12162. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Update", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 231, September 2, 1997. GARDEZ: Local authorities cleared the flood debris from the Gardez-Kabul road, and a mine dog group has checked to see that no mines had been washed down onto the road from a nearby anti-tank minefield. The road has now been reopened to traffic.

IRC provided three tonnes of improved seeds, plus fertilizer, to 350 farmers. IRC also procured seeds from farmers. The IRC project has adopted the FAO concept of providing improved seeds in exchange for normal seedcorn.

**FAO** is supporting IRC's ten fruit tree nurseries in Paktika, and helping train farmers in integrated pest management.

Herat: The suspected cholera outbreak in Badghis seems to have abated, although cases continue to be reported from Shidand. MoPH, UNICEF, WHO, MSF, MDM and Merlin have all been closely involved in dealing with the problem.

WFP, IOM and the DoR have distributed 295 tonnes of food to just under 12000 IDPs in Shaidai One camp. WFP has dispatched 200 tonnes of food to Varan for distribution to people working on the rehabilitation of roads in Farah.

UNICEF has distributed a variety of supplies to EPI centres in Herat, to the Babai Berq clinic in Herat and to hospitals in Herat, Ghor, Badghis and Shindand.

UNCHS finished construction work on 22 garbage bins in District 7. Three community centre latrines were completed and five water supply leakages repaired.

The Mine Action Programme reported the presence of mines along the road between Sang-i-Atesh and Bala Morghab. Survey work has now begun in Ghor province.

Jalalabad: The mine action programme has finished clearing Goundivillage in the Urgun region of Paktika. Residential areas, the cemetery and the mosque are now clear of mines. A total of 71 landmines and 27 other unexploded items were destroyed during the
FAO discussed the quality of improved wheat seed with farmers in Behsud and collected information about the flowering dates for rice and maize grown on the research farm at Shee-shambagh. Cabbages are being planted and okra harvested for seed.

The WHO Healthy City project continues to build latrines, clean and reinforce ditches. WHO conducted a workshop on some of the constraints facing EPI work.

UNICEF has continued its water supply work and disposed of 300 cubic metres of solid waste. Messages highlighting the dangers of careless waste and excreta disposal were disseminated around the city, along with posters and leaflets.

WFP distributed 339 tonnes of food in Nangarhar and Kunar. The Jalalabad bakery project is expected to resume this week, providing subsidized bread to 30000 needy families.

UNHCR has completed work on a 30 metre long intake to increase the flow of water to the irrigation canal at Gulsalak in Pech district, Kunar. A 90 metre flood protection wall has been built to protect farmland at Archano, Warana district, Nuristan.

Kabul: WHO held a workshop to make preliminary preparations for a nationwide active polio surveillance system. The organization also delivered more than US$21000 worth of orthopaedic equipment to hospitals.

WFP received three convoys bringing 763 tonnes of wheatflour to Kabul, and distributed 146 tonnes of mixed food via different programmes.

UNICEF reports that cases of cholera in Shranjan (Paktia) and Charkhi (Logar) are under control, as is an outbreak of measles in Gardez. Water chlorination in the west of Kabul is ongoing and there are no more suspected cases of cholera in this area.

UNCHS's liming project, another activity designed to eliminate cholera from the capital, is continuing in Districts 2, 8 and 10.

Solid waste disposal continues at a rate of 672 cubic metres per day.

The Kabul authorities handed over 25 anti-personnel mines for the mine action team to destroy. Voluntary initiatives of this kind are occurring with increasing frequency.

FAO aims to procure 100 tonnes of wheat seed from areas around Kabul under its seed exchange programme.

Kandahar: UNHCR is currently carrying out 75 quick-impact-projects (QIPs). Eight of these focus on vocational training, with a view to becoming income-generating activities for disabled returnees, widows and internally displaced women. Skills covered include calligraphy, carpet weaving and tailoring. Four projects provide 400 returnee families with shelter material. So far this year, 8768 individuals have returned to the region from Saluchistan.

UNCHS is to carry out a variety of canal improvements under the P.E.A.C.E. initiative. Work on building up local committees continues, with a total of 335 villages, 98 clusters and one district having formed committees to participate in the programme.

The Mine Action Programme has trained 29 NGO trainers, enabling them to carry our community awareness training themselves, with no external input.

Wich continues work on rehabilitating Khas Urozgan Hospital and on the Healthy Village programme.

Mazar: The roadbridge linking Afghanistan with Uzbekistan is still sealed, but the Uzbek authorities continue to allow the UN and IRC to transport humanitarian supplies across the river by barge. WFP has so far brought in almost 20000 tonnes of wheat, IRCR 30000 tonnes of wheatflour and UNOCHA 10000 litres of diesel. IRCR also plans to bring in around 100 tonnes of medicines by air over the next 10-12 days.

Just under 2800 refugees have returned to Tajikistan from the Kunduz area.

Who has distributed 1.2 tonnes of medical supplies and equipment to Mazar Public Health Hospital and to Pul-i-Khumri, Kunduz and Takhar. The organization has also distributed health education materials (mostly books and manuals) to schools, government institutions and madrasas throughout the northern region.

UNCHS has finished building work on a kindergarten at Balkh University. Around 800 patients have been treated at the community fora clinics which have been strategically located in different community areas around the city of Mazar. The clinics are staffed by people who are paid by the community and who receive occasional assistance from the MoPH, UNICEF and WHO.

UNCHS continues work on silkworm propagation.

UNCHS provided chairs and fans to the Literacy Department to accompany the convoy and discussed the IDP situation with local authorities.

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UNCHS continues work on silkworm propagation.

UNCHS provided chairs and fans to the Literacy Department to benefit 40 working children. This project is also supported by SCF-UK.

UNCHS and SCF-US installed ten handpumps in Andkhoy.

Oxfam is digging two wells and repairing two culverts in Otaqul village, Nar-e-Shahi district, Balkh -- one of the areas damaged by the spring floods this year.

FAO has bought more than 1000 kg of wheat seeds from farmers. This will be distributed for the next planting season.[=]
FAO-Livestock has started its spring vaccination campaign against anthrax, enterotoxaemia and other diseases in central and eastern Afghanistan.

A WFP-assisted drainage project has rehabilitated 200 hectares of agricultural land in Momandra.

Another WFP-assisted fruit nursery project has distributed 40000 subsidized saplings to farmers in Kunar. By the end of the spring season, the project expects to have distributed 240000 saplings.

A WFP food-for-seed project in Kunar has exchanged 300 tonnes of wheat for 80 tonnes of improved maize, rice and wheat seed.

WFP reports that a Kunar people-oriented reforestation project is providing 70 women with the chance to run income generating nurseries. Kabul: Aschiana, a local NGO supported by UNHCR and Terre des Hommes, has secured funding from ECHO and the Reuters Foundation for its two centres for street children in Shar-i-Nau and Khair Khana. It has also obtained funds to open two new centres in Microrayan. The centres provide boys (5-14) and girls (up to the age of 7) with general and health education, a daily meal and weekly medical check-ups.

UNICEF has embarked on a study of the nature and prevalence of psycho-social trauma among the children of Kabul. Over the past two weeks, water supply activities, carried out in cooperation with the authorities, have provided a further 10000 people with access to safe drinking water.

UNCHS distributed clear plastic and shelter sheeting to 600 families. Solid waste disposal, water supply, flood protection and tree planting programmes continue, as do ongoing discussions with community rehabilitation shurhas in Districts 125 and 7. FAO-Livestock distributed 2000 molasses feed supplement blocks to veterinary field units in the Kabul region. Fifteen veterinarians completed training courses in poultry management. Two refresher courses for vets and para-vets have taken place in Kabul.

Kandahar: FAO is carrying out a pest management training programme for 15 participants. A WFP mission to Helmand reported food security problems in Lashkargah. Further joint-agency investigations will attempt to address the problem. WFP delivered almost 650 tonnes of food over the past week. UNDCP is to send an exploratory mission to Ghorkar province.

Mazar-i-Sharif: WFP distributed 996 tonnes of food between 27 March and 3 April. Beneficiaries included Tajik refugees at Sakhi Camp, food-for-work projects and institutional feeding including bakery projects. WHO delivered 500kg of surgical and medical supplies to health centres around the northern region.

Save the Children USA is running a non-formal education programme for 2000 rural women from Dehdadi, Balkh, Tokhta and Aliqan. UNOPS is running a vocational skills training and income generation course in Samangan for 45 trainees. UNICEF and Oxfam are to carry out a water supply system project in Acqha. UNICEF will carry out another water supply project with Balkh Helpline assistance, a local NGO headed by a female engineer. UNICEF has also established six carpet weaving centres for 24 women in Shorteppa district. [=]

12165. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "ICRC Update: Relief Overview", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 214, May 5, 1997. The ICRC is delighted to take this opportunity to thank the UNDP/UNOCHA coordination team in Islamabad for its kind offer to allocate some space in its weekly bulletin to enable ICRC to provide regular updates on its activities in Afghanistan.

Relief overview: ICRC continues to provide food and non-food assistance to war-stricken civilians throughout the country. Since the beginning of the year, ICRC has distributed 8000 tonnes of food and non-food items in Afghanistan.

In Kabul, 30000 families headed by young widows or disabled people (190000 individuals) continue to benefit from regular nutritional assistance. They have already received stoves, coal and blankets over the winter months.

In Herat, IDPs are currently the main source of concern. ICRC is assisting 2800 IDP families (16800 people) in Shaidai ("transit") and Rawashan camps. In Shaidai alone there are 2143 families, who are now being moved to better accommodation in Maslarqeh Camp. Regular assistance is also being given to 684 families (more than 4000 people) in public buildings.

In Mazar, Pul-i-Khumri and the northern regions, ICRC is currently supporting 3800 displaced families in coordination with UN agencies. [=]

12166. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Mazar-i-Sharif & the Taliban", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 217. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, May 28, 1997. Following this weekend's takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif by supporters of Dormut defensor General Malik, the city is now being patrolled by recently arrived Taliban troops. The UN guesthouse and some offices were entered and looted during the takeover, but staff in Mazar have now succeeded in recovering all the vehicles that had been taken. The new authorities provided security guards to some offices, while others were under the surveillance of patrols. UN and NGO staff movements are currently very restricted, but reports indicate that the city is returning to normal. Nevertheless, when the UN Coordinator expressed his intention to visit the city, he was informed that the airport was closed.

The new authorities have ordered the closure of girls' schools and colleges and forbidden women from working.

First Pakistan, and then Saudi Arabia announced their recognition of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. [=]

12167. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "NGOs Protest Restrictions", in Afghanistan Weekly Update, Issue No. 229. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, August 20, 1997. Four Scandinavian NGOs protested against policies that severely limit aid agencies' from assisting women in Taliban-held parts of Afghanistan. The restrictions, imposed on 16 July, bar Afghan women from working outside the health sector and state that all aid to women and girls be channelled via male blood relatives. The NGOs also objected to Taliban authorities forbidding them to work in areas that are not under Taliban control, such as certain districts in Ghazni that are part of Hazarajat. The Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Norwegian Church Aid and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan issued a statement on 12 August announcing that if they continued to be prevented from implementing activities in accordance with fundamental humanitarian principles (i.e. that aid should be provided to all people in need, regardless of gender, or political, religious or ethnic affiliation), they would be forced to consider the possibility of reviewing their involvement in assisting vulnerable people in Taliban-controlled areas.

Meanwhile, in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghan women are only permitted to work for aid agencies that are headed by women. [=]

12168. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "News from Kandahar", in Afghanistan Weekly Update. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. It has apparently been a quiet week in Kandahar. WFP has been asked by local authorities to investigate the possibility of starting tailoring and poultry projects targeting women in Helmand. The Programme distributed 130 MT food via already existing activities.

FAO launched an integrated vegetable seed production project with seven farmers in the Dand district.

UNOPS has approved the desilting of the Fil Koh Reservoir to increase its capacity to supply electricity to Kandahar City. The reservoir currently supplies "limited" power to half the city.

WFP reports the presence of 243 IDP families from Badghis in Helmand. The families all claim they will return as soon as possible. WFP is to carry out a one-month distribution and to monitor the situation.
UNHCR and UNICEF have distributed blankets, tents and plastic sheeting (see also reports from Badghis). [=]

12169. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Orphanage Update", in AfghanistanWeeklyUpdate. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 202, February 4, 1997. UNICEF funds helped AVICEN provide emergency drugs, treat 67 patients, and run a week-long health education project. Orphans continue to undertake carpentry training. UNCHS and Save the Children's rehabilitation of the orphanage play-ground is ongoing. [=]

12170. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Overall Situation", in AfghanistanWeeklyUpdate. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 199, January 2, 1997. Fighting continued between the Taliban and the forces of the Council for Defence of Afghanistan in front-line areas to the north of Kabul city, causing civilian casualties and property destruction. On 26 and 27 December, the Taliban reportedly seized control of Istalif and Qarabagh districts to the north of Kabul, shifting the front-line areas closer to Bagram airbase. Over 200 military persons of the opposition alliance were reportedly arrested by the Taliban in the said areas. On 28 and 31 December, Kabul city was bombed by jet fighters of the Council for Defence of Afghanistan. Several bombs struck Kabul airport, Khair Khana pass and the presidential palace, causing minor damage to the windows and doors of the nearby buildings, including the offices of UNCHS, UNDP and UNOCHA. A large arms depot of the Taliban exploded on 24 December in Khair Khana district, killing nine children of the same family. A man and a youth were paraded by the Taliban police in the streets of Kabul for being accused of homosexual acts. All major roads to Kabul with the exception of the Salang highway are open to traffic.

Sporadic fighting was also reported from Badghis province. Reports from Herat indicate that Mulla Yar Mohammad, Governor of Herat, is being replaced with Mulla Abdul Razaq Akhound. Mulla Yar Mohammad is reported to take over as the new Governor of Ghazni province. A man, accused of killing four persons, was publicly executed at Herat Stadium of Friday 27 December 1996. [=]

12171. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "PEACE initiative", in AfghanistanWeeklyUpdate. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 215, May 13, 1997. Field officers and Islambad-based representatives of UNDP, FAO, UNOPS, and CDAP (the UN's disabled Afghans' programme) met with AADB and ANC members to call for action. A three-day workshop on the UNDP PEACE initiative for Afghanistan. On the agenda: practical ways to implement the programme, plus proposals for a coordinated and effective approach to dealing with the gender issue. Two more workshops are to be held in Kandahar (13-17 May) and Mazar (20-23 May). [=]

12172. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Pledges and Contributions", in AfghanistanWeeklyUpdate. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 206, March 5, 1997. Two months into the year, the 1997 Consolidated Appeal response stands at almost $9 million confirmed contributions by Egypt, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Sweden and USA. Rodda Barnen, The Swedish children's aid agency, has donated $35596 to UNHCR to help cover the costs of a social services counselling project for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. UNICEF reports that it has received pledges from the Italian government ($8340000), ECHO/EU ($570000 for EPI), the Austrian National Committee ($44536), also for EPI, and the Australian National Committee ($100400 for healthcare). [=]

12173. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. "Pledges and Contributions", in AfghanistanWeeklyUpdate. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Issue No. 221, June 24, 1997. The Norwegian Government is to donate US$ 141240 to Save the Children (US) Mine awareness activities in Kabul -- providing these benefit women and girls as well as men and boys. [=]
One of these is a US$35 million community development initiative, funded from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to be carried out by a range of UN organizations in close cooperation with NGOs, in five pilot areas of Afghanistan. The aim is to help communities get back on their feet by assisting them to come up with ways to combat poverty, provide food, rehabilitate social and economic infrastructures, reduce environmental devastation, and rebuild communities.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world today. It ranks as 170 of the 174 countries in the United Nations Index of Human Development, and last in the list of 135 countries in the UNDP Human Development Report, 2017.
Development Index. The recent intensification of the civil conflict has only exacerbated the difficult living conditions of an already impoverished population.

After 17 years of strife, destruction and displacement there is no end in sight to the misery of the people of Afghanistan. The United Nations and its partners in the international community have provided hundreds of millions of dollars of humanitarian assistance to victims of war and drought throughout Afghanistan and neighbouring countries. While many life-saving activities have been carried out and many rehabilitation efforts initiated, the volatility of the situation has precluded any durable reconstruction.

The International Forum is expected to rally international support for a strategy that links urgently-required humanitarian assistance with development and peace-making efforts. Most importantly, the strategy will reinforce the efforts of the Afghans themselves to achieve peace and stability in their country.

For more information, please contact: Madeleine Moulin-Acevedo (+4122) 917 28 56. [=]

12184. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (I) Historical Background. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. In order to understand the present day conditions of Afghan politics, especially regarding gender discrimination, the DHA mission observed how important it was to review these issues in their historical context. The gender issue has been central to the development of modern Afghanistan from the early 1920s, up to the present. This Section provides an overview of the Afghan history and its implications on the status and role of women in Afghanistan. [=]

12185. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (I) Historical Background: Afghanistan's Early History. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. Landlocked Afghanistan is at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan as a country emerged in the 18th century. The decay of two mighty Empires, the Safavids, based in Iran and Azerbaijan, and the Moghul based in India, provided for an Afghan chieftain, Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pushtun, to seize control of lands bordering on Central Asia in 1747. From the mid-18th century an independent Afghan political identity grew among distinct ethnic groups living in the region: the Pushtun, the Tajik, the Uzbeck, the Turkoman and the Hazara, among others. These ethnic groups joined together in establishing Afghanistan as a nation, although Afghanistan does not encompass any of these individual groups. This convergence of ethnically distinct groups shaped Afghan early political structure through a process of conciliation between competitive interests and strengthening of a system of central governance under a Pushtun dynasty.

Pushtuns, also called the Pathans, have played a dominant role throughout Afghan political history. Their main division, the Durrani, provided Afghanistan with the ruling dynasties of Sadozay in the 18th century and Mohammadzay from then until the military coup of 1973. The success of the Afghan political structure is to have built a model of conciliation and central governance, without alienating the components of the Afghan nation. Under the Durrani, ethnicity did not become a major issue beyond the determination of the ruling elite. Moreover, intermarriage among the educated Afghans, the universalist religion of Islam (80% of the Afghans are Sunni Muslims, 20% are Shi’a Muslim, small groups of Afghan Sikh and Hindu exist in the South-East region), and the economic interconnectedness of the regions have contributed over time to soften the notion of ethnicity and contribute to the solidarity of Afghans as a nation.

In terms of structure, Afghan political elites have displayed over the years continuous efforts to strengthen the nation-state through the enforcement of a unified set of laws and the creation of a centralized bureaucracy.

Twice the British troops attempted to extend their domination over Afghanistan, in 1838-1842 and in 1879, to secure the northern border of British India. In both attempts, their military superiority allowed them to reach easily Kabul and install a friendly monarch that would remain open and attentive to the policies of the British Empire. Each time, the monarch supported by foreign troops was rejected by the leaders of the Afghan tribes and met a bloody resistance. Twice, the British troops had to withdraw, not being able to maintain their military presence in Afghanistan. The second attempt allowed, however, the British to retain some control over the Afghan foreign affairs, until the peace treaty of Rawalpindi, signed in 1921, that recognized the full independence of Afghanistan.

To consolidate Afghanistan as a nation-state and to protect the territory against further interferences, Amir Rahman Abdur Khan (1880-1901) established an impressive standing army, although of disproportionate size at the time, considering the meager state income based mainly on an agricultural economy. He further succeeded in integrating rebellious tribes into a single polity, weakening their autonomy by transferring many of the military and administrative functions of the chiefs to the central government.

As the state structure developed and the matters it handled became more complex, the centralization project took over the conciliation process. In the early 20th century, the central government further concentrated power at the expense of a centuries-old traditional system that assigned power to secular rural magnates and religious groups. The ruling urban elite felt the need to keep an edge over the rural elite, to assert its authority over the whole nation. This opportunity was offered by the modernization of the country that would, for most of the 20th century, revolutionize the life of the urban population and leave unaffected most of the countryside. [=]

12186. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (I) Historical Background: Afghanistan's Rapprochement with the Soviet Union. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. With British withdrawal from India in 1947, the dormant issue of Afghanistan's claims over the Pushtun and Baluchi lands across the border, - the so-called Durand Line or tribal belt demarcated in 1893, re-emerged. The issue of "Pushtunistan" became a festering sore in relations between Afghanistan and the newly created Pakistan, inciting the Kabul Government to search for new routes for trade and transportation. Closer relations with the Soviet Union were established at this period of time. In many respects, the Soviet Union and communism offered to the ruling elite, as well as to the growing class of engineers and technical bureaucrats, many attractive features. Although being definitively modernist in terms of economic development, the authoritarian structure of the Soviet model discouraged the emergence of liberal political projects. Moreover, it offered to the new technocrat middle class a key role in building and modernizing Afghanistan. In the context of the cold war, the Soviet Union was keen to extend economic and technical assistance to its neighbor. In 1957, the Soviet Union financed the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan of the Kabul government, with a loan of $100 million. Over the next 15 years, the Soviet credits to Afghanistan amounted to more than $900 million, 60% of which in civil aid, amount that is exceptionally large for the region and the time.

In the same period, the main roads throughout the country were paved, some hydroelectric dams built, irrigation projects launched, education and health services improved or expanded, and some industries developed. Most of these projects and programmes served the reinforcement of the central bureaucracy based in the main cities of Afghanistan: Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Herat and Mazar-I-Sharif. The rest of the country remained again almost unaffected by these changes. Most of the Afghan people were given only a scanty access to modern education and development. The expanded bureaucracy absorbed the increasing number of urban educated elements, as the state traditionally had undertaken to employ such people. The private sector remained basically underdeveloped. The Afghan government grew, until the mid-1960s under a planned economy as an authoritarian, urban, and secular infrastructure.

In 1959, women were again allowed to unveil after the first
unsuccesful emancipation of the 1920's. Contrarily to the first attempt, this initiative restricted itself to the ruling and educated elite living in the urban areas and did not intend, at least in a first stage, to address the rights of the majority of the Afghan women living in rural areas. The unveiling proceeded smoothly in Kabul because of the number of educated women who already worked as nurses, midwives and teachers. The desire to unveil had become a marked tendency among the educated and urban women of the dynasty. The women of the educated and urban areas, government officials appeared unveiled in public functions, other followed suit. In the same trend, women were given the right to vote in 1961. The urban concentration of this phenomenon drew an increasing number of women from the countryside into the cities by the access to modern education and work opportunities, outnumbering in the late 1970's, their male co-students and colleagues in Kabul. The progress of the modern development in Afghanistan was measured by the emancipation of the Afghan women and the attraction such policies would exert on rural populations. The status of the women embodied the pride of the urban elite and the bitterness of its rural counterpart.

Still, under the pressure of the growing middle class, political reforms were progressing. A new liberal constitution was introduced in 1964 under King Zahir Shah with a system of elected parliamentary democracy. The next decade saw unprecedented liberalization of the political arena. Parties came into the open and a lively, relatively free political press came into being in Kabul. Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, the Afghan political structure became increasingly polarized under the liberalization process. Left-wing circles under the influence of Communist leadership grew in influence among students as fundamentalist Islam ideology attracted a number of young intellectuals from the rural areas and junior officers in the Afghan army. A series of political parties were created. Among them the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which would rule the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and the Islamic Association from which a series of Islamic parties would spring out under the resistance movement. [–]

12187. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (I) Historical Background: The Fall of the PDPA. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The events of the following months represent the most important period of recent Afghan political history in understanding the present political environment in Afghanistan. For a few weeks, a coalition of the mujahidin forces was governing Afghanistan, before their overriding concern became short-term personal and group gains. This period of intensive policy-making shows a fundamental turning point of the Afghan political structure. At its origins, Afghan political was motivated by a will to consolidate a central and secular bureaucracy. In this very short period, the Afghan political structure took a dramatic turn. Under the rule of the Leadership Council that took over the government functions in Kabul on 28 April 1992, Afghanistan became an Islamic state with an Islamic traditionalist project ruled by a fragmented power structure. The first few decrees issued by the Leadership Council indicate the features of the new Islamic state. It declared Islamic law (Shari'a) to be the law of the land. Among the existing laws, those considered to be contrary to Islamic law were declared null and void. Mohammed Siddiq Chakari, the Minister of information and culture declared in May 1992: "Our people have no need for music". In line with this policy, cinemas were closed. Alcoholic drinks were banned and liquor stocks destroyed. Prayers became compulsory for most of the urban population.

Women having such a prominent role in the previous regime in the eyes of the Islamic groups, their role became the object of special attention from the new policy-makers. Women were instructed to cover their heads, legs and arms and to observe a strict interpretation of Islamic law regarding the hijab (head covering). As these policies were not implemented properly, the Supreme Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan issued in September 1993 a fatwa declaring that the admixture of women with men in offices, cities and schools was unlawful, as an imitation of the West, and of atheistic orders. The fatwa forbade such mingling and demanded that the government immediately enforce all the commands of Allah, especially concerning the veil, and that it drive women out of offices and close schools for girls.

However, the social and political structure in Kabul was slowly but steadily falling apart. Islamic factions increased their military activities, most of the government administrations were deserted and Kabul, as well as its people, suffered from the worse years of war. The upheaval intensity increased by the fall of Kabul spread in the countryside where factions fought for the control of territory, each group building on its fiefdom. Again, several attempts took place to stabilize the political situation in Kabul but with no major success. When a relative political stability was achieved, the warriors engaged in looting, burglary, kidnaping and rape. During this period, 50% of the population fled and most of the city infrastructure was destroyed in the fighting. The central political structure of Afghanistan, and its modernization project appeared to have been physically wiped out with the fall of Kabul in April 1992. [–]

12188. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (I) Historical Background: The Fall of the PDPA. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. Mohammed Daoud, a Durrani who served as prime minister under King Zahir Shah, overthrew the constitutional monarchy and declared a republic in 1973. The pace of modernization of Afghanistan was preserved, but the liberal political experiment was all but suspended. Free press and most of the political parties vanished. More important was the distance taken by the Daoud Government from the supportive Soviet Union. Contacts were established with Arab and Muslim countries and loans for the new seven-year development plan were secured from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya. Furthermore, conciliatory discussions took place between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the controversies that separated the two countries. This growing distance from the Soviet Union drew renewed support to the PDPA and allowed it to take over the government in April 1978 in a military coup, called referred as the Saur Revolution, and to establish the Communist-led Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The self-proclaimed mission of the PDPA was to create a modern society by means of social revolution.

The end of the dominance of the Durrans and the take over by the Communists profoundly marked Afghan political life, to an extent that is still visible today. It marked a change of elite, from an aristocratic to a bureaucratic regime. The PDPA was mainly composed of educated bureaucrats. They were already active in the government but left out of any position of power under the Durrani. As part of the middle class, they were a cross-section of Afghan society. However, as Communists, they had alienated themselves from their origins. The Soviet Union became the blueprint for Afghan development and they basically broke with their Afghan past. This break with the past widened the gap between the urban and the rural areas.

Under the PDPA regime, this gap took dramatic proportions. Although the new leaders presented themselves as arising from the "masses", the attempts to impose heavy-handed reforms on the rural population were met with dissent. The passage of power to detribalized outsiders was viewed as intolerable in a closely knit, kinship-based rural society. The instability it generated provided fertile grounds for opposition and the further division of the Afghan political structure. A growing disunity within the PDPA and instability in the countryside are among the elements that brought the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in December 1979. From then on and for the duration of the Soviet military occupation, modernization of Afghanistan became more than a political scheme to retain power, but a military programme. Modern cities became fortified towns, modern services such as education as well as the work of women were used as instruments of propaganda. For many rural Afghans, the achievements in the field of education and gender took a definitive political color under the Soviet occupation. Interestingly, among rural Afghan women met by the DHA mission, the educated Afghan women who used to live in the cities are still commonly referred to as the "Russians".

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The Islamic groups constituted the backbone of the resistance movement. In Afghanistan, these groups were, and still are, of a fundamentalist nature. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism aims at providing a response for the rejected people of a state on the road to modernization. The overriding concern of the Afghan Islamists was to defend Islam from atheism which permeated the educated urban population after Afghanistan became dependent economically and politically on the Soviet Union. Secularism appeared as a hidden goal of the leftist intellectuals in power against whom Islamic groups vowed to defend what they saw as the unifying ground of the “real Afghanistan”, its universal Islam. From 1980 to 1992, through the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, the Afghan political structure was characterized by a confrontation along a line that was drawn in the course of the 20th century. The regime in Kabul headed by Babrak Karmal and then Dr. Najibullah, restricted itself to defending military bases, military installations, key cities and communication networks, as the countryside resisted the pacification campaigns undertaken by the Soviet forces. The traditional structure of the countryside suffered heavily during this period. Fighters and military commanders took over the power from traditional landlords, elders’ councils and mullahs. The exodus of more than a third of the population (five million refugees, and one million internally-displaced on a population of 1979 of 15 million), mostly from rural areas, aggravated the disintegration of the traditional Afghan society based on kinship.

Considering the fundamental changes occurring in the Soviet Union with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, it became a matter of time before Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan and the Communist-led regime would fall. Several attempts were made before and after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in February 1989 to establish a coalition of the political forces in Afghanistan with the Najibullah government still in place thanks to the important material support of the Soviet Union. None of these attempts succeeded in bridging the gap created by the programmes of development and 12 years of civil war. As the Islamic militia was approaching Kabul, international pressure for the establishment of an interim government increased. After months of battles and negotiations, 20000 mujahidin entered Kabul on 24 April 1992 under the cover of darkness. In Peshawar on the same day, most of the Islamic groups finally agreed on an interim regime of government to be established in Kabul. [=]

12190. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (II) Background Information on the Taliban Movement, Its Origin and Structure. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. Since their arrival on the Afghan political scene, the Taliban have drawn a lot of attention, especially concerning their policies on women. The DHA mission undertook to understand in details the reasoning and the functioning of the Taliban movement, as discussions took place on cooperation arrangements between the UN agencies and the Taliban authorities. This Section presents a summary of the information gathered on the origins and political structure of the Taliban movement. The next Section, under the points 3.1.2 and 3.2.3, describes the reasoning of the Taliban authorities in terms of women's role in the Afghan society. [-]

12191. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (II) Background Information on the Taliban Movement, Its Origin and Structure: Origins of the Taliban Movement. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. From 1993, the Afghan society entered into a downward spiral of violence, chaos and lawlessness. Kabul, and many of the major cities were the objects of confrontation between the different mujahedin factions and the countryside was divided among the different military commanders. In Kandahar, for example, four factions competed for control of the city. On the roads linking these enclaves, check points were numerous and, according to many inhabitants, civilians passing through were frequently harassed and subject to extortion. Some provinces were spared from these tensions and a slow reconstruction process took place with the support of the international community through operational agencies, such as UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), under the Afghanistan Rural Rehabilitation Programme (ARRP). In many of these regions, such as the Pakita, Paktika and Ghazni provinces, the legitimacy of the commanders, leaders of the resistance against the occupiers, crumbled for the benefit of the traditional holder of the local authority. In the cities however, tensions remained high and prospects of rehabilitation remained hampered by the rivalries between the different factions.

In November 1994, a new actor appeared on the stage by its take over of Kandahar from the local factions. The city, and soon after the province came under the control of a group of “Taliban” which claimed to restore peace and security through the imposition of a strict Islamic order. This new movement, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar Akhunzada, a 31-year-old religious leader, comprised in its early days not more than 200 members. Most of these were recruited from religious schools (“madrasa”) in neighboring Pakistan (from where their name “Taliban” comes from, meaning “students”).

In the days after the take over, the Taliban established a “shura” (an organ of consultation) of approximately 12 members around their leader, and took office as the rulers of the Kandahar province. Contrary to previous factions which would have consolidated their control over the
recently conquered territory and tried to take advantage of these new possessions, the Taliban were evidently motivated by a more ambitious objective. They retained their original goal of restoring peace and further mobilized their resources in pushing on their endeavor for an Islamic order in Afghanistan.

The prominence of the original goal of the Taliban movement over the interest in establishing themselves in the conquered territory diverted the movement, or setting up early on a sound basis for a government. The first Shura in Kandahar was constituted as a revolutionary council: semi-clandestine, highly centralized and hierarchical, its size and membership constantly changing. Such characteristics, particular to young revolutionary movements, proved to be prejudicial for the administration of the territories the Taliban controlled. Moreover, since the Taliban were outsiders, they could not rely on the reminiscence of the traditional local structure, to rule their new provinces. They had to count on their own resources to head the administration of the conquered territory.

It appeared from the beginning that the Taliban had no real capacity to rule a provincial administration. This weakness did not prevent the Taliban from extending their influence since there had been no major administration functioning in most of the territory it gained in its first campaigns. If such administration existed, the unsophisticated character of the Taliban would have been challenged early on and would have probably impaired considerably the ambitions of the movement. In this context, the Taliban appeared more as restructuring a destitute civil society on a common denominator, based on Islam and Pushtun traditions, than the set up of a ruling authority.

The first decrees of the new government reflect the strict implementation of Sharia principles that were learned as principles of government in the Koranic schools. The rigidness in the application of the Islamic law was justified, in the Taliban's perspective, by the debauchery that permeated the Kandahar society in the last days of the mujahidin commanders, including open conduct of homosexuality and the sexual harassment of girls, particularly on their way to schools. The Taliban reacted strongly against these conducts. In the absence of sound and practical alternatives, they decided to close the schools for girls until a proper civil order has been reestablished. The Taliban admitted, in discussions with the DHA mission, that this particular decree was extra-Islamic but considered it justifiable under the circumstances. This decision has had an important impact on the administration of the Taliban in the months to come since it was taken by the original leaders of the movement at a constituting moment of their project in Afghanistan.

In this first stage, the Taliban movement offered to the Afghan population a mixture of tradition and renewal. Tradition in its moral and religious claims and its ability to call for the mobilization of the tribal Pushtun society. Renewal since the leaders of the Taliban are not from the rural elite. They have been students in Koranic schools and fighters during the Soviet occupation. They do not depend on the tribal structure to support their authority. They presented themselves as fundamentalist outsiders, freed from factional interests. They see themselves as a transition force, aiming at shifting the Afghan sense of traditions from tribalism to Islamism.

This absence of an intellectual vision for Afghanistan, beyond this strict application of Sharia principles, is a crucial element in understanding the Taliban movement in its early stage. The Taliban emerged as a response to the chaos and lawlessness under the mujahidin commanders, not because of the absence of a government. There has been no functioning government for years before the emergence of the Taliban. The rise of the Taliban is based on their capacity to restore a minimal security in the territory they control and to disarm the population. They responded to the prevailing lawlessness by providing a textual interpretation of the Koran. In areas where the text is silent, they provide for strict rules, such as the prohibition of flying kites, playing music, or trimming beards. The movement had, and to some extent still has, no capacity to be flexible or amenable on substantive issues. Every substantive question has to be referred to the supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, to be decided on the basis of the Islamic teachings. This process has, until now, delivered several erratic policies that suggest the prevalence of a rudimentary procedure of interpretation of Sharia.

This centralization of the authority hinders the ability and the willingness of the Taliban members to discuss substantive matters. According to the head of a Kuwaiti NGO supporting education programmes in Afghanistan, one should not insist unnecessarily on policy issues with Taliban representatives since Taliban do not know how to exchange in substantive issues. To pressure them at a policy level, will only beget a harsh response. Practical proposals can always be discussed and may be agreed upon even if they do not entirely follow the tenets of the movement. Taliban prefer ignoring, or pretending to ignore, necessary arrangements that deviate from their policies, such as community-based schools for girls, rather than engaging in a process that will force the movement to engage in a policy-making process. Since such a process includes necessarily the ability of members to have different opinions and competitive interests that will have to be balanced by the leadership. It would bring into question the distinctiveness of the Taliban movement as compared to other factions, and the religious character of its endeavor. [=]

12192. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (II) Background Information on the Taliban Movement, Its Origin and Structure: Political Structure of the Taliban Movement. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. 3 years after its emergence, in early May 1997, the Taliban movement controlled more than 2/3 of the territory, including the capital Kabul. The military capacity required to conquer these areas suggests that the Taliban movement benefited, and still benefits, from substantial military and technical support from foreign countries. According to some analysts, this dependence on foreign support may have triggered a need for the movement to become more cohesive in its mission. From early 1998, the movement appeared as drifting some distance from the political agenda of its supporters and tried to develop its own agenda for Afghanistan. Political visions emerged in the ranks of the Taliban on the future of the Afghan society. Different schools of thought may have collided on substantive issues of governance. However, the military agenda, and its proponents, the military commanders of the Taliban militia, have prevailed over this tendency to develop and question the tenets decided in the aftermath of the take over of Kandahar.

Following the take over of Herat in September 1995, the decisions implemented in Kandahar became Taliban policies. Once again, Taliban ordered women to stay at home and schools for girls were closed. In this process, the Taliban started to see themselves as the rulers of the Afghan Islamic state, at least temporarily. The leadership of the movement was strengthened in April 1996 by the election in Kandahar, in front of thousands of mullahs and religious students, of Mullah Mohammad Omar as the: "Amir Almu'meneen", the Commander of the Believers, and the rural elite. They have been students in Koranic schools and fighters thousands of mullahs and religious students, of Mullah Mohammad Omar as the:"Amir Almu'meneen", the Commander of the Believers, reasserting the hierarchical character of the Taliban decision-making process, and strengthening the religious and dogmatic character, over the political character of the Taliban vision for Afghanistan.

With time and further military successes, the Taliban movement adopted a more stable structure. The original Kandahar Shura of the first companions of Mullah Omar expanded to approximately 30 members by the end of 1995, composed mostly of military commanders of the Taliban militia. This Shura continued to grow with the expansion of the territories under the control of the Taliban movement. The people living in these areas were not represented in the Kandahar Shura. The Shura remains a body of the Taliban movement. Its expansion is explained by the increasing number of Taliban officials running the territories conquered by the militia who, therefore, acquired a status in the consultation process of the movement. By September 1996 when the Taliban took over Kabul, the Kandahar Shura was known to count between 80 and 100 members. The growing size of the Kandahar Shura questioned to a certain extent its usefulness and cohesiveness as an organ of consultation. It is in this context that a second Shura emerged, the Kabul Shura.

The fall of Kabul into the hands of the Taliban forced the movement to reconsider the structure of its decision-making process. The existence
of the reminiscence of a government administration in Kabul had to be integrated in the Taliban scheme for temporary governance. Of this administration remained only some buildings and few civil servants. Most of the equipment was looted during the factional wars and many of the government employees, being unpaid, had left their functions.

In the fall of 1996, the Taliban leadership in Kandahar dispatched to Kabul a series of prominent members to take charge of these government functions, each of them referring to his position as acting-head of a department or ministry. However, the absence of a taxation system, the weakness of the infrastructure, and the lack of professional expertise to run the administration has impaired considerably the capacity of the Kabul Shura and its members to act on any policies, besides security and police measures. To a certain extent, it appears that the interest of the Taliban movement in taking charge of the administration and the ministerial functions in Kabul has been dictated by the need to relate with the international community which still regards Kabul as the political capital of Afghanistan, more than any interest in the reminiscence of the administration. The high moments of the activities of the Ministers appear to be limited to the reception of foreign journalists, diplomats, or representatives of an international organization in their almost empty and dysfunctional offices. Apart from the security apparatus, only the ministries that relate with major assistance programmes or public relations seem to be still active, such as public health (hospitals), education (schools), planning (coordination of NGOs), communication and information (spokesperson), and foreign affairs.

On the basis of this high-level presence of Taliban in the city, a new Shura has been created in Kabul, gathering together several times a week the heads of the ministries and some other prominent members of the Taliban movement in Kabul. The composition of this Shura has certainly been carefully managed in its relation with the Kandahar Shura. The leadership of the movement has to be sufficiently represented in Kabul to be a counterpart of the international community, without dislocating the center of power of the movement. The constant turnover of positions at the ministerial level that took place since the inception of this new “government” has been one of the ways to prevent the Kabul Shura to establish a distinct power base in Kabul. Despite these changes of portfolios, the constituting members of the Kabul Shura remain generally the same. The members commute frequently between Kandahar and Kabul, and radio contacts are maintained constantly between the two groups.

The function of the Kabul Shura does not differ from the one in Kandahar. It basically provides for a forum of consultation for the Taliban movement in Kabul. However, it should be noted that the Kabul Shura cannot take substantive decisions on any policy issue without first referring the matter to the Kandahar Shura, and eventually to the attention of Mullah Omar. Some observers argue that members of the Kabul Shura, and their Taliban subordinates in the ministries would like to see the Kabul Shura take a more executive role, motivating their insistence in seeing the UN agencies moving their country office in the Afghan capital from their present locations in Pakistan.

Also, the first Kandahar Shura seems to be losing its momentum. The increasing number of subject matters to be dealt with between the different provinces under Taliban control, and the rise of the Kabuli Shura as a more centered and cohesive process of consultation, has prompted the Taliban leadership to allow the emergence of a third Shura in Kandahar, called the Supreme Shura.

This Supreme Shura groups from six to 10 participants among the most influential members of the Taliban Movement, including some of the participants of the Kabul Shura. In many respects, this consultative body has always existed. It appears as a new embodiment of the nucleus surrounding Mullah Omar that has been forced out of its semi-clandestinity by the increasing burden in policy-making put on the shoulders of the Taliban movement and the increasing political role of the Kabul Shura. It presently deals with military and civil issues alike for the different provinces under Taliban's control and, contrary to the Kabul Shura, its positions are final. Taliban governors in the different cities, including Ghazni, Jalalabad and Herat, are accountable to the Supreme Shura in Kandahar. The overriding authority of the Kandahar Shura puzzles many observers of the political stage in Afghanistan as well as UN officials since its location in Kandahar questions the centrality and continuity of Kabul as the political capital of Afghanistan. According to some of them, a recognition of the supremacy of the Kandahar shuras, as the de facto executive bodies of the government, would have far-reaching political implications on the position of the UN agencies in the present conflict, and on the UN perspective on the future of the Afghan society.

In terms of policies, the evanescence of the Taliban structure and the centralization of its leadership have impeded the movement in the development of sound and flexible policies. The movement appears presently ill-equipped to answer the far-reaching requirements for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in terms of governance and technical programmes. The Taliban argue extensively that the establishment of a sound governmental structure with flexible policies needs to be postponed until the end of the present military campaign. This argument is certainly valid for political movements that demonstrated a capacity for governing the territory they control once peace is restored. This demonstration has not been made by the Taliban yet. They have shown only a limited capacity to rebuild and run an administration, with few exceptions such as the restoration of electricity in some parts of Kabul and Jalalabad.

To the credit of the Taliban movement, the mission observed the sense of order and personal security in the territory under the Taliban control. The mission was told that the checkpoints manned by undisciplined fighters have disappeared, and with them the harassment and the extortion of the civilian population. According to the UNHCR in Afghanistan, the return of one million refugees in these areas is an important sign of the benefits which this new regime has brought to these regions, in addition to the Taliban policy of return of the farm land to the original owners.

However, security remains a military issue. The restoration of a minimal order is not protective of a capacity to govern the regions once the hostilities have ended. The Taliban need to demonstrate a will to engage in a sustainable process of governance that requires flexibility and conciliatory skills, even for a government in a strict Islamic state. Moreover, it requires a political structure that can relate with the international community and engage in cooperation and dialogue on issues of international concern, such as gender discrimination, poppy cultivation, or the protection of the Afghan cultural heritage. Until now, some of the policies it has decreed, such as the closing of schools for girls, and the stubbornness of the authorities in applying them, reflect serious impediments in this regard. Other steps taken, such as the authorization for female health workers to resume their activities in a segregated environment, show an openness for a practical dialogue.

In this context, the evaluation of the Taliban capacity to govern is vital for the UN system. The conflicting views on the Taliban capacity to govern and will to cooperate has, until now, created significant gaps in the UN response to gender discrimination, for example between the UNICEF and WHO approaches. These gaps will be examined next, in Section III of the report. The DHA mission attempted to evaluate the Taliban will and ability to cooperate in engaging the Taliban leadership in a dialogue on cooperation with the UN agencies. This attempt is described and analyzed in Section IV. [1]

12193. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (III) Analytical Framework of the UN Responses
to the Taliban Regime. Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: Historical Background of the UN Response: Early UN Perception of the Taliban Policies. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. Undoubtedly, the arrival of the Taliban on the Afghan political stage created new constraints for the UN agencies in Afghanistan. The agencies’ representatives dealing with the Taliban authorities realized early on that the Taliban had only rudimentary knowledge of technical matters linked to their previous guerrilla warfare and how difficult it would be to argue constructively with these interlocutors. Moreover, the semi-clandestine political structure of the Taliban made the dialogue difficult. The Taliban interlocutors of the UN were not in a position to take substantial decisions pertaining to the work of the UN in Afghanistan.

From 1994 to the take over of Herat in September 1995, these constraints had a limited impact on the work of the agencies in Afghanistan. On the contrary, some agencies active in the countryside under the control of the Taliban were pleased with the new authorities. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which were engaged in the rural rehabilitation programmes, were impressed by the capacity of the Taliban to restore a minimal order and guarantee the security of the agencies in these areas. Under the previous regime of factions, the different groups exerted considerable pressure on the agencies active in the areas under their control.Expensive military escorts were indispensable and the numerous checkpoints scattered along the road, as well as the number of undisciplined fighters wandering in the countryside, complicated the work of these agencies.

The stringent policies regarding women and access to schools did not raise much interest at first from these operational agencies, and later on from the UN system. The rural areas under the Taliban control until September 1995 were among the most conservative regions of Afghanistan. The policies of the Taliban were in line with these traditions and with the modus operandi of the local rural population under the factions. For example, because of the prevailing insecurity under the mujahidin commanders and the lack of resources, education was extremely limited and concentrated on boys, who will provide a living for their future family. Girls’ education was seen as secondary, and presented serious threats to the security of the girls over a certain age who had to travel sometimes significant distances on unsafe roads to attend their classes.

Furthermore, the gap between the UN understanding of women’s status and that of the Taliban was so large that discussion became extremely difficult. The Taliban were generally unaware that a different perspective on the role of women prevailed at an international level, and that they had to relate with it. The experience of the British NGO Merlin in Kandahar is illustrative. A few weeks after the take over of Kandahar by the Taliban, Merlin was one of the first NGOs to send a female expatriate to the area. At the outset, it agreed to the Taliban’s conditions, including that this expatriate should wear the traditional “burqa” (a full veil covering the women from head to toe with an embroidered grill covering their eyes) in the presence of men, including male expatriates. Later, a mission of foreign diplomats visited Kandahar. A member of this mission was an unveiled woman. Following exposure to this women (unveiled in the presence of men), and a request by the UN in Kandahar, the Governor of Kandahar agreed in writing to exempt female expatriates from wearing the “burqa”. This policy regarding the female expatriates is still in force today.

The FAO and UNOPS experience with the Taliban in this period was one of cohabitation and mutual observation. The Taliban did not have the capacity to interact with the professionals of the agencies on the substance of their work, except from the standpoint of some of the Taliban’s own experience as farmers or stock-breeders. Taliban representatives were regularly informed of the work and of the agendas of the agencies. Some of the members of the movement participated in training sessions offered to the local peasants, such as training for the maintenance of orchards. Other agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF, did not consider the recent decisions on the gender issue as constituting a definite precedent. The regime was young and unexperienced. In general, the Taliban movement was considered to be an unusual offspring of the various factions that was, in their view, hardly sustainable.

The UN perception of the movement started to change when, in September 1995, the Taliban militia reached the outskirts of Kabul and took over Herat. The fall of Herat to the Taliban appeared, to many observers, as a turning point of the military campaign undertaken by the Taliban. The Taliban controlled a region that was, until then, predominantly Pushtun, calling into question the analysis that the movement has been basically a rural Pushtun phenomenon. The stringent policies of the Taliban were applied as well in Herat with the same strength. Women were not allowed to work, except in the health services and under specific conditions, and schools for girls were closed.

The first organization to react to the new policies was Save-the-Children UK (SCF-UK). SCF-UK opened an office in Herat in 1994. Its activities focused on the education and health sector, with a strong emphasis on training. The Taliban policies on gender forced most of these programmes to be suspended. Many of the beneficiaries were Afghan women, as well as most of the trainers. Moreover, the continuous obligation of the Taliban Governor to meet with the SCF-UK representative in Herat, who was a woman, blocked any form of substantive dialogue with the Taliban local authorities. A mission of SCF came from abroad to try to unlock the situation in early 1996, without success. Consequently, SCF-UK, supported by SCF-US and the International SCF Alliance, decided, on 6 March 1996, to suspend their education and non-emergency programmes in the regions where girls or women were denied access to education, or where the employment of women had been prohibited by the regional authorities.

This policy of SCF-UK challenged openly the prevailing modus operandi of the UN system which, until then, avoided entering into a confrontation with the Taliban authorities. The conditionality of international assistance, which requests policy changes from the Taliban as a precondition for the assistance programme, was seen by most of the agencies as a disproportionate and potentially counterproductive strategy. Furthermore, the attention of the UN agencies was centered on Kabul, still under the Rabbani’s regime, where educated women still had access to employment, and schools, to the extent they still existed, were accepting girls. After protest from Afghanistan women’s groups and other NGOs, UNICEF decided to stop school education programmes in some Taliban areas because girls had been expelled.

The reality of the life of women in Kabul and in other non-Taliban areas was not ideal either. It was reported to the mission that unhindered criminal activities, including abduction of young girls, rape and forced marriages of young girls with local commanders presented a constant threat to women. According to UN staff, even in areas where women had access to schools and employment, the overall lack of security and disregard for human rights by the factions’ members could have justified the conditionality of UN assistance.

In discussions with the DHA mission, women living in the regions under the NIMA still express their serious concerns for their security, which prevent many of them from exercising their access to schools and employment. With regard to the imposition of the “burqa”, the mission observed that, roughly, 90% of women in Mazar-I-Sharif wear the “burqa”, even though, under NIMA rules, there are not forced to, suggesting they do so of their own volition. The few women without burqa were seen in the surroundings of the university of Balkh and in UN offices. Otherwise, on the streets and in the market, the vast majority of Afghan women wore the traditional garment.

Despite the efforts of several NGOs, and certain members of the staff of the UN agencies, the prevailing modus operandi regarding the Taliban policies generally prevailed. The argument of most of the agencies in the field and at headquarters was that the Taliban was not a sustainable movement. One simply needed to be patient, rather than engage in an ambiguous precedent in conditioning the UN programmes of assistance. [1]
to the Taliban Regime, Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: Historical Background of the UN Response: The Search for a United Front on Gender. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The take over of Kabul in September 1996 forced the UN system to completely reconsider its approach toward the Taliban. For many observers, the fall of Kabul on 27 September took the international community by surprise. According to many UN staff, no one expected to see Kabul taken so rapidly, leaving the agencies without the time to consult on the UN's response to Taliban policies.

Moreover, Kabul has always been the symbol of modernity in Afghanistan. A cosmopolitan city where women had their role in the administration of the government. Many of the UN expatriates when questioned about the Afghan situation, related mainly with the Kabul reality, particularly regarding women. Educated women in Kabul participated fully in the work of some agencies and constituted a substantial part of their secretarial, health and training staff. The shock of the fall of Kabul overran the traditional pragmatic approach of the agencies engaged in the Taliban rural areas, since for the first time, an important number of UN female staff were directly affected.

The UN system realized that it had to respond to this affront. Not only did this policy of gender discrimination seems to maintain itself, it now compromised the ability of the UN system to employ women. Furthermore, the UN agencies were in a difficult position, having to pay their female workers at home, and employ new male staff in the positions left vacant. The UN system needed to vigorously denounce these new rules to prevent the Taliban policies in Kabul from becoming a fait accompli regarding the employment practices of the UN agencies. Still today, one of the basic constraints in moving the UN agencies country directors’ office from Pakistan to Kabul, apart from the security conditions, is the policy of the Taliban excluding women from the workforce.

Donors in Islamabad, and New York, met urgently in early October 1996 to request the UN system to take a strong position on the gender policies of the Taliban. The response of the UN system was rapid and strong. On 4 October, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Josué Ayala-Lasso appealed to the leader of the Taliban to ensure the respect for the basic rights of all Afghans, particularly women (See Annex 05). On October 7, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stated his dismay toward these policies which he considered contrary to fundamental humanitarian principles. He requested the UN agencies to respond in an appropriate and concerted manner to these policies (See Annex 06).

In a matter of a week, the conditionality of assistance that was previously applied to the NGO approach, entered the realm of the UN system. On 10 October, WFP Executive Director Catherine Bertini announced that, in view of recent events in Afghanistan, humanitarian operations there could be threatened and must be reassessed. She added that “the decision by the Taliban movement to ban women from working outside the home, as well as to ban education for girls, poses serious consequences for WFP’s activities in Afghanistan” (See Annex 07). In the following weeks, WFP decided to impose a temporary and partial suspension of deliveries of food to the country. This suspension has targeted non-emergency food assistance, in particular food-for-work programmes, and programmes where the equality of access between men and women was not guaranteed. UNICEF followed suit in extending in November its suspension to the rehabilitation of schools considering the inequality of access under the Taliban regime (See Annex 08). Other agencies such as the UNHCR reserved their position until further consultations with the field on the implementation of a gender-sensitive approach. WHO, through its office in Islamabad, dissented from this assertive trend by pleading for a more pragmatic approach to the gender issue in Afghanistan. This awakening of the UN system to the policies of the Taliban was abrupt and left the UN staff in Afghanistan confused. It appeared inconsistent with the previous positions. Some of the senior UN staff in the field, in Afghanistan and Islamabad, among WFP, UNICEF, UNHabitat, FAO and UNOPS, explained that they were not consulted prior to this reversal of policies, and had few hints on how to implement these concerns on Afghan women’s education and employment.

Furthermore, similar restrictions on women’s access to schools and employment had already been implemented in regions under the mujahedin commanders, apart from Kabul, Herat, or Mazar-i-Sharif. These restrictions went beyond the Taliban/NIMA front line and affected each province, although they were not equally implemented. For example, under the previous regime, the Governor of Jalalabad ordered in November 1994 all international agencies to stop hiring their Afghan female workers (See Annex 09). According to the UN staff in Jalalabad, one UN agency discharged its only female staff member in Jalalabad (as well as Medicins-Sans-Frontieres), and the other agencies refrained from hiring any Afghan female workers from then on. No specific instructions were given at the time on how the UN agencies should respond to these constraints.

The lack of common operational guidelines and the different strategic approaches among the agencies dealing with gender discrimination prompted the emergence of distinct schools of thought and triggered passionate debates between the agencies in the field. Some of the NGOs, SCF-US and Oxfam for example, played a significant role in feeding this debate and arguing for an intransigent stand with the Taliban authorities. Despite the attempt at the IFCA in Ashkhabad to anchor this debate into a process of consultation, an inflammatory discourse seems to embrace the gender issue, with the use of antagonistic language in the media. One might consider the extent to which such a discourse is propitious to the elaboration of a common operational approach.

Since these policies have been in force in half the country for more than 18 months, in Kandahar for more than 2 years, and in some locations even before the Taliban, it allows us now to document the social and economic consequences of these policies and to draw a common strategy to orient, on that basis, the agencies, and to set priorities for the UN response to gender discrimination in Afghanistan. This proposal is further discussed in Section V. Meanwhile, we will consider in more detail the assumptions underlying these different approaches and the actions that were taken on their basis. [=]
ambush convoys of aid agencies. The DRS set up an alternative power structure composed of elders and respected individuals in the communities to act as the recipient authorities of the humanitarian assistance provided by the agencies. These DRS were, nevertheless, not sustainable beyond their role as counterpart in the agencies’ scheme.

Contrary to the DRS experiment, the PEACE initiative aimed at directing the assistance directly to the communities’ entities, in existing projects or by creating new programs. It plans to resume certain programmes in terms of neighborhood infrastructure, and was able to assist in providing, for example, sewage rehabilitation and garbage removal. As incentives, Habitat provided the funding for larger tasks such as the pavement of the street. In addition, community centers flourished providing vocational training and primary health care to the neighborhood population.

12196. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (III) Analytical Framework of the UN Responses to the Taliban Regime, Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: Illustrations of the Different UN Approaches: Illustration of the ‘Principle-Centered’ Approach. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. As we saw, the “Principle-Centered” approach gained momentum at the fall of Kabul in September 1996, particularly among UNICEF and WFP. Already, UNICEF applied this approach to its assistance programmes to schools in areas under the control of the Taliban prior to the fall of Kabul. It implies the conditionality of certain programmes of assistance as an incitement to bring about policy changes. This conditionality has been reasserted in a UN press release of 1 April 1997. In terms of education, the request of UNICEF concerns the access of girls to schools where these schools existed and used to provide education to female students. UNICEF demonstrated a willingness to assist other types of schools, such as home-schooling, in areas where schools did not exist, or did not provide access to girls prior to the arrival of the Taliban. In terms of curriculum, UNICEF requested the same curriculum for both boys and girls, in accordance with the international standards, before allowing programmes of assistance to resume.

It should be mentioned that, while not a scientific sampling, among the 45 Afghan women met by the DHA mission in Afghanistan, a vast majority of them disapproved the conditionality of assistance in the field of education. They see the education of boys and girls alike as essential for the emancipation of women in the Afghan society. Furthermore, many of them, as mothers, did not like to see their boys, in addition to their girls, suffer from a position of the Taliban authorities.

At WFP, the first reaction after the fall of Kabul to suspend non-emergency food programmes had a major impact on the population concerned, according to a WFP staff member. This first decision was followed in December by a series of assessments to determine which programme could be resumed. In January 1997, WFP issued policy guidelines defining the criteria under which assistance could be resumed. These criteria aim at assisting vulnerable populations such as ‘widows and IDPs, and institutions that can guarantee the equality of access for men and women. However, WFP saw its efforts to exert pressure on the Taliban weakened by the increased food assistance of other organizations, such as the ICRC, that took over some of its programmes.


From early on, the UNHCR tried to maintain its contact with the Taliban and develop a form of dialogue. Recently, it succeeded in convincing the Ministry of Repatriation to allow the Afghan female staff of the UNHCR to resume their professional activities in the framework of a “loan to the widows” project. According to UNHCR staff, the project required several weeks of negotiation with the Ministry of Repatriation to arrange for seven female UNHCR staff and seven female staff of the Ministry to work in returnees settlements. Two more women were allowed to work in the offices of the Ministry of Repatriation for the project.

WHO succeeded in ensuring the access of female health staff to their employment. Here again, several weeks were required to convince Taliban authorities of the tremendous consequences of forbidding female employment in the health sector. According to WHO staff, the perspective of having Afghan women treated by unrelated Afghan men triggered the Taliban opening for the continued employment of Afghan female staff. The segregation of the staff in the hospital still caused major problems in the delivery of health services as nurses are hindered in contacting male physicians on professional issues. Moreover, the closing of the medical and nursing classes to female student questions the sustainability of the Taliban policies.

UNICEF and UNHCR recently extended assistance to schools for boys and girls in IDP camps near Herat. In March 1997, the Taliban Governor of Herat requested assistance for schools in IDP camps in his province. After negotiations of the terms of this assistance and consultations in Islamabad, UNICEF and UNHCR engaged themselves in providing basic assistance to these schools. Still in Herat, UNHCR and several NGOs succeeded in resuming vocational training programmes for women, but keeping a low profile on them. According to the International Assistance Mission (IAM) in Herat, authorizations have been obtained from the Taliban underlying the health aspects of the programmes and the fact that women will only work and study with other women.

WFP in Jalalabad entered into negotiations with the Taliban to obtain the necessary authorizations from the authorities to allow six women to resume their work as monitors of the WFP bakery project in Jalalabad.

Other experiments have failed. For example, the attempt by UNDP to propose to the Taliban authorities the rehabilitation of 20 schools, from which 10 would be devoted to boys’ education, and 10 to girls’ education. The Taliban authorities responded positively to this initiative regarding the rehabilitation of schools, but did not commit themselves regarding the allocation of the new schools.

Another example of a failed experiment is the attempt of UNOPS in Herat to continue to employ women to monitor their programmes. As these women were not authorized to come to the unsegregated office, they were given walkie-talkie by UNOPS to operate from their home. Security incidents (the stealing of the equipment) and pressure of the Taliban stopped the initiative of UNOPS.
"Principle-Centered" approach, the "Tip-Toe" approach, and the "Community Empowerment" approach. Each of these approaches is based on a distinct driving assumption about the Taliban authorities and constitutes an argument on its own on how to deal with this new regime. For each approach, we present the plan of action observed by the DHA mission and an analysis of the potential benefits and possible shortcomings. The purpose of this analysis is to allow us to take some distance with the different arguments, to judge the validity and the potential shortcomings of their assumptions, and eventually find a common approach that may answer the concerns of all the agencies. It should be underlined that these approaches do not belong to specific agencies, although some are, at this stage, identified with some of them. Subsection 3.4 will illustrate in details these three approaches through the different UN agencies' responses to gender discrimination in Afghanistan. [+] 

12199. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (III) Analytical Framework of the UN Responses to the Taliban Regime, Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: The UN Responses to Gender Discrimination in Afghanistan: Applicable International Legal Standards, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. We undertake in this Section a case study of the UN responses to gender discrimination in Afghanistan. For the sake of clarity, we will briefly address the applicable legal standards, both international and Islamic, and a short review of the context of the gender issues in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as a founding member of the UN, has ratified a great number of international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. These instruments provide for the principle of equality between men and women, and for special protection of women against discriminatory rules and treatment. The first and foremost instrument of this series is the UN Charter that refers to the principle of equality in its preamble "to reaffirm faith in human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women". The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex. The International Covenants on Human Rights proclaims the obligation of the States to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. According to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity. It is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries. It hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries. As a party to these international instruments, it is required of all Afghan authorities to uphold the standards as laid down, and that the Afghan authorities are answerable if those standards are not observed. In legal terms, the extent to which the Taliban are subject to international obligations has been questioned since only the Government of Afghanistan should be the holder of the rights and the debtor of the obligations contracted by the State of Afghanistan. Different UN bodies, such as the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have considered over the past year the Taliban as a facto authority in Afghanistan. It appears, furthermore, that the Taliban interest in being recognized as the government of Afghanistan by the international community and entering in cooperation with foreign entities, has presented numerous opportunities to underline the international obligations incumbent to this position. [+] 

12200. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (III) Analytical Framework of the UN Responses to the Taliban Regime, Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: The UN Responses to Gender Discrimination in Afghanistan: Taliban Policies and the Re-Islamization of Afghan Society. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. As we saw in Section I, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and the spread of Taliban movements in early 1990s challenged the modern secularization of public life in Afghanistan. The declared aim of these re-Islamization movements, known by various names throughout Afghan history and from which the Taliban emerged, is to reestablish Shari'a as the sole source of all aspects of law, both public and private. Some observers argue that these movements can be seen as a reaction to the western attempts at secularization of Afghan urban society, particularly Kabul, which is blamed by many Afghans for the political frustration of the rural population and the following disorganization of society and civil war. Others see this re-Islamization as being politically motivated by the interests of a non-urban elite to establish a legitimate basis of power, in the margin of the Afghan modern project. This basis of power is provided by the Afghan family, as the single most important institution in the society, in which the role of women is paramount. According to a renowned ethnologist on Afghanistan, personal honor and family honor, as codes of conduct of the Afghan family, rest on the behavior of female family members. Already the Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtuns, imposes serious constraints on the emancipation of women, and restricts their access to the public sphere. It was reported to the DHA mission, for instance, that the Pakistani Refugee Administration and the UNHCR encountered difficulties in attracting girls to the schools for Afghan refugees in Peshawar. With only 20% of girls attending schools at one point, it was decided to provide incentives in the form of food to families who sent girls to primary schools. Despite these incentives, female attendance rate increased only marginally with Afghan families continuing to resist education for female family members. Beyond tribal codes, the religious movements in general, the Taliban in particular, insist on their own strict interpretation of the Shari'a to maintain the purity of women. Separate spaces for men and women to preserve modesty and decency are seen as essential. Interactions between the sexes outside the group of acceptable male guardians including father, brother or son, are strictly forbidden. While conceding that men and women have equal rights to seek religious knowledge, the need for women's education lie solely in receiving the instruction necessary for the proper performance of religious duties (basic literacy). The thought, implied by modern education, of preparing for work outside the home is, in this context, inconceivable. To some extent, maintaining secular schools for girls, even when separate and taught by female teachers, are seen as the site of possible moral corruption. In their take over of Kabul in April 1992, the Islamic groups asserted their visions on the re-Islamization of Afghanistan. As described in Section I, previous un-Islamic laws were declared void. The tenets of a strict interpretation of the Shari'a were promulgated by the new government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, including the confinement of women to their home and the imposition of the veil. These tenets were loosely implemented in the fragmented political environment of the time. Some argue that the strict implementation of the Shari'a principles derived not so much of a distinct interpretation of Shari'a under the Taliban, but simply from the consistence of this group in its re-Islamization mission, and its control over a greater part of Afghanistan. The Taliban, like many other Afghan Islamic groups before them, do not recognize the former legal documents, including the UN conventions ratified by past governments, declaring them as foreign to Islamic society. Contrary to previous groups, they are strictly imposing their precepts without any interest in relating with the existing practices or substantially integrate the international community. Their decrees emphasize religious conduct and obligations which are harshly enforced by their religious police. From early on, the movement closed the doors of education and employment to women despite the traumatic repercussions felt in Kabul, and in the world. This exclusion of women
has considerably affected numerous government and international programmes, considered in many respects as sinful by the Taliban by the admixture of men and women and the modern ideas they conveyed. Some modifications were made in the health sector where women are allowed to work as long as they abide by Islamic conventions by observing the dress code, work in segregated spaces and travel with escorts. When schools reopened after the winter vacations in March 1997, only boys were accepted at the Kabul University and headmasters were directed not to register girls at schools.

In a meeting with the DHA mission, the Acting Minister of Education, Sayyed Ghaysuddin Aghar, argued that access to education for girls would be reestablished once security conditions would allow girls to go to their classes, and schools can offer an appropriate Islamic education in terms of segregated classes and curriculum. He explained that the Taliban favor education for girls, as provided for in the Shari'a. However, this education should be based and undertaken in accordance with Islamic principles and objectives. The representative of the Taliban movement in Islamabad, Muhammad Masoom Afghani, confirmed that the Shari'a-based opportunities will be the only ones offered to women, depending on security conditions and the availability of resources. [±]

12201. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (III) Analytical Framework of the UN Responses to the Taliban Regime, Particularly Regarding Gender Discrimination: The UN Responses to Gender Discrimination in Afghanistan: The Gender Issue in an Afghan Islamic Perspective. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The vast majority of the Afghan people, men and women alike, recognize and accept Islam as the foundation of the Afghan way of life and of the Afghan legal system. Many interpretations have been developed over the years on the precepts of the Islamic law (Shari'a). The religious nature of Shari'a makes it difficult for Muslims to appear critical to that law, so interpretation is the only available way to make the law progress through time and situations. These interpretations of the legal sources, the Qur'an and the Sunna, are numerous and constitute the basis for several schools of thought.

In the past, no central Afghan religious authority was given exclusive rights to interpret religious precepts. Afghans with different interpretations of the Shari'a coexisted contentedly. The war brought to the forefront groups that based the legitimacy on strict interpretations of the Shari'a. As a consequence, the traditional Afghan tolerance and openness to various interpretations was strained. Religious conservatives claimed the right to decide who was “a good Muslim”. These conservatives confronted those who argued that the principle of equality between men and women was central to Islamic tenets. They generally held that if women are permitted to move freely in the public arena, sexual anarchy will result and society will fall into ruin.

In general, Shari'a is concerned with guaranteeing certain minimum rights for women and not with achieving complete legal equality between men and women. In this context, Islamic scholars argue that Shari'a should be understood in its historic and cultural environment. In a historical perspective (Shari'a law has over 1200 years of legal interpretation), some scholars argue that Shari'a has had, and for a very long time, a positive impact on the rights of the women. From its beginning in the seventh century, Shari'a guaranteed all Muslim women an independent legal personality, including the capacity to hold and dispose of property in their own right, a specific share of inheritance, access to education (provided it is conducted in a segregated manner) and some participation in public life. In the family sphere, Shari'a restricted polygamy and guaranteed the wife's right to maintenance. It provided also the right for a judicial divorce, under specific conditions. These achievements may not appear impressive in a modern perspective, but they represent very significant improvements of the women's condition of the time. However, when compared to other contemporary legal systems, or judged by the international standards, Shari'a offers limited guarantees for women in the 20th century. Gender segregation and the requirement of the veil, as a general rule, diminish the practical value of the women's rights under Shari'a and restrain the women's ability to achieve economic independence and to secure access to education.

Islamic scholars did not yet invest the efforts required to elaborate a regime of protection of women's rights that would favorably compare with international standards. Furthermore, a space for these interpretations has not been created yet in the modern discourse on human rights. On the contrary, movements toward equality and emancipation of women have been linked throughout the Muslim world with efforts of secularization of Muslim societies, challenging not so much the different interpretations of Shari'a, but the centrality of its role in Muslim life. To some extent, this inability of Islamic scholars to generate a competitive regime of protection for women has created an unstable gap between the two sets of standards. This gap has, in turn, allowed opponents and proponents of the two models of society to argue extensively on the role and status of women in the service of larger political interests. The resulting politicization of women's issues has become highly sensitive and potentially volatile in the Afghan context, because of the centrality of women in the traditional Afghan concepts of family and honor. [±]

12202. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (IV) Perspectives for Cooperation and Dialogue Between the UN Agencies and the Afghan Authorities: Comments on the Taliban's Proposal. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. In our view, the Taliban proposal, which was endorsed by the Kabul Shura on 1 May 1997, represents a significant breakthrough in the dialogue between the UN system and the Taliban authorities. It sets a written basis for discussions on cooperation and dialogue. It may allow a variety of issues and operational agendas to be addressed in a privileged environment in which Taliban officials could be advised on the development of sound policies in terms of governance and in terms of applicable international standards. Furthermore, it demonstrates at the highest echelon of the Taliban movement an interest in engaging in a form of practical dialogue with the UN agencies. In this context, we believe the UN system should devote significant attention in responding to this proposal in a constructive manner.

On the other hand, the DHA mission observed that the Taliban's will to engage in cooperation is far from being the central issue in promoting a new relationship with the movement. Its limited capacity to engage in substantial processes of policy-making, or in the implementation of governmental programmes remains the main obstacle to a meaningful cooperation. To illustrate this point, one might consider the experience of the UNHCR in the last months of 1996 when the agency tried to convince the Taliban authorities to declare an amnesty in favor of the returnees. The intervention was made in order to promote the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees living in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. The Taliban were very receptive to the idea and all the echelons consulted in Kabul agreed with the request. The UNHCR prepared a draft of an amnesty, to be used as an example to help the authorities in this process. This draft was translated into Pushtu and circulated among the relevant authorities, and the UNHCR officials remained available for further discussions. Unfortunately, the amnesty never came. It appears that even if the Taliban had been willing to decree an amnesty, this policy would have remained meaningless since the central authorities hardly control the local judiciary system.

In this context, the implementation of an agreement with the Taliban seems far more complicated that the process to reach an agreement. The present structure of the movement, described in Section II, and the absence of a functional administration preclude the movement from undertaking substantial reforms or actions at a national level. Even if some of the civil servants that could take the necessary actions to implement an agreement with the UN system are still in place, many are not yet entrusted with the authority to undertake substantial action in the name of the government. Therefore, whatever is the will of the present Taliban authorities, one should not expect major achievements from a cooperation arrangement with the Taliban in their present state.

The question remains to determine if the development of
cooperation arrangements with the Taliban are worth the efforts. In our view, the UN system has no real choice. It has to invest reasonable efforts into promoting a substantive dialogue with the Taliban simply to manage the existing gap between their vision of Afghan society, and the international standards to be respected. Furthermore, one should acknowledge the Taliban’s impact on the political landscape of Afghanistan, restructuring Afghan society on Islamic tenets and modeling a new society of Afghanistan. Secretary of the Commander of the Believers and spokesperson of the Taliban movement in Kandahar, Mr. Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, head of UNOCHA, on 28 April, who has been preparing a response in consultation with the UN agencies and DHA headquarters. (The English translation of the proposal is attached in Annex 04, the original in Pushtu is with UNOCHA in Islamabad).

Several features are worth being underlined in this proposal. First, as stated in the proposal, the Taliban movement is interested in establishing a platform for a permanent dialogue at a professional level with the UN agencies on the elaboration of projects and programmes of assistance. In addition, this technical platform could be used to promote an understanding of the needs of the Afghan population, men and women. In this respect, the Taliban leadership has proposed to the UN system that women expatriates participate in the technical consultations in identifying the priorities of the UN programmes of assistance regarding women's needs in Afghanistan (point 3.4 of the proposal).

Finally, the Taliban leadership is interested in using such a platform for discussions on the legal status of UN staff in Afghanistan, as well as exchange of views on the Afghan and international legal standards applicable to programmes of assistance in Afghanistan. [=]

12203. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (IV) Perspectives for Cooperation and Dialogue Between the UN Agencies and the Afghan Authorities: General Discussions on Cooperation Arrangements with the Afghan Authorities. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. In the terms of reference of the DHA mission, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs asked the mission to propose a practical framework for the elaboration of a common understanding of the UN humanitarian mandate in Afghanistan, in cooperation with the Afghan authorities.

The mission engaged in discussions with the Afghan authorities in Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif on the different ways to enhance the cooperation between the UN agencies and the Afghan authorities. The authorities of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) based in Mazar-i-Sharif welcomed the initiative of the DHA but considered the present framework of contact and relationship as adequate. Their concerns were more oriented toward the implementation of programmes than the development of an understanding on the UN objectives on which they basically concur. They would like, on the other hand, to see some of the UN funding for assistance channeled through the authorities to assist them in maintaining the services to the population.

The authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan based in Kabul, as well as the leadership of the Taliban movement based in Kandahar, expressed their interest in developing a framework for the elaboration of a common understanding between the Taliban and the UN agencies on the UN programmes of assistance and rehabilitation in the region they control. Already, this interest had been conveyed to the country directors of the UN agencies active in Afghanistan in the course of a workshop on UN programmes organized by UNOCHA (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) the first week of April 1997. In the course of this workshop which attracted prominent members of the Taliban, such as the Governor of Kandahar, Mullah Mohammad Hasan, open discussions took place on the opportunities and constraints of the UN work in Afghanistan. In the same trend, discussions between Taliban representatives and UNOCHA, in the first months of 1997, addressed in particular the need to establish a process of technical consultation between the UN system and the Taliban authorities in the areas under their control.

12204. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: (IV) Perspectives for Cooperation and Dialogue Between the UN Agencies and the Afghan Authorities: Taliban's Proposal for the Establishment of a ‘Joint Technical Committee’ with the UN Agencies. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The Supreme Shura in Kandahar decided on 27 April to present a proposal to the DHA mission for the establishment of a “Joint Technical Committee” on international assistance to Afghanistan. This proposal was handed over to the mission by Mullah Yakub Ahmad Muttla, Secretary of the Commander of the Believers and spokesperson of the Taliban movement in Kandahar. The proposal was transmitted to Mr. Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, head of UNOCHA, on 28 April, who has been preparing a response in consultation with the UN agencies and DHA headquarters. (The English translation of the proposal is attached in Annex 04, the original in Pushtu is with UNOCHA in Islamabad).

Several features are worth being underlined in this proposal. First, as stated in the proposal, the Taliban movement is interested in establishing a platform for a permanent dialogue at a professional level with the UN agencies on the elaboration of projects and programmes of assistance. In addition, this technical platform could be used to promote an understanding of the needs of the Afghan population, men and women. In this respect, the Taliban leadership has proposed to the UN system that women expatriates participate in the technical consultations in identifying the priorities of the UN programmes of assistance regarding women's needs in Afghanistan (point 3.4 of the proposal).

Finally, the Taliban leadership is interested in using such a platform for discussions on the legal status of UN staff in Afghanistan, as well as exchange of views on the Afghan and international legal standards applicable to programmes of assistance in Afghanistan. [=]
Recommendations. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. From the analysis of the DHA mission, three main set of recommendations for the promotion of a common and sustainable approach can be underlined:

1. To reassert the principles of the UN and, on that basis, to identify practical arrangements for the engagement of the UN agencies in Afghanistan.

   Practical recommendations:
   - Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, UN agencies should review their present policies and develop a common response to issues of common concern, such as gender discrimination in Afghanistan.
   - Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, UN agencies should agree on a set of practical and realistic objectives on which a common strategy and position could be built.
   - Under the supervision of the Humanitarian Coordinator, a UN team composed of male and female expatriates should undertake an assessment of the situation of Afghan women throughout Afghanistan, and elaborate a set of practical objectives for UN agencies to sensitize the authorities on the implications of their policies, and to improve the conditions of Afghan women.
   - Regarding gender, efforts should be made to employ an increasing number of expatriate women to elaborate and support practical arrangements regarding programs of assistance to women in Afghanistan, and employment of Afghan women in UN operations.
   2. To engage in a dialogue with the authorities and to better understand their functioning.

   Practical recommendations:
   - UN agencies country representatives and UN policy makers should further develop and strengthen their contacts with the Taliban authorities, particularly in Kandahar.
   - Appropriate time and resources should be devoted to assess and analyze the political developments in Afghanistan on an on-going basis.
   - To commit the resources and the expertise required to have a significant impact on the situation of the Afghan population.
   - Donors and head of agencies should support the elaboration of practical objectives and encourage the development of a common strategy for the implementation of these objectives.

   Close attention should be paid to providing for tangible and observable results for the concerned Afghan men, women and children in the framework of this engagement.

Finally, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the UN agencies should respond constructively to the proposal of the Taliban on the establishment of a “Joint technical committee” and invest the time and resources required to strengthen and develop the technical relationship with the Taliban authorities in the planning and the implementation of their programs. [=]

12207. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: Acknowledgment. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The DHA mission wishes to express its appreciation to all those who supported its work in the field and at headquarters. The DHA mission is thankful for the availability and openness of the UN agencies country directors and staff who kindly shared their views with the team.

The team is particularly grateful for the assistance provided by the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, especially Mr. Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, who provided the team with a constant support and sound advice in the undertaking of its mission. Special thanks go to Ms. Brigitte Neubacher, Assistant to the Humanitarian Coordinator in Islamabad, Angela Kearney, UNOCHA representative and her staff in Kabul, Mr. Dave Edwards from UNOCHA in Kandahar, and other UNOCHA staff in Herat and Mazar-I-Sharif.

Finally, the mission is particularly appreciative of the efforts of Mr. Muntaz Akhunzada, UNDP staff in Jalalabad and translator for the mission, for his kind and discerning assistance throughout the mission. [=]


The emergence of the Taliban Movement, now in control of most of the territory of Afghanistan, entailed challenges for the UN and non-governmental organizations. Among these are Taliban policies of gender discrimination in employment and education, as well as security of UN personnel and premises.

Scarcity of information about the Taliban Movement within the UN system and factors leading to its emergence affected how the UN agencies related with the Taliban authorities. A two-person mission from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) traveled in Afghanistan for four weeks to assess the relationship of the UN agencies with the public authorities of Afghanistan and to identify opportunities and constraints of programmes of assistance to Afghanistan in the new environment.

Within the UN agencies and NGOs, there appeared multiple approaches of dealing with the Taliban based on differing assumptions about their organization and capacity. These approaches can be broadly categorized into three groups:

1. The “Principle-Centered” approach: making assistance conditional on change of policies that are in conflict with the UN charter and internationally recognized norms and principles.
2. The “Tip-Toe” approach: attempting pragmatic experiments on the ground hoping for the development of a practical arrangement with the Taliban authorities.
3. The “Community-Empowerment” approach: developing community capacity to act as counterparts to the UN agencies, in the margin of the authorities wherever possible.

With respect to the Taliban, the key issues are their willingness and ability to work cooperatively with the UN. They have demonstrated their willingness by forwarding to the DHA mission, a proposal for the establishment of a joint technical committee. They have proposed this committee to be a consultative body of professionals from the UN and the Islamic State of Afghanistan, to discuss regularly and in a privileged environment, programmes of assistance to Afghanistan, including the applicable international norms and principles. Significantly, the Taliban has invited expatriate women from the UN to participate in the proposed committee.

On the question of the ability of the Taliban to engage constructively with the UN, the mission has reservations. The mission observed a lack of capacity within the Movement to deal with issues of civil administration and the military campaign consistently having priority over these issues.

The DHA mission believes that a common consistent approach for the UN system in Afghanistan can only be developed on the basis of a clear understanding of the historical background and political implications of the Afghan policies regarding gender, and of the benefits and shortcomings of prevailing UN strategies.

A UN common approach should remain strong on principles, open to experimentation with the authorities on the basis of these principles, and supportive of the local communities. The readiness of the UN agencies to recognize the value of the different approaches and to integrate their positive elements in the agencies’ perspective will determine the ability of the UN system to elaborate a common approach.

The main recommendations of the DHA mission are:

- Time and resources should be devoted to assess and analyze the political development in Afghanistan on an ongoing basis.
- UN agencies should agree on a set of practical and realistic objectives on which a common strategy and position could be built regarding gender discrimination.
- UN agencies’ country representatives and UN policy makers should further develop and strengthen their contacts with the Taliban
authority, particularly in Kandahar.

- A UN team should undertake an assessment of the situation of women in Afghanistan and elaborate a set of practical objectives for UN agencies to sensitize the authorities on the implications of their policies, and to improve the conditions of Afghan women.

- UN agencies should respond in a constructive manner to the proposal of the Taliban authorities for the establishment of “Joint technical committees” between professionals of the UN system and the Taliban authorities. [=]

12209. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: Introduction. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. Following a series of consultations at the International Forum on Assistance to Afghanistan (IFAA) held in Ashkhabad in January 1997 with UN agencies and national and international NGOs active in Afghanistan, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, dispatched to the region a mission to study the constraints recently encountered by the UN agencies in the implementation of their humanitarian programmes in Afghanistan.

This report represents the observations and recommendations of the DHA mission. The purpose of the report is to provide policy makers of UN agencies with information on the prevailing constraints under which agencies are operating in Afghanistan. It addresses more specifically the constraints encountered in the Taliban controlled areas regarding the Taliban’s policies of gender discrimination, and offers a practical analytical framework for the various UN responses to these constraints.

The need for such a study arose from the discussions between UN agencies in Ashkhabad in which differences of approaches emerged on issues of UN concern in Afghanistan. The DHA mission observed that these various approaches were based on distinct sets of assumptions concerning the political structure of the Afghan authorities which needed to be further examined.

Beyond its commitment to the various issues such as gender, the environment and drug control, the dynamic of the UN engagement in Afghanistan relies on a continuum linking the objectives of the UN Charter and internationally recognized human rights, to the practices of the agencies under the constraints of the field. This dynamic is based on the ability of the UN system to elaborate a common understanding of the opportunities and constraints of UN work in Afghanistan. An understanding that supports the efforts of the agencies in the field while remaining in line with the guiding principles of the UN Organization.

The elaboration of such an understanding in Afghanistan appears, nevertheless, as an arduous process. The balancing exercise of combining principles and practical approaches in the Afghan context has been increasingly complicated and frustrating. Moreover, the DHA mission observed that the scarcity of background information at headquarters level on the changing Afghan political environment, and on the constraints it exerts on the UN agencies, has impaired the capacity of the UN system to respond in a practical manner to current issues of concern, such as gender discrimination in Afghanistan. These issues are being dealt within an abstract, and sometimes doctrinal environment, centered on the principles and leaving the agencies without the necessary operational guidelines to orient their response. As a consequence, conflicting agendas have emerged among UN agencies on how to implement the mandate of the UN organization on these specific issues.

The DHA mission hopes that its report will contribute positively to the elaboration of a common approach by the UN agencies in Afghanistan, particularly regarding the UN response to gender discrimination in that country. It encourages UN agencies and humanitarian organizations active in Afghanistan to further exchange their views concerning the Afghan situation, as well as the situation of women in Afghanistan, for the benefit of their operations and of their beneficiaries. [=]

12210. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan: Methodology. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, March 30-May 15, 1997. The DHA mission was composed of Claude Bruderlein, Policy Advisor at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in New York, and Adeel Ahmed, research assistant and Associate Humanitarian Affairs Officer at the Policy and Analysis Division of the DHA. The mission spent four weeks in the region, from 30 March to 2 May 1997, during which it traveled extensively throughout the country. The team met with more than 100 interlocutors from a large spectrum of authorities and organizations, including the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, UN agencies and programs involved in Afghanistan, non-governmental organizations, both national and international, and representatives of the authorities of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) and of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA). (A list of interlocutors is attached in Annex 01).

The objectives of the mission were to review the framework of dialogue and negotiation with the authorities of Afghanistan and to suggest a series of measures aimed at developing and improving the cooperation between the Afghan authorities and the UN agencies involved in Afghanistan, especially regarding the concerns of the UN system on gender discrimination in that country. (The terms of reference of the DHA mission are attached in Annex 02).

This report assumes no prior knowledge concerning Afghanistan nor of the UN response to the Afghan situation. As mentioned, the mission noticed the lack of background information, or the presence of contradictory information, among UN agencies and non-governmental organizations concerning Afghan recent history, particularly regarding the situation of the Afghan women. In an effort to promote a common understanding of the Afghan political environment and the situation of women, the mission felt the need to review briefly the history of Afghanistan from authoritative sources (see Annex 03) and introduces the main points of this preparatory review in Section I of the report.

Similarly, Section II of the report presents an analysis of the Taliban political structure in the Taliban-controlled areas from the observation of the mission during the numerous meetings which took place with a series of representatives of the Taliban movement. Since the Taliban movement, at the time of mission, controlled over 75% of the territory, the mission believed its origins and structure should be better understood in connection with any practical approach dealing with issues of concern in these areas. Section III introduces an analytical framework of the UN response to the recent developments in the Afghan situation and applies this framework for the UN response to the UN policies against gender discrimination of the Taliban movement. Comments on the Taliban proposal for the establishment of a joint technical committee on the cooperation with the UN (see Annex 04) are presented in Section IV. Section V draws the main conclusions and recommendations of the mission. [=]


(165) The representative of the United States said that the Conference should be the occasion for a constructive, practical reaffirmation of the shared commitment to peaceful co-operation. To a large extent, this expectation had been fulfilled, and a large degree of consensus had emerged. There was agreement on such important population matters as the necessity for viewing family programmes within a development framework and the unacceptability of government coercion in any form in connection with population programmes. He welcomed the Conference’s affirmation that abortion was not to be considered or promoted as an acceptable element of population control programmes.

(166) Commenting on that part of recommendation 3 which called for an increase of earnings from exports of commodities, he hoped that, under market conditions, returns to exporters would be enhanced. He
questioned, however, the idea that countries should join in co-operative efforts to maintain prices at artificial levels. In his Government's view, the reduction of barriers to trade remained the best way to increase income. With reference to the call for increased international lending and official capital flows, he noted that the problem had both governmental and private dimensions. Governments could not be bound to a particular form or quantity of official assistance. Nor could Governments dictate the policies of private lending institutions. What all delegations could do was to promote, in their respective countries, conditions that would invite lending and create incentives for domestic and foreign investment in the form of loans and equity capital.

(167) He noted that the recommendations contained numerous references to international conventions or agreements. Some of these commanded universal support, others did not. Yet the attempt was made to imply that the entire international community supported all these instruments, some of which were quite controversial. The United States reserved its position with respect to all the international agreements mentioned, in keeping with its acceptance or non-acceptance of them. In particular, he referred to the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (168) Proceeding, the United States representative said that international efforts in support of population programmes had been among the most successful examples of international co-operation. In the developing countries in the last 30 years, total fertility rates had fallen on average more than halfway toward a goal of population stability: related social indicators had improved, human life expectancy had dramatically increased; caloric intake per capita had improved, literacy rates had significantly increased, disease had diminished and health care improved. Per capita income had grown substantially. The absolute numbers of people had nevertheless increased, and their need was still very great. Some nations had not shared equally in these improvements and much remained to be done. The World Population Plan of Action had provided a solid foundation for co-operative contributions to this enormous human progress. The Conference had further strengthened and adapted that foundation - a heartening achievement. Unfortunately, these significant achievements had been overshadowed by successful efforts on the part of a number of countries to introduce extraneous and divisive political issues into the deliberations. Those efforts were prejudicial to the entire system of peaceful, non-political international cooperation.

(169) The United States representative said that the founders of the United Nations, with the experience of the Second World War still fresh in their minds, had understood the tragically destructive potential of the divisions and divisions persisting among the peoples and nations. In structuring the United Nations system, they had sought to shelter international efforts to promote progress from political contention. They had established a number of organizations and agencies from which political contention would be banished. In that way they had displayed an understanding not only of the care needed to preserve the fragile structures of co-operation, but of the contribution such co-operation could make to the foundations of peace. Those who truly understood the meaning of the ideal of the United Nations knew that, above all, its purpose was to preserve the hope for peace.

(170) Those who sought to politicize the non-political fora of international co-operation were the enemies of this hope. Because it was hoped that they cherished, even as they cherished the truth of human dignity and freedom, the Government and people of the United States were committed to resist the destruction of this hope. Because of this commitment, the United States opposed recommendations 5 and 34 contained in the text (E/CONF.76/S.5) submitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee. The sponsors of both these recommendations had violated the principles of the founders of the United Nations. They had refused to respect the distinction between fora suitable for the discussion of divisive political issues, and those, such as the Conference, where such discussion was not suitable. Those who sought most strenuously to divert the efforts of the Conference to an inappropriate discussion of disarmament had refused to sit down in good faith at the negotiating table to achieve real reductions in arms through verifiable arms reduction agreements. The peoples of the world, particularly those in developing countries, were unlikely to benefit if efforts to promote development, social progress and the alleviation of human suffering were held hostage to the divisive passions of an intransigent minority.

(171) The United States delegation accordingly strongly protested against the shadow of divisiveness and confrontation that the actions of some nations had cast over the work of the Conference and over similar efforts throughout the United Nations system. It appealed to all nations represented, and to all people everywhere, committed to the original ideals of the United Nations to join the United States efforts to avert the eclipse of co-operation and hope which the cynical manipulation of some, and the misguided passions of others, were threatening to bring upon all.

(172) The representative of the Holy See stated that his delegation believed that it had benefited from its participation in the Conference and hoped that it had made a contribution to the work of the Conference. None the less, the Holy See regretted that it could not participate in the consensus on the recommendations produced by the Conference. The discussions had produced an improvement over the World Population Plan of Action. The recommendations contained some valuable proposals with regard to development, the important role of the family, migration and aging. In the light of its understanding of the nature of the human person, the sacredness of life, marriage and sexuality, the Holy See could not, however, agree with or give approval to those sections that asserted for individuals, including unmarried adolescents, the prerogatives that belonged to married couples in regard to sexual intimacy and parenthood. Secondly, the recommendations endorsed and encouraged methods of family planning that the Catholic Church considered morally unacceptable. In fidelity to its own responsibilities, the Holy See could not endorse proposals that were contradictory to its belief and teaching.

(173) The Holy See participated in the many activities of the United Nations in the hope of eliciting an ethical consensus on many of the issues before the United Nations bodies - a consensus arising from a universal concern for the dignity and rights of the human person, men and women, and many other human and societal values. At the same time, the Holy See must preserve coherence and consistency in its moral commitment and teaching.

(174) Whereas Members of the United Nations often conditioned their approval of United Nations resolutions and declarations on the right of national sovereignty, such a conditional approval was not possible for the Holy See.

(175) While agreeing with many of the positive conclusions reached, the Holy See regretted that it was unable to associate itself with the consensus.

(176) The representative of Sweden stated that the Swedish delegation welcomed the adoption of the recommendations and was especially satisfied with the emphasis on the situation of women and on their role in development.

(177) While fully associating her delegation with the adoption of the recommendations, the representative of Sweden wished to place on record its view that the recommendations in one important respect did not meet its expectations. Little consideration had been given during the Conference to the very serious problem of illegal abortions. Her delegation regretted that an amendment to delete the word illegal" qualifying abortions had been adopted in recommendation 13(e). Reports showed that induced abortion was one of the most common methods of birth control in the world. Abortions were carried out in practically all societies, and high abortion rates existed both in developing and in industrialized countries. Abortions took place more or less irrespective of socio-economic conditions, medical facilities, official religion and - as a matter of fact - also of national abortion legislation. Abortion was often more widespread in countries where abortion and contraception were restricted than in countries where abortion was legal and contraceptives were freely available. Millions of women were seriously hurt - many even died - every year as a result of illegal abortions under unsafe medical conditions. The Conference had chosen not to recognize the plight of all these women and had thereby postponed an effective solution to this pressing problem. PreventIOn of unwanted pregnancies must always be a primary goal. Through family planning, it was possible to
create a first line of defense against abortions. Hundreds of millions still, however, lacked access to safe forms of contraception. This was why illegal abortions in many countries constituted such a serious health hazard. In her opinion, all women should have access to legal and safe abortions.

(178) In a note addressed to the President and delivered after the meeting, the representative of Saudi Arabia stated that, having been unable to attend the final meeting at which the recommendations and the final report of the Conference were adopted, the delegation of Saudi Arabia, while associating itself with the recommendations adopted by the Conference, wished to record that had it been present, it would have reserved its position with respect to paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 and recommendations 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the text proposed by the Main Committee.

(179) At the 12th (closing) plenary meeting on 8/14/1984, the draft text of a "Mexico City Declaration on Population and Development" (E/CONF.76/L.4) was submitted by the following States represented on the General Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, China, Cuba, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, united Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.

(180) The representative of Bangladesh proposed that the Conference should adopt the draft Declaration by acclamation. The proposal was seconded by the representative of the Netherlands, as Vice-President/co-ordination, and by the representatives of Brazil, India, and Senegal and supported by the representatives of Hungary (on behalf of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe), Sweden (on behalf of the Andean and other countries), Bulgaria (on behalf of a number of socialist countries); Zambia (on behalf of the African countries) and Paraguay (on behalf of the Latin American countries). The draft Declaration was adopted by acclamation. (For the text of the Declaration as adopted see chapter I above.)

(181) The representative of the Holy See stated that although he did not agree entirely with the contents of the Declaration he had not wished to stand in the way of its adoption by acclamation.

(182) The representatives of Bulgaria, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Viet Nam, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic stated that these delegations attached great importance to the Conference as a broad international forum for the consideration of important problems whose solution would promote the achievement of further progress in raising standards of living and towards a more just and rational process of world development. They considered, on the basis of the position of fundamental importance reflected also in the documents of the Conference that the determinants of demographic trends were socio-economic changes. Such changes were necessary for the purpose of freeing many developing countries from the social consequences of their colonial past and eliminating any remaining dependence on important monopolies pursuing a neo-colonialist policy. The economic crisis of the capitalist economy, which most severely affected the developing countries, their enormous foreign debt, unequal terms of trade, rising interest rates and other political and economic actions taken by certain developed capitalist countries, were causing a deterioration in living conditions in the developing countries.

(183) These delegations considered that national and international policies ensuring fairness and harmony in the global process of development constituted the main requirement for a positive change towards demographic trends that would promote well-balanced socio-economic development on both the global and the national levels. There was an important relationship, therefore, between the establishment of a New International Economic Order and population development.

(184) In the opinion of these delegations, the prevention of nuclear war and the adoption of concrete measures for arms reduction and disarmament were an indispensable condition for the successful solution of the problems of development and population everywhere, including the developing countries. This idea was reflected in the Conference's recommendations concerning the fulfilment of the World Population Plan of Action. These delegations shared the deep concern felt by the vast majority of nations about the arms race pursued by aggressive forces, which diverted enormous material and intellectual resources to non-productive purposes, while much of the world's population suffered hunger and disease and remained deprived of basic education and medical care.

(185) As the experience of the socialist countries showed, a decisive role in the acceleration of socio-economic development and the consolidation of economic independence was played by the State sector and planned economic management.

(186) The solution of population problems would be facilitated by implementing demographic policy within the framework of a socio-economic policy specifically aimed at improving living and working conditions for all sections of the population. The shaping and implementation of demographic policy was the sovereign right of every State, acting independently, without any external pressure, through measures taking account of specific conditions, receiving broad public support, observing humane principles and maintaining respect for fundamental human rights and human dignity. The nature and form of aid in carrying out population policies must be determined solely by the States interested in such aid and must not be tied to their acceptance of any prior conditions.

(187) These delegations supported the progressive provisions of the World Population Plan of Action and the recommendations and Declaration of the Conference, whose implementation could be ensured only if the world's peoples lived in peace and security; they expressed confidence that the results of the Conference would bring about broader international co-operation. [=]
interpretation of Islam, have barred girls and women teachers from the classroom and ruled that women may not work.

“... The exclusion of girls and women from the public sphere has disastrous consequences for the entire nation, as well as being an affront to basic human rights,” said UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy. “Not only are they shut out of educational opportunities, but they are denied the right to contribute to their families’ welfare and the country’s economy.”

The Taliban have used the implausible argument that there are not sufficient funds to provide for girls’ education. But according to Ms. Bellamy, the real economic issue is that the exclusion of girls from schools and women from the workforce is seriously undermining the economic and social development prospects of Afghanistan.

“... Afghanistan is a nation of widows,” she said. “Women are not only vital members of the workforce but are frequently the only breadwinners of the family. If they cannot earn a living, they will not be able to feed their children. The consequences will be catastrophic.”

There are an estimated 30000 widows in Kabul alone. A small proportion of them work in the health sector, the only employment permitted by the Taliban. The remainder have lost the right to work and many have been forced on to the streets to beg.

Other Taliban rulings also place considerable additional financial burdens on women. For example, the ‘burqa,’ -- the head-to-toe covering with an embroidered grill over the face that all women are required to wear in public -- costs the equivalent of $10 or two months’ salary. Forced by the cost to share the garments, women are even further restricted to their homes.

In recent weeks, humanitarian organizations have expressed cautious optimism at an apparent softening of the Taliban position on girls’ education. Last month, at a meeting in Kabul between the Minister of Education and UN representatives, an agreement was reached to allow girls up to nine years old to attend school. Days later, however, the Minister reversed his position, leaving girls and women teachers excluded from schools.

Kabul University also re-opened at the end of March without women teachers or female students. When the university was closed in September after the Taliban takeover of the city, women made up 4000 of the university’s 10000-strong student body.

In November 1995, UNICEF suspended its assistance to education programmes in those parts of Afghanistan where girls were excluded from schools. In the meantime, UNICEF has continued to negotiate with local authorities on resuming educational opportunities for girls.

“... UNICEF is committed to the principle of non-discrimination and considers education one of the most fundamental rights of every human being, boy or girl,” said Ms. Bellamy. The right of every child to education is laid down in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by 190 nations, including Afghanistan.

The Taliban maintain that there is no all-out policy barring girls from schools. They promise that, once the military situation has stabilized and they have been recognized as a legitimate power base, a segregated educational structure with a limited curriculum will be put in place for girls. Clearly this is still not acceptable, and would constitute a further violation of the Convention.

Recent reports confirm that there has been no softening of the Taliban position on women. Taxi drivers are punished for carrying women who are incorrectly dressed and Kabul residents have been forced on to the streets to beg. Clearly this is still not acceptable, and would constitute a further violation of the Convention.

“... Together with many Islamic scholars, and UN agencies, and countries that have some influence with the Taliban, we must keep the pressure up until each and every girl and woman has her basic human rights restored,” said Ms. Bellamy. [+]
Morocco, 327.
Pakistan, 600.
Saudi Arabia, 52.
Somalia, 1100.
South Yemen, 100.
Sudan (births only in hospital and medical institutions), 607.
Syria, 280.
Tunisia (community data from rural areas only), 1000.
Turkey, 207.
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14000. ------. "Algeria Says It has Killed 21 Muslim Fundamentalists [reports search operations killed 20, as well as one who had slit the throat of two sisters; government reports 20000 insurgents have been killed in 36 months; armed militants number 3000-4000]", in Seattle Times, March 19, 1995. p. A18. [TXT]

14003. ------. "French Officials Crack Down On Muslim Fundamentalists", in Seattle Times, October 29, 1994. p. A8. A national policy of repression of Muslims will begin in France: the goal is to destroy Muslim fundamentalism as a political, social and cultural force among Muslims in France: Christian and Jewish fundamentalists will not be affected by the new policy and will enjoy the traditional French freedom of religion. Muslim scarves worn by girls will be banned in French schools, as Minister of Education Francois Bayrou notes to 'end Muslim repression of women'. The Ministry of Education has expelled 25 Muslim girls under this new policy. Osman Sahin, imam of a mosque in Sochaux, reportedly with links to pro-Algerian Germany-based AFDI deported to his native Turkey. There are 5 million Muslims in France: 5-10% express sympathy for fundamentalist views. [TXT]

14004. ------. "Gunmen in Algiers [kill one French diplomatic worker and kidnapp three, including a woman]", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 31, 1992. p. 5. [TXT]

14005. ------. "Interview: Susan George", in Multinational Monitor, March 1982. "Famines do occur; they are organized by the grain trade." - Berthold Brecht

Food is the most basic commodity in the world--literally a matter of life or death. Like other commodities, however, food is controlled by a number of giant multinationals, such as Cargill, Continental Grain, Unilever, Nestle, General Mills, General Food and Quaker Oats. These companies, by their producing and marketing techniques, as well as their pricing policies, have an enormous effect on the ability of poor people the world over to eke out a living. In How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger, first published in the US in 1977, Susan George put forth the thesis that hunger and starvation in the third world are caused by the international agribusiness corporations and their allies: multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank, Western governments, and local third world elites. "Hunger is not a scourge," she wrote, "but a scandal." She depicted the multinational food industry as a Midas gone dreadfully wrong. "Agribusiness is capable of destroying everything it touches: local employment patterns, local foodcrop contract farming--letting local farmers own the land and buy the goods they grow is really just naked violence." What role are agribusiness companies currently playing in the global food industry?

The companies are transforming the food systems of other countries in order to fit the needs of predominant countries, particularly the United States, whether to serve as markets for Western goods or as suppliers of agricultural raw materials for the food systems of the West.

Can you give a specific example?

Take the area of animal feeds. There's a huge thrust, which I think is very important, to bias the diet of third world countries toward a much more meat-based diet, because in this way you sell much more soya and corn, and you can sell more processed animal feed. There have been any number of projects geared to chicken promotion, which involves feeding the chickens processed feeds and is a very dependency-creating industry because you're perpetually hooked up to a kind of a diet not based on your local available foodstuffs. You create a demand which depends on imports. In Algeria, an extreme case, 85% of all of the basic foodstuffs of the country are imports. Nonetheless, the government is encouraging a much more meat-based diet, including chicken and beef, and it is destroying the local olive oil industry by importing soya oil. The olive oil industry in Algeria is just dying. It's a very decentralized industry, with each farmer having seven or eight olive trees and little mills dotted around the countryside. The man who's in charge of the national olive oil industry was practically crying when I talked to him. He said, "If they'd just raise the price of soya oil by a few centimes--it's been the same price for 20 years--I could renovate 500 mills a year."

What was the staple diet of Algeria before the entry of agribusiness companies?

It was couscous, based on wheat and sometimes barley. Couscous is like many local foods, it is prepared communally, by women working together on a porch, rolling it out; it is a sort of social activity. But now, that's too much work and too time-consuming, so you get instant couscous or you get something else: bread. It's taking over the world. Bread's a wonderful capitalist food in the sense that it can be consumed separately; you don't have to get together at lunch to eat it like rice or the various other communal dishes that take time to cook. Brazil is another classic example. There large amounts of agricultural land were converted over the last 15 years from black beans and corn production to soybean production. The Brazilian government got scared around 1975, 1976 when people rioted because they couldn't buy beans. About 200000 people voted in municipal elections for black beans instead of a candidate: they just wrote "black beans" on the ballots. The government began to get worried, and instituted a rule requiring soy producers to devote 10-15% of their land to black beans.

What multinational companies are involved in that transformation process in Brazil?

Oh, they're all there. Continental, Archer-Daniels, Cargill, Central Soya.

How would a multinational go about changing the production bias in a country like Brazil?

Well, the multinational doesn't change it by itself. What changes it is the prices, the relative prices that are being offered for these different crops. Farmers convert because the export crop is lucrative, and because the government's been calling for exports and the incentive to produce is higher. Also the World Bank contributes to making very efficient transportation networks to get the soya beans to the processing plants and to the ports. In some cases, there are private corridors, road and rail networks, devoted entirely to the transportation, processing and efficient handling of soybeans. So, when you get all the infrastructure, the price incentives and the government credits, it's stupid not to produce it, from the farmer's point of view.

Why have agribusiness corporations increasingly opted for contract farming--letting local farmers own the land and buying the goods these farmers produce--rather than directly controlling the land and production?

It is less efficient to have direct control of your land through ownership. Land is the first thing to be nationalized under political pressure, and it involves a number of fiscal problems and taxes that corporations don't want to get into. Perhaps most importantly, they don't want to be burdened with plantations producing a raw material that costs them more to use than another raw material purchased on the open market. With contract farming, they have much greater flexibility. Now the world markets are so integrated that a company like Unilever is able to purchase any kind of oil from any source and make exactly the same kinds of soaps or margarine--it doesn't matter to them, the technology is exactly the same. Because soy oil from the US at some point could be much cheaper than even palm oil produced on a Unilever estate with low-paid workers, it's quite possible that Unilever could be more interested in the soy oil than the palm oil.

What is the relationship between the large landowners and the rural poor in developing countries?

Anybody in this country who thinks that class struggle is something that was invented by an unmentionable 19th century economist should go to Bangladesh. While I was there recently, I was talking with some people who are doing wonderful work, on a $40000 a
Europeans, however, refused to invite the infante terrible of the Arab Belhadj, leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front, were returned to prison in desert tent, camels at the ready, hoping to get a last minute reprieve. The International, November 16-30, 1994. p. 2. Shaikh Abbasi Madani and Ali garbage collection in six zionist-occupied West Bank towns and the Gaza Liberation Organization, Yassir Arafat, was there. Arafat is in charge of Islam. In this they have truly found each other. [=]

is considered a troublemaker. Even the putative leader of the Palestine The European Union and the Muslim regimes share a common aversion to arrogance, the European Union invited Jordan, which is not on the countries, it would like to have a secure environment. The client regimes years ago - the fifteen member EU foreign ministers met their counter Husain of Jordan, the PLO's Arafat and even Kemalist Turkey are not Spain - the last Muslim post in Europe that was wiped out five hundred years ago - the fifteen member EU foreign ministers met their counter parts from eleven countries of the southern rim and the Palestinian Authority to sign a series of agreements. With characteristic European arrogance, the European Union invited Jordan, which is not on the Mediterranean coast, but barred Libya which is, because the latter's ruler is considered a troublemaker. Even the putative leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yassir Arafat, was there. Arafat is in charge of garbage collection in six zionist-occupied West Bank towns and the Gaza Strip. Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi must have blown hot and cold in his desert tent, camels at the ready, hoping to get a last minute reprieve. The Europeans however, refused to invite the infante terrible of the Arab world while tiny Malta, Cyprus and Israel were all there. Life is full of cruel ironies. The European Union is even denying the facts of geography when it suits its convenience. Those invited to Barcelona included the representatives of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Malta and the Palestinian Authority. All fifteen members of the EU were of course also there. From the outset it was clear that the Europeans would dictate the agenda. They want the vast export markets of the Muslim countries for their manufactured goods but do not want their people in Europe. The non-European Mediterranean rim has some two hundred million people. With the exception of Turkey and Israel, the rest are still considered largely agricultural, non-industrialized countries.

The European surpluses in manufactured goods can now be dumped on these markets. The new alliance will achieve several objectives. First, in a highly competitive world, the Europeans will secure captive markets for their goods for the next century. It will also help elbow out such other competitors as the Japanese and Koreans who have secured a niche for their products in the oil-rich (now not-so-rich) Middle East. In the sixties and seventies, millions of migrant workers from the Mediterranean rim countries were allowed to enter Europe to work in low-paid jobs as the post-second world war reconstruction boom materialized. The boom is over and the Europeans want to get rid of these workers now. The blatantly racist tone of political discourse in most of these countries - France, Germany and Britain - is evidence of this phenomenon. While the Europeans would like to get rid of the migrant workers and their families, they would still like to exploit the cheap labor in countries from where they originated. Hence the new mantra of promoting trade instead of aid. While nobody would take issue with promoting trade since aid is a euphemism for economic bondage, the Europeans plan to set up industries in these countries to make their products competitive internationally. This is a mirror-image of the Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia or the North American Free Trade Agreement. The two North American giants have started moving their manufacturing industry to Mexico and further south in Latin America because of cheap labor there. The economic agenda for the Mediterranean rim was pushed under the guise of creating a free trade zone for manufactured goods by the year 2010. If anyone get the idea that this would be patterned on the European Union member States' relations, it would be mistaken. There was no agreement under which they would fight 'terrorism' and 'religious extremism'. These are euphemisms for crushing the Islamic movements struggling to overthrow oppressive regimes in the Middle East. This was also evident in the manner in which Algeria was welcomed. The North African State had just had an election in which the junta's candidate - Lamine Zeroual - claimed to have won a massive victory. Such resounding 'victories' are the norm in Middle Eastern dictatorships.

The 11/27-28 conference set in motion the creation of a regional security accord which was similar in nature to the agreement reached with former eastern bloc countries in the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Under the guise of fighting 'terrorism', the European Union and Middle Eastern tyrannies will now jointly fight Islamic activists. France has been leading the crusade within its borders against Islamic activists sympathetic to the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria. A number of its supporters have been arrested or deliberately killed in police encounters. Other regimes, too, are fed with serious opposition from the Islamic movement. Husni Mubarak of Egypt, king Husain of Jordan, the PLO's Arafat and even Kemalist Turkey are not immune from what the west contemptuously calls the 'virus of fundamentalism'. If the European Union is going to invest in these countries, it would like to have a secure environment. The client regimes are to be protected against a popular Islamic challenge under such ruses. The European Union and the Muslim regimes share a common aversion to Islam. In this they have truly found each other. [=]
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Bida on 11/5/1994. They refused to call off the armed resistance until the army returned to the barracks and handed over power to the elected representatives of the people. Madani and Belhadj were moved from jail to house arrest on 9/12/1994 in anticipation that they might strike a deal with the junta. General Llammme Zerouali announced in a radio and television broadcast on 11/1/1994 that presidential elections will be held in 1995. Junta spokesmen later indicated that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which had gained a massive majority in the first round of elections on 12/26/1991, would not be allowed to take part. The western-backed junta is trying to promote a "third force," but such a force simply does not exist. The Algerian junta closed two papers, the French-language daily El-Ouma and the Arabic weekly Al Wa'ah al-Akhmar, on 11/7/1994, charging them with spreading "subversion" for reporting activities not authorized by the regime. At least 130 civilians were killed by the the junta in the first week of 11/1994, the first such large-scale casualties admitted by it. Observers believe that more than 30,000 people have been killed by the junta over the last three years. Prime minister Tansu Ciller became the first head of a Muslim government to visit Israel on 11/3/1994. Ciller paid rich tribute to the zionist State, saying she wanted close relations with it. Her visit was criticized by some newspapers and opposition groups in Turkey. From there, Ciller went to Cairo on 11/6/1994 for a meeting with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak. France expelled the Imam of Matz Mosque on 11/6/1994 and sent him on a plane to Algeria. Imam Naha Zahar Eddine was popular with the people and critical of recent French attacks on Muslim girls' hijab. France of course is a democracy where people criticizing government policy are liable to be deported! Imam Naha was the third Imam to be deported.

Spain and Italy have urged the European Union to pay more attention to the countries of the southern Mediterranean rim where a number of regimes are about to collapse under the pressure of the Islamic movement. The two countries fear that should the regimes in Algeria and Egypt, for instance, fail to the Islamic movement, it would lead to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of people into their countries and exacerbate an already fragile situation where immigrants are reviled and abused. Jordan's parliament on 11/6/1994 approved by 55 to 23 the treaty with Israel that had been signed on 10/25/1994. The Islamic Action Front was among the groups which opposed the treaty. [–]

14010. -------. "Slaughtering of Sheep Protested," in Seattle Times, April 16, 1997, p. A11. Brigitte Bardot denounced Muslims for slaughtering sheep, women and children, monks and tourists. She accused Algerian Muslims, noting: "They've slit the throats of women, and children, of our monks, our officials, our tourists and our sheep. They'll slit our throats one day and we'll deserve it." She describes Muslim practices as "torture, signs of the most atrocious pagan sacrifices", and condemns the "invasion of France by an overpopulation of foreigners, notably Muslims". [TXT]

14011. -------. USSR: Uzbekistan: Part 18: At Home and Abroad. Moscow, RFSSR: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1968. Uzbekistan's economic, cultural and friendly contacts with other countries are growing year by year. The Republic takes an active part in rendering scientific and technical assistance to 67 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 55 delegations from 80 countries and over 10,000 tourists have visited Uzbekistan during the last two years. During the same period about 2000 Uzbekks visited foreign countries as members of delegations, and to render assistance to the developing countries. Besides that, 4000 people from Uzbekistan went abroad as tourists. At the end of 1966 Uzbekistan was exporting its products to 80 countries, whereas in 1958 to only 32. Most of these countries are in Asia and Africa. Demand for goods from Uzbekistan is growing in Japan, Britain, France, Federal Germany and Italy. Since 1963 the Republic has taken part in 47 international fairs and exhibitions. She is also displaying goods at EXPO 67 in Montreal. Tashkent has developed into a big cultural centre. During the last two years it has received 36 musical and dance companies from 17 countries. Uzbek performers have also made concert tours of 25 countries, their appearance everywhere being attended with success. The Uzbek Society of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries maintains contacts with 96 countries. The United Nations has sponsored 18 international seminars in Uzbekistan during the last four years. Those taking part studied the methods of Uzbek irrigation and land improvement specialists, live-stock breeders, cotton-growers and other workers in industry and agriculture. A number of international exhibition committees have given high awards to Uzbek-manufactured machines. For example the "OK-100" loom was awarded a gold medal at the 1965 International Exhibition in France, and Mr. Shah, Indian Minister of Industry, wrote to Tashkent to express his admiration over the high qualities of the machines manufactured in Uzbekistan. Mr. Kaplan, director of a spinning-mill in Mistok, Czechoslovakia, wrote: "Your machines work perfectly. They have helped us to achieve the highest results in the country." A well-known Algerian journalist Henri Alleg wrote after he had visited Uzbekistan: "More than 5 years have passed. The bright banner of socialism is flying over free Uzbekistan. Once an impoverished, backward colony, it has become one of the advanced countries of the world. When I was flying over the fields of Uzbekistan that only yesterday were a barren desert and which today are turned into a flourishing, country by the will and labor of the Soviet people, I felt as if I had taken a look into the future of my Algeria. . . ." Tashkent has become place for holding important international conferences. It was at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference of 1958 that the "spirit of Tashkent" was born. The Declaration signed by the Indian and Pakistani leaders in the Uzbek capital in 1965 prevented adangerous military conflict that was threatening the 600-million population of Hindustan. The international significance of the Tashkent Declaration extends beyond the limits of Indo-Pakistani relations. The Tashkent talks clearly illustrated the difference between socialist foreign policy and the actions of some Western countries in fanning dangerous conflicts in Asia. As an African newspaper wrote, during the Tashkent Conference the Soviet Union demonstrated to the whole world that she strove with all her heart for peace on earth. [–]
becomes the inconsequential third term, the catalyst for a final rebellion. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [=]

14013. Bangash, Zafar. “Focus: Pretoria Islamic Conference Takes Bold Steps Towards a More Confident Future”, in Crescent International, May 15, 1996, p. 3. The largest conference ever held in South Africa, indeed anywhere in Africa, surpassed the wildest expectations of the organizers. The 30/27/1996 conference was attended by representatives from about 100 countries and 100,000 people over three days and heard live on radio by another three hundred and fifty thousand people in Johannesburg and Cape Town through the courtesy of Radio Az-Zaahir and Radio 786. Another great feature was the participation of a large number of sisters at the conference. This has been a very significant development in the history of the Muslim community in South Africa. Initially, only a handful of guest speakers from overseas were anticipated. As the date of the conference approached, the list grew, and ultimately, more than two dozen guests from overseas had joined. These included such internationally renowned speakers as Doctor Kalim Siddiqi (who unfortunately passed away on 4/18/1996 in Pretoria); Imam Muhammad al-Asi and Imam Abdul Alim Musa, both from Washington DC; Doctor Yaqub Zaki; Imam Muhammad al-Asi; the concept of Jihad in Islam (Imam al-Asi); the Global Islamic Movement and the New World Order (Imam Abdul Alim Musa); the Role of Muslims in the Islamic Movement (Sister Bahiya Ali); The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (Jahangir Muhammad); Creating a New Civilization of Islam (Doctor Kalim Siddiqi); and, Awakening the Muslim mind (Advocate Abubakr Mohamed). Other topics discussed were Bosnia--drawing the proper lessons (Iqbal Siddiqui); the Struggle in Algeria (Imam Al-Asi); Partial Islamic movements—the era of Political Parties (Doctor Kalim Siddiqi); Creating a global Islamic movement: the role of the Muslim media (Zafar Bagash); The Arabian Peninsula: the crucial center or a distant frontier? (Doctor Yaqub Zaki); Islam in South Africa (Doctor Rashid Salooji); The role of Islam and ulama (Saadullah Khan); The Islamic Movement in Malaysia (Muhammad Sabu); fifty years of the United Nations (Doctor Yaqub Zaki); The growth of Islam in North America (Imam Abdul Alim Musa); Islam in the Electronic Age (Mufti Barkatullah); Western strategies for controlling Islam (Jahangir Muhammad); How to achieve Muslim Unity? (Sheikh Thafier Najjar): The role of Muslim media (Abdullah Osman); and, The clash of civilizations (Zafar Bangash).

A number of local speakers also addressed the conference including Zakariya Aboobaker Chankie, A S Gani, Abdul Rehman Zwane, Farida Muhammad, Imam Ahmed Cissieu, Mualana Mukaddam, Mualana Abdul Raouf Soofie, Sheik Akhbar Samad Nana and Ebrahim Chomba. On the final day of the conference, the Organizing Committee turned itself into a Commission to explain the role of Muslims in Southern Africa and to come up with proposals, in two years, about it. The Commission will consult Muslims throughout the region before submitting its report. Doctor Kalim Siddiqi delivered the concluding address on the final day of the conference. He paid tribute to the conference organizers as well as the participants for their efforts. He said that now he saw the realization of twenty-five years of his work before his eyes. Doctor Kalim had nearly collapsed from exhaustion the night before after delivering a powerful speech in the evening. There was much concern for his health among the conference participants. Little did they realize that these would be the last appearances this valiant son of Islam would make anywhere. Once the conference had officially ended, a number of interviews were recorded on camera with Doctor Kalim Siddiqi and the other guests. These were done in professional studios. In fact, the entire conference proceedings were also recorded on camera with professional equipment. There were a total of eight interviews recorded. The last two were in front of live audience. These were enormously successful. Doctor Kalim and the other participants were in great form. The interviews and panel discussions came exceptionally well. These interviews as well as the conference proceedings will be available from "Crescent International" shortly. One final point about the conference. The Muslims of South Africa have invested heavily in preparing their children--boys and girls--for Qur’anic recitation. It was a moving sight to see young children recite the qiraat in such a melodious way. These innocent souls brought tears to the eyes of many participants. It was indeed a wonderful sight. And their parents are truly fortunate to have made such great efforts. The conference tapes can be obtained from the "Crescent International" offices around the world. Please see details in the forthcoming issues. [=]
widespread stereotyped prejudice in the west toward "all things Islam and Muslim in this world." Such insensitivity had carried over into the main UN human rights forum as well. Musa delivered the unusually stinging attack three day before the 53-member body opened its annual session in Geneva on 3/18/1996. As usual, the west trained its guns on its favorite bogeymen - China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Cuba - confirming what the outgoing chairman had said, Madelaine Albright, American ambassador to the UN, blasted Cuba as a "bad actor" and included her own country in the list of human rights offenders. As in other UN declarations, the embargoed lady could not see at her feet in the US where far more people are killed daily than anywhere else in the world. "We see double standards again and again," said Musa. "The word is...that if you want to abuse human rights make sure that you are the best of friends of the big powers that matter, then you can get away with it," he added. Ample proof of this western hypocrisy was evident in the US State department annual report for 1995 released on 3/6/1996. While it lists the usual "bad guys," it also includes Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Algeria for instance. But far be it for the US to bring up the question of Egyptian, Algerian or Turkish human rights abuses at the UN human rights forum in Geneva. The case of Israel is even more illustrative. The State department mildly criticized Israel's brutal policy of collective punishments and suppression in the West Bank. Yet Washington provides more than $6 billion in military, economic and other aid to the zionist State. After the recent series of bombings, US president Bill Clinton personally visited the zionist State to offer sympathy and condolences as well as $100 million to augment Israel's brutal policy against the Palestinians. This includes the policy of collective punishments such as blowing up houses which the State department's annual report had criticized.

John Shattuk, the US State department point man for human rights, when asked during a press conference in Washington on 3/13/1996 about the contradiction in US words and deeds, pretended not to have heard the question at all. When the questioner repeated as to how the State department report criticized collective punishments by Islam on the one hand and Washington financed such a policy on the other by millions of dollars in handouts, Shattuk mumbled that a new situation had emerged in Israel! Even with its hypocrisy exposed, Geraldine Ferraro, head of the US delegation and a one-time vice presidential candidate, submitted a draft resolution expressing concern about human rights abuses in Cuba and Sudan but not in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel or Turkey. America's other allies - Kuwait and India - also got away with murder and free. It would be unthinkable for anyone to bring up the subject of US, British or French human rights abuses. The US has targeted Muslims living within its borders in a vicious way. Shaikh Omar Abdel Rahman and a number of other Muslims have been sentenced to life terms in an FBI/Mossad engineered conspiracy. These Muslims are the victims of a zionist-instigated witchhunt worldwide. France and Britain, too, both western countries, have launched vicious campaigns against Muslims. In France, Algerian Muslims are being persecuted. Some have been executed in fake encounters with the police. The Algerians' only crime is that they are committed Muslims and refuse to support the fascist junta in power in Algeria. The junta is backed by France and most of the western countries. Naturally, the human rights of Muslims in Algeria do not matter. Nigeria, on the other hand, is different. It is also ruled by a military junta but that is not why the West African State is ostracized. The real reason is that the Christian minority has not been able to grab total control as in Ethiopia or Uganda, for instance. The presence of Christian minorities in Muslim countries - in Nigeria, Sudan and Egypt - is the latest weapon to be used against Muslims. The Egyptian regime can brutalize its Muslim majority and the west eagerly supports such a policy but if something were to happen to the spoiled Coptic minority, may God help Egypt.

Russia, too, received only a mild wrist slap for its slaughter of Muslims in Chechenya. As for Russia's and the west's Serbian allies, there was little to worry about for the crimes they have perpetrated against humanity because their victims are Muslims. And Muslims, as far as the west is concerned, do not matter. This is also, unfortunately, the view of most Muslim regimes which take pride in their subservience to the west. Amnesty International, the London-based human rights body, announced on the eve of the conference that it will call on the UN commission to take action "as a priority" on five areas: China, Colombia, Indonesia/East Timor, Nigeria and Turkey. "These countries with abysmal human rights records blatantly continue to escape scrutiny by the Commission," the group said in a statement issued on 3/14/1996. "Often their peers shy away from action because of their own perceived economic, military and political interests," it added. Indonesia was rightly hauled on the carpet for East Timor but not for its genocidal policy in Indonesia. Americans have been roundly condemned for the state sanctioned torture and murder of the Irianese-dominated Jakarta regime. The reason again is that the Achenean are Muslims while the Timorese are Christians. The Committee to Protest Journalists (CPJ) also issued its list of jailed journalists for 1995 on the eve of the conference. Its 3/14/1996 release said that at least 182 journalists were in jail in 22 countries at the end of last year, a record number and up from 173 the year before. For the secondconsecutive year, Kemalist Turkey which had just refused to allow the Refah Party to come to power because of the latter's mildly Islamic program, held more reporters in jail, 51, than any other country in the world. The reason, according to the CPJ, was that Ankara sought to suppress independent reporting on its conflict with the Kurds. Ethiopia, another US client, was next with 31 journalists in jail, followed by China with 20, and Kuwait with 18, the report said. Of these, only China was singled out for criticism at the UN forum. The message from all this, as Musa Bin Hitam pointed out, is that it is alright to have a terrible human rights record so long as you are the west's favorite client. It is also for this reason that Hindu India can get away with murder in Kashmir and still bask in the glory of proclaiming itself the largest democracy in the world. A more appropriate description would be, "the largest hypocrisy in the world."
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Algeria

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Scientific Research (Dar Al-Abhath al-Ilmiyya) publishing and cultural group: one publication ("The Muslim Brotherhood in the Balance") attacked the Muslim Brotherhood as fascist and Muslim. Only in 1945 would the first non-Jewish members enter the group. New recruits spent at least a year being groomed for membership in study groups, before they were admitted into the secret Iskra network of cells.

(3) New Dawn, established in the 1940s by Ahmad Saqiq Saad, Yusuf Darwish and Raymond Dewayk, had its roots in anti-fascist activism in the 1930s. A legal reformist group, the New Dawn worked with leftist members of the Wafd, by organizing the Youth Group for Popular Culture and the Society for Spreading Modern Culture, by publishing Al-Fajr Al-Jahid and the worker's newspaper Al-Damir, and by associating with the Workers Committee for National Liberation (WCNL). The group exerted influence through the intellectual quality of its publications, and reached unionists through its activities with the Workers Committee (formed in 1945), which in turn spread its message through in the Shubra al-Khayma Plant and the Mahalla al-Kubra Plant. In 7/1946, the name of the group was changed to the Popular Vanguard for Liberation, then to the Workers Vanguard, and then to Popular Democracy. The party tried to recruit working class women but was never successful in that effort.

(4) Peoples Liberation, a short-lived atheistic-Trotskyste group led by Marcel Israel, an Egyptian Jew with Italian citizenship, that left little trace.

In 1946, Egypt entered a new political era: nationalist demands were now widespread, and the end of martial law and censorship in 8/1945 created the environment for new activism. Student protests and strikes in 1946, both of which saw significant Communist participation, escalated into confrontations with the British, which led to the British decision to withdraw. The regime of Sidiqi Pasha, however, decided to move against the left, closing down seven organizations (House of Scientific Research, Committee to Spread Modern Culture, Union of University Graduates, Popular University, Twentieth Century Publishing House, League of Women Graduates from the University & High Institutes, Center for Popular Culture), and banningseven newspapers (Al-Wafd al-Misri, the central Waldist organ; Al-Bath, Waldist daily; Al-Damir, radical trade union paper; Umdurman, radical Sudanese magazine; Al-Talia, Union of University Graduates magazine; Al-Fajr al-Jadid, radical cultural weekly; Al-Yaara and Al-Jabha, two trade union weeklies). Claiming evidence of a mass ploy, in 7/1946 Sidiqi staged mass arrests of leftist leaders. Sidiqi would resign in 12/1946 when he failed to obtain British agreement to withdraw from Egypt. [TXT]

14017. Bouatta, Cherifa; Moghadam, Valentine M. [editor]. Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies: Part 2: Feminine Militancy: Moudjahidates During and After the Algerian War. United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER). London: Zed Books, 1994. pp. 18-39. The officially sanctioned discourse that has development on the role of female Moudjahidates during the war of independence against the French in Algeria is a discourse developed by men: the history is told in a masculine voice and the role and contributions of women remain little known. Women were involved in the war in many ways: Moudjahidates were nurses and soldiers, fledgates couriers planted bombs in the cities and carried money, messages and weapons. Women searched for imprisoned husbands and sons and collected intelligence doing so. On 12/11/1961, women staged a mass protest to repudiate colonial propaganda that argued that the rebellion had few adherents, winning the insurgency considerable legitimacy in international public opinion. Franz Fanon saw the participation of women in the revolution as signifying the breakdown of the patriarchal system in Algeria, yet immediately after the revolution women were confined to activism within the UNFA (Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes) which was a unit of the FLN. The role assigned to the UNFA was insignificant: it was restricted to opening sewing classes and advocating the decisions of the FLN. This trend culminates in the Family Code of 7/1984, based on Islamic Law, which institutionalized the patriarchal domination of women. Significantly, Moudjahidates define the new post-revolutionary domination of women as a new colonization and envision the necessity of a new struggle to deconstruct women.

14018. Boumediene, Latifa. "Martyrdom Haunts Algerian Intellectuals and Artists", in Al-Jadid, November 1995. p. 19. The continuing violence in Algeria has claimed 30000 lives in the last seven years. Many of those who have died were journalist, intellectuals, civil servants, magistrates and women. Much of the intellectual class has left the country, and alienation characterizes many of those who have remained. A large number of artists and intellectuals fled the country into exile after the assassination of playwright Abdelkader Alloula and actor and head of the Algerian National Theater Azzedine Mahjoudi. The 'Masrah El-Kalaa and its director Ziani Cherif Ayad, Algerian's foremost theatrical group have also left Algeria and settled in France. [–]

14019. Cherifiat-Merabine, Doria; Moghadam, Valentine M. [editor]. Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies: Part 3: Algeria At a Crossroads: National Liberation, Islamization and Women. United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER). London: Zed Books, 1994. pp. 40-62. The Revolution in Algeria was a watershed in the social history of the people of Algeria, differing from earlier tribal based rebellions by engaging the loyalties of the entire people, including the mass participation of women in every aspect of the struggle. In the wake of the revolution, the question of the meaning of the role of women in the revolution must be considered: were women merely used by the revolution: this question is complicated by the resurgence of Islam. Islam, for example, discounts the role of the Moudjahidates, since the role of female soldiers in the revolution inherently undercuts the paradigm of traditional Islamic women. Yet millions of Algerian women...
played a key role in the revolution, transcending the traditional family-centric role of Algerian women that was rooted in Islamic patriarchy and was reinforced by the colonial fantasy of the orientalist exoticism of Muslim women. The symbol of the liberated woman in the rhetoric of revolution was that of the "Muslim woman", which meant not a religious woman but rather a woman fighter for the decolonized Algeria. Many women were heroines: many were sentenced to death and were saved only by the strength of their families and the power of the people. The women fought for freedom, while many others fought for their lives. The struggle was not just a fight for freedom, but also for the right to vote and to be heard. Some women took up arms, while others organized protests and demonstrations. The struggle was not just a struggle for women, but also for the Algerian people as a whole.

Ironically, the triumph of the revolution led to the immediate flight by women into employment as domestic workers, due to the pressing need to earn a living to support their families yet without any changes in the labor market that would allow them more opportunity. The ideological delegitimization of the Moudjahidates included both the argument that only in Islam could women have true freedom and the concurrent argument (advanced by the Islamic Salvation Front) that feminists are the "hawks of neo-colonialism", seeking to restore Western domination of Algeria. Yet for the ISF, the question of women's voting is a diffused one, torn between arguing that voting is inappropriately given to women as an expression of political power, even as the existing of pro-ISF votes by "Muslim sisters" would help contribute to the foundation of the Islamic state. Similarly, Muslim women activists, often university educated, focused on socio-educational activities, the maintenance of the "purity of civilization" in the future Islamic Algeria.

"Feminism and Religion: Fundamental Oppression: South Asia", in Bangladesh Constitution were the tribal or the Harijan. What better way to prove strength, manliness, than by showing that women are under your control? Rape is not a simple but political issue of women's rights get converted into a major defend passages in the Koran about female modesty as communal riots are reversed. Since then the government has been supporting the growth of Islamic institutions by linking up with Islam-based political parties whose objective is to make Bangladesh into an Islamic state. Similarly, the recent communal riots in India have shattered the illusion of the secular character of the State, which is increasingly being identified with majority-Hindu fundamentalism.

A point often made about fundamentalism is that it is a positive rejection of Western culture. The Iranian revolution showed how Islam could play a revolutionary role in overthrowing the Shah and American imperialism. Women took an active part in the struggle and the chador became a symbol of resistance. However, today the Islamic Republic of Iran has surrendered the other side of the veil, reminding us of the duality of the veil in Algeria as it moved from resistance to control. Iranian women have been increasingly pushed into the roles of only wives and mothers. Also, the age of marriage has been reduced to thirteen years.

When Khomeini sent messages of reassurance to women from Paris, he said: "women would have everything to gain" (in the society he envisioned) because not only does Shism not exclude women from social life, but it elevates them to a platform where they belong--a higher platform. It took women a short time to realize the hidden implication of this--if women can be elevated to a higher platform they can also be pushed to a lower one--a higher platform does not mean equality.

And this is the crux of fundamentalist rhetoric--a call for a return to culture and tradition is almost always a call first addressed to women. It is interesting that when Western dress was rejected no one said that men should stop wearing suits and ties. Women have throughout history been projected as the guardians of culture--national, regional, or communal. When this culture is itself a culture against women, the implications for women are frightening. Fundamentalism makes selective use of religion and picks out only those elements which suit it.

In India's secular constitution, while a common criminal code exists for everyone on the issues of marriage, property, etc., separate personal laws exist for Muslims, Christians, and Hindus. The stereotypic conception of India as a nation torn by two homogeneous nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, is a modern phenomenon. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the educated middle and lower middle classes were faced with increasing unemployment; Indians were forced to compete with each other for scarce resources. The frustration, sense of deprivation, and a constant fear of loss of identity and status created an atmosphere of violence and brutality. Religious questions such as the protection of cows or music before a mosque became crucial issues because they came to symbolically represent the preservation of middle-class identity. In addition, fundamentalism became an important instrument of colonial policy in the effort to thwart the rising nationalistic movement. Nationalists themselves identified nationalism with the revival of Hinduism. Nationalist literature defined Hindus as heroes, Muslims as foreigners and as oppressive, lecherous tyrants. This movement affected women, too. While earlier both Hindu and Muslim women attacked the system of purdah (veil), Muslim women began to defend passages in the Koran about female modesty as communal divisions intensified.

But the assertion of fundamentalism has a far deeper and more insidious implication for women. As we've seen, fundamentalist consciousness arises in situations of insecurity and fear of the loss of identity. External symbols become crucial for the redefinition of communal identities, and here we find one essential component of this identity--whether it is national-, religious-, or caste-based--is the assertion of control over their women. The imagery of communal riots is full of sexual stereotypes, as in an article from the Times of India: "They captured beautiful Hindu women, forcibly converted them and utilized them as temporary partners of life. Hindu women were threatened, molested, and compelled to run half naked for shelter to forests..."

In the communal image, a Muslim is a man of low morals and uncontrolled lust who is ready to seduce, abduct, and assault Hindu women. The Hindus are on the other hand 'mild' and docile. These stereotypes have often been transferred to other communities without much change--the stereotype of the Muslim now exists for the Sikh, or the tribal or the Harijan. What better way to prove strength, manliness, and power than by showing that women are under your control? Rape is an expression of this same principle--raping the other man's woman is a way to humiliate him and show access to his property.

In the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim fundamentals in India today,
control over women is a central theme. As far as women are concerned then it becomes difficult to talk of a majority or minority community. Both are repressive for women.


14021. Clancy-Smith, Julia; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 14: The Modern Arab World: The House of Zainab: Female Authority and Saintly Succession. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 254-274. The Rahmaniyya zawiya (sufi lodge) in Al-Hamli, Algeria, gained thousands of followers by the 1890s, spiritual clients of its shaikh Sidi Muhammad ibn Abi al-Qasim and later of his daughter Lalla Zainab. The town emerged as a significant regional pilgrimage center; its facilities included a library, mosque, children's school (kuttub), sufi meeting rooms, and lodgings for older students attending te madrasa. By 1897, the center's holdings were estimated at F2.5 million, during a period of the general impoverishment of Muslim Algerians. On 6/2/1897, Sidi Muhammad ibn Abi al-Qasim died; his death brought a fierce struggle for spiritual and administrative control of the zawiya and from 1897-1904, until her death, Lalla Zainab directed the activities of the zawiya.

In North Africa, the Tijaniyya and Rahmaniyya sufis allowed women a role in institutionalized collective activities; by the late nineteenth-century, there were many female members in the Rahmaniyya; in 1880s, Louis Rinn estimates the female membership at 4000. In 1913, one oasis in the Trout region had three female Rahmaniyya members for every male member. Membership in the tariqas gave women power and was a source of pride. Women had held leadership roles in the Rahmaniyya order in the Jurjura Mountains in the Kabylia, at least temporarily. The widow of the deceased shaikh, Lalla Khadjia, resolved a bitter succession dispute, after leading herself from 1336-1842, using her daughter Lalla Fatima would be a popular leader of resistance to the French conquest. Lalla Zeinab was regarded before and after her death as a pious, learned woman and a saint; much of her legitimacy came from her own actions and activities rather than her descent. There is little detail about her life however, and most information available comes from her political opponents. Zainab was singled out by her father as being learned, and her vow of celibacy, simplicity of manners and devotion to the needy added to her popular veneration. When her father died, she successfully pushed aside the successor designated by her father, her cousin Muhammad ibn al-Hajj Muhammad, due to his impurity and her rejection of the letter appointing him her father's successor. The struggle between the two was never framed as a gender issue by Rahmaniyya members, but rather was seen in terms of who could be the stronger leader, especially against the French. Since the French authorities supported Muhammad ibn al-Hajj Muhammad, who they believed would be a weak leader, they were stunned and defiantly maneuvered by Lalla Zeinab's canny use of the French courts; her combination of French legal procedures, Islamic law and her own formidable rhetorical abilities defeated all her male opponents, including the French administration. Today, almost a century after her death, Lalla Zeinab remains a popular leader in the region. The apparent uniqueness of the life of Lalla Zeinab among North African women may be merely a product of the lack of research.


The psychological abuse of women from religious extremism and pornography were two types of violence against women that had not received enough attention, the Commission on the Status of Women was told this afternoon, as it concluded its general discussions on the priority themes of the Fourth World Conference on Women. The representative of Algeria said that the tenets of religious extremism psychologically abused women by mandating the separation of the sexes. Women were also made scapegoats for society's ills. Such violence must be condemned as a violation of the basic rights of women, she said. Similarly, the harmful effects of pornographic, degrading and violent materials had been of great concern for women in New Zealand, the representative of that country said. As a result, laws were written to restrict the availability of pornographic materials likely to harm women and reduce the visibility of images that they found offensive and demeaning. Addressing the situation of women in areas of conflict, the observer of Palestine said that the situation of women in the Israeli-occupied territories had not improved, despite the peace process. However, Palestinians were working to rebuild their communities through training, agricultural cooperatives, income-generating projects and psychological counselling. Palestinian women were preparing to help set up national institutions, as well as centres for information and education, she added. The representative of Liberia said that, as a result of her country's civil war, women there had begun to take part in politics and help with humanitarian activities. The Government now realized the importance of women's votes, she asserted. Turning to women migrant workers -- some of whom had fled from armed conflicts -- the representative of the Philippines said that the plight of migrant women living in large cities in western industrialized countries deserved more attention. They should have mobility and access to transport in order to pursue employment opportunities and career prospects, she added. The representative of the Philippines said that the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should lead in addressing the problems women migrant workers faced. She called on all countries to sign the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The representatives of Kenya, Spain, Tanzania, Cyprus, Pakistan and India, as well as the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations also made statements. Pakistan and India spoke in exercise of their right of reply. The Commission will meet again at 10 a.m. Wednesday, 16 March, to take up draft resolutions on: the condition of women under apartheid; the status of women in the United Nations Secretariat; the mainstreaming of women's issues in development policies; and the situation of women in the occupied territories had not improved, despite the peace process.

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discrimination that kept women from inheriting property, and to ensure their access to acquisition and ownership of property. She reviewed some of the Kenyan Government’s steps to protect the rights of women in the workplace, such as ensuring the right to equal pay, promotion, leave with full pay, adequate housing and medical attention. She supported the adoption of legislation to protect women from violence.

FAMATTA R. OSODE (Liberia) said the contributions of Liberian women had been disrupted by the civil war in her country. Liberian law stated that all Liberians were equal. However, there was no equality between the sexes. Some women had been able to overcome prejudices and stereotypes, but there was no room for complacency. Equality would come only when the distribution of wealth and purchasing power was improved. Most women were unaware of job possibilities and, due to the war, development strategies were relegated to the background. In addition, the war had brought refugees and displaced persons, food and water shortages, disease, including acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and an increased use of drugs. Peace was now the highest priority to her Government, she continued. Peace promoted social justice, forged unity and allowed the restructuring of the country. If its young people were not rehabilitated, they could be left to a life of crime and poverty. In the past, Liberian women had not shown an interest in politics, but during the war their sense of responsibility to others had changed that situation. During the war, many women chose to remain in the country to help with humanitarian activities. The Government had also come to realize the importance of the women’s vote. Finally, she would appreciate assistance for Liberian women to attend the World Conference and other meetings.

FOUZIA BOUMAIZA (Algeria) said that although equal pay for equal work was now accepted and prescribed by law, work-related gender disparities were still common, as was discrimination in the workplace. For example, it was rare that teachers encouraged sending young girls into science fields, the army, foreign affairs or finance. As a result, women were promoted faster than their colleagues and women were relegated to assistant positions. It should be noted that the concept used to measure the inequality of pay in the Secretary-General’s report on equality of pay was not satisfactory. Violence to women was a violation of the basic rights of women, she said. The Commission should remain seized of the issue until the 1995 World Conference. Women had become the scapegoat for all the ills of society. She supported measures aimed at eradicating violence against women, such as education and social communication. Moral and psychological violence were two types of violence that had not received enough attention and were often attributable to the tenets of religious extremism and separation of the sexes. Such violence must be condemned, she said.

ANA SANDERATS (Spain) said that in 1983, a Government body had been set up to develop specific policies for women. The Government had implemented the First Plan for Equal Opportunity. Even so, real equality had not yet been achieved in terms of access to employment, equal wages, and decision-making posts. Last year, the Second Equal Opportunity Plan was carried out, in an attempt to achieve real equality. The Plan would try to ensure the full employment of women by addressing that discrimination in employment should stop and emphasizing the training of women. The Plan also examined the problems of women in the cultural field, in order to combat negative stereotypes, she said. It would try to ensure access for women to high-level jobs in the political sphere and promote efforts to achieve 40% representation for women in legislatures and other positions of power. She called for solidarity between women in the advanced and the developing countries, which would help reduce the destruction of jobs and the tendency towards migration.

NARCISA L. ESCALER (Philippines) called for close attention from the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to the gravity of the problem facing women migrant workers. There was a continuing trend towards international migration of women workers, mostly from developing to industrialized countries. It was a process also known as the feminization of overseas contract labour. Many of those women, who took low-rung jobs in service sectors, were vulnerable to economic and sexual exploitation. They faced rape, beating, violence through mutilation and death. The contributions they made to industrial economies were hardly recognized. All countries should sign the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, she said. The Philippines did so last December. She said she would submit a resolution that would deal with the problem more concretely, provide positive action to address it and enhance the issue at the World Conference.

PATRICK RATA (New Zealand) said that New Zealand supported the consensus adoption by the General Assembly of a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on violence. New Zealand had taken several measures to prevent violence against women, including the establishment of a Crime Prevention Unit in the Prime Minister’s Department. It had also provided shelter for women and children escaping from domestic violence, adopted laws to protect victims of family violence and increased jail terms for serious offenses against women. For example, rape sentences had been raised from 14-20 years. He said that pornography had been of great concern for New Zealand women and the country had written restrictions on pornographic materials. The Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act was passed last year to ban harmful materials. It was specific on how violent and degrading material was to be treated and provided greater restrictions on the availability of videos and printed publications. The purpose was to reduce the visibility of images that women found offensive and demeaning. The new law would punish possession of of offending materials, which was designed to curb the circulation of such materials in the underground markets.

TERESA FOEGELBERG (Netherlands) said that the goals of closing the gap between women’s and men’s pay deserved comprehensive policy-making, which would include: establishing effective legislation; making more information available to women about comparative pay; equal wages in similar jobs; and changing the gender-based division of labour and the stereotyped choices of men and women in vocational training. Progress on that issue depended on women’s economic self-reliance, enabling them to decide more freely about their own lives and destiny. Support to the urban poor in developing countries was a central part of her country’s development cooperation policies, she continued. As the problems facing women in development were interlinked, an integrated approach to policy-making was needed which would address the phenomenon of mass migration and mobility and public transport. The situation of migrant women, particularly those living in large cities in western industrialized countries, needed to be given more attention. Mobility was often a prerequisite of employment possibilities. Further, she said the major themes of the agenda of1995 Social Summit should be analysed for their approach to gender. That would ensure that the contribution of women would be taken into account in the Summit.

OLEKUMBAINE (United Republic of Tanzania) said that current economic relations between the developing countries and the international monetary institutions had hurt women. Debt servicing and structural adjustment programmes had led to government cuts in social services and education. She reviewed some of the measures her country had taken to improve the situation of women. For example, it had set up a Women’s Development Fund to improve their conditions through income generation and implemented plans to reduce poverty. Local laws in Tanzania had been revised to set aside 25% of local government posts to women and members of their families, she said. The Philippines did the same thing, but during the war their sense of responsibility to others had changed that situation. During the war, many women chose to remain in the country to help with humanitarian activities. The Government had also come to realize the importance of the women’s vote. Finally, she would appreciate assistance for Liberian women to attend the World Conference and other meetings.
COUNTRIES,

KAHDIJA ABU-ALI, observer of Palestine, said that the Secretary-General’s report on peace and violence against women stated that the situation of Palestinian women had not improved, despite the peace process. Unemployment in the Gaza Strip had reached 50%, 130,000 workers had lost their means or their income, and per capita income had fallen to $200, below the poverty level. More than 100,000 people died or disappeared for eight years. Women who fled from their homes and displaced persons had increased, as had the percentage of women as head of family. Girls had dropped out of school to search for work. Equal pay could not be discussed in the face of such difficulties. Further, ecological problems had been caused by the exaggerated exploitation of Israeli occupiers and settlers, posing a direct danger to the population, she continued. Diseases, especially measles, had spread in refugee camps, and a majority of children suffered from anaemia. In addition, 50% of the population lacked health services, as there were only 1.9 beds per 1,000 persons. In Israel, there were six beds per 1,000. Children had been exposed to poisonous gas, prison, beatings and shootings. Psychological pressures caused fear and anxiety, and violence to women had increased in 80% of the families. The cruelty of occupation affected the family as a whole, with women suffering most. The Palestinians had worked to rebuild their communities, she said. They had initiated training, agricultural cooperatives, income-generating projects and psychological counselling. Peace should not be made up of slogans designed to acquire political gains. Palestinian women were preparing to contribute to the setting up of national institutions. They were training to attain positions in research, development, planning and policy. They had set up centres for information and education. Support from the international community was needed to build a new society based on equality, peace and justice, she said.

EHNMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said the question of States that were the major source of violence against women and policy-makers that were responsible for such systematic policy needed to be addressed. There had been horrendous acts of violence against women in Bosnia, in India-occupied Kashmir and in some conflict zones in Africa, whose perpetrators were the States themselves. The deliberate and systematic targeting of women in situations of armed conflict was a grave development that demanded action. In order to stop ongoing atrocities and to prevent such occurrences in the future, she said offending States should be prevailed upon to provide immediate and unrestricted access to human rights groups to investigate any reports of violence against women. Upon verification of such violence by those groups, there should be an immediate activation of the international human rights machinery, with the offending State being required to give an official account of its actions. The State functionaries found responsible for the acts of violence should be prosecuted for war crimes. Swift and resolute action by the international community was needed to stop State-sponsored violence against women.

ERATO KOZAKOU-MARCOULLIS (Cyprus) said that her country was writing new laws to curb violence against women. A bill entitled “Prevention of Violence in the Family and Protection of Victims” was before the House of Representatives. As for violence in armed conflict, she said that women and children were too often the victims of inhumane acts and degrading treatment. Almost 45 years since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, grave violations of human rights continued in such forms as “ethnic cleansing”. Cyprus itself had suffered from abhorrent practices against its civilian population, particularly against women and children, as a result of foreign aggression and military occupation. She welcomed the programme of action adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights to express dismay at the massive violations of human rights, especially in the form of genocide, ethnic cleansing and systematic rape of women in war situations, which led to the mass exodus of refugees and displaced persons. Violence against women should be eliminated. The Beijing Conference would be a unique opportunity for undertaking specific commitments and actions to stop it.

S.K. GUHA, Joint Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development of India, said that the Indian Parliament was enacting Constitutional Amendments to reserve one-third of all posts for women in local rural and urban areas. There was a nation-wide legal literacy campaign through non-governmental organizations to educate and make women, particularly poor women, aware of their legal rights including those enshrined under the labour laws. Coupled with legal awareness, the nation-wide process of democratic decentralization, with women in the vanguard, would make equal remuneration more and more a reality. Real empowerment of women could only take place through mobilization and employment and income generation, he said. There was a large amount of skills training mobilization and employment creation schemes aimed at wage employment, as well as self-employment. If violence against women was to be eliminated, it was important to alter the unequal power equations between men and women that supported such violence, he said. It was the ideology of patriarchy that had to be challenged and dismantled. The other sector that contributed to violence was the culture of silence. Women were forever reluctant to discuss violence or bring it to the fore. That was particularly true for domestic violence. It was therefore necessary to extricate family violence from within the private sphere and bring it to the public sphere for redress. The continued portrayal of violence and stereotyped images of women needed to be addressed and confronted. Gender sensitization of the enforcement agencies and legal literacy were two of the most important interventions, he said. In India, a National Commission for Women was a statutory body with wide powers aimed at overseeing the working of various safeguards for women. All policy proposals affecting women had to be compulsorily referred to the Commission for its views before adoption. There was a system of continuously reviewing and reforming laws relating to women, so as to make them more focused. For instance, legislative amendments relating to certain forms of violence against women shifted the burden of proof to the accused. He also responded to the statement by Pakistan, saying it was an attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of India. He said that the position of women in Pakistan was backward, quoting from a Pakistani newspaper as support for his views.

OLGA STAWNYCHY, of the World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations, appealed to the world community to inform their Governments on the concern of Ukrainian women regarding the effects of environmental disasters, such as the Chernobyl accident.

There should be measures to stop the spread of nuclear facilities, she said. [...]


In 1997, the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front won 188 seats in Algeria’s first multi-party parliamentary elections. The second runoff ballot, scheduled for 1/1997, was canceled after President Chahdi Ben Jaddid was forced to resign by a group of military and civilian officials who formed a new State Council.

Remembering Djamila Bouhired, the legendary heroine of the war of liberation, Akila Guared, also a veteran of that struggle, is touched. We are in the Aula Portico of the Sociology faculty at La Sapienza University in Rome. Guared, president of the Association to Defend and Promote the Women’s Organizations, appealed to the world community to inform their Governments on the concern of Ukrainian women regarding the effects of environmental disasters, such as the Chernobyl accident. There should be measures to stop the spread of nuclear facilities, she said. [...]
the new military-political troika in power. The task is burdensome. No other nation in the vast Muslim world has had to marry as schizophrenically as Algeria. In the space of one generation Algeria has been confronted with faith and liberation, emancipation and tradition, Boumedienne-style socialism and the Right, mosques and intellectual salons. No other Arab women have paid more dearly for this schizophrenism than the Algerians. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]


That’s the point! respond the feminists. They contest above all the notion of a single truth, an Islamic one, by which the FIS would interpret the complex reality of all Algerians. Equality between the sexes, recalls Sharifa Bouatta, for the Roman audience, is a point in the Constitution that has no use in the single creed of Islam, nor in the patriarchal family. There is a woman, Oum El Moudhir, of the Islamic Association Al-Irshad oual Isalh ready to supply the necessary theory. She states, “For thirty years, we were tossed around by a political system that was imposed against our will. But we were not confused: God ordained us to take control of what was theirs. In liberation and in family. A true Algerian wife could delegate her vote to her husband because she wants to scrupulously attend to the word of God.” [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]


A few days after the march of the 10000, the Algerian streets were once again host to a crowd of women. Veiled, heavily veiled even, the Islamic faithful, as they are called by the westernized Algerian women, marched to defend the right to elections, and the politics of the Islamic front, in the name of democracy. The Islamic militants, required to be submissive to men, are in the majority. Mixed in together are women wearing blue jeans, creating an immediate image of the two spirits of Algeria. These are same spirits which, after having dozed for years in the memory of the liberation struggle, now demand to be its exclusive representatives. For Islamic society, as is each and every orthodox Muslim’s dream, it is the return to Medina, the holy city where Mohammed dreamed of building a state based on religious obligations made real. The other side, the lay society that separates Church and State, finds its base in rights determined by popular referendum, as with all democracies. The socially determined weakness for Muslim women and the legislation about Algerian women is the point of contention between them. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]
intellectuals of the Arab diaspora who dream of models of feminine liberation in the mythical figures of early Islam. In the warrior-wife of Mohammed, in the tribal chief who, before converting, opposed armies and the lucid arguments advanced by the successors of the Prophet. One can perceive in this mediation ground a break that points towards feminine thought. For good or ill, women, women’s liberation, and Islam are discussed. Which of them might play a part in the future battle of Algiers? This permission to draw on International Journalists (ANAA), Dakar; Association des Juristes démocrates, Dakar; Association de Solidarity & Friendship Among the People, Algiers; Association nationale pour l’alphabetisation et la formation des adultes (ANAAA), Dakar; Egyptian United Nations Association, Cairo; Mauritian-Palestine Friendship Society, Port Louis; Organization of African Trade Union Unity, Accra; Palestine Committee for NGOs, Tunis; Pan African Women’s Association, Luanda; Sudanese Women Union, Khartoum; Supreme Islamic Council of Sienna Leone, Freetown; Union of Journalists of Sierra Leone, Freetown; Zimbabwe Pakistani Friendship, Harare. [=]

14030. DS. “Algeria: New East and North Africa: Algeria: Introduction”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February1995. pp. 1143-1154. groups steadily intensified their campaign to overthrow the Government. Guerrillas mounted daily attacks on security personnel and established strongholds in certain Algerian neighborhoods and other parts of the country. Militant Islamist groups with more radical agendas than the FIS have steadily become more active in the insurgency. A climate of fear and intimidation deepened as extremists assassinated dozens of political figures, journalists, academics, and thousands of other civilians, as well as over 78 foreigners. Reprisals by the regime’s forces have grown bloodier. The Government estimated that 10000 people had been killed by the end of 1993. The figure for 1994 has not been officially released but most sources estimate that it will be twice as high. The State’s security apparatus includes the police, the gendarmerie, and the army, all of which are involved in efforts to repress the Islamist insurgency and combat terrorism. They were responsible for numerous human rights abuses. Civil strife has devastated the economy, aggravating the longstanding problems of unemployment, inflation, housing shortages, scarcity of foreign exchange, and the legacy of years of inefficient state planning. Economic pressures and an inability to make service payments on its foreign debt prompted the Government in April to sign an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and to begin implementing market reforms. Nonetheless, conditions for ordinary Algerian only worsened in 1994. Respect for human rights and the rule of law continued to deteriorate in an increasingly tense environment. Abuses by all sides multiplied. Using emergency law powers, the Government continued to detain, in many cases without due process hundreds of people suspected of Islamist activities or sympathies. Special antiterrorist courts, created under the state of emergency handed down death sentences in trials which were unfair according to international standards. There is convincing evidence that the security forces carried out hundreds of extrajudicial killings, mostly in retaliation for previous attacks by armed groups, and often tortured otherwise abused detainees. The Government continued to restrict the freedoms of assembly, religion, and the press and to discriminate against women.
Domestic violence against women remains a serious problem. Armed groups, many of which claim to have Islamist objectives, also committed escalating abuses and atrocities. Terrorists, often disguised in uniforms of the security forces, killed hundreds of civilians. Some armed groups carried out a campaign of violent intimidation aimed at closing down schools and other public institutions. As law and order broke down, anti-Islamist vigilante groups engaged in reprisal killings of Islamists and their sympathizers. [ ]

14032. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The cancellation of National Assembly elections and assumption of power by the High State Committee (HSC) in 1992 effectively denied citizens the right to change their government. Constitutional provisions approved by the National Assembly in 1989 that afford Algerians the right to change their government have been effectively suspended. National elections in 12/1991 resulted in a decisive victory for the FIS— 188 of the 430 assembly seats went to the FIS; 15 went to the governing National Liberation Front (FLN) and reflected strong popular discontent with the Government. In 1/1992, President Bendjedid resigned under pressure from the army, election results were cancelled; and a 5-member executive committee, the BC, was named to serve until 12/1993 when Bendjedid's term of office was to end. The BC pledged to respect this mandate and said it will step down before 1/31/1994. However, the Government has postponed resumption of the electoral process until it considers conditions, including the security situation, to be stable enough to allow a resumption. Until such time, a transition government will be responsible for governing the country. The Government has not offered a definitive timetable for new elections but has said repeatedly that 2-3 years would be needed before elections could resume. Two levels of local government exist: 1541 local districts elect municipal councils to 4-year terms, and 48 provinces elect provincial councils to 5-year terms to work in consultation with provincial governors appointed by the Ministry. In local and regional elections in 6/1990, the FIS won control of 853 municipal and 32 provincial councils. But in 1992 and 1993, under Article 8 of the State of emergency Declaration, the Government replaced most elected local councils—including all 895 FIS-controlled councils as well as some FLN, Hamas, and Rally for Culture & Democracy (RCD) councils—with government-appointed executive committees. Very few women are active in government, there are presently no women among the 26 Cabinet ministers. Fewer than than 1% of the candidates for assembly seats in the 1991 election were women, a reflection of strong social pressures against women's participation in politics and government. The Berbers, an important indigenous minority group, participate freely and actively in the political process. Two important Kabyle-based political parties exist, including the FFS, which came in second to the FIS in the number of seats won in the 12/1991 election, and the RCD. Furthermore, Berbers hold a number of influential positions within the Government and the army. Algerian Tuaregs (a people of Berber origin) do not play as important a role in the national-level political process, due in large part to their small numbers (estimated in the tens of thousands) and their nomadic nature. Systemic or government-sanctioned barriers to political participation, however, do not exist against any minority groups. [ ]

14034. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Women's rights are restricted by Islamic law and custom. Women's rights to work, live independently, and generally function outside the traditional Muslim social norm have come under attack from Islamist leaders and conservative elements of society. Revisions in 1984 to Algeria's Family Code effectively restricted women's rights. Under the Family Code, much of which is based on Shari'a law, women, regardless of their age, employment, or civil status, remain like minors under the legal guardianship of a husband or father. Although the Family Code allows husbands to have four wives (a rare occurrence in Algeria), it requires the husband to disclose his marital status and intent to both his present and future spouses. If he fails to tell the truth, any of his wives may file a suit in court against him for fraud or divorce. The Code awards 4 months of alimony to the woman regardless of the husband's means and the circumstances of the divorce, although under the Code the wife may receive a significant settlement in cash or property after divorce if so stipulated in the marriage contract. Because the Code forbids Algerian women from marrying non-Muslims, women engaged to non-Muslim men can be subjected to harassment, reportedly including confiscation of their passports by authorities. In March women's rights advocates commemorated International Women's Day by calling on the Government to protect women's rights and to change the Family Code. With the growing influence of highly traditional Islamist views and norms among the Algerian population, protest women regard themselves as increasingly under pressure from proponents of the implementation of Islamic law. Conservative societal and family pressures as well as support or fear of political Islam, have compelled many Algerian women to wear Islamic dress, including the hijab headcovering with ankle-length overdress Many other women, however, continue to wear Western dress despite what they feel is continuous harassment and pressure to dress more traditionally. Roughly 10-15% of the work force are women, most of whom work in urban areas. Many of these women are trained and employed in the fields of medicine, education, and the media; some women serve in the armed forces. Some orthodox Islamists have blamed high national unemployment (21% according to official figures) on female participation in the workplace and argue that women should not work outside the home. However, some moderate Islamist leaders have publicly defended the right of women to work. Girls represent just under 50% of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools and 35% of students enrolled in universities. The extent of violence against women is unclear. National studies on this problem do not exist, but the Central Hospital in Algiers alone reported more than 4,600 cases of abuse against women requiring medical treatment in 1991 and 1992. Women's rights advocates assert that such violence is not rare, particularly in the context of family conflicts (i.e., wife and sister beating) in more conservative, male-dominated families. Such abuse, however, is increasingly unacceptable to middle-class Algerians. Violence against women is seldom discussed publicly, although several independent journals published articles on the subject during 1993. Women who are beaten by their husbands may file criminal charges or sue for divorce, but such legal actions are rare, and civil courts are far more likely to rule in favor of men, according to women's rights advocates. Cases of rape and incest continue to be underreported to police and to doctors, due to the social stigma attached in Algeria to
victims of such crimes. The Government is committed in principle to combating violence against women, but, given the higher priority it places on other political and security problems, it devoted few resources and little attention to this issue in 1993. [–]

14035. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government is committed in principle to protecting children's human rights and welfare. several children's advocacy groups exist, including the Association for Children's Rights and the National Association for the Defense of Children's Rights. Governments at the regional level offer social and sanitary services for children, but financial resources for such services are severely limited. Furthermore, according to local observers neither the Penal Code nor the Family Code offers sufficient legal protection to children. Although most larger hospitals treat at least several dozen cases of child abuse every year, many more such cases go unreported Some schools, according to news accounts, still use corporal punishment, and disciplinary beatings of children by parents are said to be common. [–]

14036. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The minimum employment age is 16 years. Work inspectors, who report to the Ministry of Labor, are responsible for enforcing the minimum employment age by periodic or unannounced inspection visits to the workplace. The minimum age is enforced in the state sector, the country's largest employment sector. It is not effectively enforced in the agricultural or small private sectors, but violations are not widespread. However, many children under 16 are driven by economic necessity into informal employment, such as street vending. Legislation on acceptable working hours does not make a distinction between young workers and the regular work force. [–]

14037. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (b) Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Although the Constitution and legislation adopted in 1989 provide for the rights of assembly and association, freedom of peaceful assembly is sharply curtailed under the state of emergency. Article 7 of the State of Emergency Declaration allows the Government to close all places of entertainment, halls, and assembly places, as well as ban all demonstrations likely to disturb peace and threaten public order." In 1993 the authorities generally allowed meetings, assemblies, and marches to occur, provided they were consistent with the regime's security policies. Permits were granted for a national march against violence in March (in which antigovernment placards were carried), for public assemblies held in June by Algerian economic associations (which were critical of the Government's economic policies), for an assembly held by the Algerian Journalists' Association (which was critical of the Government's handling of the press), and for a gathering to mark the commemoration of President Bourdais's 1992 assassination (at which the Government's handling of the investigation of the assassination was criticized). Permits were also granted to the Front for Socialist Forces (FFS), a political party stridently critical of the Government's policies, to hold public assemblies in June and October. In April Berber cultural groups demonstrated throughout Kabylie without having obtained a permit to do so; most of the demonstrations were allowed to take place, although at least one group of marchers was dispersed with tear gas. According to the 1989 Political Associations Law, membership in political organizations is permitted for all Algerians except judges, army and security service personnel, and members of the Constitutional Council. All nongovernmental associations must be approved by the Interior Ministry. Most political groups operate openly, although the FIS was banned in 3/1992. These range from political parties—there were over 50 parties, including some centrist Islamic parties such as Hamas, active in 1993, to specialized groups such as human rights and women's rights groups. [–]

14038. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Freedom to travel within Algeria and abroad and to emigrate is provided for by law and is generally respected in practice, although minor children are not allowed to travel abroad without their father's permission. A curfew imposed in 12/1992, and modified in 5/1993, prohibits people from traveling within Algiers and surrounding provinces between 11:30 p.m. and 4 a.m. Gendarmerie checkpoints in the cities and countryside routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification papers and vehicle registrations and occasionally search for signs of terrorist activity or evidence of black marketeering. There are some administrative restrictions on foreign travel related to mandatory military service and the obligation to repay state education scholarships. The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum. Based on data compiled by the Government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that approximately 165000 Sahrawi refugees live in camps in southwestern Algeria. Of these, some 80000 are considered by the UNHCR to be in vulnerable groups and thus in need of aid. Sahrawi refugees in southwestern Algeria are supported by both the Government and the UNHCR. Another estimated 50000 displaced Tuaregs from Mali and Niger live in settlements in southern Algeria. [–]

14039. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including: Freedom From: (a) Political and Extrajudicial Killing", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There is credible evidence that security forces committed politically-motivated extrajudicial killings. Despite President Zeroual's assurances to the contrary, there was no evidence that the authorities investigated such killings. The National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH), a government body, maintained that it provided the Ministry of Justice with information on 12 cases of suspected extrajudicial killings. In September a group of Islamists sent an open letter to President Zeroual citing 36 cases of summary executions in 1994. The Government maintains that the security forces resort to lethal force only in the context of armed clashes with terrorists. Nonetheless, security forces are believed to have carried out hundreds of extrajudicial killings, mostly in retaliation for previous attacks by armed groups. Many victims were
reportedly killed by security forces wearing civilian clothes or covering their heads with hoods. The security forces reportedly killed victims during curfew hours, at or near the victims' homes, or in the presence of the victims' family and friends. The bodies of some victims were reportedly discovered clothed in pajamas, indicating that they had been killed after they were taken from their homes. Security forces allegedly killed other persons after they were taken into police custody. Security forces in Algiers reportedly killed in reprisal against the killing of nine students and their teacher from the El Oued area-Dahab Omar, Derouiche Abdel Bassat, Rahal Abderrazak, Mahaddha Salah, Aouniet Andelkader, Djedrad Abdelkader, Arhouma Saad, Maataallah Abdelbaki, Nazli Abdelkamel, and Kouider Messaoud, who were arrested on March 12. The police maintained that the men were arrested to verify their military service status. On April 13, the police informed a relative of one detainee that the 10 men had been released on April 8, but that they were immediately killed by unknown "terrorists" after release. The Government has not provided an adequate explanation of the deaths. On March 19, the body of Kouider Melal was found in the street near his home in El Ataf, Ouedfodada, alongside the bodies of three men from the same district. Melal had been previously seen in police custody 2 weeks before his death. In addition to reports of extrajudicial killings outside detention facilities, Islamists and human rights activists accused the security forces of causing the unlawful deaths of many detainees who succumbed to torture while in custody. Armed groups, most notably the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), killed hundreds of persons, including members of the security forces and ordinary citizens. Terrorists attacked civilians whom they regarded as instruments of the State or whose lifestyles they considered in conflict with Islamic values. Victims included politicians, teachers, tax collectors, hairdressers and beauticians entertainers, veterans of the war of independence, government-appointed Islamic preachers, lawyers and magistrates who work with the Special Courts, women who refused to veil themselves, industrialists, journalists, intellectuals, and foreigners. Many victims had their throats cut or their bodies mutilated after death. Often the victims' severed heads would be discovered in one location and the bodies in another. According to a February press account, suspected terrorists kidnapped and killed a 14-year-old boy from Medea purportedly because he had befriended several police officers. His body was found hanging from a street sign. His head was found in a nearby town. Armed groups killed at least 18 Algerian journalists and 10 lawyers. In early November, gunmen forced two reporters from their homes and shot and decapitated them. One of the victims worked for the state television company the other for a state owned newspaper. Throughout the year the GIA issued death threats to journalists, foreigners, and others. Many journalists fled abroad because of threats to their lives. In October independent newspapers suspended publication for 3 days to protest the killings of journalists.

Armed groups killed the national secretary for the country's major labor union, the Union Generale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA); the president and vice president of Islah Wa El-Irchad, the largest private charitable organization; the rector of the Houari Boumediene University of Science and Technology; the president of the Algerian League for Human Rights; the chairman of the Agronomy Institute at the University of Blida; a professor of economics at the University of Oran; the director of the School of Fine Arts in Algeria, a famous playwright Vactor, the director of the National Institute of Islamic Studies; in Batna a popular singer, a leading sports personality, and the husband of the Government's former spokeswoman. In 1993, the GIA announced that foreign residents should depart Algeria or face death. Since then, terrorist groups have killed at least 90 foreigners, including more than 78 in 1994. Foreign victims included members of the clergy, business People, diplomats, and longtime residents of Algeria. Victims were citizens of a number of European and other foreign countries, although French citizens were the primary targets. In addition to targeted killings, terrorist groups also resorted to indiscriminate violence. In June two grenades were thrown at demonstrators at an Algiers march organized by the Movement for Berber Culture, an anti-Islamic group. The grenades and the return fire from the police wounded 64 persons; 2 died later. Armed Islamist groups used car bombs on numerous occasions, killing many passersby. In July, five French Embassy personnel were killed by terrorists attempting to place a car bomb inside an Embassy residential compound. Armed anti-Islamist groups such as the Organization of Young Free Algerians (OJAL) widely suspected as a front for elements of the regime's security forces carried out reprisals against terrorist groups. Such groups are reportedly active in the Berber region of Kabylie. In March anti-Islamists likely killed two veiled high school students at a bus stop in an Algiers secondary school. Armed men in reprisal for the killing a month earlier of a 17-year-old high school girl who declined to wear a head scarf. In April the OJAL issued a threat to kill 20 women wearing a head scarf or 20 bearded men for every woman killed by Islamic terrorists for not wearing a head scarf. There were many reports of reprisals by vigilante groups for the deaths of military personnel. Vigilantes may have killed 9 persons whose bodies were found on a street near an Algiers bread shop on April 12. The killings may have been committed in revenge for the murder a day earlier of an army colonel near the same bread shop. In September an anti-Islamist group killed as many as 90 people in Annaba, apparently in retaliation for the earlier terrorist murder of a gendarmerie captain and his daughter. The Government has failed to condemn the violence by anti-Islamist groups. [-]

14040. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Algeria: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (b) Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, in Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Using emergency laws, the Government sharply curtailed freedom of assembly, although the 1989 Constitution provides for the rights of assembly and association. Citizens and organizations must obtain a permit from the local Governor's office before staging demonstrations. Such permits are generally granted, after referral to the Ministry of Interior, for demonstrations against Islamist terrorism or in favor of the Government. The regime does not require legal opposition parties to obtain permits to hold internal meetings. The regime allowed Berber organizations to hold demonstrations as long as they took place in the Berber Kabylie region. However, it denied permission for 2 rallies sponsored by the The Berber Rights Movement (MBC) in the Algiers area. Nevertheless, the MBC demonstrated repeatedly in Kabylie for the teaching of their language in elementary and secondary schools. Interior must approve all nongovernmental associations. The Government regards all associations as illegal unless they are licensed. It may deny a license to or dissolve any group reported as a threat to the existing political order. In 1992 the regime dissolved the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as a political party as well as Islamic social and charitable groups associated with the FIS. Membership in the FIS is illegal. However, the Government itself has continued to meet periodically with detained FIS leaders Abbad Medani and Ali Belhadj. According to a 1989 law, all citizens may join political organizations, except judges, army and security service personnel, and member of the Constitutional Council. Most political groups, except the FIS which was banned in 3/1992, operate openly. There were over 56 parties, including some centrist Islamic parties such as Hamas, active in 1994. Other associations include specialized groups such as human rights and women's rights groups, social welfare groups, and regionally based cultural organizations. [-]

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electoral process in 1992 effectively denied citizens the right to change their government. Power remains in the hands of the military leadership and former ruling party officials. Despite President Zerouals halting attempt to consult with legal political parties and informal contacts with imprisoned leaders, there is no democratic process. In a national speech on November 1, Zeroual declared that the political dialog had failed and announced his intention to hold presidential elections in 1995 regardless. The FIS as well as the other major opposition parties dismissed the promise of elections. Few women are active in government, a reflection of strong social pressures against women participating in politics. One woman served in the Cabinet until her resignation in October, one woman served as governor of the province of Annaba and fewer than 1% of the candidates for Assembly seats in the 1991 election were women. The Berbers, an important indigenous minority group, participate freely and actively in the political process. Berbers hold influential positions in the Government and the army. The Tuaregs, a people of Berber origin, do not play as important a role in the national political process, due in large part to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of thousands, and their nomadic existence. Systemic or government-sanctioned barriers to political participation, however, do not exist against any minority group.

Nonetheless, social pressure against women pursuing a career is strong. In 1994 Islamists increased their pressure on women to adopt Islamic fundamentalist views and norms. In March terrorist groups posted notices threatening to kill any woman who does not cover her head with a scarf. In one case, terrorists killed a 17-year-old woman, reportedly because she declared to adopt Islamic dress (see Section 1.a.). Also in March, suspected terrorists killed a woman in Souala, reportedly because she refused to leave her job outside the home. Women's rights advocates assert that spousal violence is common, although there are no reliable studies on the problem. Nonetheless, the central hospital in Algiers reported that in 1991-1992, it treated more than 4600 cases of abused women. Battered women may file criminal charges or sue for divorce, but women's rights advocates maintain that legal actions are rare because the courts are generally lenient with abusive husbands. [-]

14044. Donadey, Anne. Polyphonie And Palimpsestic Discourse In The Works Of Assia Djebar And Leila Sebbar. Northwestern University. Dissertation. 223pp. AAC 9327185. [Advisor: Lionnet, Francoise] This dissertation foregrounds discursive strategies of empowerment with regard to language, colonization and female subjugation. I analyze two contemporary, post-colonial fictional responses to French colonialism in Algeria in order to reformulate the relationship between violence and desire in the colonial context. The novels under consideration, written by two women at the crossroads between Algeria and France, participate in both European and Maghrebian cultures. As cultural metisses, Assia Djebar and Leila Sebbar weave Arabic and Western intertexts in their fiction. Their writings become palimpsests: both writers inscribe their own texts over a number of previous writings which resurface as a trace. Their novels are polyphonic, dialogical texts in which different voices reverberate and conflate in sometimes violent arabesques. This dissertation explores different areas (historical discourse, literary and pictorial intertexts) in which Djebar and Sebbar deconstruct Western production in order to reappropriate it for their own purposes. Both writers reconstruct a history through the gaps of the Other's discourse (be it the colonizer's or the patriarchal tradition's). Djebar uses fiction to destabilize French archival reports on Algerian colonialization, rewriting them fictionally from an Algerian point of view. Sebbar's treatment of the Algerian war links that war to the rise of anti-Maghrebian violence in France in the past two decades. I then analyze the complex system of epigraphs framing Djebar's novels—an element which has no counterpart in Sebbar's fiction— to reveal how she manipulates her written and pictorial intertexts by decentering and recontextualizing them. Finally, I explore how Sebbar and Djebar come to terms with and deconstruct the violence of the Orientalist literary and pictorial tradition, repeating it in a subversive manner at the same time as they acknowledge their fascination for Orientalist representations of Arab women. As women at the crossroads between two cultures (whose relationship has historically been marked by violent encounters), both writers reclaim a possible utopian territory in their fiction by deterritorializing their intertexts in order to reterritorialize writing. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]

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14045. Dufrancatel, Christiane; Peoples Translation Service =


[On 11/1/1954, Algerians began an open revolt against French colonial rule in a protracted struggle ending in 1962, when Algeria gained its independence. The war, which united urban and peasant Moslems, has been a symbol and example for national liberation struggle throughout the world. Women's participation in this struggle has become a widely discussed subject, many feminists have wondered what happened to those Algerian women who had fought side by side with men. In the Winter 1980 edition of Les revoltes logiques, a French quarterly, Christiane Dufrancatel takes a fresh look at Algerian women's roles during the war for independence.]

There are detailed accounts depicting the participation of Algerian

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women in the liberation war. Two films, Battle of Algiers and Algeria in Flames show many women actively fighting with the FLN (National Liberation Front). Yet almost 20 years later little is said about Algerian women. Today, women hold no leadership positions in the government. Many women are illiterate, work without pay in their homes, are forced into marriage, and still wear veils. The nebulous phrases "failure of the revolution" or "to be expected in an Islamic country" are unsatisfactory explanations for such a phenomenon. One wonders where these active political women are today? Women fighting for national liberation in other countries apprehensively regard Algerian women as examples of what could happen to them if they do not safeguard their specific demands as women.

I interviewed Mohamed Harbi, a high-ranking Algerian government official under the Ben Bella regime (1963-1965). Ousted by a military coup in 1965, Ben Bella and many of his supporters spent years in jail. Harbi, among the jailed, was freed in 1971 and now lives in exile.

Mohamed Harbi provides some startling insights into the relationship of the FLN to Algerian women and to foreign journalists. The Algerian revolution, Harbi reveals, was a model. It opened the way for "progressive trickery," corresponding to the need to create a popular image to the outside. The theme of the participation/liberation of women was exploited for the benefit of foreigners in order to solicit international support for the resistance. It was also used to foment French opposition in France. In this vein, El Moudjahid on 5/25/59 states: "The Algerian woman is already free, because she participates in the liberation of her country, of which she is its soul, its heart, and its claim to glory." And again, on 5/31/60, "In the National Liberation Army all sectors are open to women." Ultimately though, the intent of the FLN was to preserve Algerian islamic culture and social structures against the onslaught of French modernization. El Moudjahid published an article entitled "Colonialism and Islam" which stated, "The French, who moreover are Christian or Jewish, have dared to deliberately attack the Koran and to impose by the sword France's secular laws on the Moslems of Algeria."

In addition, they have attacked the most sacred aspect of the Koran, of which she is its soul, its heart, and its claim to glory." And again, on 5/31/60, "In the National Liberation Army all sectors are open to women." Ultimately though, the intent of the FLN was to preserve Algerian islamic culture and social structures against the onslaught of French modernization. El Moudjahid published an article entitled "Colonialism and Islam" which stated, "The French, who moreover are Christian or Jewish, have dared to deliberately attack the Koran and to impose by the sword France's secular laws on the Moslems of Algeria."

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For the most part, the women fighters were forced to leave the resistance at the end of 1957 and the beginning of 1958. Those who remained performed only traditional tasks. They taught them to march in parades, and they would show them off in film documentaries. Then they dispersed them. Their political role and participation ended. "Women who had political aspirations or who wanted equality with men had a lot more difficulty. Their behavior and their desire for equality were considered a sign of loose morals."

Obviously there were some heroines. But they had special status, their participation was short-lived and for the most part they became known in prison."

On the women's part there was atrendousoumsunderstanding. Undeniably, the women believed they would be equaloneindependence came. The context lent itself to this belief. But at the same time, they put themselves completely in the hands of the leadership. They were in a position of marginal sub-proletarians vis-a-vis the Supreme Savior. They were waiting to be emancipated."

Claiming that there is a massive assertive force of women in the struggle for liberation is used as a purely verbal retort to colonialism. Propaganda is intensified through the use of the word. In the 1950's and 60's we read, because she is already free the Algerian woman will always be opposed to colonialist barbarism. It is no longer struggle which liberates, it is because the woman is liberated that she struggles.

I focused my research on the uncritical if not eager acceptance of FLN propaganda by leftist journalists. But what prompted me to delve into the relationship of the resistance movement and the progressive media to Algerian women were reports by leftist French press on the Saharan struggle for independence.

Since 1976, the Polisario Front has been fighting for the Saharan Republic's independence. At the time the Spanish colonizers decided to leave the country, they offered to split it up between neighboring Morocco and Mauritania, a move fiercely opposed by the nearly one million Saharans living in this desert land. Like media stories decades earlier, the French reports give a glowing account of the developing role of women in the Sahara. "A new Saharan women is being born" reads the caption beneath a photo showing a group of women participating in literacy classes. The Saharan woman, unlike other Maghreb (North African) women, is emancipated."

The special correspondent of the French Socialist Party daily, Le Matin, went to search the refugee camps of the Sahara for the "soul" of the Saharan resistance. The resulting article, quite favorable to the Saharan cause, sings the praises of the good place of women in national liberation struggles—despite the underlying bias in his language. "Through the struggle for liberation, we have become one man" says of the Saharans. Women are a profitable theme for propaganda arguments; women even become the symbol for the struggle. A Polisario Front poster places a woman in the front row: her body enveloped in her heavy garments, her face uncovered, holding a gun and books in her arms. Behind her, eclipsed by her figure, stands a man also holding a gun. Superimposed on this image is the drawing of a long-range gun whose target is on the heart of the woman. This type of image is not new. It is repeated with subtle variations in numerous appeals for the support of liberation struggles. The words, the slogans and the political arguments which one finds in propaganda reappear woven into journalistic discourse.

For all its pretensions to reportage on the Saharan cause, what this article really informs us of is the complicity which unites left journalist and political leaders. The journalist does not see, but believes and wants to make us believe what the political leaders think we want to believe: that the Saharan woman is emancipated even before the liberation struggle. We read that, "she is not veiled," "polygamy does not exist," "women who want to marry do so without their parents' intervention." Whether a journalist writes what s/he truly finds inside these movements is never known. Is it necessary for traditional society to be free from any accusation of the oppression of women even before the liberation struggle? In this case, reality is of little importance and can always be changed.

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lesbian rights while there were women who were just trying to survive... [Note: it is hard to tell whether the NGO Forum had an anti-Islamic focus or whether it was just the US news coverage that emphasized the anti-Islamic elements of the NGO Forum.][TXT]

14047. Fargues, Philippe; Giddens, Bryce [trans]; Stork, Joe [trans]. "Gender, Population, Environment: From Demographic Explosion to Social Rupture: Present Population Structures Already Carry In Their Consequences An End to Rapid Population Growth in the Most Populous Arab Countries", in Middle East Report, September-October 1994, pp. 6-10. The present population crisis in Arab countries is not the product of the population structure (in the Maghrib, for example, the number of children reaching school age has stopped growing), rather population pressures are the product of a higher rate of social demands by these children and their parents: so smaller cohort of children in relative terms in producing a larger number of children seeing education in absolute terms. In addition, education is now more readily available, and the education levels of women and young people in society is overtaking that of men. Birth rates started falling (a 10% fall in Egypt in 1986-1991): this will be felt in schools six years later, and in the housing markets in 2010; similarly, such turnovers will come in Syria in 2020 and Tunisia in 2005. The number of entrants into the job market at ages 20-24 will rise 30% in Tunisia before stability is reached, 50% in Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, but 120-150% in Syria: if women participate in wage earning employment at the same rate as men, the growth will be 70% in Tunisia and 300% in Syria. Throughout the region, changes of status in women is resulting in smaller families (except among refugee Palestinians supported by UNRWA): the most powerful engine for transformation has been the surge in education for women. As more women receive educations, they will enter the wage workforce: the present low levels of women's participation in the workforce (5% in the Arabian peninsula to 25% in Tunisia, compares with the world average of 50%) is directly related to the fertility rate of women in the Arab women: as more educated women enter the workforce, fertility will decline. At the same time, the diffusion of education is undermining the traditional authority of older generations, even if housing shortages will maintain the patriarchal family for a time. By 2030, literacy will be universal in Arab societies, and long before that the diffusion of education will recast gender relations and have significant political impacts.

14048. Fetni, Hocine. Law And Development In The Third World: A Case Study Of Algeria. University Of Pennsylvania. Dissertation. 287pp. AAC 9235138. [Adviser: Evan, William E.] The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the relationship between law and development in developing countries, with Algeria as a case study. In this regard, law serves as both an independent and a dependent variable. Specifically, the Boumediene era is studied. The making of laws and the process of implementing them are investigated by using two specific categories of Algerian law, family law and agrarian reform law. The first type of law serves as an illustration of law following social change, and the second of law leading to social change. The effectiveness of legal reform is determined by the appropriate choice between an incremental approach and a rapid approach to societal change, depending on whether the aspect of society to be altered is emotionally charged. To investigate the aforementioned relationship between law and development, two surveys were conducted in eastern Algeria. The first one aimed at discovering changes in attitudes of individuals in three-generation families toward family law, depending on occupation and residence. A modernity scale was used to measure the respondents' answers, denoting whether the responses were traditional or modern. The second survey, conducted among participants chosen by occupation and residence, was utilized to evaluate the use of agrarian reform laws as an instrument of social change and their impact on the Algerian society. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,][TXT]

14049. Geesey, Patricia A. Writing The Decolonized Self: Autobiographical Narrative From The Maghreb. The Ohio State University. Dissertation. 404pp. AAC 9201662. [Adviser: Bjornson, Richard] Since 1950, autobiographical fiction has been the preferred genre for many North African writers of French expression. Assia Djebar's and Abdelkebir Khatibi's autobiographical narratives distinguish themselves from the earlier examples of the genre in that they consciously challenge the notion that autobiographical discourse can communicate an authentic self-portrait of the decolonized writer. La Memoire tautoue (1971) and L'Amour, la fantasia (1985) illustrate that, while self-writing remains an integral tool in an intellectual "autodecolonization" process, it also offers bilingual writers new possibilities for an exploration of the subject's relationship to the languages that have shaped the evolution of the "self." Khatibi has used self-writing as a means of autodecolonization through the deconstruction of the paradigms that characterize earlier Maghrebian French-language autobiographies. His "autobiographie d'un decolonise" explores his plural identity as well as his internalized alterity. Through the autobiographical act, Djebar and Khatibi retracted their "coming to writing" in the French language, leading them to a greater appreciation of how both the mother tongue and the "other" tongue affect the emergence of the self. In the case of Djebar, her autobiographical project highlights her belief in the inescapable necessity for an Algerian woman to use the "adversary tongue" (i.e., French) to "veil" her innermost self. She warns that the intrusion of the foreign tongue upon the self reenacts on a metaphorical plane the 1830 French invasion of Algeria. The autobiographical act in the other tongue effectively reopens the wounds suffered as a result of colonization, thereby becoming an "auto-autopsy" instead of an autobiography. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,][TXT]
act breaches the UN Charter and conflicts with the aims of Third World development. What the United States is doing through the United Nations is an act against the spirit and the letter of the Charter. In addition to halting development, the human services we provide to our people, such as education, teaching, and industry, will be also harmed, and they are actually harmed as a result of the economic blockade. The best evidence is that public health and the health of children in particular are exposed to the dangers of malnutrition, and a shortage of education and teaching. The United States and its Western allies are responsible, and every party that yielded to pressure and personal interests and participated in this campaign is also morally and ethically responsible for the damage inflicted on us. However, we cannot surrender, out of self-defense, to such damage. In fact, we have to resist. Comprehensive resistance should begin to minimize the effects of the damage through self-reliance, maximizing agricultural production, and providing for needs through local resources. The United States and its allies and every party that responded to that are responsible for the damage inflicted on our national economy and the life of our people. The reaction will be resistance rather than surrender. Large-scale agricultural development will minimize the damage. Through determination, effort, and persistence, we will succeed.

[Nahl] What are the prospects for development at this stage, and has Iraq halted its development plan under the pressure of the crisis?

[Hammadi] Development at this stage is development of self-defense. This means provision of food and other basic needs on the civilian side of the issue, and meeting the needs of defense and the Armed Forces, on the military side, in the best way possible. Therefore, all development efforts at this stage have been readjusted and reorganized on this basis. Undoubtedly, this does not mean halting the long-term development process, which is not directly linked with the goals I have mentioned. This is an exceptional situation, but we are obliged to deal with it. There are many differences between this development plan and the other plans under ordinary circumstances.

[Nahl] Numerous measures have been taken to activate the agricultural sector, since it is at the core of Iraq's ability to hold fast at the current stage. How do you assess the agricultural sector's response to the measures that have been adopted, especially for the next winter season? Can we say that there is a possibility for achieving a certain level of self-sufficiency in basic, strategic crops?

[Hammadi] All signs indicate that there is a large-scale response to the current development efforts in the agricultural sector. There have been two reasons for this success. The first is that financial incentives for increasing production have been provided, such as increasing the prices of basic crops. Other financial incentives include reducing the prices of seeds, fertilizer, and everything related to agricultural mechanization. In addition, administrative restrictions curbing the petty traders' ability to increase production have been removed. We have taken major steps in this field within a short period of time. Moreover, there is the national enthusiasm factor, which is very important, because it is related to the morale of the peasants and all those who work in agriculture. We make use of both individual and national incentives, because we believe that both factors should be made available to achieve the highest increase in production. All signs so far indicate that there is a large-scale response among workers in the agricultural sector. Therefore, we expect a great response and success in the achievement of the aspirated objectives. The core of these objectives is the achievement of self-sufficiency in cereals as a minimum requirement. Some say we are going beyond this objective, and that agriculture will expand not with regard to cereals only, but also other products. All this is possible and will be clear within the next period. However, what we are sure of now is that there is a large-scale and voluntary response by the peasants to increase the cultivated area and, consequently, production. I will not discuss here the measures that have been adopted, since they are known and have been declared. These measures are numerous and are aimed at achieving these objectives. These measures cover prices, ways of using the state-owned lands, and the lifting of the administrative and legal restrictions on the agricultural sector. I must remark here that we are trying to encourage creativity among agricultural specialists in the invention of new methods and production techniques to help replace imported materials with local ones. For example, good progress has been achieved in the field making new fodder for livestock using basic materials based on non-cereal local products not needed for human consumption. We are about to develop an alternative to this basic material. There have been numerous suggestions, some of which will be useful for achieving such purposes.

[Nahl] Some say that in the next season, Iraq will be able to export an agricultural surplus. What do you think?

[Hammadi] This is possible. If this takes place, we will not export before the end of the crisis. Iraq will maintain every human foodstuff to defend itself. It is possible that production may exceed local needs.

[Nahl] There have been reports on offers by industrial and commercial companies to supply Iraq with medicines and foodstuffs through a third party. How true are these reports?

[Hammadi] This is not true. As far as intentions are concerned, I am sure that most companies and commercial individual and collective establishments are willing to break the embargo and to continue profitable businesses. However, these establishments are currently subject to pressure by their governments, which are also subject to pressure by the United States and its Western allies. As for intentions, yes, there are strong intentions, but I think the implementation of these wishes is not possible for the reasons I mentioned. We are working on the basis of self-reliance only. Our plan takes into consideration no materials from abroad.

[Nahl] Leader President Saddam Hussein has repeatedly proposed the establishment of an international fund to help developing countries that were hurt by increasing oil prices. He also put forward initiatives concerning high inflation rates in the capitalist countries, and other issues. Are current circumstances appropriate for such initiatives? And what was the response to them?

[Hammadi] When the president makes proposals, he means that Iraq must certainly be a main contributor, he does not mean that others should implement the proposals while Iraq stays aloof. Therefore, I naturally believe that the president wants his proposals to be implemented when Iraq is experiencing a normal situation, not the current extraordinary situation. I expect that after the crisis has been resolved, Iraq will play a more active role in consolidating the various Arab countries, increasing their capital and facilitating their activity. The oil-producing countries will increase their financial assistance to poor Arab countries with a view to achieving radical transformation in the process of Arab wealth distribution. The poor Arab countries have rights to the oil wealth, which is centered in certain Arab countries merely by geographic coincidence. After the unification of Kuwait and Iraq, the latter's financial capability has increased, and out of its principles, Iraq is expected to play a more active role in this regard.

[Nahl] Iraq put forward a positive and humanitarian initiative when it proposed supplying the needy developing countries with free Iraqi oil. How many requests have you received? And how can this proposal be implemented to the advantage of the developing world?

[Hammadi] Here, there is also a difference between the desire and the realization of this desire. I strongly believe that perhaps all Third World countries, and even other countries not belonging to the Third World, would have liked to benefit from this initiative if they had the freedom to do so. The Third World countries and world nations in general believe that Iraq is serious in its offer, and it means what it says. All world nations are willing to benefit from the initiative, but they are unable to because of the current circumstances. Immediately after the initiative was made, the United States said through its administration officials that the oil embargo includes this free oil, which meant that no country could benefit and ensure the safe arrival of Iraqi oil or any other Iraqi product.

[Nahl] The Saudi regime has taken measures to punish the fraternal Arab countries that opposed the US invasion of the Arab lands. Particularly, it cut off oil to these countries. How do you view this? And are there any Iraqi measures to provide urgent assistance to these countries?

[Hammadi] First, this is an old and regrettable story. Whenever a political dispute emerges between an Arab government and another, each government tries to punish the citizens of the other, cut off human and...
popular bonds, and abrogate earlier agreements. This has had very negative effects on inter-Arab relations and has significantly hindered Arab interaction. Such conduct shows weak or lacking pan-Arab feelings and reflects a primitive, uncivilized spirit. The Saudi Government’s measures against Jordan and Yemen are a concrete example on this. Iraq is now going all-out to lessen the economic and financial burden on Jordan and Yemen as a result of the Saudi position. It approved cooperation with both countries for the purpose of returning private property from the cutoff of Saudi oil. I think that the measures taken are successful and can solve the problem. We are also trying to take other measures to ease the damage resulting from such actions against Jordan, Yemen, and any other Arab country in a similar position.

[Nahi] French-Iraqi relations were strongly shaken when the French Government got carried away and followed the US position. Will this have any impact on the distinguished French-Iraqi ties? Will it also affect the status of French companies?

[Hammadi] France and Iraq are bound by strong ties which have been formed throughout a long period of time. We have made it clear time and again to the French side that we are eager to maintain these ties and promote them, and that we are ready to strengthen these relations in the future. This position has taken shape following the termination of the war with Iran, and through many measures. The re-scheduling agreement which we signed with France was better than any similar agreements which were concluded with other countries. Moreover, we encouraged the activity of French companies in Iraq, and all pending economic problems between the two countries were resolved. Things got out of hand, however, and all this has come to a halt as a result of France’s contribution to the economic embargo against Iraq. Many French quarters wished this had not happened. Here, I would like to note that the positions of France during this crisis have been far from identical with those of the United States. We have always been concerned to make France understand that this is not in its interest in the region, and it has been proven that the status France has in Iraq and the Arab countries following the independence of Algeria, and since the age of President de Gaulle, has turned out to reflect a sound policy which deserves to be heeded. Here, I would like to point out that the French position has recently shown some moderation represented in the proposals of the French president, which he declared in his speech to the General Assembly. We have explained to the French side that these proposals are worthy of attention and development. At any rate, and regardless of what has taken place, we are eager to maintain ties with France, but it depends on the French side to confirm this.

[Nahi] The position taken by some official Soviet sides at international forums has revealed an unmistakable change which runs counter to the existing ties of friendship between Iraq and the USSR. To what extent does this reflect on the nature and magnitude of cooperation between Iraq and the USSR, which has been characterized throughout previous decades by stability and mutual trust?

[Hammadi] In the case of the USSR, it is well known that Iraq and the USSR are bound by a long-term friendship agreement. The radical change that has overtaken Soviet policy toward the Western camp, especially the United States, has led the USSR to take positions identical to those of the United States in relation to the Security Council resolutions. It is clear that this position is not in harmony with the spirit of the Iraq-USSR friendship agreement. I can say that in this regard we have shown patience and tolerance, and have been eager to explain to the USSR that these positions harm relations between the two countries and are incompatible with the spirit of the friendship agreement. To tell the truth, I would say that the USSR, for its part, has expressed its eagerness to maintain friendly relations with Iraq. However, it depends on the USSR in the next stage whether it is eager to maintain relations with us or whether it has other considerations.

[Nahi] How accurate is it to say that this is the era of American hegemony of the world?

[Hammadi] It is still early days. The emergence of other powers to counterbalance the United States is not a farfetched possibility. Monopoly and tyranny cannot reign forever.

[Nahi] Would you name some of these powers?

[Hammadi] Western Europe, for one, can act as a new center of gravity, and so can Japan. The same goes for Arab countries pursuing unity and liberation.

[Nahi] Iraq is said to be seeking a deal to swap oil for foodstuffs and medicines via Iran. How accurate is the report?

[Hammadi] No, such contacts are taking place. It is absolutely groundless. The contacts under way between Iraq and Iran are on the POWs and normalization of ties and to seal the end of the war that, for all intents and purposes, halted on 8/8/1988.

[Nahi] Incidentally, what is the latest on the POWs?

[Hammadi] Yesterday the Iraqi delegate traveled to Iran and communicated to the Iraqis that we initiated the prisoner release on the strength of numerous promises by them that the prisoner swap would be full and comprehensive. We kept our part of the deal, having set free all the Iranian prisoners. The Iranians released a corresponding number. Given that Iraqi prisoners outnumber the Iranians, the Iranians unjustifiably halted the releases. It is not true that there are Iranian prisoners left in Iraq. We are now seeking, through dialogue, to let the Iranian side honor their promises they gave relevant to the prisoners.

[Nahi] Are you optimistic all these crises, above all the blockade, will come to an end?

[Hammadi] A blockade cannot last forever—nothing does. But I cannot pin it to a time frame. It is hard to predict, but certainly it will take some time yet. It may be days or weeks before the blockade ends. This will happen when those who initiated the embargo come to the realization that it is doing them more harm than good. [Reprinted from Fred Moore (compiler), Iraq Speaks: Documents On The Gulf Crisis. Palo Alto, Calif., N.D.] [=]

14052. Hedges, Chris. "Close-Up: US Troops Face Another Danger: The Mujahideen; Many of These 3000-4000 Islamic Extremists Are Veterns of the War In Afghanistan", in Seattle Times, December 3, 1995. p. A3. The hundreds of mujahideen who went to Bosnia to prevent the genocide of the Muslims there are now described as the greatest enemy of the US forces that will be deployed there. Many of the men are described as seeking the overthrow of what they see as the anti-Islamic governments of Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. UN forces have been involved in several confrontations with the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen acted as shock troops for the Bosnian army, willingly accepting heavy casualties in frontal attacks on otherwise unassailable Serbian positions. One Mujahideen observer that US troops will be no better than UN troops, bringing drugs and prostitution to Bosnia, as UN peacekeepers have done in so many places. Although there are reports of Mujahideen harassing Christians, there is no single report of a confirmed killing of a civilian by a Mujahideen. Znenica, which is a Mujahideen center, has several Iranian and Egyptian Islamic charities, such as Human Relief International, outlawed in Egypt. [TXT]


Sometimes national liberation struggles can reinforce women's oppression rather than challenge it, according to Marie-Aimee Helie-Lucas. She documents how the propaganda surrounding the formation of a newly independent socialist Algeria blinded women to the rising power of the Islamic State. Although Algerian socialism was supposed to be combined with Islamic religion, she feels that the socialist label was a fraud intended to silence those who feared the Islamic state. 'Because it was a socialist state, one could not oppose the politics of the state without opposing socialism; because the people were in power, one could not criticize the regime without being anti-people. This rhetoric, as stupid as it appears when one has stepped out of it, has proven to work successfully in silencing the left in most of the Eastern European
women have lived in myth, talking about myth. Women were equal to men in the Constitution, but only as long as the Constitution was in conformity with Islamic religion. Later developments taught us what this stipulation meant.

I’ll now give two concrete examples of the policy of the state against women, and how nationalism, socialism, and religion entwined to work against women.

The first example is the birth policy of Algeria. At the time of independence, Algeria was still under the old natalist French law of 1920, which forbade not only the use but also any knowledge of contraception. This law, like many others, could not be replaced immediately, so it was temporarily continued. Obviously, we women hoped that after independence came we would have access to some means of contraception. But many men died during the liberation struggle, and the policy of the State was clearly to replace them. Having children was encouraged as a main accomplishment for women and a duty to the nation. Nevertheless, it would have been very difficult to have us accept, without protest, such a blunt policy.

But fortunately, if I may say so—the United States was, at that very time, trying to enforce a brutal policy of birth control in the “Third World.” The policy culminated in an attempt to pressure governments to adopt the US world plan, called “fertility target,” at the World Conference on Population in Bucharest. As the champion of the liberation of Africa, as the champion of socialism, Algeria was not to allow such policy. We still know that population policies are not the way to development. Could we, as women, disapprove of that? Could we, as socialists, not support the international policy of our government? Indeed, we did not protest when the natalist law was not changed.

Although we managed to get statements from the highest Islamic authorities that contraception was not forbidden by religion, nothing was to change for a whole decade. This is proof that people in power use religion only when it suits them. At that time, they strengthened their control over people by dictating their private lives in all possible respects, including the bearing of children.

The anti-imperialist stand that they took on birth policy also perfectly suited the needs of their internal policies: women had to pay a high price for it. In about 10 years, the average number of children per woman was 7.9: pregnancies ranged from 14 upwards; we do not know about legal abortions, nor about maternal death. The population growth reached 3.5%, one of the highest at the time in the world.

To make a long story short, 10 years were enough to turn a socialist bureaucracy into a more conventional bourgeoisie, owning means of production. The Algerian ruling class felt threatened by the growth of the lumpen masses, and suddenly reversed its policies: birth control was legalized, contraception clinics were opened and their number increased rapidly, and therapeutic abortion was legalized. Population growth came down to 3.2% within a few years. In 1981, taxation penalized large families. In both cases women had no say. They are the producers of goods which the State controls.

The second example is the use of religion. Although the constitution guarantees equality to all citizens, it was stated shortly after independence that we should have a family code more in accordance with Islamic values. Three projects were drafted, one under Ben Bella, the first president of Algeria, two under Boumediene, the second president. All were circulated in small circles: all legalized the inferiority of women, submitting them to the authority of men who were their legal tutors (fathers, brothers, husbands—or elder sons). In 5/1984, a family code was finally passed, without warning or discussion, which reproduced the Fourth Project that women had challenged in 1981, except for a clause on permission to work. This law was highly unfavorable to women’s economy, but had to be given into marriage; they had no right to divorce, no right to work without permission of the male tutor., restricted rights to inheritance, etc. All this was said to be Koranic, so that no argument should be made against it.

It is now a legal fact that women have lost many rights which were once guaranteed by the Constitution, on the grounds that these rights were anti-Islamic. Supporters of religion will tell you that religion stands for equality among all human beings; Muslims also have this language, and see no contradiction with the inequalities that Muslim law enforces with respect to women. With little sense of humor, they also claim that Islam asks that each believer be fair to his women (polygamy and repudiation are now legal in socialist Algeria); if each man were a true believer, women would be well treated and would not need to seek formal equality.

This erosion of women’s rights is evidence of the takeover by rightist Muslims in the male population, who are known in Algeria as Muslim Brothers and in other countries as Fundamentalists. The rise of religious elements challenging the State in Algeria and channeling the discontent of the population is not an isolated phenomenon; it occurs in most Muslim countries at present. One of the most striking elements of their philosophy is nationalism, entangled with a “going back to traditions,” a search for roots of identity, a rejection of all the evils of Western imperialism. One of the commonalities of these fundamentalist tendencies in Muslim countries is the growing oppression of women.

New enforcement of Muslim laws has toughened the situation for women in many countries and communities—not only in Algeria, but in Egypt, in Pakistan, in India, in Sudan. Not to speak of the unspeakable situation of Iranian women. In Algeria the number of mosques has increased to the extent that each block has a huge room for prayer, each school or university has at least one. The improvised mosques gather huge numbers of young men and teenager boys, who rule their female fans according to the prescriptions of their leaders, we have recently discovered that Fundamentalists train young leaders in several countries and that huge amounts of money are involved in such trainings. For instance, young Pakistani men might be trained in Iran with Saudi Arabian money, Sudanese might be trained in Pakistan with Egyptian money. We hope to encourage research on such matters.

We also found out that both in the Arab world and in South Asia, Ministers of Justice meet and attempt to unify family codes in a way which is even more restrictive to women. There is no doubt about the international dimension of this attempt to use religion as a unification device in the present world situation.

Further Reading: Woman in the Muslim Unconscious, by Fatta A. Sabbah, Pergamon Press, New York, 1984. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 1443, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface; US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]
the Algerian population. They have been condemned as terrorists and totalitarians who want to take Algeria back to the Middle Ages. But it is wrong to see Islamic fundamentalism merely as a movement which wants to oppress women or which kills innocent civilians to achieve that end. It is also wrong to say that the FIS and other Islamic groups are fighters against Western domination who should be supported uncritically. In the past decade, the FIS and groups like Hamas in Palestine have grown rapidly because they have put themselves forward as unyielding fighters against foreign domination of the Middle East and North Africa. Middle Class; The FIS's core is a section of the middle class students, Islamic clergy, and landowners-who aspire to advance their careers and standing in Algerian society. The middle class is always torn in two directions. On the one hand, because of its small size, it must mobilize the oppressed to fight its battles. On the other hand, it does not seek to overturn capitalism nor to support workers' struggles. Therefore, it upholds many of the old prejudices of the existing society. The FIS has mobilized millions behind a vision of a society ruled by Islamic law which promises a better life for the oppressed masses. But this vision also means forcing women to wear the veil. It is anti-gay and hostile to democracy and trade union rights. The FIS has grown at the expense of other political alternatives in Algeria have shown they can't deliver to the mass of the population. Thirty years ago, the French were kicked out of Algeria by a popular movement which fought a bitter war against the colonial power. The new, secular National Liberation Front (FLN) government held out the promise of a better life and dignity for a nation which had been occupied and brutalized by French imperialism for 130 years. But because the Algerian nationalists followed a program of accommodating with world capitalism, they failed miserably to live up to the promise of independence. Increasing Bitterness; Increasing bitterness in the face of declining living standards and undemocratic rule created a space for the FIS to grow simply because they opposed the government and put forward some alternative. It is the political bankruptcy of nationalism that allowed the Islamists to win support for a program that, in many ways, is backward and reactionary. The FIS can no more deliver liberation to the masses than the FLN. The example of Iran shows this clearly. The conquest of power by Islamists in 1979 has not improved the lives of ordinary Iranians. Understanding this allows a better assessment of Islamic fundamentalism than the media's diatribes or the blanket condemnation adopted by much of the left in the West. Socialists will often fight on the same side as the Islamists-against US imperialism in the Middle East or against anti-Muslim racism in countries like France or the US. Socialists should denounce the coup in Algeria and insist that Algerian people have the right to choose whatever government they want. But at the same time, socialists oppose the Islamists' use of individual terrorism and their attacks on women, gays, members of other religious groups or national minorities. To win liberation in North Africa and the Middle East, requires the mobilization of the masses of ordinary people to fight against imperialism. But it also means fighting for a society in which women can do as they wish and in which nobody is oppressed because of their national origin or language. In other words, those who support the FIS today must be won to the ideas and politics of revolutionary socialism. [-]

14055. Huxley, Christine. "Arab Governments Wake Up To AIDS Threat", in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. pp. 24-25. WHO reports only a very small number of AIDS cases in the Middle East, but there is a general awareness that AIDS could become a major regional problem. The reported 366, even if it up 87% from 196 in 5/1988, is certainly an understatement. Nevertheless, Qatar has 21 in a population of only 257000; Sudan with 88 is at the edge of the African AIDS belt, Israel (with close ties to the US) has 76 reported cases, and Morocco and Algeria, both significant tourism destinations, have high rates. While Arab countries initially thought AIDS was a disease of Gays and drug addicts and that their societies would remain exempt, and the fact that the first Arab cases were related to blood transfusions (the high number of cases in Qatar and UAE is related to blood imports; in Iran, testing of the 3198 hemophiliacs has found 450 with HIV; the 1 case in Kuwait is of a hemophiliac child), Arab governments have now recognized that AIDS could become a problem. Only Tunisia has publicly recommended condoms for recreational sex among students. In many countries, the threat of AIDS is being seen as a continuation of imperialism: one underground source in EWgypt reported Israel had set AIDS infected prostitutes to Egypt. Dubai has banned the entry of Ugandan women; Iraq requires AIDS testing of all citizens who return from abroad. All countries of the region are screen blood at blood banks, although poorer states such as Sudan, Yemen and Tunisia have not been able to afford such equipment. The continuing emphasis on screening foreigners in the region could be an imminent explosion in domestic AIDS cases. [AIDS cases reported to WHO and in local media, as of 4/1989 total: Algeria 13, Bahrain 0, Cyprus 7, Djibouti 1, Egypt 6, Iran 5, Iraq 0, Israel 76, Jordan 4, Kuwait 1, Lebanon 11, Libya 0, Morocco 22, North Yemen 0, Pakistan 6, Qatar 21, Saudi Arabia 18, Somalia 0, South Yemen 0, Sudan 88, Syria 5, Tunisia 36, Turkey 18, UAE 22; total 366.] [TXT]

14056. Iraqi Communist Party. "Events of the Week: Women and Peace Week", in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al- Shaab). December 30, 1959, p. 4. "A "Women and Peace" week, sponsored by the League for the Defense of Women's Rights was inaugurated on Sunday, 12/20/1959. The week was commenced by the Minister of Municipalities Dr. Nazihah al-Dulaimi who delivered a lecture on "women and her role in safeguarding peace. "The lecture emphasized the particular interest of women in peace since the mother alone "can appreciate the value of the child since his birth and exerts all efforts to bring him up." The minister stressed on the campaigns that can be launched by women for the backing of the cause of world peace. The meeting also unanimously approved a cable to be sent to the UN denouncing the intention of France to carry out her atomic tests in the Algerian Sahara which would mean "devastation for the fraternal Algerian people and all the peoples of Africa. "The cable demanded that this test should be halted. [+]" }

14057. Iraqi Communist Party. Editorial: "Editorials from the Arabic Edition: Our Absolute Support to the Revolution of the Brotherly Algerian People Is a Reflection of the Soundness of Our National Liberated Line (11/1/1959)", in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab), December 7, 1959, p. 8. All the Arab peoples are now engaged in direct or indirect battles against imperialism, reaction and agents. However it is the Algerian people who have been engaged for the last five years in the fiercest of these battles, hundreds of thousands of Algerians have been mown down by the fire of the imperialists. The battle of the Algerian people will be immortalized as one of important battles in modern history. The Arab peoples, held together with the Algerian people by the bond of common history, language, interests and land as well as the common struggle against imperialism have stood solidly on the side of the Algerian people. Should there seem any discrepancy in practical stand of each people, it is only due to the difference in the possibilities made available by the circumstances of each people. Thus our people were unable under the oppressive regime of Nuri es-Said to provide Algeria with the aid they desired. As regards the governments, their attitudes with respect to the revolution in Algeria vary according to the nature of their systems and attitude towards imperialism. The more the government adhered to a democratic anti-imperialist line the greater will its support to Algeria be. This is illustrated by the difference in the attitude between the old and the new attitudes of Nasser. Hence it is not surprising that es-Said Government should satisfy itself of offering ID, 200000 while it spent a quarter of a million on banquets and entertainments during the Development Week. Nor is it surprising that the present Iraqi government should make unmatched generous aids to Algeria, take firm measures with France and ask the other Arab countries to do the same. Similarly, it is not surprising that Nasser, before his recent drift to the side of the imperialists, should support the Agrarian Revolution or that he should now compromise with imperialism at the expense of Algeria, and against the interests of the Egyptian and Syrian peoples and against the 7/14/1958 Republic. The attitude taken towards the Algerian cause is the
best measure of the essence of all movements, forces, elements and governments. We take pride in the wise and honest stand of our government from the Algerian and Arab Liberation Movement. This stand is honest because our government does not seek rewards or provinces; it is sound because it is hostile to imperialism as a whole including the French. Let us then proceed in supporting Algeria morally, materially and politically and continue in fighting the common enemies: namely, imperialism, reaction and the agents; let us continue to safeguard and consolidate our republican standing in support of the Algerian cause right to the end. Many greeting to the revolutionary heroes of Algeria: to the workers, peasants, artisans, intellectuals and merchants, men and women young and old; greetings to all those who are participating in this battle against the imperialistarmy, their American bases, North Atlantic organization and all their agents. [–]

14058. Jacobs, Milton. "Isolation of a 1000-Year Old Saharan Trading Town", in American Anthropologist, April 1967. pp. 220-222. The arguments in Leonard Kassad's review of and the monograph itself by Briggs and Guede, No More For Ever: A Saharan Jewish Town (1964), includes numerous generalizations about the uniqueness of features of Ghardaian Jewish life that are untrue. The work is uncritical and valueless. The features of Ghardaian society that are asserted as unique include aspects of marriage, childbirth and midwives, status of women, magic, religion, food and dress, yet these same social characteristics are widely found throughout Jewish populations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, as well as among the Arabs and Berbers of North Africa. The authors are correct when they state that Ghardaian Jews are not a "typical" Jewish society only if they are comparing the lives of Ghardaian Jews to the life of American Jews: the Ghardaian Jews are simply typical of the Jewish and non-Jewish peoples of the region in which they live.

14059. Kaplan, Roger. "Algeria Stumbles Toward Democracy", in Wall Street Journal, December 3, 1996. p. A22. [Kaplan is a New York Post editorial writer and director publications at Freedom House.] Algeria "has emerged as a key test of whether secular and democratic institutions can prevail" in the face of Muslim fundamentalism. The recent referendum has legitimized the government that came to power in a coup that overturned the first free elections in the name of a Western backed military dictatorship. The 50000 people who have died in the civil war that followed the coup may not seem auspicious, but the destruction of popular Muslim movements in Algeria is the real path to a model of Middle East democracy that can be built by pro-Western security forces. However, no matter how serious the human rights abuses in Algeria, anything justifies the prevention the emergence of an Islamic-government in Algeria. For example, Kaplan asserts that Islamic law allows rape [/sic]. The destruction of Islam in Algeria by the authoritarian forces of the government "may yet offer the world cause for optimism": [TXT]

14060. Krislov, Samuel. Representative Bureaucracy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974. The question of representative bureaucracy is tied in with the questions of compensatory justice for minorities, quotas, and affirmative action. While bureaucracy was grown steadily albeit against general reluctance in the United States, the question of the relationship of bureaucracy to the broader society has become one of growing importance: namely, should the socio-economic composition of the bureaucracy have any relation to the broader society. The term 'representative bureaucracy' was coined by J. Donald Kingsley in 1944 in England; he feared the British bureaucracy was so wedded to Conservative policies that it would sabotage any Labor program, seeing the composition of the bureaucracy as over-representing classes associated with the traditional elites, and including few of the classes ruled by these elites. The question of representative bureaucracy emerged in the United States as part of the broader civil rights movement, and embraced the demands of Blacks, Hispanics and women for a great role in the great state bureaucracies; these demands superceded the ideology promulgated by Israeli Zangwill that the United States was a perfect 'melting pot' for ethnicity. While bureaucracies were not an immediately apparent venue for the question of representativeness, the position of bureaucracies in modern mass, multi-ethnic societies in tandem with the 'organizational revolution' (modern management, computers, accounting) led bureaucracies to be seen as a necessary focus for representation. However, the American electoral system which principally reinforces the social position of the wealth, who tend to dominate the electoral process, and that of superior ethnic groups ("academic' Jews over inferior' Blacks (rabidly suspicious' Blacks) as in the New York City educational system.

How Bureaucracies Can Never Be Fully Representative (pp. 42-62): Bureaucracies cannot be representative because of differences in skill levels within the population, immutable 'attributes' such as gender or height (although the consistent use of women or Jews as American diplomats in Muslim countries seems to those societies as an 'absurdity or insult', although it is merely a product of 'majority sentiment' in the United States [sic: Zionism? Feminism?]), interests and personality structure [caste?](so Jewish-Americans become diplomats, Greek-Americans become restaurant owners and candy makers, German-Americans beer brewers, Irish-Americans become policemen, and Blacks postal clerks (Krislov notes that postal clerks are the lowest grade people in the American bureaucracy, p. 49)), or broader purposes (whether nepotism or Affirmative Action').

How Bureaucracies Can (and Should) Be Representative (pp. 63-81): Bureaucracy, due to their size and range of activities can be more representative than most branches of government. In addition, there is some social good that can come from greater representation in bureaucracies. As long as skills or aspirations are similar, bureaucracies can readily span ethnic, religious and cultural differences in a population. In several areas, bureaucracies can be more representative that elected offices, as with age groups, and gender (even if women are under-represented in higher bureaucratic posts).

Some Patterns of Bureaucratic Representativeness and Misrepresentativeness (pp. 82-103): The question of bureaucratic representation has been resolved in different manners in difference societies. (1) In India, to redress caste grievances, the government has tried to create a preference for scheduled castes comprising 64.5 million people in the lowest castes. Constitutional and legal methods were used to redress the rigid caste lines built on social acceptance and social habit. (2) In the 1950s, quotas for Harijans were unsuccessful, but in the 1960s, as cohorts of educated Harijans entered the workforce, more started to enter the civil service, albeit at the price of creating significant resentment among other castes. However, against the general background of bureaucratic ineffectiveness in the post-colonial Indian government, the impact of quotas for the scheduled castes is unclear. (2) In Malaya, the problem of ethnic competition between Malays and Chinese led to the partition of Malaysia and Singapore in 1963. (3) Linguistic conflicts in Belgium and Canada, representing the most obvious element of separate cultures and nationalities: in neither country has the problem been resolved. (4) Confessional boundaries in Lebanon has led to the careful and precise division of offices in the national government along confessional (ethno-religious) lines. Maronites have the Presidency, a Sunni is prime Minister, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies is a Shiite. However, since the 1943 census provided the basis for the division of power, further census have not been undertaking since it is feared that the new data would destabilize the equilibrium of the government. However, the division of positions within the bureaucracy along ethnic lines has marginalized the bureaucracy, as the best minds enter business, as has long been traditional in Lebanon. (5) In Israel, Krislov sees the only ethnic problem as the integration of new, immigrant Jewish populations (Iraqi Jews, Yemeni Jews, Moroccan Jews, Algerian Jews) within the 'Jewish state' though state control of MAPAM, Histadrut and the Kibbutzim. Oddly, Krislov ignores the question and existence of Oriental Jewish dissidents like the Black Panthers.

The American Bureaucracy As a Representational Service: The American bureaucracy has a mixed record in being representative.
Russians have sought to create women astronauts where the US has not, the FBI and diplomatic corps remain WASPy. Beginning in the late 1960s, there was a concerted effort to increase the number of Blacks, women, veterans and handicapped in the civil service. The Nixon Administration would see the greatest relative increase in Hispanics in the federal civil service. The successes in making the bureaucracy more representative has been impressive at the grossest level, but remains suspect. An important next step is to provide representation in the workplace. The government must be in elected office, not in the bureaucracy. [Kristlov is Prof. of Political Science at University of Minnesota; he is a member of the American Political Science Association council and editor of Law and Society Review; in 1972-1973 he was the recipient of the Ford Foundation Faculty Fellowship.]

14061. LCOME: Power, Jane. “Building a Network: Labor Education Conference Looks at Middle East Unions”, in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter 1990. WASHINGTON, D.C. - American unionists took another step towards building a network of activists concerned for Middle East workers at a conference of the independent Workers Education Local 189 held here in November 18. The meeting focused on teaching US workers about the conditions of their Middle East counterparts. It began with participants examining the current situation in the different countries in the region: Making the presentation on Israel’s Jewish workers was Bernie Bellush, assistant editor of the Jewish Forward. He described Histadrut’s consistent rejection of opportunities to put Palestinian workers on an equal footing with Jews. When jobs were scarce, Bellush noted, the Israeli labor federation shut Palestinians Out. Over the years, said Bellush, Histadrut has become an employer, controlling 28% of Israeli industry, and a state within a state, providing social services such as the country’s main health insurance system and running the biggest bank and women’s organization. “It’s impossible,” asserted Bellush, “for the Histadrut to be all these things and a true labor organization, too.”

Now, said Bellush, the Histadrut should decide what it wants to be and give up the rest. It must support the independent West Bank and Gaza unions, not condone repression of all unions there. It should campaign for negotiations leading to peace in exchange for land-specifically, to a politically independent Palestinian state. Occupation, he concluded, is economically, morally, psychologically and politically destroying Israeli workers. Samir Miari, a Palestinian from Nazareth and an Israeli who testified before the Knesset’s subcommittee that traced Israel’s discrimination against Palestinian workers from the early Zionist goal of “the conquest of labor” (a 100% Jewish labor force), Israeli laws have provided ample excuses, he noted, for excluding or limiting Palestinian Israeli workers as “security risks” or “non-local.” Today, said Miari, Histadrut employs over 23% of the labor force, second only to the government. Just five of the 168 executive board members are Palestinians, he said. Histadrut’s influence extends to the 189 workers’ branches in private workplaces with 50 or more workers where a majority of the workers vote to unionize. The “socialist prosecutor can ban leftists from leadership, and union leaders are normally close to the government. Although Arab governments try to control labor movements and every union must be sanctioned by the government, unions do function. It is in the union leaders’ own interest to defend private employment against privatization. They are also subject to pressure from their members. Since strikes are illegal, and therefore “wildcat,” they formally condemn them, but at the same time press the government to grant the workers’ demands. Pripstein recounted two recent examples of the Egyptian government’s reaction to labor actions. When 100 train engineers were imprisoned for striking, a court ruled that because President Hosni Mubarak had signed the International Declaration of Human Rights, the imprisonment was illegal. In less than a month, Mubarak, in turn, repudiated the ruling. The government also recently arrested, beat and tortured 52 intellectuals who had formed a solidarity committee for 600 Helwan Steel Plant workers who had been imprisoned, beaten and tortured for staging a Sit-in. Noting that Arab unionists would welcome the solidary of US workers, she commented that any AFL-CIO support for Arab workers against their governments would, however, be somewhat suspect in view of the US federation’s consistent support of Israeli government interests. (Jane Power is a writer living and working in Washington, D.C.) [–]
Q. [Dr. Mohammed Muslih]: What is the relative institutional space to be allocated to government and society? The present government of Sudan is transitional, ultimately it plans to withdraw from many of the areas it now operates in, as social development allows it to do so. The Islamic model of government is that of limited government. The sharia is itself a limitation on government. Because of sharia, Sudan is privatizing: Sudan has rejected the IMF model of privatization and instead has adopted one that does not damage society in the manner of IMF dictated privatizations. The ‘optimum model is one where most functions are privatized’.

Q. [Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche]: Will the Persian Gulf War allow the West to recover its pre-eminence or will it encourage Islamic movements? Turabi: Saddam Hussein is not a Islamist and his government was a brutal one, with terrible abuses of human rights. It was his lack of popularity in the Islamic world that explains why Muslims did not rally to support Iraq. However, Hussein and ‘even’ Qaddafi represent a national response to the West, which does create some sympathy for them (even if their governance is not Islamic or to be admired). So, many Muslims saw the war not as one to restore the monarchy of Kuwait, but rather believed that the war was fought for oil or to advance Israeli expansionist plans. All saudis believed that the only motive of the Americans was to control the oil: King Fahd himself told me that he did not invite the Americans, but felt that if he did not invite them that they would come anyway, and in that circumstance he would lose his throne. However, between the war and the collapse of the USSR has led to a tremendous growth in the Islamic movement among both the masses and intellectuals (whether nationalists or Marxists). Interestingly enough, it was the experience of colonialism that awakened the desire for Islamization in Sudan; now with the domination of Saudi Arabia by ARAMCO and with the foreign military presence, the Saudi people are belatedly experiencing colonialism.

Q. [Dr. Richard Cottam]: In Iran after the revolution there was an extreme polarization between Islamists and secularists, with an erosion of support for the government by the majority over time; can this tendency be avoided? Turabi: Some polarization in societies along political lines is ‘very natural’ and new phenomena give rise to anxiety; Palestinian nationalist cause. Ultimately, the unity of the Islamic world will have a major role in resolving the question of Palestine. The Muslim world is changing, and Islamic movements are growing everywhere; even Arafat finds himself outlawed by an Islamic movement. In time the Palestinian problem will become more Islamic.

Q. [Dr. Richard Herrmann]: Is the change in direction in the Muslim world toward Islamization inevitable? Turabi: ‘I said it was ‘almost inevitable’ since I don’t believe in historical determinism. However, the process of Islamization seems to be a strong and widespread trend; military attacks alone cannot change this trend, but could convert it from a peaceful path to a ‘radical and aggressive’ path.’

Q. [Dr. Robert Kramer]: If there is no slavery then why is the word ‘abid’ [slave] widely used in Khartoum? Is the civil war not the product of hold the country for 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 2 years, God knows how long; nobody can predict. The Soviet Union collapsed in a fraction of the time that people gave it; people thought it would take 50 years. Once the change was launched, it took two years for the whole edifice to collapse’.

Turabi. Wise Monograph 1. Tampa, Fla.: World & Islam Studies Enterprise, May 10, 1992, pp. 13-31. Hasan al-Turabi begins with the unitarian principle and the heart of Islam; very early (forty years after the beginning of Islam), secularism ‘afflicted Muslims’, and the Islamic paradigm of the government as the organizer of popular consensus and decisionmaking was usurped by jurists. Secularism and de-Islamization of Muslim society began in non-Arab Muslim countries primarily under the Turks, with its power extending as a part of Western Imperialism. The replacement of sharia started the revival of Islam, but early efforts (Iraq, Syria and Egypt) were politicized and tried to engage in westernized politics: electioneering, standing for elections, and lobbying for Islamic reforms. Such movements were suppressed, even as more traditional groups such as Jamaat Islami and likwan Muslumun (itself having the traditional elitist form of a sheikh with followers) refused to join the governments. New Islamic movements have become populist, even after starting from elitist roots, in Iran, Sudan, and recently, in Algeria; built from the grassroots, such movements have been inherently democratic. Initially many people were unimpressed by the new Islamic populism, since, like all reform movements, it begins with criticism of the existing order; the climate for reformist movements was also poisoned by the general failure of hollow and contentless movements such as Arab Socialism.

Islamic government would be minimal government; the range of the law is limited, because so much of what in the West is reserved for the law is embodied in Islamic societies in moral norms, and the Islamic way of life; many areas of normative Islamic life are and should be beyond the reach of the law. Prophet Mohammed strongly criticized people who did not attend prayer, but he never did anything to force them to go to pray; like moral injunctions about how men and women should dress, dress and prayer are matters on which the law is and should be silent. Society, and not the state, is the primary institution in Islam. One reason for this is that sharia limits the power of government; absolutism in the Islamic world followed the growth of secularism, and is itself a rejection of the limits on governmental power that the ‘higher law’ of sharia demands. Similarly, the Quran speaks very little about government, rather such powers that are assigned in the West to the government are held by the community of the people: ‘...[the Quran] entrusts authority to the people and not to the government’. Parenthetically, it is this central role of consensus that makes the Western notion of ‘political parties’ irrelevant; such parties have, notably, frequently been absent even in the West. Unfortunately for the creation of a modern Islamic system in Sudan, there is no contemporary model. Sudanese reformers were aware that party politics in Sudan would be contaminated by the tendency of people to vote for religious, ethnic and political dynasties; every attempt at basing a government in party politics has had a very short life expectancy in Sudan, typically 3-4 years. The historical reason for such failure in Sudan has many elements: corruption, public opinion is not developed, no significant press, excessive respect for traditional authority, and the chaotic remnants of colonialism (arbitrary borders creating a patchwork of tribes, sects, ethnic groups, trade unions, etc.). Sudanese also rejected military dictatorship. Sudan tried dictatorship but the ethnic complexity led to its failure: ‘You cannot hold the Sudan with an iron fist, it would resist.’ So Sudan has started a democratizing process, beginning with local elections, then regional elections are planned, and finally national elections will be held. At the same time, the new Sudanese parliament has rejected parties and caucuses, creating a system termed ‘government by convention’, without central leadership. So, ‘the important thing is the process; the question is not one of flaunting democracy, but it is the democratizing process’. Sudanese also see the boundaries of the state as colonial relic, and many ethnic groups extend far beyond the formal borders; it is this transmission of ideas through ethnic groups that are partitioned by colonial borders that is sometimes described in the West as ‘the revolution being exported’. Muslims wish peace in an international order based on equality: ‘Those who enjoy an advantage should see that Islam constitutes a opposed to the voice of Islam, would be heard. At the time when this

14064. Merari, Arzu. “Role of the Satanic Verses in the Western Onslaught on Islam”, in Crescent International, April 16-30, 1996. p. B. 2/1989. Pakistan: six dead and more than one hundred injured. Kashmir: three dead, 40 wounded. India: 93 dead, 200 injured. The deaths of protesters against Salman Rushdie and his book, The Satanic Verses, in the Indian subcontinent proceeded the now historic fatwa of the late Imam Khomeini, passing death sentence on the apostate. Those opposed to the book in the west were accused alternately of paranoia and abuse of freedom of expression. Perhaps more significant was the western reaction, especially its united stand against Islam, over the last seven years as the world has witnessed the birth of the so-called ‘New World Order’ and seen Islamophobia spill bloodily onto the soil of Europe. Before the fatwa there were two types of social and political discourses which determined western perceptions and indeed influence even the Muslim view of how the world functioned. Aside from the Islamic Revolution in Iran, all political debate revolved around the east/west, communist/capitalist dialectic. In art, literature, culture and all else that supposedly concerns the “educated” classes, more diluted forms of debate between political correctness and its opponents, for instance, dictated the way people should view the world. Each side accused the other of promoting censorship, limiting free speech and so on. An example is the politically-correct notion that all things that create stereotypes of people of color should be banned; similarly, a more conventional rightwing view, although one shared by marxist States as well, was that literature promoting homosexuality should not see the light of day. In the days preceding the fatwa, Muslims became the new boogeymen of both camps. Abuse of the freedom of expression, or at best failure to satisfy the criteria of being blasphemed against, were charges that had always been directed at Muslims. While the liberal literati had always promoted the myth of accessibility to any cultural group aspiring to it, the Rushdie affair exposed the bankruptcy of these claims. Everyone has a right to an opinion, as part of the Rushdie defense stated, unless you are a Muslim. Nearly 200 protesters died before the fatwa was issued on 2/14/1989, yet the abuse of their right to protest has never been a case for concern to those who defend Rushdie. Those who died were martyrs of Islam, but they were also martyrs to the ideal of freedom of expression - more so than a well-paid and well-protected writer in London.

Only a couple of years after the Sypcatcher affair, when Peter Wright's book was banned in the UK, the British government issued several statements including its initial support for Rushdie. “Europe is resolved to stand firm to preserve freedom of expression, human rights and non-intervention in other countries' affairs.” In the wake of Bosnia these words are more poignant. The process of demonization that had always been the lot of non-Europeans in western culture and politics, was now dramatically speeded up in the case of Muslims. Intellectually we had no case, despite satisfying different categories of thought. Politically we were to shut up, or ship out. Television coverage of the London rally against Rushdie translated British demonstrators swearing in Urdu at “anti-fascist” demonstrators from Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF), but did not translate the same abuse from WAF. The favored genre of an oppressed Muslim-girl plays and television dramas became much more popular with programs like Shalom, Salaam about the romance and marriage of a Jewish boy and Muslim girl got astounding ratings. The message and the choice was simple - Muslims could only have a legitimate voice if their identity was malleable. Integration into and the acceptance of values established in western polemic whether form a liberal or rightwing perspective would ensure “Muslim” voices as opposed to the voice of Islam, would be heard. At the time when this
"choice" was criticized. Shabir Akhtar, a Muslim writer, pointed out in the Guardian that the next time there were gas chambers in Europe, Muslims would be their fuel. Muslims were accused of paranoia yet few had realized how soon this would come to pass in Bosnia. The Rushdie affair shaped a whole culture’s consciousness about Muslims. Those who argued for intervention in Bosnia from Europe, be they Claire Short, MP (Lbor) or Margaret Thatcher, did so on the grounds of preserving that integrated Muslim idea - a Muslim who could be contained without any of the old polemic, or the "New World Order." Both politicians and many others were specific when they said that they wanted to prevent not the bloodshed of innocents by the Serbs or Croats, but the rise of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Europe.

There were a few dissenting voices in 1989 that castigated both the left and right for their stigmatization of Muslims. David Cooie in the New Statesman & Society asked for tolerance from the liberal establishment at least. He asked them to see that Muslims were aggrieved and that unlike them, Muslims did not have the same access to literature and culture, hence unable to appreciate the subtleties of the dilemma or indeed understand how wrong they were. He asked for Muslims to be given greater access to speech. In other words, if Muslims could only write they would be racist to stigmatize them for being "illiterate." This and the accusation of paranoia left some Muslims still hoping for understanding and tolerance of Islam from the west. If we tackle racism, we tackle Islamophobia, they argued. One of the many lessons of Bosnia is that we must now understand that ethnicity is not the only or even the main factor in the onslaught against Muslims - Islam is. The Rushdie affair has become the yardstick by which to measure a Muslim’s acceptability within a western framework. God or country first? The Rushdie affair has also become the stick with which Muslims are beaten whenever they are faced with oppression. If Muslims are oppressed, the western psyche is now accustomed to accepting it with little unease. After all are Muslims not the ones who want to kill Salman Rushdie? Seven years after the fatwa, half a million Muslims have been slaughtered only in Europe for being just that - European Muslims. Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt - the list is endless, as are the numbers massacred and maimed for expressing their opinions. Not one of them received the sympathy that the apostate got. Seven years later, millions of Muslims have been murdered, but Rushdie lives. [-]

14065. Merini, Rafika. The Subversion Of The Culture Of Voyeurism In The Works Of Leila Sebbar And Assia Djebar: A Socio-literary Study. State University Of New York At Binghamton. Dissertation. 250pp. AAC 9300986. The main contribution of this dissertation is to assess the inhibitionMaghrebiancharacters and writers (Assia Djebar and Leila Sebbar in this case) acquire which becomes self-censorship as they witness the voyeur turning them into "sex objects of consumption" and become defensive, adopting the attitude that whatever the "evil eye" cannot see will be better protected (this "evil eye" often appears to belong to a male and/or a Westerner in Djebar's and Sebbar's writings). Nevertheless, they vigorously denounce, symbolically and otherwise, the victimization of women by voyeurism and reductionism. I argue that they do so by subverting voyeurism, re-writing and/or co-opting it in order to forge their own identities. I define this process as one of "reverse voyeurism" and I show the double oppression and double reductionism to which major Maghrebian female characters in search of self-realization find themselves subjected because of their "inferior status" of Third World citizens struggling as ex-colonial subjects, and as women. Due to the nature of the material covered and of the issues discussed, a socio-literary approach to these works was adopted as it appears best suited to a comprehensive exploration of these realities. As this study testifies, Maghrebian female characters learn to use their femininity to their advantage with the help of reverse voyeurism as they seek and achieve the ultimate subversion of the culture of voyeurism that surrounds them. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,] [-]

14066. Millard, Betty. Women on Guard: How The Women of the World Fight For Peace: Part 12: How The Words of Freedom Were Carried Home. New York: New Century Publisher, February 1952. ALL THE DELEGATES to the Conference of the Women of Asia went back to their homes enriched and strengthened by the bonds created there. In Paris, Jeannette Vermeersch, one of the delegates and a powerful and beloved leader of the French women, stood up in the French Parliament of which she is a member, and denounced the war in Viet-Nam. When one of the government deputies attacked her for embracing the Viet-Nam delegate on the rostrum of the Conference at Peking, she cried proudly: "Yes, I embraced my Viet-Namese sister! With all my heart! I embraced her in the name of all the women of France who hate your war against her." The government supporters banged their desks and shouted in anger at the very words "Viet-Namese sister" --such is the fear of reactionaries everywhere of the united forces of the women of the world. In Algeria the return of Baya Allaouchiche, a Moslem delegate, produced a sensation. Thousands of women flocked to hear her speak wherever she went, and crowded up to kiss the Chinese flags she brought. Sometimes they trudged miles to her next speaking-place, in order to savor again the words of freedom. The men began to regret the Moslem ban on mixed meetings and forgot their prejudice against listening to a mere woman; in every village, they insisted that she speak to them, too. In Oran, Algeria, where the dockers were on strike against unloading American arms, the dockers’ wives were so inspired after hearing about the heroism of the Chinese women in their fight for liberation that they outdid their husbands. Whereas the latter just stayed home during the strike, the women one morning swept down the hill to the harbor and formed cordons around the piers, tying themselves together with their veils. When the police and strikebreakers attacked, these formerly silent and submissive Moslem women hiked up their long white burnooses and resisted energetically, shouting, "We want peace! Send us bread, not guns!" That evening, the union headquarters were piled high with veils abandoned in the fray. And from then on, the men, following the women’s example, actively picketed. [=]

14067. Moghadam, Valentine M.; Moghadam, Valentine M. [editor]. Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies: Part 1: Introduction and Overview. United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER).London: Zed Books, 1994. pp. 1-17. [This book was a product of Round Table on Women & Identity Politics, held in Helsinki, 10/1990, focusing on Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and the Palestinian Intifadah.] The relationship between nationalism and the ‘woman question’ in Islamic societies is a central issue but has been rarely discussed. It is clear that movements for national liberation and revolutionary states have not always improved the status of women: in both the Algerian and Iranian revolutions women played a major role and yet were discouraged, if not barred, from assuming any power in the post-revolutionary governments. In many nations in the 19th and 20th centuries, modernization and women’s rights were seen to be complementary, but in recent decades, feminism and nationalism have come to see each other with suspicion, especially as nationalism [or at least the new nationalisms] is increasing seen as counter-productive and as burdening women with the requirement of high fertility. In Algeria, despite the active role of at least 10000 women in the revolution, the needs of the post-revolutionary government to restore Arabic as the national language, Islam as the national religion and men as the heads of households relegated women back to the family. As Algerian writer Assia Djebar noted: “Women in general...are conscious of the fact that the Muslim man, however revolutionary he may be within his own union or party or in discharging his civic responsibilities, all too often clings in his domestic life to the old ways.” Despite this, feminism is widespread in the Islamic world, and is increasingly associated with leftist political parties. However, in Iran, many former women socialists and communists have shifted entirely to feminism, blaming the shift on the betrayal of women by the left after the revolution. As gender relations become more prominent in socio-political transformations, the ‘woman question’ has become more important in revolutionary discourse and the programs of revolutionary states.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Algeria

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n. 10, September 1, 1983. pp. 3-4. [Translated from a personal testimony submitted to Connexions this year.]

Badra is an Algerian lesbian currently living in France. Like many women, she has a difficult choice to make—to remain in her country bound by the restrictions accorded to women, or to become a refugee of sorts in a society that allows more options.

Up until the age of 15, I though of myself as asexual. I liked tenderness, was very affectionate and emotional, but despite a large family (eight brothers and sisters), I lived a very solitary life in the company of books. Around the time I turned 15, I began to attract quite a lot of attention from boys, but I wasn't drawn to them at all. But I did so want tenderness, and I began to suffer from this contradiction for wanting love, but absolutely refusing the love that boys offered me. My feelings for women were of passionate friendship, but I knew nothing of homosexuality. Naively, I told myself that I was someone who liked love, but not sex. I battled with this for many years, holding back the pressing desire that I had for women's caresses. I learned from my readings that it was indeed possible to have a relationship with a woman that was not only affectionate but also sexual. I wanted this love, but I did not dare express my desire openly; I was too afraid of being singled out or marked.

I lived with my secret until the day I decided that I had to show my feelings, that I had to stop lying to myself. I had tried loving men, but it was no good. I had even tried forcing myself, but I was too unhappy. So I left Algeria, thinking that in a more open society I would finally be able to express my desires freely. And I did have homosexual relationships abroad, but something wasn't quite right. I wanted to connect my desire for women with the struggle for the liberation of Algerian women, especially since these were the women for whom I had felt my first emotions.

Back in Algeria, I tried to make this connection by beginning a dialogue with my younger sister, for I sensed her budding homosexuality. Alas, we both fell in love with the same woman, and this abruptly ended our relationship. It was especially painful, since homosexuals who recognize themselves as such are few and far between in our country. To fail to find a common ground between us is to condemn ourselves to a solitary struggle, with all the wrenching and despairing moments that that entails.

Five years later, my situation is still the same, without the satisfaction of having lived a full relationship with an Algerian woman. For so few accept to go all the way. They marry under social pressure and fall into traditional roles. I myself got married, but it didn't last long; I felt incapable of living a normal marital life. I had to leave Algeria again. I suffered too much from having to hide my homosexuality. Perhaps I lacked courage. But I was alone, and I didn't have the strength to take on that task by myself. But I still dream of my ideal, which is to have a relationship with an Algerian woman in Algeria, for the struggle for a women's liberation movement needs all our energies. Perhaps one day.

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Dear sisters, we need your help. We have a big problem in France. It is about divorced couples from different countries and their children. There are about 2000 children kidnapped by their fathers and taken back to their father's country, mostly to Algeria. Very often the mothers cannot see or visit their children any more, even if they have the legal right to keep them. Negotiations have been settled successfully between France and several countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and the situation is much better there. But with Algeria, we are at a dead end. Negotiations between the two governments were halted one year ago. We tried to force them to renegotiate with an operation called "a boat to Algiers" in 7/1984. 30 mothers (French, Belgian, German and Scottish) were going to sail to Algiers with journalists, radios, and so on, with some of our Collective to support them. It was a great project. Unfortunately, the French government succeeded in putting a stop to it, assuring the Collective that negotiations would get on again very soon.

Since then practically nothing has happened and the mothers are desperate. Some of them can visit their children in Algeria in the father's family. Some of them cannot even see them. But none of the children has been allowed to leave Algeria to visit the mother's family.

Five mothers decided to act by staging a sit-in at the French Embassy in Algiers on 6/17/1985. Since then, they are occupying the French Embassy where they are tolerated. Two mediators (one French, one Algerian) were designated in July by the governments and negotiations are on again, but are going very slowly.

We know that the five mothers will not give up until they are satisfied. They are aware that this is their only chance, not only for themselves, but also for all the mothers who are in the same predicament. They are fighting, above all, for the children's rights to have a mother and a father, and to have normal relations with both parents, both countries, both cultures.

We need support. You can help us by sending telegrams of solidarity to the two governments: Laurent Fabius, 1er Ministre, Hotel Matignon, Paris and President Chaddi, Algiers. You can also send money to support the mothers to: Collectif de Solidarite aux mere d'enfants enlevés, MFPF, 4 Square Saint Irene, 75011 Paris. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [x]


For the first time since independence in 1962, Algerian women took to the streets in protest of the government proposed Family Law. In 1982 a group of women emerged, expressing feminist positions and demanding human rights for women.

The proposed law would have denied Algerian women their civil rights by requiring women to be legally represented by male family members in matters relating to divorce and the right to work. Because of their protest, the Family Law was suspended for a time at least.

Many women have been arrested for their ideas and opinions. The exact number is not known. A group of lawyers is investigating these cases. Among those arrested are Fattouma Ouzagane, Louiza Hannoun and Leila Soudid. They have not violated any law. They were arrested in 12/1983, but this was not revealed until 3/1984, when the international press began writing about their case, they were transferred to other prisons.

After an international campaign was mounted for the release of these women, they and others were freed from prison. The Committee for the Liberation of Algerian Detaienees says that the international campaign was the significant factor in their release. In this sense it was a great success. Nevertheless, the Committee is also stressing that the political situation has not changed substantially; more people are being arrested, and some form of the Family Law, which denies women their rights, will most likely be approved in the near future.

Contact: Committee for the Liberation of Algerian Detaienees, C/o Marie-Aimee Helie-Lucas, 251 Badnuluiweg, 2509 LS, The Hague, The Netherlands. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][x]

But the economic deterioration had some even more fundamental reasons cogently explained by Sevet Plotzker in Yedioth Ahronot already orb/19/1994. His views carry all the more conviction since he is a zealous Reaganist on economic issues. Let me quote him selectively. “The gap between imports and exports has widened. The exports from Israel were growing in 1994 at a very slow pace: by less than 7%. But the imports continue to grow at a very rapid pace, twice the rate of growth of the exports. The [Israeli] foreign debt might increase this year by about one third of its present size, that is by about $2 billion”. This turned out to be an underestimate. Reports dating from December show that the Israeli trade deficit grew in 1994 by $3 billion. “The gap between consumption and growth is also growing. Private consumption might grow this year by 10%, but the domestic product by 4.5% to 5% only. How is this possible? Very simple: the Israelis save this year much less than they saved last year. The rate of private savings is declining sharply”. Naturally, Plotzker blames Rabin for failing to resist the 1994 strikes of teachers, nurses, doctors and academics after proclaiming solemnly that he would never yield to their demands. In Plotzker’s view all these strikes resulted in wage hikes which Israeli economy could ill afford. As noted by all commentators, in the course of 1994 the Israelis discovered how easy it was to change Rabin’s positions under resolute pressures by various Israeli lobbyists, in stark contrast with his tough resolve in foreign affairs.

Perhaps the most important economic factor discussed by Plotzker in some detail is the formidable rise of costs of housing during Rabin’s term of office. “In the spring of 1992, on the eve of the elections, the Shamir government was involved in the construction of 60,000 apartments, directly or through subsidizing measures, promises of acquisition, benefits to speed up construction and the like”. (Actually, only a fraction of those apartments was constructed in the Territories.) “In its devotion to free enterprise, Rabin’s government did not like this involvement. Confronted with the sharp decline in [Jewish] immigration, many unsold apartments in development areas and heavy government commitments to buy them from the contractors, Rabin’s government decided immediately to stop all public construction for the sake of returning to free play of the market forces. The result: while in 1991 the Housing Ministry initiated construction of 62,000 apartments, the corresponding figure in 1993 was 4700 apartments only. A decline of 93%. “At first it seemed that this policy bore fruit. The prices of apartments stopped rising. Budgetary allocations for public housing were diverted to construction of new roads or highway junctions and to the reduction of budgetary deficit... But when the experts looked at those data, they were immediately concerned about who and how will supply the annual demand for 50,000 apartments. They knew that the private sector could supply only half that amount. But they were reassured by the Finance Ministry that owing to the market mechanisms everything will turn out O.K. Yet in 1/1993, the building prices started to rise again... Had the government carried out emergency plans prepared in advance, it could perhaps have prevented the misfortune. It could facilitate private housing projects, sell much government land, break local contractors’ monopolies and if all that would not have sufficed, initiate direct government construction projects. Experts, officials and committees less devoted than Rabin to the sacred free market, had suggested a whole basket of solutions, but for more than one year hardly anything was done. The rapid rise of apartment prices started in wealthier neighborhoods of Tel Aviv but in the end extended to poorest towns. In 1993, the apartment prices in Israel increased by 26%, this year they will rise by another 30%. In two years’ time, they are going to rise by at least 56%. People tend to recall such things when they vote”. Indeed, in 12/1994 the increase in apartment prices during the Rabin’s government term of office was estimated at about 58%.

Let me add that like all economic correspondents of the Hebrew press, Plotzker staunchly supports Rabin’s government on the count of peace process. Moreover, Plotzker is afraid of what he calls “Likud’s populism”, i.e. its penchant - much more pronounced than that of Labor - for advocacy of programs calculated to raise the people’s standard of living. As many commentators have noted, Rabin admires the
women in the middle east and north africa
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conservative wing of the American Republican party, especially its economic views. Yet Rabin's views on economy are not often denounced by the Israeli leftists, because they are too afraid to hurt the "peace process" by the mere fact of criticizing Rabin.

Contrary to what Plotzker had observed earlier, the perceived deterioration of the economy led to the downfall of consumption. Let me quote some data of Gideon Eshet (Yediot Achronot, December 2) on this topic: "The pessimistic scenarios get reinforced by the data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. They indicate that the decline in private consumption between July 1 and October 1 was catastrophic. The sales of such goods as the cars, refrigerators and washing machines declined by a monstrous amount of 43%. The sales in the supermarkets declined by 33%. To all appearances, the public is already tightening their belts. A staunch supporter of the "peace process", Eshet quotes the view of a majority of Israeli professors of economy to the effect that "Israel is in an economic slump". He tries hard to dispove this estimate, but has to admit that it is widely held.

It is true that all this must be seen in proportion. In the last years Israel has become one of the richer countries of the world, with the average income of its citizens (but of course not of those subjects in the Territories!) much higher than of the surrounding Arab countries. Let me report the World Bank data about the 1992 GNP per capita in some Middle Eastern countries, quoted by Avraham Tal (Haaretz, November 11). While in Israel the GNP per capita amounted to $13220, the corresponding figures for Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were respectively $640, $1120 and $7510. (The GNP per capita in the West Bank is roughly estimated as about half of the Jordanian one and in the Gaza Strip as not even its quarter.) Nevertheless, like in other rich states, the Israelis want their standard of living to go on improving, and are blaming their government when it does not improve. The more promises of improvement they hear - as they did from Rabin and Peres - the more infuriated they subsequently became.

Incidentally, as Tal observes, the reported contrasts between GNP per capita figures in Israel and the Arab countries prevent any meaningful trade between the former and the bulk of the latter. The only Arab countries with comparable GNP per capita to Israel (and only if one discounts their migrant workers and non-citizens) are Gulf oil states, such as Qatar and Oman. It can be supposed that their relations with Israel are not unrelated to their GNP per capita levels. As Tal points out, this fact turns Peres' visions, as uttered, e.g. at the Casablanca Conference, into a sheer phantasmagory. With the exception of the few "Peace Now" fanatics and their likes, the Israelis already realize that no Peres-style media event can improve their economy. This realization cannot but express itself in the government's popularity ratings.

But the decline of Rabin's government popularity has also another reason. Rabin's party, Labor, is rapidly going to pieces. The phenomenon is already widely acknowledged by leading Laborites. A former secretary-general of the party and present Industry and Trade minister, Micha Harish said (Haaretz, November 11) at a session of the party's executive committee convened to discuss the plans for 1995, that "the Labor party is now in a state of clinical death", and therefore there is will make a big mistake. Rabin reached the end of his political career. A former speedier implementation of the Oslo Agreement. He says that it is yet too early to publish an obituary of Mr. Labor Party, but most of the stuff, including the titles and the interviews with the bereft relatives can be expected to end his political career in the same way as Teddy Kollek.

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revolutionary Histadrut elections the voters threw away the old bureaucrats who ruled that institution since the 1920s. The third stage may take place already in the next elections. It looks very likely that Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres will bear the costs of the coming change. Which means that whatever they will not accomplish during their present term of office, they will not accomplish at all.

"All indications show that the average Israeli voter is more and more dissatisfied with the old, leading generation. The same can be said about other issues. Celebrations are intended to convince us that we have peace. In reality, we have none. We are stuck with more terrorism than before, and it is not clear whether the government has any plan to do anything about it or about anything else..."

"In the third place, Rabin does not really have the situation under his control. This contrasts with the carefully built image of him as an authoritarian Prime Minister feared by everybody. To corroborate this image, he sent a TV message from Seoul to his rebellious ministers that, in South Korea, the ministers automatically resign at the end of each year. But the image does not work any more. The ministers are still afraid of him, but not as much as they once were. They see too many weak moments of Rabin. They sense that he has reached the endpoint of his life in politics, and are accordingly more and more concerned about their own interests. But Rabin does not really have the situation under his control also because he began too many things without completing them. He began the peace process, he began the debate about the Land of Israel, he began the supposedly radical change in the economy, taxation and health (in the middle of which he lost the Histadrut). When he was elected he boasted: 'I will lead everything'. Now he should confess: 'I am stuck with everything'."

According to Markus, "the fourth and the main reason of Rabin's fatigue' is that he decides everything. "Rabin functions as the Prime Minister, Defense minister, head of the Labor [party] and the one who has usurped all the powers of other ministers, without leaving them with any room for action of their own. He behaves as if he were a king or an emperor, except that the Israeli regime has no place for a king or an emperor. The result is that he doesn't look like a king or an emperor, but like a very tired, confused and weak man". To remedy this state of affairs, Markus advises Rabin that "he has only one way to extricate himself from his present sorry predicament. No matter how rude the very saying of it may sound, he should return to the pattern of two coequal leaders of the government; concretely to share power with Shimon Peres. Instead of his attempts to neutralize Peres and restrict his powers, Rabin should reach an understanding with him, resting on a concept of shared and equal leadership". This is in my view a counsel of despair. Even if Rabin and Peres get over their long-standing virulent mutual hatred, it remains the fact that Peres is much less popular than Rabin. If Rabin's current popularity ratings oscillate between 37-42% (compared to Netanyahu's 45-49%), those of Peres oscillate between 9-15%. "Otherwise", concludes Markus, "Rabin alone will not be able to make all too many decisions in all too many sectors of administration. Together, Rabin and Peres may be able to make these decisions; without Peres, Rabin's government's days cannot but be numbered."

In another article (Haaretz, December 16) Markus upbriads Rabin for renouncing views he first proclaimed as unchangeable. Let me talk about a specific example which Markus discusses. For more than two years after coming to power in 1992, Rabin used to announce that "as long as I am Prime Minister no tax will be imposed on profits from stockmarket". In 10/1994 Rabin was persuaded by his Finance minister, Beiga Shohat that such a tax was necessary. The requisite law was duly passed by the Knesset by the end of November. However, during his mid-December tour of Japan and South Korea Rabin was accompanied by a delegation of Israeli businessmen. Referring to one of periodic crashes in the value of stocks which had just then taken place, the businessmen succeeded in persuading Rabin to announce that the implementation of the tax "would be suspended" without consulting Shohat, in a TV interview from Tokyo. Shohat had to wait two days to be able to talk to the Prime Minister for no more than (as Markus says) 7 minutes. He in turn persuaded Rabin to announce that "the tax would not be suspended but there would be consultations whether to impose it or
not": at the time of this writing everyone was at loss what it all might have meant. In the first place, it was a flagrant breach of the law which stipulates that neither the Prime Minister nor even the government in corporte has the right to "suspend" a law duly passed by the Knesset. On the contrary they are bound by their oath of office to execute it faithfully. In the second place, as Markus rightly notes, "this is the way in which decisions are being taken by the Rabin government". Markus himself had opposed this change to the benchmark of policy that Rabin supports the immediate implementation of the law in question as a point of principle. Otherwise, he feels the government can lose the remainder of its credibility in economic affairs. [=]

14074. Shahak, Israel. Political Situation In Israel At the End of 1994: Part 3 of 4. Shahak Report 148. Israel, December 30, 1994. Similar views have been voiced by Uzi Benziman (Haaretz, November 20) whom I am going to report more selectively. He points out that on a number of issues the Rabin government ministers have issued mutually contradictory statements. The examples are: (1) whether Israel encourages or discourages visits of foreign dignitaries to Yasser Arafat in Gaza, (2) whether the settlement of Netzarim is necessary or unnecessary, and (3) a host of economic decisions. In the case of Netzarim, the Foreign minister could contradict himself, perhaps on Rabin's orders, within two days time. This reflects in Benzinam's view a deeper contradiction: Rabin announces on every possible occasion that "his policies are intended to bring about the maximum amount of segregation between the two peoples", the Jews and the Palestinians. "At the same time, his actual policies of promoting the Jewish settlement only "encourage friction between them". In another article (Haaretz, December 18) Benziman says that Rabin's conduct in such matters "can only make his supporters want to cry".

Reuven Padatzur (Haaretz, December 18) recounts the story of Rabin's confrontation with massively dismissed workers from the "Israel Weapons Industries". Himself responsible for those dismissals, but perhaps surprised by the strength of the workers' protest, Rabin announced that "much of the weapons used now by Hizbollah against the Israeli army were produced by the 'Israel Military Industries'. It sounded as if the workers themselves had have sold those weapons". Incidentally, military censorship did not allow anyone to inquire how and when those weapons had reached Hizbollah. Padatzur scornfully advises Rabin to "conduct a policy instead of merely insulting the workers", and reminds him that he still hesitates whether to implement the long-standing decision to privatize the "Israel Weapon Industries".

Finally, Rabin's obsession with what can be only described as the idea of an anti-Islamic crusade, to be led by Israel, certainly doesn't add to his popularity. Nahum Barnea (Yediot Ahronot, December 16), who accompanied Rabin to Japan and South Korea, reports that "latey, he does not make a speech without uttering, whether after five or after fifteen minutes, his favorite phrase: 'the dirty wave of Islamic fundamentalism'. The speech then must include the sentence: 'I tell you again and again that I describe it as Khumeinism without Khumeini'. Rabin has repeated the last sentence so often that the [Hebrew press] correspondents are by now referring to it by the acronym "KKW". I heard Rabin's every speech from Oslo to Seoul and the KWK indeed figured in all of them". Barnea admits that "Israel derives great benefits from the anti-Islamic campaign it initiated. Its most important advantage is that it lets Israel please the American public. Even in the U.S. Congress some dare to say that Israel lost its former value as a major American strategic asset. To that, the anti-Islamic campaign provides an answer! The evil Iran will replace the Soviet 'evil empire' which regrettably disappeared. Israel will become the western vanguard in the war against the Islamic enemy". In this context it is worth recalling that the Commander of the Planning Department of the Israeli General Staff, general Uzi Dayan, said that "it is quite possible that Israel may yet have to decide to take armed action against Iran already in 1995" (Yediot Ahronot, December 30). Although this report does not deal with Israeli foreign policies, the quote has its place in it, because Rabin and his government have tried hard to convince the Israelis that at the end of the "peace process" there will be peace rather than a war at a scale which even the Shamir government never contemplated.

On purpose, I am quoting mainly Haaretz's articles because this paper has been the firmest in supporting Rabin and because it represents the voice of the Israeli elite. Other papers have attacked Rabin and his policies more than Haaretz. Not a few of their commentators have pointed out that the mistakes of the present Rabin government resemble those of his first government, in 1974-1977. Let me now quote two attacks of December 16 and 17, which were published in Davar and the editorial of December 18. This latter says that "great differences between the avowed and actually implemented policies are a constant feature of Labor governments. The best present example is the contrast between the declarations that the settlements will not be any more expanded and the enormous amounts of money poured into their expansion. The facile way of justifying it is by referring to the natural increase of the settlers' population. But when the Israeli Arabs demand more money to house their naturally increasing population, the argument somehow does not work. Rabin's budgets could show that Shamir's priorities had been really changed because the funds were channeled to Israel, much of it to reward his faithful supporters. But the settlers know how to exploit Rabin's weakness and always end up by getting more money. In an effort to save his government from the consequences of soaring costs of housing, Rabin accepted the recommendation of [general-director of Prime Minister's office] Sheves, to build as many multi-floor buildings as possible. But he never applied this recommendation to the settlements. Had he so insisted, he could allow the settlers no construction other than adding storries to the already built houses, and he certainly could prevent the continuous expansion of the settlements' land". The editorial's conclusion is that "constant displays of Rabin's affinity for the settlers prompts the informed observers, not only in Jerusalem but also in Washington, to start counting the months until the day when power may pass from Rabin to Netanyahu".

Motty Basuk (Davar, December 30) says that "the big lie of the Labor-Meretz government burst out a few days ago". The lie was that the government, while pretending to freeze the settlements "helped them financially more than ever the Shamir government had ever done". Basuk rebuts the feeble excuses of Rabin's spokesman that the enlargement of Efrat was due to its location within "Greater Jerusalem". He says that "settlements have been enlarged everywhere in the West Bank, even in the most provocative spots. Jewish settlements are being established not only in the town of Hebron but also in Tel-Rumeida neighborhood", a den of Kahanists. As Basuk informs, the Kahanist leader Baruch Marzel "boasted about the enlargement of their neighborhood on TV".

For a long time, the Hebrew press was hardly interested in covering this policy. Interestingly, Basuk attributes it to the fact that during Shamir's term of office the Hebrew press got used to rely on two sources of information: the government's public hearings and the reports about the Israeli settlements in the West Bank: to the published reports of the teams of "Peace Now" observers who monitored the actual construction there, and to the leaks from the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, "whose officials could be frequently seen watching the developments on the ground". According to Basuk, "Peace Now" discontinued its monitoring work after Rabin came to power, whereas the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem officials "could at first be seen there less and less, and in the end not at all". In my view it means that the first stage occurred after Rabin's meeting with Bush in 9/1992, whereas the second after Clinton assumed presidency. As for Rabin, I interpret his policy in the Territories not as a manifestation of weakness, but as a dictate of his ideology. Still, Rabin tries to accomplish his aims by deception, in society where questions can be asked and are asked. This is why his deceptions are bound to be short-lived.

A host of similar anti-Rabin statements can be quoted from all Hebrew papers, with only few voices raised in Rabin's defense. Still, the problems responsible for Rabin's present plight can be diagnosed as deeper than his personal failures, his mismanagement of economy and even his reliance on deception in his "peace process". An attempt to tackle such deeper problems, in my view mistaken, was undertaken by Ian Lustig (Yediot Ahronot, December 20). Lustig openly acknowledges what all other Hebrew press correspondents quoted in this report do not
even mention: that any genuine decision to withdraw from the West Bank is bound to lead to a deep crisis in Israeli Jewish society. “If any Israeli government ever decides to withdraw from the West Bank, it will have to overcome a serious internal crisis in Israel. This would not be a merely governmental crisis, but a crisis of the entire [Israeli] regime, as it will by necessity involve a deep cleavage within the Israeli Jewish nation. As a consequence, an Israeli government will have to fear a rebellion and terror from the Jews even more than it now fears Arab terrorism.” Such a crisis would be much graver than that which usually occurs during the formation of a government coalition. The crisis could have been avoided, had the Israeli government decided to withdraw from the Territories before Likud came to power in 1977. However, since then the Likud governments succeeded, at least to some extent, to turn the West Bank into an inseparable part of the State of Israel in the consciousness of Israeli Jews. Had they fully succeeded in it, Israeli could not, or at least hardly could give up its rule over the West Bank. However, since their success was only partial, the Rabin government will be able to withdraw from the West Bank if it so decides. A crisis it would then have to cope with, would be deep and in my view no longer avoidable”. By using the expression “if any Israeli government ever decides to withdraw from the West Bank”, Lustig obliquely admits that the Israeli government has not so decided.

Lustig advises Rabin, that in the event he decides to withdraw from the West Bank “he learns how to cope with the attendant crisis from the experience of two states which experienced similar crises: the British government, when it wanted to withdraw from Ireland in 1913-1914, and France when it wanted to withdraw from Algeria in the 1950s”. Let me skip Lustig’s analysis of the Irish conflict and proceed straight to the Algerian one. “The European settlers, resentful of De Gaulle’s plans to separate Algeria from France, were involved in several attempts to overthrow his regime and to assassinate him. But De Gaulle didn’t panic and refused to give in... The Algerian settlers were politically unsophisticated and internally divided. Owing partly to those factors, De Gaulle was able to convince the French public that they were plain thugs and fascists willing to kill French soldiers for the sake of their narrow interests and unrealizable dreams”. Lustig concludes that “if any Israeli government tries to reduce the short-range risks of the withdrawal from the Territories, it will only beg disasters in a more distant future... If Israel creates a Palestinian entity comprised of many areas separated spatially from each other, this entity will lack any legitimacy, which in turn will paralyze it from keeping its agreements with Israel. If Rabin’s government wants to increase the probability of any permanent solution, it must be begenerous to the Palestinians in the interim stage. True, such generosity means the risk of growth of domestic instability within Israel, just as in De Gaulle’s case. But only by taking such risks can it reach a stabler and more all-embracing solution. If Rabin’s government opts for the total withdrawal from the Territories as a solution, it will find itself in a much better position than the government of De Gaulle was. The settlers in Algeria were convinced that if France surrenders its authority over it, they will lose absolutely everything. The Jewish settlers in the West Bank know that by moving a short distance away they will return to a society of their own, in which life is likely to be even more pleasant for them. The majority of the Jewish settlers in Sinai found it true in 1982. Moreover, in France the army, or at least its major components, firmly opposed any withdrawal from Algeria. By contrast, the Israeli army would be united behind the government and any policy it adopts. Thus, Rabin’s government can take greater risks in its endeavors to solve the conflict with the Palestinians than it has taken.”

Lustig’s analysis is in my view mistaken on a number of points, including one important point of principle. First, majority of Jewish settlers in the West Bank were not settled by “the Likud governments” but by the national unity government in 1984-1990 in which Rabin as Defense minister was solely responsible for the Territories and thereby for the settling. Peres, as the Prime Minister from 1984-1986 and Finance minister from 1988-1990, was hardly any less responsible. Every analysis which attempts to put all the blame for settling on Likud, rather than on the Israeli Jewish consensus which includes also Labor and Meretz, is in my view vitiated. In the case of a person as well-informed as Lustig undoubtedly is, I wonder whether an error of that magnitude can be due to oversight alone. After all, the customary and undeniably true claim of secular settlers is “it is the Labor who sent us here”. That claim does carry not a little weight in Israeli Jewish society. It could be neutralized by an honest acknowledgment of mistaken policy. But Rabin has acknowledged nothing of the sort. [=]
which was from the start intended to rely on deceiving their two respective peoples.

It can be predicted that the collapse of the Rabin government is impending. Together with that government, the entire Labor movement can be now expected to collapse, at least in the form it existed since the 1920s. That moment, however, will also mark the end of a relative consensus within Israeli Jewish society which persisted since 1927, with its high point during the six years of the “national unity” government [1984-1990]. In place of that consensus, the two segments of that society have already become openly hostile toward each other. As more detailed polls document it, those two segments are pretty closely coextensive with two Israeli Jewish voting blocs, the one comprised of Labor and the parties to its left, and the other of Likud, the extreme right-wing and the religious parties.

Perhaps the greatest error of Rabin, Peres and most of their followers was that they ignored the entire religious and quasi-religious influence upon the majority within the right-wing segment. Only very few Hebrew press commentators have grasped the importance of the religious factor in the looming crisis. Let me conclude this report by quoting the one who did grasp it, the Davar co-editor Yoram Peri (December 30). Peri first notes that Likud and Labor have in the last years contained groups of people with quite similar views on a number of issues. Then he goes on: "Together with various new groups emerging in Israeli society, one powerful force can be located only at the ultra-conservative and ultra-reactionary pole of the political spectrum. This force is embodied in the religious parties. Whenever security issues are not involved, the deepest cleavage in the Israeli Jewish society is the one dividing religious and secular Jews. It would be most difficult to bridge an abyss separating them. The two camps on the two sides of that abyss are worlds apart, with hardly anything in common. Yet both sides are stalemated. We recently heard the religious Knesset members vilifying the Supreme Court. To their liberal colleagues their arguments sounded like: 'How could you do that?"

Peri is referring to streams of abuse of the Supreme Court voiced lately by the religious parties. The abuse became most ferocious after the recent ruling of the Court to the effect that homosexual couples are entitled to the same benefits as granted by employers to heterosexual couples. In the course of that vilification religious parties and individual politicians, including some reputed to be "moderate", said expressly that the State of Israel should not only discriminate against but also persecute all homosexuals and lesbians in order to preserve its "Jewish character". A state's failure to do so, and especially that state's official recognition of their equality can be construed as sure proof of that state's repudiation of its Jewish character. The Haredi parties, including Rabin's favorite Shas party, went farther still, quoting the Biblical and Talmudic definition of homosexuality as "an abomination in the sight of the Lord", and on its basis appealing for death penalty by stoning for any homosexual act. Since the secular segment in the Israeli Jewish society has in the last 10-15 years been "westernized" enough to support equality for homosexuals, a majority of politicians from secular parties are in this respect no different. At the same time, the programmatic opposition of the religious to any "westernization" prompted them to be on this issue particularly extremist. Hence the verbally violent character of the confrontation on this issue. But other recent confrontations were hardly less verbally violent.

It is significant that while all the secular right-wing parties, including even the transfer-mongering "Moledet" party, supported the peace with Jordan, all the religious parties opposed it. Why? Because it implied the denial of the Jewish right to the territory bestowed by God to two and half of Israelite tribes, i.e Reuven, Gad, and half of the tribe of Manasses. Hence in the opinion of religious Jewish parties the treaty "denied Judaism". It is even more significant that on the really substantial issues involving the "peace process", such as the status of Jewish settlements, all religious parties have staunchly supported the settlers. Rabin and Peres do not seem to understand that no "peace process", especially the one they have been programming, could possibly be carried out without confronting the Jewish religious parties head on. Their failure to realize it portends their undoing. [-]

14076. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 83: The Beginnings of Palestinian Feminism: Part 1. Israel, August 23, 1991. As everywhere, the beginnings of feminism in Palestine assume at first the form of a spontaneous protest against subjugation of women by men and against gender inequalities in general. As everywhere, it begins when a select group of women feel secure enough to break the time-honored pattern of women's silent acquiescence to their miseries, and start organizing for the sake of voicing grievances befalling all women as women. Unlike elsewhere, however, the status of women vis-à-vis the men, and the conditions of female existence in general, differ in the Arab cultural tradition markedly from those prevailing in the Western civilization, even prior to the feminist reawakening of the 1960s. This background difference needs to be first described. The direct impetus to the still germinal Palestinian feminist organizing was provided by the custom of murdering women by the closest of their kin in retaliation for their "profaning family honor" by their real or imagined premarital or extramarital sexual contacts. Such murders, usually preceded by public brutalities against their victims, have been too deeply ingrained in the Arab cultural tradition to be effectively deterred by the prosecution of their perpetrators by the Israeli authorities. Consequently, the instances of such murders have been far from rare, and they continue to recur. One has to understand, however, that "redeeming family honor" by murder constitutes only the most extreme form of parental, sibling and marital control over women from puberty age until old age, which in the Arab cultural tradition tends to surpass anything encounterable in even the most religiously strict subcultures of the modern West. Throughout adolescence, boys and girls live in strict separation, allowing for hardly any incidental encounter. Schoolgirls are often pressed by their parents to drop out from school early, especially prior to their puberty. Marriages are usually prearranged, so that the bride usually sees her groom for the first time in her life only shortly before the actual ceremony. After the marriage, many Arab women would appear in public with their faces covered by a veil, so as to be "protected" from men's glares. Actually, the custom of wearing the veils, rather limited to most tradition-bound urbanites of lower classes, and not practiced in the countryside, was already on the wane, before it recently became, for reasons to be explained below, enforced more strictly again. Anyway, women, veiled or not, appear in public rather infrequently. As can be seen by any casual observer, the crowds on the Arab street, in the shops, at political demonstrations, and in the places of entertainment tend to be exclusively male. Division of labor by gender is enforced strictly from early childhood. A graphic description of this aspect of an Arab woman's experience, as recorded by Yossi Elgazi in Haaretz of July 17 ("Family Executuors"), was provided by a young Palestinian feminist using the cover name of Souad. "My family is a Muslim family in the north of the country. My parents, both of whom are educated people, ran our home in a clearly patriarchal way. From the time I can remember myself, I was angered by the fact that because I was born a girl, I had to help my mother clean the house, cook and iron. I hated the fact that upon returning from school, I had to help my mother with the household and could not go out to play in the neighborhood or do my homework. Sometimes, I had to do my homework in the middle of the night. The whole division of roles in our home really made me angry. The role of the women in our home was to serve the men. I had to fix meals for my father and brothers, iron their clothes, make their beds, prepare coffee for them and entertain their guests. My brothers, who are about the same age as me, did not have to do these things." Far from being peculiar for one particular family, this description depicts a cultural pattern extending across the Arab world. The impact of the Israeli rule upon this cultural universe needs an analysis much more profound and comprehensive than any that have appeared thus far. Two points, however, can be made at once, with absolute safety. The first is that women began to tell even harder, as a result of protracted absences of many of the menfolk from home, due either to their incarceration or employment on locations remote from their homes, deep inside Israel or abroad. The second fact is that the
Israeli secret police ("Shabak") quickly learned to turn the women's fear of illicit sex to its advantage. A fairly accurate description of how it works was provided by a founding member of the first Palestinian feminist organization, Al-Fanar ("Searchlight"), Mannar Hassan. As again recorded by Elgazi (reference above), Hassan said: "The interrogators and prison authorities use sexual violence against Palestinian women prisoners from the Territories in order to force them to confess. They threaten them by things that touch their places of misbehavior. In a short, they exploit prejudices rooted in our society in order to apply pressure on women and stop them from being politically active. And they actually succeed in doing so. Once released from prison, women, particularly if they are young and single, are pressed into leaving school or university, or even the area [of their residence], and they coop themselves up at home. They cease taking part in any kind of public and political activity. Some of the women prisoners are even subjected to beatings following their release." But Ms. Hassan does not confine herself to the subject of the secret police's immediate goal of extracting confessions from its vulnerable female prisoners and to the subsequent treatment of the already released women back at home as somehow "tainted." She also points her accusing finger at "higher" government policies. Concretely, "she accuses the authorities of being lenient when it comes to men who kill women to 'preserve family honor'. She speaks of cases in which police officers transfer girls 'who are in some way suspect' to the head of the clan, thereby signing their death warrant. Likewise, there are government prosecutors who reveal their 'empathy for murderers' motives' and sometimes attenuate the charge from murder into manslaughter. And there are even cases in which the murderers are pardoned by the President. The authorities want to maintain good relations with our traditional leadership, even if it comes at the expense of women's lives.... The establishment is interested in perpetuating our social backwardness." (The source of this quote is again Elgazi, reference above.)

Al-Fanar is too recent a creation to expand its activities beyond a quite modest scope. It does publish a newsletter, and it did organize its first public demonstration in Nazareth which was attended by about 40 women joined on the spot by a handful of casual passersby. The flyer circulated at that demonstration, as quoted by Rolly Rosen in Kol Ha'ir of June 28 ("The war of liberation of Palestinian women"), is reproduced in its entirety in an appendix below. The particularly gruesome story referred to in the flyer was committed in the vicinity of Nazareth. The figure of about 40 "family honor" murders yearly, as cited in the flyer, refers to the Israeli Arab population alone. Nobody knows how many such murders are being committed each year in Occupied Territories, but a figure much higher than 40 can be assumed rather safely. Unfortunately, Al-Fanar as an organization does not have a sufficient access to the Occupied Territories and therefore it operates exclusively within the Israeli community. No corresponding movement in the Occupied Territories has arisen as yet. Worse still, the "family honor" murder issue is shrouded there in complete silence. It is never mentioned in the press or at public assemblies. The same is the case of the Palestinian diaspora press. In the process, Al-Fanar won for itself some friends and many enemies. The Hebrew media coverage of its activities has been scanty but sympathetic. The reactions of Arabic language press appearing in Israel have been more diversified. Two most prominent papers, the Communist-affiliated daily Al-Ithad and the non-party weekly A-Sinara, offered the women their support. (But the Communist boasts of having provided initiative in Al-Fanar's formation seem baseless.) A-Sinara did even more. It opened its pages (strictly speaking one page each week) to individual women for voicing their grievances against their male kinfolk. A-Sinara initiative virtually opened the floodgates. Stories, usually anonymous but rich in detail, of incest, sexual molestation, all varieties of violence against women continue to pour forth, creating shock waves in Arab society where talking about such matters in public is devoid of all precedents. Some Arabic language papers, however, aligned themselves against Al-Fanar. A case in point is Al-Arabi, the paper edited by Muhammad Wattad. In the past, Wattad was for a time a Knesset member from Mapam party, from which he defected to the Communist-dominated Knesset faction of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. Not reelected in 1988, he subsequently became increasingly chummy with Muslim fundamentalists. Consequently, Al-Arabi uses rather traditionalist arguments to attack Al-Fanar. Among such arguments, the one reiterated over and over ad nauseam is that the Al-Fanar women encourage sexual licentiousness, "free love," etc. At the extremes of Muslim fundamentalist opinion, such arguments can be twisted into a really sinister form of racism.

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14077. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 83: The Beginnings of Palestinian Feminism: Part 2. Israel, August 23, 1991. Some left-wing attacks on Al-Fanar assumed a more vicious form. There were hints that Al-Fanar women had consciously or unconsciously acted in Israel's best interests, or even that their initiative had been blueprinted by Shabak. One episode in this left-wing assault on Al-Fanar was downright comic. A tiny ultrarevolutionary organization of Trotskite provenience with a predominantly Jewish membership, "Derekh Hanitzotz" ("The way of the spark"), came out with a truly ultrarevolutionary solution: to petition the Muslim religious authorities (i.e. the Israeli government appointees) to issue a Fatwa (an authoritative religious ruling) in condemnation of the "family honor" murders. Predictably, the Muslim religious authorities have not even bothered to answer Derekh Hanitzotz's petition. It is difficult to take the left's arguments against Al-Fanar at their face value. It
would rather be more advisable to probe a little into the unverbalized emotions and calculations behind those arguments. Thinly disguised deference of many on the Arab left to nationalism, religious traditionalism, clan and family solidarities and plain sexism is certainly part of the answer. National consensus remains a cherished goal, especially in view of the still widely believed myth that the Palestinian cause provides an inspiration capable of uniting all the Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. Hostility towards the sheier fatwa, that has generalized to imply a wholesale rejection of the Western culture, including its modernizing and emancipatory contents. Some may prefer to keep silence about the more repressive native traditions out of reluctance to "launder dirty linen in public", for fear of thus reinforcing anti-Arab racism and attacks on Arab politics at a time when Arab self-esteem and reputation in the eyes of others are anyway at their lowest depths, not just in Israel, but in the West as a whole. One consideration behind left-wing anti-feminism, however erroneous, is at least rational. The Israeli militant left, both Jewish and Arab, has always been under considerable, even if unacknowledged, influence of Sartre's and Fanon's doctrine that nations struggling for liberation from colonialism need to guard their native traditions as the shields protecting them from the one-by-one cooptation by the colonizers, and thereby from the abandonment of the leaderless masses to their fate.

This is not the place to discuss the merits and demerits of this doctrine in any depth, although it is difficult to refrain from the observation that the strategy advocated by Sartre and Fanon exacts a terrifying price, never spelled out by the two authors too clearly, of arresting social change in a colonized society. More germane for this discussion, however, is the fact that the Sartre-Fanon doctrine does not apply to the Israeli case, for the simple reason that Jewish racism precludes the threat of individual cooptation. All colonialisms have been racist, at least in the sense that they all denied political rights to peoples they colonized. Most of them nevertheless encouraged the cooptation of at least the moneyed and/or educated elites from within the colonized nations. Jewish racism, however, is too rigid to do the same. An Arab has no way to assimilate into Israeli Jewish society. What Israel has encouraged, was a mere collaboration with its police or other authorities. The services of collaborators have been rewarded by money and all kinds of privileges, but never by social acceptance. Given this situation, the Palestinians do no need to enforce national solidarity, but they don't need to guard all and sundy native traditions as a bulwark against the allures of individual acculturation into Jewish society. An adherence to the Sartre-Fanon doctrine becomes under such conditions an excuse for bowing to the native traditions for other reasons, never spelled out to clearly. Given so much hostility from so many different corners against Al-Fanar, has the tiny organization managed to have any noteworthy impact at all? In their talk with Rolli Rosen (reference as above), Mannar Hassan and her colleagues assessed that impact in most modest terms possible. To Rosen's question "What did you hope the [Nazareth] demonstration would accomplish?", Ms. Hassan replied "Not much. We simply wanted to do some consciousness raising, and to initiate discussion. We wanted... that at the very least people would begin thinking about it." It now transpires that such initial expectations of the Palestinian feminists were rather too modest. In at least two respects the impact of their appeal to Palestinian society has proved to be more substantial than anticipated.

In the first place, the "family honor" murders and other incidents of violence against women, previously as a rule kept by the Palestinian community under wraps, now tend to be at once reported to the Israeli police, even if anonymously. In the second place, the male Arab left groups are now reported to be envious of Al-Fanar's successes in reaching the clientele they themselves have never been able to reach. To all appearances, their envy can be interpreted as a sign of budding respect. Yet Al-Fanar has still completely failed to penetrate the "Green line" and extend its influence onto the Occupied Territories. The conditions of women there have, if anything, undergone a further aggravation of late. This holds particularly true for the Gaza Strip, as a direct consequence of Hamas' and other Muslim fundamentalists' rise to communal power. The ghastly situation of the Gaza Strip women is described in another article by Rolli Rosen, in Kol Ha'ir of June 14 ("What could be worse than being a refugee in Gaza?"). Along with other sources, Rosen makes it transparently clear what really happened. At the beginning stages of the Intifada, inevitable political activation of women indeed contributed mightily to their personal emancipation from the men's tutelage. The prediction of Frantz Fanon, that the liberation of the Third World's women will be eventually won, not under the impact of the Euro-American civilization and not through modernizing efforts of benevolent but the sheier fatwa, their involvement in national liberation struggles, then seemed vindicated. Unfortunately, the sequel of events prove Fanon sorely wrong. The gradual discreditiation of the PLO paved the way to the gradual takeover of Intifada leadership by Hamas. As soon as they gained influence, the Muslim fundamentalists began to insist on "showing women their place". The veil wearing was a custom, increasingly deferred to more in breach than in observance, and devoid of any political meaning. Once in control over the steering wheels of communal power in Gaza, Hamas began to enforce veil wearing as a symbol of women's solidarity with the struggle against the Israeli occupation and of remembrance of the Intifada's fallen. Women were implored to wear it, gently or urgently, and those who refused to comply were referred to the youthful masked-face Hamas militants for a "special treatment" their style. In the end, in the entire Strip hardly a woman can be seen today without veil.

But the women's lot worsened in other respects as well. To begin with, at some intermediate stage of the Intifada, women found themselves hard-pressed by their fathers and husbands to desist from any further political activity. The motive of the pressure was the fear of women's arrest and their being "tainted" by interrogations, in line with the logic described above by Mannar Hassan. For men, such a "taint" would hurt their "family honor"; but some single women proved all too compliant with the pressures, out of fear that, while "tainted", they would find it impossible to find husbands. Other factors of the deterioration of women's condition at the later stages of the Intifada are more demographic in nature. Reduced to dire poverty, "parents press their daughters to marry early, as this means one mouth in the family less to feed. And indeed, girls now often get married at 14 or 15." The fact that constant curfews induced many schoolgirls to drop out of school has also contributed to the early marriage trend. "But it is also much cheaper nowadays to get married. Accordingly, some men can afford to take a younger and cheaper bride and wife. And many get divorced soon after marriage, while still young, because what comes easy, goes easy." (The first quote is from Rosen's anonymous informant, the second from Rosen herself.) In the West Bank, where Hamas has less of a clout, the misery of women may be not quite as ghostly as in Gaza. But significantly, women themselves seem to aggravate their own misery not a little, by sheer force of their self-concepts and role perceptions. As Elgazi (reference above) reports it, "a poll of 185 Palestinian women from East Jerusalem, carried out by Nadira Shahouf-Kabourkian, a sociology lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Bethlehem University, revealed that 81% believe that wife beating is a legitimate way of dealing with family problems, 73% claimed to believe that violence can contribute to family life, 57% agreed that a woman who does not obey her husband deserves to be beaten, and most of them blamed themselves for the beatings. Ms. Hassan disputed the validity of these findings. But even if the just quoted statistics are biased, there can be little doubt that all too many Arab women internalize their own subjugation deeply. It may well be that Al-Fanar will yet find the deepest vindication of its existence, and its deepest challenge, in contending with such attitudes of the women themselves, no less than in struggling against male superstitions about, prejudices against, and domination over women. [=] 14078. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 83: The Beginnings of Palestinian Feminism: Part 3: Nazareth Demonstration Flyer: An-Fanar: Palestinian Feminist Organization: Stop Burying Girls Alive: No More Obscurantism. Israel, August 23, 1991. Yet another despicable crime has been committed in the Palestinian community. A young girl was robbed of her life, which was sacrificed to the social terror exercised on a daily basis against women and which is known as "family honor." The murder victim was in the flower of youth when her executioners dragged
her to the altar. And those executioners were her flesh and blood: her father and brothers, the very ones who should have been closest to her, who should have provided her with love and protection. Instead, they tied her up and set her on fire, and the flames enveloped her body and her pleas. Approximately 40 girls and women are murdered every year in our society through the despicable crime known as “preserving the family’s honor,” and this is done in view and earshot of all the “enlightened” and “progressive” persons, including individuals, parties, without anyone giving the matter the slightest consideration. The time has come for us to raise a hue and cry in condemning this atrocious crime, and to root out both it, and the social legitimacy extended to it, from Palestinian society. Because as long as it continues to exist, we will only perpetuate our social backwardness, closing the door to any possibility of real national liberation. We appeal to the Follow-Up Committee and all the parties, institutions and organizations to join their voices to ours in condemning this despicable crime and in banishing it and those who carry it out and sympathize with it from Palestinian society. Stop Burying Girls Alive: No More Obscurantism: Yes to Liberating Society from Social Terror. Al-Fanar, The Palestinian Feminist Organization P.O.B. 9105 Haifa [*]

14079. Sloymovics, Susan. "Power, Mass Media and the Middle East: Cartoon Commentary: Algerian and Moroccan Caricatures From The Gulf War," in Middle East Report, January-February 1993. pp. 21-24. Political cartoons have become very popular and widespread in the Arab world. In the Persian Gulf War media, Algerian and Moroccan political cartoons were very critical of the absence of any independent news gathering about the war. The Algerian press has only recently become free at all, in 1988, but that window closed in 8/92. During the Gulf War, Algeria had both a free press and many illegal satellite dishes pulling down international television programming. In Morocco, censorship and tight state control continues to characterize the press: however, during the Gulf War, the press in Morocco was relatively free (even if television was tightly controlled). A USIA study found that all countries allied with the US had tight press censorship during the war (except Morocco), while countries that opposed the war had a free press. Political cartoons heavily criticized television news coverage, being able to freeze and criticize the ephemeral images of television, and create images that capture contradictions that escape television imagery (such as that of the irony of American women soldiers fighting to defend a Saudi Arabia in which women have no rights).

14080. Studer, John. "Former Algerian President Ben Bella Backs Curtis," in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), October 16, 1995. p. 4. Dear Curtis, I have the honor of asking you to grant parole to Mr. Mark Curtis," Ahmed Ben Bella, leader of the workers and farmers government formed in Algeria following a revolution in 1962, wrote to the Iowa State Board of Parole on 9/22/1995. Ben Bella is 79 years old. He spent 10 years in prison under French colonial rule. When the workers and farmers government was overthrown in 1965, he was thrown back in prison for the next 15 years. Ben Bella also wrote directly to Curtis offering his continuing solidarity and support and wrote to the Mark Curtis Defense Committee, saying, "Count on my help, even though modest. Be brave, in friendship, Ben Bella." Ben Bella is one of hundreds of political activists, unionists and supporters of democratic rights who have written to the Iowa Board of Parole in the last two months urging that Mark Curtis be freed on parole. Curtis was a member of the United Food and Commercial Workers union who was beaten by Des Moines police and framed up on charges of rape and burglary in 1988 while participating in a public campaign to defend 17 co-workers from El Salvador and Mexico seized in an immigration raid at his plant. He is a long-time political activist and member of the Socialist Workers Party. "Speaking as a member of the Canadian working public who has been made familiar with the case of Mark Curtis," wrote Tim Better, a miner from Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, serving time in a frame-up for his union activism while on strike. "I fail to see the justice or the anticipated rehabilitation by the handling of his or any other case in this manner." Unionists from many other countries also have written the board. "Curtis is a trade union fighter and a socialist not a rapist," wrote Vassilis Paparis, a member of the Garment, Textile and Leather Workers Union in Athens, Greece. "He has served more than the average prison term for the crimes he has unjustly been convicted of. Keeping him longer in jail only shows the political nature of this case."

“Our workplace club has followed, for some years now, the case of Mark Curtis,” wrote Bert Jagerby, club chairman of the Swedish Foodworkers Union at the Trygg-Hansa Brewery in Stockholm. “Whatever the discussion about the legality, or otherwise, of Mark’s conviction, the fact is that Mark Curtis now fills all of Iowa’s requirements for conditional release, on parole. The only reason we can now see for any more delay, in Mark’s release, is due to his political and union activities, as all other requirements have been met.” “Our Union Federation of Postal and Telecommunications Workers asks you respectfully to grant Mark Curtis the right to freedom on parole,” wrote AnnickCoupe, secretary general of the French federation. “We have followed the evolution of this case for several years and we are convinced that Mark Curtis is the victim of a judicial frame-up for his political ideas.” A number of political leaders in France have also added their organizations’ voices to the call for Curtis’ freedom. "Under the laws of Iowa, he meets, to our knowledge, the conditions to be ‘free on parole.' This is why in the name of the rights of man, we ask you to grant to Mark Curtis the right to this freedom on parole," wrote Roland Wlos in a letter on behalf of the Committee in Defense of the Freedoms and the Rights of Man in France and in the World. Patrick Baudouin, president of the International Federation of Human Rights, wrote that the organization has been "particularly attentive to the developments in the international campaign to win freedom on parole for Mark Curtis.” He explains that they continue to support the request that Curtis be granted parole as soon as possible.

"I am urging you to grant parole to Mark Curtis without further delay," wrote Dion Martin, regional organizer of the National Distribution Union in the Central Region of New Zealand. "It is becoming obvious to international observers like myself that this delay amounts to nothing short of political persecution." “Having studied the facts of the case I am convinced of the innocence of Mark Curtis and believe that justice demands his immediate release,” wrote Maurice Quinlivan, coordinator of London Saorise, an international organization fighting for the release of political prisoners. “I do hope you will look favorably on my plea and grant Mark Curtis immediate parole.” Activists in Iowa and across the US also continue to send letters to the board. "I have followed Mark Curtis’ case for over a year now," wrote Juan Estrada, vice-president of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1149 in Perry, Iowa, and president of the Perry League of United Latin American Citizens. “I became interested in his case when I saw how he was beaten by the cops and when I learned that he was a union activist in a meat packing plant and had spoken out in defense of the rights of immigrant workers at a meeting in protest of a raid by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. “He has certainly been kept in jail and denied parole as punishment for his political views,” Estrada continued. “Any nonpolitical person with a similar record in prison would have been paroled by now. Please! Do the right thing now. Parole Mark Curtis.” Roxanne Gould, an activist in the fight for justice against the police murder of Kimberly Frazier in Sioux City, Iowa, wrote, "Obviously, Mark Curtis has been seen as a threat for some time by those entities who support the status quo, such as the FBI, for his political activities around the civil war in El Salvador, the management at Swift's meatpacking plant, and the Des Moines Police Department for his socialist beliefs and activities, particularly around immigrants' rights." On 9/22/1995 Richard Trujillo, vice-president of Amalgamated Transit Union Local 265 in San Jose, California, forwarded a petition signed by 48 delegates and guests who attended the 51st international convention of the union in Las Vegas, Nevada. "The case of union brother Mark Curtis has prompted our interest and serious concern. We respectfully submit, brother Curtis should be paroled immediately. He has definitely earned it.,” the petition stated. The defense committee is continuing to gather letters to present to the board until 10/17/1995, when the parole board is planning to meet and decide whether to grant Curtis a hearing this year. Letters can be
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addressed to the Iowa State Board of Parole and sent to the Mark Curtis Defense Committee, P.O. Box 1048, Des Moines, Iowa 50311, for delivery. [=]

14081. UN. Press Release: Advisory Panel On 1995 Fourth World Conference On Women To Meet in Geneva Under Auspices Of Secretary-General. UN, April 29, 1994. A draft platform of action and advocacy strategies for next year's Fourth World Conference on Women will be discussed in Geneva on Thursday, 5 May, by an advisory panel of eminent persons convened by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The Fourth World Conference on Women, scheduled from 9-4-14/1995 in Beijing, has as its subtitle “Action for Equality, Development and Peace”. During a session of the Conference’s preparatory body – the Commission on the Status of Women – in March, the Commission asked the Secretary-General to prepare a draft platform of action for consideration by the Commission at its next session early next year. Participants The eminent persons expected to participate in the panel are as follows: (1) Victoria F. Chitepo, of Zimbabwe, member of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa; (2) Dane Ann Hércules, of New Zealand, international consultant; (3) Idriss Jazairy, of Algeria, Executive Director of the Agency for Cooperation & Research in Development; (4) Justice A.R. Jiagge, retired Justice of the Superior Courts of Judicature, Ghana; (5) Jacek Kuron, of Poland, former human rights activist and former government Minister; (6) Roberta Lajous, of Mexico, Executive Director, Dialogue with Society, General Coordination of Campaign of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional; (7) Jack Lang, French Deputy from Loir and Cher; (8) General Olusegun Obasanjo, of Nigeria, Chairman, Africa Leadership Forum; (9) Barbara Simons, of Germany, member of the European Parliament; (10) Princess Basma Bint Talal, of Jordan, Chairperson, National Committee for Women; (11) Muhammad Yunus, of Bangladesh, Managing Director, Grameen Bank; and (12) Queen Fabiola of Belgium. [=]

14082. UN Commission on the Status of Women. Eight Draft Resolutions Introduced In Commission On Status Of Women: Texts on Development, Centre for Human Rights, Violence and Discrimination Against Women, Middle East, Palestine, South Africa, Status in UN Secretariat. WOM/750. Thirty-eighth Session 16 March 1994. 14th Meeting (AM): Eight draft resolutions that would have either the Economic and Social Council or the Commission on the Status of Women recommend actions that Governments, the international community and the United Nations system could take to advance the status of women and enhance their human rights were introduced in the Commission this morning. The draft texts were introduced under agenda items on programming and coordination matters related to the United Nations system; the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies, and the priority themes of the 1995 World Conference on Women. Under the priority themes for the Conference -- equality, development and peace -- the representative of Algeria, on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing countries and China, would have the Commission call upon Governments, intergovernmental organizations, and international institutions to promote measures to stimulate the economies of developing countries and the full integration of women in the development process. It would also call upon them to support the efforts of those countries to reduce the negative effects of the external debt burden, structural adjustment policies and adverse terms of trade, in order to integrate women into mainstream development. Another text, introduced by the representative of the Netherlands and concerned with implementation of the Nairobi Strategies, would have the Commission request the Secretary- General to direct the preparation of an annual joint workplan on women’s rights for the Centre for Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women. The Commission would also encourage the Centre to explore the organization of training in women’s human rights and convening an expert group on gender-based human rights violations. The Commission would call upon all Governments and the international community to take steps to implement the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and promote its understanding, according to a draft text on the elimination of violence against women, also introduced by the representative of the Netherlands. Another draft resolution, introduced by the representative of Finland, would have the Economic and Social Council again urge all States that had not done so to sign the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Under the terms of the draft, the Commission’s thirty-ninth session would examine the feasibility of introducing the right of petition through the preparation of an optional protocol on the Convention. A draft resolution on women and children in South Africa, introduced by the representative of Algeria, would have the Economic and Social Council demand the immediate and unconditional release of the remaining political prisoners and detainees and request the international community to provide material and human resources to South African women towards the establishment of special programmes and projects for their advancement. The representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution on the Middle East peace process, by which the Commission would urge the international community to include women in the peace process. Another text, on Palestinian women, introduced by the representative of Algeria on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, would call on Israel to facilitate the return of all refugees and displaced Palestinian women to their homes and properties in the occupied Palestinian territory. It would also urge the international community to intensify its efforts to assist financially Palestinian women in creating projects responding to their needs. A draft resolution, introduced by the representative of Australia, on women in the United Nations Secretariat would urge the Secretary-General to meet targets for advancing women to decision-making positions. Concerning the draft rules of procedure of the World Conference, the Commission decided this morning to discuss that in detail at its thirty-ninth session. The Commission will meet again at 10 a.m. Thursday, 17 March, to hear the introduction of all outstanding draft resolutions.

Commission Work Programme: The Commission on the Status of Women met this morning for preliminary discussions on draft provisional rules of the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace (Beijing, 9/4-15/1995). It was then expected to hear the introduction of draft resolutions on: programming and coordination matters related to the United Nations and United Nations system; the monitoring of the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women; and on the Priority themes. (For details of this session, see Press Release WOM/734 issued 4 March.)

Preparations for Fourth World Conference on Women: A note from the Secretariat contains draft provisional rules of procedure of the Conference (document E/CN.6/1994/L.3), which lists the rules regarding elections of officers, representation and credentials, the running of the Conference, its decision-making and voting procedures. Programming Matters Related to United Nations System: A draft resolution on improvement of the status of women in the Secretariat (document E/CN.6/1994/L.8) would have the Economic and Social Council strongly urge the Secretary-General to make further use of the opportunity offered by the United Nations reorganization process to promote more women into senior-level positions. It would urge him to accord greater priority to recruiting and promoting women in posts subject to geographical distribution, particularly in senior policy-level and decision-making posts in United Nations system where the representation of women was considerably below average. The Secretary-General would also be urged to implement fully the plan of action for 1993 and 1994 to improve the status of women in the Secretariat by 1995. It would have the Economic and Social Council urge him to examine work practices in the United Nations system and consider such issues as flexible working hours, child-care arrangements, career break schemes and access to training, in order to remove direct and indirect discrimination against staff with family responsibilities.

Monitoring Implementation of Nairobi Strategies: Under the terms of a draft resolution on women and children in the process of the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic South Africa (document E/CN.6/1994/L.6), the Economic and Social Council, alarmed that politically motivated violence in that country continued to rise, would demand the immediate and unconditional release of the
remaining political prisoners and detainees. The Council would also request the international community to provide financial, material and human resources to South African women towards the establishment of special programmes and projects geared to women's integration and advancement. Further, the Council would call upon the Secretary-General to monitor and report on the incidents of political and domestic violence directed against women and children in South Africa. By the text of a draft resolution on a process of a joint workshop on women's rights for the Centre for Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women. The Commission would also encourage the Centre to explore the organization of training in women's human rights and convening an expert group on gender-based human rights violations. A draft on the elimination of violence against women (document E/CN.6/1994/L.10) would have the Commission call upon all Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to take all possible steps to fully implement the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, to disseminate information on it and promote its understanding. It would also request the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, to publicize the Rapporteur's work and disseminate the Rapporteur's findings and conclusions. A draft resolution on the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (document E/CN.6/1994/L.12) would have the Economic and Social Council, noting with concern that the Convention was still one of the human rights instruments with a large number of reservations, once again urge all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention, encourage States to consider limiting the extent of their reservations and review those reservations with a view to withdrawing them. The Commission would examine, at its thirty-ninth session, the feasibility of introducing the right of petition through the preparation of an optional protocol on the Convention. By a draft text on Palestinian women (document E/CN.6/1994/L.13) the Commission would call upon Israel to facilitate immediately the return of all refugees and displaced Palestinian women to their homes and properties in the occupied Palestinian territory. It would also urge Member States, international financial organizations of the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations and other relevant institutions to intensify their efforts to provide financial assistance to Palestinian women for the creation of projects responding to their needs, especially during the transitional period. Further, it would request the Secretary-General to review the situation, assist the women by all available means and report to the Commission at its thirty-ninth session on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution.

Priority Themes: A draft resolution on women and development (document E/CN.6/1994/L.11), sponsored by Algeria, on behalf of the "Group of 77" developing countries and China, would have the Commission recommend that Governments create and strengthen national machineries for advancing women and ensure their participation in the political, economic, and social planning processes. It would also recommend that Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and international donor agencies further develop gender-oriented research in all development. By its terms, the Commission would urge Governments to: foster women's full and equal participation in the elaboration, planning, execution and evaluation of development policies and projects, so they can be agents and beneficiaries of development; include gender perspectives in all guidelines for economic and social policies; ensure access of women to income-generating activities as a means to stimulating economic independence; and identify quantitative and qualitative targets in education and employment in order to fully integrate women in development. The draft resolution would also call upon Governments, intergovernmental organizations, and international and other relevant institutions to promote measures to stimulate the economies of developing countries and the full integration of women in the development process, and provide financial services on the basis of equal opportunity for women and men. It would also call upon them to support the efforts of the developing countries to reduce the negative effects of the external debt burden, structural adjustment policies and adverse terms of trade, in order to integrate women in mainstream development.

Preparations for Fourth World Conference on Women: The Commission decided that substantive discussions of the Conference draft rules would take place at Commission's thirty-ninth session in 1995. IRENE FREUDENSHUSS-REICHL (Austria) said she wanted to know whether the rules had been inspired by those of similar Conferences. GERTRUDE MONGELLA, the Secretary-General of the Fourth World Conference on Women, said that the draft rules had been inspired by the rules of the Nairobi Conference and other similar forums, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The secretariat of the Conference had examined other rules of procedure before drafting the current proposals. KRISTEN TIMOTHY, the Deputy Director and Coordinator for the World Conference, said that the rules were state-of-the-art and represented current thinking on rules of procedure. Introduction of Draft Texts: ANNE MOORES (Australia) introduced the draft resolution on programming and coordination matters related to the United Nations system. She said Japan had joined the nations sponsoring it. FAWZIA BOUMAIZA (Algeria) introduced the draft resolution on the women and children in the process of elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic South Africa. MARIE COLTON (United States) introduced the draft text on the integration of women into the Middle East peace process. JOKE SWIEBEL (Netherlands) introduced the draft resolutions on mainstreaming women's human rights and on the elimination of violence against women. RAILI LAHNALAMPI (Finland) introduced the draft resolution on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. HOCINE SAHRAOUI (Algeria), on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, introduced the draft resolution on the situation of Palestinian women and the draft text on women and development, as orally amended. [=] 14083. UN; Center for Human Rights; World Campaign for Human Rights, "Part 12: Action in the United Nations", In Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Fact Sheet 14, Geneva, Switzerland: UN Center for Human Rights, June 1991. The Working Group on Current Forms of Slavery (In 1990, the members of the Working Group were: Fatma Zohra Ksentini (Algeria) (chairperson/rapporteur), Ion Diaconu (Romania), Asbjorn Eide (Norway), Waleed M. Sadi (Jordan), Suescun Monroe (Colombia) has the general responsibility in the United Nations for the study of slavery in all its aspects. Meeting for the first time in 1975 as the Working Group on Slavery, the group was renamed in 1988. The Working Group consists of five independent experts chosen on the basis of fair geographical representation from the membership of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The group meets for one week each year and reports to the Sub-Commission. In addition to monitoring the application of the slavery conventions and making a review of the situation in different parts of the world, the group selects a theme for special attention each year. In 1989, the theme was prevention of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and in 1990, eradication of the exploitation of child...
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labour and debt bondage. The 1991 theme is the prevention of the traffic in persons and exploitation of the prostitution of others. Programmes of national and international action to deal with the problems raised by the first two themes have been drafted by the Working Group, which expects to receive reactions to its proposals from governments and a wide range of organizations. In 1992, the Working Group expects to evaluate its study of the three themes and to take up the idea of an international pledging conference to help put an end to the exploitation of child labour. [-]

14084. UN; World Conference on Women; World Conference on Women-Advisory Panel. Advisory Panel On 1995 Fourth World Conference On Women To Meetin Geneva Under Auspices Of Secretary-General. UN, April 29, 1994. A draft platform of action and advocacy arrangements for next year's Fourth World Conference on Women will be discussed in Geneva on Thursday, 5 May, by an advisory panel of eminent persons convened by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The Fourth World Conference on Women, scheduled from 9/4-15/1995 in Beijing, has as its subtitle "Action for Equality, Development and Peace". During a session of the Conference's preparatory body - the Commission on the Status of Women - in March, the Commission asked the Secretary-General to prepare a draft platform of action for consideration by the Commission at its next session early next year.

Participants The eminent persons expected to participate in the panel are as follows: (1) Victoria F. Chitepo, of Zimbabwe, member of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa; (2) Dame Ann Hercus, of New Zealand, international consultant; (3) Idriss Jazairy, of Algeria, Executive Director of the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development; (4) Justice A.R. Jiagge, retired Justice of the Superior Courts of Judicature, Ghana; (5) Jacek Kuron, of Poland, former human rights activist and former government Minister; (6) Roberta Lajous, of Mexico, Executive Director, Dialogue with Society, General Coordination or Campaign of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional; (7) Jack Lang, French Deputy from Loir and Cher; (8) General Olusegun Obasanjo, of Nigeria, Chairman, Africa Leadership Forum; (9) Barbara Simons, of Germany, member of the European Parliament; (10) Princess Basma Bint Talal, of Jordan, Chairperson, National Committee for Women; (11) Muhammad Yunus, of Bangladesh, Managing Director, Grameen Bank; and (12) Queen Fabiola of Belgium. [-]

14085. Vergano, Elisabeth Lucie. Poétique, Politique Et Culture Dans Les Romans De Leila Sebbar. University Of Texas At Austin. Dissertation. 247pp. AAC 9212657. [Advisor: Sherzer, Dina] This study presents a reading of three novels (Sherazade, Les Carnets de Sherazade, and Le Chinois vert d'Afrique) written by Leila Sebbar, an author whose works belong to Maghrebian literature written in French. Sebbar focuses the subject of her works on the North African immigrants living in France and particularly the "Beur" generation, the children of these immigrants, raised in France and belonging to French as well as Arabic culture. The novels discussed present the quest of Sherazade, a 17 year old Algerian girl (in Sherazade, Les Carnets de Sherazade, and Mohammed, a 12 year old boy of Algerian and Vietnamese nationality (in Le Chinois vert d'Afrique), for their respective identities and pasts. The introduction discusses Sebbar's upbringing in Algeria and her subsequent career as a writer interested above all in the destiny of women living in Arab communities within France. It also explores the sociological context of Sebbar's fiction: the rise of Maghrebian populations in France. Chapter one deals with the problems of physical and psychological differentiation and biculturalism which contribute to the distance between the protagonists and the surrounding French community as well as within their own families. The second chapter concerns the role and impact of imagery (Orientalist paintings and photographs of wars in Algeria and the Middle East) in the protagonists' search for their Arabic roots. Chapter three focuses in the role of "intertextuality" in the narratives: texts by Rimbaud, Chateaubriand, Loti are important keys with which Sherazade unlocks her Arabic cultural heritage. The fourth chapter emphasizes the traditions and customs of the North African community in the cities and the countryside of an emerging French society which Sebbar shows in her fiction to be increasingly "colored" by the diversity of its ethnic population. Chapter five studies the function of fictional techniques (the impact of imagery, the recurrence of certain themes, modes of characterization, etc.) that Sebbar uses to represent French and Arab immigrant communities and their interrelationship. The conclusion assesses Sebbar's originality as a writer fascinated by the ethnic diversity of contemporary French society. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [-]

14086. Wakin, Daniel J. "Population Conference Shift Focus To Youth; Panel Works On Abortion Language In Draft Of Action Program". In Seattle Times, September 9, 1994. p. A2. After developing a compromise position on abortion (a compromise backed by the US, EU, Iran, Pakistan and Nordic states), the UN Population Conference is now focusing on the questions of contraception and teenage sex. The draft sets a target of $17 billion in worldwide spending by 2000 on basic health care for women and children, family planning and AIDS prevention; this would rise to $22 billion in 2015. Libya, Iran, Algeria, Indonesia and Central African Republic called for deletion of the references to 'individuals' since extramarital sex is proscribed in Islam. Alexander Sanger, president of Planned Parenthood of New York City accused the Vatican of hijacking meetings to advance its minority opinion on abortion.

14087. Wilson, Amrit. Women and the Eritrean Revolution: The Challenge Road: Part 04: Behind the Enemy Lines. Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1991. pp. 62-96. The Eritrean revolutionary experience was very different than that suggested by Franz Fanon based on the Algerian revolution against French settler colonialism. While he argued that the revolution would spread from the rural areas to the urban areas, in Eritrea, the rural and urban insurgencies grew in tandem, but under direction from rural areas. Asmara was not in any sense a modern city, or even a modern settler colonial city: it was rather a segregated Italian core, surrounded by clusters of Eritrean villagers that supplied labor. The Eritrean economy had been looted by the British before 1952, and again by the Ethiopian occupation army. While rural areas were subjected to aerials, massacres, torture, deforestation, destruction of whole villages, and progressive impoverishment, the cities swelled with multinational lumpenproletarian masses, who lacked political identity. In 1975, in a major rampage through Asmara, the Ethiopian army started massacring Eritreans. Many Eritrean members of the Ethiopian army defected directly into the EPLA. During this period, the EPLF never focused on urban warfare, instead building deep networks of cells in the rural areas; many of the recruits were women (while the rebellion of women against patriarchy under the Italians just led to new kinds of exploitation, rebellion of women against patriarchy and imperialism led them into a leadership role in the EPLF). [TXT]

14088. World Federation of Trade Unions. Xlíh Session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions: Part 1: General Resolution On The First Item on the Agenda. Peking: General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, June 9, 1991. The General Council, which is holding its 11th session in Peking, notes that since the 4th World Trade Union Congress the forces of socialism and world peace have increased considerably and have won unprecedented successes. This progress, as well as the upsurge and the successes of the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle, and the strength of the movement for demands in the capitalist countries, create objective conditions that favour the reinforcement of the united struggle of the workers to force the imperialists to enter into serious negotiations and to accept disarmament and peaceful co-existence, so as to eliminate the menace of a world atomic war. Hostile to this progress, the imperialists, faced with the worsening of the general crisis of their system, pay lip-service to peace, yet are multiplying their acts of provocation and continuation. Chions for war. By sending a military plane over Soviet territory and later cynically boasting that this was their deliberate
General Council as well as the workers of the whole world condemn these American provocations against the Soviet Union as a grave danger to peace and to the interests of the working class and the peoples in all countries. The workers will understand better than ever the imperative need to increase their vigilance in the face of the aggressive policy pursued, notably in West Germany and Japan, by the ruling circles of the United States and other western powers. Thanks to the strength of the peace forces in the world, thanks to the peace policy of the socialist camp and the many steps taken by the Soviet Union, it has become really possible to avoid the menace of an atomic war that would prove devastating, to impose on the imperialists disarmament and the use of the enormous resources that are at present being wasted on the arms race for the economic, social and cultural progress of all the peoples. But it is necessary to make the situation clear to the workers so that they should have no illusions about the willingness of the imperialists to accept disarmament. All workers must be convinced that only by the untiring, ever-stronger and more united struggles of the peoples throughout the world, and by the isolation of imperialism, which is the source of war and aggression, can the imperialist war policy be thwarted.

The General Council warmly welcomes the new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on 6/2/1960, developing and giving details of its plan for universal and complete disarmament and thus offering further proof of its tireless efforts in the service of peace, despite the provocations by United States leaders. These proposals concern in particular the banning and destruction, under international control, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, linked with the elimination of all military bases on foreign soil, as well as the banning of atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons, the dissolution of armed forces and elimination of military budgets. The General Council recommends the trade unions to make these proposals widely known to the workers, so that the latter will actively support them. The General Council considers that under these conditions the preservation and consolidation of peace remains among the fundamental aims of the struggle of the international trade union movement. Thus, it considers that it is essential to unmask imperialist manoeuvres and to work constantly for common action:

1. for the relaxation of international tension and peaceful co-existence;
2. for universal and complete disarmament;
3. for the elimination of military bases on foreign soil;
4. for a cessation of nuclear tests and a ban on nuclear arms;
5. for national liberation and independence of the peoples;
6. for democracy;
7. against the rebirth of German militarism and for its liquidation by the signing of a peace treaty with the two German states;
8. for the transformation of West Berlin into a free, demilitarised city;

Conscious of the close bonds that link the struggle for the relaxation in international tension to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle for independence, the General Council salutes and supports’ the heroic fight of the Algerian people for independence. It calls upon all workers and trade unions to strengthen their active solidarity in favour of the struggle of their Algerian brothers, and to demand that the French Government stop the colonial war in Algeria. It greets and warmly supports the struggle of the people of Turkey and the popular uprising in South Korea that led to the downfall of Syngman Rhee; the struggle of the Korean people, which continues, will force the withdrawal of the American armed forces and the peaceful unification of the country.

The General Council gives its entire support to the powerful movement of the workers and people of Japan for the abrogation of the Japanese-US treaty of military alliance, against the rebirth of militarism and for the liquidation of military bases. It expresses its warm solidarity with the workers and trade unions of Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile, and particularly with the people of Cuba, who are courageously and [united in] defending the economic and social conquests of the popular democratic revolution and the national sovereignty of their country. After examining the economic situation in the capitalist countries, the General Council notes that its essential characteristics are the progressive militarisation of the economy, increased monopoly concentration, and a considerable speed-up of work and automation to the sole profit of the monopolies. A certain recovery followed the crisis of 1958—1959. It has proved incapable of re-absorbing unemployment, which in some countries has become chronic, and in general has remained at a high level, particularly in certain important branches of industry. The capitalist monopolies and the governments in their service are attacking simultaneously the purchasing power of wages, trade union and democratic rights. Thousands of trade union leaders have been arrested and imprisoned. Tens of thousands of strikers have been victims of police repression and employment losses, thanks to the peace policy of the socialist camp.

The workers and the people in certain countries, such as the Union of South Africa, are suffering from savage racist repression. The General Council draws attention to the fact that this anti-trade union offensive is accompanied by the adoption of new laws which attempt to legalise the violation of fundamental rights, among them the right to strike, inscribed in the Charter of the Workers’ Trade Union Rights, adopted by the WFTU in 1954. [=]

14089. World Federation of Trade Unions. Xth Session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions: June 9, 1991. The deepening of the general crisis in the capitalist world contrasts increasingly sharply with the unprecedented economic, social, scientific and cultural developments of all the socialist countries, where the peoples have become the masters of their own fate. These developments, which free the productive forces of society, permit a continuous and remarkable increase in purchasing power, an improvement in working conditions, social advantages and in the general living standards of the mass of the people in these countries. The workers of the world appreciate the full importance of the most recent measures of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, announcing the generalisation of the 7- and 6-hour working day and the gradual suppression between now and 1965 of income tax for workers, as well as the extension of the role and rights of the trade union organisations in the socialist countries. The General Council sends its warm congratulations to the workers, men and women, of the socialist countries, particularly the workers of the Soviet Union and China, for their remarkable successes in the economic and social field. Thanks to their creative enthusiasm the socialist system is from year to year winning victories of far-reaching importance which are also victories for the entire working class of the world and for the cause of peace. [=]

14090. World Federation of Trade Unions. Xth Session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions: June 9, 1991. The General Council greets the millions of workers and trade unions in the capitalist countries who are carrying on exceptionally strong united struggles for wages, shorter working hours and the defense of trade union rights. The strike movement, which has reached an extent rarely known since the last world war, has been remarkable in Argentina, Japan, the United States, France, Italy, Belgium and other countries. It shows the sharpening of the class struggle in the present period, the desire for unity and the remarkable militancy of the working class. This development gives a categoric refutation to the "theories" of class collaboration which the monopolies and certain trade union leaders spread continuously among the workers, trying to divert them from their struggles. The workers must denounce and reject all attempts to win over the trade union movement to positions of close collaboration, increasing their common actions for: (1) the reduction of working hours without loss of pay; (2) a general increase in wages; (3) the right to work, the defense of employment and assistance to the unemployed; (4) the creation, protection and widening of the social security system; (5) the defense of trade union rights and democratic liberties; (6) the limitation of the power of the monopolies.

These demands should permit fresh progress in united action.

The General Council recommends all workers and trade unions to intensify their action for trade union rights and democratic liberties, and for the liberation of all imprisoned trade unionists. To help bring about on the international level the indispensable common front of workers and
and multilateral contacts among individual unions, national trade unions to continue and multiply exchanges of delegations and bilateral social demands. The General Council calls on all workers and trade unions to denounce the stubborn refusal of the ICFTU leadership to reply to the many proposals made to it over a period of nearly ten years by the Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of Algeria. The exchanges of trade union delegations between capitalist and socialist countries and also among capitalist countries, the bilateral and multilateral contacts, trade union organisations are seeking the best methods of taking sexual difference into account can identify this muting of the Third World. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the anti-colonial/nationalist discourses in the Muslim Third World. By exploring the pretexts and manoeuvres of those opposed to unity. As a result of the inequalities are also taking a similar Orientalist masculine authority position. The trope of the veiled woman is also employed by the...
Bahrain

16000. ------. "Women Have Been Arrested and Held In Communicado in Bahrain [Amnesty International reports]", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 28, 1996, p. 4. [TXT]

16001. DS. "Bahrain: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government has often stated its commitment to the protection of children's human rights and welfare within the courts social and religious framework. The Government honor this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and an extensive social welfare network. The status of children is shaped by tradition and religion to a greater extent than by civil law. Public discussion of child abuse is rare, and the preference of the authorities has always been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against prostitution, including child prostitution and procuring. They deal harshly with violators. In some cases, the authorities reportedly return children arrested for prostitution and other crimes to their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first offenses. The regular courts hear juvenile cases. Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a juvenile court, but other citizens insist that the protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and oppose greater government involvement. Independent and quasi-governmental organizations play an active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal assistance and advice and in some cases, shelter and financial support to distressed children and families. [=]

16002. DS. "Bahrain: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: People With Disabilities", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The law protects the rights of people with disabilities, and a variety of governmental, quasi-governmental, and religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled persons. The Regional (Arabian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the Blind is headquartered in Bahrain, and a similar center for the education of deaf children was established in 1994. Society tends to view people with disabilities as special cases in need of protection rather than as fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the law requires the Government to provide vocational training for disabled persons wishing to work. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer employing over 100 employee encase at least 2% of its employees from the Government's list of disabled workers. The Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs works actively to place people with disabilities in public sector jobs, such as in the public telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations require that access be provided to disabled persons. Most large public buildings (including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the University, and schools) are equipped with ramps and other aids which make them accessible to disabled persons. [=]

compulsory labor is legally prohibited, and the Labor Ministry is charged with enforcing the law. The Ministry enforces the labor laws with periodic inspections and routinely fines violators. New provision to the Labor Law passed in 11/1993 stiffened the maximum fines and mandated imprisonment for certain violations. The press often performs an ombudsman function on labor problems, reporting instances in which private sector employers have violated foreign workers from developing nations. Bahrain's Labor Law stipulates that any Bahraini found guilty of illegally sponsoring foreign workers may be sentenced to 6 months in prison for each worker. However, the Government's efforts to deport illegitimately sponsored workers make the foreign workers reluctant to bring cases of abuse to the courts. The intense fear of deportation almost certainly allows some sponsors to impose abusive conditions, which approach inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for advancement. While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases, occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances must travel outside of Bahrain, as the Ja'afari sect courts in Bahrain are said to lack a scholar of sufficient rank to issue rulings in controversial cases. Women of either sect may own and inherit property and may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the absence of a direct male, Shi'a women may inherit all property; in contrast, Sunni women—in the absence of a direct male heir—inherit only a portion, with the balance being divided among uncles and male cousins of the deceased. In the event of divorce, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7. In all circumstances except incapacity, the father, regardless of custody, retains the right to make certain legal decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property belonging to the child until the child reaches legal age. A non-Bahraini woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their Bahraini father. Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the permission of a male head of the household. Bahraini women are free to wear the clothing of their choice (a large percentage wear Western dress outside the home), to work outside the home, and drive a car without an escort. As the Bahraini economy has developed, women have increasingly taken jobs previously reserved for men. Women constitute over 20% of the Bahraini work force. The Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of women. Bahrain's Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for equal work, and women are generally paid less than men. Except for a few exempted professions, women are prohibited from working at night. Generally, women work outside the home during the years between secondary school or university and marriage. Women make up the majority of students at Bahrain's universities. There are women's organizations which seek to improve the status of women under both civil and Islamic law. Increasingly women have expressed the view that, despite growing female participation in the work force, women in Bahrain are not significantly advancing their rights and that much of their lack of progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists, especially in the government-run school system and in the Shari'a courts. Other women, however, desire a return to more traditional religious values and support calls for a return to Islamic patterns of social behavior. Violence against women is known to occur, but knowledge of incidents is usually kept within the family in this traditional society. In general, there is virtually no public attention to, or discussion of, violence against women and no government policies to address it. Women's groups and health care professionals state that spousal abuse is relatively common, particularly in poorer communities.
There are very few known instances of Bahraini women seeking legal redress for violence, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are not receptive to such cases. Cases of foreign women working as domestic servants being beaten and sexually abused have been reported to local embassies and the police. Most victims are too intimidated to sue their employers. Those who do, however, appear to be received sympathetically in the courts. In December a Bahraini court sentenced a Bahraini in the private sector to 10 years in prison terms after their extreme neglect led to the death of an expatriate domestic worker. Anecdotal evidence from other embassies and local contacts indicate that other serious abuses occur but are infrequently reported. [=]

16007. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Bahrain: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The minimum age compensation package because of home leave and holiday pay was published in the press In addition, the Labor Department of the US Government has always stated its commitment to the protection of children's human rights and welfare within the social and religious framework of this traditional society. The Government honors this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and an extensive social welfare network. The status of children in Bahraini society is dictated by tradition and religion to a greater extent than by civil law. Public discussion of child abuse is rare, and the preference of the authorities has always been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or religious groups. In 1993, however, the government-controlled press featured commentaries decrying “growing” trends of child prostitution, abuse, and begging. Bahraini authorities actively enforce the laws against prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned or deported if non-Bahraini. In some cases, authorities reportedly will return Bahraini children arrested for prostitution and other crimes to their families rather than actively prosecute them, especially for first offenses. In January a local women’s society held a seminar on the legal rights of children in which some participants called for greater governmental protection of children, including the establishment of a separate juvenile court. Juvenile cases currently are heard in the regular courts 1 day a week. Other Bahrainis, however, insist that the protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and would oppose greater governmental interference in this traditional sphere. Independent and quasi-governmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the Protection of Children and the Mother & Child Welfare Society play an active part in the protection of children by providing counseling, legal assistance and advice, and, in some cases shelter and financial support to distressed children and families. [=]

16008. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Bahrain: Part 21: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government of Bahrain has often stated its commitment to the protection of children's human rights and welfare within the social and religious framework of this traditional society. The Government honors this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and an extensive social welfare network. The status of children in Bahraini society is dictated by tradition and religion to a greater extent than by civil law. Public discussion of child abuse is rare, and the preference of the authorities has always been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or religious groups. In 1993, however, the government-controlled press featured commentaries decrying “growing” trends of child prostitution, abuse, and begging. Bahraini authorities actively enforce the laws against prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned or deported if non-Bahraini. In some cases, authorities reportedly will return Bahraini children arrested for prostitution and other crimes to their families rather than actively prosecute them, especially for first offenses. In January a local women’s society held a seminar on the legal rights of children in which some participants called for greater governmental protection of children, including the establishment of a separate juvenile court. Juvenile cases currently are heard in the regular courts 1 day a week. Other Bahrainis, however, insist that the protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and would oppose greater governmental interference in this traditional sphere. Independent and quasi-governmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the Protection of Children and the Mother & Child Welfare Society play an active part in the protection of children by providing counseling, legal assistance and advice, and, in some cases shelter and financial support to distressed children and families. [=]

16009. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Bahrain: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The minimum wage scales, set by government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families. The current minimum wage for the public sector in Bahrain is $236.50 (91 Bahraini dinars) a month. Wages for workers in the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For foreign workers, employers consider benefits such as annual repatriation and housing and education bonuses part of the salary. Bahrain's Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers, including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours per week) and occupational safety and health. The Fourth High Court (labor) has jurisdiction over cases involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled through arbitration must, by law, be referred to the Court within 15 days. In practice, most employers prefer to settle such disputes through arbitration, particularly since the Court and Labor Law are generally considered to favor the worker/employee. Under Bahraini Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued employment. In February the Government strengthened the Labor Law by Amiri decree, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be imposed upon private sector employers who fail to pay legal wages. This law applies equally to employers of Bahrainis and expatriates and is intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers who in the past have sometimes been denied legal salaries. In 1993, after consulting with the GCBW and the Majlis Al-Shura, the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs submitted a further package of 29 amendments to the Labor Law to the Government for consideration. These changes were proposed in part, to bring Bahrain's labor laws into greater conformity with international norms. The law provides equal protection to Bahraini and foreign workers. However, all foreign workers are required to be sponsored by Bahrainis or Bahrain-based institutions and companies. Subject to sanctions for wrongful dismissal, sponsors are able to cancel the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby prevent them from obtaining entry or residence visas from another sponsor. Foreign workers, particularly those from developing countries, are often unwilling to report abuses or fear of losing residence rights and having to return to their native countries. Although instances of foreign workers being denied their guaranteed holidays days off, and vacations without compensation are periodically reported in the local press, government attempts to address individual abuses in these and other cases are often hampered by the workers' unwillingness to make a formal complaint. In September a senior Ministry of Labor official publicly invited a group of expatriate contract employees to lodge official charges against their Bahraini company after their letter protesting 13-hour workdays, 6 days a week, with no break, no overtime or compensatory time off was published in the press. In addition, the Labor Law specifically favors Bahrainis, followed by Arab expatriates, over all other foreign workers in the areas of hiring and firing. Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary scales, Asian workers are legally paid lower regular wages than their Bahraini counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday pay allowances. Western expatriates and Bahraini workers are paid comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly greater for the former. Women are prohibited from performing night work, except in certain exempted fields. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity leave nursing periods during the day and up to 1 year of unpaid maternity leave. However women are generally paid less than men. [=]

16010. Greenpeace USA; Carothers, Andre. "After Desert Storm--The Deluge", in Greenpeace Magazine (USA), October0December 1991. ON JANUARY 22, SIX DAYS AFTER THE United States and its allies
began bombing Iraq, a black and oily rain began to fall in southern Iran. Three days later, the Department of Energy issued a memo to all "DOE contractors and facilities" ordering an end to public discussion of environmental impacts of the war. If asked, wrote DOE information officer John Belluardo, government scientists should say that "catastrophic predictions in some recent news reports are exaggerated." Scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were also ordered to close their mouths. "If we are not seen to suddenly become military secrets. In the weeks that followed, calls went out to academics and private research firms under contract to the government, asking them to remain silent. A gag order on the state of the gulf environment was in effect. An eerie attitude of detachment has descended on White House officials, of which the gag order is just a symptom. Since the end of Desert Storm, the White House has acted as if it were eager to get past the gulf war, as if looking too long and hard would reveal a flaw in its reasoning and perhaps take some of the gloss off the military victory. But while the White House wishes the war had ended six months ago, when the bombing stopped, for the people and the environment of the gulf, it still continues.

IN JUNE, WHILE THE OIL FIRES RAGED AND Kuwait City choked on soot, the White House began to distance itself from the implications of Desert Storm. EPA Chief William Reilly returned from the gulf with what he called "encouraging news." "Testifying on June 11 before Congress, Reilly offered a sanguine analysis, declaring that, after a brief EPA study, "we do not see the acute effects of pollution we had feared." The statement seems premature at best. As of late July, according to Kuwaiti officials, only about 240 of 732 fires had been extinguished. While the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, Saud Al-Sabah, and the chairman of the Kuwait-owned Santa Fe Corp. declared in mid-July that they had set the "goal" of extinguishing all the fires by 3/1992, most observers are more persuaded by Reid Adair, head of one of the four major fire fighting companies in Kuwait, who told Congress the week of Reilly's return that "the real work hasn't started." Characterizing the Saudi fire fighting support as a "Mickey Mouse operation," Adair said that, without more help, "we're talking five days" before the fires are all out. An investigation conducted by Friends of the Earth (FOE) the same month also suggested that much work remained to be done. FOE found that many of the well heads are completely destroyed and that oil is gushing from ruptured piping below the surface. These fires may require more sophisticated methods to put them out, such as drilling lateral "relief" wells, a time-consuming and complicated procedure. The breached well casings are also creating rivers and lakes of oil, some aflame, presenting firefighters with the harrowing prospect of having to navigate burning, mine laden barriers in order to approach the wells. "It looks like the hard part is just beginning," says Richard Golob, an international expert on oil pollution and publisher of Golob's Oil Pollution Bulletin. "Some individual wells may take weeks or months to bring under control." "Two months into what may be a 20- to 60-month campaign to extinguish the blazes, a government official tells us it is not as bad as we had feared?" says Brent Blackwelder, vice president of Friends of the Earth. "Statements like that don't inspire confidence in the White House's judgment, or its sincerity." The administration's rosy view of environmental consequences started long ago. The environmental impact assessment that the administration relied on publicly since December, a model crafted by Richard Small of Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, has been proven wrong on nearly all its predictions. Small's worst-case scenario called for 1.6 million gallons of oil burning in the gulf. Current estimates put the daily oil burned at two to four times that. Small's model estimated some 16,000 tons of sooty smoke released each day. The World Meteorological Organization pegs the daily soot release at more than 40,000 tons, and other estimates suggest that up to 100,000 tons of smoke may be lofting into the sky each day. Finally, Small's estimate of the maximum height of the smoke plume was less than 4,000 feet. By March, FOE had put the height of the plume at over 16,000 feet. In June, the National Science Foundation reported the plume rising to higher than 20,000 feet.

But through all this, Small's reputation has remained intact, while FOE and nuclear winter experts Richard Turco and Carl Sagan have been painted as alarmist. "They are consistently wrong on nearly all counts, and we are deemed unprofessional?" says James George, former Canadian ambassador to Kuwait and head of the FOE expedition. "It just doesn't make sense." In addition to dismissing global effects, the White House gave the environment immediately downwind from the oil fires the all clear. This conclusion has been roundly criticized. "People come for a week or two and do some sampling and say the situation is under control," says John Belluardo. "In reality, the environmental destruction is far worse than anyone thought. They have been painting the picture of a clean-up operation, and the reality is far worse..." FOE's Executive Director, James Huber, told The Washington Post. "It's not a clean-up operation, it's not a benign assessment of their country's plight." According to Huber, a US government official told him that the EPA will "soon be eating its words." The US government's blithe dismissal of the health effects of the smoke and the possibility that it might have global climatic consequences. The cable noted that without better data, "predictions should be considered as little more than guesswork." The cable also mentioned a consideration thus far ignored by US government spokesmen: As the fires are extinguished, the reduced heat will cause the toxic smoke plume to stay closer to the ground, further affecting the health of Saudis, Kuwaitis and American servicemen still in the gulf. Other discrepancies cast further doubt on the sincerity of Reilly's reassurances. According to the minutes of a meeting convened by the World Meteorological Organization in April, the EPA found one part per million (ppm) of sulfur dioxide in air samples taken at the US Embassy in Kuwait, and up to 20 ppm in the air downwind from the fires. (Sulfur dioxide levels in American urban areas, by contrast, hover around .01 ppm.) But the public report released that month declared that their sampling "did not reveal the existence of high concentrations of sulfur dioxide near the burning oil wells or in population areas in the path of the oil well emissions." The same month, a French mobile lab found "very high levels of sulfur dioxide and black smoke, either near the wells or in town [during] unfavourable weather conditions."

According to the French report from the Central Laboratory of the Police Prefecture in Paris, "it may be feared that peak values of both pollutants will be associated with increased morbidity and mortality due to bronchopulmonary diseases." As for the more obscure toxins that one finds in polluted air, the only report available thus far comes from the laboratory of the National Toxics Campaign, an environmental watchdog group based in Boston. By equipping a rotating military unit with some simple collectors and teaching the soldiers how to use them, the lab was able to obtain air samples from Jubail, Saudi Arabia, some 175 miles downwind from the oil fires. At this distance, the lab found five toxic hydrocarbon compounds. One chemical, 1,4-dichlorobenzene, appeared in concentrations twice the maximum level considered safe by the state of Massachusetts. The health effects of these pollutants, as well as the soot, may not appear for years. The US government's blithe dismissal of local health impacts seems disingenuous at best. Brad Hurley, editor of the Global Environmental Change Report, says that while publicly cooperative, some Kuwaiti officials are privately furious about the EPA's benign assessments of their country's plight. According to Hurley, a US government official told him that the EPA will "soon be eating its words." Regardless of its validity, the notion that things aren't as bad as they might be has taken hold in the media. The public relations strategy in cases such as these is an open secret: paint the rosiest picture possible, and if flaws are discovered in the tableau, admit them later, after the "spin" is firmly in motion. The tactic is very successful. The collective brow-wiping and the unspoken corollary that "someone" was wrong about this persists, despite the fact that no one ever suggested we should be seeing global effects within months of the end of the war. "They say it is not as bad as anticipated," says FOE's James George. "Anticipated by whom?" Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the Bush administration's post-war stonewalling is the curious lack of support for clean up, independent feet. Observers are horrified at the lackadaisical attitude of the regional governments and their American patrons, particularly in the early days of the oil spill, but also today, as the oil fires continue to rage out of control. "They are not treating this as the ecological disaster that it is, " says Richard Golob. "Much could have been done to save the gulf..."
environment, and much still could be done, but it is just not happening. Unless the coalition members join together to assist Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in responding to this crisis, our military victory will become an overwhelming environmental defeat."

Since January, the United States has confounded the difficulties of determining what may occur here by prohibiting government employees from discussing the situation. Satellite photos of the oil fires were not released until April after the official embargo on public disclosure was lifted. The Union of Concerned Scientists. A US atmospheric observation station on Hawaii's Mauna Loa Volcano detected an unusual amount of soot in early February, but EPA press officer John Kasper refused to let the environmentalists see it. It was finally released three months later under pressure from the Sierra Club. Also in April, a government researcher declined to present a computer simulation of the oil fires at a conference in Vienna, arguing that she was not sure what the rules of the gag order were. The next month, other DOE researchers were prohibited from discussing the fires without clearance from their superiors. And in May, the EPA refused to allow reporters to talk directly to air assessment researchers in Kuwait.

At least six major scientific investigations of the atmospheric impact of the oil fires had been put under the gag order, says Lara Gundel of DOE's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. Yet no one in government will admit to having issued the order. John Belluardo, the author of the DOE memo, initially admitted to Scientific American reporter John Horgan—and then later denied—that the order had come from the White House. At a meeting in Paris, NOAA director John Knauss told Horgan that the gag order "came down from as high a level as you can imagine." Knauss appeared surprised, according to Horgan, that the gag order lasted the war itself. Why the secrecy? There are several theories. First of all, the timing of the "spikes" of soot collected at Mauna Loa confirms that it was allied bombing, rather than Iraq's destruction of the oil fields, that first sent sooty smoke into the atmosphere. While it pales in comparison to Saddam Hussein's savage act of environmental vandalism, the notion that the global plume of soot was launched by allied forces may not sit well with the White House. Several observers have charged that allied bombing was responsible for a significant portion of the oil spill as well. Second, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have little interest in stirring up debate on the wisdom of a military campaign that was conducted on their behalf. Kuwait in particular is worried that its brightest have lost faith in the country and may leave, prompting officials to paint the most benign picture possible of the country's environmental woes. This affords Washington the convenient excuse that, since the crisis is located in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the two countries have the final say over what is said about their plight (and there is no free press in either country to interfere with spin control). And as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are for the moment beholden to the US, there is little to stop the three countries from collaborating to shape the story as they please. Any reporting on the wretched state of the gulf environment will only speed the reappraisal of the wisdom of Desert Storm that is already taking place around the world. Few observers outside this country are as enamored as most Americans are with the success of this military campaign. Baghdad's electric and water infrastructure is destroyed; promoting disease and malnutrition among the city's poorest. Between20000-30000 cubic meters of raw sewage are pouring into the Tigris River each day. A Harvard study reported in May that 55000 Iraqi children had already died as a result of the "indirect effects" of the allied bombing and predicted 170000 more children will die by the end of the year. According to a Greenpeace report, between 63000-99000 Iraqi civilians were killed by the bombing, and nearly nine of every 10 deaths in Iraq occurred after the bombing ended. It is hardly the sort of victory that any civilized country should exult in. By late July, the gag order had lifted somewhat, no thanks to the mainstream press. Only two major dailies in North America have even mentioned the gag order. And initially The Washington Post simply reported the cursory findings of the interagency report in April, without referring to the gag order or to the fact that it was prohibited from conducting any follow up interviews with the researchers. But Scientific American's revelations, along with columns by Tom Wicker and Jack Anderson as well as other public discussions of the gag order probably forced the White House to loosen its grip on the information flow. In the aftermath, many scientists paint the restrictions as not unduly harsh. "[The restrictions] assured that thorough work was done," said Russell Schnell of NOAA's research center in Boulder, Colorado. "Scientists should be sure of what they are saying." But the atmosphere of secrecy and retribution persists. "I am still getting the runaround," says John Horgan of Scientific American. Some researchers have suggested that the climate of secrecy under a gag order is likely to be a pervasive feature of the scientific work following this disaster. The scientific data is restricted. "It is hard to get anyone to say anything publicly," says Brent Blackwelder of Friends of the Earth. "People will lose their jobs." Lara Gundel agrees: "These scientists are walking on eggshells, perhaps out of fear of loss of research funding. They have begun effective self-censorship."

As for what happens next, few can say with certainty, although that does not dissuade some from trying. Science, unfortunately, is a creature of politics, whether through the influence of funders (in this and most cases, the US government) or the inclinations of the researchers themselves. DOE's client, Richard Small, calls himself a conservative. McKracken and others at DOE's Livermore Laboratory argue that greenhouse and nuclear winter skeptics, who tend to dismiss speculation about global impacts of regional atmospheric events. Many environmentalists, for their part, demonstrate an overdose of precautionary alarm, raising the possibility of dire worst-case atmospheric scenarios in the absence of what the scientific community holds as concrete evidence. In questions of child rearing and the airline industry, such prudence is considered understandable, even desirable. But in the case of the gulf war, their caution has been cast as near treason by the media and the White House. We are thus presented with the bizarre tableau of environmentalists being forced to defend themselves by arguing with government scientists over whether the catastrophe is global or merely hemispheric. It is worth noting, in this regard, that the bulk of environmentalists have been proven far more accurate in their predictions than the US government. The largest single factor in assessing the long-term environmental impact of the oil fires is the uncertainty. There is no baseline data on what levels of contaminants already existed in the region. Almost all the regional diagnostic equipment was either destroyed or stolen by the Iraqi army. As of April, only 25 of the 450 employees at the Kuwaiti Environment Protection Department were at their posts. As of July, there was no data on particulates in the air 10 microns in diameter or smaller, the most dangerous particulates in terms of lung damage. "Nobody has ever been exposed to something like this before," Dr. Morton Lippman, an authority on the health effects of air pollution at New York University Medical School, told The Washington Post. "There is no precedent for it." Likewise, no one has ever experienced having ten percent of the world's daily oil consumption burning in one spot. "There is basically no literature on this problem," says Joel Levine of NASA's Ames Research Center. The gulf war has become, in the words of Michael Renner of the Worldwatch Institute, "a massive unplanned experiment in the atmosphere." While few scientists support the notion of a causal link, it is hard to ignore the fact that since the war, the weather throughout Asia has been unusually severe. And although most scientists are skeptical that enough oil fire plume will reach the stratosphere to have a global impact. NOAA scientists have detected soot from the gulf above Wyoming at nearly 35000 feet, roughly where the stratosphere begins (something the first two government gulf studies insisted would not occur). If a link between the oil fires and the weather anomalies does exist, it is certainly not going to be discovered if no one looks for it and if access to the scientific data is restricted. Adam Trombly of the Aspen Institute for Advanced Studies, a member of the FOE expedition, insists that global effects are likely. "Why do people think the Himalayan snows are being darkened by the plume?" asks Trombly. "How do you think that relatively heavy particulates are being carried to Wyoming and beyond? The sooner the international community wakes up to the realities associated with this phenomenon, the better."

Every war will surprise you, said General Dwight Eisenhower. The gulf war is no exception. For the first time, the potential impact of war on the environment was raised in advance of the actual
battle. The wisdom of Desert Storm can in part be judged by how well these factors were considered. The White House knew as early as November, three months before Desert Storm began, that Hussein had wired the well heads with explosives. The president opted for war, despite the potential impact (based in part on the environmental assessment, which was deeply flawed) and over the objections of nearly half the US Congress and several of the president's senior advisors. Now, in the aftermath, the White House is considering the environmental disaster calls for an organized international fire fighting and clean up campaign, yet the US demurs, letting ill-equipped Kuwait and Saudi Arabia take the lead. A public health disaster as a result of the oil fires looms in Kuwait, yet the administration muzzles its scientists, manipulates the facts and gives the gulf environment a relatively clean bill of health. Where a measure of scientific caution would be warranted on the fires' potential impact on the regional and global environment, the White House issues broad denials. Where full disclosure is called for, the White House issues gag orders. Six months after the Persian Gulf War, a reappraisal is just beginning. The myriad justifications for war--human rights, military and political--are being questioned. That the US would have been better off tightening its oil belt, perhaps by ratcheting up the fuel efficiency of the US car fleet a notch, is without question. Whether Kuwait and its inhabitants would have emerged less scathed had the United States stopped short of war is still debatable. But it is appearing more and more likely.

OCEANS OF OIL: International environmental catastrophes are hard to hide, even for the US government. Despite the cover-up, there is enough information to support the contention of Salim Jawed Al-Arrayed, Bahrain's minister of health, that "We are grappling with the biggest environmental crisis in modern times." As of July 30, what we know for sure is this: Up to 1 billion barrels of oil have been released, according to Richard Golob. If a conservative one percent of this amount was spilled on the ground and not burned, says Golob, then some 10 million barrels are streaming across the desert floor. Another 6-8 million barrels have been spilled into Persian Gulf waters, making Saddam Hussein largely responsible for the two largest oil spills in history. Roughly 3-6 million barrels of oil a day are going up in flames inside an area the size of the greater New York metropolitan area. The plume represents roughly 10% of the oil the world burns in a single day, but it is burning far less cleanly, and therefore releasing a greater amount of toxic particulates. The pollution released in a single day in June was 10 times that released in a day by all the industries in the United States, according to the Worldwatch Institute. Between 5-10 million tons of sulfur dioxide will be released in a year by the fires, more than the combined output of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Food crops will be devastated in some areas. "You can write off this year's crops [in southern Iraq and western Iran]," says Robert Pellew of the World Conservation Monitoring Center. "We are now talking about working to save those of 1992." Livestock are dying because their lungs are blackened with soot. Hospitals, or what remains of them in Kuwait, are full of patients with respiratory illnesses of several kinds. According to a survey conducted by the Kuwait Environmental Action Team, nearly nine of every 10 residents in seven communities near the oil fires believe that the fire has affected their health. The contents of the plume, which include carcinogens and other poisons, are swept into the sky and return to the earth in raindrops, contaminating water supplies, soil and crops. "The whole region is in for a bath of carcinogenic, mutagenic and possibly teratogenic chemicals," says Peter Montague of Greenpeace and the Environmental Research Foundation. In August, the MV Greenpeace set sail for the Persian Gulf to conduct its own investigation of the environmental situation. [1]
staged a sit-in and 30,000 people took to the streets of Mulhaila al Jabra where the factory is located. It was ended only by intervention by paramilitary police. In 1989, after the Minister of Manpower had agreed to meet with strikers, Egyptian police broke into the Helwan steel plant where they were sitting-in and killed one worker and beat and detained hundreds of others. They were accused by the Minister of Interior with "communist agitation which we will never allow." The ILO COE noted in its 1989 report that "in its previous observations… the Egyptian government’s approach to the settlement of disputes… enabling one of the parties to the dispute, namely the employer, to resort to compulsory conciliation and arbitration, was liable to result in a restriction on the right to strike." It also noted that a section of a 1976 labor law "empowers a criminal tribunal, at the request of the Public Prosecutor, to dissolve the executive committee of a trade union organisation that has provoked work stoppages or deliberate absenteeism in a public service or utility." According to the Egyptian Constitution, half of Egypt's parliament is supposed to be made up of workers and peasants, but according to Jihan Alaily, writing in the 1989, an additional law was passed stipulating that foreign workers could only change jobs after having worked three years on their current job or else they must have been legally in Kuwait for more than 10 years.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in her 1990 report, noted that "strikes are not prohibited… they are never resorted to, disputes being settled in accordance with conciliation procedures established by the Labor Code." Foreign workers, the bulk of the Kuwaiti labor force, were permitted to join unions as non-voting members after five year's residence and could not hold elective office. According to Kuwaiti law any new union had to have at least 100 members, 15 of whom were Kuwaiti. Foreign workers who were deemed to be troublemakers or labor agitators were summarily deported, and a non-Kuwaiti could not remain in Kuwait without employer sponsorship. In 1989, an additional law was passed stipulating that foreign workers could only change jobs after having worked three years on their current job or else they must have been legally in Kuwait for more than 10 years. Foreign workers were destined to remain in that status, no matter how many years they lived in the country nor were their children allowed to become citizens. Well before the Iraqi invasion, the prospects for work on the Gulf had diminished due to declining oil prices, a process in which Kuwait was a major player. As a consequence, foreign workers had already begun returning home in the past few years leading to a rise of unemployment and a diminished economy in the poorer Arab states. The estimated $150-250 billion that Kuwait's ruling Al-Sabah family has and still has invested in Europe, Britain and the United States produced a greater financial return than the sales of its oil, and was the factor that enabled Kuwait to cut its price per barrel as low as $11 before the war, well below the agreed OPEC price of $18. It was suggested in such mainstream publications as the Washington Post, that this was done as part of a joint attempt with the CIA to destabilize the Iraqi economy which was already struggling to recover from its eight-year war with Iran. A relatively small, but nevertheless important portion of the Al-Sabah's income went to the PLO and to hospitals and schools in the West Bank and Gaza. Since the PLO and the Palestinians appeared to side with Saddam Hussein in his conflict with the US, these funds have stopped coming. In neighboring Saudi Arabia there is not even a pretense of labor rights. James Baker's State Department, in its annual report in 1989, noted that "government decrees prohibit the formation of labor unions and strike activity… Collective bargaining is not recognized." That is a mild way of describing the killing of workers at ARAMCO who tried to start a union. Strikes did occur in the immediate post World War II period, in 1945 and 1947. At that point King Ibn Saud took time out from his embrace with the United States to ban trade unionism outright.

SAUDI ARABIA: "FORCED LABOR": Two and a half million of Saudia Arabia's 12 million population are foreign workers. The same State Dept. report describes situations in which their work amounts to forced labor "especially in remote areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work." It also cited reports "that female workers (all foreign) are sometimes prevented from leaving the homes of their employers and forced to work 12-16 hours per day, seven days a week." As in Kuwait, foreign workers are prohibited from seeking employment with anyone but their sponsor, and if fired, are officially obliged to leave the country on the date determined by their employer. Foreigners who have worked in Saudi Arabia for decades and who have no country to which they can return are often dismissed and forced to leave, or to retire and face the same fate. Particularly notorious has been the Saudi's treatment of domestic servants, many of whom come from the Philippines or Sri Lanka and there are frequent reports of their being subjected to overwork and sexual and physical abuse. The Saudi government's position is that the relationship between Saudis and their house servants is a "private family matter." Again, as in Kuwait and many of the other Gulf states, workers from certain countries are paid less than workers from other countries even though they have equal seniority and are doing the same job.

GULF WAR CATASTROPHIC FOR YEMENIS: The present crisis has
been catastrophic for the large Yemini population that made up a large part of the Saudi workforce for many years. As a result of their country’s and their own perceived sympathy with Saddam Hussein they were deported in mass following the Iraqi invasion, further crippling Yemen’s already battered economy. In Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, unions are illegal as are strikes. The notion of collective bargaining is completely foreign as are most of the workers, who come from Egypt and Yemen. Occupied in Pakistan, they are effectively discouraged elsewhere.

SYRIA: FOREIGNERS NEEDS NOT APPLY: Non-Arab foreign workers are prohibited from joining or forming trade unions of their own unless they have been living in Syria for one year and only if there are reciprocal rights with the worker's nation or origin. There are also allegations that foreign workers do not receive the same pay as Syrian workers to which they are legally entitled. On the other side is Iraq which imported millions of workers, mostly from Egypt and Pakistan. When the surviving Iraqis came the home and found foreigners in their jobs, their resentment led to widespread abuse and physical attacks, particularly on the Egyptians. In the first eight months of 1989, the bodies of 1100 Egyptian workers were sent to Egypt and with them, plane loads of Egyptian workers, whose reports in the press on their ill treatment aroused the anger of the Egyptian people and accounts, to a large extent, for their initial antipathy to Saddam Hussein. Despite this, an estimated one million Egyptian workers were said to be in Iraq when the US launched its attack. At the bottom of the economic spectrum is Yemen, formerly divided into the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. There is no democracy in its heavily government-dominated union structure. Yemenis look for work in Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the East. As noted, the demonstrations of support for Iraq within Yemen and the refusal of its government to be bribed into joining the US coalition, led the Saudis to punish their neighbor by sending its workers, many of whom had lived and worked there for years, back home. [-]

16012. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. "Part 07: The Profession's Composition and Activities: The Bahraini Bar Society", in Lawyers and Human Rights. The UN Basic Principles On The Role of Lawyers In the Arab World, The Legal Profession in the State of Bahrain. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, February 1992. The BBS is financed by private subscription and other non-governmental sources. The Minister of Social Affairs has the power to veto proposed donations to the Society. There are now approximately 200 lawyers in Bahrain, of whom only about 100 are members of the BBS. Women account for approximately 10% of the total number of lawyers, but their numbers have been growing continuously in recent years. [Interview with Bahraini lawyers. Names withheld.] The government does not appoint representatives to the officially recognized committees dealing with lawyers’ affairs. Generally, the government treats lawyers who are members of the Bar Society with suspicion. One reason for this is that the Bar Society has shown more independence than other registered associations in its dealings with the government. For example, in December 1981 the government announced that it had discovered a plot to overthrow the regime. Some 73 people were detained. In the aftermath of the announcement the government urged all societies to issue statements condemning the plot. Many complied, and statements supporting the government flooded the newspapers. The board of the Bar Society discussed the issue and unanimously decided not to issue a statement, supportive or otherwise. One of the reasons for this decision was that it was the view of the Society that lawyers have the duty to defend detainees, and therefore should not condemn them beforehand. The objectives of the Bar Society make no reference to the issues of human rights, due process, or the rule of law; such matters apparently fall within the broad definition of “political activities” precluded by the Law of Societies. If the Bar Society intends, for instance, to stage a public rally, the names of speakers and the subject of the rally must be submitted to the Minister of the Interior who has the right to grant or withhold his approval without giving any reason. A denial of approval from the minister cannot be challenged in the courts. To some extent the Bar Society avoids those issues, exercising a degree of self-censorship so that it does not find itself in confrontation with the government. A Bahraini lawyer told the Lawyers Committee: “I have never heard of nor attended any public rally or even a meeting organized by the Society in which an issue relating to human or fundamental rights was discussed.” Indeed, no collective effort organized by the lawyers or the Bar Society for the promotion of human rights seems to exist. Individual lawyers do take on cases involving human rights violations, but many have suffered government persecution for fulfilling duties connected with the defense. In 1989 the general assembly of the BBS challenged the new Law of Societies Law No. 21/1989, bringing a case to contest it in accordance with the country’s procedural laws. The main objections were that the law prohibits societies from “dealing with politics,” without providing a definition of what constitutes “politics,” and that it does not allow them to participate in any public activity without the written permission of the Minister, making the violation of this restriction an offense punishable by law. One Bahraini lawyer explained the situation this way: “The BBS did not accept the new law, although other societies did. It raised a petition before the Superior Civil Court challenging it. The court has held two or three hearings in which the requirements of the petition were completed, yet to date no decision has been made by the court. In the meantime, the government offered [a compromise] through a third party acting as a broker that the BBS accept the law and, in exchange, the government would issue standing permission for it to attend meetings held by any regional or international organizations whose names were forwarded to the government at the time of the agreement... I believe that an agreement has been reached along those lines, although it is not been declared publicly. Meanwhile the case is still pending before the court. [-]

16013. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. “Part 10: Assessment: The Bahraini Legal Profession and the UN Basic Principles On The Role of Lawyers: Openness of the Profession”, in Lawyers and Human Rights. The UN Basic Principles On The Role of Lawyers In the Arab World, The Legal Profession in the State of Bahrain. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, February 1992. The Bahraini Legal Profession Statute contains no provisions prohibiting discrimination against applicants based on sex, race, color, religion, or political or other convictions, as required by the UN Principles. [Article 10.] A Bahraini lawyer explained the situation as follows: “There is no discrimination
among lawyers based on the law itself, but in practice lawyers who are politically active or are members of opposition groups are not usually hired by companies... Some of the companies do not want to deal with a lawyer who may be arrested at any time, and many companies are government-owned... and therefore have government representatives on their boards of directors. These representatives will not allow a lawyer belonging to or suspected of being a member of the opposition to be selected for the company, for which this mobilization of power is considered politically suspect simply for seeking to carry out his or her professional duties through the Bar Society with serious professional and economic consequences. The law also fails to include any reference to special measures that would ensure the right of representatives of minority groups to join the legal profession. [Provided for in Article 11 of the Basic Principle.] This is of special importance in Bahrain because of the existence of a Shiite majority and a non-national population which are discriminated against both by law and in practice. The ruling Sunni minority traditionally has dominated the judiciary, and the legislative powers in the country. There is no law school in Bahrain. All those who want to study law have to seek opportunities for higher education abroad. Individuals born in Bahrain but whose parents are not Bahraini nationals are not allowed to seek higher education abroad, although they may be the best students in the high schools. Even if they manage to obtain a temporary passport and have the opportunity to study abroad at their own expense, they are not allowed to join the legal profession because they are not considered Bahraini nationals, regardless of how long their parents have been living in the country. The fact that the Minister appoints the advisory committee responsible for admissions to the Bar, the recommendations of which are not binding on him, casts doubt on the impartiality of decisions made regarding admission to the BBS. Although the law makes the admission decisions subject to appeal to the High Court of Appeal, it does not provide sufficient guarantees against bias since that court, like the Ministry of Justice, has always been presided over by a member of the ruling family, and has little actual independence from the executive branch of the government.

16016. Workers League; Workers League-Special National Congress; American Trotskyist Movement; Workers League Political Committee; North, David. War in the Persian Gulf: Perspectives and Tasks of the Fourth International: Report To The Workers League Special National Congress. Detroit, Mich.: Workers League; American Trotskyist Movement; Workers League Political Committee; Workers League-Special National Congress, August 30, 1990. This Special Congress of the Workers League is being held in the midst of a crisis that clearly marks a crucial political turning point in the affairs of world imperialism and the international class struggle. The purpose of this congress is to define the attitude of the Workers League to the events in the Persian Gulf, critically review the perspectives of the Workers League and the International Committee of the Fourth International in the light of the most recent developments, and, on this basis, specify the tasks which now confront the party as the political vanguard of the working class. First of all, let us briefly review the events which have taken place during the course of this month. It is crucial that we understand the political significance of these developments, for the situation in the Persian Gulf—like every great international crisis—has, as Trotsky once noted, "its positive side, in that it puts to a test all the various traditional values and formulas, laying bare the rottenness of those that served to mask 'peacetime' contradictions." [Writings of Leon Trotsky (1938-1939) (New York: Pathfinder Press, p. 52.) The "traditional values and formulas" of the postwar epoch were grounded on two monstrous falsehoods which served to retard the development of revolutionary consciousness in the working class. The first was that Stalinism represented socialism and the second was that imperialism was perpetually compatible with peace and democracy. The first of these illusions was shattered by the events of the autumn of 1989. The second is now being destroyed by the still-unfolding events of the summer of 1990. Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on August 2nd. Within a few days, the United States began transforming Saudi Arabia into a staging ground for a massive military armada. The speed of the military buildup is without any precedent; and—except for, at least to this point, the absence of the draft—involves a mobilization of air, sea and land forces of world war dimensions. It is a fact of enormous political significance that the United States has brought to the brink of a major war as the result of decisions taken by a handful of people working, apparently, without any constitutional restraints upon them. Even from the standpoint of the formal precepts of bourgeois democracy, the United States has been accused of the pretense that this is some sort of democratic government where the country represents the interests and will of the people. Allow me to quote the New York Times of August 19th: "In only 15 days while Congress was scattered on summer recess and much of official Washington was on vacation, senior officials in the Bush administration have committed the United States to its broadest and most hazardous military adventure since the Vietnam war... The administration has been reluctant to disclose the full extent of its military commitment, the Pentagon's officials are declining to tope out exactly how much armor or how many troops it is sending or intends to send, or to say how long it expects they will be there or to make public assessments of the short- or long-term risks to American personnel or prestige... How long the forces will be in place at worst is something the Bush Administration has deliberately kept vague... The decision which put in motion the most rapid military buildup in American history was effectively made by President Bush and a small circle of advisers in a weekend at Camp David shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2. Most Congressional leaders were informed of the operation after it was ordered. Only one influential lawmaker, chairman Sam Nunn, the Georgian who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, appears to have been consulted in advance. So far no member of Congress has proposed hearings to discuss the ramifications of the actions. In keeping with Mr. Bush's demonstrated penchant for making decisions in secret, some officials said the White House has kept Congress, citizens and foreign leaders alike in the dark about the ultimate scope of its operations. The pivotal decisions have been made by Mr. Bush and a handful of his top advisers, including the National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Secretary of State James Baker and the Army General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." As you know, Mr. Bush was once the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and it's fair to say that the United States government has now been converted into a massive cover operation. The coverage of military operations in the Gulf is limited by a degree of censorship—which the bourgeois press has not attempted to challenge—that goes beyond anything that existed even during World War II. Decisions have been made which could cost the lives of tens and even hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Arabs and thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of American youth. But absolutely nothing has been said to the American people about the implications of these decisions or what the decisions actually are. Bush, in between tours of the golf course and joy rides on his speed boat, pontificates about resisting aggression and defending small nations. These hypocritical platitudes come from a regime which only seven months before invaded tiny Panama, killed thousands of defenseless civilians, reduced large portions of the country's capital to rubble, ousted its government, arrested and imprisoned its president and installed its own stooge regime. The war which is being threatened by the United States against Iraq is a war of an imperialist bandit against a poor and historically oppressed country. The Bush administration is preparing a war of plunder, aimed at securing control over the crucial oil reserves of the Middle East and, on that basis, strengthening its position in the affairs of world imperialism. Were the United States to win this war, it would mean the bNtal subjugation of Iraq and potentially the entire Arab region to a form of colonial exploitation even more brutal than that which existed in the pre-World War I heyday of imperialism. While the United States is acting as the military spearhead of the attack, Iraq is confronting a coordinated assault by every imperialist power on the planet. In this sordid operation, the "United Nations" has proved itself to be nothing more than an imperialist brothel, whose delegates—including those of the Soviet Union and China—are nothing more than political pimps employed to obtain satisfaction for the needs of the world bourgeoisie.
This international imperialist gangup against Iraq is an expression of the historical essence of the Persian Gulf crisis. It marks the beginning of a new imperialist redivision of the world. The end of the postwar era means the end of the postcolonial era as well. As it proclaims the “failure of socialism,” the imperialist bourgeoisie is, in deeds if not yet in words, proclaiming the “failure of independence” as well. The deepening crisis confronting all the major imperialists powers compels them to secure control over strategic resources and markets. Former colonial subjects that had achieved a degree of political independence must be resubjugated. In its brutal assault against Iraq, imperialism is giving notice that it intends to restore the type of unrestrained domination of the backward countries that existed prior to World War II. Despite their misgivings over America’s rapid military deployment, its uncertain aims and unpredictable consequences, the cynical imperialist strategists of the “Old World” welcome the opportunity which Bush has provided to restore colonial-style domination. The American intervention is perceived as the beginning of a new repartitioning of the globe. That is why every imperialist state is so anxious to participate in the modem-day crusade against the Iraqi infidel. Even the flabbiest old scoundrels are pulling in their potbellies and attempting to suit up in imperial uniforms which circumstances had obliged them to consign to the storage closet for decades. The Spanish bourgeoisie, wondering if perhaps Morocco and Sierra Leone might once again wind up on the auction block, informs the world that it is once again ready for imperialist exploits by announcing the dispatch of a few ships to the Gulf. The Belgian ruling class, which has never reconciled itself to the loss of the Congo, also has announced its desire to participate in the enforcement of the blockade. The Dutch imperialists, who not long ago terrorized tens of millions of Indonesians, are also eager to stand fast against “aggression” in the Gulf. Even Switzerland, in the first significant change in its foreign policy in about 500 years, has renounced “neutrality” in order to hang on to the Kuwaiti gold deposited in the vaults of its banks. Of far greater significance for the future course of events is the decision of Germany and Japan to participate in the imperialist campaign against Iraq. Both countries have seized the opportunity to announce that they will revise the postwar constitutions which have until now prohibited the dispatch of troops beyond their borders.

All the major imperialist states and even the bourgeois regimes in the backward and dependent countries do not wish to be left behind in the new rush for spheres of influence. Each national bourgeoisie intends to review and reintroduce territorial claims which one might have thought had been relegated to the diplomatic archives. The Turkish president offered this interesting explanation for the speed with which he acceded to America’s request that he cut off the Iraqi oil pipeline that passes through his country. Mr. Ozal said that Turkey does not want to be left out of a future “peace conference” that might be convened to redraw the borders of Iraq in the aftermath of war! While Ozal in Turkey and Assad un Syria may be content to munch on the morsels of Iraqi territory that the Americans, in the event of a successful war, might be prepared to throw their way, the big imperialist powers have voracious appetites—for far bigger than even that of the hefty Mr. Ozal—that cannot be satisfied so easily. The Germans and the Japanese cannot be certain that the American forces now deployed against Iraq might not in the future be used against them. It cannot but cause the Germans and Japanese disquiet when they ponder that the American occupation of the Persian Gulf will place their oil lifeline in the hands of their most dangerous economic rival. In the last war, it was precisely the lack of oil reserves which doomed the Axis to defeat. It is impossible to believe that the German and Japanese bourgeoisie have not pondered this bitter lesson and drawn certain conclusions. If war should come again, the same fate must be avoided. How long can it be before the German and Japanese imperialists begin to create the military forces they require to secure their strategic interests? Germany may agree to recognize, for the time being, American hegemony in the Persian Gulf. But in return it will expect, and at some point even demand, US recognition of German interests in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (e.g., oil in Romania and Baku) and North Africa Japan, for its part, may decide that it is necessary to demand a “free hand” in China and East Asia, not to mention Eastern Siberia.

Thus, even as the imperialists put on a display of anti-Iraqi solidarity, the ground is being prepared for the future struggle between them. In fact, although the immediate object of US aggression is Iraq, there can be no doubt that the actions of the Bush administration are quite consciously aimed at strengthening the position of the American bourgeoisie in the ongoing and evenmore bitter struggle with its imperialist rivals. So great are the economic significances of the Persian Gulf that control over this region must have a profound influence on the global balance of power. Eight countries in the Persian Gulf region—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman—are the source of more than half of the world’s proven oil reserves. Intensive exploration aimed at discovering new sources of oil have failed to identify regions that could displace or even seriously challenge the Gulf as the world’s major supplier. According to a report by the US Geological Survey: “Clearly discoveries are on a downward trend from a high in the 1950s of some 35 billion barrels per year to a present day total of 10-15 billion barrels of new oil per year. Production of about 20 billion barrels per day has now out-paced discovery by a factor of two. The reality is that the Middle East increasingly will monopolize world petroleum supplies... most of the world’s conventional oil resources lie within the narrow confines of the Middle East and so does the production capacity. The economies of the western world rest on the daily production from the Middle East and indeed even the amount of oil transiting the Straits of Hormuz daily, some 7 to 8 billion is about two times the surplus producing capacity found outside the Middle East.” Much has been made of the fact that the United States consumes far less Persian Gulf oil than Japan and Western Europe, and it is thereby suggested that the Bush administration is acting to defend world, rather than purely national interests. It is, of course true, that the United States imports less than 10 percent of its oil from the Gulf, while Western Europe imports about 25 percent and Japan about 60 percent. However, these figures do not give a true picture of problems that are anticipated by oil industry analysts. It is now widely expected that the so called oil glut which kept oil prices depressed throughout the 1980s will have dissipated by the mid-1990s (and these projections predate the present crisis). As consumption begins to outstrip production, the price picture will change and, as one oil analyst warned, “the US would have to compete with other importing nations on the world market. Even if it used its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the US might still face another massive price crisis.”

Aside from oil, the Gulf region has already become an area of growing trade and general economic competition between the United States and Japan. During the past 20 years, the United States has seen its once dominant position in Saudi Arabia steadily undermined. “Whereas the United States once overwhelmingly dominated Saudi markets,” two Persian Gulf specialists wrote recently, “and the US Army Corps of Engineers and US companies dominated Saudi construction, the construction business has now largely been forfeited to Japanese, Korean, other Asian, and some European companies. (These, in turn, increasingly all rely on low-cost labor from Southeast and South Asia.) Today, the United States and Japan are roughly neck-and-neck in the Saudi market, in which both are most heavily involved.... “As trade becomes a major issue of contention between the US and Japanese governments (and as economic power increasingly supplants military power as the determinant of world influence), competition for market share in the wealthier non-Western markets could become a key issue. At the moment, both the United States and Japan seem to be focusing mainly on bilateral issues, but competition in third markets is a possible future irritant.... Japan has not, so far, attempted a full-court press in the Gulf market, but given the fact that the Gulf is one region with which Japan runs a trade deficit, can such a campaign be ruled out in the future?”

Only political simpletons who have faith in the altruism of American imperialism will believe that the Bush administration’s actions in the Persian Gulf are unrelated to such longer-range economic considerations. Confronted with a steady deterioration in its competitive world position vis-a-vis its principal imperialist rivals, the temptation of the American bourgeoisie to stem the economic tide and even turn it in its
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own favor through the use of military power must be very great. While the military buildup of the United States has been justified as a necessary response to the invasion of Kuwait, it is obvious that the Iraqi action merely provided a long-awaited pretext for the implementation of strategic plans that the last three American governments have been working on for more than a decade. Indeed, as the first statement of the Workers League Political Committee in the crisis stressed, the United States has been planning for years to see how it could use its military preparations for the occupation of the Persian Gulf. A former State Department official, John Ausland, has boasted in an article which appeared in the French press that he personally participated in decades-old planning for military action in the Gulf. These preparations," he wrote in Liberation of August 25th, "began at the end of the 1960s after Harold Wilson's Great Britain informed the United States that it could no longer maintain the same level of military presence east of Suez."

Britain’s retreat, according to Ausland, led immediately to the creation of "what has become over the years the gigantic logistical base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean."

Since the early 1980s the US Middle Eastern Force has been operating locally from facilities it leased from Bahrain. AWACS surveillance aircraft have been based in Saudi Arabia. According to information provided by a Marine Corps general in testimony before congress last year, billions of dollars have been spent over the past 10 years to upgrade military facilities in the Azores, Morocco, and on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Substantial improvements have also been made to port and airfield access facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Oman, and Pakistan so that they might be ready for use in the event of a Persian Gulf emergency. The United States had also prepositioned in the region substantial stores of fuel, ammunition and other requirements to maintain large combat forces in the Gulf. In addition, the United States developed special water purification and distribution equipment, communications packages, and off-loading equipment tailored for use in the Gulf region. The sealift capability of the US was more than tripled between 1981-1987. Finally, there have been extensive desert training exercises for US military forces. However, the realization of these plans and preparations would not have been possible without the decisive contribution which has been made by the Gorbachev regime to the imperialist ambitions of the United States. The critical turning point in the development of this crisis came when Shevardnadze signed the communique with State Secretary Baker which gave the US a free hand in the Gulf. The Soviet bureaucracy no longer averts to the oppression of the Egyptian nation or pretend to bargain on their behalf with imperialism. The venal pettybourgeois parasites that constitute the personnel of the Soviet regime are proud to serve as the accomplices and cheerleaders of the imperialist warmongers. In exchange for American credits, not to mention a few dollar-denominated bribes, the Kremlin officials offer the United States a free hand in dealing with the Arab people. In fact, the middle class parasites in the Soviet bureaucracy and lumpen-intelligentsia—obsessed with their dreams of restoring capitalism and converting themselves into a new bourgeoisie—display less resistance to American imperialism than would a genuine bourgeois class conscious of its own national interests. To the extent that theol pre-1917 Russian bourgeoisie was striving to strengthen the position of his national capitalism in the affairs of world imperialism, he recognized the necessity of dismembering the old Ottoman Empire constitutes just one of the many sordid chapters in the history of the British Empire. Even as the British imperialists were compelled to retreat from their former possessions in the aftermath of World War II, they still sought to preserve Kuwait as an important base of operations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Allow me to quote a document which was written by a British diplomat in Baghdad in June 1947. In order to maintain British influence in the region, he proposed that the imperialists create what he referred to as police stations in the area. This of ficial, Douglas Busk, wrote the following in 1947: "It seems to me that our strategic and security interests throughout the world will be best safeguarded by the establishment of suitable spots of police stations fully equipped to deal with the settlement of boundaries that have never been defined. Five of the twenty-one boundaries in the Gulf fit that category .... all of Oman’s boundaries remain undefined except possibly part of its boundary with the UAE. Similarly Saudi Arabia’s boundary with South Yemen has yet to be defined..." The manner in which the shekdom of Kuwait emerged out of Britain’s imperialist diplomacy and its participation in the dismemberment of the old Ottoman Empire constitutes just one of the many sordid chapters in the history of the British Empire. Even as the British imperialists were compelled to retreat from their former possessions in the aftermath of World War II, they still sought to preserve Kuwait as an important base of operations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Allow me to quote a document which was written by a British diplomat in Baghdad in June 1947. In order to maintain British influence in the region, he proposed that the imperialists create what he referred to as police stations in the area. This of ficial, Douglas Busk, wrote the following in 1947: "It seems to me that our strategic and security interests throughout the world will be best safeguarded by the establishment of suitable spots of police stations fully equipped to deal..."
with emergencies within a large radius. Kuwait is one such spot from which Iraq, south Persia, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf could be controlled. It will be well worth while to go to consider Middle East trouble and expense to establish and man a police station there. I should start now to establish a new base in Kuwait where we can reasonably count on security of tenure for a great many years."

We have no interest in defending this Kuwait state. Our opposition to the Iraqi regime is not a step of any sort toward national independence and the completion of the unresolved tasks of the democratic revolution. Through its annexation of Kuwait, the Iraqi bourgeoisie seeks merely to strengthen its own position vis-a-vis its imperialist masters and its bourgeois rivals in the region. It seeks not the destruction of the imperialist order but the renegotiation of its terms.

(a) The action taken by the Iraqi bourgeoisie is not a step of any sort toward national independence and the completion of the unresolved tasks of the democratic revolution. Through its annexation of Kuwait, the Iraqi bourgeoisie seeks merely to strengthen its own position vis-a-vis its imperialist masters and its bourgeois rivals in the region. It seeks not the destruction of the imperialist order but the renegotiation of its terms.

(b) To speak of the "progressive" character of the annexation of Kuwait without considering the class nature of the regime which has carried it out is, in the light of the vast experience accumulated by the international working class over the last half-century, to indulge in self-deception and the deception of the working class in the Middle East. The Arabian Peninsula consists of political scoundrels whose Pan-Arabist phrases merely conceal their own venal and provincial ambitions. The Ba'athists sing hymns to Arab unity while ruthlessly subordinating that fictional goal to the material interests of the national bourgeoisie within the imperialist-drawn state borders defended by their regime. Thus, it is not accidental that there exist no more bitter enemies than the Ba'athist Assad and the Ba'athist Hussein.

(c) Again and again, such "progressive" actions as the invasion of Kuwait have been followed by the most treacherous deals with imperialism. For example, Sadat's 1973 victories in the war against Israel paved the way to the Camp David deal. There is no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would have proceeded any differently if his annexation of Kuwait had not been challenged.

(d) The fact that the United States has decided to utilize the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as a pretext for its long-planned assault in the Persian Gulf does not mean that we are required to support the actions of the regime. We unconditionally support Iraq against US imperialism; we do not believe that the Iraqi invasion and the subsequent annexation can lead to the resolution of the outstanding problems of democratic development. The economic and cultural development of the Arab masses requires not merely the elimination of "imperialist enclaves" but the entire capitalist nation-state system throughout the Middle East. We seek not the reshuffling of borders but their elimination. That can be achieved only by the revolutionary proletariat on the basis of a socialist program.

(f) It is understandable that comrades should feel inclined to welcome the chaising of the Emir out of Kuwait. But sympathy must not be translated into any sort of defense of the policies of the Iraqi bourgeoisie. If we support the annexationist policy of the Iraqi bourgeoisie, our claim to uphold the independence of the working class is reduced to a mere pretense. Our independence is grounded on a historical perspective which attributes to the working class a progressive revolutionary role that no other social force can play. Therefore, we fight for the unification of the Arab masses not through the medium of any of the existing regimes, but through the building of the world party of socialist revolution and the overthrow of these reactionary bourgeois regimes.

(g) There may be a superficial similarity between the political aspirations and methods of Saddam Hussein and those of Bismarck. But what was achieved by Bismarck in the 19th century on the basis of wars and annexations could be achieved in the 20th. Moreover, the task of our epoch is the creation of new viable national states but the fraternal unification of all nationalities into a worldwide socialist federation that raises mankind to a higher economic and cultural level. As Trotsky said, "The national problem merges everywhere with the social. Only the conquest of power by the world proletariat can assure a real and lasting freedom of development for all nations of our planet" (Writings of Leon Trotsky (1933-34), p. 306).

Finally, for the sake of the clarity of our historical conception, we are obliged to observe that the reference to Chiang Kai-shek suggests a revolutionary policy in 1926 consisted of supporting the reactionary leader of the national bourgeoisie. In fact, that was the line of Stalin, who insisted upon the subordination of the Chinese Communist Party and the working class to Chiang's Northern Expedition and thereby to the bourgeois Kuomintang. Trotsky, however, referred to the Northern Expedition under the leadership of Chiang as "an expedition against the proletariat." In another article, he said that "The Northern Expedition only served to strengthen the bourgeoisie and weaken the workers." Trotsky maintained that the Northern Expedition could have yielded positive results for the workers only if the Communist Party had intervened with its independent program among the masses, in opposition to the policies of Chiang Kai-shek. At any rate, an attempt to provide political support to the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein by citing the anti-war lord campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek is an academic and sterile exercise. A loose analogy is not a substitute for historically concrete analysis.

At the present time, it cannot be stated with certainty how this crisis will develop over the next few days and weeks. In this situation we must bear in mind Trotsky's adage: the more concrete a prognosis, the more conditional it is. Events are moving very quickly and any number of outcomes are possible. Within the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie a debate is raging over the advisability of resorting to war. Last week's selloff on Wall Street is an indication of the nervousness within the ruling class over the political and economic implications of a full-scale military clash. For all the war propaganda in the media, the more astute sections of the bourgeoisie are reluctant to base all their calculations on the highly dubious premise that all the high-tech weaponry will work flawlessly and produce complete victory within a few days, if not hours. Indeed, unless the bourgeoisie, or at least those in Bush's entourage, has completely lost its head, it must seriously doubt that the aims of the United States can be achieved on the basis of a single and massive strike against Iraq. The very launching of war changes the objective situation and raises new and even unforeseen problems that may well prove to be greater and more dangerous than those which the military actions were intended to resolve. The precise mathematical calculations of the Pentagon technicians would be the first casualties of war, for, as old Clausewitz noted long ago, war produces "an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of

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of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.

But the massive buildup of military forces has a logic of its own; and there is reason to doubt that even an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would avenge a military strike by the United States. It is less and less likely that a return to what the Financial Times, the leading organ of the British bourgeoisie, calls the status quo ante, is acceptable to the United States. Its goal is to assure a major American victory in the Persian Gulf region, which is incompatible with the existence of an Iraqi military force in its present form. Significantly, yesterday's New York Times declared that "The U.N. Resolutions don't go far enough. There's a need for broader objectives — reducing the risks of future Iraqi aggression and preventing hostile control of gulf oil. To these ends, Iraq would have to agree to destroy its chemical and nuclear-weapons facilities and accept credible international inspection. This would be accompanied by border guarantees and an international force to monitor frontiers." The Wall Street Journal has gone even further. It states explicitly that the "optimum" aim of American policy should be the military conquest of Baghdad and the installation of a "MacArthur regency." Barring a complete capitulation by Saddam Hussein—entailing not only a complete withdrawal from Kuwait but also major political concessions on matters relating to Iraq's internal security (the size of its army, its weaponry, etc.)—it is not likely that the far-reaching aim of the United States to establish its undisputed military and political domination of the region can be achieved without war. However, we need not engage in too much conjecture over the course of events in the coming weeks and months. It is far more important to recognize that whatever the immediate outcome of this crisis, the political situation on a world scale has been transformed. If this particular crisis does not lead to war, another crisis not too far in the future will. We must grasp that the change in the world situation will pose the greatest political challenges to all the sections of the International Committee and the Workers League. For the revolutionary p/9, a war crisis is a great political test. It reveals the real political character of all tendencies in the workers' movement, the true value of their program and perspective, and the caliber of their cadre. It exposes who has prepared for struggle and who has not.

The crisis has already provided the most powerful verification of the scientific content of the perspective upon which the Workers League and the International Committee have based their work. The events of the past month did not come as a surprise to either the Workers League or our international co-thinkers. We anticipated and prepared for the crisis which has now erupted. Throughout the past year, in the face of a campaign of unprecedented virulence against Marxism, the International Committee has insisted that the breakdown of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe represented a crisis of the entire imperialist system and postwar order through which the global interests of all capitalist states were maintained for nearly a half-century. We stated that the events in Eastern Europe, arising out of the pressure of the world economy on the obsolete nation-state system, was part of a general collapse of the international equilibrium which had regulated the affairs of imperialism. A new equilibrium, we warned, could not be achieved without passing through a protracted period of political and social convulsions. Permit me to refer to a number of statements that have appeared in the press and internal documents of the Workers League and the ICFL.

(a) In the statement of the Political Committee on the US invasion of Panama, issued December 22, 1989, the Workers League stated: "The attack on Panama shows the increasing resort of US imperialism to military force. It is the third time in little more than four weeks — following the dispatch of Delta Force commandos to San Salvador and the mobilization of the US Air Force to block the Philippines coup— that US military forces have intervened in the affairs of another country. Far from a sign of strength, the resort to military force is the expression of the weakness and crisis of American capitalism. With its financial system in a shambles, facing escalating trade and budget deficits, and hammered by the competition of more efficient imperialist rivals, especially Japan and West Germany, imperialism is seeking to assert by force what it no longer has the economic resources to sustain .... The US is thus flexing its muscles, not merely to chase out Noriega, but to send a warning to its principal rivals in Europe and Asia that while in decline economically, the United States still possesses decisive military advantages. "This combination of economic weakness and military power is an explosive mixture. But in the long run, the first factor is far more decisive, and the increasing recklessness in the use of American military power means that inevitably, US imperialism is headed for a monumental debacle.... The US invasion is yet another expression of the increasingly incendiary nature of world politics. The tendency to resolve local disputes through armed intervention towards a more general military configuration. The return to gunboat diplomacy signals a violent eruption by American imperialism on a global scale.... The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the abandonment of any pretense of anti-imperialism by the Soviet Union have made US imperialism even less likely to show restraint in its actions.

(b) On 1/6/1990, in a political report to the membership of the Workers League, the following was stated "The postwar settlement was aimed at resolving the very contradictions which led to the bloodiest war in history, a war which nearly brought about the end of capitalism and now, 45 years later, it turns out that all those contradictions are still there, all those fault lines still exist and once again world imperialism is preparing inexorably for a new confrontation between the major imperialist powers. What could be more explosive than the combination of America's declining world position and its still considerable military power. Nations and states and classes don't go peacefully into the 'Good Night.' America is not going to accept the loss of its world position. It views this as the American century, no matter what defeats and setbacks it has suffered.... Taken within a world historical framework, the breakdown of the Eastern European regimes and the postwar order in general means the reassertion, on a far higher level, of all the basic contradictions of imperialism. Far from entering into a new and triumphant period of capitalist ascendancy, imperialism stands on the brink of a new bloody epoch of wars and revolution. The new equilibrium that will be necessary for capitalism will only be worked out after a period of profound struggles and eruptions of all sorts, of wars and revolutions. In other words, contradictions have been set into motion that cannot be peacefully resolved. So this is the question confronting the working class, that it must resolve this crisis on a progressive basis or it will be resolved by capitalism on an extremely reactionary one."

(c) In the opening report to the 14th National Congress of the Workers League on 2/17/90, it was stated: "But the pressure of the world economy, which has had such a devastating effect upon the nationally-isolated economies of Eastern Europe, is having a no less shattering impact upon the political and economic relations of the major imperialistpowers. The old capitalist equilibrium that prevailed during the postwar era, which depended upon the hegemonic role of American imperialism, has now been shattered; and a new equilibrium cannot be reestablished without a violent restructuring of political and economic relations among the major imperialism powers.... Now, the breakup of that equilibrium opens the Pandora's Box of economic and political rivalries that produced within the space of 25 years, between 1914 and 1939, the eruption of two world wars which proved to be the greatest and most te
democratic rebellions in history."

(d) At the 10th Plenum of the ICFL, on 5/6/1990, the following point was made: "The political map is being redrawn as dramatically as it was in the period after 1914. The question is: how is it going to be redrawn and who's going to do the redrawing? Is it going to be redrawn on a capitalist basis, that is, through wars and bloody annexations, which is what the future will hold, or is it going to be redrawn by the working class through the abolition of national boundaries and the establishment of a worldwide socialist federation."

(e) On the next day, this point was expanded upon: "The question is: will the imperialists be able to work out a new and stable equilibrium peacefully? Clearly, the old equilibrium which was established after World War II on the basis of the global supremacy of US imperialism is utterly unviable. This supremacy has been deteriorating over an extended period, but the framework of the Cold War still endowed it with a certain legitimacy. The United States-Soviet antagonism provided the means for suppressing the interimperialist rivalries. If there exists any possibility of working out a
new interimperialist status quo ‘peacefully’, it first of all depends on the willingness of the United States to accept a new relationship which, in one way or another, given the changes in the relationships economically between the major capitalist powers, would represent a diminution of its world position. The question is: should we expect such a dignified retreat on the part of American imperialism? The evidence so far strongly suggests that we should not. (I) The political resolution of the Workers League, initially adopted in February and amended in April, summarized the objective situation as follows: “The Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe were an essential part of the political framework established at the end of World War II by imperialism, with the collaboration of Stalinism, to suppress the proletarian revolution. Their collapse expresses not only the crisis of Stalinism. It is the most advanced expression of the general crisis of world imperialism, and signals the disintegration of the postwar order. In Eastern Europe, the chain of the imperialist world order has broken at its weakest link. The underlying economic crisis of world capitalism is as profound and sweeping as those which forced the redrawing of the map of Europe and other parts of the world in the aftermath of World War I and the October 1917 Revolution, and again in the aftermath of World War II. Previously sacrosanct political divisions and state borders are crumbling first in Eastern Europe. But this is only the prelude to a convulsive period of wars and revolutions that will remake the map of the world. The issue which confronts the working class is whether these changes will be imposed from above, by the imperialist ruling classes, by means of nuclear war and fascist barbarism, or from below, by the working class, by means of world socialist revolution. World events are once again moving at a blinding speed, and the vastly accelerated tempo is itself the mark of an revolutionary period.” It is indisputable that the political analysis of the party has been vindicated by the course of events. But the vindication of our analysis is, more fundamentally, the vindication of the Marxist method and the entire principled foundation of the Fourth International. I will not repeat the points which have already been made in the editorial of the current issue of the Fourth International, but no other movement except that founded by Leon Trotsky can provide answers to the historic problems which confront the working class. Fifty years after his assassination, the program of world socialist revolution has acquired a life-and-death significance for the working class. All the alternatives to Marxism—the reactionary national socialist panacea of the Stalinists, the piddling reformism of the social democrats and trade union bureaucrats, the bourgeois nationalists in the backward countries, not to mention the apologies provided for all the above by Pableite opportunism—have provenutterly bankrupt. In confronting the present crisis, we base our work on all the essential principles of Marxism and the historical experiences of the working class embodied in the program of the Fourth International. In defining our attitude to this war, we have no need to seek programmatic innovations. Our work must be based on the principles of revolutionary defeatism elaborated by the great founders of our movement. We tell the working class that its principal enemy is the American ruling class and its government; that it must oppose the war drive of the American bourgeoisie with all its might; and that if war should nevertheless break out, the working class should continue to oppose the war and develop its independent class struggle in opposition to all appeals for patriotic sacrifice. Its attitude should be, “Not a man and not a penny for this imperialist war.” We must, as advised by Trotsky, utilize transitional demands to aid the independent mobilization of the working class and break it from the influence of the pro-imperialist bureaucracies that dominate the workers’ movement. Ata time when it is obvious to every serious worker that war is welcomed by the rapacious defense contractors who feared that the end of the Cold War might depress their profits, the Workers League must energetically call for workers’ control of the war industries, the confiscation of war profits, and the expropriation and nationalization of the war industries and their transformation into means of socially useful production. The Workers League must build its own program on the independent political mobilization of the working class and the youth against imperialism. There is no effective struggle against war except one that proceeds from the essential Marxist-precept that war is the inevitable outcome of the contradictions of the imperialist system. We do not fight war with moral appealstothebourgeoisie. We do not approach war as if it was a ghastly mistake. We recognize that war arises inevitably out of imperialism and, therefore, to fight war means to fight for the international unity of the working class and the overthrow of capitalism. Within this political framework, the demand for the formation of a Labor Party, based on a revolutionary program, assumes the greatest practical significance. Despite what Clif Slaughter attempted to tell us in 1983 following the US invasion of Grenada, revolutionary opposition to imperialism is reduced to empty phrases if it leaves out the essential issue of fighting to break the American working class from the domination of the bourgeois parties. The drive to war must accelerate the economic crisis of American capitalism and intensify the exploitation of the working class. We have often stressed that it is not possible for the bourgeoisie to maintain a policy of “guns and butter” as it did during the Vietnam era. The economic conditions which exist today are the opposite of those which prevailed in 1985 when President Johnson initiated the massive escalation of troop levels in Vietnam. In that period the United States was not troubled by trade deficits, and its dollar, convertible into gold at the price of $35 per ounce, functioned as the world reserve currency, that is, the bulk of world trade was calculated and paid for in dollars. Such was the apparent economic strength of the United States that Johnson and his advisers believed that the war in Vietnam would not interfere with the “war on poverty” proclaimed as the goal of the administration’s domestic policy. But what is the situation today? The United States is the largest debtor country in the world; the dollar, now worth less than one-third its value in 1971 against the major currencies, is plunging on the world markets; and the trade and budget deficits have reached astronomical proportions, even before the enormous expenditures required to finance the US military operations in the Persian Gulf. What is coming is not a war on poverty but a war on the working class. From the very start, the United States must place the full burden of militarism on the back of the working class. The financial credits required by the American bourgeoisie to pay for its military adventures must be raised on the international credit markets, which, in turn, will demand drastic reductions in the increasingly miserable living standards of the working class. Therefore, the preparation for war and its actual outbreak must produce an enormous intensification of the level of class struggle in the United States. Efforts will be made, of course, to suppress its expression. One can be certain that among the first victims of war will be the democratic rights of the working class and all those who oppose American imperialism. But no amount of police repression can contain the mass discontent that is suffering caused by war will produce. It will inevitably break through the surface; and the Workers League—while taking the necessary measures to strengthen its political security and anticipating the likelihood of attacks on its legal rights—must systematically prepare for that inevitable development. The historical experience of the 20th century has demonstrated the profound connection between imperialist war and social revolution. Lenin’s call to turn the imperialist war into a civil war was not some sort of agitational appeal, but a programmatic formula based on a scientific analysis of the organic tendencies of capitalism development. Imperialist war, as Lenin explained again and again, is the outcome of objective social contradictions whose development, accelerated and intensified by war itself, inevitably leads to a revolutionary crisis. However, the development of a revolutionary crisis into a social revolution is not simply an objective process. It requires the intervention of those subjective forces which are actively
seeking to utilize the possibilities created by the revolutionary crisis to achieve the conquest of power by the working class. The revolutionary party represents that essential subjective force. In appraising the political situation and our historic tasks, we recall the words written by Lenin in 1915: “The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, but enlightens and tempers others. Taken by and large this is a law governing the history of the world as an essential objective principle of politics, the number and strength of the second kind of people have—with the exception of individual cases of the decline and fall of one state or another—proved greater than those of the former kind.... Will this situation last long; how much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer can be provided only by the experience gained during the development of revolutionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced class, the proletariat. There can be no talk in this connection about 'illusions' or their repudiation, since no socialist has ever guaranteed that this war (and not the next one), that today's revolutionary situation (and not tomorrow's) will produce a revolution. What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists—that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat's revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revolutionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organizations suited to the revolutionary situation.”

Every comrade must recognize that enormous tasks confront this party. A war changes everything; all the relations between classes, the relation between the party and the working class and the relations within the party itself. The greatest danger we face is complacency and fatalism and the continuation of forms of work and routines that have acquired the force of habit. It is not easy to change methods of work which have been rooted in objective political conditions which are quite different from those which we now confront. We must fight against all methods of work which are based on the unstated assumption that somehow or other things will continue to go on as they have gone on in the past, that the present crisis and the increasingly explosive conditions within world imperialism will not produce social eruptions that quite suddenly change the relationship of the party to broad masses of workers and which pose directly to the party the task of leading tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands and millions of workers in struggle. We have stressed repeatedly during the past year that the objective relationship between the party and the working class has changed. All the practical experiences of the party during the past year have tended to confirm that. A vast gulf has opened up between the masses and their official leadership and that gulf will grow far wider as the impact of the war crisis is felt by broad masses of workers. We must mobilize the growing discontent of the working class; we must tirelessly fight for its independence; we must above all turn people of this fact. While Iraq has occupied our attention in recent years, we must above all turn people of this fact. While Iraq has occupied our attention in recent years, we must never forget that in the long run Iran remains America's most formidable enemy in the Middle East. Shiite fundamentalist groups sponsored by Iran have been wreaking havoc and unrest throughout the region for decades. These groups prolonged the agony of the civil war in Lebanon, and are currently fomenting unrest in Israel, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt in addition to Bahrain. Bahrain is a particular target of Iranian political aggression because of Iranian claims to the island as part of its historic dominion of Persia and because of Bahrain's indigenous Shiite majority (even though the vast majority of Bahraini Shiites are loyal to their country). Also, Bahrain's unswerving support of the US aroused the ire of the late Ayatollah Khomeini and those Shiites in Bahrain loyal to him. The Al-Khalifa regime is not a model for pluralism judged by American standards, but in recent years the country has taken tremendous strides in the area of human rights, especially women's rights. In Bahrain women hold numerous positions of authority. For instance, the Bahraini social services and telecommunications agencies are both headed by women. There is some discrimination in societal status and the job market, and economic hardship has given some in Bahraini reason to protest. However, blacks in the South suffered far worse discrimination in this country only 40 years ago, and while we have made progress on the race issue, who can say that racism is not once again recall, speeds up enormously the political development. Those great tasks which only yesterday seemed long years, if not decades away, can loom up directly before us in the next two or three years, and even sooner. Programs which are based on habitual peacetime conditions will inevitably remain dangling in midair. On the other hand, the Fourth International's program of transitional demands, which seemed so 'unreal' to nearsighted politicians, will reveal its full and dazzling potential only when the masses are mobilized in the process of the mobilization of the masses for the conquest of state power.”

Our program today is the most realistic of all programs in the world. No other movement has understood, has analyzed, has anticipated developments as this party has. It is the power and strength of that analysis which provides the deepest insight into the real relationship of class forces. The work which we are carrying out is not based on the clever insights of a few individuals. It expresses the growing comprehension of the working class as a whole of its historical tasks and such a development of consciousness reflects the very advanced stage of social contradictions. We are not making predictions or offering guarantees; but we have no doubt that the period immediately before us will open up possibilities which only a short time ago would have appeared almost inconceivable. Can this party and the other sections of the International Committee become mass parties in the period immediately ahead? Is it possible that in a year's time we will be holding meetings of ourW by hundreds and thousands of people? I believe that is certainly the case. That is the direction of objective developments. We must base ourselves not on what we perceive to be our organizational limitations but on a scientific analysis of the objective situation. Our task is to mobilize the working class for the conquest of power. Our perspective has already demonstrated the power of the Mancist method and now we must act on this perspective to transform the forms of our work, to develop our activities broadly throughout the working class, to change in practice the relationship between our party and the growing emergent movement of the working class and in that way the provide the revolutionary answer to imperialist war.[=]
still a problem here? Who are we, then, to lecture other countries on racial equality? Sheik Isa Al-Khalifa is one of the most accessible heads of state in the world. At least once a week he holds an open court where any person in Bahrain can have a cup of coffee and discuss whatever may be on his or her mind. I can’t even imagine walking into the White House and having a cup of joe with Bill. The American press has always been quick to judge our allies when their system of government does not fit neatly into some rigid egalitarian template, while at the same time giving our totalitarian enemies on the left a free ride. (Witness recent calls to lift the US embargo against Castro's
18000. ------. “Cave Woman” is Identified Taken Home [Marie Louise Brigitta Henriz, 47, identified as Swede and was returned at the expense of the Cyprus government via Cyprus Airways”, in Seattle Times, August 20, 1995, p. A25. [TXT]

18002. ------. “The Economy: Turkey to Enter into Customs Union with the European Union”, in Week in Germany, March 10, 1995, p. 5. The European Union and Turkey moved a step closer together this week as officials signed an agreement on customs union that will provide nearly unrestricted access to each other’s markets beginning in 1996. The agreement signed on 3/6/95 will reduce or eliminate tariffs on goods traded by EU countries and Turkey, bringing Turkey closer to the EU membership it has sought for years. Officials from both countries welcomed this accord. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that it was an event “of both economic and political significance,” and Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller spoke of a “turning point in Turkey’s integration into Europe.” The agreement on customs union became possible after Greece dropped its longstanding objections in exchange for a pledge of negotiations on membership for Cyprus later in the decade. Greece had blocked customs union and had successfully vetoed European financial assistance since Turkey occupied part of Cyprus in 1974. Turkey now stands to receive financial assistance totaling 700 million Ecu (about $900 million) over a period of several years. Although signed, it is by no means clear that the agreement will actually go into effect, since it requires approval from the European Parliament, the Strasbourg-based EU legislative body. The parliament has said that it will withhold approval if Turkey’s human rights record does not improve. Kinkel referred to the still uncertain status of the agreement when he called it a “pledge of confidence.” Turkey must now move quickly to institute constitutional reforms and review its treatment of the Kurdish minority, he said. Some European Parliament members displayed much less confidence. Claudia Roth, a Green deputy in the European Parliament said that “the yes to customs union means that human rights have once again fallen victim to economic interests.” Germany’s National Association of Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, or DIHT), on the other hand, pointed to the economic benefits of the agreement, including low wages, the relatively high skills Turkish workers and accessibility of central Asian markets through Turkey. The agreement will particularly benefit the sectors vehicle assembly, foodstuffs and metalworking, according to the DIHT. [TXT]

18003. ------. “Wedding Bells in West Bank; Palestinians May Offer Women who wished to open small businesses. Other financial benefits of the agreement, including low wages, the relatively high skills Turkish workers and accessibility of central Asian markets through Turkey. The agreement will particularly benefit the sectors vehicle assembly, foodstuffs and metalworking, according to the DIHT. [TXT] 18004. ------. “Woman Found in Cyprus Cave Will Move To Island Convent”, in Seattle Times, May 28, 1995. p. A6. [TXT] Mysterious foreign woman found semi-conscious in a cave has been moved to a women’s right to divorce and remarry was a basic human right, she said. Other financial benefits of the agreement, including low wages, the relatively high skills Turkish workers and accessibility of central Asian markets through Turkey. The agreement will particularly benefit the sectors vehicle assembly, foodstuffs and metalworking, according to the DIHT. [TXT] 18005. Commission on the Status of Women. Impact Of Mass Media On Women’s Lives Must Be Addressed At World Conference, Say Speakers To Commission On Status Of Women; Holy See Calls for ‘Media Ethnic’ To Promote Women’s Dignity; Overcome Impact of Broadcasting Violence, Pornography: Part 3: Statements. Thirty-eighth Session 9 March 1994 6th Meeting (PM),Commission on the Status of Women. WOM/742. MARY PURCELL, of the International Federation of University Women, commended the Conference secretariat on the new language of the platform for action and its emphasis on the education of young girls. Girls faced discrimination early in life in health, nutrition and human rights. More than 2 million children died each year in parts of Asia from malnutrition and other effects mainly because they were born female. She described a number of problems girls faced in their youth, which followed her to adulthood and were inherited by her own daughters. Women should have equal access to the benefits of society. The status of the girl was the bedrock for achieving equality for women. Therefore, their status must be given special attention. GUSTAVO ALBIN (Mexico) said the platform of action must accelerate implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies. National efforts were critical to ensuring broad dissemination of the objectives of the Conference and, towards that end, the work done by the Department of Public Information (DPI) was particularly important. Bodies of the United Nations system must coordinate their approaches to the preparatory process. A regional preparatory meeting would be held in Argentina in September for the countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region. The logo approved for the 1975 World Conference in Mexico should be used for the Beijing Conference, as it was well-known. The motto of the Conference should remain “Action for Equality, Development and Peace”, as it took account of the broader issues to be tackled by participants. The platform for action should, if possible, contain quantifiable measures for action, so that implementation could be monitored. The platform should be elaborated in easily understandable language. SHARON SHENHAV (Israel) said her country’s declaration of independence had granted full equality to women in 1948. The Equal Rights Law of 1951 had further strengthened that equality. Since then, a series of labour laws had been passed to ensure practical equality. Despite such forward-looking legislation, women had not achieved equality. Women suffered from violence in the family, often finding that the most dangerous place for them was in the home, where they could be brutalized by their father, brother, husband or boyfriend. In response, Israeli non-governmental organizations had sought methods for empowering women, she continued. It was discovered that despite the laws, women earned less than men. Recent legislation required that women be appointed to top directorships of government corporations. Women’s organizations were running courses to train women on how to be a director. The goal was for women to be appointed to 50 per cent of all directorships. In order to boost the economic power of women, the Ministry of Trade and Industry had agreed to provide loan guarantees to women who wished to open small businesses. Other financial benefits of the agreement, including low wages, the relatively high skills Turkish workers and accessibility of central Asian markets through Turkey. The agreement will particularly benefit the sectors vehicle assembly, foodstuffs and metalworking, according to the DIHT. [TXT]
of the family in establishing a base for equality, development and peace for women, she said. It should ask international agencies, governments, non-governmental organizations and the media to support a positive family environment. The media had a crucial role to play. They could hurt values by broadcasting violence, pornography, inciting moral relativism in relationships, glorifying violence and degrading women. The platform for action should ask for an ethic in the media that would include a commitment to promoting the dignity of women. Refugee women should be given priority in the international agenda and given secure environments, with security measures commensurate with their increased vulnerability, she said. Women living in extreme poverty must be given attention. To change their lot, political will was necessary to satisfy the rights of the poor, specifically their right to equal access to the resources needed to live dignified lives. The World Conference should lead to fundamental equality, which would be the basis of the right of all to share in the process of full development.

SHEILA FINESTONE, Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Status of Women of Canada, said that the platform for action had the potential to set a course for real and sustained progress towards women's equality. Energies should be focused on developing a concrete and action-oriented document that contained targets, deadlines and priorities needed to speed up achievement of women's equality. Since measures needed to achieve equality had been identified, it was necessary to determine what was critical and to concentrate efforts on what could be achieved in the time available, she continued. The challenge facing the Commission from now until the end of the World Conference was to use the platform for action as a strategic document to further women's equality by providing Member States, United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations with the tools to put commitments into effect. She called for monitoring mechanisms to ensure that activities for women's equality were implemented. In that regard, she said that each specialized agency of the United Nations should identify one priority area to which they would dedicate their resources for the next five years. Reviewing the activities of Canada in preparation for the Conference, she said that the Canadian Preparatory Committee would contribute to the platform for action. Some of the members of the Canadian Preparatory Committee were representatives chosen by the Beijing Coordinating Committee, a non-governmental organization representing women's groups from the national and regional levels in Canada. To achieve equality, women's rights must be recognized as human rights. The Conference should work to curb violence against women, which was a violation of the human rights of women. Also vital was equality in the economic and peace processes, but much remained to be done in those areas. She expressed the hope that the Conference would start a process whose results and achievements could be monitored and measured.

PATRICK RATA (New Zealand) described preparations in his country for the Conference. In addition to preparations in New Zealand, a number of its non-governmental organizations had attended the Asia-Pacific preparatory meeting held last year. The small size and lack of resources hampered the participation of many small Pacific nations in international events. In response, New Zealand and Australia would provide the bulk of the funding for upcoming regional preparatory meeting to be held in Jakarta. He welcomed the wording of the draft platform for action, which highlighted the positive contributions made by women, rather than focusing only on their difficulties. The statement of mission rightly addressed such factors as the participation of women in national life and the protection of human rights. The call for a concerted effort among different members of the international community was important, as without cooperation among them, progress would be unlikely text on the global framework should bring out more clearly the effect of global information networks – the “CNN phenomenon”. It would be important not to simply draft a “shopping list” or reiterate the 372 paragraphs of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies.

ERATO KOZAKOU-MARCOULLIS (Cyprus) said that efforts to achieve equality for women should be redoubled, so that men and women would enter the twenty-first century as equals in the family, at work and in the political and economic spheres. In her country, an intergovernmental body had been set up to prepare a national report, to be presented to the regional Conference scheduled for October in Vienna and, later to the World Conference in Beijing. International Women's Day was marked in her country with a peaceful protest against the 20-year occupation, she said. The protest was intended to bring down the wall separating the country's two ethnic communities. The message delivered that day was that there should be a solution to the conflict that would restore the rights of all Cypriots, unite the country, provide the return of refugees to their homes and ascertain the fate of the missing.

EMILIA CASTRO DE BARISH (Costa Rica) said the First Lady of Costa Rica would participate in the group of experts meeting in May to prepare for the Conference. The status of women worldwide continued to deteriorate, particularly in developing countries. An enormous commitment was required to implement the Forward-looking Strategies. Women must be provided with health care throughout their lives and access to information on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) must be provided to them. In the area of human rights, there were enormous gaps between legislation protecting women and the reality of that protection. Substantial discussion on violence against women was needed, as such violence had shown an alarming increase and had spread to situations of armed conflict. Unfortunately the rape of young girls was not seen in terms of the need to protect women. She went on to describe recent legislative initiatives in Costa Rica to guarantee equality. Laws covered such subjects as the portrayal of women in advertising and labour practices, she said. Centres had been set up to protect battered women and provide them with legal assistance. Sexual harassment in the workplace was cause for dismissal. A national committee for the Conference had been established. Also, women were taking a leading role in managing and developing the environment.

JOKE SWIEBEL (Netherlands) said drafting the platform for action's section on finance would have to wait until the strategic objectives and actions to be taken were formulated in greater detail. However, brainstorming on institutional arrangements should commence. The best national mechanisms had clear mandates, political support at the highest level, adequate resources and professional staff. Ideally, such machinery cooperated with non-governmental organizations, while taking account of their independent role with respect to government bodies. The machinery should be developed in accordance with the political structure of the country concerned. In order to transfer those experiences concerning national machinery to the international level, she said it would be valuable to strengthen the mandate of the Commission on the Status of Women by elaborating its monitoring function in a practical manner. The time constraints faced by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women must be resolved and its work should be conducted at the Centre for Human Rights, as that would facilitate coordination among treaty bodies. That position, mandate and resources of the Division for the Advancement of Women must be reconsidered. In order to tackle those matters, an expert group meeting should be convened.

THEHEREZA MACHADO QUINTELLA (Brazil) said that her country was forming a national committee to coordinate Brazil's preparations for Beijing. It would hold seminars and workshops to mobilize public opinion all over the country. The language of the platform for action should be sharpened and strengthened, she continued. Among the issues to be addressed was how the outcomes of the World Conference would be monitored. The platform should give more emphasis on the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the developing countries and how they affected women more than men. The Conference should be a chance to stress the need to develop new political, economic and social structures with a gender perspective. The systems that had determined the world's political, economic and social life must be re-examined. There should be no additions to the areas of critical concern, because a longer document would diminish its impact. The measures envisaged to achieve equality for women must be effectively implemented.

IMELDA M. NICOLAS (Philippines) said the draft platform of action provided a sound basis on which to build. The section on the global framework should refer to the need to eliminate the adverse effects of
economic restructuring on women. National machineries should play a
critical role in policy planning. The text on poverty should address the
plight of migrant women. Many Filipino women took jobs in other
countries under exploitative conditions, both economic and sexual. States
should be invited to sign and ratify the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families. Migrant women should be dealt with under the text on violence
against women. Issues pertaining to women should be viewed in a
global context. Political and economic problems must be addressed in an
integrated manner. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against women in development held last year in Minsk had recommended
guaranteeing constitutional equality for women, as well as their right to
work, she continued. It also recommended that countries undertaking the
transition to a market economy should promote entrepreneurship among
women. Other recommendations included developing State policies to
raise the status of women, studying the dynamics of women's participation
in the decision-making process, and reducing the workload of working parents. It also called for promoting new types of family
relations based on equality of the sexes.

INGEBORD BREINES, of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), said that education
should be a critical area in its own right in the platform for action for
Beijing. The importance of women's access to education should be
underlined. Special attention should be paid to educating poor women in
rural areas, marginalized urban areas and refugee and migrant women.
She said there was a need to stress that media images of women should be
deo of stereotypes. To get more women into the media, scholarships and training for women to study the media should be
increased. Action should be taken to change the mentality towards
women. Both genders within the United Nations system should be given
the possibility of reconciling family and work responsibilities, she added.

DOROTHY WART, of the International Women's Medical
Association, said greater attention must be paid to women's health.
Women must have equal access to all health services, as stated in the
Forward-looking Strategies, and have access to information on family
planning. Many Governments had not implemented these mandates, thus
denying women their basic rights. Governments might provide the
services, but what good were they if women had to walk for two days or
wait months or years for treatment? she asked. All departments of health
should have knowledge of diseases affecting women and should keep
statistics on the utilization of health services. Women in the United States
had less access to diagnostic procedures than men. Women were aware
of the injustices and should be part of policy formulation.

BERHANE RAS-WORK, of the Inter-African Committee on
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, said
that dowry deaths, wife battering, early girl marriages and female-genital
mutilation were violence against women and they violated the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The Convention on
the Rights of the Child also stipulated the need for measures against
practices that hurt the health of children. Although 100 million women
were affected by the practice of female-genital mutilation, there was no
outcry. If a hundred men were treated similarly, there would be more
concern. Her organization was making efforts to stop the practice of
mutilations and the early marriage of girls and was staging several workshops on those
practices. She expressed the hope that mutilation would find its
appropriate place in the platform for action. It should be universally
recognized and identified as violence against women. All parts of the
world should take steps to eliminate it. [=]

(51) A total of 48 non-governmental organizations participated in the Symposium. The other Seminar participants and the delegation of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People attended as observers.

(52) Following the panel presentations described in Part I, which the Symposium shared with the Seminar, three workshops specifically related to NGO activities were established to consider the following topics: Developing solidarity activities by Israeli and other organizations with: (a) Palestinian women: Ms. Zahira Kamal (Palestinian) Ms. Hanna Knaz (Israel); (b) Physicians, health workers, health services; Dr. Ahmad Yaziji (Palestinian) Dr. Rachama Marton (Israel); (c) Educational institutions; students: Mr. Albert Aghazarain (Palestinian).

(53) The NGOs participating in the Symposium adopted a Declaration and elected an Asian Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine. [-]

18007. DPR. "Part 02: Declaration Adopted By The Fourth Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine", in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (54) We, the non-governmental organizations gathered at the United Nations Asian Regional Seminar and NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, representing millions of people concerned with a peaceful solution of that question, believe that the situation has acquired great urgency following the Gulf war. We totally uphold the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. We recognize and uphold the historic proclamation of the State of Palestine made on 11/15/1988. We recognize the proclamation as the expression of the continuous struggle of the heroic Palestinian people culminating in the intifadah. We unconditionally affirm the rights of self-determination, statehood and return of the Palestinian people as guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations and all relevant United Nations resolutions. We call on all Governments of Asia and the Pacific region which have not already done so, to recognize the State of Palestine in unequivocal terms and without delay.

(55) We are motivated by the genuine desire to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East on the basis of international legitimacy as provided by all relevant United Nations resolutions, and mutual recognition of the right of both the Palestinian and Israeli people, to self-determination and the right to live in sovereign independent States along side each other.

(56) We draw attention to the peace process initiated by the Palestine National Council (PNC) in compliance with all relevant United Nations resolutions. We note and welcome the resolutions of the PNC to the effect that any international peace conference be based on the implementation of all United Nations resolutions and the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We fully support the objectives of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the peace process, and therefore urge all Governments to follow suit.

(57) We note with utmost concern the continuous systematic policy of violating the rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories conducted by the Israeli occupation authorities. We deplore and denounce the continuation of the Israeli occupation of all Palestinian and Arab territories including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, and Israel’s brutal measures against the Palestinians, including the current policy designed to dismember the West Bank by restricting movement of Palestinian individuals and goods through the City of Jerusalem. We condemn the conditions of Palestinian prisoners in the administrative detention camps and the use of torture and brutality during their interrogation, including women and children. Furthermore, we condemn the Israeli Government’s policy of the systematic expulsion of Palestinians from the national homeland as a clear violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and affirm the United Nations Security Council’s adoption of resolution 726 (1992) which strongly condemns the decision of Israel to resume the deportation of Palestinians. Therefore, we call upon all Israeli authorities to permit the return of all deportees to their homeland.

(58) We observe with great concern the illegal colonization by Israel of the occupied Palestinian territory. We demand the immediate cessation of the construction and expansion of all Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine, which undermine the current peace process.

(59) We draw attention to the fact that Jewish immigration poses a great threat to the Palestinian survival on their land and is an obstacle to the resolution of the Palestinian problem due to the ensuing demographic changes. This is especially true while Palestinians continue to be denied their right of return. We call upon new immigrants to Israel and all Israelis to refuse to settle in the occupied Palestinian territories. We also call upon the international community to mobilize in all ways for the return of the Palestinians to their homeland, thus contributing to the efforts for a just settlement of the question of Palestine.

(60) We call upon the States to recognize the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people as they have done in the case of Israel. We also call upon the United States to apply pressure upon Israel to comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions.

(61) We oppose the massive and unconditional aid to Israel provided by the United States and other States which underwrite the continuing occupation. We call upon all Governments to condition all aid, loans and guarantees to Israel on the cessation of Israeli settlement construction and expansion in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. We call on all Governments and the United Nations Security Council to institute sanctions against Israeli occupation.

(62) We unaniormously recognize and support the intifadah as a national liberation struggle for the achievement of the State of Palestine and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

(63) We condemn the American and Israeli endeavours to bypass the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the current peace talks. We call upon the American administration to re-establish dialogue with the PLO. We insist that Palestinians, as do all other peoples, have full right to choose their own political representatives in any peace process. We call for direct participation of the PLO and the effective participation of the United Nations in the peace process.

(64) The issue of the status of Jerusalem should not be excluded from negotiations, nor should Palestinian residents of that city be excluded from participation in the negotiations currently under way.

(65) We consider it most urgent that the United Nations provide immediate and sustained protection for the Palestinians under occupation, and that the Security Council establish in East Jerusalem an authority responsible for the monitoring of human rights violations in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention. We urge the Security Council to take all necessary measures to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their inalienable rights. We call for the establishment of a United Nations force to protect the Palestinian people and to stop Israel’s attempts at uprooting and destroying it.

(66) We observe that Palestinians in Israel are subjected to a policy of legal and political discrimination and demand that Israel apply the principles of justice and equality to Palestinian Israelis in accordance with their status as a national minority in Israel. We condemn the Israeli policy of continued confiscations of Palestinian lands and destruction of Palestinian homes for the purpose of settlements of immigrants inside Israel.

(67) We express our strongest protest against the action of the
Israeli Government in preventing the distinguished experts, Mr. Omar Abdel-Razeq of Al-Najah University from attending this Seminar and Symposium.

(68) We call upon all NGOs to establish contacts with and extend support to fellow NGOs in occupied Palestine, especially those related to human rights, women, health, labour, children and education. Furthermore, we call upon all Asian NGOs to monitor the relationships among Asian governmental and private institutions and Israeli governmental and private institutions. We urge NGOs to publicize these linkages and to take collective action against them including organizing boycotts of Israeli products regardless of the exporting or intermediary country.

(69) We request all Asian Governments to support the important role of NGOs in Asia in mobilizing public opinion and to extend financial and other assistance to these organizations so that they can more effectively support the struggle of the Palestinian people.

(70) We warmly thank the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for convening this Asian Seminar and NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine. We greatly appreciate the presence of the Committee delegation and its guidance at this meeting. We wish to convey our deep appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations for his message which was read by Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services, whose presence in our meeting was most highly appreciated. We thank the DPR and all others of the United Nations Secretariat including the interpreters who so valuably contributed to our deliberations. We express our heartfelt appreciation to the Government of Cyprus for being our gracious host and for all the excellent facilities so generously provided. We particularly wish to express our gratitude to the Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus, His Excellency Dr. Vassos Lyssarides for his presence in our meeting. We extend similar appreciation to Her Excellency Mrs. Androulla Vassiliou, the First Lady of the Republic of Cyprus, for her highly inspiring message. In addition, we extend our appreciation to His Excellency Mr. George Iacovou, the Honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus for addressing the Opening Session of the meeting. We also wish to express or appreciation to His Excellency President Yasser Arafat for his message. [=]

18008. DPR. “Part 03: Declaration Adopted By The Fourth Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine: Annex To The Declaration”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (71) We request all Asian Governments to support the important role of NGOs in Asia in mobilizing public opinion and to extend financial and other assistance to these organizations so that they can more effectively support the struggle of the Palestinian people.

(72) Pressure should be brought to bear on the Government of Israel to comply fully with the principles of international law and, in particular, to apply the international legal provisions concerning armed conflicts and the situation of peoples subjected to occupation and which call for the protection of women and children, such as the Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 1949.

(73) The requisite measures should be taken to prevent the occupation authorities from imposing collective punishments, such as curfews, suspension of water and electricity supplies, the demolition of houses and the closure of schools, universities, hospitals and socio-cultural institutions, since these are highly detrimental to women and children.

(74) The ability of women to achieve self-reliance, improve their social situation and increase their participation in economic activity should be developed through support from governmental, non-governmental and international organizations for the development programmes and activities in which Palestinian women are engaged.

(75) Assistance should be extended to Palestinian women in order to help them to establish women's development centres that will cater for the welfare of children and provide the education and vocational training needed for the implementation of production projects.

(76) Palestinian women should be given an opportunity to attend seminars and training courses on matters concerning equality of rights, political participation and decision-making. [=]

18100. DPR. “Part 05: Workshop Report: 2: Developing Solidarity Activities By Israeli and Other Organizations With Palestinian Women: Soheer Mahmoud and Hanna Knaaz”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (77) The basic idea is to establish a general hospital for the Gaza Strip, the urgent need for which arises because of the great shortage of health care and hard infrastructure in the Strip and because of deteriorating health conditions in Gaza and the Strip. If we compare it with neighbouring areas, we see that it is insufficient and cannot meet the growing need for health care. (78) The objective is to achieve the minimum level of health services in the Strip, and it is for that reason that we put forward our previous proposal to establish a general hospital. The reasons are as follows:

(a) Health and medical factors: (i) In recent years the number of hospitals has remained constant, i.e. fewer than before the occupation. The same goes for the number of hospital beds, although the population has grown to many times its previous size; (ii) The number of doctors and nurses, by comparison with the Gulf States or Egypt, is very high; this strength should be utilized to enhance medical care; (iii) A large number of patients are transferred to Israeli hospitals, so the establishment of a hospital would reduce the physical and material burden imposed on patients (some 15 patients are transferred to CT in Israel, at a cost per patient of $700); (iv) Services should be in public hands; (v) The Strip does not provide specialized care in many areas such as neurosurgery and internal medicine, despite the very great abilities of Palestinians who built up the health infrastructure in the Gulf;
many families are prevented from returning home; (v) UNRWA has to transfer its patients to private hospitals; the establishment of a general hospital would increase services for refugees; (vi) The two nursing schools in Gaza would be important sources of trained manpower for the new hospital;

(b) (i) Most of Gaza’s population is under the age of 15, meaning that medical needs will multiply in years to come as these young people marry; (ii) The living conditions of refugees require more extensive health care; (iii) Citizens’ economic conditions, caused by the large population and high unemployment; (iv) A reduction of the financial burden on patients transferred to Israel; (v) Provision of new employment for nurses and doctors;

(c) The political factor: we must begin to build up the infrastructure destroyed by the occupation. With your support and resources, we shall be able to do so. [=]

18011. DPR. “Part 06: Opening Statements: Statement on behalf of The Asian NGOs”, in Sixth United Nations Asian Seminar On The Question of Palestine. (Twenty-Ninth UN Seminar). Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (10) Mr. Syed Farid Alatas, reading out a statement by Mr. Ali Alatas, Chairman of the Asian Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine (ACCP), emphasized that the Asian region had much to contribute to worldwide NGO endeavours with regard to the question of Palestine. The occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories was more than just a political phenomenon, it also had economic and cultural dimensions. Israeli laws made Palestinians second-class citizens. Such laws granted to Israeli Jews nationality rights which were denied to the Arabs. At the same time, Israel benefited from Palestinian wage labour. Lack of economic development in the West Bank and Gaza pushed the Palestinian labour force to seek employment within Israel itself. He said that Asian non-governmental organizations should oppose the frequent torture and sexual harassment of Palestinian women by Israeli soldiers in the occupied territory. They should make the world aware of the torture and imprisonment of children by Israeli authorities in the occupied territory, as well as of the tear-gas-induced, intra-uterine fetal deaths. He outlined that Asian NGOs must play a role in getting the press to project true images of the Palestinians and their plight. Documentaries and films on life in Israel and the occupied territory must be made available in the Asian countries. He said the Asian NGOs called for effective international economic and political sanctions on Israel to pressure the Israeli Administration into complying with the Fourth Geneva Convention and accepting all the relevant Security Council resolutions. He appealed to the Security Council to establish a United Nations presence in the occupied territory to protect the Palestinian people. For its part, the ACCP would publish a bulletin containing news on Palestine and on the activities of various Asian NGOs, in order to counter insufficient or one-sided coverage of issues pertaining to the question of Palestine. He also suggested that the ACCP be divided into sub-regional committees, in order to plan more activities. [=

18012. DPR. “Part 06: Workshop Report: 2: Developing Solidarity Activities By Israeli and Other Organizations With Palestinian Physicians and Health Workers: Dr. Rachuma Marton”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (79) Dr. Marton thanked the participants and the Chair for both inviting her and making the Conference successful. She said that the level of medicine in the areas under occupation was equivalent to that which prevailed in Israel in 1950. There was a great shortage of treatment for many diseases such as cancer, surgery, etc.

(80) The General Union of Israeli-Palestinian Doctors was convinced that the population of the areas under occupation was entitled to establish its own health institutions in complete freedom. The occupation was the only reason for the poor conditions in the Strip. The association represented by the General Union of Israeli-Palestinian Doctors was founded in 1981 and consisted of Israeli and Palestinian doctors who conducted activities in the fields of information, education and medicine in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The doctors of the Union distributed medicines to patients in villages and camps where there are no doctors or clinics. The Union had published dozens of reports on the medical situation in the areas under occupation. In 1990, it treated 62 citizens and prisoners, and a higher number in 1991.

(81) Visits to and treatment of prisoners were extremely difficult to arrange, as they required the military officer’s permission. The Union had also helped to secure the release of some prisoners.

(82) There were other ways in which the Union demonstrated its devotion to Palestinian citizens, e.g. by demonstrating against the closure of clinics, etc.

(83) Dr. Marton reported that she was about to establish a fund for the treatment of children whose families were unable to pay for treatment such as heart operations or rehabilitation. The Union had carried out a study on rehabilitation in the areas under occupation, but the occupation authorities were not interested in supporting such a project.

(84) In conclusion, Dr. Marton said that she wished to share something which she always said to herself: namely there were people who paid dearly because of their attendance - such as Dr. Ahmad al-Yazili - so solidarity is not equal. [=

18013. DPR. “Part 07: Workshop Report: 2: Developing Solidarity Activities By Israeli and Other Organizations With Palestinian Physicians and Health Workers: Ibrahim al-Hafi”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (85) A look at different aspects of the Palestinian people’s suffering showed how difficult the issue was and how difficult it was to solve. However, that did not mean we should not begin to solve some aspects of the issue in the hope eventually of achieving a complete solution. The workers’ movement suffered more than others from the imposition of the occupation. We call on non-governmental organizations to bring pressure to bear on the Israeli Government and to support the peace process.

The unemployment rate in the occupied territories is as high as 40%. With their green identity cards, Palestinian workers cannot enter Israel.

The work permits issued by the Military Governor are another of the many forms of discrimination against the workers’ and trade union movement. Mass arrests of workers’ cadres and imprisonment in the Ansar 3 camp.

Prevention of the establishment of production projects. High and exorbitant taxes on production projects.

Suppression and persecution of trade union work. [=


(87) Some of the colleges in the outskirts have been opened since 1989 and Al Najah University is open on a month-to-month basis.

(88) The authorities have also disrupted classes and educational activities outside University’s campuses. The Israeli authorities use terms like “cells of illegal education” gives a true picture of their hostile reaction towards giving education to the Palestinians. We are also informed that student leaders have been expelled and some are under consideration for expulsion.

(89) The workshop took a position to express the strongest protest and to condemn the action of the Israeli Government in preventing a
scolar from Al Najah University, Mr. Omar Raze, from attending this Asian Seminar and Symposium. [–]

18015. DPR. “Part 09: Asian Coordinating Committee for NGOs On The Question of Palestine”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. (90) The participants in the Symposium elected the Asian Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine until the next Asian NGO Symposium. Mr. Zafar Bakhhtwari was elected its Chairman. It consisted of the following organizations: (1) ASIAN COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE ARAB PEOPLE; H. No. 20 Street 25 F-8-2, Islamabad, Pakistan. (2) UNMYoung MALAYSIA; 75-2 Jalan Thambapillai, Brickfields, 50470 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (3) INDO-ARAB SOCIETY; 4 Akbar Road, New Delhi 110011, India. (4) PALESTINE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN IN NEW ZEALAND; P.O. Box 29-168, Christchurch, New Zealand. (5) NATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR SOCIAL CARE AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING, P.O. Box 135-621 Beirut, Lebanon. (6) CHINESE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INSTITUTE: Beijing, China. Fax: 086-1-550961. (7) UNIVERSITY GRADUATES UNION OF HEBRON: Amman Branch, P.O. Box 2347, Amman, Jordan. (8) COMMITTEE OF SOLIDARITY WITH ARAB PEOPLE; Akamas Street, 8 Nicosia, Cyprus. Another three seats were reserved to be filled by the Asian Coordinating Committee at a later stage. [–]

18016. DPR. “Part 10: Annex 1: Motion of Thanks”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. The participants in the United Nations Seminar and NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, being held from 1-20-24/1992 in Nicosia, Republic of Cyprus, express their profound thanks to the Government and people of Cyprus for generously providing a venue for this meeting and for the excellent arrangements made, which greatly contributed to its success. The participants wish also to convey their sincere gratitude and appreciation to H.E. Mr. George Iacovou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, for his statement of warm support for the Palestinian cause and our Seminar and NGO Symposium. The participants wish to express their appreciation also to H.E. Mr. Tassos Panayides, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their contribution to the Seminar and the NGO Symposium. The meeting was honoured to be addressed by Madam Androula Vasiliiou, wife of the President of the Republic of Cyprus. The participants take this opportunity to convey their sincere appreciation to the Government and people of Cyprus, for their consistent support for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights and for the active role they have played in advancing the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East on the basis of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. [–]

18017. DPR. “Part 11: Annex 2: List of Participants”, in Report of the Fourth United Nations Asian Regional NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine. Held in Nicosia, Cyprus, January 20-24, 1992. New York: Division of Palestine Rights, 1992. Experts: Mr. Radwan ABU-AYYASH (Palestinian); Mr. Albert AGHAZARIAN (Palestinian); Mr. Muhammad AMERAH (Jordan); Mr. Moshe AMIRAV (Israel); Mr. Don BETZ (United States); Ms. Yael DAYAN (Israel); Mr. Omran EL-SHAFIE (Egypt); Mr. Muhammad HALAJ (Palestinian); Mr. HE Yafei (China); Dr. Vassos LYSSARIDES (Cyprus); Mr. Ian S. LUSTICK (United States); Mr. Ron MACINTYRE (New Zealand); Mr. Hashim MAHAMEED (Israel); Mr. Mattiyahu PELED (Israel); Mr. A.H. RIzAVI (India); Mr. Yezid SAYIGH (Palestinian); Mr. Ryoo TATEYAMA (Japan); Dr. Ahmad YASJI (Palestinian).

Resource persons: Mr. Albert AGHAZARIAN (Palestinian); Ms. Hanna KNAA (Israel); Ms. Soheer MAHMUD (Palestinian); Dr. Ruchama MARTON (Israel); Dr. Ahmad YAZJI (Palestinian). [–]

18018. DPR. “Part 12: Annex 2: Delegation of the Committee on the
miscarriages. In addition, the conditions in the detention camps had left thousands of Palestinians with deteriorating physical and psychological problems. He said that the only solution to that health hardship was the end of the occupation and the transfer of authority to the Palestinian people in a Palestinian State. [=]


18021. De Laroche, Robert; Labat, Jean-Michel. The Secret Life of Cats: In The Cat's Footsteps; Companion on the Final Voyage; Bastet-The Divine Mother. Hauppage, N.Y.: Barrons Educational Service, 1995. pp. 17-21, 26-31, 32-39. The earliest known cat remains have been found at Jericho, Palestine and date from 6700 BC. Cats were also found in Harappa sites in the Indus valley civilization dating to 2000 BC. Cat remains from 5000 BC have been found in Cyprus; an ivory statue of a cat has been found at Lachisch, Palestine from 1700 BC; a terracotta cat’s head has been found for the same period at the Minoan site of Palaikastro on Crete.

The ancient Egyptian cat is apparently derived from the Felis libyca, or ‘gloved cat’, which is still found in Egypt, rather than the Felis ornata, which is still found wild in Iran and Pakistan; alternately, the modern cat could be derived from Felis chaos, which still remains wild in Egypt. One tradition argues that cats were domesticated in the Third and Fourth Dynasties (C. 2600 BC). The earliest evidence of cat dates from the Fifth Dynasty (c. 2500); the effigy of a cat wearing a collar which was found in the tomb of Ti’at Saqqarah. The cut of the cat-goddess Bastet emerged in the Twelfth Dynasty (c. 2000 BC). The cat became important in the era of the New Empire and the Eighteenth Dynasty (c. 1500). In this period trained cats were used to catch birds (in tomb pictures), tombs are decorated with portrayals of house cats. In the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties the Great Cat is portrayed in the Book of the Dead. The earliest cat sarcophagus dates from the Eighteenth century and was found in Saqqarah: it contains the body of cat belonging to a high priest of Memphis. The rise of the Bast cult accelerated with the designation of Bubastis (Tell Bastra) as his capital by Pharaoh Sheshank from all over Europe, as well as volunteers. The Arabs accuse Britain of fighting against European influence; to them it is a ‘new aggression of the West against the East’ and they regard it on a par with British Imperialism or the Italian war in Abyssinia. There is a certain amount of truth in both claims, because undoubtedly much of the outside criticism of Zionism comes from anti-Semitism and support for Zionism out of sympathy with Jewish victims of Nazi and other oppression in Europe. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the majority of Zionists regard the Arabs in the same way as other colonisers have regarded other ‘native inhabitants’, and it is hardly an answer for the Israeli authorities to claim co-operation from certain Arab tribes, such as the Druses, who have always been on unfriendly terms with other Arabs and inclined towards their enemies. Similar tactics were pursued by the British in India. There is not the slightest question of Jewish superiority in any claims they may make, as for example in the case of the British withdrawal enabled them to bring in thousands of Jewish DP’s and also munitions from all over Europe, as well as volunteers. The Arabs accuse Britain of betraying their interests in withdrawing at the particular time it did (had it withdrawn in 1936, for instance, the Jews could have been militarily defeated by them, since at that time they had no possibility of calling in large-scale immigration from Europe, importing arms from countries like Czechoslovakia, nor had they the thousands of British-trained troops from the war.) On the other hand, the Zionists generally have portrayed Britain as aiding the Arabs on the grounds of the association with Abdullah of Transjordan, and there is a left-wing picture (which is now accepted as truth by all Zionists) of Bevin forcing through pro-Arab policy against the Cabinet’s wish, and being able to call the war off any time he chose. Bevin’s ability to control the Arab States’ policy in regard to Palestine (but not in regard to Egypt or the Sudan!) may he doubted. It is more certain that Britain has played a diplomatic game of keeping in with both sides: influencing the Arab country, by the military missions under Glubb, etc., and relying on the pro-British sentiments of Weizmann and the Social-Democrats on the Jewish side. An alternative theory is pointed out by many: namely, that Britain and America—who are agreed on policy in every country in the world—may be not so much at loggerhead over this one small country as may be imagined. Americ ostensibly and loudly backs the Jewish side and calls on their support in the case of war. This is convenient for whoever may be President (having to placate the New York Jewish vote) and in addition, American influence among European Jewish circles can be considered. On the other hand, Britain ostensibly backs the Arabs—she has ‘traditional friendships’ among the Arab countries, and calls on their support in the case of war. The Jewish vote in this country does not count very highly, and in any case is not
generally pro-Zionist. Thus, whoever wins is an ally against Russia for Britain—or America! It cannot be doubted that Palestine may be an important focal point of another war, since Russia has seen the weakness of the Arab countries, and that even such a small body as Palestine Jewry can resist them all, and if it had not been restrained, might not have toppled them all over. Her striking point in a war might well be the oil fields of Iran and with only “Glubb’s Girls” to stop them might soon be in Cairo. The Israeli leaders are well aware of their importance to world politics, and disinclined to give way over hating their territory, to please the Arabs.

Arab refugees: Meanwhile, the most pressing of all post-war problems has received very little notice—namely the displacement of thousands of Arabs from their homes. These thousands became refugees not because of “misleading Arab propaganda” as the Israel Government claims, but because they feared terrorists’ attacks such as that of the Jewish Fascists on Deir Yassin, when a village which had actually not co-operated with and even resisted Arab terrorists, was massacred by Jewish terrorists. As the thousands of Jewish immigrants come in, the Israeli Government can only accommodate them in the deserted Arab cities, and in such towns as Jaffa, transform it completely from an all Arab city to a Jewish city. Before very long, there will simply be nowhere for them to go back to, and having gone, the Israeli Government does not particularly want them back, however it condemned the methods which drove them away. It is futile and unreasonable to blame the Jewish immigrants for this problem of Arab homelessness; they have themselves certainly nowhere else to go, and are naturally bitter at the cynical ease with which Great Powers who deny the great open spaces under their control to settlers, declare that they ought not to go to Palestine but elsewhere. They cannot be expected to stay behind barbed wire and bars until their death, as has been apparently the view of the British Government in its great Cyprus concentration camp experiment (which still goes on). They are no more likely to consider Arab claims than the thousands of Europeans who swarmed to build up America considered the Indians. In spite of all the bunk about peace by settlement and negotiations between the Powers, under the United Nations delusion, the fact is that conflict is in these circumstances inevitable, and victory will certainly go to the strongest side. The Powers are not really interested in any other solution, but are doing their best to use the Palestine struggle as one of the many pawns in the cold war.

No easy solution: As internationalists we ought not to delude ourselves into any other facile solution, but rather to look for hopes that in the future some measure of international co-operation will come about, not between governments or political leaders, but from the people from below, and in the meantime to expose such delusions as those spread by the leaders of all sides in any war. But the major deduction to be drawn from the Palestine conflict is the utter degeneration of Soviet Russia into Czarism, a fact known to anybody with the least perception who witnesses the flight of so many Jews from Europe, but one concealed not least by the Zionist parties who welcome Russian UNO support, and who have in any case a certain vested interest in anti-Semitism. There can be no denying the fact that if conditions were normal and decent in Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the other countries behind the Iron Curtain, there would be no ‘DP problem’: the fact of open and silent pogroms in those countries causes the great exodus from Eastern Europe to the overladen DP camps of Germany and Italy, and the great frights of human cargo leaving the Danubian ports. The Communists may deny responsibility for this, but the fact remains that all opposition to Stalin has been stamped out in those countries and if Stalin so wished, anti-Semitism could not last a minute. It has not been tolerated in Russia for many years because of its identification with and exploitation by the ‘White’ Czarists, but now that Red Czarism is so firmly in the saddle, it is used throughout the Great Russian Empire of Eastern Europe to divide and rule. [Publisher’s note To simplify the subtitle to this volume all articles were attributed to Freedom, whereas some appeared in Freedom’s predecessors: Spain & the World (1936-1939) and War Commentary (1939-1945), both published by Freedom Press and forming part of the Centenary Series.]

18024. Pantazi-Haliassou, Ioanna. Marital Satisfaction And The Domain Of Household Labor In Cypriot Parent And Childless Couples. University Of Maryland College Park. Dissertation. 171pp. AAC 9327479. [Advisor: Brown, Robert] The U.S. literature has consistently reported a decline in marital satisfaction and changes in a number of household labor variables following the arrival of the first child. However, few studies have directly addressed the relationship between the domain of household labor and marital satisfaction. Furthermore, most studies have looked at these variables independently of one another and have not paid sufficient attention to their relative importance in predicting marital satisfaction. This study focused on Cypriot parent and childless couples, a population on which no data on the transition to parenthood, marital satisfaction, and household labor are available. First, parents were compared to childless subjects on division of household labor, satisfaction with the division of labor, and consensus around desired division of labor. Arguments and negative feelings regarding division of labor were also explored. Surprisingly, in contrast to the U.S. literature, parents did not differ from childless subjects on the above variables, except that mothers performed a significantly larger proportion of the household labor than childless women. Second, the impact of these household labor variables on marital satisfaction was examined. Consensus between spouses around desired division of labor was a powerful predictor of mothers’ marital satisfaction accounting for 42% of the criterion variance. Possible explanations included the pervasiveness of household labor in mothers’ lives, mothers’ limited physical and emotional resources, and a need for a sense of togetherness during early motherhood. Satisfaction with division of labor was a significant predictor of only childless women’s marital satisfaction. Childless women (in contrast to mothers) who were dissatisfied with the division of labor may have not perceived the situation as unstable and situation specific, which are relationship-enhancing attributions. Arguments and negative feelings regarding the division of labor accounted for a significant proportion of marital satisfaction for all four subgroups. The above findings were interpreted in light of the U.S. literature, the limited information on Cypriot and Greek couples available, and the author’s personal knowledge of the Cypriot society. Limitations/suggestions for future research and the study’s potential implications were discussed. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]


Ethiopia: 850000 refugees.

East Timor: 200000 refugees.

Kampuchea: 4 million refugees.

Kosovo: 200000 refugees.

Laos: 1 million refugees.

Lebanon: 1 million refugees.

[Source: Worldwatch Institute, 1983.] [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]


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18028. Van Boven, Theo. "Right to Reparation of Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights: Theo van Boven Refutes Tokyo's Comments: Some Considerations and Factors: Problems and Obstacles, Nationally and Globally", in Peoples Korea, August 5, 1995. p. 8. Limited scope of national laws (refusal on the part of the State to acknowledge responsibility; the operation of amnesty laws; the restrictive attitude of the courts; incapability of groups or individual victims to present and pursue their claims; insufficient economic and financial resources). Large numbers of victims are deprived of any remedial or reparational rights and perspectives. Political convenience and inconvenience as well as the tendency to turn away from the past and to address the future. The application of statutes of limitation; how far should one look into the past for repairing injustices? Responsibility of non-state actors exercising power (for instance the self-proclaimed Serbian republics in Bosnia-Herzegovenia and in Croatia and the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus); what is the role of international law in such cases? [=]

18029. Wockner, Rex. "World Briefs: Cyprus [charges of homosexuality dropped against popular Archimandrite Pangratios Meracis]; in Just Out (Portland), May 17, 1996. p. 5. [TXT]

18030. Women Overcoming Violence. "Resolution By Women From Countries At War: The Following Statement, Signed By Women From Cyprus, Turkey, Serbia, Croatia, Israel, Palestine, South Africa, Russia, And Morocco Was Endorsed By The Conference On Women Overcoming Violence Held In Bangkok, Thailand In 11/1992", in Women In Black Newsletter, Spring 1993. A Resolution By Women from Countries at War

We are women from countries with conflicting interests and countries at war, who have seen bloodshed, the loss of life, and the loss of dignity as a result of racism, sexism, antagonism, and militarism. These have given rise to internal strife, military intervention, or foreign occupation.

We demand that our voice be heard as a condemnation against violence as a means of resolving any problems in a state or between states. We demand an immediate end to the war and violence between opposing sides within our countries and the immediate withdrawal of foreign occupying forces from our countries.

We, victims of violence and war, demand that all differences be resolved through peaceful negotiations, and that every measure be taken for enhancing the quality of life. We shall not support efforts that do not respect human rights or that use violence against people (men or women), whether in their own countries or against other countries. [Chaya Shalom, a Woman in Black from Jerusalem, attended from Israel.] [=]

18031. Zhou Qingchang; She Duanzhi. "Women Ambassadors On Women: Part 02: Myrna Y. Kleopas of Cyprus", in Beijing Review, September 11-17, 1995. pp. 21-22. Myrna Y. Kleopas of Cyprus: Lawyer-Turned Diplomat: Myrna Kleopas, a career diplomat, talks in a fast, tense, and concise manner. She exudes precision, logic and strong will. Before entering the foreign service, she was a lawyer in Famagusta, eastern Cyprus. She lost her job in 1974, when the Turkish forces occupied 37% of Cyprus, including Famagusta.

To support her family, she had to find a new job. At the time the best jobs available were in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "I thought this job suited my ambition and wish to help Cyprus," she recalls. She stayed on and became a permanent member of the ministry. She came to Beijing in November 1993, her first post as ambassador and also the first woman ambassador of her country.

On women's status in Cyprus, Kleopas says, "From a legal point of view, we have achieved quite a lot. Our constitution and laws guarantee equality between the sexes in all fields."

An official report to be submitted to the conference sets out the various measures taken to protect women's interests. The National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, founded in 1988 and reformed in 1994, deals with all matters concerning women, focusing on the elimination of legal discrimination against women and the promotion of
of real equality between men and women. This organization operates under the auspices of the Minister of Justice and Public Order, which makes it powerful and effective.

Legal equality, however, is not enough, Kleopas notes. “The attitude of the society and men toward women needs to be changed,” she says, adding, “We need equality in practice.”

The absence of women in decision-making bodies bears witness to the practical inequality of men and women, she reflects. “We have only one woman minister and two women in the House of Representatives,” she explains.

“The decision-making process is very important because it’s there that decisions are made to affect our lives and I think it’s unfair because half of the population is excluded,” she commented.

“We are absent not because we are lesser people, less intelligent, or less hard-working, but because of the attitude of the society,” she adds.

She describes Cyprus as being in a transition from a traditional to a modern society with regard to women. “We have achieved quite a lot in ensuring equal pay for men and women, particularly in the public sector,” she says.

“My philosophy is that every human being should be given the opportunity to develop fully and equally his or her potential,” she emphasizes.

“All human beings are born with potential and this potential should be left to be developed freely,” she adds.

Kleopas says on average Cypriot women do not have many children. “This usually happens when the society becomes rich,” she explains.

“As a woman, I always feel compelled to work harder than my male colleagues in order to prove myself,” she says. “It was my choice, and I like it.”

Brought up in a family with no brothers, she says she was taught to be tough and strong like a man. At the same time, she was reared in a traditional setting to be a mother and wife. “I've always worked, but I have a good relationship with my children,” she says.

“Equality means allowing every individual to develop his or her potential and no impediments on the way because of his or her sex,” she says.

Speaking of which jobs are more suitable for women, she says, “You can't deny your nature, but you can't impose restrictions on your nature as well. It's up to the individual to decide.

Kleopas does not agree with extreme feminism. “Extremity in anything is bad. The Greek philosophers thought about the golden mean,” she says. But she was quick to add, “Maybe sometimes you have to be extreme in order to make people listen to you. Because women have been suppressed for so long, not every one has the opportunity to advance herself. That's why we need the conference and the (women's) movement, and governments need to pay more attention to women.”

"Men still want to hold on to their advantages. Power is sweet, and they don't want to share it with us,” she pointed out.

The woman ambassador does not agree with the view that women should go back to home to take care of children and family. "It's not fair to women,” she says. "But if a woman decides so, that's her free choice and why not? Bringing up our children is a most worthy job,” she adds.

"Who says women's role should be in the house only? Let them decide, but you have to give them opportunities to be able to decide freely,” she emphasizes.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

20000. -------. "Aside: Pop Conference", in Wall Street Journal, September 16, 1994. p. A12. Third World delegates were presenting a very different agenda at the UN Population Conference than one would think in light of the coverage by the Western Media. While the Western Media focused on abortion and empowerment of women, Third World delegates were interested in other issues: arguing poverty not population was the major problem in the Third World; criticizing First World support for failed megaprojects and their accompanying corruption; and (as noted by M.S. Swaminathan of India) Western economic policies that slow economic growth in the Third World by preventing their products from entering First World markets. Kenyan delegate Daniel Mbekar simply thought the First Worlders were obsessed with sexual rights and abortion. [TXT]


20003. -------. "Cairo Court: Professor Must Divorce; Writings Insult Islam, Wife [Nasr Abu Zeid found unfit to be married to Muslim woman; Zeid and his wife of four years Ibtihal Younis teach at Leiden University in Netherlands]", in Seattle Times, August 5, 1996. p. A7. [TXT]


20005. -------. "Egypt Convicts Arab From Israel of Spying", in Seattle Times, September 1, 1997. p. A6. The Egyptian State Security Court sentences Azam Azam to 15 years for intelligence collection on Egyptian intelligence. Prosecutors allege he was recruited as a spy by two Israeli women, Zahra Yousef Kreis andMohia Ahmed Shawahna, after he was seduced by Kreis. Azam is a Druze from Galilee, PM Netanyahu demanded that the trial be ended and charges against Azam be dismissed. [TXT]

20006. -------. "Egypt Court Backs Female Circumcision", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 6, 1997. p. 5. A Cairo court has overturned the law that bans female circumcision being performed in clinics and hospitals. The ban was implemented in 1996 by the Ministry of Health. The court found the ban to be contrary to Islam. A recent study found 97% of Egyptian girls undergo the operation, usually at ten or less.

20007. -------. "Egyptian Court Forces Professor to Divorce for Writings on Islam", in New York Times, August 6, 1996. p. A4. An Egyptian court supported Islamic fundamentalists in their insistence that a university professor and his professor wife must obtain a divorce, due to his writings, which many believe are anti-Islamic. His critics argue that Abu Zeid's writings have made him an apostate. Mohammed Moneib, secretary of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, stated the court ruling was a major blow to Egypt.

20008. -------. "Even in Qana Massacre, the UN Tries to Blame Muslims for Being There!", in Crescent International, September 1-15, 1996. p. 6. In a new report which takes Israel to task for the Qana and other massacres in southern Lebanon in 1996, Amnesty International somehow contrives to blame Hizbullah as well, while another report (The Copts of Egypt edited by Saad Eddin Ibrahim) on Egyptian Copts by the London-based Minority Rights Group devotes space to the discussion of unrelated issues such as female circumcision, which is often broached to give Islam a bad name. Both reports betray a powerful need, perhaps unconscious, to find fault with the Muslim side in any relationship or conflict, even when Muslims are the victims, as in Qana. By contrast, no attempt is made to equate victim and aggressor, when the alleged victim is Christian, Jew or otherwise non-Muslim, and the presumed aggressor is Muslim, as rights reports on southern Sudan or the Indonesian province of East Timor show. The Amnesty report on Qana, published on 7/24/1996, comes down hard on Israel, concluding that the Israeli attack on the UN compound, in which over 100 civilians died, was deliberate and that the UN inquiry into the killings was cursory. A UN report on the same attack would only go as far as saying that it was "unlikely" that the Israelis shelled Qana by mistake. But the UN investigators did not blame Hizbullah fighters for provoking the Israeli attack on the compound while the Amnesty report obliquely does so in obscene disregard of the facts. The Amnesty report condemns the fighters for firing mortars at Israeli troops from close to the Qana compound, saying that they must have realized the danger to civilians sheltering nearby. The UN investigators were convinced the shelling had nothing to do with the alleged firing at Israeli troops near the compound. Their report was watered down because UN secretary general, Boutros Ghali did not want to offend the US at a time when he was seeking a second term as UN chief.

Amnesty report itself established that the attack on the Qana compound was deliberate and not the result of an attempt to fire back at the Hizbullah fighters nearby. To criticize Hizbullah in connection with the massacres is unnecessary and an affront to the memory of the civilian martyrs Amnesty claims to champion. It also confines a degree of credence to Israel's and US president Bill Clinton's position that the shelling of the compound was accidental. But that is not all. The Amnesty report also criticizes Hizbullah for firing rockets into northern Israel, accusing it of violating international law. In fact, even international law, with all its flaws, grants the right of self-defense against external aggression. Lebanon is an independent country recognized by the UN, and Israel's occupation of the south is illegal and defies a host of UN resolutions, including resolution 425 of 4/1978, calling for unconditional withdrawal by Israeli troops. Amnesty is also monstrously wrong to equate the shelling of northern Israel by Hizbullah, using almost harmless katusha rockets, with the murderous bombardment of southern Lebanon by an occupying army, using tanks, warplanes and state of the art weaponry. A similar anti-Muslim bias is revealed in a balfing report on Egypt's Coptic minority, by the London-based Minority Rights Group. Although the report is only 30 pages long (hardly enough space for an overview of Coptic history and an analysis of the place of the Coptic minority in modern Egyptian society) it manages to discuss at length totally irrelevant issues. For example, no less than a fifteenth of the report is devoted to a section called Women's and Girls' Rights, which include expansions on the marriage laws. It is a dull overview which is too cursory to explain what one critic of the report called the Copts: "ambiguous and complex place in modern Egyptian society." Predictably, the publishers suggest in the blurb on the back of the report that the Coptic way of life is today under threat from "Islamic fundamentalism," discussing no other sources of threat. In the words of a recent article in the Middle East International, "both the Coptic and the Muslim ways of life in Egypt...are under threat from western cultural penetration."

The report ends with a number of recommendations, one of which also illustrates its anti-Islamic thrust. The recommendation calls on the State to provide protection for Egyptian Muslims who want to convert to Christianity, an absurd proposal which is unrelated to the condition of the traditional Coptic minority. This failure of "human rights" groups to resist their deeply-seated cultural bias against Islam and Muslims should, perhaps, not come as a surprise. The groups are after all a product of the Western tradition which publicly equates the victims of mass murder in Bosnia and Chechnya, to take only two examples, with the perpetrators of the genocide. [↩]

20009. -------. "Fighting In Hebron Escalates After An Israeli Woman Passed Out Leaflets Depicting the Prophet Muhammad As a Pig [Egypt's top clerics states that insulting the prophet is punishable by death]", in Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1997. p. A1. [TXT]
20010. "First Anniversary of a Mutiny", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to Ithihad Al-Shaab, April 30, 1960. p. 10. The "Valley of Two Springs" is the happy description of the town of Mosul, but Nature and politics seem lately to have conspired to make the last two springs Mosul has witnessed a time of tragedy for the city inhabitants.

Last 3/8/1959 saw the rise and fall of Shawaff which cost the people of Mosul many innocent lives. In response to the call of the National Government they rose bare-handed to capture arms and put a speedy end to the Nasser inspired "Shawaff Republic." They considered it their duty to safeguard the Iraqi Republic and defend the honor of the city. Their deeds and sacrifices won nation-wide sympathy and admiration. A delegation of the people came to Baghdad after the suppression of the mutiny had been popularly acclaimed. They met the Premier and he expressed to them his deep appreciation of their courageous acts.

As spring comes north again to Mosul after a winter of mourning the sons of the city who risked their lives in responding to the call of the National Government to suppress the Shawaff mutiny, are being tried by martial courts for having suppressed the mutiny. The charges brought against them carry the death penalty. Such is the terrible irony of events.

Even before Colonel Abdul Wahab al Shawaff declared his "republic" and ran up the flag of the United Arab Republic over his headquarters, these brave patriots had come to Baghdad to express the anxiety of the people of Mosul about the sinister activities going on in their city. A few days before the mutiny they submitted a note to the authorities in Baghdad in which they demanded the purge of the state apparatus, the arrest of conspiratorial elements and an end to the suspicious contacts being made across the Syrian border. They also asked the authorities to take the necessary measures to protect the citizen from the evil forces at work.

These warnings were of no avail. The delegation was politely listened but no measure at all were taken. The Iraqi people sensed what was going on in Mosul, for they have learned from bitter experience that the forces of reaction will never cease their efforts to bring down the Iraqi Republic, so when the peace rally was declared to be held in Mosul (on the Friday before the mutiny) tens of thousands of people thronged to the city from all over Iraq to show their support for the people of Mosul and to serve as a warning to the plotting elements. The trains carrying people to the peace rally were stopped several times on the way and there was a long interruption before they passed through the long tunnel leading to Mosul. It was learned later on that explosives had been placed on the railway line and at the mouth of the tunnel. It was intended that everybody in the train should be killed and this be the signal for the start of the mutiny. But the bombs were discovered in time and were removed. The rally took place and more than a hundred thousand people attended.

There was a chill however in the atmosphere of the city. Shops were closed and few people were in the streets apart from those watching the peace delegation coming from the railway station. Troops were posted to the strategic points in the city. But the plotters had to wait for the delegation to go home before they could start.

The following day an armed but small demonstration of fanatics attacked houses and burned down cafes. This was to provide the necessary provocation. The people of Mosul demonstrated against the local authorities encouragement of the armed bands terrorizing the city. That day, 3/7/1959, as darkness fell in the warm spring weather, Shawaff struck.

Democrats were "invited" to meet the military commander Colonel Al-Shawaff in connection with that day's demonstrations. As they entered the stone castle which was Shawaff's headquarters, they were told that they were under arrest. Patriotic officers and soldiers were arrested in the early hours of the next morning. The next day Shawaff installed a broadcasting station sent from the UAR and declared himself the "leader." He raised the flag of the UAR on his headquarters and called upon the people of Iraq to finish with the "madman ruling Iraq" and to support "Shawaff's Republic."

Meanwhile Radio Damascus made no secret of its stand and broadcast all Shawaff's proclamations, while Nasser hovered expectantly in Syria. But to the shock and disappointment of Nasser all his calculations proved wrong. "Shawaff's Republic" lived for one day only, though they controlled the army units in Mosul and Kirkuk. The Iraqi Premier Abdul Karim Qassim called on the people to kill Shawaff and put down his mutiny and the people of Mosul responded heroically to the call. Bare-handed, together with soldiers, they attacked the arms depots and captured the arms with which they stormed the stone castle, just after two planes from Baghdad had bombarded it. Soldiers from the engineering unit climbed the castle from the back in time to save the Mosul democrats just when their names were being called for execution.

Kamel Kazanch, the prominent Iraqi lawyer and democrat, was murdered just before the castle was stormed. Shawaff was killed as he was running to the military hospital to nurse his wounds caused by the bombing. The back of the mutiny was broken.

The Iraqi peasants from the villages surrounding Mosul played an important part in defending the city from the bedouin hordes of the Shammar, whose Sheikh Ahmed Agil al-Yawar ordered them to support Shawaff and sack the city. "We shall have their money and their women - a town girl and a house." But they could not even enter the city, and had to flee to Syria. When the storm ended and the dust settled, the people of Mosul hoped that their peace would not be disturbed again. But the summer came and their hopes were disappointed and as the spring comes north again the sons of Mosul are being tried for having responded to the call of the national government and defended the Iraqi Republic.

Spring to most people means happiness and joy and a renewal of life but for the people of Mosul this year there hangs the shadow of death over the valley of two springs. [=]


In Hebron, Israeli soldiers near the Ibrahim Mosque reported that they were shot at. After investigations, the army said bombs had been thrown at the patrol. No casualties were reported.

Israel Radio reported that five "wanted" Palestinians escaped to Egypt. [=]


In Nablus, Ragheb Ziyad Aja, 17, died when soldiers shot him in the chest. His body was laid to rest with scores of Palestinians attending the funeral despite the military closure which was imposed on the area. Two other youths were shot and injured in the incidents.

In Gaza, Raed Yusuf Zurob, 17, from Rafah, died and another youth was injured when soldiers shot at allegedly masked youths from the military wing of Islamic Jihad. The two were reportedly writing graffiti on the walls.

In Gaza, hundreds of Gazan children staged a sit-in protest against the killing of children by Israeli troops. In the town of Qabata, gunfire was aimed at an Israeli military encampment.

In Jerusalem, a homemade bomb was discovered and dismantled before exploding.

5/25/93: In the town of Qabata, in the Jenin district, activists fired at a military post. No casualties were reported.

In the Strip, Israeli sources said five "wanted" people and three others who "aided" them were arrested. Weapons were allegedly found with the arrested. Army sources reported that 50 "wanted" people were arrested and 25 others escaped to Egypt since the military siege was imposed on the occupied territories two months ago. Palestinians noted that in just one month - 4/27/93 to 5/27/93 - "16 "wanted" youths were killed by the army.

Curfews were imposed on the city and refugee camp of Khan Yunis and the village of Bani Suhailah in the Strip.

In the town of Qalqiya, in the West Bank, fierce clashes were
reported between soldiers and Palestinian civilians. Several houses were raided by the military following the incidents.

Attacks with stones and empty bottles were carried out against military patrols in Tulkarm, Ramallah, Hebron, and the Ramallah village of Ein Arik.

In Nablus, merchants closed their stores to mourn the killing of a youth the day before.

5/26/93: At least two Palestinians were shot and injured by soldiers in the Gaza Strip. Curfew was imposed on the city and Khan Yunis refugee camp, where the army continued searching for "wanted" people.

In Jerusalem, Israeli sources noted that a Fatah cell was arrested. Cell members are charged with tossing Molotovs at the house of former Israeli Minister Ariel Sharon in the Old City.

Also in Jerusalem, Israeli explosive experts dismantled a bomb.

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20014. -------. "Miscellaneous: Feminists Are not Humorless", in Week in Germany, March 19, 1993, p. 6. A blow against the prejudicial notion that feminists are humorless has been struck in Dortmund (North Rhein-Westphalia), where an international women's film festival dedicated to the "subversive power of laughter" began on 3/17/93. The festival, which is taking place for the fourth time, gathers some 90 films and videos that demonstrate, according to the festival organizers, that women can laugh not only about men but also about themselves. Filmmakers from numerous European countries as well as China, Mexico and Egypt, are participants in the festival. [=]


An anonymous important fundamentalist leader in Imbaba, an impoverished section of Cairo, said that the conference may provoke attacks by operatives from other groups willing to die for Islam, because the conference is considered an insult to traditional beliefs. Subjects expected to be covered at the conference concern abortion, family planning and teenage sexuality. Also, the leader said that the conference is an assault against Islam and a policy that is being forced upon people by the United States.

The leader stressed the importance of fundamentalist groups not to carry out any attacks, but meanwhile government officials have been cracking down on fundamentalist groups, in a series of police arrests and mass raids. [TXT]


20018. -------. "New Language of Political Discourse in the West", in Crescent International, February 16-29/1996. p. 6. In western political discourse, an entirely new vocabulary has been developed in which words assume meanings entirely divorced from their regular usage. This Orwellian language is most commonly used in the US, Britain and France. Other western powers are also not above resorting to this devious technique. Such vocabulary is used at appropriate times to evoke the right responses among the largely apathetic masses in the west. Two of the most commonly-used (abused?) terms are the "peace process" and "terrorism." Of the two, the first is much older. This has been applied specifically to the process going on between the zionist State of Israel and the Arab regimes. Naturally, nobody can be against peace. Thus, the process that will bring about peace also cannot be such a bad thing. But what kind of peace is being offered? Clearly, the "peace process" is supposed to bring peace to Israel but not to the victims of Zionism. Israeli troops can even invade another country - Lebanon, for instance - in the name of peace. Lebanese villages are bombarded by Israeli planes and artillery almost daily but far be it for the western mouthpieces to refer to this as "State terrorism.” The "peace process" of the American conception is also now applied to the Balkans where the Bosnian Muslims have been forced to accept the occupation and partition of their country by the Serbs. No such "peace process" was initiated when Iraq occupied Kuwait in 8/1990. Instead, Iraq was ordered to immediately pull its troops out of Kuwait, failing which a horrible war was unleashed against the Iraqi people. Is the occupation of Palestine by the zionists, Bosnia by the Serbs and Kuwait by the Iraqis so very different? Why, then such different prescriptions? The answer lies in what the interests of the US and the west demand. Let us consider the term "international terrorism." According to the dictionary definition, the word terrorism means the use of force or threats to demoralize, intimidate or subjugate, especially for political purposes. Most often, such threats are used against civilians. "International terrorism" means using it on a worldwide scale.

The behavior of Israel and the US would immediately make both of them the greatest terrorist States in the world. Not only do they resort to threats but they also feel no compunction in killing innocent civilians in order to force regimes to alter their policies to suit US/Zionist interests. Israel’s bombardment of Lebanese villages is justified on the pretext that they harbor members of the Islamic resistance who attack Israeli military targets in South Lebanon. Is resistance to foreign occupation a crime? Is the occupation of others’ land justified under any law - western or others? If Iraq could be bombed back into the Stone Age because of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, why is the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and Palestine not condemned? The tiny Christian minority in South Sudan is backed by western governments and churches in carrying out attacks against the government of Sudan. Such attacks are naturally never condemned. In 4/1986, US planes bombed Tripoli in Libya, killing more than 100 civilians including the 18-month-old adopted daughter of colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The reason was the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin, allegedly by Libyan agents, in which one American soldier was killed. Information subsequently released by the Bonn ministry of justice completely ruled out Libyan involvement. When asked how he felt about the death of a child, then US president Ronald Reagan gave the flippant reply: "I did not see the adoption papers." Such callous disregard of human life is typical of American rulers. Instead, American television stations reported that the bombing of Libya was "playing well in Peoria," a small town in Illinois. The viewers were expected to believe that "approval" of a small rural community in the middle of nowhere was all that was needed to justify mass murder! The Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), a terrorist outfit, offers another example of how western States behave. The MKO openly advocates the violent overthrow of the legitimately-established government in Iran. In pursuit of this aim, it has bombed civilian targets such as passenger buses, trains, mosques and crowded shopping malls. Thousands of innocent civilians have been the victims of its vicious campaign. The MKO, based in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, has publicly admitted to carrying out such attacks.

Anyone linked with Iraq is denounced by the US but not the MKO terrorists. US lawmakers are staunch supporters of the MKO as are British parliamentarians. These people cry hoarse if an operation is carried out against the zionist occupiers of Palestine but applaud every terrorist act of the MKO. The US even surpassed its own criminal record when the congress approved, in 11/1995, an additional $20 million for a CIA covert program to destabilize the government of Iran. The CIA is well-known for its criminal activities worldwide. Here was public admission by members of the congress to destabilize and, therefore, help overthrow a legitimate government in another part of the world. Can one imagine the outcry in the west if a Muslim country were to propose the destabilization of the US by supporting a campaign of bombings and
assassinations? A number of other words and expressions are similarly used to convey a specific political meaning. Here is a sample. Moderate: This refers to any regime or ruler who is subservient to the US and the west in general. These are usually the most oppressive regimes in the world. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia fall under this category. Stability: This term is used to prevent the removal, even though western-style elections, of a pro-western government. Thus, the destabilization of the popularly-elected government in Iran is supported by the US but the removal of the Algerian junta is opposed. Similarly, demand for the removal of the House of Saud in the Arabian Peninsula is opposed under the pretext that it would lead to “instability.” Democracy: This is another favorite word but its application is limited to those governments which are not in the good books of the west. There are no demands for democracy in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Algeria. Nigeria and Mayanmar (Burma), on the other hand, must show respect for democracy. Minority Rights: The western countries do not respect the rights of minorities in their midst but insist that countries around the world (meaning Muslim), must respect the rights of theirs, especially Christians. There are no longer any Jewish minorities in the world now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and all the Russian Jews have flooded into Palestine. Christian minorities in Nigeria and Sudan are talked about often as being “oppressed.” The Coptic minority in Egypt, which controls important sectors of the Egyptian society, is mentioned but only in the context of denigrating the Islamic movement. While the rights of the majority in Egypt are never mentioned because they oppose the oppressive regime of Husni Mubarak, the Coptic minority’s interests must be protected! Freedom of Expression: This refers to the west’s right to abuse Islam but not the right of the Muslims to defend themselves. Even in the value-free societies of the west, there are limits on freedom of speech. This applies specifically to restricting any discussion of the inordinate influence the Jewish minority wields in these societies. In the politically-correct environment, one must not even refer to a woman as chairperson but “chairwoman.” Such sensitivity is strikingly missing when referring to Muslims. In fact, “terrorism” and Muslims have become interchangeable words. [-]

20019. ------. “News in Brief: Africa: Shaikh of Al-Azhar Upholds Divorce of Nasr Abu Zeid”, in Crescent International, September 1-15, 1996. p. 2. Mohamed Sayyed Tantawi, the shaikh of Al-Azhar, said on 8/22/1996 that an Egyptian court was right to divorce university professor Nasr Abu Zeid on grounds of apostasy. The only way back for Abu Zeid was to renounce his writings in public, shaiikh Tantawi told the London-based Saudi Arabic newspaper al-Hayat. Abu Zeid and his wife, fellow academic Ibtihal Younis, have fled to the Netherlands. [-]

20020. ------. “Population: Children, Burden or Blessing?”, in Middle East, June 1, 1993. pp. 23-25. Egypt's 55 million population will double in 28 years and the country's resources are already stretched to the maximum. Yet tradition, religion and ignorance are resistant to controlling the coming explosion. The status symbol of a large family still holds sway in the Arab world. Improved health care has lowered infant mortality, adding to the problem. The Mufti of Egypt has ruled birth control and family planning as acceptable but many fundamentalists disagree, and family planning personnel have been murdered. The International Planned Parenthood Federation has a policy of encouraging sheikhs to promote the idea of economic and social security for women to the forefront of the debate. The world population of 5.7 billion is seen growing to 8-12 billion in 2050 depending on the population strategy adopted. Nafis Sadik, head of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) states: “Women are at its center and their empowerment is its key”. The UN proposed program includes: counteracting social and family pressures and lack of reproductive choices; to persuade men to assume more parental responsibility; to combat a widespread preference for male children; to make abortion legally available; and open the doors of education and employment to poor and subjugated women. Many Third World delegates see the thrust of the conference as blaming the Third World for the environmental excesses of the First World.

20022. ------. “The Politics of Population”, in Seattle Times, September 1, 1994. pp. A1, A14-A15. Next week almost all the nations of the world will meet in Cairo at the UN Population Conference to develop a new world population policy. Women’s groups have lobbied hard to bring the idea of economic, social and environmental security for women to the forefront of the debate. The world population of 5.7 billion is seen growing to 8-12 billion in 2050 depending on the population strategy adopted. Nafis Sadik, head of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) states: “Women are at its center and their empowerment is its key”. The UN proposed program includes: counteracting social and family pressures and lack of reproductive choices; to persuade men to assume more parental responsibility; to combat a widespread preference for male children; to make abortion legally available; and open the doors of education and employment to poor and subjugated women. Many Third World delegates see the thrust of the conference as blaming the Third World for the environmental excesses of the First World.

20028. ------. “The Virgin in Cairo [actress Vivian Acosta won the prize for best performance in the Seventh International Experimental Theater Festival of Cairo with the monologue La Virgen Triste (The Sad Virgin)]; she went on to tour Spain, which was organized by the Latin American Center for Theatrical Creation & Research (CELCIT)”, in Granma International (Havana), February 28, 1996. p. 11. [TXT]

20029. ------. “US Presses For Abortion Language In UN Plan”, in Daily World (Aberdeen), April 7, 1994. p. B3. The Clinton Administration is pushing the UN to include explicit support for abortion in a draft UN document that seeks to outline a plan for stabilizing world population. The 20-year draft plan has come under fire by anti-abortion and Roman Catholic groups. The document will be presented for adoption at the UN International Conference on Population & Development in Cairo, 9/1994. The draft calls for stabilizing world population at 7.8 billion in 2050; the present rate of population growth would lead to a population of 12.5 billion

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www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
in 2050. [TXT]

20030. --------. "United States Senate OKs Palestinian Aid, Trims Help For Ex-Soviets", in Seattle Times, July 16, 1994. p. A4. The United States senate has approved an aid plan that include: $80 million for Palestinians; $539 million for former Soviet states ($61 million below Administration request); $150 million for Ukraine, $75 million for Armenia, and $50 million for Georgia; Israel will receive $2.1 billion; $802 million for Sub-Saharan Africa, $359 million for Eastern Europe and $450 million for international family planning assistance. Two amendments required $30 million of aid to former Soviet states to be used for police training and FBI assistance in crime fighting in the states. An additional amendment would terminate aid to Russia if all Russian troops are not withdrawn from the Baltics, or an agreement for withdrawal, is not concluded by 8/31/1995. [TXT]

20031. --------. "Vatican May Alter Condom Stance", in Seattle Times, September 3, 1994. p. A5. Vatican delegates to the UN Population Conference may not object to the use of condoms to prevent the spread of AIDS. The Vatican has opposed use of condoms for birth control. One diplomatic source speculated that the Vatican wants to focus its energy on its opposition to abortion. [TXT]

20032. --------. "World Watch: ILO Combats Worldwide Child Labor", in UFW Action, September-October 1996. p. 24. ILO estimates that there are more than 73 million children, more than 13% of all children aged 10-14, involved in child labor. There is no count of girls employed in domestic work fulltime, but with such an addition, the number of child laborers would be in the hundreds of millions. Labor organizations, such as AFL-CIO, argue for use of trade agreements such as GATT and the Caribbean Basin Initiative to regulate child labor. The AFL-CIO and National Consumers League support legislation to restrict import of products made with child labor and support the RUGMARK labeling program to certify that carpets made in India were not made with child labor. ILO is planning to increase its technical support to a number of countries to bring national laws on child labor into line with international standards through its International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC); the countries to be assisted include: Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. [TXT]

20033. --------. Editorial: "New Path To Stability Is World Goal In Cairo; The New Policy Is Based on the Simple, But Compelling Notion That a Healthy, Educated Woman Is More Likely To have Fewer Children", in Seattle Times, September 6, 1994. p. B4. The Clinton Administration's activism at the Cairo UN Population Conference is the paradigm of its approach to the world issues. The new policy would 'place women at the center'. However, without 'new foreign aid dollars from legislators back home, consensus in Cairo will be little more than a wish meaning, but hollow gesture to millions of women and families around the world.'

20034. --------. Editorial: "Land Mines Great Killers of the Innocent; The UN Estimates That Up To 110 Million Mines in 64 Countries Could Explode At A Miststep", in National Catholic Reporter, February 16, 1996. p. 40. An estimated 3-6 million landmines threaten UN peacekeepers in Bosnia: Bosnia has the second largest number of mines in place, led only by Cambodia with 10 million mines in place (142 per square miles). There are some 500 victims of landmines per week worldwide, and up to 110 million landmines may be in place worldwide. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates that even if not one more landmine were to be emplaced, the mines in place would continue to maim for decades. Mines are now produced and exported by 56 countries: major exporters include China and Russia, with production rising in countries such as Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and Singapore. Mines are cheap and deadly, and very often profitable. Mines cost $3-30, but cost $300-1000 to remove: some $70 million per year is being spent to remove approximately 100000 mines, as governments and rebels emplace several million more mines each year. While a temporary ban forbids

US exports, the Pentagon is lobbying for increased exports and is a heavy user of landmines. Pope John Paul II condemned landmines for their 'veritable slaughter' of children on World Peace day, but political leaders such as Pres. Clinton, long silent on this issue, must lead. [TXT]

20035. --------. Press Release: Stop the UN's Killer Population Conference. S.L.: August 24, 1994. The one-worldists who run the United Nations are preparing for a mass in the final international population conference: the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), which is formally titled, is to set the stage for an intensified campaign to drastically reduce population levels, especially in the developing sector. The Cairo conference is also designed to further consolidate the United Nations' emergence as a global government, a new Roman imperium that will rule with savage brutality over the shards of former nation-states, and reduce their living standards to the level of animals. The ICPD is based on the same contempt for human life that drove Hitler's extermination camps. Its fundamental premise, namely, that the world has a finite "carrying capacity" (an idea first developed by eighteenth-century Venetian Giammaria Ortes and popularized by Great Britain's Thomas Malthus) which can support only a limited number of people, has absolutely no scientific basis. Yet the implementation of this fraud means that billions of people must die to meet the ICPD's population goals. The Cairo conference draft document seeks to destroy the institution of the family, the foundation of human society, under the guise of sexual freedom and "women's empowerment." It aims to slash population growth rates to zero over the next decades through the rampant spread of abortion, sterilization, and euthanasia. And it proposes to meet the developing sector's desperate need for economic development by cynically foisting the hoax of "sustainable development"--an economic model whose sole purpose is to suppress the industrial and agricultural development necessary for supporting life. Pope John Paul II has stated publicly that he has "grave concerns" about the Cairo draft document, and has warned that "what is at stake" at the conference "is the very future of humanity." The pontiff has charged that "certain basic ethical principles," including respect for the rights of the unborn and the importance of the family, are "contradicted" by the proposals put forth in the program that has been drafted by the UN bureaucracy, and that the conference's Malthusian premises jeopardize the "very future of humanity." "There is reason to fear," he has said, "that [the draft document] could cause a moral decline resulting in a serious setback for humanity, one in which man himself would be the first victim." The African Academy of Sciences has also challenged the draft document for the Cairo event, asserting that, "For Africa, population remains an important resource for development, without which the continent's national resources will remain latent and unexplored." For certain parts of Africa, infertility, overpopulation, "is a major problem." From the United States, economist Lyndon H. LaRouche, who has repeatedly demonstrated in such locations as the book, [There Are No Limits To Growth], that Malthusianism is a fraud implementation of this fraud means that billions of people must die to
allowed to occur. As Pope John Paul II rightly stressed, the Cairo draft document represents a direct threat to the continued existence of mankind. All individuals and institutions who uphold the principle of the sacredness of human life must rally to shut down the ICPI. The Egyptian government, which is hosting the conference, must be convinced to withdraw its invitation. What humanity desperately needs at this critical juncture is an ecumenical alliance which will defend human life, which is under assault from all sides, and which will help to institute the kinds of economic and social policies required to support increasing numbers of people at an improving standard of living. An international conference on the dignity of man, that would bring together people of goodwill who wish to fight for a better future for humanity, would provide an excellent starting point for reversing the culture of death which has gripped our institutions. The serpent's head of neo-Malthusianism and "free market" economics must be crushed once and for all. Instead, we must build societies based on the principle that man is made in the image of God, and that each child born into this world is a gift, whose unlimited potential for good must be nurtured. It must be recognized that the starvation, illness, conflict, and despair that are all too common in our world are not the consequence of "overpopulation," as the neo-Malthusians behind Cairo would have us believe. Nor are they inevitable. They stem in large part from deliberate decisions made by people—not some depersonalized, disembodied "market forces." For example, the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have wreaked havoc, especially in the Third World and the former Soviet sphere, destroying the basis for productive activity, and thereby creating an apparent "overpopulation" crisis. The orgy of speculation which has dominated the world economy over the past two decades and brought it to the brink of total collapse was not the work of an "invisible hand," but the conscious policy of international financial networks. In reality, despite endless amounts of propaganda to the contrary, there is no "overpopulation" problem. The history of man's development has depended on both increases in his numbers, and increases in his power over nature. Those who propose to reduce the world's population by billions are actually proposing to send humanity back to the Stone Age. The world actually faces a massive depopulation crisis in the immediate future, as the direct result of the anti-natalist campaigns of the last twenty years. This holds as true for many countries in Africa, which are supposedly the most overpopulated, but where, in fact, population density is far smaller than in Europe, as it does for the industrialized countries and the former Soviet sphere, where the lack of children has created a demographic imbalance that is driving the growing international euthanasia movement.

New World Empire: The Cairo event must be stopped not simply because of its anti-family, anti-population orientation. It must also be stopped because it is part and parcel of a larger gameplan to make the United Nations the centerpiece of a new world empire. Lyndon LaRouche has situated the Cairo meeting in the context of a shift in overall UN policy that began in 1982. "[W]e are actually moving into a phase where we can say that there is (virtually) a United Nations World Empire," said LaRouche. "We now have a United Nations which is moving closer and closer to what people like Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells and so forth ... wanted back in the beginning ... a United Nations world dictatorship." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN and a prime mover behind the Cairo population conference, typifies the type of individual set to administer this brave new world. He comes from a wealthy Egyptian family, whose intimate ties with British imperialism extend back to his grandfather, Boutros Pasha, who signed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1899 which formally established British rule over Egypt and Sudan. Culling the 'Human Herd': Under this UN dictatorship, the nation-state will disappear, and the world will be turned into one large "game park," in which "park rangers"—in the person of UN blue helmets—will cull out the "undesirable" and "excess" populations from the "human herd." This is the real content of the UN's "family planning for all" crusade that is supposed to be endorsed at Cairo. The UN has already put this plan into action in select areas of the world, such as Bosnia, where UN forces—and Boutros-Ghali himself—have been bitterly denounced because of the genocidal destruction of the Bosnian people.
one-half; and infant mortality was cut nearly in half. In Bangladesh, where half of program funding for family planning and maternal and child health, the average number of births per mother has dropped from 7.0 to 4.2 since 1970, and infant deaths dropped from 200 87/1000 between 1970-1993. A new project in India’s largest state is working with indigenous nongovernmental organizations using social marketing techniques to reduce fertility by doubling the use of modern contraception over a ten-year period. In the Philippines, contraceptive prevalence has increased from 20% to 25% between 1988 and 1993, and delivery of child survival services has increased dramatically, with immunization rates increasing from 65% in 1989 to 90% in 1993. USAID assistance in Egypt has contributed to a 26% decline in total fertility rates, from 5.3 in 1979 to 3.9 in 1992. USAID and other donor assistance has supported an even more dramatic 53% decline in Egyptian infant mortality rates from 1983 to 1992. In Jordan, a national birth spacing plan, developed by the National Population Commission with USAID funding, was recently approved by the government. USAID assistance has reached the grassroots level and is helping 270 pharmacies to provide family planning devices to couples in their neighborhoods. USAID, as the principal donor supporting family planning activities in Morocco, has contributed to a 32% decline in the total fertility rate, from 5.9 in 1979 to 4.2 in 1992. Over the same time frame, the infant mortality rate declined from an estimated 89 deaths per 1000 live births to 57, and contraceptive prevalence has increased from approximately 19% to 41.5%. USAID was one of the principal donors to alert Yemen to its impending population crisis and to encourage it to develop and implement a population strategy and action plan. [–]

20038. AID. Congressional Presentation, FY 1995; Part 099: Asia and Near East: FY1995 Sustainable Development Request: Introduction: Building Democracy. District of Columbia: AID, February 28, 1994. The burgeoning populations in the Asia and Near East region are placing greater demands on the governments. The demands are for increased government accountability and transparency, greater citizen participation in national and local development, increased respect for the rule of law and human rights, especially among women and minority groups, and regular elections to enforce accountability. USAID's democracy program seeks to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and processes in the region. Programs supporting fiscal decentralization in the Philippines have resulted in internal revenue allotments to local governments increasing seven-fold from 1989-1993 and Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) representation on local government planning boards. In Mongolia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, political institutions including political parties, parliamentary staff, and the legal staff, have received training in how to function in support of operational democracy. Innovative programs in clinical legal services and mediation and arbitration have been supported, as well as traditional electoral assistance. A number of the region's countries have had their first successful (i.e. relatively peaceful and honest) democratic elections in recent years; USAID has provided electoral assistance to several. USAID institutional support to increase the capacity of the parliaments in Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Lebanon is resulting in their becoming a focal point for political reform. Assistance to enhance the capacity of trade unions has enabled them to participate effectively in the formulation of national policies and to represent worker’s interests. [–]


USAID assistance is crucial to support Egypt's moderating role in the Middle East and to help Egypt confront political and economic problems which could endanger its stability. Assistance supports the historic Camp David peace accord between Egypt and Israel.

USAID SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND MISSION STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (MSOs):

1) Broad-Based Economic Growth: Improved Macroeconomic Performance. USAID policy reform programs promote macro-economic stability and structural change in the agriculture, trade, fiscal, and the financial sectors which are essential to sustain broad-based growth, along with privatization to encourage investment. Institutional and price reforms in infrastructure and social sectors assist the Government of Egypt's cost recovery and sustainability efforts, reduce its budget deficit, and provide a base for increased production and growth. USAID expects investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) to increase from 26% in 1992 to 33% in 1997, while the fiscal deficit will decline from 20% to 3.5% during the same period. Through regional programs, Egypt participates in activities which promote economic, scientific and technical collaboration. Increased Private Investment and Trade. USAID has targeted specific policy reforms and projects which encourage and support increased private investment and trade within a market-oriented framework. USAID will contribute to diversifying the number of financial market instruments from 4-6, deepening and broadening the stock exchange from LE 600 million to LE 6 billion ($1 equals approximately LE 3.38), increasing the number and types of financial intermediaries, and privatizing 23 commercial banks. The number of micro, small and medium enterprises receiving otherwise inaccessible credit will increase from the current level of 22,500 to at least 80,000 by 1997. The new lending institutions set up to provide this credit will achieve financial self-sustainability within two years of the first credit extension. By 1997, 56 state-owned enterprises will be privatized (from a base of zero in 1992), with a total book value of at least $560 million. The International Executive Service Corps of retired American volunteers will have benefited 1,250 Syrian clients by 1997 (from a 1992 base of 800). In addition, the Commodity Import Program will encourage trade by increasing access to US goods and technology. Increased Production, Productivity and Incomes in the Agriculture Sector. USAID efforts will increase agriculture production and incomes, in part by liberalizing product and input markets. For example, the private sector will market 100% of all fertilizer by 1997, from a baseline of zero in 1990. Sector policy reform will continue improving incentives for production and marketing. Cropping pattern restrictions will be reduced to zero. All remaining price and marketing controls will be removed. USAID will also contribute to the development and adoption of improved technologies in production, processing and marketing for agriculture products, and will increase the efficiency of irrigation water use. Improved economic incentives and provision of technologies will increase the yields of the major agricultural commodities by an additional 5%-15% by 1997, continuing the substantial productivity increases realized since 1989.

Improved Maternal and Child Health. USAID emphasizes improved access to higher quality preventive services for maternal and child health. USAID is placing special importance on improved pre-natal and peri-natal care as well as combating acute respiratory infections and other infectious diseases. USAID efforts will contribute to a drop in the infant mortality rate from 61.5 (1990) to 37 (1997), and a decrease in the child mortality rate from 24.8 to 17. The maternal mortality ratio will drop from 184 (1992) to 130 (1997). USAID is also trying to improve the sustainability of the health care system through its efforts on health financing. For example, the percentage of Egyptians covered by health insurance schemes will rise from 16% in 1993 to 35% in 1997.


3) Building Democracy: Democracy and Participation. USAID's governance and democracy strategy recognizes the central importance of strengthened democratic systems to sustainable development. The strategy emphasizes support to Egypt's legislature, judiciary, and professional and community organizations to enable these institutions to become more responsible participants in governance. As USAID's current strategy evolves, assistance will be provided to the legislature and judiciary to strengthen their capacities to administer the legal functions of governance. USAID is still working on the formulation of its strategic objective and has not yet established performance indicators and targets.

4) Protecting the Environment: Adoption of Water and Air

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Protection Practices. The strategy focuses on the adoption of air and water pollution prevention practices directly through project assistance and indirectly through pricing reforms which reduce the demand for commodities or services injurious to the environment. For example, USAID has targeted annual increases in the price of electricity to reach 100% of long-run marginal cost (LRMC) by 1997. USAID has also targeted increases in the price of water of 30% per annum and an annual percentage increase of 60% in the wastewater tariffs in selected cities. Infrastructure projects increase access to potable water and sanitation services in urban areas and other projects address energy conservation and other measures that lead to clean air. USAID will avert the number of metric tons (MT) of pollutants entering the Nile and Lake Maryut from 81,000 MT in 1993 to 265,000 MT in 1997. USAID is still collecting and identifying air quality data and will then set targets for achievement. Egypt benefits from regional activities which address the problem of desertification and water issues in the region.

**USAID MISSION RESULTS:**

1. **Broad-Based Economic Growth:** Improved Macroeconomic Performance. Multi-donor economic policy reform, with major support from USAID, has helped the Government of Egypt (GOE) unify exchange rates, liberalize interest rates, reduce tariffs, eliminate most non-tariff barriers to trade, cut the budget deficit from about 20% of gross national product (GNP) to 4.7% of GNP, reduce inflation, and build up substantial international resources. Increased Private Investment and Trade. USAID funding in power has resulted in the installation and rehabilitation of over 400 of Egypt's total generating capacity and the reduction of subsidies. USAID financed equipment and technology has also resulted in reliable telephone service to over 7 million people in Cairo and Alexandria. Economic infrastructure of this type is essential to private investment and trade. The number of micro, small and medium enterprises accessing credit for the first time grew from 600 in 1990 to 22,500 in 1994 as a result of two new private sector foundations, one commercial bank, and a new private credit guarantee corporation. Three state-owned enterprises have actually been sold with more than 20 brought onto the market for sale over 1993–1994. Over 750 private Egyptian firms have been exported more than 1000 different commodities from 1400 US manufacturers and suppliers from 46 states valued in total at approximately $1 billion since 1986. Increased Production, Productivity and Incomes in the Agriculture Sector. USAID efforts in agriculture have resulted in increased yields of between 30%-40% between 1986-1992 for cereal grains, and replacement of 19,000 irrigation structures reducing water loss for 2 million farmers. Improved Maternal and Child Health. USAID assistance has helped reduce the infant mortality rate by approximately 50% from 1977, saving 80,000 lives each year.

2. **Utilizing Population Growth:** Increased Level and Effective Use of Contraceptive Methods. Almost 50% of Egyptian couples are now using contraceptives and the total fertility rate has fallen to 3.9 births per woman from a level of 5.3 births in 1980.

3. **Building Democracy:** Democracy and Participation. Earlier USAID efforts in local governance and participation provided over 16,000 grants to rural village and urban areas. These grants financed the construction of water, wastewater, road improvements, and renovated schools and clinics in 26 governorates. The basic services provided under these activities benefited over 45 million people. As USAID's democracy strategy is implemented, it will focus on promoting greater transparency and accountability in government and increased participation. Initial efforts will focus on improving the efficiency of Egypt's judicial and legal institutions and improving the impartial delivery of legal and judicial services.

4. **Protecting the Environment:** Adoption of Water and Air Protection Practices. USAID assistance is rehabilitating and expanding urban water and wastewater systems in Cairo and other major cities, directly benefiting 22 million people. USAID-financed industrial energy conservation activities are protecting air quality by reducing toxic emissions.

**OTHER FY 1995 USAID-MANAGED ACTIVITIES:**

**OTHER DONORS:** In 1993, the United States, with about 42% of bilateral contributions, was the largest bilateral donor. Other leading donors are the World Bank, IMF, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, and the Abu Dhabi Fund.

**FY 1995 PROMOTING PEACE REQUEST:** The Administration requests $816.7 million in Promoting Peace funds, of which $815 million is to promote Egypt's long-term economic growth and $1.7 million is support from regionally funded activities which benefit Egypt. Sustainable Development funds of $4,029 million from regionally funded activities will support GOE's broad-based economic growth ($630,000); population ($3.299 million); and environment ($100,000). [USAID/Cairo Mission Director: Henry Bassford.] [ ]

20040. AID. Statement of the Administrator to the Congress of the United States; Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1994: Part 12: AID Program Summary; FY 1994 Budget: Special Assistance Initiatives. District of Columbia: AID, April 1993. The Special Assistance Initiatives (SAI) program first requested in FY 1990 provides funding for the US contribution to the Philippines Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) and for support of the democratic evolution in Eastern Europe. For FY 1994, AID is requesting a total of $448,951,000 -- $40, million for the MAI and $408,951,000 for Eastern Europe. The FY 1993 appropriation included $40, million for the MAI and $400, million for Eastern Europe.

1. **Central and Eastern European Program:** As noted above, the need for continued support for the transition to democracy and market economies in this region remains a key foreign assistance priority for FY 1994. Environmental degradation continues to undermine the quality of life in the region, and economic adjustments continue to place increasing numbers of people in need of social assistance. Finally, the Yugoslav war and related sanctions are creating suffering, not only in the former republics of Yugoslavia, but also in neighboring countries. US assistance to date has played an important part in the transitions taking place. In the Czech Republic, for example, US-financed investment advisors have helped the government garner $1.5 billion in US investment commitments over the past year. In Poland, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and other programs have facilitated the rapid growth of the private sector, which now accounts for over one-half of Poland's GDP. Assistance to democratic parties in Albania helped them level the playing field for the 3/1992 elections. Fertilizer shipped to Albania both increased yields, thus reducing needed food imports, and helped develop a network of private agricultural input dealers. The $408,951,000 SAI request for Eastern Europe for FY 1994 will be used principally for democratic strengthening, economic restructuring, and quality of life activities.

2. **Multilateral Assistance Initiative for the Philippines:** The $40, million requested for the FY 1994 US contribution to the multi-donor Multilateral Assistance Initiative will permit continued support for economic and policy reform objectives aimed at stimulating market-based growth and supporting infrastructure growth.

3. **Humanitarian Aid to the New Independent States (Former Soviet Union):** For FY 1994, $703,820,000 is requested for humanitarian and technical assistance for the New Independent States. The FY 1993 appropriation was $417, million. Two revolutions have shaken the former republics of Yugoslavia, but also in neighboring countries. US assistance to date has played an important part in the transitions taking place. In the Czech Republic, for example, US-financed investment advisors have helped the government garner $1.5 billion in US investment commitments over the past year. In Poland, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and other programs have facilitated the rapid growth of the private sector, which now accounts for over one-half of Poland's GDP. Assistance to democratic parties in Albania helped them level the playing field for the 3/1992 elections. Fertilizer shipped to Albania both increased yields, thus reducing needed food imports, and helped develop a network of private agricultural input dealers. The $408,951,000 SAI request for Eastern Europe for FY 1994 will be used principally for democratic strengthening, economic restructuring, and quality of life activities.

4. **Cross-cutting Initiatives:** (a) Economic Restructuring. AID will continue to help NIS countries implement policies needed to create market-based financial stability. Technical assistance in fiscal and financial sector reform is improving tax administration and developing comprehensive economic policy reform; training of bankers will be expanded to help develop financial and monetary payments systems necessary for market economies. (b) Private Sector Development. Structural priorities include
ending massive subsidies to state enterprises, converting defense industry to civilian purposes, promoting small businesses to empower a middle class and provide employment, and supporting agribusiness development. AID’s technical assistance has supported a major privatization program in Russia. In policy development, experts are reinforcing NIS privatization strategies, supporting development of securities and commodity exchanges, and of legal and regulatory systems. Market-oriented, economy-wide policies will be promoted through business centers and training. US agribusiness associations will work with NIS partners to support private agribusiness and increase food production. (c) Democratic Institution Building. AID is helping NIS governments transform their legal frameworks to systems based upon the rule of law, free and fair elections, an independent media and competent local governments. Training and technical assistance are being provided in political party development, training of lawyers and judges, drafting of laws and constitutions, and improved management and administrative skills for local government officials. Independent media centers will improve access to information and modern technology for print, radio and television journalists.

(4) Sector Initiatives. (a) Energy. Dramatic improvements are needed in the efficiency of production and consumption, energy sector policies, and in the operational safety of nuclear power plants. Needed improvements in fire and operational safety procedures have been identified at nuclear power plants in Ukraine and Russia; and, through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy, advisers will improve emergency response capabilities, operational controls and regulatory systems. New technologies will promote more efficient gas, oil and coal production and delivery systems. Ongoing pricing, policy and institutional reform helps develop market-driven approaches to supply and demand. (b) Environment. Through policy dialogue, as well as partnerships between local and US NGOs and business, AID is seeking to promote price-sensitive use of natural resources and enhance environmental quality. A joint US-World Bank review of environmental policy reform and investment priorities in Russia will facilitate a planned $200 million IBRD environmental loan. Advisers are developing recommendations to reduce constraints to privatization from environmental liabilities, and experts are assisting economic, environmental and natural resources ministries and legislatures to improve environmental management. (c) Housing. AID is providing critical technical assistance to help create a private market for housing. With AID’s assistance, local governments in Russia and Kazakhstan are reducing housing subsidies while developing targeted support programs for the needy. US-funded pilot projects for privatized management and maintenance of public housing are under way in Russia and a demonstration project for a private mortgage banking system in Russia is planned. Placement of advisers in additional municipalities in NIS will expand current efforts to develop market-based rent and utility pricing and privatization of management and construction. An officer resettlement initiative will facilitate the resettlement of Russian officers returning to Russia. (d) Health. The NIS needs modern medical technology, restoration of its pharmaceutical production capacity, population assistance and rationalization of health care financing. Vaccine production facilities are being improved through training and technical assistance from FDA. Private US manufacturers are reviewing vaccine facilities for potential investment. Twenty hospital partnerships between US and NIS health care institutions are improving clinical programs and management systems. Expanded efforts are planned to improve health financing systems and to develop a women’s health initiative, with a focus on family planning. (e) Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance. The living standards of the peoples of NIS have plummeted rapidly and will improve only gradually. However, ensuring protection of those groups which are the hardest hit by economic contraction, political instability, and fraying basic social services is in our political and humanitarian interest. While continuing to respond to emergency supply needs, AID will increase its emphasis on building NIS early warning systems and emergency response capabilities through indigenous humanitarian organizations and local governments. (f) Exchanges and Training. AID’s programs offer NIS citizens the opportunity for exposure to US culture, business systems, management principles, free-market economics and democratic principles, as well as training for specific skill needs. Networks of US business groups, nongovernmental organizations and NIS counterparts are exchanging information and visits. An expanded exchanges and training project will bring several thousand NIS citizens to the US for a wide range of activities such as secondary school exchanges, sister universities, academic training, short-term small-tree technical training, and private business meetings.

(5) Economic Support Fund (ESF) The FY 1994 request level for ESF is $2,582, million compared to the FY 1993 appropriated level of $2,670, million (excluding the separate appropriation of $19,704,000 for the International Fund for Ireland). ESF is allocated for a number of purposes: base rights or access rights agreements and other broader foreign policy concerns, such as peacekeeping and support for democratization. AID manages ESF under the foreign policy guidance of the State Department and, to the maximum extent feasible, the use of ESF conforms to the basic policy directions underlying development assistance. ESF finances commodity import programs and balance of payments and economic stabilization programs, the latter frequently in a multidonor context. Major ESF programs continue in Israel, Egypt, Central America and Turkey. ESF assistance to Latin America has supported growth-oriented policies in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua and funds for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. Much of ESF is projectized within the framework of sustainable development where stronger links to policy performance are beginning to pay some dividends in countries such as Egypt. Some ESF for Latin America, Eastern Europe, the New Independent States and the Asia also supports sustainable development objectives. Projects in support of our democracy program have been closely coordinated with the State Department, resulting in successful efforts to achieve democratic objectives within an overall framework of sustainable development.

(6) P.L. 480 Food for Peace As noted earlier, although the P.L. 480 Food for Peace program is administered by the Agency, funding is appropriated under the Agriculture Act and therefore is not included in the AID program request. Food assistance responds to an immediate critical need, is a valuable and major component of AID resources directed toward sustainable development, and helps the US economy through export of US agricultural products to countries who will become greater farming partners. Under the FY 1990 revision of the Agricultural Development and Trade Act, AID is charged with implementing the revised Title II and Title III grant Food for Peace programs which are directed toward achieving food security. In addition, AID supports (a) the Farmer-to-Farmer program, a people-to-people technical assistance program implemented through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and cooperative development organizations (COCOs) to bring American farming and agribusiness expertise to NIS farmers, and (b) a program to provide cash support to PVOs and COCOs for food assistance related activities. AID chairs the Food Aid Consultative Group with PVO participation. Title II provides grant food aid for emergency programs, for regular programs sponsored by PVOs and for the World Food Program (WFP). The US provided over 750,000 metric tons of Title II for emergencies in 1992 and over 1.2 million metric tons for regular programs through PVOs and WFP. Budget authority requested for Title II in FY 1994 is $831,870,000, an increase of almost $22, million over the FY 1993 appropriation level of $810, million. The new Title III grant program entails planning, resource allocation and implementation processes much like those for other multi-year AID-managed development programs. Per the Act, these programs must contribute to improved food security. AID also seeks to integrate Title III programs into AID country strategies and to measure developmental results. Under this program food assistance is provided through governments of least developed countries which meet specific eligibility criteria established in the FY 1990 legislation. The FY 1994 budget authority request is $283,594,000, which includes both commodity and transport costs; the FY 1993 appropriation was $335,594,000. [—]

This article discusses death in a bedouin community in Egypt. Its dress, language, songs, religious aspects, social implications and women's roles.

20042. Abu-Lughod, Lila; Altorki, Soraya [editor]; El-Solt, Camilla Fawzi [editor]. Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your Own Society: Part 7: Fieldwork of a Dutiful Daughter. Modern Arab Studies. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 139-162. In 1983 the author returned to the Awlad Ali Bedouin community in the Egyptian Western Desert where she had done fieldwork for her dissertation five years earlier. Both being a woman and an Arab immediately raised two questions that created distance from her informants: her lack of children in the five intervening years, and her conspicuous lack of conventional forms of Muslim piety, especially prayer. Her initial contact was mixed: her poor arabic and anomalous status as a young single woman was balanced by her sound Muslim and Arab lineage (the fact her father was Jordanian was seen as especially good, since Bedouin perceived all non-African Arabs as being essentially Bedouin). This 'non-Arabian' status was valuable since the Awlad Ali Bedouin are distrustful of the government, which is encroaching on their traditional status; outsider anthropologists are often seen as police spies, foreign anthropologists are perceived as CIA agents.

20043. Abzug, Bella; Womens Caucus. Press Release: Women’s Caucus at ICPD in Cairo. New York: Womens Caucus, August 23, 1994. Dear Women's Caucus member. In your responses to our last mailing following PrepCom III, it has been wonderful to hear how so many of you are maintaining the energy and power of the Women's Caucus agenda in your respective countries: disseminating information; organizing local, national and regional meetings; cultivating the media to spread our message; and in some cases securing representation on your delegation to Cairo.

WOMEN'S CAUCUS PRE-CAIRO: Enclosed please find the key document we will use for our advocacy work in Cairo, "Women's Caucus Recommendations on Bracketed Text in the Draft Programme of Action of the ICPD."

It was prepared in close collaboration with the Writing Analysis Group of the Women's Caucus, comprised of Caucus task force chairs, key chapter monitors and major reproductive rights networks. The Writing Analysis Group has worked very hard, during the interim period between PrepCom III and Cairo, to prepare careful amendments with rationales to all bracketed text in the document, including Chapter II "Principles" and Chapter XIII "National Action" which were widely distributed to delegates at the Informal Consultations described below. Please use this document now, in your discussions with your government representatives who will be going to Cairo. We would appreciate hearing their reactions to our recommendations. A few weeks ago, three consecutive Informal Consultations were convened by governments (see parentheses) at the United Nations in New York, to discuss issues that were not thoroughly deliberated upon at PrepCom III: Preamble and Principles (Canada) on 13 July; Goals (Indonesia & India) on 14 July; and Financial Resources (Netherlands) on 15 July. The Chair of each of the informal (Ruth Archibald, Amb. Nicolas Biegman and Amb. Nugroho Wisnumurti, respectively) reminded delegates that the consultations were meant to stimulate discussion and not act as negotiating sessions; hence they would not have the power to add or delete brackets in the document. A brief overview of each session follows: Preamble & Principles: Ruth Archibald led the discussion on the Preamble and each of the 16 Principles in Chapter II. Most delegates expressed concern about the high number of Principles, suggesting a reordering of Principles without any new additions. Some Southern delegates emphasized that the Principles should better recognize the integral linkage between population and development and stressed the importance of the right to development. Discussions revealed that the issue of national sovereignty was "the formulation and implementation of population policies" in Principle 4 will be one of the key principles for negotiations in Cairo. A number of delegates (i.e. Egypt, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan and US) supported the Women's Caucus amendments to the chapeau, Principle 3 and Principle 6. Delegates called for tightening the text of Chapter I's "Preamble" so that it clearly states their collective commitment to implement the Programme of Action and is not simply an executive summary of the document.

Goals: Ambassador Wisnumurti led the discussion on the goals of education, especially for girls; infant, child and maternal mortality reduction, and universal access to reproductive health services, including family planning. Dr. Nafis Sadik defended the necessity for the proposed population goals, because the Programme of Action would be sporadic and scattered. Some delegates expressed apprehension over the attainability of global goals and called for the adoption of "realistic" attainable goals. Although roughly 60 countries were represented, only 10 delegates took the floor.

Resources: Ambassador Biegman opened the floor for discussion on the following areas: (1) estimates quoted in Chapter XIII of the document; (2) the 20/20 proposal urging governments "to devote at least 20% of public sector expenditures to the social sectors as well as 20% of official development assistance, stressing, in particular, poverty eradication within the context of sustainable development"; (3) the proposal that "up to two-thirds of the costs will continue to be met by the countries themselves and up to one-third from external sources" to implement the Programme of Action; and (4) recognizing the specific needs of countries with economies in transition. A few delegates (i.e. Canada, Sweden and US) supported the Women's Caucus amendments to para 13.15 which articulated our concern that the estimates in Chapter XIII are based on incomplete and imprecise data which must be improved on an urgent basis at national and international levels. While these calculations currently put most infrastructure costs in the family planning estimates, it is recognized that all financial, infrastructural, and human resources must be equitably used for the several reproductive and sexual health services.

WOMEN'S CAUCUS PROGRAMME IN CAIRO, 9/4-13/1994: An orientation session to the Women's Caucus process is scheduled for Sunday, 9/4/1994 from 1:45 - 2:30 pm in the NGO Forum Room 3, following a general orientation for NGOs from 1 - 1:45 pm. This session will initiate newcomers into the Women's Caucus process, and update old-timers. During the orientation, we plan to form regional groups (Africa, Asia, Caribbean and Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, North America) in order to: (1) Allow for greater interaction between experienced Women's Caucus members and newcomers; (2) Nominate a Women's Caucus chair from each of the seven regions for the seven daily Caucus meetings; (3) Nominate Women's Caucus Lobby Contacts within each of the government voting blocs and key sub-regions (G-77, EU, CANZ, CARICOM, Nordic); (4) Cluster into one of the Women's Caucus Task Forces organized by Chapters in the Document and the ICPD agenda, to monitor floor discussions and coordinate advocacy efforts on the bracketed text in each chapter. It will be very important to get women NGOs on government delegations to take on these assignments, due to limited security passes for NGOs to access the official conference center. (5) Call for volunteers for a Women's Caucus post-Cairo Task Force to collect ideas out of the rich array of NGO Forum panels and workshops in preparation for the last session of the Women's Caucus at ICPD. (see below) After meeting in regional groups, we hope to reconvene as a full Women's Caucus to announce the respective regional decisions and gear up for our first Women's Caucus meeting on Monday, 5 September at 9 am. The Women's Caucus will convene daily from 9 - 10 am in the NGO Forum Room 3. The strength and momentum of the Caucus depends on your active participation. We have a heavy agenda and collectively we can build support to remove the brackets on language which supports women's perspectives on population and development, as well as continue our struggle for sexual and reproductive rights and health which is at the core of our agenda. One of the main purposes of the daily Caucus will be to brief people on the government process. Many NGOs will focus on activities in the NGO Forum to network, strategize and build an agenda for the future, while a smaller number of accredited NGOs will have access to the government/negotiations in the conference center. Our strategy, therefore, is to divide work and maximize power for our common advocacy work. Our sisters who are on government delegations will, no
doubt, be key allies in carrying the Women's Caucus concerns onto the floor. In collaboration with IPPF, Women's Caucus representatives (lobby contacts, chapter monitors, regional chairs etc.) will meet with NGOs on government delegations daily from 1 - 1:30 pm in the government Conference Center. At the suggestion of many PrepCom III Women's Caucus members, we have scheduled an NGO-Delegate Dialogue for Thursday, September 8 at 6:30 pm in the NGO Forum Room. I would like to describe what I have accepted an invitation from the Women's Caucus to engage in an open dialogue on our critical concerns and how to hold the world's governments accountable to them. This session on reproductive rights and implementing the ICPD will give us an opportunity to openly and directly engage key delegates on how they plan to implement the ICPD outcomes and decisions. For your information, attached is the provisional timetable for the work of the ICPD and general information for ICPD participants prepared by the ICPD Secretariat. Please take careful note of the process for NGO registration. The NGO Planning Committee for the ICPD has done a terrific job in preparing an NGO Forum Programme Guide, scheduling a tremendous array of NGO activities, which each of you should be receiving shortly.

WOMEN'S CAUCUS POST-CAIRO: The last session of the Women's Caucus at ICPD will be Tuesday, 9/13/1994. It will be an important session to take stock of our achievements through the ICPD process and to share strategies and plans as we continue our work throughthe upcoming International Conference processes on Women (Beijing, 9/1995) and Social Development (Copenhagen, 3/1995). For your information, Diane Dillon-Ridgley, Brownie Ledbetter and I will be staying at the Semiramis Intercontinental Hotel, in Cairo, with the US government delegation.SusanDavis, Anita Nayar and the rest of the WEDO team will be staying at the Dar El Defaa El Gawy (tel. 202-2506905).

See you soon at the Women's Caucus in Cairo. Till then, I remain, Yours in sisterhood, Bella S. Abzug. [=] 20044. Aleis, Fady. "Arafat visits Tulkarm, Qalqilya: Redeployment in northern West Bank completed", in Biladi-Jerusalem Times, January 5, 1996, p. 3. As part of the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement, the Israeli Army concluded the withdrawal of their forces from the twin cities of Ramallah and Al Bireh, Wednesday, December 27. Ramallah became the sixth town to be evacuated by the Israeli Army. This move completes the liberation of the cities in the northern West Bank. Following the Israeli departure, some 1200 Palestinian police entered Ramallah and took up previous Israeli army positions. Streets, commercial districts and graffiti were cleaned and decorations were put up to welcome the arrival of the Palestinian police. Thousands of Palestinians paraded and danced on the streets expressing their joy at the occasion following 28 years of bitter occupation. Firecrackers were heard throughout the city and speeches were given by prominent figures. Crowds of Palestinians jumped the fences of the former Israeli military compound to visit the isolation cells where many of them had been detained at one time or another. Some of the cells measured four feet by four feet. On December 30, more than 70000 Palestinians crowded into the former Israeli military compound to welcome the President, Yasser Arafat. At 11:10 am, two Egyptian military helicopters landed on the roof of the compound. Palestinian scouts circled the area and played the Palestinian National Anthem. President Arafat left the helicopter, head for the stage above the compound and gave a speech. He welcomed Palestinians in the liberated cities and declared that "Ramallah and Al Bireh are now liberated." He spoke about Palestinian prisoners and declared "I promise you that all Palestinian prisoners will be released and first and foremost amongst them should be Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas and Abeer Al Waheidi, the woman prisoner charged with participating in killing a settler." During his speech, he called on all the Palestinians in exile to come and participate in building the country. He finished his speech at 12 pm. Ziad Al Louzy, a Presidential guard in Force 17, was jailed for three years during the Intifada and expressed his feelings saying, "This is a dream that we are all living in reality. I'm originally from Ramallah. God only knows my happiness at seeing the Israelis vanish from this city."

I approached an old man who was shedding tears while watching the helicopter land, when I asked why he was crying, he replied, "I'm seventy years old. I have spent over 6 years in Israeli jails and 2 years in Jordanian prisons as well. I prayed for this day and now it's happening before my eyes." A chain of Palestinian women were singing and taking part in Palestinian traditional dances in the heart of the compound. I asked one of them to describe how she felt. "There are no feelings to express during a universal wedding," she said. "Today is a Palestinian national day. I have sacrificed a son in the name of Palestine, now he lies peacefully in his grave." Ahmed Al Nabati, a lieutenant in the Palestinian police, said: "Over 1200 Palestinian police have arrived in Ramallah. Nine hundred of whom are Gazans and the rest are from Ramallah. We are here to keep order; no one is above the law. People here are very hospitable. Supermarkets and restaurants are offering free drinks and sandwiches to police and soldiers. This is a sign of their joy to see the Palestinian police. Our first task consisted of removing all the cement blocks that closed streets leading to and from Ramallah which will ease the flow of traffic." After President Arafat left the stage, he met prominent personalities and officials and then convened the weekly cabinet meeting inside the compound. Later that night, he visited the house of Abeer Al Waheidi in Ramallah and assured her family that he was confident of her release. [=] 20045. Amnesty International. Press Release: Amnesty International Calls World Conference "Summit Of Missed Opportunities": Part 1: Summary. London: Amnesty International, June 28, 1993. Amnesty International's Secretary General has denounced the World Conference on Human Rights as "a summit of missed opportunities". In his statement he said "there has been no reprieve for the victims, as governments fine-tuned their official declarations and reaffirmed the 50 year-old core values of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence." The complete statement by the secretary general is attached. [=] 20046. Amnesty International; Sane, Pierre. Press Release: Amnesty International Calls World Conference "Summit Of Missed Opportunities": Part 2: Summary Comments at the Conclusion of the World Conference on Human Rights: Summit of Missed Opportunities. London: Amnesty International, June 28, 1993. First, I would like to point out that as the conference is coming to an end, many of the governments have continued to kill, torture and persecute political opponents. 4400 known prisoners of conscience in 60 countries languish in jails. Amnesty International groups have been working for 11000 individuals in 80 countries. 25 appeals for Urgent Action to save lives, stop torture and the death penalty have been issued. Thousands of appeal letters were sent to Brazil, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, India, Kuwait, Latvia, Malawi, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Turkmenistan, USA, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia. At least 20 people have died under torture. Over 40 people have "disappeared". More than 100 death sentences have been passed. Every four hours a prisoner has been executed in one of the 106 countries which continue to use the death penalty. Gross violations have continued unabated in many other countries around the world. [=] 20047. Amnesty International; Sane, Pierre. Press Release: Amnesty International Calls World Conference "Summit Of Missed Opportunities": Part 3: Summary Comments at the Conclusion of the World Conference on Human Rights: These Are The Facts-All These Violations Took Place During The Last Two Years. London: Amnesty International, June 28, 1993. There has been no reprieve for the victims, as governments fine-tuned their official declarations and reaffirmed the 50 year-old core values of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence.

Secondly, analyzing the Declaration of Principles which governments attending the world conference have agreed to, Amnesty International welcomes:

1. That women's rights have now been put in the mainstream of the UN human rights machinery and that their rights have been
reaffirmed as being "inalienable, integral, and an indivisible part of universal human rights." This is tribute to the struggle that human rights activists and women's organizations throughout the world have been waging for decades.

2. The priority accorded to the rights of the child and the call for universal ratification by 1995 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. Children constitute certainly the group under highest risk in times of increased pauperization and armed conflicts.

3. That the rights of indigenous peoples has been reaffirmed. However, it seems that nothing very new has been recommended.

Amnesty International regrets however:

1. That no radically new principles have been articulated to address the enormous challenges of today's world and to move the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from a "common standard of achievement" to an "obligation under international law". The text does not even state that human rights violations are an obstacle to development.

2. The references to national and regional particularities that may weaken universality.

3. That states are being "encouraged" to ratify international treaties instead of being "urged" to do so (for instance, the Convention Against Torture).

Amnesty International utterly rejects:

1. The descending phraseology regarding the NGOs whose courageous work keeps the human rights issue on the international agenda, and without whom the UN system of human rights monitoring and protection would collapse.

2. The potentially dangerous reference to the rights of the media guaranteed only under national law and not under international standards of freedom of expression.

Thirdly, looking now into the Action Plan issued by the world conference which of course will be the yardstick against which we NGOs will measure the extent to which the world's governments will live up to their proclamations, we note that:

1. The High Commissioner is referred to the General Assembly of the UN for further study. This is another missed opportunity to attach to the Vienna Declaration a political initiative that would have made this conference a landmark.

2. The International Court is referred back to the International Law Commission which is "encouraged" to continue its efforts. This is another proof of the lack of clear political support and an attempt to reintroduce the so-called national and regional "particularities" through the back door.

3. The resources of the UN Centre are to be increased within the existing and future regular budgets. When we know how strained the UN budget is at the moment and how stretched its operations are, this recommendation turns any Action Plan into mere wishful thinking.

Clearly Amnesty International has to look beyond Vienna and work more forcefully for the emergence and build up of a strong global human rights movement that will constitute one of the major guarantees of human rights protection and promotion in the future. The seeds of such a movement were planted in Vienna. [ = ]

20049. Arab Womens Solidarity Association of North America; Arab Womens Solidarity Association; AWSA. Arab Womens Solidarity Association of North America (AWSA), Brochure. Seattle, Wash.: Arab Womens Solidarity Association [Post Office Box 95760, Seattle, WA 98145; (206)-782-5236 or (206)-322-1360]. N.D. [1994?] "Arab Women are well aware of the international dimension of oppression. Our feminism is global, and includes international, national, family and personal issues." -- Nawal El-Saadawi, AWSA President.

In 1982, 120 Arab women established the Arab Womens Solidarity Association (AWSA) in Cairo, Egypt, to promote women's rights in Arab countries and to encourage Arab women to work together in their respective countries, as well as internationally. Since then, the association has grown to include 3000 women and men worldwide. In 1985, AWSA obtained consultative status as an international, non-profit, NGO with the UN Economic & Social Council.

AWSA North America was established in Seattle, Washington, in 3/1994, under the guidance of Nawal El-Saadawi. This branch of AWSA was formed to respond to the issues facing Arab-American women, and to create solidarity among Arab women in North America, the Arab region and internationally.

AWSA encourages Arab women's active participation in social, economic, cultural and political life. Because women's rights are directly connected to human rights AWSA works to address many forms of discrimination and oppression. Through educational and informational activities, we promote an understanding of Arab and Arab-American women's experience in order to pave the way for cultural understanding and cooperation with other groups committed to human rights, equality and justice.

Current activities: (1) Networking with other Arab-American and women's organizations in North America. (2) Organizing a local reading/lecture series by and about Middle Eastern women. (3) Studying specific issues affecting women of Arab origin living in North America. (4) Meeting with other American ethnic women facing similar issues. (5) Re-issuing AWSA's magazine 'Moon' in Arabic and English language. (6) Establishing a quarterly, international newsletter to connect all AWSA branches. (7) Sending delegates to the International Conference on Population & Development in Cairo, Egypt, 9/1994. (8) Organizing the AWSA workshop for the UN Fourth International Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing, China in 9/1995.

Other issues and tasks will evolve out of our efforts. Life is always reflected in change and growth. We invite you to join us. We ask all our friends, women and men, to give this new branch of AWSA as much support as possible. [ = ]

20050. Avakian, Bob. "Communism and Religion: Part 1(a): Islam: Introduction", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), July 20, 1997. Let's apply dialectical materialism to examine certain aspects of Islam and its Holy Book, the Qur'an (Koran), historically and in the present-day world In A History of God, Karen Armstrong discusses the rise of the Islamic religion, at the time of its founder Muhammad, at the beginning of the seventh century. She links this with significant changes in the circumstances and "fortunes" of the Meccan tribe of Quraysh, of which Muhammad was a member—specifically, a rapid and dramatic change from a nomadic life in the Arabian steppes to becoming very successful in trade in the area of Mecca (in what is now Saudi Arabia). Along with this, there were corresponding ideological changes. Armstrong characterizes it this way: "their drastically altered lifestyle meant that the old tribal values had been superseded by a rampant and ruthless capitalism" actually this was a pre-capitalist mercantilism but nevertheless Armstrong's point is important. And she goes on to say: "People felt obscurely disoriented and lost. Muhammad knew that the
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Quraysh were on a dangerous course and needed to find an ideology that would help them adjust to their new conditions. At this time," she adds, "any political solution tended to be of a religious nature." Islam at that time, as Muhammad was first forging it, had many different influences, including the influences of the other major monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, which both had adherents in that region. Out of all this, Muhammad developed a new religion that fused elements of these monotheistic religions and religious traditions with traditions from the Bedouin tribes of Arabia. But Islam was a new synthesis, adapted to the changing conditions in Arabia at the time of Muhammad; and this religion, as it was evolved by Muhammad, was able to unite Arabs across and beyond tribal divisions. This was an important factor. The changing conditions brought forth both the need and the possibility to unite Arabs across and beyond tribal divisions. This was one of the great strengths of the new religion of Islam that Muhammad synthesized out of different trends and influences.

Now, when I say he forged this new synthesis out of these different traditions in the context of changing conditions, I don't necessarily mean that Muhammad sat there and consciously said, 'I'll borrow a little bit from Judaism...I'll take a little from Christianity. I'll make Christ one of the main prophets...and so on'(although he did incorporate significant parts of the whole tradition of Abraham and Moses). Muhammad claimed to be receiving this from god (Allah), via the archangel Gabriel. And Muhammad apparently spoke much of what became the Qur'an while in a trance-like state. Obviously, I'm not in a position to know whether, or to what degree, he was sincere, to what degree he actually got himself into a trance-like state and had all kinds of hallucinations and other things—this is quite likely since it seems he was frequently fasting—and to what degree he coldly calculated it. It is clearly the case, as I will show a little bit later, that there are parts of the Qur'an that he coldly calculated, yet it is quite possible that, in an overall and basic way, Muhammad actually believed that he was receiving the divine word from Allah. But the point here is that's important, in terms of situating this materially and historically, geographic as well as the social conditions in which Muhammad lived (which comes through in the emphasis on shady trees and water flowing, and so on) but it also reflects, more importantly, the patriarchal and generally the oppressive and exploitative social relations of that age end society. This is why, in the Qur'an's vision of paradise, there are not only going to be shady trees and rivers flowing underground, but there are going to be all kinds of seductive "dark-eyed maidens," as well as young boys, who will serve the faithful in paradise.

Now what does this vision of paradise tell us about those Muhammad envisioned as the faithful, who would be rewarded this way in paradise, and what does it tell us about the social relations and the underlying mode of production that Muhammad was, in fact, expressing, whether in a trance-like state or otherwise, when he brought forward this religion? What is being expressed here is not the vision, or the will, of someeternal,transcendental, all-knowing, all-seeing, all-powerful god (Allah) but instead is the vision of a human being reflecting the natural and social conditions, including relations of patriarchal oppression, in which he lives. And this comes through in ways that get a lot funkier and even more down on the ground. There is, as I referred to earlier, some cold calculation on Muhammad's part that is incorporated in the Qur'an; besides the general and very frequently repeated references to heaven with the "dark-eyed maidens" wailing on the faithful, and so on, there are even references in the Qur'an that are much more personal and clearly a matter of personal calculation by Muhammad. This comes out very sharply, for example, in one chapter (sure of the Qur'an called (in English translation), "Prohibition" (or "The Forbidding"). This is very interesting. You have to remember, when you read the Qur'an, that it's not supposed to be Muhammad speaking as such. It's Allah speaking, through the archangel Gabriel. And at one point Allah feels moved to scold Muhammad for being too lenient with his wives. As recorded by Muhammad, Allah tells Muhammad—this is a very intimate and personal reference—right here in the Qur'an—Allah tells Muhammad that he (Muhammad) has been doing too much to please his wives. What was Allah taking about? Well, you see, Muhammad's wives were mad at him because he kept on sleeping with a slave woman that he had promised he was going to cut loose, and obviously his wives had been
complaining about this, so here it is, right in the Qur'an, Allah starts scolding Muhammad for having been too lenient with his wives about all this. And, as relayed by Muhammad, Allah warns Muhammad’s wives that there are plenty more where they came from: “It may well be if he divorce you, his Lord will give him in your place better wives than yourselves!” In effect, what has happened is that Muhammad says, my wives are out of line, so I need a verse in the Qur'an telling them they’d better watch out or I’ll get better, or I won’t get better. And of course Muhammad believed, or convinced himself, that he got this word from Allah, but the least that can be said is that this is very convenient for Muhammad! Now, in passages like this in the Qur’an, what comes through is not only a general expression of certain patriarchal social relations, but a direct (and rather crude) voicing of Muhammad’s personal interests in enforcing, in his own family-sexual relations, these oppressive patriarchal relations. Muhammad even manages to enlist Allah to warn his wives that they’d better quit bugging him about sleeping with this slave mistresses that he’s got.

Now, moving from the origins of Islam and how the Qur’an reflects the world—including the economic and social relations—in which Muhammad lived, about 1400 years ago, we can say that, in terms of the role of Islam in the world today, generally speaking, in the societies where Islam is the dominant religion there has not been any kind of thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution, and society has not been thoroughly transformed in correspondence with the bourgeois mode of production. At the same time, in many of these societies, with the further penetration of imperialism, there is a tendency for a kind of “hybrid” to develop in which Islam in various ways upholds the old traditions, corresponding to pre-capitalist relations, but attempts to adapt or “interpret” these in accordance with certain changes in productive forces and corresponding production relations. (And, to a large degree, the differences in the “interpretation” and practice of Islam in different societies, as with Christianity and religion in general, reflects differences in the prevailing production and social relations in those societies, including the degree of imperialist penetration and corresponding transformation of economic relations and conditions).

You can see this, for example, in Iran During the 1960s and 1970s, while remaining a semi-feudal as well as semicolonial country, Iran underwent certain partial but significant economic and social transformations associated with the “modernization” program of the Shah, under the direction of US imperialism. Now, when the Shah was overthrown—and reaction against the effects of this “modernization” had a lot to do with the upheaval that resulted in the overthrow of the Shah—the “Islamic Republic” that replaced the Shah in power has not attempted to do away with the technology, etc., associated with the Shah’s “modernization” and generally with imperialist penetration and domination of the economy of Iran, but instead has attempted to make use of this technology. Actually, there is an analogy here with the Christian Fascists in the US and similar forces in other imperialist countries. The Islamic fundamentalists aren’t going around literally trying to impose all the economic and technological conditions of the time of Muhammad, any more than the Christian Fascists are trying to remake society on the basis of the economic and technological conditions that existed at the time of Jesus or of Moses or Abraham. They’re not saying, “throw out all advanced technology.” They use very advanced technology. And the Islamic fundamentalists in Iran are even going forward on the basis of some changes that were made under the Shah—certain partial changes in the economic base of society. They’re not trying to reverse all that, but what they are attempting to do is to graft into the superstructure, and also somewhat into the production and social relations, elements of the old tradition. So it becomes kind of a “hybrid”: the society overall remains a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, but it has these peculiar features where the superstructure is to a significant degree dominated by forces who are seeking to impose aspects of culture and custom and social relations that run counter to “modernization” while at the same time, in a fundamental sense, these forces are compelled to act in accordance with the underlying production relations of semicolonial, semi-feudal society and to actually facilitate the further domination and penetration of imperialism in their country. Now, in a certain way, there is an analogy between the role of Islam today in Iran and any other countries, and the initial development of Islam under the circumstances Muhammad faced (which I briefly summarized). The analogy, or the similarity, lies in the massive upheaval and dislocation in society—and in today’s world the massive uprooting and urbanization (or we could describe this as the “shantytown-ization”) of masses of (former) peasants—and the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in the face of these changes. In today’s world, all the things that got better, or got worse, of traditional life, and dislocation is associated—objectively and to a significant degree in popular consciousness—with Western imperialism and its penetration and domination of the country. In other words, a lot of this upheaval—the uprooting and dislocation of masses of peasants, who are being forced in the millions into the cities, or into miserable shantytown conditions, and are being to a significant degree wrenched out of the formal economy—these changes are objectively very much related to and a product of the operation of imperialism, particularly Western imperialism. And, to a significant degree, in the minds of the masses these changes are associated with this imperialist penetration and domination. Again, the example of the “Islamic Revolution” in Iran is very instructive in this regard, not only now but also in the original upheavals in 1978 and 1979 which led ultimately to the triumph of Khomeini and the forces associated with him as the rulers of the country—forces that are outwardly and in certain secondary aspects in opposition to “modernization” associated with imperialism but are fundamentally dependent upon and subordinate to imperialism and the international accumulation and rule of capital. You could see in the initial outpourings of the Iranian revolution that one of the main bases for the “Islamic Revolution” in general, and more specifically one of the main bases for the Khomeini forces, were these masses of recently dislocated and uprooted peasants who had been crowded into the rings of shantytowns around the cities.

Now, it is important to keep in mind that, in the revolutionary upsurge in Iran in this period, and particularly before the Islamic fundamentalists grouped around Khomeini consolidated their hold on government, there were many different forces in the field, including Maoists and other non-religious revolutionary forces as well as some Islamic forces who played a positive role in the revolutionary struggle, and who opposed the imposition of reactionary, theocratic rule by Khomeini & Co. Reactionary Islamic fundamentalism was not the only force in the field—it was not even the only Islamic trend in the field—although unfortunately, it did win out in the short run and did turn the revolutionary upsurge into its opposite, into the consolidation of power by reactionary forces whose ideology and program represents the oppression and exploitation of the masses and ultimately the domination of imperialism. At the same time, it is also important to understand that dislocated peasants who were crowded into the impoverished shantytowns were not the only significant force who were affected by the Shah’s “modernizations” and more generally by imperialist domination in Iran and its continuing “penetration” and “transformation” of aspects of Iranian society. There were also significant groups within the middle strata, including the urban middle strata, of Islamic society who were affected by this. These forces also made up an important part of the social base for the ouster of the Shah, and some of them became a social base for the eventual consolidation of power by the Khomeini forces and their “Islamic revolution”. One very key aspect and indication of its actual counterrevolutionary nature is that this “Islamic revolution” in Iran did not really mobilize and definitely did not fully unleash the peasant masses who remain in the countryside. This “Islamic Revolution” had (and has) no program for carrying out an agrarian Revolution in the countryside as
a pivotal part of an overall revolution. And here we can see, very dramatically, the need for a real revolution—a New Democratic Revolution as the direct prelude to the socialist revolution—which still cries out to be made in Iran, and which MLM forces there are working to bring about—a revolution led by the proletariat, which is capable of and does in fact win the masses away from the Islamic fundamentalists. [6]

20052. Avakian, Bob. "Communism and Religion: Part 1(c): Islam: Islamic Fundamentalism and the proletarian Revolution", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), July 20, 1997. Islamic fundamentalism is a significant phenomenon as an ideological expression in the world today, but more than that as a political movement which is obviously gaining in influence and in organized strength, not only in the "Middle East," but in other parts of the world and even to a certain degree in the US. As with every other major social phenomenon, we have to get a deep and all-around understanding of Islamic fundamentalism as an ideological and a political trend and as a material force. We have to understand more deeply its attraction, particularly among those dislocated masses in the urban slums and shantytowns of many countries in the "Middle East" and some other parts of the Third World. In this connection, third: it is important to speak to a point that is touched on in "The End of a Stage—The Beginning of a New Stage." [Revolution Magazine, Fall 1990.] In "End/Beginning" there is a discussion of "the demise of communism"—in particular, the end of the Soviet Union as a counterfeiter "communist" state (a revisionist state) and the break-up of the Soviet bloc—and how strategically this does not represent a defeat but a positive factor for us, how it represents revisionism becoming more openly bourgeois, and how this in turn provides more of "an uncontested field" for us forgedene Marxist-Leninist-Maoists, in upholding the banner of communism and rallying the masses to that banner. Now, in reviewing this more recently and thinking about it in various aspects in light of developments since then, including the growing strength of this whole phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, it strikes me that there was a secondary tendency in "End/Beginning" to underestimate the complexity of the situation with the "demise" of Soviet revisionism.

As Lenin emphasized, at one point when he was arguing against "infantile idealism" and dogmatism, the world would be very simple and the revolution would be very easy if it just consisted of two opposing armies: one lines up on one side of the battlefield and says "we're for socialism," while the other one lines up on the opposite side of the battlefield and says "we are for imperialism," and they square off, and that's it. But, as Lenin was emphasizing, making revolution is always much more complex than that—there is always more than one army in the field (at least in the political sense), even within the broad camp of opposition to the ruling system—there are always many different banners being raised and rallying forces (and even the communist forces are themselves not "pure" but consist of many contradictory things). This is a principle that has important implications and application in a number of different ways but here I'm focusing on how it applies to this phenomenon of the "demise of communism" and its consequences. And in fact one of the main things giving impetus to this growth of Islamic fundamentalism as a trend end to its influence and material force is precisely the changes in the Soviet Union (changes which have led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its bloc), as well as what happened in China with the coup and the restoration of capitalism in the mid 1970s. So we have to continue to return to this reality and deepen our grasp of it, and be able to explain it to the masses as well as act on it in a deeper way. We have to recognize the strategically favorable situation, and maximize our advances in this situation, but in order to do this we have to take full account of and deal with the complexities of the situation. It should be noted—and this is a very important point—that the growth of this Islamic fundamentalist trend is particularly among masses of people who have to be won to, and even have to be major forces in, the proletarian revolution—or the revolution lead by the proletariat. In the case of Third World countries the revolution generally involves going through the stage of new democracy as a prelude to the socialist stage, but nevertheless in world-historical terms is part of the proletarian revolution. So, in an important aspect, there is a very profound and intense contention going on between us and these Islamic fundamentalist forces. These forces may, in certain contexts and to a certain limited extent, oppose imperialist domination, or aspects of this, but in the final analysis, where they pursue their own program and resist the program of the proletariat, they can only end up serving the rule of imperialism and the all-around exploitation and oppression of the masses of people.

In strategic terms, it is a question of winning these masses to one banner or the other—one that represents their fundamental interests or one that runs counter to those interests even if it opposes certain secondary aspects of the established order. These are masses of people, numbering in the hundreds of millions, that the ruling classes may consider, or declare, to be marginalized, but they are hardly marginal to the process of proletarian revolution and the transition from the bourgeois epoch to the communist epoch And for that matter they're hardly marginal to the overall process of imperialist accumulation. The growth of this Islamic fundamentalist trend is very pronounced precisely among these masses particularly those people, in countries where Islam is a major religion, who have been uprooted and then migrate into the urban slums, or shantytowns, and who have not been integrated in any kind of articulated way into the formal economy. Not only were many of these masses a base of support for Khomeini, during the course of the Iranian revolution at the end of 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s; but, if you look at Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and a number of other places—places where, generally speaking, Islam is a major religious and ideological expression—these strata of uprooted and shanty-ized masses are a major base right now for the growth of these Islamic fundamentalist movements. This is not something that we, that is, the international proletariat and the international communist movement, can allow to happen—we cannot let the Islamic fundamentalist forces have the banner of opposition to imperialism and oppression. As I have said, with their outlook and program these forces can only end up serving imperialist rule and the all around oppression and exploitation of the masses, while we represent the only ideology and program that stands for thoroughly defeating and uprooting imperialism and all oppression and exploitation. Now, we can't just say we cannot let this happen—we have to change things through our work and struggle. But, from a strategic standpoint, we cannot allow these Islamic fundamentalist forces to rally these masses under their banner, because what that banner represents is actually against the fundamental interests of the masses. Again, going back to what Lenin emphasized, we can't just say, "Not that banner, this banner," line up on this part of the battlefield, not that part of the battlefield, be for socialism, not for Islamic fundamentalism." As Lenin stressed, we have to recognize and deal with the complexity of the situation, and in particular the complexity of every situation that involves real revolutionary transformation. We have to recognize the various "shadings" and variations within things, including the fact that there are differences—including in some cases very significant differences—between various Islamic forces and their political roles. Not all such forces are the same as the fundamentalists, and even some fundamentalists may, at certain times and under certain conditions, be opposed to certain aspects of imperialist domination and to certain forms of the oppression of the people, even though in the final analysis such forces, particularly when they have the initiative and in the lead of things—and more especially where they actually head governments can only end up oppressing the people and serving imperialist domination.

The point is that we have to win the masses to our banner, through carrying out our line and program and in that context carrying out ideological struggle for MLM in opposition to religious fundamentalism, to all religious ideology, and to philosophical idealism generally. And, in order to do this in the most correct and powerful way, we have to understand this phenomenon. We have to understand deeply and in all-round way why Islamic fundamentalists (and some other, similar trends) are gaining in influence and in organized strength now among important sections of the masses. This is a very important part a new complication (if you want to put it that way), of the terrain we have to work on—of the objective and subjective factors we have to confront and transform This is a real challenge for the MLM forces worldwide, represented in a concentrated way by the Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement (RIM), and for our Party in carrying out our internationalist
responsibilities and contributing to the work and development of the RIM
in the fullest way that we can. [TO BE CONTINUED] =*

20053. Badran, Margot. "Institutionalization of Middle East Women's
Zahiya Dughan called for the creation of a new discipline of Arab
women's studies in Arab universities at the Awha Conference
(also alternative called the Arab Feminists' Conference) in 1994. Two
decade later, women's studies emerged as a discipline in the United
States and the Middle East. However, the study of women in the Middle
East remains a marginal area of study within the Middle East Studies
Association (MESA). In the United States, the emergence of women's
studies followed the emergence of Black Studies; MESA itself was only
organized in 1966. While the National Womens Studies Association
(NWSA) in the United States was founded in 1977, three years earlier in
1974 the Institute for Womens Studies in the Arab World had been
established in Beirut, and the Women Development Center has been
established at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. From 1973-1975, 35 papers of
women's studies were presented at MESA; in 1976-1983 there were
less papers presented (although with 9 in 1981); in 1984 there were 37
papers, in 1985 nineteen, and in 1986 thirty papers. In its first decade,
NWSA papers focused on Western women. The first dissertations on
women's studies were published on Egypt in 1965 (University of
London), on Arab women's journalism and Arab women's education in
1966 (Ain Sams University, Cairo University), and on Aaran feminism in
1966 (Dropsie College). The 1970s and 1980s saw numerous additional
dissertations on women in Western societies and in the Middle East;
journal articles became on womens studies in the Middle East became
more numerous by the end of the 1970s. The first womens studies
courses started appearing in the United States by the 1970s, with the first
women's studies programs appearing in the 1980s. In the 1980s, the first
courses in women in the Middle East started being taught; the first
director of a women studies program with a Middle East specialization
was Sondra Hale, at California State University-Long Beach in 1980-
1982. Womens studies, as well as Middle East studies, were heavily
funded by the federal government and foundations, such as the Ford
Foundation, in the 1970s and 1980s. The future of womens study within
Middle East studies depends on womens studies being accorded its
appropriate role in the Middle East studies curriculum. [TXT]

20054. Baron, Beth; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor].
Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and
Gender: Part 15: The Modern Arab World: The Making and Breaking of
Marital Bonds: Modern Egypt. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1991. pp. 275-291. The ancient doctrine of the 'aliveness' ('both living and
female') of the earth or nature, termed hylozoism, has been embraced by
ecofeminists (Starhawk notes: 'this Earth is alive and we are part of her
being'; Riane Eisler sees hylozoism as part of her ethos of the prehistoric
society); ecofeminists oppose this aliveness model to the mechanistic
model of the scientific-industrial era which is seen as the enemy of this
aliveness. Starhawk argues that hylozoism inherently leads to political
activism, and notes that anyone who questions this doctrine is exercising a
form of 'cultural imperialism [that] is itself a form of racism'; despite
the fact that such cosmological formulations, for example, as that
embodied in the ancient Egyptian Memphite Theology, was the basis for
a 'highly oppressive pharaonic hierarchy'. Biehl notes that the immanent
goddes of ecofeminists is part of a cyclical model of the universe, which
both supports the return of divinely sanctioned social orders and which
inevitably forecloses the possibility or any real social or political
development. 'Loose and simplistic metaphors like 'aliveness' and
'divine immortality' are an inadequate basis for the creation of a
meaningful ecological ethic for our era. At the same time, ecofeminists
ignore the thought of Darwin in particular, and dialectical and
development thinking in general: these methods provide the principle
basis for criticizing the mechanistic world order in a meaningful manner.
Finally, the aliveness metaphor, and the historical revisionism that is
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Europe as a 'long period of patriarchal class rule, a long dark age'. In fact, Neolithic cultures were relatively peaceful, matrilineal and matrilocal, however, pervasive evidence of human sacrifice seems to contradict the belief that Neolithic cultures can be characterized by women's virtues of 'caring' and 'nurturing'. Gimbutas' assertion that the fat female figurines that are characteristic of the Neolithic are consistently goddesses is questionable (ironically, ecofeminists who cite Gimbutas as a source for the pervasiveness of the earth goddess cult overlook her characterization that the figurines are of air or water goddesses; this is contrasted by Gimbutas to the Indo-European cult of the earth mother goddess); while it is true that there was a goddess cult at Catal Huyuk, for example, there is no reason to believe in an immutable and consistent goddess cult throughout Europe for millennia. In some cultures, the figurines are always found in trash heaps, which perhaps indicates that they were fertility fetishes carried to ensure pregnancy, and were discarded after they had yielded a pregnancy.

The ecofeminist celebration of Minoan Crete is even more problematic. Ecofeminists assert a 'sensuous, free, peaceful, gender-equal, nature-loving society, complete with priestesses, goddesses and perhaps even a queen' on the basis of almost no archeological evidence. The only reason for believing in a queen is the fact that the original Victorian excavator labeled one room the 'Queen's Megaron' simply because a stone chair was lower than others, and his Victorian imagination saw the lower height of the chair as befitting a woman. Newer work sees the Knossos complex as not a palace but rather as a temple complex, on the model of the priestly corporations or Egypt and Mesopotamia; new archeological evidence indicates that human, especially child sacrifice, has an integral part of the Minoan cult (which may well have included goddess worship).

The question posed by ecofeminism is not whether the Neolithic was relatively peaceful, or whether a goddess was worshipped (the epiphenomena that ecofeminism tends to focus on), but rather what the meaning of these facts is for social formation in early society. Many ecofeminists (such as Lynn White, Riane Eisler, and Charlene Spretnak) believe that worship of a goddess rather than a god will in itself and of itself will transform social reality. However, the weakness of goddess worship as a force transforming societies should be apparent from the common worship of goddesses by particentric societies: such historical instances illustrate the weakness of goddess-worship as a force in organizing a society along non-hierarchical, gender-equal, and peaceful line.

Ecofeminists also address the emergence of patriarchy and hierarchy in society by arguing that the Kurgan culture invaders from the Pontic-Volga-steppe invaded Neolithic Europe and subjugated the society of the peaceful goddess-worshippers. Although supported by some theorists (Joseph Campbell, Ashley Montagu), the archeological evidence is thin, the argument begs the question of how the Kurgan culture developed hierarchy, and ignores the question of how hierarchical-patriarchal societies emerged worldwide. The 'ecofeminist reduction of the origin of hierarchy solely to invasion...is simplistic'.

Similarly, theorists such as Ynestra King argues that the fundamental oppression is of women, and that the prototype of domination was of men over women; this is extended to argue that only patriarchal societies are warlike. However, these theories are not supported by historical or ethnographic studies. Ironically, many ecofeminists accept the role of hierarchies of priestesses in Neolithic societies, although there is no evidence that domination by priestesses is any better than domination by priests. Finally, it is clear that the social power of men is more exercised by domination of other men, and the freeing of women form the domination of men will not necessarily lead to more egalitarian society. Statism, capitalism and racism emerged for reasons other than structure, the frequent social contacts among Communists made it easy for women as feeble and depressed. He notes the preference for progressive books, refers to the formation of the League of Arab Writers in 1954 and of the League of Egyptian Writers in 1956, and notes the latter's support of Nasser. He says that in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen, which tended to imitate classical literature, more is being written about present-day life. Describes the increase in periodicals, noting especially four new journals in Lebanon in 1955. Comments on the aversion of the League of Egyptian Writers to American periodicals which some would like to see banned. Records the increasing interest shown by Arabs in Soviet literature and the increase in literary and cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and the Arab East. [From: "Part II: Arabs and the Arab World: Social Structure: 1955-1958", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. p. 31].

20059. Botman, Selma. "A Portrait of the Communist Movement", in The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970. Contemporary Issues of the Middle East. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 17-32. The activists who participated in study groups and antifascist circles of the 1930s emerged as in the 1940s as dissidents seeking to establish concrete political organizations; however, the creation of Marxist organizations took place without any Marxist political tradition. Communists were mainly from Upper Egypt, Cairo and Alexandria: Cairo would gradually become the center of Communist activism. Most Communists were of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, being mainly middle class. Most recruits to the Communist movement started their activism as students and/or below age age 25; in recruiting such people the Leftists had to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt. In the 1940s, middle and upper class feminists (sometimes the wives and sisters of male Marxists), mostly Jewish women, also started joining and creating Communist organizations: rejecting Huda Shaarawi's Feminist Union and Fatma Nimit Rashid's Feminist Party, in 1944-1945 they set up the League of Women Students & Graduates from the University & Egyptian Institutes. The League of Women Students & Graduates was shut down in 7/1946 by Sidqi Pasha. Jews in Egypt (most holding foreign passports) in the 1940s numbered some 75000-80000 of 0.04-0.05% of the population; 45-50% of Egyptian Jews lived in Cairo and 35-40% in Alexandria. About 1% of Jews, 500-700 were Communists, but in the small Egyptian Left, this gave them a very disproportionate role; this role would diminish after WWII.

20060. Botman, Selma. "Unification and Division in the Communist Movement1947-1954", in The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970. Contemporary Issues of the Middle East. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 69-114. As nationalism grew in strength in Egypt, the disunity of the left became a greater problem. At the end of 5/1947, EMNL and Iskra joined forced in the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL) (also Hadeto, an acronym from the Arabic): this organization would be the most important Communist organization in Egypt in the later 1940s and 1950s. In 5/1947, DMNL had 1700 members (800 from EMNL, the rest from Iskra and the Peoples Liberation movement). DMNL was organized on the basis of cells, financed by subscriptions from members. However, despite the cell structure, the frequent social contacts among Communists made it easy for the police to identify and arrest them. DMNL published internal handwritten or typed bulletins, as well as clandestine newspapers: al-Qaida (The Base), al-Kifah (The Struggle), al-Talia (The Vanguard), and Saut al-Fallahin (Voice of the Peasants); main legal publications were al-Ahwar (The Masses), and later al-Malayin (The Millions), and Al-Wajib (The Duty), as well as the Voice of the Students to educate and politicize students. DMNL was successful in recruiting labor leaders and...
workers, and were especially successful in recruiting workers in textiles, transportation, telecommunications, hotels, shipping, tobacco and military men (although the Free Officers were more successful). A key strike effort by the DMNL and unions was the failed effort to protest the plan of the Misr Spinning & Weaving Co. to layoff workers as it automated; while the strike failed, the strike did radicalize workers in other industrial sectors. Efforts to recruit among the peasants were hampered by breakdowns in security in rural areas: especially as the DMNL started to break down into factions, efforts in the countryside failed. In 1950-1952, DMNL operated through several fronts in legal organizing efforts: for example, the Movement of Peace Supporters, formed in 1950, as a branch of the World Peace Council (the broad-based group drew together Jews, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Wald, women and artists).

In 1946, the DMNL started to factionalize, as dissatisfaction with the pace of progress, personality clashes, unfulfilled political programs, ideological differences and police strikes created divisions in the group. These problems created splits within the group since there was no internal dialogue. The DMNL split into the DMNL-Revolutionary Workers, DMNL-Communist, Toward a Communist Party, Vanguard of the Egyptian Communist Party (none of which had much lasting impact), and the Voice of the Opposion (created by Sidney and Odette Solomon, adopted an ultra-left position, remained restricted to former DMNL intellectuals, and created a permanent split in the Egyptian left).

In 1947, the British referred the Palestine question to the UN: when Russia endorsed the creation of Israel (believing the state would weaken the British Empire and be a Marxist state), the Egyptian left also endorsed the partition of Palestine. As early as the mid-1940s, Marcel Israel had created the Jewish League to Combat Zionism; merging with Iskra, the group produced a pamphlet 'Against Zionism' (the League was dissolved in 1947 by PM Nuqrasri, who had strong ties to Jewish Zionist business interests). Endorsing the partition plan of DMNL led to Jewish-Egyptian conflicts within DMNL, with Sd Suleyman Rifai demanding the expulsion of Henri Curiel and Hillel Schwartz. With the majority of Egyptians backing the right of the Palestinians to all of Palestine, the DMNL choose to stand for Zionism: when police raids decimated the Left, it had little popular support.

In 1945, the Egyptian Communist Party was established from Egyptian students that had traveled to Europe for their education: its initial members were numerous Jews, as well as Fuad Mursi, Ismail Sabri Abd Allah, and Mustafa Safwan. Well established by 1948, the group worked to consolidate other Egyptian Communist groups: many factions of the old DMNL merged into the new party. By contrast with the loose organization of the DMNL, ECP had an 'iron' organization. In the early 1950s, ECP established ties with Madi Al-Fatat (then called the Socialist Party), with the Nationalist Party of Fathi Radwan, and with intellectuals such as Ihsan Abd al-Qadus (then editor of the newspaper Roz al-Yusuf). Such united front efforts never yielded much due to conflicting programs of the groups. [Text]

20062. Chaitkin, Anton. Press Release: Rockefeller and Mass Murder: International Conference on Population & Development. S.L., August 24, 1994. The Rockefeller Foundation is the prime sponsor of public relations for the United Nations' drastic depopulation program, which the world is invited to accept at the UN's scheduled September conference in Cairo, Egypt. Evidence in the possession of a growing number of researchers in America, England, and Germany demonstrates that the Foundation and its corporate, medical, and political associates organized the racial mass murder program of Nazi Germany. These globalists, who sold Fascism as a conduit for British Empire geopolitics, were not stopped after World War II. The United Nations alliance of the old Nazi rightwing with the New Age leftwing poses an even graver danger to the world today than the same grouping did in 1941. Oil monopolist John D. Rockefeller created the family-run Rockefeller Foundation in 1909. By 1929 he had placed $300 million worth of the family's controlling interest of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (later called 'Exxon') to the account of the Foundation. The Foundation's money created the medical specialty known as Psychiatric Genetics. For the new experimental field, the Foundation reorganized medical teaching in Germany, creating and thenceforth continuously directing the 'Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Psychiatry' and the 'Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Eugenics and Human Heredity.' The Rockefellers' chief executive of these institutions was the fascist Swiss psychiatrist Ernst Rudin, assisted by his proteges Otmar Verschuer and Franz J. Kalimann. In 1932, the British-led ' Eugenics' movement designated the Rockefellers' Dr. Rudin as the president of the worldwide Eugenics Federation. The movement called for the killing or sterilization of people whose heredity made them a public burden.

The Racial Laws: A few months later, Hitler took over Germany and the Rockefeller-Rudin apparatus became a section of the Nazi state. The regime appointed Rudin head of the Racial Hygiene Society. Rudin and his staff, as part of the Task Force of Heredity Experts chaired by SS chief Heinrich Himmler, drew up the sterilization law. Described as an
American Model law, it was adopted in 1933 and proudly printed in the 1938 Eugenical News (USA) with Hitler’s signature. The Rockefeller group drew up other race laws, also based on existing Virginia statutes. Otmar Verschuer and his assistant Josef Mengele together wrote reports for special courts which enforced Rudin’s racial purity law against cohabitation of Aryans and non-Aryans. The “T4” unit of the Hitler Chancery, based on psychiatrists led by Rudin and his staff, cooperated in creating and then spreading films to sell eugenics to German citizens. The public reacted antagonistically: Hitler had to withdraw a tear-jerker right-to-die film from the movie theaters. The proper groundwork had not yet been laid. Under the Nazis, the German chemical company I.G. Farben and Rockefeller’s Standard Oil of New Jersey were effectively a single firm, merged in hundreds of cartel arrangements. I.G. Farben was led up until 1937 by the Warburg family, Rockefeller’s partner in banking and in the design of Nazi German eugenics. Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Standard Oil pledged to keep the merger with I.G. Farben going even if the US entered the war. This was exposed in 1942 by Sen. Harry Truman’s investigating committee, and President Roosevelt took hundreds of legal measures during the war to stop the Standard-I.G. Farben cartel from supplying the enemy war machine. In 1940-1941, I.G. Farben built a gigantic factory at Auschwitz in Poland, to utilize the Standard Oil/I.G. Farben patents with concentration camp slave labor to make gasoline from coal. The SS was assigned to guard the Jewish and other inmates and select for killing those who were unfit for IG Farben slave labor. Standard-Germany president Emil Heßertestified after the war that Standard Oil funds helped pay for SS guards at Auschwitz. In 1940, six months after the notorious Standard-I.G. meeting, European Rockefeller Foundation official Daniel O’Brien wrote to the Foundation’s chief medical officer Alan Gregg that “it would be unfortunate if it was chosen to stop research which has no relation to war issues”--so the Foundation continued financing Nazi “psychiatric research” during the war. In 1936, Rockefeller’s Dr. Franz Kallmann interrupted his study of hereditary degeneracy and emigrated to America because he was half-Jewish. Kallmann went to New York and established the Medical Genetics Department of the New York State Psychiatric Institute. The Scottish Rite of Freemasonry published Kallman’s study of over 1000 cases of schizophrenia, which tried to prove its hereditary basis. In the book, Kallmann thanked his long-time boss and mentor Rudin. Kallmann’s book, published in 1938 in the USA and Nazi Germany, was used by the T4 unit as a rationalization to begin in 1939 the murder of mental patients and various “defective” people, perhaps most of them children. Gas and lethal injections were used to kill 250,000 under this program, in which the staffs for a broader murder program were desensitized and trained.

Dr. Mengele: In 1934, Otmar Verschuer’s assistant Josef Mengele was made medical commandant of Auschwitz. As wartime director of Rockefeller’s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Eugenics and Human Heredity in Berlin, Verschuer secured funds for Mengele’s experiments at Auschwitz from the German Research Council. Verschuer wrote a progress report to the Council: “My co-researcher in this research is my assistant the anthropologist and physician Mengele. He is serving as Hauptsturmfuhrer and camp doctor in the concentration camp Auschwitz.... With the permission of the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, anthropological research is being undertaken on the various racial groups in the concentration camps and blood samples will be sent to my laboratory for investigation.” Mengele prowled the railroad lines leading into Auschwitz, looking for twins—a favorite subject of psychiatric geneticists. On arrival at Mengele’s experimental station, twins filled out “a detailed questionnaire from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute.” There were daily drawings of blood for Verschuer’s “specific protein” research. Needles were injected into eyes for work on eye color. There were experimental blood transfusions and infections. Organs and limbs were removed, sometimes without anesthetics. Sex changes were attempted. Females were sterilized, males castrated. Thousands were murdered and their organs, eyeballs, heads, and limbs were sent to Verschuer and the Rockefeller group at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. In 1946, Verschuer wrote to the Bureau of Human Heredity in London, asking for help in continuing his "scientific research."

Facelift: In 1947, the Bureau of Human Heredity moved from London to Copenhagen. The new Danish building for this was built with Rockefeller money. The first International Congress in Human Genetics following World War II was held at this Danish institute in 1956. By that time, Verschuer was a member of the American Eugenics Society, then indistinguishable from Rockefeller’s Population Council. Dr. Kallmann, in his book, published in 1934, in his demography, in his demographics, that is really what Dr. Kallmann created the American Society of Human Genetics, which organized the “Human Genome Project”–a current $3 billion physical and culturalism effort. Kallmann was a director of the American Eugenics Society in 1952 and from 1954-1965. In the 1950s, the Rockefellers reorganized the US eugenics movement in their own family offices, with spinoff population-control and abortion groups. The Eugenics Society changed its name to the Society for the Study of Social Biology, its current name. The Rockefeller Foundation had long financed the eugenics movement in England, apparently repaying Britain for the fact that British capital and an Englishman-partner had started old John D. Rockefeller out in his Oil Trust. In the 1960s, the Eugenics Society of England adopted what they called Crypto-eugenics, stating in their official reports that they would do eugenics through means and instruments not labeled as eugenics. With support from the Rockefellers, the Eugenics Society (England) set up a sub-committee called the International Planned Parenthood Federation, which for 12 years had no other address than the Eugenics Society. This, then, is the private, international apparatus which has set the world up for a global holocaust, under the UN flag. [+]
My daughter and I were talking about Haiti a few months ago, and I was telling her about her mother and I had gone to Haiti once many years ago, shortly after we married and about what sadness and hope I had seen there at the same time and what had happened since then. And she said to me, I know all that, Dad, because I've seen aerial photographs from space. And if you look at the island, you can see where the Dominican Republic ends and where Haiti begins. And there couldn't be all that environmental destruction without all those other problems you talked about. It was a stunning thing—from the perspective of an American schoolchild—that sort of wraps all this up.

I say that to make this point: We have to be disciplined in saying well, all right, how much time and how much money and how much energy have we got; and we have to order our priorities. But we cannot be naive enough to think that it is so easy to isolate one of these issues as opposed to another, that there is some silver bullet that solves the future of the world. If you look at the rate at which natural resources are disappearing and you look at the rate at which the gap between rich and poor is growing, if you look at the fact that the world's population has doubled since 74 nations met in Rome only 40 years ago, it is clear that we need a comprehensive approach to the world's future. We put it under the buzzword of sustainable development. I guess, but there is no way that we can approach tomorrow unless we are at least mindful of our common responsibilities in all these areas. During the nine days of the upcoming Cairo conference, more than 2 million people will enter our world—more than 2 million new babies will be born into a world in which already one-third of our children are hungry, two of every five people on Earth lack basic sanitation, and large parts of the world exist with only one doctor for every 35000-40000 people. Reversing these realities will require innovation and commitment and a determination to do what can be done over a long period of time—while all of us around the world are busy with our own business within our own borders. It will require us to be willing to think anew about the relationship of human development to what is going on in all of these nations; to cast aside a lot of our ideas from the past—when it was always tempting to believe that there was one single thing we could do—some silver bullet—that would make everything all right. [=]

2006A. Clinton, Bill. "Sustainable Development: Advancing a Vision Of Sustainable Development: President Clinton: Address to the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 6/24/1994: Part 2: Principles For a Shared Prosperity", in US Department of State Dispatch, July 18, 1994. To bring about shared prosperity, as Professor Homer Dixon has written, the nations of the world simply must move forward on many fronts at one time. Reducing population growth without providing economic opportunity won't work. Without education, it's hard to imagine how basic health care will ever take hold. Ignored, these challenges will continue to divide people from one another. We simply have to solve these problems together—the problems together, and together as the people of the world. I'm really proud of the fact that the G-7 has agreed to address some of these issues in a serious way this week in Naples. We're going to talk about what we can do within the G-7 to promote not just growth but more jobs—because a lot of the wealthy countries are finding they can't create jobs even when they grow their economy. And then, when they can't do that, they lose the constituency at home to engage the rest of the world. We're going to talk about how we build an economic infrastructure for the 21st century. What's this new world trade organization that we create with GATT going to look like? What should the World Bank and the IMF do? We're also going to talk about how we can help economies in transition, such as the states of the former Soviet Union, and what we can do with the economies that are not in transition—or, if anything, are going the wrong way—to address our common responsibilities. This is quite a unique thing, really, for the world's advanced nations. And we're quite pleased that with all the economic problems that exist in many of these countries they are willing to have a serious look at where we should spend the 10-20 years from now—far beyond the election prospects of the world leaders who will be there. As we head for the Cairo conference, I think that same approach has to guide us. The policies we promote must be based on enduring values—promoting stronger families, having more responsibility on individual citizens, respecting human rights, deepening the bonds of community. Here at home and around the globe, that's where the future lies, beginning with our families. When they're whole and they function, families nurture and care for us. They provide role models. They communicate values and enable people to live together in peace and work together for common objectives. Therefore, that is the most important thing we can do. Since the beginning of this administration, we have worked to promote policies that would permit families to grow in strength at home and abroad. I reversed the so-called Mexico City policy because I thought that doctors and medical workers around the world should be able to really work on family planning and provide a full range of family-planning information. Since then, we have increased by about 50%-at-a very tough budget time—the Agency for International Development's budget for international family-planning and support services. To bolster families here at home, we passed a big increase in the earned income tax credit to help keep 1 million working families off welfare, out of poverty, and in the work force. We increased Head Start availability and nutrition programs to hundreds of thousands of children, cracked down on delinquent child-support payments, and increased immunization funds so that we can increase by literally more than a million the number of children who are immunized. We're working to reduce out-ofwedlock and teen births. Through the Family and Medical Leave Act, we're working to make it possible for people to be successful workers and successful parents—a big issue everywhere in the world now, when more and more parents must work. Any society which forces people to choose is doomed to failure. If people have no option but to work and we all need people to continue to bear children, then surely all of our parents must be successful workers and our workers must be able to succeed as parents. Our population policy is rooted in the idea that the family should be at the center of all of our objectives. Therefore, there must be support for the concept of responsibility—of parents to their children, of men and women to one another, and of our current generation to future generations. Progress brings freedom; freedom requires more disciplined responsibility. We must teach our young people to choose wisely, and tell them that their choices must include abstinence. Our policy always has been rooted in the ethical principles of compassion and justice and respect for human rights. We have supported every individual's dignity and worth. And we will continue to oppose and condemn all forms of coercion in family planning. [=]

2006B. Clinton, Bill. "Sustainable Development: Advancing a Vision Of Sustainable Development: President Clinton: Address to the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 6/24/1994: Part 3: Translating Principles Into Reality", in US Department of State Dispatch, July 18, 1994. Helping to translate these principles into reality is the charge that the Vice President will take to Cairo in September. No one is better suited to this task than he. He has shown his commitment to these long-term challenges, and he had been thinking in large ways about them long before they were politically unpopular or even the source of much current discussion. In Cairo, we'll join the international community in pursuing a new plan of action to attack the population problem as part of the larger issue of sustainable development. At the top of our agenda will be active support for efforts to invest in the women of the world. Over the long run, maybe the most important thing that the Cairo policy will call for is for every nation make an effort to educate its children on an equal basis, to increase in the earned income tax credit to help keep 1 million working families off welfare, out of poverty, and in the work force. We increased Head Start availability and nutrition programs to hundreds of thousands of children, cracked down on delinquent child-support payments, and increased immunization funds so that we can increase by literally more than a million the number of children who are immunized. We're working to reduce out-ofwedlock and teen births. Through the Family and Medical Leave Act, we're working to make it possible for people to be successful workers and successful parents—a big issue everywhere in the world now, when more and more parents must work. Any society which forces people to choose is doomed to failure. If people have no option but to work and we all need people to continue to bear children, then surely all of our parents must be successful workers and our workers must be able to succeed as parents. Our population policy is rooted in the idea that the family should be at the center of all of our objectives. Therefore, there must be support for the concept of responsibility—of parents to their children, of men and women to one another, and of our current generation to future generations. Progress brings freedom; freedom requires more disciplined responsibility. We must teach our young people to choose wisely, and tell them that their choices must include abstinence. Our policy always has been rooted in the ethical principles of compassion and justice and respect for human rights. We have supported every individual's dignity and worth. And we will continue to oppose and condemn all forms of coercion in family planning. [=]
Contrary to some assertions, we do not support abortion as a method of family planning. We respect, however, the diversity of national laws—except we do oppose coercion whenever it exists. Our own policy in the United States is that this should be a matter of personal choice, not public dictation. And, as I have said many times, abortion should be safe, legal, and rare. In other countries where it does exist, we believe safety is an important issue. And if you look at the mortality figures, it is hard to turn away from that issue. We also believe that providing women with the means to prevent unwanted pregnancy will do more than anything else to reduce abortion. Finally, let me say, we must take to Cairo the same basic commitment to provide health care for every citizen of the world that we have brought to the public debate here in America. I must say that there is less disagreement among the representatives of the 174 countries going to Cairo than there is among the 35 members of Congress. Maybe we can bring the spirit back home. Experience shows that investing in maternal health, prenatal services, and preventive care for children not only saves lives, it eventually gives people the confidence they need from knowing that their children will survive. And that changes all kinds of attitudes that affect the way children are raised. Every country has committed itself to improving the health of women and children. And every one that has really done that has seen a decline in population growth and a rise in prosperity. The Cairo conference, therefore, can do a great deal to advance our vision of sustainable development and stabilized population growth and to help us fulfill a vision of a world of intact families in which every member is cherished, a world that has the wisdom and the strength to tackle challenges head on instead of talking about them and using words to divide people so they don't really address the challenges, a world that will lead to equal opportunity and shared prosperity. When President Roosevelt died in 194, there was a typed manuscript of his last speech, which was found with just a single sentence written in his own hand. This was the last sentence of the last speech that Franklin Roosevelt had written—one that he never got to give. His handwritten sentence said, "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith." In the face of so many seemingly intractable problems, it is certainly tempting to let those doubts take control. But I think those of you here tonight believe as I do that we can, instead, search for and find solutions that will help generations yet to come. President Roosevelt governed at a time when doubt was a luxury the American people clearly did not afford. I say to you, tonight, doubt is a luxury the world can no longer afford. I commend you for your compassion and your commitment. I urge you to turn this faith into action and to help me to do my job to do the same. [=]

20066. Cockburn, Alexander. "The Greed Factor Behind US Population Policy", in Seattle Times, September 9, 1994, p. B4. The US official line of 'empowering women' through its population policy, vigorously advanced at the UN Population Conference in Cairo, is a thin lie. An AID report on US population policy for Haiti makes clear that the only rationale underlying US population policy for the Third World is simply to keep inferior races from breeding. The US goal for Haiti, embodied in a secret 6/1993 AID document, envisions 200,000 new 'acceptors' of contraceptives', and 23 sterilization clinics, termed 'voluntary surgical contraception' facilities. There is no mention at all of women's health issues, which is the public smoke screen for this policy: indeed, the document rejects the value of any medical examinations of women 'targeted' for sterilization of contraceptives. The Brooklyn based Haitian women's group, Women of Koalisyon, has issued a report detailing abuses of women by AID funded clinics in Haiti. Abuses include: offers of food for sterilization; promises that irreversible sterilization is easily reversible; promises that sterilization prevents AIDS; misrepresentation of Norplant (5-year implants) as free of side-effects; and then refusal to remove Norplant implants. Notably, the cynicism of the Clinton Administration policy echoes that of Henry Kissinger in his National Security Study Memorandum 200 in 1974, which read in part: that the US should 'help minimize charges of imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with the right of the individual to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of children'. Kissinger forthrightly asserted in this study that the reason for slowing population growth in the Third World was to ensure US access to their natural resources. By 1977, Reimert Ravenholt, director of AID's population program, stated that the goal of AID was the sterilize one-quarter of the world's women. In India, AID tactics included requirement of 100% sterilization of a village in return for a new well, or cash rewards for 75% sterilization rates. Sterilization of Third World women has become the central goal of US population policy, which would ensure US access to Third World natural resources under the guise of empowering women. [TXT]

20067. Coordinating Committee for the US Network for Cairo 1994; US Network for Cairo 1994. US Network for Cairo 1994: August Update: Part 1: On To Cairo. New York: US Network for Cairo 1994, August 1994. The Network's last pre-Cairo event, a half-day briefing on last minute issues of concern to folks planning on traveling to Cairo will be held here in D.C. on Thursday, August 18, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. (Call for location.) Speakers will include Jim Lawrence, Executive Director, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, US Department of State; Mary Beth Powers, Executive Director, NGO Forum; and Sally Ethelston, Director Media Relations, Population Action International. Briefing will cover security arrangements, logistics, the NGO Forum, and information for Cairo visitors. The Environmental and Religious Interest Groups are planning regular caucuses in Cairo. Contact the interest group directly for information.

At the State Department's "First Tuesday" briefing on August 2nd, current information on logistics for Cairo were reviewed (see enclosures). The Official US Delegation has been announced (copy enclosed). The delegation will hold a briefing with US NGOs at 2:00 p.m. every day at the NGO Forum. The first briefing will be held in the Multi Media Center (see enclosed description). Revised advisories for travelers and other background information was distributed by State Department representatives (copies enclosed). Latest word on representation leads us to believe that "international NGOs" will be allotted 5 non-transferable passes to the official Conference Center while "National NGOs" will be allocated 2 non-transferable passes. Access to the NGO Forum will be unlimited, but does require registration and payment of the $50 registration fee. Network Scholarship Awards: The US Network for Cairo '94 Administrative Committee recommended and the Coordinating Committee approved disbursement of over $10000 in scholarship money to individuals representing the following organizations: Sisterlove, Inc.; Project Azuka, Inc.; Georgia Women Preventing AIDS Campaign; Action for Youth C.C.; Tam Cam Project; National Women and HIV/AIDS Project; Boston Women's Health Book Collective; The Gathering Place; Women of All Red Nations; One with Creation; Anoka United Methodist Church/Board for Global Ministries; African American Future Society; Committee on Women, Population and the Environment; and the International Council of Ethelston, Director Media Relations, Population Action International. The Environmental and Religious Interest Groups are planning regular caucuses in Cairo. Contact the interest group directly for information.

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Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
New York, NY 10017, (fax: 212-297-5250) (please see earlier notes regarding potential restrictions on the number of representatives)

(2) For the latest on the ICPD and related Administration activities call the new State Department Population Hotline at 202-663-3070. The NGO Planning Committee for the ICPD requests that NGOs planning to attend the ICPD make travel reservations and complete and return their NGO Forum registrations (see enclosed forms) as soon as possible.

(3) Network “interest groups” are available. The purpose of these groups is to facilitate communication among individuals and organizations concerned about specific issues. Interest groups may advocate a particular viewpoint. However, interest group views and positions can not be ascribed to the Network. The following individuals are organizing interest groups. Please contact them for further information.

(4) Religious Interest Group, Douglas Hunt, Church Center for Sustainable Communities/United Church of Christ, 1820 Sanford Road, Wheaton MD 20902-4008, phone & fax: 301-593-4724. Next meeting is June 20th, 2:00 p.m. (a) ZPG, 1400 Sixteenth ST, NW - Suite 320, Washington DC 20036.

(5) Men's Roles and Responsibilities, Nick Danforth, Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception, 79 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (212) 561-8000.

(6) People Sustaining People: a group of people of color who are working to influence US and international population policies, Sarah Moten, National Council of Negro Women, 1667 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20006 (202) 659-0006.

(7) Religious Interest Group, Douglas Hunt, Church Center for Sustainable Communities/United Church of Christ, 1820 Sanford Road, Wheaton MD 20902-4008, phone & fax: 301-593-4724. Next meeting is June 20th, 2:00 p.m. (a) ZPG, 1400 Sixteenth ST, NW - Suite 320, Washington DC 20036.

(8) Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health Concerns, Dr. Asha Mohammed, Center for Population Options, 1025 Vermont Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 347-5700.

(9) Men's Roles and Responsibilities, Nick Danforth, Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception, 79 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (212) 561-8000.

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(3) Global Issues Forum, US State Department, Thursday, June 23rd, 2:00 p.m. R.S.V.P. 202-647-0753. State Department “First Tuesday Briefings” continue on the first Tuesday of each month at 10:00 a.m. at the Office of Personnel Management, 19th & “E” Streets, NW, Washington DC. July’s meeting will feature a presentation by the Agency for International Development.

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The World Bank also notes that the rate at which life expectancies have improved in less developed countries has declined since 1955 - from 2.7 years in the periods 1950-55 and 1955-60 to 2.6 years in 1960-65 and to only 2.0 years in 1965-70. [World Bank, "Health," Sector Policy Paper, District of Columbia, 3/1974, annex 2, p. 3.] A particularly significant factor in the slowdown of the decline of LDC mortality appears to be that mortality in childhood has shown a somewhat greater resistance to decline than mortality at some later ages. [Tim Dyson, "Levels, Trends, Differential and Causes of Child Mortality - A Survey," World Health Statistics Report, vol. 30, no. 4, 1977, pp. 289-90.]

The persistence of infectious diseases (above all diarrhea) that cannot be conquered with modern medicine is, in large part, responsible for slowing the decline in infant mortality. Malaria control, antibiotics, and immunization programs have brought some quick, dramatic gains, but further progress depends on improvements in nutrition and sanitation, which are coming along slowly, if at all. According to Dr. John Bryant (formerly with the Rockefeller Foundation, now with the office of International Health, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare):

"The great weapons of modern medicine are aimed at the pathophysiology of disease and its susceptibility to pharmaceutical, immunological, or surgical attack. Health services are designed to deliver these weapons mainly through the hands of doctors. The dismal fact is that these great killers of children - diarrhea, pneumonia, malnutrition - are beyond the reach of these weapons.

"If children sick with these diseases reach the physician, there are sharp limits to what he can do. Diarrhea and pneumonia are often not affected by antibiotics, and the frequent presence of malnutrition makes even supportive therapy difficult or futile. And even these interventions by the physician, whether or not they are therapeutically effective, are only sporadic ripples in a running tide of disease. We are speaking of societies in which, at any given time, a third of the children may have diarrhea and more than that may be malnourished. Their lives are saturated with the causes - poverty, crowding, ignorance, poor ventilation, filth, flies." [John Bryant, Health and the Developing World, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1969, p. 39.]

The causes of high infant-mortality rates are well known and closely linked to environmental conditions. As shown in Table 13-11, the diseases most often fatal during early childhood in a developing area (in this case, Latin America) are fecally related and airborne contagious diseases. Although diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and polio all contribute to the mortality statistics, intestinal parasites and various infectious diarrheal diseases are probably the most devastating of the fecally related types. Surveys of parasite-infected populations frequently show from 70% to 90% infestations. [W. J. van Zijl, "Studies on Diarrheal Diseases in Seven Countries by the WHO Diarrheal Diseases Advisory Team," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 35, no. 2, 1966, pp. 249-61.] In Egypt, Iran, and Venezuela, the monthly incidence of diarrhea among preschool children has been estimated to be 40-50%. [W. J. van Zijl, "Studies on Diarrheal Diseases in Seven Countries by the WHO Diarrheal Diseases Advisory Team," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 35, no. 2, 1966, pp. 249-61.]

The effects of diarrhea, pneumonia, and intestinal parasites are greatly aggravated by undernutrition, which is the major underlying cause of death among children. Deaths from infection nearly always result from a combination of undernutrition and infection. When women are undernourished, too frequent pregnancies result in malnutrition for the mother and baby, low average birth weights, and poor resistance to disease.

The prospects for reducing malnutrition are mixed. The Global 2000 Study food projections, in the medium case, show only limited improvement in per capita food availability and, in some instances, declines. Furthermore, when food distribution among income classes is taken into consideration, the number of malnourished, disease-vulnerable children is likely to increase by 2000. Increased death rates in parts of Asia have already been observed during poor crop years. [Lester R. Brown, World Population Trends: Signs of Hope, Signs of Stress, District of Columbia: Worldwatch Institute, 10/1976, pp. 15-25.]

To further complicate the situation, many of the diseases most threatening health in developing countries are becoming increasingly resistant to drugs now being used in their treatment. [Sheldon M. Wolff and John V. Bennetts, "Gram-Negative Rod Bacteremia," New England Journal of Medicine, 10/3/1974, pp. 733-34; Henry E. Simmons and Paul D. Stolley, "This is Medical Progress? Trends and Consequences of Antibiotic Use in the US," Journal of the American Medical Association, 3/4/1974, pp. 1023-28; LaVerne C. Harold, "Transferable Drug Resistance and the Ecologic Effects of Antibiotics, in M. Taghi Farvar and John P. Milton, eds., The Careless Technology, Ecology and International Development, Garden City: Natural History Press/Doubleday, 1972, pp. 35-46.] Already drug-resistant pathogen strains [Pathogen resistance to drugs is not limited to developing countries; it causes increased mortality in industrialized societies as well] ("Rise of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria," Science News, 8/24-31/1974, p. 119). Certain staphylococcus infections (especially in hospitals) and gonorrhea in particular are growing problems. There are many indications that drug resistance in pathogens will continue to increase throughout the world (Marietta Whittlesley, "The Runaway Use of Antibiotics," New York Times Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122). Coastal waters off New York have been contaminated with both sewage and mercury. Tests show that bacteria in these waters have developed varying degrees of resistance to ampicillin, tetracycline, kanamycin, and streptomycin, and research with both the genus Vibro and the genus Bacillus led to the conclusion that ampicillin resistance and mercury resistance are genetically linked (Marine Ecosystems Analysis Program, New York Bight Project Annual Report for FY 1976-77, Boulder, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1977, p. 28.) have contributed to severe epidemics in several LDCs.

In Central America between 1966 and 1971, a dysentery pandemic occurred in which the drugs normally used to treat the disease proved ineffective [Sheldon M. Wolff and John V. Bennetts, "Gram-Negative Rod Bacteremia," New England Journal of Medicine, 10/3/1974, pp. 733-34.]


In recent years resistance to commonly used therapeutic agents against malaria has increased substantially in South America and Southeast Asia. There is every reason to believe that these resistant
strains will spread, thus hampering treatment and eradication. [World Health Organization, Weekly Epidemiological Record, 10/14/1977-
11/11/1977, pp. 325-70; 6/23-30/1978, pp. 181-96.] In short, there is growing evidence that numerous pathogens and vectors [See the food and agriculture section of this chapter for a
discussion of the increasing problems of insecticide resistance and
immunities developing in strains of insect vectors.] are evolving strains that
are resistant to many of the common and least expensive drugs.
Times Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122.] While new drugs will continue to be
developed, the new drugs are often more expensive and effective for a
smaller group of pathogens than those that they replace. [Marietta
Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122.] Excessive use of common antibiotics both
Times Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122; Janice Crossland, "Power to
Resist," Environment, 3/1975, pp. 6-11.] and in animal feed [Office of
Technology Assessment, Drugs in Livestock Feed, vol. I, Technical
Report, District of Columbia: GPO, 1979.] may increase the rate at which
resistant strains evolve. The most inexpensive, common antibiotics are
widely available without prescription even in remote rural LDCs.
Times Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122.] And the appearance of resistant
bacterial strains may not be due only to low probability mutations; it is
now thought that epidemic diseases may suddenly acquire resistant traits
through higher-probability contacts with more common, harmless
intestinal species that have already evolved their own resistance.
Times Magazine, 5/6/1979, p. 122.] If the reduced LDC mortality figures projected in the population
chapter are to be achieved, progress must be made in controlling the
facially related diseases, the airborne diseases, and the increased
mortality associated with these diseases as a result of nutritional
deficiency. These diseases are largely of environmental origin and can
be controlled only through improved environmental and sanitation
conditions and through improved nutrition and education, all of which
require capital investment, as well as through changes of habits and
cultural traditions. As discussed above under urbanization in the LDCs,
there is reason to question whether the needed improvements in sanitary
and environmental conditions will occur. By the year 2000, sanitary
conditions in some areas may even deteriorate. This situation, worsened
by increasing scarcities of food and energy in poorer regions, could lead
to an increase, rather than a decrease, in mortality rates among some
populations [Davidson R. Gwatkin, "The Sad News About the Death
Rate," Washington Post, 12/2/1978, op ed page; and his "The End of an
Era: A Review of the Literature and Data Concerning Third World
Mortality Trends," District of Columbia: Overseas Development Council,
forthcoming.]  

20072. DPR. Tenth United Nations International NGO Meeting On The
Question of Palestine: Part 16: Annex IV: List of Participants and
Observers: Participants and Observers: Participant NGOs. Held on
8/25-27/1993, at Austria Center, Vienna, Austria. Palestine Groups Of
Norway. Palestine Committee Of Norway. Palestine Red Crescent
Society. Palestine Solidarity Association Of Sweden. Palestine Studies
Program, University Of Exeter. Princeton Middle East Society. Prisoners
Friends Association. Salaam - Children Of The Olive Tree. Society For
Austro-Arab Relations, Spanish NGO Committee On The Question Of
Palestine (Comite Espanol De Ong Sobre La Cuestion Palestina). Trust
Programs For Early Childhood Family, And Community Development.
UMNO Youth - Malaysia. Union Of Palestinian Medical Relief
Committee. Union Of Palestinian Women Committee. United Methodist
Church - General Board Of Global Ministries. United Nations
Association Of Egypt. Women's International League For Peace &
Freedom (WILPF). World Federation Of Trade Unions (WFTU). World
Peace Council (WPC). World Young Mens Christian Association
(World YWCA).  

20073. DS. "Egypt: Introduction", in Country Reports on Human Rights
Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International
Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In
Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social
democracy in which Islam is the religion. The President is Hosni
Mubarak, who was reelected unopposed to a 6-year term by the
People's Assembly in 1993. The President appoints the Cabinet which is
responsible to him. His party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), has
governed since its establishment in 1978. It commands large majorities in
the popularly elected People's Assembly and the Shura (Consultative)
Council. One opposition party is represented in the People's Assembly:
the others boycotted the previous People's Assembly election in 1990 and
are not represented. There are several security services in the Ministry of
Interior., two of which are primarily involved in combating extremist
violence: the State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which
conducts investigations and interrogates detainees; and the Central Security
Force (CSF), which enforces curfews; bans on public demonstrations, and
conducts paramilitary operations against terrorists. Egypt is a
developing country with a mixed economy dominated by the public sector.
Agriculture, an almost entirely private sector, remains the largest single
employer. Remittances from approximately 2 million Egyptians working
in the Gulf countries are the largest source of foreign currency earnings.
In the past 4 years, the Government has enacted significant economic
reforms, which have reduced the budget deficit and stabilized the
exchange rate, but has made slow progress on other reforms, including
privatization. The Constitution provides for various human rights,
including a multiparty political system, regular elections, the rule of law,
and an independent judiciary, freedom of opinion, and the right to peaceful
private assembly. However, the Emergency Law continues to restrict
many basic rights. There continued to be widespread human rights
violations in 1994. The security services and terrorist groups remained
locked m a cycle of violence. Security forces committed human rights
abuses in their campaign against terrorist groups, and frequently
victimized noncombatants as well. Under the Emergency Law, abuses
included the widespread torture of detainees in security cases, the
government's continued failure to punish those responsible for torture,
arbitrary arrest, and detention without trial, and the use of military courts
to try suspected terrorists. The Government continued to arrest and
harass journalists and lawyers who defended accused Islamists.
Terrorists bombed banks, attacked and killed government officials,
security forces, Egyptian Christians, and foreign tourists, and were
responsible for the majority of civilian deaths in 1994. The ruling
NDP dominates the political scene to such an extent that, as a practical matter,
the citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their government.
The Government continues to restrict substantially basic rights of
expression and the press. Women and Egyptian Christians face
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law.  

20074. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the
Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c) Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the
Committee on International Relations, United States House of
Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and
520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint
Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There is
convincing evidence that the police and officers of the SSIS
systematically practice torture. The law does not adequately protect
citizens from physical abuse by security forces. Article 126 of the Penal
Code prohibits torture to obtain a confession but is silent on the
mistreatment of detainees for other reasons. Punishment for offenders is
imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years. A one-year sentence and a
modest fine may be imposed if the injury does not reach the level of
bleeding or wounding. However, Article 126 does not address such
abuses as blindfolding and The Minister of Interior stated several times in 1994 that torture does not exist in detention facilities. Instances may occur, he said, but they are isolated and not official government policy. The Minister also stated that the authorities investigate all allegations and punish those responsible. Government officials have accused human rights organizations of focusing on the rights of accused terrorists, while ignoring those of the victims of extremist attacks. Officials argued that international human rights groups exaggerate torture reports, but that reporting does not take into account the extreme nature of the security threat. However, the report indicates that the Government does not adequately investigate torture complaints in cases involving suspected terrorists. Since 1986, there is no evidence that officers implicated in such cases have been prosecuted or punished. While the Government has investigated torture complaints in criminal cases and punished some officers, the punishments do not necessarily relate to the seriousness of the injury. In August the press reported that a senior SSIS officer received 6 months’ imprisonment for permanently crippling a suspect during interrogation. Officers of the SSIS allegedly are responsible for most of the torture used on suspected terrorist detainees. Prisons report that torture takes place in police stations, SSIS headquarters in Cairo, and the governorates, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture is used to extract information, coerce the victims to confess and to end their anti-government activities, and deter others from such activities. Torture victims are usually taken to a state security office where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious beliefs, and political views. Victims have reported the following torture methods: detainees are frequently stripped to their underwear, hung by their wrists with their feet touching the floor or forced to stand for prolonged periods; doused with hot and cold water; beaten, forced to stand outdoors in cold weather; and subjected to electric shocks. Some victims, including female detainees, report they have been raped or threatened with rape; others report that security officers have inserted solid objects, including electric devices, into their anuses. Written records of detainees’ whereabouts are not kept while they are in the custody of the state security police, a period which may last 10 days or longer. Records are maintained only after security forces deliver the detainee to a prison. The absence of such a record in the early days of detention invites abuse and effectively blocks the investigation of torture complaints. The security forces also transfer detainees from prisons to other facilities where they are interrogated, tortured, and then returned to prison. No written records are kept on such transfers. To pressure male fugitives to surrender, security forces have taken custody of their relatives, including minors and female family members. An undetermined number of such detainees have been subjected to physical abuse. According to government sources, the prisons have a 400% occupancy rate resulting in unhealthy living conditions, severe overcrowding, and occasional outbreaks of disease. Many of the counts 31 prisons were constructed during the Ottoman era. Prisoners report cells are poorly ventilated, and food is inadequate in quantity and nutritional value. Prison officials occasionally levy collective punishment on inmates, suspending visits and delivery of food to inmates by their families. According to official prison sources, in Qanater women’s prison, the prison doctor was prosecuted for sexually molesting 12 female prisoners during examinations. Prisoners reported that prison guards beat a number of women in the aftermath of the scandal, and a sweep of the prison facilities resulted in the confiscation and destruction of many prisoners’ clothes and personal belongings. As many as 28 adolescents between the ages of 12-17 have reportedly been detained in the Assiut General Prison, a facility for adults. The charges against the adolescents reportedly include membership in the illegal Islamic Group, monitoring the movements of the police, and attempting to break into a mosque. The adolescents allege that they were blindfolded and tortured at the state security police headquarters in Assiut or at local police stations in southern Egypt. Torture methods reportedly included suspension, electric shocks, and beatings with sticks. In some cases, electricity was reportedly applied to the penis and tongue. Some of the adolescents have been detained for prolonged periods without trial in one case since 1993. Prison officials impose particularly harsh living conditions on some categories of prisoners such as Islamic activists. Al-Aqrab prison, which houses security suspects has been closed to all visitors, including lawyers, since January, despite an administrative court order in April annuling the Ministry of Interior’s ban. [7] 20075. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (a) Freedom of Speech and Press", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print, District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press. Egyptians openly express their views on a wide range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of the Government, without fear of retribution. Nonetheless, there are substantial limitations on the freedom of the press. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are often targets of criticism, but the press law stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism of the President or a foreign head of state. However, in recent years, opposition journalists have, within limits, criticized the President without harassment, although he may not be satirized in cartoons. The Government owns most major dailies, and the President appoints their editors in chief. These newspapers generally follow the government line. Nevertheless criticisms of government policies are frequently found in the government-owned press. The opposition newspapers are associated with political parties. Most are weeklies, except the centrist daily Al-Wafd and the smaller Islamist semiweekly Al-Shaab. All have small circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish tough criticisms of the Government, inspiring rejoinders from the government-owned press. They also give greater prominence to human rights abuses than the state-run newspapers. Most of the opposition press receives foreign funding as well as government subsidies and is printed and distributed by government-owned publishing house. The Government restricts the press in a number of ways. It controls the right to publish through its power to license newspapers. The Higher Press Council, chaired by the Speaker of the Shura Council, has the power to approve applications for licenses and publications. Most members of the Higher Press Council are close to the ruling National Democratic Party and are inclined to follow the government line. In a potentially serious move against the freedom of the press, the Higher Press Council in September issued new regulations for licensing new newspapers, requiring applicants to provide detailed information on sources of financing, editorial structure, and, in the case of a political party paper, the party’s ideology and platform. The regulations may be applied retroactively to existing newspapers and represent a significant tightening of the Government’s control over the opposition press. Opposition party papers may be called to account for publishing articles deemed inconsistent with their official ideologies. In the past, the Government has refused to license new parties whose stated platforms duplicate those of existing parties (see section 2). As in past years, the Government continued to interfere with freedom of expression, arresting and harassing Egyptian and foreign journalists, and confiscating printed material from the marketplace. In general, the Government harassed some journalists who wrote stories about corruption, portrayed Egypt in an unfavorable light, explored human rights and military issues, or who were associated with Islamist opposition elements. The Government has used such harassment to indicate that there are limits to criticism of the Government. In March state security officials interrogated journalist Moustafa Bakry for his article in Al Shabha newspaper in which he criticized the security forces’ use of violence against demonstrators protesting the massacre at the Hebron mosque in 2/1994. Also interrogated were Adel Hussein, the Chairman of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), and Magdy Hussein, Al-Shaab’s editor in chief. The three reportedly had been accused of publishing articles that threatened state security, social order, and national unity. The Government did not file charges. In the spring, state prosecutors repeatedly interrogated Magdy Hussein and the leadership of the SLP in connection with libel...
suits filed against them by senior government officials for articles on official corruption. As of late September, two of the four cases had been dropped against them. In 1994, a court sentenced another reporter for Al-Shaab, m Abdul Satar Abu Hussein, to 1 year in prison for publishing state secrets in an article on US-Egyptian military exercises. Abu Hussein claimed his article was derived from open sources. He also claimed that after he was arrested, he was held incommunicado for 3 days, under torture, and questioned about articles he had written in this stories for artists and writers. For artists and writers, the previously published work, law, faculty deans were elected by their peers. The Government justified the measure as a means to combat Islamist influence in the school system. In January a court ruled against Islamist lawyers who had petitioned the court to divorce Nasr Abu Zeid, an Arabic language professor at Cairo University, from his wife on grounds that Abu Zeid's writings on the Koran were heretical. The petitioners argued that, as a heretic, Abu Zeid should not be allowed to remain married to a Muslim woman in a Muslim country. The court found the petitioners had no standing to file a divorce suit. The case was in appeal at year's end. [ ]

20076. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (c) Freedom of Religion". In Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution provides freedom of belief and the practice of religious rites. However, there are important limitations. Islam is the state religion. Most Egyptians are Muslim, but approximately 10% of the population, 6 million people, belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church, the largest Christian minority in the Middle East. There are other small Christian denominations. The small Jewish community practices its religion without harassment. Members of recognized religions maintain links with coreligionists abroad. The foreign clergy pursue their ministries without harassment, but the law effectively bars non-Muslims from proselytizing. Islam accepts Christian and other converts, but Muslims face legal problems if they convert to another faith. There is no clear legal provision against conversion or proselytizing, but Article 98f of the Penal Code prohibits any person from "degrading or disdaining any of the holy religion or any of its religious sect with "the intention of harming national unity and social peace." This is interpreted as forbidding the conversion of Muslims by non-Muslims. Conviction is punishable by 6 months to 5 years' imprisonment. In 1993 the authorities twice arrested an Egyptian lay missionary for preparing Christian missionary literature for publication. A court ordered his release from detention in March. In July the Ministry of Education issued a decree prohibiting local school officials from requiring schoolgirls to wear the hegab (head scarf) without parental consent on school grounds. A group of lawyers and parents, who favored the hegab, challenged the decree. An administrative court ruled against the Minister, but his decree was later upheld by an appellate court. The courts have upheld the principle that Muslims cannot change their identity papers to reflect their conversion to a new religion. As a consequence, married male converts from Islam must register their children as Muslims, as the law considers them to be Muslims. In the past, state security forces have harassed and detained for prolonged periods Egyptian Christians accused of proselytizing Muslims. In 11/1993, security forces arrested six Coptic Christians who had sought to dissuade another Coptic Christian, who was also arrested, from converting to Islam. All seven persons were held in detention without formal charge. The Supreme State Security Court ordered their release in May. An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to obtain what is now a presidential decree to build or repair a place of worship. Coptic Christians maintain they are frequently unable to obtain such authorization or are blocked by the security forces from using the authorizations that have been issued. As a result some communities use private buildings and apartments for religious services.

From 1992-1994, the Government increased the number of building permits issued to Christian communities to an average of more
than 20 a year, compared to the average of 6 permits issued annually in the 1980's. Most permits appear to be for the repair of existing structures and not for new construction of churches. Christian and Muslim reformers urge the abolition of the Ottoman decree, but Islamists defend the building restrictions. According to human rights and legal sources, the Government in June closed two buildings in an unzoned area near Alexandria which had been used by Coptic Evangelical Christians since 1990 for church activities. Church lawyers are pursuing the legal suit against the closures. The lawyers maintain that the closures violate previous court rulings upholding the right to conduct religious services in private buildings without prior government approval. They also point out that the closed buildings are located in an area were unlicensed buildings are common. In July security forces arrested a Coptic Christian who protested the closures in letters published in newspapers. The police released the individual after 10 days' detention after he signed a statement binding him not to discuss the closures in public. In theory, mosques must also be licensed by the Government, but the Government reports approximately half of the estimated 70,000 mosques in Egypt are unlicensed. The Penal Code prohibits using a place of worship for antigovernment speeches, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs provides themes and monitors sermons. In practice, the Government cannot control all sermons, especially at "unauthorized mosques where sermons may invoke antigovernment, anti-Christian, and anti-Western themes. In 1994 the Government increased efforts to bring private mosques under its administrative control as a means to counter Islamic extremism. [2]

20077. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Egyptians and foreigners are free to travel within Egypt except in certain military areas. Males who have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or emigrate, although this restriction can be circumvented. Unmarried women under 21 must have permission from their fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the right to return. In recent years the Government has denied permission to Christian converts from Islam to travel abroad. The deportation of citizens and aliens granted political asylum is prohibited and not practiced. Egypt is host to thousands of refugees, but only a few are granted the right to resettle in Egypt. In the past, some Ethiopians and other Africans, who seek documentation as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, have been detained by the police and then transported to areas near the Libyan or Sudanese borders where they are released. Some have returned to their countries; others have found their way back to Egyptian cities. [2]

20078. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government remains committed to the protection of children's welfare within the limits of its budgetary resources. Many of the resources for children's welfare are provided by international donors, especially in the field of child immunization. Child labor is widespread, despite the Government's commitment to eradicate it. International health experts have condemned female genital mutilation (FGM) as damaging to physical and mental health. Statistics on the prevalence of FGM vary but government and private sources agree it is common among 70-80% of rural and poor urban women. The act is generally performed on girls between the ages of 7-10, probably with equal prevalence among Muslims and Coptic Christians. A 1959 decree and subsequent amendments, which described the practice as "psychologically harmful," limited the practice to excision. However, the more drastic infibulation is practiced in some parts of southern Egypt. The decree prohibited doctors not engaged in the excision of genitalia from providing any operation on the genitals. The law stipulates penalties for nonmedical practitioners; a barber was sentenced in 11/1994 to a year at hard labor for circumcising a child. However, the law does not stipulate punishment for parents who violate the law. Following public outcries in 1994 over foreign television airing of the circumcision of a 9-year-old girl, the Minister of Health, in the company of religious leaders, announced the Government would hold its first conference on FGM. The Government also broadcast television programs condemning the practice. The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, head of the world's oldest institution of Islamic thought, has issued a decree declaring FGM a religiously mandated duty. His ruling could hamper any public educational efforts by the Government. [2]

20079. DS. "Egypt: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The law provides for equality of the sexes, but aspects of the law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law women need their husbands' or fathers' permission to obtain a passport or travel abroad (Section 2.d.). Only males can confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that children born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are themselves stateless. Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to an individual's religion, which for most Egyptians is Islam. A 1979 liberalization of the Family Status Law strengthened a Muslim woman's rights to divorce and to child custody. In 1985, however, the changes were found unconstitutional on grounds that they conflicted with Islamic law and were repealed. Under Islamic law male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who need assistance. Egyptian women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, in business. About 100 officers in the Egyptian diplomatic service are women, including 3 ambassadors. There are no women judges. Although there is no legal basis to prohibit women judges, a woman under consideration for promotion to magistrate was denied the promotion on the basis of gender in 1993 and is suing the Government. Social pressure against women pursuing a career is strong, and some Egyptian feminists say that a resurgent Islamic fundamentalist trend limits further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other discriminatory attitudes and practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and the male relative's role in enforcing women's compliance with religiously prescribed codes of sexual conduct. Family violence against women occurs and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. Official or unofficial quantitative data do not exist. In general, the intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit the Prevalence and scope of such violence. Abuse within the family is rarely discussed publicly owing to the value attached to privacy in this traditional society. Neither the government, nongovernmental organizations, or human rights organizations has commented publicly upon family violence. There are at least two active women's rights groups, one affiliated with the EOHR. The other is the Communications Group for the Enhancement of the

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
Status of Women, which has published a booklet on the legal rights of Egyptian women. [2]

2008. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Egypt: Part 04: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Through the Penal Code prohibits the use of torture to obtain a confession, there is convincing evidence that police and security forces systematically practice torture. Such a determination was made in August when a state security court found that all 27 defendants tried for the torture of 10/1990 assassination of People’s Assembly Speaker Rifaa Al-Mahgoub were tortured while in custody. The court acquitted 17 defendants of all charges but sentenced 10 to prison on related charges. The presiding judge found that security forces used “hiding methods to extract confessions.” However, no action was taken to punish the officials responsible for the torture. In September a military court ordered the release from detention of Sami Salama Abdul Munin, one of 35 detainees in a trial of alleged terrorists. The court decision was based on a complaint by Abdul Munin that both his feet were crippled and his kidneys injured by physical abuse committed by security officers while he was in police custody. Mahmoud Hussein, 46, died in may several days after his release from police custody, reportedly owing to injuries sustained during interrogation by security forces for his alleged connection with terrorist groups. The Government stated that it was investigating the case, but at year’s end there had been no public statement. The Government generally investigates torture complaints in cases involving persons arrested for common crimes and has punished offending officers. However the Government does not adequately investigate torture complaints in cases involving detainees in political or religious cases. There is no public record that offending officers in such cases are punished, thus suggesting that the Government tacitly condones the mistreatment of those it considers to be opponents. Officers of the Interior Ministry’s GDSSI are known to practice torture on all alleged terrorists and nonviolent Islamists. Torture, which takes place in police stations, at GDSSI offices, and at CSF camps, is used to extract information, coerce the victims to end their anti-government activities, and deter others from such activities. Torture victims are usually taken to GDSSI offices where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious beliefs, and political views. Victims have reported the following torture methods: During interrogation, detainees are frequently stripped to their underwear, hung by their wrists with their feet touching the floor hung upside down, or forced to stand for prolonged periods; doused with hot and cold water; beaten; forced to stand outdoors in cold weather, and subjected to electric shocks. Some victims in 1993, including female detainees, reported that they were threatened with rape. As many as 10 days may elapse from the date of arrest until detainees enter the penal system. During that period, detainees are usually held at GDSSI offices where they are questioned and often tortured. The security forces do not acknowledge any detention during that period, pointing to the lack of any documentary proof of arrest. The lack of written records during the early days of arrest invites the abuse of detainees and frustrates investigations into torture complaints. The Government denies that such temporary disappearances occur and maintains that all arrests are conducted with warrants and that written records are always kept on the whereabouts of detainees. Moreover, the security forces sometimes transfer detainees from prisons to other facilities where they are interrogated, tortured, and then returned to prison. No written records are kept on such transfers. Under pressure fugitives to surrender, security forces have taken their relatives, including minors and female family members, into custody. An undetermined number of such detainees have been physically abused while in custody. Persons arrested for ordinary criminal offenses are commonly mistreated by the local police. Mohamed Ali Mohamed Ali, 33, arrested in January for car theft, was allegedly hung by his wrists for extended periods and beaten with a stick while in police custody. An investigating officer allegedly injected a mixture of water and human waste into his leg, causing gangrene. On October 17 Ali appeared in court on a stretcher and told the judge that the police had injected his leg with feces after he refused to confess to several car thefts. The court acquitted Ali on one charge of car theft but sentenced him to 6 months on other charges. At year’s end, there had been no public record of any investigation into Ali’s alleged mistreatment. [3]

20081. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Egypt: Part 11: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There is freedom to travel within Egypt except in certain military areas. Egyptian males who have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or emigrate, although this restriction can be circumvented. Unmarried women under 21 must have permission from their fathers to obtain passports, married women require permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the right to return. In October the Government discontinued the practice of requiring a special travel permit, issued by the Ministry of Interior, for Egyptian citizens to visit Israel. In recent years, the Government has denied permission to Christian converts from Islam to travel abroad. In a recent case, police arrested a convert to Christianity at Cairo airport and prevented her from boarding a flight to Europe. The Government also sometimes prevents travel for political reasons. In March security forces prevented Faten, the second wife of Omar Abdel Rahman, from departing Egypt for a pilgrimage to Mecca. The deportation of Egyptian citizens and aliens granted political asylum is prohibited and not practiced. Egypt is host to thousands of refugees, but only a few are granted the right to resettlement in Egypt. In the past, some Ethiopians and other Africans, who seek documentation as refugees by the Ministry of Interior, for Egyptian citizens to visit Israel. In recent years, some have returned to their countries; others have found their way back to Egyptian cities. [4]

20082. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Egypt: Part 12: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the 464-seat People’s Assembly. In October Mubarak’s reelection was submitted to the public in a national referendum in which 96% of the voters approved it. The Government claimed that 86% of the electorate went to the polls, although the actual figure was believed to be much lower. Under Egypt’s electoral system, the electorate was not presented with a choice among competing presidential candidates; it was offered the opportunity only to vote for or against Mubarak’s reelection. Two opposition parties, the Wafd and the Islamist-affiliated Socialist Labor Party, urged the public to boycott the referendum, and two other parties, the leftist Tagammu and the Nasserist, urged the public to vote against Mubarak. The other opposition
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

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20084. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Egypt: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) "Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government is committed to the protection of children's welfare. According to law, public education is compulsory until age 12, and the employment, or job training, of children under age 12 is prohibited. For many years, the Government has operated a "reading for an program" which seeks to bring literacy to older children and adults. The Government has also employed the media to promote children's education and welfare. Examples include Egypt's annual international children's film festival and television programming aimed at children's education. However, despite the Government's commitment to children's welfare, child labor is a widespread problem. Moreover, much of the resources for children's welfare are provided by international aid donors, especially in the fields of education and child immunization programs.

Female genital mutilation (excision), which international health experts have condemned as damaging to both physical and mental health,

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20083. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Egypt: Part 14: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) "Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Egyptian law provides for equality of the sexes, but aspects of the law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. Under Egyptian law, only males can transmit Egyptian citizenship. In rare cases, this means that children born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are themselves stateless. Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to an individual's religion, which for most Egyptians is Islam. A 1979 liberalization of the family status law strengthened a Muslim woman's rights to divorce and to child custody, but in 1985 the changes were found unconstitutional on grounds they conflicted with Islamic law and were repealed. Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half her parent's estate - the balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who need assistance. Egyptian women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, in business. About 100 officers in the Egyptian diplomatic service are women, including 3 ambassadors. Social pressure against women pursuing a career remains strong, however, and some Egyptian feminists say that a resurgent Islamic fundamentalist trend limits further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other discriminatory attitudes and practices, such as female circumcision and the male relative's role in enforcing women's compliance with religiously prescribed codes of sexual conduct. In 1993 Fatma Abdul Raouf was denied employment as a magistrate in a public prosecutor's office, the first step in Egypt to becoming a judge, because she is a woman. She is currently suing the Ministry of Justice for sex discrimination. There are no women judges in Egypt. Family violence against women does occur, but its extent is unknown. Abuse within the family is seldom discussed publicly, owing to the value attached to personal privacy in this traditional society. There are at least two active women's rights groups, one affiliated with EOHR.

The other is the Communications Group for the Enhancement of the Status of Women, which has published a booklet on the legal rights of Egyptian women. [=]
enforces child labor laws, especially in family-owned enterprises. [\textsuperscript{23}]

20087. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Libya: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. With the exception of security areas, the Government usually does not restrict the internal movement of Libyan citizens. It requires exit permits for travel abroad. Following the failed 10/1993 coup plot, the Government imposed additional exit requirements, including authorization from certain ministries and limits on access to hard currency. Women must have their husbands' permission for travel abroad. Authorities routinely seize the passports of Americans, as well as those of some other nationals, married to Libyan citizens upon entry into Libya. In 1991 Libya and Egypt agreed to allow the unrestricted travel of their nationals across their mutual border, and thousands of Libyans reportedly go back and forth regularly. This travel, as well as travel from Libya to Tunisia, continued at a high level in 1994, partly as a result of the international embargo on airline service to Libya. In response to antigovernment activity, the Government tightened border controls temporarily in late 1993 and again in mid-1994. The Government increased restrictions on travel across the Tunisia-Libya border in late 1994, possibly in reaction to improving Tunisian relations with Israel. In late 1993, the Egyptian media reported that Mr. Qadhafi turned over three expatriate Egyptian Islamists to the Egyptian security services. The Revolutionary Committees maintain surveillance of some citizens when they are abroad. The right of return is more nearly an obligation; the regime often calls on students, many of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad to return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad are interrogated upon their return. Some citizens, including exiled opposition figures, refuse to return. [\textsuperscript{24}]

20088. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 04: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. As in 1992, there continued to be reports that Saudi authorities tortured and abused detainees, both Saudi citizens and foreigners. Abuse included the practice of flogging, beating the soles of the feet to cause intense pain, and sleep deprivation. A foreign journalist was arrested in a business dispute, subjected to flogging, and deported. Allegations appeared in the International Arabic-language media in August that detained members and sympathizers of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, which announced its formation in May, were subjected to torture while in detention. In keeping with their customary practice, Saudi officials made no comment on these allegations. Following a March 9 riot at the Rafha refugee camp in which eight people were killed, including four Saudis, there were reports that some refugees had been beaten during the investigation into the cause of the riot. Responding to UNHCR, Saudi authorities promptly relieved the responsible guards from duty at the camp, but there was no indication the guards were otherwise reprimanded. The UNHCR reported that Saudi soldiers responding to the riot did so with minimum force and that documented cases of torture and abuse of refugees by Saudi guards had declined significantly. Agents of the Interior Ministry were alleged to be responsible for most incidents of torture. The Government failure to punish human rights abusers is a salient factor in the climate of impunity that prevails. While it is general government practice not to respond to reports of abuse, the Saudi Government has been responsive to diplomatic inquiries in some specific cases. The Mutawaw'a sometimes physically abused detainees while seeking to elicit confessions for supposed social misconduct. They often used switchlike sticks to harass those they perceived as violating religiously mandated standards of behavior and sometimes hit or slapped persons for alleged infractions of proper behavior. One of the 49 women who were arrested in 1990 for driving cars to protest the ban on women driving reportedly had the car in which she was driving seized in June while returning from visiting friends and was detained by Mutawaw'a. She was held for 3 days and beaten while in custody because she had been at a family gathering in which men who were not close relatives were present. In another instance, an American woman and her Saudi female companion were picked up by the Mutawaw'a and held incarcerated- the Saudi woman was struck by the Mutawaw'a and injured herself in trying to run away. In most areas, Mutawaw'a are seldom punished for such acts, so far as is known, none of those involved in the instances cited were punished. Representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNCHR both visited Saudi detention facilities where Iraqi refugees were held in 1993. Officials from the UNCHR officially recognized by the Government in June, regularly visit detained refugees in the Kingdom. Recognized international human rights organizations like the UNCHR reported that the Saudi Government improved conditions and treatment for some detainees in specific cases. The Saudis rigorously observe criminal punishments prescribed in their interpretation of Islamic law, including execution by beheading and stoning, and amputation for reported theft. In the absence of two witnesses (four witnesses in the case of adultery), confessions before a judge are almost always required for conviction—resulting in credible charges that this induces many forced confessions. Defendants are tried in closed chambers, without benefit of defense counsel being present. All 85 capital sentences in 1993 were carried out by beheading, sometimes followed by gibetting, which was confirmed in two of the cases. An Amnesty International report noted the increased number of executions in Saudi Arabia in 1993 which government officials explain is due to the rise in drug trafficking, a capital offense in the Kingdom. Death by firing squad is imposed for capital sentences for women instead of beheading. Repeated thievery is punishable by amputation of the right hand as prescribed by Shari'a law. For less severe crimes, such asadultereness and public defiling Islamic precepts, the Shari'a punishment of flogging with a cane is often imposed. Egyptian Mikhail Cornelius Michel received 500 of the 1000 lashes to which he was sentenced for blasphemy before being released from prison and deported. [\textsuperscript{25}]

20089. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Somalia: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. [The absence of progress toward reconciliation and a continued decline in security led to the relocation of the US Liaison Office from Mogadishu to Nairobi on 9/15/1994. US diplomats based in Kenya made periodic visits to Somalia after that date.] Somalia has been in a state of nearly unceasing civil war since 1988. Its last president, dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, fled the country in 1991. The fighting between factional clan leaders resulted in massive killing, displacements and starvation of thousands of citizens and led the United Nations to intervene militarily in 1992. There continued to be no central authority in Somalia. Despite UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) efforts, the Somalis have not been able to reestablish international relations with any government. There continued to be instability within Somalia, including Mogadishu, continued to be split between General Mohamed Farah Aideed of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi
Mohammed of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). Attempts to reach reconciliation failed. In the extreme south, where Darod clans are strong, remnants of Siad Barre's Somalia National Front (SNF) vie for control with other group including a divided Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The Isaak-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) continued to control the northwestern Somaliland area and in the northeast, the divided Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) controlled the traditionally Majertain homelands. In both areas violent intrafactions conflicts developed during the last months of 1994. The fighting in Hargeisa capital of the Somaliland region, was particularly intense and resulted in numerous civilian casualties and the suspension of almost all humanitarian assistance programs. In response to worsening conditions the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions concerning Somalia and UNOSOM. Resolution 897 scaled back the number of peacekeepers the goals of the UN mission. In November, in the absence of political reconciliation and a deteriorating security situation the UNSC ordered a total withdrawal of UNOSOM from Somalia by 3/31/1995. At year's end close to 10000 peacekeepers from Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe remained on the ground. When UNOSOM was forced to abandon the development of a national police force, local law and order remained highly arbitrary and largely in the hands of factions and clan-based Islamic courts some of which applied strict Islamic (Shari'a) law. Somalia's economy improved in 1994, compared to 1992 when US and other foreign troops intervened to halt mass starvation. UNOSOM was initially successful in facilitating the flow of food to the starving population, and, despite the deteriorating security situation, agricultural production revived in many parts of the country. Excellent rains during the principal growing season resulted in a bountiful harvest close to 76% of prewar levels. Thousands of displaced people and refugees returned to their homes. Flooding in the fall of 1994 caused extensive damage to crops in the Juba valley, apparently without causing too much harm to reserve food stocks. Commercial exports of livestock and fruit increased in 1994, including an estimated 13000 metric tons of bananas. The human rights situation deteriorated throughout the year as calls for military restraint went unheeded. Intraclan conflict worsened as rival groups, including those of Aideed and Ali Mahdi, jockeyed for power and control of strategic areas. There were continuing reports that factional militia, bandits and clan militias committed extrajudicial killings and also intimidated, detained, raped, and kidnapped persons in order to gain or maintain power in areas under their control. It was impossible to investigate these charges in most instances. Violence and social discrimination against women and abuse of children remained widespread. There were few reports of abuses by UNOSOM troops in 1994, in part because of the changes in UNOSOM's mission and the withdrawal of a significant percentage of foreign troops. [-]

2009.090. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There were credible reports that the authorities continued to torture and otherwise abuse detainees, including citizens and foreigners. A common method of torture is intense pain. The authorities also deprive detainees of sleep, beating, especially "fallaqa," which is a beating on the soles of the feet to cause intense pain. The authorities also deprive detainees of sleep. Agents of the Ministry of Interior also allegedly responsible for most incidents of abuse. The Government's failure to announce the punishment of human rights abusers has contributed to a public perception that abuses can be committed with impunity. The Mutawaa'in were also responsible for abuse. In 5/1994 they arrested 19 expatriate workers from the United States, Egypt, Canada, Ireland, and Venezuela after they departed a party at a private home. The Mutawaa'in reportedly beat an Egyptian and a Venezuelan man, ripped off the outer clothing of an Egyptian woman and severely beat an American woman, ramming her head on a car door, resulting in serious injury to her face and one eye. Following diplomatic protests, the Government indicated privately that it had conducted a high-level investigation and that "very strong measures had been taken against the Mutawaa'in involved. However government official did not specify what actions were taken and did not make a public report on the incident. In May, after CDLR spokesman Mohammed Al-Mas'ari fled the Kingdom, security forces arrested several members and supporters of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). Security officials reportedly tortured these detainees after their arrest. In accordance with standard practice, the Government did not comment on the allegations. Al-Mas'ari reported that he was tortured during 6 months of detention in 1993. While regular access to detention facilities by impartial observers is rare, representatives of the UNHCHR visited detention camps holding Gulf War refugees. In 1993 during her visit to the Rafha refugee camp at the invitation of the Government, UNHCHR Ogata praised the Government's contributions to the refugees' welfare. In May Amnesty International (Al) published a report containing allegations that guards tortured and beat refugees at the Rafha, Syria. However, reliable sources indicate that the allegations were inaccurate and exaggerated. Many of the incidents cited in the AI report allegedly occurred between 1991-1993. Sources from UNHCHR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed some of these incidents and reported that authorities promptly removed the guards responsible for abuses. The sources also maintain that documented cases of abuse of refugees by guards dropped significantly during that period. Government rigorously observes the criminal punishments according to its interpretation of Islamic Law, including amputation for repeated theft and execution by beheading and stoning. In 1994 the authorities beheaded 69 of the 80 persons convicted for drug trafficking, rape, and murder. They impose execution by firing squad for women convicted of capital offenses; there was one such execution in 1994. The number of executions, which had risen in recent years because of drug trafficking was down from 85 in 1993. The authorities punish repeated thievery by amputation of the right hand. In 1994 they imposed this punishment on 5 Sudanese and a Pakistani. For less serious crimes, such as drunkenness or publicly flouting Islamic precepts, the authorities often impose flogging with a cane. [-]
should be noted that the urban population of Asmara did not specifically desire came from the Liberal Progressive Party who professed to have formation it had not been able to present candidates at the elections. It in decisive terms, for unconditional union with Ethiopia. Opposition to this deputed separate representatives, who had not been elected by their figures, thereby introducing further arbitrary factors into the recorded not represented. Except in rare instances, those who attended the interrogated regarding the number of people they purported to represent.

The methods of selection showed local variations, and there were separate divisions, and these Administration advised these communities early in 1947 wholly in favour of Union with Ethiopia those who expressed no opinion at were usually unable to give a reasoned, or sensible, answer to relevant reservations on the "Method of Investigation," their conclusions on the result of the hearings differed very little from that of the U.K. and the USA.] INTRODUCTION: Because of the differing nature of the population and of the terrain of Eritrea, it has been considered wise to present the results of the investigation of the wishes of the people, in the first instance, by each administrative division separately, as, except in the Akkele Guzai which embraces both plateau and lowland, these divisions roughly correspond to the differing geographical and ethnologic areas. The method by which the recorded figures were calculated, and any special circumstances noted in the division concerned, are explained in each case. The reports by divisions are followed by an analysis of the results obtained for the whole country together with a summary of important factors which must be taken into account when considering them.

REPRESENTATION: In preparation for the arrival of the Commission, the British Military Administration informed the inhabitants of settled villages, through the normal administrative channels, that meetings of representatives with the Commission would probably be held at various centres, and that each community should elect representatives to attend those meetings. In most cases the elections were held as much as twelve months prior to the Commission's hearings, and the majority of the representatives chosen were confirmed later. The procedure for the tribal communities of the Western Province was different because of the scattered and nomadic character of the population which made it impractical to hold community meetings. The British Military Administration advised these communities early in 1947 to begin to elect their representatives and this was done. Agreement upon the selection of representatives was necessarily a gradual process and no definite date could be ascribed to individual elections. For both of the above methods the Administration determined the unit of representation supplementary questions which went beyond the simple main issues. Agreement upon all regarded as supporters. The representatives had evidently been coached in the appropriate replies to give to the obvious questions and weightier reason for omitting them, however, was that no machinery had been thought that to some extent these inhabitants retained their village or tribal affinities, and that their views would find expression through family or kinship channels, but the observations made by the Commission suggest that this was effective to a limited extent only. A weightier reason for omitting them, however, was that no machinery exists for municipal elections, and could not adequately be improvised in the time available. Of the Eritrean inhabitants of Asmara, (a) 59580 are Moslems and (b) 36000 are Christians. Of these the Liberal Progressive and Pro-Italy parties claim only 1200 and 7000 respectively. The Moslem League and Unionist parties claim 47370 and 57790 respectively. Although no means of verifying these claims exists the general political trends observed by the Commission throughout the country suggest that the Christians would mostly favour union with Ethiopia, and that the Moslems would support the Moslem League. Since the Pro-Italy party would draw its strength either equally from both, or in greater numbers from the Moslem League, a Unionist majority for Asmara is probable. No allowance has been made for these figures in the accompanying statistics.

HAMASIEN DIVISION: The Hamasien division which is situated on the plateau and includes the town of Asmara, was the first to be visited. Two meetings were held on 23rd and 24th November respectively, at which 327 representatives from 123 villages, representing a census population of 114000 appeared before the Commission. The figures shown as claimed by the representatives are those shown for the villages in census figures supplied by the administration. Most of the representatives claimed to represent a whole village, and the majority of those to whom the question was put gave the number of their followers as being a figure substantially higher than that of the census. The result of the interrogation of the representatives was a vote in favour of unconditional union with Ethiopia, desired on behalf of 95.8% of the population said to have been represented. A small fraction declared in favour of the Moslem League programme, and a much smaller one for Italian rule. The Commission did not question the representatives as to whether any solution other than the one they advocated would be acceptable to them and no preferences of this nature have therefore been recorded. The general tenor of the replies obtained from the twelve representatives of the Moslem League was that they would follow the policy of their leaders. They were not asked for, and did not volunteer, any preference regarding the Power to whom the trusteeship should be entrusted, but the opinion was ventured that it would be the duty of the Four Powers to choose the trustee. Membership of the political parties concerned implied no specific status and included women, men and children of all ages. Often a whole community was regarded as belonging to a party and it is probable that in a village declared to be wholly in favour of Union with Ethiopia those who expressed no opinion at all regarded as supporters. The representatives had evidently been coached in the appropriate replies to give to the obvious questions and were usually unable to give a reasoned, or sensible, answer to relevant supplementary questions which went beyond the simple main issues. There was ample evidence of party drilling and organization, but, despite this, there is no reason to doubt that the overwhelming majority of the population, and practically the whole Christian population, of the Hamasien division desire unconditional union with Ethiopia.

AKKELE GUZA DIVISION: Three meetings were held in this division, which takes in both plateau and lowland, and contains Christian inhabitants of settled villages and nomadic Moslem tribes, on the 26th, 27th and 28th November respectively. At these meetings 855 representatives of 486 villages and tribal communities representing a census population of 180000 were questioned. They were not all interrogated regarding the number of people they purported to represent and use had to be made of the census figures in the same manner as in the Hamasien. In addition, certain rules had to be applied to the census figures, thereby introducing further arbitrary factors into the recorded statistics. The answers recorded by the Commission show that 70% of the "represented" inhabitants of settled villages expressed a preference, in decisive terms, for unconditional union with Ethiopia. Opposition to this desire came from the Liberal Progressive Party who professed to have adherents to an extent which would give them the support of 17% of the
plateau inhabitants. Representatives from the settled villages who declared in favour of the Moslem League programme, or in favour of the Pro-Italy Party, were comparatively small minorities. The roles are reversed in the views recorded from representatives of the tribal communities. The followers of the Moslem League claimed figures which would give them as adherents 71% of the members of the tribes, the Pro-Italy Party claiming second place with 22%, the Liberal Progressive Party a fragment and a small party and the Unionist Party nowhere. The information obtained may be summarized as showing a strong majority of the settled inhabitants of the plateau in favour of unconditional union with Ethiopia, the comparatively small opposition mainly coming from Christians supporting the Liberal Progressive Party. Among the Moslem nomadic communities the opposition to Ethiopia is almost complete, a strong majority being claimed to be in favour of the Moslem League policy of independence or trusteeship with rather less than one in four claimed as favouring the return of the Italians in some shape or form. Over the whole division the Unionist claims put them strongly in the lead and gave them slightly less than half of the total inhabitants, the Moslem League claiming one half of the remainder. The followers of the Liberal Progressive Party thought that they might need assistance in technical services and some protection, but little other help from outside. In general they expressed no preference as to the Power which would be acceptable to them as a Trustee Power, but both the U.K. and, to a lesser extent, Italy, were mentioned as acceptable. The Moslems were in the main content to follow the policy of their leaders, and it was stated that if the policy of their leaders changed, they would accept the decision. The U.K. was mentioned as being the first choice for the Trustee Power, and many objections were registered against Italy or Ethiopia filling the role if the U.K. were not available. The Pro-Italy Party consisted almost entirely of ex-soldiers sent by the Party, or who only appeared as the selected delegate of a village or tribal community in a few instances. The reason most frequently advanced for the resumption of Italian rule was the desire to obtain satisfaction of monetary claims. With some representatives, however, the memory of better times when work was plentiful and colonial troops were maintained, weighed heavily. Ex-soldiers in other parties expressed strong dislike of the Italian army, and it was suggested by representatives of other parties that material inducements were offered by the Pro-Italy Party to entice followers of the other parties into their ranks. The numbers claimed by representatives were frequently exaggerated and the figures themselves are therefore to some extent discredited. This fault, however, was not confined to one party and there is no reason to doubt that the results of the investigation in the Akkele Guzai division as recorded fairly reflect in a general way, the wishes of the bulk of the inhabitants. The supplementary questions asked by the Commission followed no set plan, and such information as has been recorded in reply should be regarded only as a cross-section of public opinion taken at random.

SERAE DIVISION: Three meetings were held in this division which is situated wholly on the plateau, on the 30th November, 2nd and 3rd December respectively. At these meetings 902 representatives of 515 villages representing a census population of 170000 were questioned. They were not in every instance asked regarding the number of people they purported to represent, and in such instances census figures have been used in the same manner as for the Hamasion and Akkele Guzai Division. The practice of exaggerating figures reached large proportions in this division, with the result that in the division the number of constituents claimed is double the population shown by the census. All parties were guilty, the Unionist and Pro-Italy Parties probably being the worst offenders, and the excesses to some extent cancel out. The answers recorded show that the representatives claiming 77.6% of the total expressed a preference in decisive terms for unconditional union with Ethiopia. The Moslems claimed 11%, while the Liberal Progressive Party and the Pro-Italy Party shared the remainder, with the former in the majority. The Liberal Progressive Party’s representation remained, of only minor proportions, and in the hearing at Aressa, a Unionist stronghold, no representative holding their views appeared. In this division the followers of the Moslem League specifically nominated the U.K. as their first choice for the trustee power to a greater extent than had been recorded previously, and from the unanimity with which this was specified it is clear that the party policy had been explained in greater detail in this area than elsewhere. Nomination of the Trustee by the Four Powers was the second preference. With this difference, and the fact that a number of representatives gave expression to strong anti-Italian and anti-Ethiopian opinion, the opinions given by followers of the Moslem League followed the pattern of, and were generally in agreement with, those recorded on the previous day. The followers of the Liberal Progressive Party and of the Pro-Italy Party, were also on party lines. Supporters of the latter confirmed that membership was largely composed of ex-soldiers with monetary claims against the Italian Government. Before the hearing at Aressa, the representatives of certain Moslem villages expressed a fear of intimidation if they appeared in such a predominantly Unionist gathering. The Commission therefore heard them at a separate place. The deductions drawn from the above are that the figures given were so exaggerated as to be unreliable in themselves; but that the inflation affected all parties and especially the Unionist Party. It does not, however, alter the fact that a great majority of the inhabitants have declared their preference for unconditional union with Ethiopia.

WESTERN PROVINCE: Four meetings were held in the lowland hills and plains of the Western Province, at which in all 607 representatives of 753 kinship groups and 54 communities representing a census population of 350000 were heard. Special meetings were not held for Keren and Agordat towns as their native population have almost exclusively come from local tribes and were regarded as being represented through their tribal groups. They are almost wholly Moslem. The inhabitants of this province, including the negroid tribes of Barentu, are predominantly Moslem, and representatives claiming to speak for 74.9% of them, almost unanimously, as followers of the Moslem League, expressed a desire for British trusteeship for a period of ten years to be followed by independence or a variation of that theme. When questioned regarding possible alternatives, nearly all declared their willingness to accept any government chosen by the Four Powers but specifically excepting Italy and Ethiopia, while some others stated that they would follow any decision taken by the Moslem League. Even amongst those holding the latter view many expressed antipathy to rule by Italy or Ethiopia. Some stated that they would accept no alternative but their own independence. None of the many representatives questioned regarding union with the Sudan favoured such a course. A few were asked whether they would accept government by Egypt, and most of them rejected the idea. Partition of Eritrea was also regarded with disfavour. That quarter of the inhabitants of the province which did not profess allegiance to the Moslem League was divided about equally between those desiring unconditional union with Ethiopia and membership of the Pro-Italy Party. Amongst those followers of the Pro-Italy Party who were questioned as to whether they advocated Italian rule or Italian trusteeship opinion was equally divided. Representatives of the Moslem League and the Unionist Party, chiefly the former, stated that recently they had lost a number of their followers to Pro-Italy Party, and averred that this party was distributing food and clothing to its members. This allegation was supported by one of the Pro-Italy representatives, who stated that the distribution was made on account of the Commission’s visit. Some ex-soldier members of other parties had joined the Pro-Italy Party in the hope of obtaining satisfaction of their claims against the Italian Government. The party members gave reasons similar to those recorded in previous hearings. A considerable proportion of representatives of the aristocratic classes were in favour of union with Ethiopia though some of them admitted that they had left the Moslem League because it had promised their serfs more rights, and had joined the Unionist Party, even though it had not definitely promised the return of their serfs. Several representatives of the serfs gave as one of their reasons for joining the Moslem League the hope that if independence were granted the payment of tribute would be made direct to the Government and not through the chiefs, although this had not been promised in the party programme. The exaggerated figures claimed on the plateau were not in evidence in the Western Province. Irregularities observed were in the figures claimed by representatives of the
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Egypt

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imported factor, which affected the number of representatives from the Pro-Italy Party was that the formation of this Party was only authorized Just before the arrival of the Commission whilst the election of representatives took place up to 12 months before its arrival." Four Power Report, Vol. 1, p. 107) particularly when it is considered in the light of the remarks made above regarding the exaggerations and distortions which have accompanied the presentation of the figures, which in their context are more than the unverified claims of representatives and of political parties. The figures, however, are of value in revealing trends of opinion. It is obvious that the country is split into two camps, and that the political thought in each is conditioned in the main by religious creeds are congregated, one in the Christian highlands, and the other in the Moslem lowlands and plains. The Christian inhabitants of the three plateau provinces, apart from an important minority, are strongly in favour of unconditional Union with Ethiopia. This simple aim of the party was clearly understood by those who were in favour of it and there was no room for doubt that this was their desire. The minority is formed of followers of certain important Christian Chiefs who appear sincerely to believe that immediate alliance with Ethiopia would not be in the best interests of their people. It is an essential part of their programme that their country should be re-united with the Tigrai Province of Ethiopia by placing the latter within the boundaries of Eritrea. There is a Moslem minority, mainly composed of nomadic tribes, who migrate between the plateau and the coastal plain, who are opposed to Union with Ethiopia. The Moslem areas of the lowlands and the Western Plain are predominantly followers of the Moslem League. They are in favour of eventual independence but generally agree that an interim period of trusteeship under United Nations' control, will be necessary. It is doubtful whether the political implications of these terms are fully understood by their protagonists. Preference is given for the U.K. to be the Trustee in the published programme of the Moslem League, and this desire was expressed by the majority of those questioned. A great majority of those followers of this party, particularly in the Western Province, who were asked the question expressed opposition to acceptance of Italy as the trustee Power and almost unanimous opposition was recorded in similar circumstances to the appointment of Ethiopia. Not a single supporter was found for the idea that the Western Plain should be amalgamated with the Sudan, and only in isolated instances was Egyptian rule regarded as acceptable. Those desiring the return of Italian rule in one form or another were drawn in the main from ex-soldiers and their families, and many of them, probably the majority, are actuated by the desire to see the old conditions return and to secure satisfaction of claims they have against the Italian Government. It is a reasonable assumption that, even with these inducements, less than 10% of the whole population genuinely desire the return of the Italian Government. And that opposition to this course is several times as strong.

SUMMARY:

Moslem League; Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=495,040; 40.5%; Membership claimed by Party=731,764; 44.8%;

Unionist Party; Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=546,954; 44.8%; Membership claimed by Party=725,156; 48.2%;

Liberal Progressives; Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=52,985; 4.4%; Membership claimed by Party=53500; 3.2%;

Pro-Italy; Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=13260; 9.2%;

Membership claimed by Party=219600; 9.2%;

National; Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=13985; 1.1%;

Membership claimed by Party=56377; 1.1%;

TOTAL Numbers Claimed by reps at Hearings=1,222,224; Membership claimed by Party=1,790,434. Total Population: 850000. [=]

20093. Danielson, Virgina; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 16: The Modern Arab World: Artists and Entrepreneurs: Female Singers in Cairo During the 1920s. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 292-309. Female performers have often been very prominent in the Arab world, especially singers, even if formal music criticism and commentary excludes female singers from being
considered serious musicians. In the post-WWII era, women in Cairo seized a leading role in Egyptian urban music, a role that extended into all areas of commercial entertainment, even management and entrepreneurship.

Traditional female singers in Cairo (alima, awalim) were organized in their own guilds; they were typically working class; most were Muslim although some were Copts or Jews; often family members were musicians. The most skilled earned large incomes. The growth of a theater district in Cairo created an opportunity for local singers to perform during intermissions: many singers began their careers in this manner. Smaller theaters also appeared throughout Cairo, meeting the popular interest in musical theater, where singers could work; in such a theater Umm Kultum first sang in Cairo after moving from her village in the 1920s (she was the daughter of a poor Quran reciter and part-time singer). Her "angelic voice" allowed her to overcome her countrified roots, learn new musical styles and practices, and create a sophisticated urban style. In 1928, she assumed management of her career from her father. Her first records came out in 1923-1925 on Odeon Records and sold astonishing numbers of copies almost immediately (she would later attribute the large sales to her years of working the small towns of the Delta, where everyone interested in music had listened to her in person).

At her initial success with records, she won the highest fee in Egypt for a recording, $250 in 1924; in 1926 Gramophone Records gave her $320 per record, rising to $400 in 1927. In 1926-1927, Umm Kuthum earned more than $25,000. Women entertainers in Egypt were ambitious and hardworking, were expected to be morally upstanding, and typically became careful managers of their own finances. Yet entertainers had low social status, and were popularly associated with prostitution, drunkenness, gambling, use of drugs and undignified public displays, yet the accomplishments of women such as Umm Kulthum deended and received public respect: Umm Kulthum's dignity in particular, is credited with raising the level of respect for female singers generally. Egyptian singers also became widely known throughout the Arab world. In her later career, Umm Kulthum assumed a leadership role in the governing board for music programming for radio, was seven term president of the musicians' union, and was on federal commissions for funding of music.

20094. Davies, Kay; AID. "Examples of AID Funding for WID Activities: Egypt," in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 100-106. The Vocational Training Department (VPTD) Project is technically part of the education sector portfolio. Its most striking feature is the fact that it has been a relatively immediate springboard into the job market for women. These jobs are in non-traditional areas of employment for women such as electrical motor winding, welding, and radio and television repair and maintenance.

USAID financing for this program is $17.5 million. This is a three year program in two vocational training centers. The first year is devoted to classroom work and the next two years are spent actually working as an apprentice in a factory or shop. Private sector managers have become increasingly interested in accepting these trainees as apprentices because of the high level of interest and commitment these women have to doing a good job.

In 1987, 75 females graduated from the program in Alexandria; 22 in industrial electronics (radio and television repair and maintenance); 23 in electrical motor winding; and 30 in weaving. 34 women, or 45% of these graduates are currently employed with 15 of that number in private sector companies. Also in 1987 45 females graduated from the program in Tanta: five in welding; 19 in electrical motor winding and 21 in garment machine operation and maintenance. 23, or just over 50% of these graduates are currently employed with nine of the number in private sector companies.

USAID/Egypt estimates funds allocated to WID activities are $106 million. [=]
On 9/6/1981, Saadawi was arrested. She had been estranged from her then husband and accused of being a Marxist: her lawyer denied she had ever been a member of the Communist Party. She was arrested by a mob of bayonet-tipped rifle waving armed soldiers, who broke down her door without a warrant, seized personal papers, her diary and an incomplete novel (a fearful crowd watched the arrest with some disapproval; one young mother carrying a child cried out: “Shame on you! Poking rifles in the face of a woman. Go fight Israel instead!”). She was taken first to a prison in Cairo for a few hours, then driven into the Delta (the driver was suffering from pellagra she noted, a vitamin B deficiency); she was admitted to a barracks women’s prison as Detainee 1536. In the first cell she met other women activists: Dr. Amina Rashid from Cairo University; Dr. Latifa al-Zayyat; 48-hours later Dr. Awatif Abd al-Rahman arrested at the airport. There were many Copt women in the prison: ostensibly arrested for promoting sectarian strife. The Copts were mixed in with the Muslims, but were suddenly separated into separate cells, making it clear that the government was not afraid of sectarian conflicts but rather solidarity across sectarian lines, even in the prisons. The radio loudspeakers in the prison constantly carried the speeches of Sadat: “I will have no mercy... I will crush and eradicate them... I will have no mercy...” A meeting with officials led to the revelation that the group of “political women” was being held on order of the President of the Republic on a “Precautionary Detention Order... until the Socialist prosecutor can begin the investigations.” (The women would joke: “Why did they call him the Socialist prosecutor?”—“There is nothing left of Socialism except the Socialist Prosecutor.”) Periodically, Sadat’s personal helicopter would carry him from his country home in the Barrages over the women’s prison. Prison life includes slogging tension, like those between the ultra-religious women prisoners (munaqqabas) and the prostitutes; yet the daily exercises of Saadawi came to be a time when many of the women did exercises together in a small but continuing defiance of the wardens. She encountered the prison doctor, Sabir Barsum, who had been in medical classes with her 25 years ago (she had discovered that in class he had passed out when she mentioned menstruation and, after the disapproval; one young mother carrying a child cried out: “Shame on you! Poking rifles in the face of a woman. Go fight Israel instead!”). She was arrested by a mob of bayonet-tipped rifle waving armed soldiers, who broke down her door without a warrant, seized personal papers, her diary and an incomplete novel (a fearful crowd watched the arrest with some disapproval; one young mother carrying a child cried out: “Shame on you! Poking rifles in the face of a woman. Go fight Israel instead!”). She was taken first to a prison in Cairo for a few hours, then driven into the Delta (the driver was suffering from pellagra she noted, a vitamin B deficiency); she was admitted to a barracks women’s prison as Detainee 1536. In the first cell she met other women activists: Dr. Amina Rashid from Cairo University; Dr. Latifa al-Zayyat; 48-hours later Dr. Awatif Abd al-Rahman arrested at the airport. There were many Copt women in the prison: ostensibly arrested for promoting sectarian strife. The Copts were mixed in with the Muslims, but were suddenly separated into separate cells, making it clear that the government was not afraid of sectarian conflicts but rather solidarity across sectarian lines, even in the prisons. The radio loudspeakers in the prison constantly carried the speeches of Sadat: “I will have no mercy... I will crush and eradicate them... I will have no mercy...”
joined any political party. She was asked what she thought of an article published by a journal of the legal Tagammu Party, an article she had neither written nor read. She was accused of attacking the Camp David Accords at the International Womens Conference in Copenhagen in 1978: she stated she spoke about the problems of Palestinian women under Israeli occupation, and that meeting was repeatedly disrupted by Israeli journalists (Saadawi shamed the interrogator momentarily by asking whether he knew the source of his information or Egyptian internal security police). It was then that she realized the only common element among the wide assortment of political prisoners she had encountered: "there was nothing in common among those whom Sadat had imprisoned except their opposition to the peace agreement with Israel." It was then that Saadawi remembered being asked by one of Mrs. Sadat's entourage why Saadawi had been so cruel to an Israeli journalist, who had been ejected for trying to disrupt the meeting—Saadawi just replied by asking when that woman had become a defender of Israel: Saadawi realized suddenly that she had been arrested on the denunciation of Mrs. Sadat, a denunciation that was an Israeli lie [perhaps more specifically, she was the victim of an Israeli disinformation effort which involved reporting to the gullible Mrs. Sadat that Saadawi was a traitor to Egypt]. The inquiry ended with no evidence of any kind being brought against her, but with a statement that having been arrested on the order of president Sadat, only he could release her.

She was returned to prison with the awareness that no investigation would ever lead to her arrest since the charges were simply based on personal malice: "there was no law, no jurisprudence, and no justice." The political women sometimes believed Sadat would remain in power forever and that they would all die in prison, and then came the news that sadat had been assassinated. Not knowing whether Sadat was dead and fearing that if he was wounded he would have all the political prisoners butchered, they fearfully and hopefully tried to find out what had happened. Listening that night to a smuggled radio they heard Sadat was dead. The next day worried prison officials allowed them to buy fresh chickens; days passed without an order for a release although now mail and food packages were delivered from their families; Sadat was buried with few mourners other than the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel. Weeks passed: the new government of Husni Mubarak accused political prisoners (listed by name and including Saadawi) of planning a Soviet backed coup. Shortly thereafter she was taken to meet Mubarak (30 other detainees were also there): without even a word to release her, she walked alone out a side door.

Afterword for the American Edition: The memoir of prison was written in 1981. In the following years she traveled to many countries: "I have discovered that this thing called 'democracy' is nothing but a veil— as are the words 'God', 'religion', 'peace' and 'justice'—used to conceal the vilest sorts of force, murder, oppression and exploitation. This veil, which is forcibly placed over minds by the media, is more dangerous than the veil fashioned from a length of fabric that women in some countries use to cover their hair of faces. Upon meeting a number of senior-level European and North American political science professors, I was astonished to discover that they did not know the true reasons behind the war in the Gulf. Somalia, Bosnia, Palestine and elsewhere. I was baffled to learn what a momentous role print journalism and the other media have played in brainwashing these professors—for then what of the masses of ordinary folk? We inhabit the age of technology of false consciousness, the technology of hiding truths behind amiable humanistic slogans that may change from one era to another. The latest slogan is human rights, which has become a sword for the mighty to use against the weak... We continue to live in an age of servitude. Although the form has changed, the fundamentals remain the same. It is the servitude founded on the concealment of rights and the existence of a double standard.... Today power is in the hands of the exclusive possessors of nuclear weapons and their secrets, of the media, of means of rapid broadcast and rapid killing. This power allows them to slay thousands of men, women and children in a hugely destructive war that they have labelled a 'clean war' to assert their innocence." In 1991 the government closed down the Arab Womens Solidarity Association; in 6/1992 the government sent 24 armed guards to her home to protect her: now Saadawi lives abroad.

20099. El-Saadawi, Nawal; Peoples Translation Service [Trans]. "What Is Creativity?", in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 4, April 1, 1982. pp. 2-3. Nawal El Saadawi is an Egyptian doctor and writer. She worked as director of Egypt's Public Health Service, but lost her job in 1972 due to her feminist and liberal activities. Denied permission to publish in Egypt, she went to Beirut, Lebanon. Her works are written in Arabic and have only recently been translated into several European languages. From 1978-80 she worked for the UN in Beirut, dealing with women's programs for West Asia. In early 1981 she returned to Egypt to continue her writing, but was imprisoned in 8/81. A few months before his assassination, President Anwar Sadat embarked on a fierce campaign against government opponents. Several thousand people were arrested. Due to international pressure, El Saadawi was released from prison on 11/25/81 together with 30 other political prisoners.

The following is an excerpt of a speech given at a writers' conference in Oslo, Norway in 7/80, shortly before the UN Mid-Decade Conference on Women in Copenhagen, Denmark.

What is creativity?: Creativity, to my mind, is an innovative process which embraces all the arts and sciences. It includes the love, friendship and cooperation which people develop between one another in the common effort aimed at achieving a better life, and molding better individuals. It is not confined to the intellectual activity or the mental production of the individual, but in its essence encompasses the collective action of groups, classes and nations and the mobilization of the potential of all peoples to improve life, develop societies materially, culturally and morally, and ensure that peace reigns among all peoples.

The human body, whether that of man or woman, the mind and the emotions enfold a range of dazzling capabilities that reveal themselves through creative action and also through the manifold activities carried on everyday by people who are considered "ordinary" because these activities, which to us often appear mundane and repetitive, are the result, historically at least, of a long creative effort. The tendency has been for dominant schools of thought to limit the creative and innovative process, and to see it only in some specific restricted forms of action carried out by an oligarchy of men. This limited class group, elevated by the patriarchal class system to the level of gods, are bestowed privileges and titles and referred to as geniuses, artists, exceptional talents, creators, extraordinary people.

The human being is artistic and creative by nature. He or she is capable of finding solutions to new problems, and does it all the time. This is the essence of creativity, which is a universal human gift, and not a distinction confined to any specific group. He or she is engaged in a constant struggle to improve life and make it more beautiful. The folk songs, legends, dances, arts and crafts handed down through the ages indicate that the most beautiful artistic expression can be the work of thousands or even millions of "ordinary" men and women.

Since it is not possible to divide a human being into separate parts, the mind cannot be isolated from the body. Thus physical activity is an integral part of creative action. Dancing which might appear to be pure entertainment is being made of bodily force to achieve a given objective. The dividing line between craftsmanship, skill and creative action is not as sharply defined as many might think, although it exists within certain limits.

Creativity, Imagination and Reality: Reflection, meditation and contemplation of the past enhance the sensitivity of the individual, like a tool refined and sharpened by practice. Thus, it is that he or she is brought step by step to a discovery of the new in the old, the particular in the general, the astounding in the ordinary, the contradictory in the harmonious and the harmonious in the contradictory. The creative process can only unfold itself in conjunction with this process of contemplation and reflection, which permits the individual to live through reality once more, yet in a way which is different to experience a reality
which, although real, is not the exact replica of the reality known before. For ideas, thoughts and concepts are not born outside reality but within it, inspired by it, born of its matter, its energy, its dynamic forces. What grows out of the creative process is in fact reality, but it never is, and never should be, a mirror image. It is more difficult than mere copying, more complex than an exercise in imagination. It is the capacity to restructure reality, to endow it with a different content and form, so that it appears as a new reality.

Whenever I sit writing in my closed room, despite the four walls which hem me in and isolate me from other people, and despite the nature of the writing process which is a purely individual form of action, I always feel that I derive my thoughts, or draw what we call inspiration, from the creative imagination of the men, women and children among whom I have lived or am still living. Even if I rebel against many of the traditions and customs which govern their lives, they remain the rich and lasting source of inspiration for my thoughts and feelings. I have come to realize that my literary or scientific creativity can only flourish if it passes through the multiple network of relations and links which I have established over the years with people of my city Cairo and my village Kafr Tahla. These links are also the support and the protection which have spared me the sorrow of loneliness and the alienation of excessive individualism. My desire to nurture my art, and to preserve my individual identity, my pressing need to be alone, away from people, so that I can meditate and contemplate, are accompanied by an equally pressing need to be in contact with people, not because I want to write about them, but because I must live with them and touch with my hands the fiber of their support.

The Power of Creative Action: The basic power of creative action is the ability to penetrate and influence the minds and hearts of people. This can only be realized when the person involved really lives the life of the people and shares their sorrows and aspirations. Keeping close contact with people and reality, creating action makes the creative woman capable of recording the minutest details related to time, location and the incidents and personalities constituting the essence of reality. This record may permit her to immortalize the fleeting moments involved in the raping of a girl, the beating of a prisoner or the death of a child from hunger, because thousands and even millions of hearts and minds are gripped by such moments. They relive them through the narrative, a play or a film. The incident that was a part of the past, and might have died and been buried with it, is revived by creative action and resurrected to become a living part of the present, of the minds and hearts of people in different ages and places. It disturbs the placid waters of resignation, evokes new thoughts and feelings. The minds and hearts of individuals are transformed, their determination to rebel against oppression is strengthened.

Consequently, the power of creative action lies in its ability to implant seeds of revolution in the hearts of oppressed men, women and children. This revolution might not materialize in the form of a popular movement capable of changing the system within their lifetime, but at least the seeds will have been sown in the ground, and as surely as the sun rises from the East, they will ultimately flourish. Revolution is the natural result of creative action and freedom is the daughter of the revolution. Revolution and freedom, together, constitute the form and content of any creative action.

Conflict With Authority: One of the most difficult problems that confronts a creative woman is the inevitable conflict which breaks out sooner or later between her and authority, between her and the system dominant in society, because this system is built on patriarchal class relations. The intensity of this conflict is proportionate to the effectiveness of the action undertaken by the creative woman. The methods and weapons used against her differ according to the types of society in which she lives.

The dominant system possesses a whole range of oppressive instruments such as censorship, police forces, prisons, newspapers and mass media, as well as religious and cultural institutions. It is, therefore, always capable of breaking any individuals who try to rebel against it, unless those individuals succeed in building up a people's political organization capable of standing up to the powerful forces that will be unleashed against it. This task is an extremely difficult one in societies where liberty and freedom are words devoid of content, where a single individual commands the destiny of a nation and where any criticism or difference of opinion is outlawed. Where this is the case creative people, and especially creative women, feel themselves surrounded, cornered, threatened by obvious and obscure dangers every moment of their lives.

It is undoubtedly a difficult task for the creative woman to safeguard and develop her capacities under the prevailing system of society. She is often called upon to pay a heavy price in her private and public life. She may divorce (I was divorced twice) or be expelled from her job (my experience more than once). She might have to face harsh circumstances which pose a threat to her reputation, or to her economic, psychological or even physical stability (sometimes I have been threatened with violence, even death, by bigoted, fanatical individuals, groups or institutions).

The creative woman must realize that she is struggling against established forces which are equipped with powerful means and deeply rooted values. She must mobilize all her powers in this struggle and depend on the real forces which can support and protect her - those men, women, young people and children whose hearts and minds she touches through her creative production. I believe that, were it not for the hundreds and thousands of readers who sincerely and enthusiastically support my writings, buy my books and attend the lectures I give, I would not have been able to maintain my activity and keep on writing. Moreover, the forces of authority in my country and in other Arab countries would have been able to crush me completely.

If interested in having the full text of the above speech, please send $1.00 to Connexions. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]


Q: As we approach International Women's Day, 1991, we can embark on some kind of intellectual extravaganza to explain things, or we can look at the current global situation as being no different--except in terms of technological sophistication--from what it was 500 years ago when the imperialist powers sailed to our countries, murdered our people and traded land for blankets. They are doing the same thing to us in 1991, only in a different guise. But at the same time, we are witnessing momentous changes worldwide in another direction. Colonialism and international capitalism are in deep recession and crisis. To maintain their reign of terror they are fighting wars all over the globe on an increasingly larger scale to try and stem the tide. Their potential to deceive the people is wearing thin. It seems like internationally we are on the edge of something.

A: Yes, I think that once again, imperialism and colonialism are much more visible, they have been more invisible over the last decades. After WWI and WWII, and after the so-called independence we were given, we were controlled by economic exploitation and economic colonialism. US and British troops were not in the streets, the enemy was more invisible. But the fact is we were colonised economically. For centuries we have not lived with any independence--the colonial powers have not left us alone.
I think we are really witnessing a very important period in the colonial history of our region. We as Arab people, all over the Arab world, having faced colonialism and imperialism for centuries in different shapes and guises, are starting to be awakened. This is one of the positive effects of the war. When I hear about the demonstrations in Algeria, in Morocco, in Jordan, in Libya, in Tunisia, in Sudan, all over the Arab World, even in Egypt and Syria, I know this is an important moment in history. We are no longer simply relying on the West to save us. We are starting to see the light of day and the end of the colonial era.

Q: After recent events it is clear that there will be a new order in the Arab world, but to whose advantage?

A: Yes, unfortunately this new order will be in the interests of the imperialists—the US and Britain. They want another map because they are threatened. They were threatened by Nasser, they were threatened by Qadhafi, they were threatened by Saddam Hussein, they are threatened by any Arab leader who challenges them. They were very threatened in 1973 when there was a clash between the Arabs and the West over oil. Since then, they have been thinking about this war and how to dominate the gulf area and all the Arab countries, because they could no longer simply rely on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. And when they lost Iran they were threatened again. They were afraid of Iran's power and especially the Khomeini regime, which was very anti-US. The US used Iraq to diminish the military power of Iran. The Iraq-Iran War was initiated and encouraged by the US and their allies to destroy both countries. The Gulf War too was initiated by the US.

Q: Yes, they certainly rushed into the region, ensuring that the Arab people never had a chance to find an Arab solution to the conflict. They are so afraid of Arab unity.

A: Yes, their main aim is to prevent Arab unity at all costs. And for that they need their puppet regimes. But the people of the Arab world have shown that they are united in their opposition to the backward and fundamentalist traditions of Saudi Arabia, supported by the US machine, and in spite of the fact that they won militarily, this will be temporary.

This war was paid for by Kuwait and Saudi money. This is the first time in history that the colonised are paying for being colonised—can you believe it?

I think the injustice built into the UN structure has been clearly exposed in the past months and I think this is very important. That's why, in Geneva, at the Women's International Conference on 2/23/1991, we issued a statement calling for the resignation of Perez de Cuellar. He met Saddam Hussein on 1/15/1991 and the transcript of the meeting was published. At the meeting Saddam Hussein indicated that he was ready to withdraw and open negotiations. And this meeting and this transcript was never discussed by the UN Security Council. Can you imagine? Instead the US rushed to war. It is a scandal.

Q: Can you tell us about the International Women’s Conference you have just attended in Geneva?

A: There were about 90 women from 26 countries. It was called the Emergency Conference since we met at very short notice because we were horrified about what was happening in the Gulf.

The conference was organised by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. The agenda for the conference was to look at what we could do to stop the war immediately. The conference called for an international conference which would deal with the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait as well as other conflicts in the Middle East, in particular Palestine and the conflicts over oil. And as I mentioned, we also decided to send a delegation to the United Nations to meet Perez de Cuellar and ask him to resign, and also to meet with the UN Security Council, and ask the members who approved Resolution 6-78 to resign, because this resolution was clearly in violation of the UN Charter. It is stipulated within the Charter that the United Nations should work to resolve conflicts between countries peacefully, not with force. And there was definitely no effort put into finding a peaceful resolution. All avenues to peace were blocked.

The women at the conference were calling for peace. We wanted to stop the war, but we wanted to listen to the Iraqi people, and we agreed, because everybody wants peace, but not in exchange for slavery.

Q: How are we to move to an Arab solution and end of all this?

A: First of all there must be Arab unity. Without Arab unity, as scattered and divided countries, we are going to remain powerless. That's why they keep us divided. But Arab unity is increasing. And Arab unity must happen between the people not the governments. During this disaster the Arab people have come together. We feel that we are all, as Arab people, in the same boat. We are colonised, we are killed, this is our oil, they want to take it from us and they come to our land and kill us for their interests, and we can no longer tolerate that. We are also seeing that what really prevents us from having this Arab unity is our governments, they are divided. So, first of all the Arab people have to get rid of the governments that oppress them. The Arab League should then really work hard not to be divided, because in the present Arab League, all the problems of the Arab governments are reflected and there is a great deal of division, and this division is encouraged by the imperial powers.

And also an important development is the increasing power of women in the Arab world. We have to face the fact that women are coming to the fore. We cannot imagine how women are coming up. When you see demonstrations in Jordan, in Morocco, in Algeria you find women in there in the forefront. You see that 50% or more are women. And I think that in a crisis women have a chance to come out and liberate themselves. It's like a crack in the wall, the system is cracked, so the poor come out, women come out. And we must ensure that there is no relapse. We have seen often enough in our histories the way governments and leadership have used women, and then when the struggle is done and the war is fought, they tell them thank you very much, you can now go back home. But we will no longer let this happen. We are not ready to go back home after this scourge, we have to stay on and fight and win.

Also one of the positive results of this Gulf War is that it has clearly differentiated between fundamentalist and progressive Islamic tendencies. There is the Saudi Arabian group who are collaborating with the imperialists. These are the most backward the most right-wing, the most fanatical. And there is another grouping of progressive Muslims, who understand the need to separate religion and state, who understand the need for women's liberation etc. This I think is very positive because it crystallizes the fact that the Muslim religion, like any other religion or ideology, is open to interpretation, and like any other religion or ideology can have a fundamentalist and progressive interpretation. Among the Arab countries you find that each political system, and each country has a different interpretation of the Koran. When you have a progressive political system then you have a progressive interpretation of the Koran.

And of course we have to look at what we call the Islamic policy of America. Quite a lot of people think that the US is against fundamentalism. This is not true. In fact, the United States supports fundamentalism—the most right-wing versions of Islam they can find. And of course this serves the US in numerous ways. You know Saudi Arabia paid a lot of money millions of dollars, fighting Communism instead of Zionism. We call Saudi Arabia the 51st state of America. From Saudi Arabia came the death list of progressive writers in the Arab countries on which my name was included.

And so you see the US has a hidden agenda in relation to the way in which it can use Islam. They have used Islam to divide people, and they discourage Islam if it is enlightened. They use religion in a very clever and cunning way. And we have to be clever back. Some women in the Arab World have started an organisation called “Progressive Muslim Women in the Arab World,” using Islam to unify people, not to divide to liberate women, not to veil them, etc.

Q: On this International Women’s Day, what is your vision for women worldwide?

A: We must achieve unity, we must sit around a table and meet until we do. We should do this collectively and continuously. It’s hard work but we have to do it. And this coming together needs a new philosophy. We need to learn how to cooperate with people who have different ideas and who are from different political groups... We have to transcend all these boundaries, all of these limitations, because it’s time to come together. In times of crisis you have to forget your differences. You have to compromise to bring people together. And we should not reject the idea of nationalism. Although sometimes I am not for it, I
believe we can use it in a positive way to achieve unity.

And I think that women can play a major role in the process of coming together as a people and as a world, because women are much more flexible. We are not as dogmatic as men. We listen and we are not as conceited and stubborn. We are ready to listen and change our mind and work with people. That's the advantage we have gained from being so completely excluded from this dogmatic, imperialist, patriarchal system.

Q: Yes, being left out of it is positive.

A: It's very positive, and it has enabled women to greatly contribute to the process of bringing us all together. And I think that in addition to working together in the Arab world, we have to work with progressive groups worldwide to achieve international unity. There are many groups in the imperialist countries that are against the war and against their governments. Many women in the US, in Britain and throughout Europe spoke out against war. We need to study the diversity in the West and to work with groups that are against imperialism and colonialism. And this in turn weakens the idea of the so-called allies—as if everyone in the West is united. This is not true.

We must have global feminism, because very simply we are all in the same boat. I think women in the West are becoming more and more aware of this. They are oppressed by the same element as us. I see women suffering a severe poverty here because of the same government that sent troops to kill the Iraqi people. They have money for war, but they don't have money for women and for children or education or for social services. So we are saying to women internationally that we have one enemy and we are all in the same boat. We are all oppressed but to different degrees. This will bring us together. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$80.] [X]

20101. El-Solh, Camillia Fawzi; Altorki, Soraya [editor]; El-Solh, Camillia Fawzi [editor]. Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your Own Society: Part 5: Gender, Class and Origin. Modern Arab Studies. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 91-114. As the pretense of objectivity in anthropology has started crumbling, being replaced by a realization that making the assumptions built into anthropologic can produce a better understanding of the results of fieldwork. In studying an Egyptian peasant settlement in Iraq, commonalities of being an Arab-American woman can overcome much of the distance between peasants and foreign-academic researchers. The author is Egyptian-Irish, grew up in Egypt, and received her higher education in West Germany. In 1975, a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Iraq provided for the settlement of Egyptian peasants in communities in Iraq at Iraqi expense: in 1976 the Khalasa Settlement was established 36 miles south of Baghdad. Being an Egyptian in Iraq led to some difficulties, both political and in terms of the continuing formality of relations between men and women (the Iraqi Federation of Women tends to underestimate such problems). Even worse, in 1981, the housing crisis in Baghdad due to the Iran-Iraq War had led a spillover of people into Khalasa Settlement. One notable ideological difference between the author and her peasant informants was that while she found female circumcision to be very distasteful, they perceived it as a personal and social good and considered women not circumcised as "distasteful and unclean". Despite the relative advantages of being an Arab and Egyptian woman in Khalasa Settlement, this advantage was fragile and was damaged by a meeting she held with a local official on his request: this meeting made people less friendly towards here and in effect limited her ability to do fieldwork, which was soon ended.

20102. Ethelson, Sally. "Gender, Population, Environment: The Cairo Neighborhood of Manshiet Nasir Reflects The Social and Demographic Circumstances Common to Most Countries In The Region: Rapid Population Growth and Increasing Urbanization; Scarcity of Land, Water and Other Economic Resources; and Limit's On Women's "Social and Economic Autonomy", in Middle East Report, September-October 1994. pp. 2-5. Manshiet Nasir is a squattertown at the dge of Cairo's Muqattam Hills: most homes now have water and electricity; immunization campaigns have eliminated tetanus and other common diseases among women and children. The tacit recognition of settlement rights has enabled the residents to buy and sell their property. PVO’s like the Association for the Protection of the Environment (Gamaat Himayat al-Biat min Al-Talawuth) provide literacy and handicrafts projects for women. Moreover, Manshiet Nasir remains very impoverished and still suffers from public health and sanitation problems. On task done in local workshops is dismantling Cairo hospitals’ used syringes, work that is done by children. The settlement illustrates the problems of advancing an environmentalist agenda in very poor regions: some problems, such as solid waste management or water conservation, may simply be beyond the means of the impoverished communities. Yet the modest interventions in Manshiet Nasir have enabled women to learn to read, to earn money, and thus gain a measure of autonomy, if limited in an absolute sense, may transform the lives of these women. At the same time, population as a concern was downgraded to a secondary concern at the Earth Summit in 1992. The $600 billion forecast needed at the Earth Summit to promote environmental policies is simply not forthcoming: only a few hundred million has trickled into the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility. The hope that NGOs can do such a global job, even if there are local successes as in Manshiet Nasir is simply unrealistic: Following the Cairo Conference, with all its extravagance and whatever the merit of its proclamations, the task of pushing the process of change in the face of existing hierarchies of wealth and power will remain.
Ford advances the idea that libraries are obsolete except as museums of books as material culture; he begins with a strong-headed Foucault quote observing, ‘rhetoric is a means of momentarily postponing the burning of libraries’ [Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977)] (p. 10, col. 1), when it is surely more likely that libraries are burned as a result of rhetoric. Postiling his discourse as exploring the ‘new art history...[that is],...the museum’ (p. 10, col. 3), Ford advances a program that would terminate libraries as institutions associated with knowledge (p. 10, col. 1), would terminate classification of knowledge in the name of a new disorder (p. 11, col. 2-3; p. 14, col. 1), would terminate scientific inquiry and reinstate the primary role of a hyper-oral tradition (p. 12, col. 2), and would terminate authorship of text by redefining authorship as little more than rearrangement of previously existing paragraphs, or even better, of images or video clips (p. 12, col. 2). So, for example, Ford argues that: ‘classification and forms of cataloging do not just aid the retrieval of relevant material they impose a grid of the permissible on the field of the possible’ [citing Victor Burgin, ‘Institutional Legitimation Imposes a Grid of the Permissable Upon the Field of the Possible’. The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity (London: Macmillan, 1986)] (p. 11, col. 3). However, in real libraries significant books are excluded from collections not because the works cannot be assigned a call number, and not because they don’t otherwise meet the collection policies of the libraries, but rather because of a failure in collection development policy implementation. Characteristically, Ford confuses classification of books as a process with censorship: books are not censored because they cannot be classified, but rather because they are classified (classified as having undesirable ideas). Ford goes on to make very clear his specific rejection of the meaningfulness of ideas by his rejection of intellectual processes that are ‘consistent, unitary and linear’ (p. 12, col. 1); accepting the next logical step, Ford dissolves the possibility of meaningful authorship of text by dissolving the difference between author and reader, making every reader also the producer of the text since the reader can add to or rearrange fragments of any text within the ‘hyper-reality...docuserve’ (p. 12, col. 2-3). Ford quotes Poster who asserts that the effects of [wordprocessing] include[s] the possibility of degendering...and dissipation of the subject, dislocating it temporally and spatially (p. 12, col. 2), a very odd statement that can only have been made by someone who does not type very much on a keyboard (of course, Poster may be using some very unusual wordprocessing software; but Poster’s observation is consistent with Ford’s assertion that the reader becomes the producer in a way that might mean Ford, for example, cannot tell whether or not he is Madonna when watching her Internet hypervideo). This process of creating, mainly by rearrangement and rewriting, makes a personal history of ancient Egypt. In which, for example, Simon Ford is Pharaoh, or of pop culture in which Simon Ford is Boy George, as valid as any objective reality since “the distinction between representation and reality seems to become irrelevant or ‘immaterial’” (p. 15). Ford then goes on to argue that hypertext is ‘rapidly becoming the characteristic mode of expression both in the culture and in the study of cultural forms’, which is a clear confusion between ‘representation’ (termed vaporeon in the software industry) and ‘reality’, since only a few toy hypertext systems have ever been built: this fundamental error in turn become the premise for Ford’s program for reform of libraries in the Western world. Ford does pause to cheerfully note that hypermedia, since it will likely not include materials that are ‘dangerous, radical and potentially treating’ (p. 12, col. 3) will make such materials ‘marginalized, insignificant and practically nonexistent’ (p. 12, col. 3), even as books (the traditional mechanism for disseminating such marginalized ideas) will become the preserve of ‘specialists, be they curators, historians, bibliographers, or librarians’ (p. 12, col. 3): he balances this grim scenario by noting happily that the central role of the visual image will be reaffirmed (but is a self-authored hyperdocument about the neolithic really made more valuable illustrated with video clips from the Flintstones? and is such a document a meaningful replacement for dissertation or education of the young?).

Ford’s central thesis is that the library is a temporary special case of the museum which is now obsolete. With books becoming irrelevant as all correct ideas escape from the physical shell of books into cyberspace (and as real libraries become unreal ‘virtual libraries’), books become the merest material culture (p. 13, col. 1), that should be displayed in exhibit cases for their ‘decorration’ or ‘construction’ (p. 13, col. 2). Ford states that libraries and museums can learn much from each other, and while specifically rejecting the ‘dominance’ of libraries by museums (p. 13, col. 1), he states very clearly that the only remaining purpose of libraries is become a second-rate class of museums and to display books as artifacts of an earlier age, in display cases (p. 13, col. 2) presenting the ‘history of the book’ rather than the book itself (p. 14, col. 1). He tries to soften the impact of this true death of the library as an institution associated with ideas by quoting Hooper-Greenfield saying, ‘where reality and hyper-reality can barely be distinguished, the potential of a return to the concrete material evidence is of overriding importance’, even as he asserts that the specialist nature of any ‘marginalized’ ideas that the books contain be the exclusive domain of experts (who themselves do not pretend to understand such ideas, but rather merely classify the books as physical objects). Of course, Ford is driven to this conclusion by his remarkable assertion that it is a mere ‘misapprehension’ that books and ideas have any real connection (he notes Jesse Shera is wrong to say of books that: ‘its fundamental concern is with the communication of knowledge, ideas, thought; but because those intangibles are embodied in physical objects--books and other graphic records--it is easy to mistake the physical object rather that its intellectual content as the reality’ (p. 13, col. 2). Ford, having already rejected linear text as relevant, and in noting that for the post-modernist person reading is ‘increasingly difficult’ in any event (p. 12, col. 3), describes the ‘book’ as the ‘poor relation’ of text (p. 13, col. 1-2); and so, for Ford, the examination of the cover of a book, or the glue that holds it together, is a greater ‘celebration’ than is the reading of the book (p. 13, col. 2). It is impossible to imagine how anyone who has ever read a book and been influenced by its ideas could claim that the real meaning of a book is in the decoration of its binding. Ford’s self-proclaimed ‘radicalism’ is rooted in the destruction of the library and the book, the traditional media of dissertation and education, culminating in the substitution of the representation of dissertation and the simulation of education for its reality. Postiling an improbable world of omnipresent hypermedia, Ford advocates the immediate gutting of all Western institutions that have administered the destruction of our intellectual freedom and discourse for half a millennium; and advocates, in the name of higher ‘museological’ purpose, the abolition of the book. [Simon Ford is a curator at the National Art Library, Victoria & Albert Museum, London, and self-styled leader of the Movement for Avant-Garde Librarianship.][TXT]

20105. Fridman, L. A. “Polozheniya i Borba Rabochego Klassa Yegipeta v 1913-1938 (The Position and Struggle of the Working Class in Egypt in 1913-1938),” in Voprosy Istori, 1954. pp. 117-128. The article is factual and quotes Egyptian and British sources. It regards ther period 1931-1938 as a school of political activity for the Egyptian working class whose position it describes as follows: owing to the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 Britain had to make some concessions to the bourgeoisie such as an increase in customs duty. There was a marked development of industry in the period 1931-1938 so that by 1937 there were between 160000 and 1700000 workers. The proletariat was being constantly reinforced by landless peasants who numbered from 2 to 3 million. There was thus an army of workers which caused wages to fall far below the cost of living, in addition to which prices were forced up by indirect taxation. Foreign workers received about four times more than Egyptian workers who were quite unable to provide suitably for their families. This caused heavy mortality and led to the employment of women and children. Industry was owned by foreign firms or Egyptian capitalists who earned great profits. Thus the struggle of the workers to better their economic position merged with the struggle to win independence for Egypt. There were periodic strikes, but the workers were leaderless since the Communist party had been broken. The treaty of 1936 caused a new wave of strikes which were forcibly quelled by the Wafd. It had tried to control the trade union movement in its own interests but did nothing to improve the position of the workers. The war put a stop to strikes and
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

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I am not a traditional psychiatrist working through a clinic. I am more or less a psychiatrist who wants to change psychiatry and reach people through writing rather than through clinical work.

Q: What kind of reception have your books, especially the Hidden Face of Eve and Women and Neurosis received from the medical profession?
A: Some of the progressive doctors really want to change, especially the young doctors. They read my books and come to home for discussions. But some of the older generation of traditional doctors don't like what I say. They think I am violating the medical profession.

Q: How do you see traditional psychiatry?
A: The medical profession is very commercial. You find the psychiatrist sitting in his clinic watching the clock. He will interrupt you in the middle of a sentence when your time is up. A psychiatrist usually prescribes drugs to his patients. It's easy--he writes you a prescription for some sleeping pills, some tranquilizers and you go home with many drugs to swallow. They call this "treatment" and they profit a lot. Psychiatrists can become very rich in this business. And it's the women who suffer.

Q: What did you discover in your research about women and neurosis?
A: I discovered quite a lot about psychiatric doctors. Most of them believe that mental problems are congenital, genetic or related to the past. So the psychiatrist often asks the patient about her mother or father--whether the parents had a history of depression. The psychiatrist is not interested in the patient's present life. Maybe the patient has a very cruel husband who is responsible for her neurosis. They psychiatrists do not question the relationship between husband and wife because he believes a wife must be obedient to her husband to have a good mental health attitude.

I found in my study that the causes of neurosis, depression or anxiety in women are related to their present life rather than their past history and it is usually caused by a man in her present life (husband, father, boss) who is oppressing her. So neurosis is more often socially caused rather than congenitally or genetically caused.

Most psychiatrists believe that domination of the husband over the wife is something natural and even sought for--every husband is dominant every wife obedient. They don't think the woman becomes neurotic because her husband is dominant. They can't understand that. They treat her in such a way that she should submit to her feminine attitude, her feminine role. They don't try to make her aware of her identity, her independence, her personality. They try to help her adapt to the marriage system and to fit into the obedience role. Most of the women I interviewed during my research were suffering from domination of their husbands. They were beaten by their husbands. They couldn't tolerate such a life and they were rebelling. To a traditional psychiatrist, they were unable to adapt.

Q: How did the women you interviewed for your study on "Women and Neurosis" respond to your questions?
A: Some of them at the beginning were resistant, especially the women in prison Firdaus, who was the topic of my book Woman at Point Zero, refused to meet me. She though I was going to investigate her. But after a time, they developed confidence in me and some of them became my friends.

Q: What kinds of crimes had the women prisoners you interviewed committed?
A: Different crimes--some of them were killers--the prostitute who killed her pimp, the wife who killed her husband, the mother who killed her children. One woman killed her child because she was poor and she couldn't find money for food for him. One woman killed her illegitimate child. There were women who sold narcotic drugs, prostitute women and women who were thieves.

Q: How do women end up in the prison mental hospital?
A: Some women develop mental symptoms in prison and are referred to the hospital. They stay at the hospital for a very short time to be treated as an emergency. Then they go back to their cells, and if they develop symptoms again they return to the hospital.

Q: What are the conditions inside the prisons, the prison hospitals,
and the public and private mental hospitals?
A: The situation is very desperate in the prisons. In prison hospitals the situation is bad—the treatment is lacking. The doctors are negligent of the patients because they are considered prisoners not having full rights. The same goes for the public mental hospitals. They are free for the poor and are also very bad, but they are better than the prison hospitals.

The free mental clinics suffer from overcrowding. Some people even sleep on the floor because there aren't enough beds. Some of the nurses exploit the patients by making them work or by stealing their food. These situations are improving now because many people began writing about the conditions in the hospitals.

But in the private mental hospitals, you find the upper class women in clean, bright surroundings. If you go first class you have your own room with a bathroom.

Q: Do women voluntarily go to mental institutions or are they committed?
A: The poor women don't go voluntarily; usually someone in their family takes them. If, for example, a woman develops hysterical fits, especially a poor woman, she is taken by force to the mental hospital. With upper class women, when they suffer depression or anxiety, they go by themselves just to change their atmosphere. Or her doctor may advise her to go to an institution for a month or so to get treatment and relax.

Q: If a husband wants to get rid of his wife, can he commit her to an institution?
A: To get rid of her, he can divorce her. Why should he send her to an expensive institution? The Egyptian family law gives a man the full right to divorce his wife without any reason. Women live under pressure because they are afraid of divorce.

Q: Is there a high suicide rate among women?
A: No, but there are a few cases.

Q: Are lobotomies and electric shock treatment practiced on women?
A: I haven't heard of lobotomies used in psychiatric cases, only in organic cases, when there is a tumor on the brain. [As for shock treatment] they still practice it in hospitals, but the percentage of usage is diminishing, because some people have started to write about it. I wrote in one of my books about damage the electric shock treatment caused. It really affects the brain and personality, so quite a few doctors are refraining from using it.

Q: Are there any movements among mental health patients to organize for better rights?
A: No, not yet.

Q: And women prisoners?
A: Among women prisoners it is very difficult. The prisons are very oppressive. The women are kept separate by the jailers so they cannot come together to communicate or organize.

Q: Are the prisons overcrowded?
A: Yes. When Sadat sent 1536 political prisoners to jail, there was no room for us. [These mass arrests began in 9/1981—those charged were held under the “Law for the Protection of Values from Shame.”] I was with a group of 14 women. They had to evacuate the cell of the beggars for us.

Q: Who were the women you shared the cell with?
A: We came from different groups; there were Muslim fundamentalists, leftists, liberals, Christians—all of the opposition were represented in the cell. It was quite an experience. I wrote a play about it called Twelve Women in One Cell and also a book called Memoirs of My Life in Prison. [Neither are currently available in English.] The three months in prison gave me insight and exposure to a totally different life and totally different people. Whether it was the Muslim fundamentalist or the jailer or the prostitute who served us, everything was new to me.

Q: The jailing are prisoners you?
A: The jailers used prostitutes to assist them in washing clothes and in cleaning the wards. They used prostitutes, but they wouldn't use a woman who sold drugs, for instance. There is a class system in prison—those women who sell drugs are rich and dignified so they might assist the jailer in some of the administrative work. The prostitutes who are imprisoned are considered lower class. Only the poor prostitutes end up in prison, the rich ones pay bribes and escape being caught.

Q: Were you able to have outside contact when you were in prison?
A: No, not a newspaper or even a paper and pen. Everyday there was an inspection. After the assassination of Sadat, though, inspections loosened and we were able to smuggle some things in. The same prostitute who washed our cell, smuggled in toilet paper to write on and pens. So I started writing my memoirs on toilet paper and buried my writing under the ground. I remember one day I unburied my writing and it was all wet, so the letters were indistinguishable. So I started putting the papers inside a tin can so that the water from the ground wouldn't spoil it. We also smuggled a small radio to try to keep in touch with the outside world.

Q: Was there a lot of public reaction to these mass arrests?
A: Outside Egypt, yes. We heard through the radio that internationally people were speaking about it. But in Egypt the radio and the newspaper are controlled by the government. They accused us of being traitors. So we didn't like to listen to the station from Cairo or read the Cairo newspaper.

Q: Were you in prison when Sadat was assassinated?
A: Yes, I was released two months after his assassination [11/1981]. Government officials came to the cell, told me to get my clothes and took me in a car, refusing to tell me where I was going. I thought they were taking me to another prison, but instead I found myself at the home of the new president [Hosni Mubarak]. It was so dramatic. I was one of the first groups of 31 people to be released, and he invited us to his home for a discussion. It was really interesting because I found myself in my sneakers from the cell standing in the house of the president.

Q: Were you doing work about women prisoners when you were arrested?
A: Yes, for many years. When I interviewed women in prison, I never imagined I would someday be a prisoner myself because I've never been a member of any political group. I have always been an independent writer. But under Sadat a lot of people were jailed, including singers and poets. [1]


The last two decades of Infitah (the opening up of Egyptian economy to local and international capital) reversed most of the economic and the social gains made possible by state feminism. It undermined the state planned economy that constituted the materialist basis of Egyptian state feminism. The state, which had been the largest employer, provider of important social services and supporter of equal rights for women in different arenas, has significantly retreated on all of these fronts in the 1980s. It froze its economic commitment to hire all the graduates of Egyptian universities and technical institutes in the state sector, which had kept unemployment down among young men and women. The state presently waits 5 to 6 years before it offers a job to the graduates of different colleges and institutes in the local and central administrations, which represent the bulk of the jobs in the state sector. (Nadir Ferani, Tab'at Mushkil al-Tashhil fi Misr (Cairo: Unpublished paper, 1988), p. 22.) In addition, the more profit conscious managers of the public sector have become increasingly reluctant to hire women because of the gendered expenses the state committed itself to in the 1960s like 3 months of paid maternity leave and the day care services provided for working women.

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As a result, unemployment among young women has risen to 40% in marked contrast to the 10% among young men. Finally, the deterioration of the systems of public education and public health and their increased privatization have undermined some of the other gains made by women in the 1960s. Not only did the public education and health systems improve the quality of life of rural and urban working class women in the 1950s and the 1960s, but they also served as the two most important employment outlets for middle class women. Worsening work conditions and salaries in the public social service system have devalued the social standing of these historically feminine occupations and made public employment an unattractive career for young middle class women. The political demise of state feminism is more difficult to analyze. From the very beginning, the political paradoxes of state feminism were overshadowed by the regional acclaim it won in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iraq as a progressive approach to women's rights. The discussion of the advances that women made under state feminism left unexamined its problematic definition of women's relationship to the state. In the first section of this paper, I want to present a more realistic assessment of the political accomplishments of state feminism in Egypt. I want to begin this section by asking two questions that sum up the difficulties which state feminism presented its analysts. Was the state's support of women's rights a magnanimous gesture or was it a shrewd political decision that allowed it to serve its own social and political interests? What role, if any, did women play in the decision to launch the policy of state feminism? And how were women, in turn, affected by its program of change?

In Egypt, the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser initially resisted the demands made by the different feminist groups for suffrage in a publicized hunger strike at the reporters syndicate in 1954. Early in 1956, a few days before the announcement of the new constitution, the representatives of 20 different women's associations formed a general federation that was committed to the defense of women's suffrage. (Ahram, (1/13/1956), p. 78-79.) The decision by the Nasserite state to recognize women's political rights in the 1956 constitution was mindful of this new round of feminist campaigning as well as their success in mobilizing Egyptian public opinion around the issue. According to one of the first public opinion surveys to be done in Egypt in 1956, 64.1% of Cairenes supported granting the vote to women, 33.4% opposed it and 2.5% had no opinion. (See Ahmed Muhammed Taha, al-Mar’at al-Ahl, al-Mar’at al-Misiriya (Cairo: Matb’at Dar al-Tal’if, 1979), pp. 78-79.) State recognition of women's political rights, which was followed by important social and economic changes identified with state feminism, developed as a response to and a reflection of significant changes in public opinion. The state wanted to win this public to its side in the continuing battle with its internal and external opponents, i.e., the political and the social representatives of the old regimes and the West. The regime's positive response to women's demands immediately gave it a progressive social character. It also served to distinguish it politically from the different monarchical governments, which were unified in their refusal to address the political needs of bourgeois and middle class women. Once the state discovered the political usefulness of gender issues in giving it new legitimacy inside and outside the country, the state was reluctant to give up control of the gendered social agenda to organized middle class and bourgeois women whose views seemed radical to the socially conservative free officers.

Credit for the change must go to different feminist groups, who were persistent and successful in their mobilization of the Egyptian public opinion in support of their specific demands. They weaved those demands into the national struggle against the British as well as the new struggle to build a post monarchical Egypt. The generation of Ceza Nabrawi, Inji Aflatun and Duriya Shafiq, who participated actively in this campaign, saw the vote as an important means of political mobilization to influence the state on a variety of important political and social issues. In contrast, the state viewed the vote as a neutralizing device. By recognizing women's right to suffrage, the state hoped to defuse the power of this historical demand to mobilize women around a wider feminist agenda. Without it, the older feminists faced the very difficult task of defining a new agenda in a rapidly changing society. In addition,
the state's corporate ideology emphasized the importance of mobilizing women, along with other social groups, around its developmental agenda. It opposed the expression of specific interest as self-centered, divisive and anti-nationalistic. It discussed the need to create a women's organization, within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's only political party, to mobilize women around this agenda. Paradoxically, no such organization was built during this period that was committed to the rapid transformation of society. This institutional failure partly reflected the state's larger ambivalence about institution building. While the state was constantly attempting to build its own viable political institutions (first the Liberation Rally, then the National Union and finally the ASU), it undermined their viability by denying them any autonomy. It was most suspicious of women's organizational efforts because they were continuously surprising and challenging the regime. During the war of 1956, al-Lajna al-Nisa'iya ll Muqawama al-Sabiyaa (the Women's Committee for Popular Resistance led by Ceza Nabrawi) attempted to create alliances between middle class and working class women as part of the resistance to the war. [Jamila Kamel, "al-Khawfa al-Talaa al-Amilah was al-Falaha", al-Mas'a (12/1957), p. 6.] In 1957, Duriya Shaifiq condemned the regime's turn to political authoritarianism and called for the return to democracy. [Cynthia Nelson, "The Voices of Doria Shafik: Feminist Consciousness in Egypt, 1940-1960", Feminist Issues 6, 2 (Fall 1986), p. 27.] Finally, the end of the war brought forth a renewed effort by both Ceza Nabrawi and Inji Aflatun to form a new women's organization in 1957. In all of the above instances, the state reacted repressively to undermine the feminists' attempt to organize themselves. Even when their agenda was sympathetic to the regime, their institutional initiatives were stifled. At the same time, the state domesticated some of the old feminist organizations by encouraging them to transform themselves into social service organizations providing child care services and meals to underprivileged families. Ironically, the old Egyptian feminist Union, which was founded by Huda Sha'rawi, became such an organization under the leadership of Hawa Idris. In short, the principle of allowing women to form organizations, whose agenda and constituency were independent from that of the state, clashed violently with the state's claim that it was the feminist representative of Egyptian women. Despite its formal support of the political rights of women, state feminism was very antagonistic to the political engagement of women and/or their organization building. While it is true that the Nasserite state sought to control other functionally specific organizations, like labor unions and professional associations, in the case of women's organizations, it went one step further by repressing and/or demolishing them and leaving women without any organizational representation. [=]  

20113. Hatem, Mervat F. Demise of Egyptian State Feminism and the Politics of Transition (1980-1991): Part 03: The Political Paradoxes of Egyptian government. Given the prevailing Egyptian customs, however, the registration of women for the vote was left as a choice to be decided by each individual woman." [Mujum'at al-Muhtam bi Shu'un al-Mar'at al-Misyriyat, in al-Huqeq al-Qaniyaa il-Mar'at al-Misyriyat (1988), p. 30.] In other words, even though the state gave women the right to vote and to run for public office, they were not automatically registered to vote like men. To be registered, women needed to petition the state before they could exercise that legal right. Here, the state clearly viewed the vote as a primary concern of a small minority of dedicated women who would not be discouraged by this bureaucratic hurdle. For the average illiterate woman in the Egyptian countryside, this was a disincentive. As a result of these voter registration requirements, very few women registered to vote. In 1956-7, only 1% of the total number of registered voters were women. This figure rose to 6% in 1958 and remained the same for 1959, 1960, 1 961, and 1 962. In 1 963-4 when the socialist transformation of Egyptiansocietybegan, the number of registered women voters only increased slightly to 8%. By 1965, it rose slightly again to 10%. In 1967, this rate rose to 11% and in 1972 to 12%. [Muhammed Farghat Farag, "Tatawwur Musherakat al-Mar'at al-Misyriyat fi al-Hayat al-'Amma", in Taghir al-Wadh al-Iltima'i il-Mar'at al-Misyriyat fi Misr al-Mu'asarat (Cairo: al-Markaz al-Qawmi lil Buhuth al-Iltima'ya wa al-Jina'iyat, 1974), p. 207.]
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In less than a year after his formal ascension to political power, President Sadat confronted a political challenge to his power from within the ASU in 5/1971. Following his victory and the defeat of the radical faction, he sought to restructure the party and its affiliated organizations (especially those of the youth and women) so that they owed their allegiance to him. Women, who had up until then lacked their own organizational base within the party, were given their own secretariat in 1971. In his directive to the Secretary General of the ASU, Sadat asked that the president of the new organization be a "woman who was like a man" (Imrat Ragil). This summed up a very important concept which state feminism developed with great skill. It reflected the fear and hostility with which the state approached the organization of women. It did not want a feminist to be the president of the new women's organization. Because it was no longer acceptable to appoint a man to head the women's organization, the next best thing was to appoint a woman, who had a non-gendered perspective on politics which would make her comfortable in a political establishment dominated by men.

The impetus for a change in the regime's agenda for women came from the outside. The United Nations decade for women focused the world's attention on the gender record of different states. Jehan Sadat's participation in the international women's conference in Mexico City in 1975 as an official representative of Egyptian women increased her level of interest in the cause of women's rights. Soon thereafter, she decided to adopt the cause of women's rights as one of her numerous pet projects. Other projects included charitable activities, work with the handicapped victims of the 1973 war, as well as numerous business ventures).

Not surprisingly, with this limited number of registered women voters, the number of women elected to parliament during this period was also negligible. In the 1957 elections, two women were elected to parliament, less than 1% of parliament's total membership. In 1960, there were 6 women elected to parliament (representing 1.7% of membership); in 1969, only 3 were elected (showing a significant drop to 8% of the membership) and finally in 1971, 9 women were elected (representing 2.5% of the membership). In 1976, there were 6 women elected to parliament dropping again to 1.7 of the membership.

In sum, the most striking political paradox of state feminism is its progressive facade of encouraging women's political participation by giving them the vote, but at the same time demobilizing them by undermining their organizational efforts and domesticating their existing institutions. The lack of any representative organization for women, whether official or unofficial, along with the restrictions placed on female voter registration has discouraged women from political participation. It explains the depoliticized consciousness of the younger generation of Egyptian women. Finally, to appease some of the active middle class women, the state included them in visible bureaucratic (largely in the ministry of social affairs) and political positions (some in parliament and some in its political party). This has allowed the state to maintain its progressive image and to ensure minimal representation for women. With both, it could safely justify continued state control of the society's gendered agenda. [ ]

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Figure 20113. Percentage of Women Elected to the Egyptian Parliament in 1957-1976.

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perspective on what are desirable social and political changes. In other words, state feminism, which had originally developed in response to popular demands in 1956 had, by 1979, come full circle. Egyptian femocrats, some of whom had participated in the popular lobbying to give women the right to vote in the 1950's (like Amina al-Said) now believed that all that one needed for the success of a gender agenda, was state support. This was what the ideology of state feminism claimed to divert feminist attention from the important task of educating and mobilizing the public opinion for change. It was clearly successful in contributing dissonance in the historical memory of its femocrats. The ideology rewrote Egyptian women's political history so that it began with the state giving suffrage to women and not with their successful mobilization of the Egyptian public which led the state to recognize their rights. In fact, the state also believed its own ideology which caused it irreversible political damage. Very specifically, the imposition of a state agenda on an unwilling public in 1979 precipitated the political crisis of the regime and that of state feminism.

The Sadat regime issued 2 presidential decrees in 1979 that were to expand the political and the social rights of women. The first decree added 30 seats earmarked for women to the Egyptian parliament and specified that 20% of the seats in the 26 local governorate councils will be for women. [Jehan Sadat, Woman of Egypt (New York: Simon and Schuster.)] The second attempted to introduce some reforms in the Egyptian personal status law by arguing that the first wife of a man who takes a second wife is entitled to file for divorce on the grounds that this is a source of harm to her. It also guaranteed divorced mothers the right to the family residence until her children grow up. I will focus my discussion on the first decree and how it undermined the political legitimacy of the regime and of state feminism. On the surface, the first decree seemed to represent heightened state commitment to women's political rights. A closer examination shows, however, that both the way the decree was passed and its content were politically problematic.

Despite official commitment to increased democratization, the use of a presidential decree to force the issue denied parliament the right to legislate (i.e. to suggest, to debate and then to pass laws). In this process, parliamentary institutions portray the diverse opinions of its general public. In preempting parliamentary procedures, the popular impressions of the continued authoritarian tendencies of the Sadat regime were confirmed. Not only did the presidential decrees backfire by making the regime seem more authoritarian, they also tarnished the old positive image of state feminism as an institutional response to public support for women in the 1950s and the 1960s. The state feminism of the late 1970's was a different creature. It appeared as part of the existing equality in its special treatment of women. [Al-Ahram, 1/1/1988, p. 11.]

The second decree in 1985, the High Constitutional Court struck down the 1979 amended personal status law on procedural grounds. It argued that there was no women's issues. As a result, active middle class women have become unwilling public in 1979 precipitated the political crisis of the regime and New National Democratic Party (NDP) fivefold to 33 members. To middle class women, the NDP appeared as a sympathetic institution keen on the recruitment and the recognition of women as a constituency. The party's political interest in women did not disadvantage its male members. The seats given to women were not taken away from male candidates. The total number of parliamentary seats was increased by the 30 seats that were now reserved for women. Only 3 members ran against men and defeated them in this election. All, but one of the 33 women elected was from the official NDP. Earl Sullivan, Women in Egyptian Public Life (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 43.] The 1984 elections contributed a similar crop, 36 members were elected: 31 occupied the reserved seats for women (an extra reserved seat increase the share of the Cairo districts), 2 were appointed by the President and 3 ran against men and won. [Kathleen Howard-Merriam, "Guaranteed Seats for Political Representation of Women: the Egyptian Example", Women and Politics 10, 1 (1990), p. 32.] Two of the last 3 were from the opposition New Wafd Party.

What the above figures show is that the changes instituted in 1979 created an interest on the part of women in the NDP. It was not clear, however, that these new members of parliament were viable representatives who could have won their seats if they were not reserved for women. Since they could not pull their political weight during an election and expand the support base of the NDP, the party quickly lost interest in supporting such a large group of women. This attitude was strengthened by the decision of the High Constitutional Court in 1987 to void the law which established reserved seating for women. The Court argued that the law undermined the constitutional principle of gender equality in its special treatment of women. [Al-Ahram, 1/1/1988, p. 11.] The ruling implicitly challenged the acceptability of state intervention on behalf of women which was one of the key pillars of state feminism. Special treatment for women was declared to be contrary to the principles of equality. The Court was silent on the question of gender discrimination against women in the political arena and what role the state can or cannot play in combating it. [=]

20115. Hatem, Mervat F. Demise of Egyptian State Feminism and the Politics of Transition (1980-1991): Part 05: The Political Crisis of State Feminism. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's Series. Working Paper 3. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-13, 1991. pp. 14-16. The regime of Hosni Mubarak has since reversed the changes introduced by these presidential decrees whose legitimacy and fairness were questioned from the beginning. In 1985, the High Constitutional Court struck down the 1979 amended personal status law on procedural grounds. It argued that there was no national emergency to justify the use of a presidential decree to pass this law while parliament was in session. The rationale given by the High Court reinforced the public's impression of the anti-democratic bent of the Sadat regime, and by association, of state feminism. Immediately after the Court passed this decision, the state, which was keen on sending its official representatives to the Nairobi conference marking the end of the U.N decade for women, proposed a new amended law. Here, again, Egyptian femocrats supported the new personal status law even though it diluted some of the minor changes that were introduced in 1979. (A judge was now required to assess whether or not harm was done and a husband had the choice of offering his divorced wife and children a comparable house of residence). The way the 1979 law and the amended law were passed make clear the structural flaw in Egyptian femocracy. In theory, femocracy was an institutional strategy to suggest change from within the state structures and to mobilize the general public behind it. In practice, Egyptian femocracy was unable as a client of the state to shape and/or modify the official agenda. It could not develop its own program. It had no separate legitimacy from that of the state which denied it the right to separately mobilize the female population around any important issue.

If bureaucratic feminism had limited success initiating and negotiating gender policies, then what was its political attracting point to a section of the present generation of women? The 1979 presidential decree increased the number of women representatives active in the New National Democratic Party (NDP) fivefold to 33 members. To middle class women, the NDP appeared as a sympathetic institution keen on the recruitment and the recognition of women as a constituency. The party's political interest in women did not disadvantage its male members. The seats given to women were not taken away from male candidates. The total number of parliamentary seats was increased by the 30 seats that were now reserved for women. Only 3 members ran against men and defeated them in this election. All, but one of the 33 women elected was from the official NDP. Earl Sullivan, Women in Egyptian Public Life (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 43.] The 1984 elections contributed a similar crop, 36 members were elected: 31 occupied the reserved seats for women (an extra reserved seat increased the share of the Cairo districts), 2 were appointed by the President and 3 ran against men and won. [Kathleen Howard-Merriam, "Guaranteed Seats for Political Representation of Women: the Egyptian Example", Women and Politics 10, 1 (1990), p. 32.] Two of the last 3 were from the opposition New Wafd Party.

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reserved seats for women, showed the diminished commitment of the NDP to women candidates. In 1987, 14 women were elected to Parliament: 13 belonged to the NDP, 1 belonged to the New Wafd party. In addition, the president appointed 4 women bringing the total number of female parliamentarians to 18. [Howard-Merriam, p. 32.] In the 1990 election, the number of women elected to parliament dropped more noticeably to 7: 4 belonged to the NDP and 3 independents. The president appointed 3 more women bringing the total to 10 members out of 444 members. It is interesting to note that the 3 women, who ran as independents, represented Alexandria, Sinai and Ismailiya. The NDP representatives whether elected or appointed represented different sections of the capital city. Out of the 10 members of the 1990 parliament, 3 were workers. Out of these 3 workers, two were independent. [Khatouma M. Intikhabat ‘Amilat al- ‘Amilah, in Al-Hurriya (12/12/1990, pp. 8-9.)] This leads one to suggest that the NDP has now become the representative of Cairene professional middle class women. By deciding to run as independents, working class women seem to have reached similar conclusions regarding the class make up of the NDP.

The only other organizations within which working class women were active were their own unions. Their participation in the unions has changed dramatically in the last decade. In 1981, women workers were largely represented in union committees at the lowest levels of the organization. They were noticeably absent from membership of the Executive Council since its inception in 1956 with the exception of the period from 1971 to 1973. [Amin Taha Mursi, “al-Mufawadat al-Jama’ya fi Misr”, in Al-Ahram (5/4/1981), p. 20.] Equally noteworthy was the fact the Union’s secretariat for women was being run in 1981 by a man. By 1990, an active woman had emerged as the secretary of this committee. She began to encourage other women to be active with the unions. The fact that the Union continued to have a man represent women’s concerns until 1981 is worthy of debate. In Egypt of the 1970s, the principle of having a man represent women’s concerns had been abandoned by most other societal organizations. How is it that the labor movement was oblivious of this trend? Does this mean that the labor movement was more conservative than the rest of society in responding to the need for women representatives? This may be one answer, but there are many others as well. Here, it is important to remind ourselves that in 1971 President Sadat was recommending that the chair of the women’s secretariat be a woman who is like a man. Does this mean that the labor movement formally did what the president suggested be done informally. More significantly, the vicious attacks on the gains made by workers in the public sector since the beginning of Infitah in the mid-1970’s contributed to a climate of retrenchment within the labor movement. This may have created an environment within the unions that trivialized such changes in the light of the challenges that were threatening their very own livelihood. While this does not necessarily excuse the lack of union sensitivity to gender issues, it helps one provide a context for it. There is also the question of the greater solidarity that exists among unionized men and women in their social demands. In 1986, the male workers at al-Nasr car factories asked management to provide them (the fathers) with day care facilities for their children. [Fardus Bahnacy, “Humum Imr’at ‘Amilat al- ‘Amilah”, in Al-Mar’at al-Jadida 2 (1986), p. 35.] In Egypt, this particular demand has been associated with the struggles of middle class women, who wanted to juggle family and work obligations. The fact that this demand was picked up by working class, not middle class men, reflects a greater male sensitivity within this class to the problems of their working wives. In a parallel pattern, the female workers at al-Mahalla textile factory struck in support of their male colleagues in 1986. They refused to work until the striking workers were released which led the police to intern some of them. They were quickly released, however, for fear that protests would increase in reaction to the internment of the women. [Muthaharat “Amilat al-Mahalla”, al-Mar’at al-Jadida 2 (1986), p. 37.] Here, the state assumed that working class patriotism would make the internment of women unacceptable and would be reason for increased activism.

What is clear is that working class men and women do not behave in ways that we expect of them. This should lead one to question some of middle class assumptions that dominate the literature regarding the appropriate strategies for representing the interests of women in general. Juggling the need for autonomous representation with the need for participation in the institutions that protect one’s class interest may be the special dilemma facing working class women. [=] 20117. Hatem, Mervat F. Demise of Egyptian State Feminism and the Politics of Transition (1980-1990). Part 07: The Politics of Transition. G.E. von Grunebaum Center for the Study of the Middle East, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-13, 1991, pp. 19-26. Let me now turn to a different but a somewhat related question, to what extent have the opposition parties opened up their ranks to women of different classes? This is not an easy question to answer partly because only anecdotal evidence is available. There are more women candidates, who contest elections from the opposition parties than there are candidates from the NDP. For example, in the 1984 elections, 140 women candidate ran for election. Out of this group, 75% ran for the opposition parties. [Sullivan, p. 110.] In the 1987 elections, the number of women candidates dropped to 40, 27 of which belonged to opposition parties i.e. 67.5%. [Howard-Merriam, p. 35.] The figures seem to suggest that the opposition parties choose more women to run for them, it does not tell us anything about where they were placed in the party list. Under the list system used for both the 1984 and the 1987 elections, only those candidates placed high on their party’s list have a chance of being elected. Given the fact that in both elections only 2 or 3 women candidates were elected from the opposition parties, it is safe to assume that most women candidates were placed very low on their party’s lists. Of those who were elected, all came from the middle class. None came from the working class leading one to assume that the class make up of these parties is not very different from that of the NDP.

The 3 major political parties that have benefited from the opening up of the political system are: the labor party, the Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party and the New Wafd party. One can add the Muslim Brotherhood to that list. Since 1981, when the state began an effort to court the moderate Islamist groups, represented by the Brotherhood, by giving them permission to participate in the political process and in this way split the Islamist movement and marginalize its militant groups. Because the state still upholds the principle of “no politics in religion”, it has not allowed the Brotherhood to operate as an autonomous political organization. Instead, it encouraged the Brotherhood to form electoral alliances with the other opposition parties and in this way contest elections and have deputies in parliament. The use of the list system which allowed only those parties with 8% of the vote to have representation in parliament made electoral alliances with the Brotherhood politically expedient to most of the opposition parties. In 1984, the Muslim Brotherhood allied itself with the New Wafd party (the representative of the new parasitic bourgeoisie identified with the Infitah) to emerge as the official political opposition in parliament. Out of 58 elected members, 10 were from the Brotherhood. In 1987, the Brotherhood allied itself with the labor party (which up until then had a social democratic agenda) under the label of the “Islamic alliance” and were able to increase their number of representatives in parliament to 34. [Hala Mustafa, “al-Qawm al-Islamiya wa al-Taqarab al-Dimukratiya fi Misr”, in Al-Ahram (3/3/1990), p. 3.] In 1990, most of the opposition parties (the Labor party, the New Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood) boycotted the elections with the exception of the Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party, which represented the alliance of the Nasserites and the Egyptian left, and emerged as the representative of a more secular opposition in parliament that included the independent representatives.

The participation of the Brotherhood in the political process triggered a debate on whether or not electoral politics was a legitimate Islamic concern for women. The debate showed that Islam’s position on women’s political participation was ambiguous at best. While the liberal Islamic scholars, who represent the views of the State’s religious establishment, argued that there is no verse in the Quran or the Sunna that forbids or denies women that right, the conservatives, who represent the militant views of some of the Islamists, contend that the absence of a verse in support of women’s rights to run for public office implies some of the Islamists, contend that the absence of a verse in support of
women's rights to run for public office implies that this is not a proper activity for women. The conservatives argue that if hearing a woman's voice is a sin, then her absence from the political arena is a virtue. They also cite the ominous hadith that no people will ever succeed if they are ruled by a woman. In response, the liberals point to the fact that the prophet consulted his wives in political matters and in fact got good advice from them. After concluding a peace of Hudaybiya, Um Salma, one of the prophet's wives, advised him to let his frustrated followers who were told that they were going to visit Mecca to perform the rituals of the pilgrimage, to perform these rituals outside of Mecca. Her advice succeeded in lessening the frustration and the anger felt by those who accompanied the prophet in this trip. The liberals also point out to a Qur'anic verse that asks the prophet to accept the political endorsement (al-bay'ah) from Muslim women. It says the following:

If women come to endorse you by promising not to believe in another God, not to steal, not to engage in adultery, not to give false testimony regarding what they have done or seen, then you should accept their endorsement and extend to them God's forgiveness.

The whole debate points to the use of conservative and liberal textual strategies in arguing for change. The conservatives will opt, more often than not, for a literal reading of the texts proceeding through a tight deductive system to reach conclusions that adhere as closely as possible to the letter of the text. This strategy is designed to discourage any departure from what it sees as a pure Islamic ideal that existed in the past and which needs to be reproduced at the present. The silence of the text is also taken as an injunction against change which may introduce alien influences which confuse the ideal of the return to a [text missing].

The liberals rely on a different textual strategy aimed at opening up new spaces where silence exists. While the conservatives will sometimes use Qiyas (analogies) as in the argument they offer about a women's voice being a sin and hence the virtuousness of their abandonment of public engagement, it is the liberals who use this logical tool most frequently. It allows them to move inductively to support an evolving view of the religion. Charting the presence of these diverse strategies within the Islamist debates allows one to appreciate the nuanced differences in the Islamist discourses and the political uses to which they put religion. It is a more fruitful way of proceeding because it moves away from the essentialist debates regarding whether Islam is truly for or against women.

As an electoral ally, the Brotherhood advocated a socially conservative agenda. It is not clear, however, whether the Brotherhood can be held responsible for the problematic positions both the New Wafd and the Labor parties have on women and their issues. For example, in the 1984 elections, the only two women elected to parliament, who did not belong to the NDP, were members of the New Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood. The nomination and electoral support that the Brotherhood gave to Rizga al-Balshi served to dispel the image of the Brotherhood as unsympathetic to women. Her election was an important symbolic gesture towards veiled women who gave the Islamist movement its visible urban social base. It is not clear that al-Balshi was elected through the votes of Islamist women. The evidence indicates that it was the male Islamist vote that carried her to victory. [Sulivan, p. 110.]

In the 1987 election, no women representatives won from the Brotherhood confirming the symbolic nature of al-Balshi's election. The New Wafd's alliance with the Brotherhood in this election did not lead it to nominate another veiled woman. Its candidate for that election was Olfat Kamel, a veteran parliamentarian, who was very popular in her working class neighborhood of al-Gamalia. The party did ask its Coptic women candidates, however, to cover their hair while campaigning. More serious was the way the party dealt with Olfat Kamel's candidacy in the 1987 election. Despite her respected electoral showing in different elections, she was placed in fourth position on the party's list. Because success under this list system depended on one being placed high on the list, Kamel had complained about her ranking to the party leadership. While campaigning in her neighborhood, Awli Hafez, a leader figure in the Wafd leadership, humiliated Kamel and her son by publicly advising him to "tell your mother, she can either have fourth place or nothing. In the argument that followed, Kamil's son had a heart attack and was hospitalized. Only his death made the Wafd put Kamil at the number 2 spot where she had been placed in the 1984 elections. ["Olfat Kamel la Tufadil al-Tabikh", Rose al-Yusef (3/3/1987), p. 8.]

This sad and violent story shows the deep hostility, which even the most experienced women candidates, face in the different political parties. It demonstrates the high cost women must pay for their political success. Finally, it reveals how the political leadership of the different political parties uses the language and the rhetoric of fundamentalism to intimidate and to put women in their place. This is why politics continues, after 4 decades of state feminism, to be a very dangerous arena.

In contrast, the labor party gave no attention to women in its 1984 electoral program. The party called for the formation of a women's section and another for the youth. It also called for having a representative of women and of the youth in each of its committees. [Iqbal Baraka, "al-Nas wa al-Intikhbat: al-Nisf al-Hawl", Sabah al-Khayr (5/17/1984), p. 12.] It had very few women members and consequently placed only a few women on its electoral list. [Ibid.] The party's alliance with the Brotherhood in the 1987 elections has affected its self definition and contributed to a split in its ranks. The socialists claim that the party was taken over by the Islamists, who now control the leadership, and have succeeded in marginalizing the other elements. The power struggles within the party has pushed the gender issues to the side and created a new socially conservative environment within the party that inhibits women.

Finally, the Nationalist Unionist Progressive party distinguishes itself from other parties by having a well developed program for women that analyzes the causes of gender discrimination in Egypt and commits itself to policies which will contribute to the liberation of women. It is important to note here that when the Constituent Assembly of the party met in August 21, 1976 to discuss the establishment of the party, it approved the formation of a feminist wing for the party. It was only 6 years later in January 1982 that the party held the Constituent Congress of the Federation for Progressive women. The delegates who attended the Congress represented the governorates of Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, al-Gharbiya, al-Bihara and al-Dhaqahali, all in the Egyptian Delta, where the party was active. Upper Egypt seems to have been regarded as an inhospitable region for its activities or was ignored because it had no significant industrial work force. The program reiterated its support to the involved use of the legal arm of the sate to further the rights of women. In other words, it advocated the upholding of the institutional principles of state feminism as its strategy for the liberation of women. While the party recognized that the accomplishments of state feminism met with numerous obstacles in the day today practice, it argued that with the economic development of Egyptian society these obstacles will disappear and legal equality transform the daily reality of women. [The Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party, al-Mu'atamar al-Ta'ssissi li lIthhad al-Nisf al-Taqadumi (Cairo: 1982), p. 25.] Until then, it called upon all the feminists in feminist associations and political parties as well as independent figures to use their program as a basis for a unified program that Egyptian women can work for. It also called for the establishment of a single organization that can democratically unify women's efforts, represent their interests and work for the realization of their goals. [Ibid.] In short, the party's program was committed to the resurrection of state feminism: its organizational ideals and agendas.

Despite the problems that state feminism contributed in practice and of which it is aware, the party put its faith in economic development as the ultimate solution to all problems. [=]
representation of women and their agenda. Some parliamentarians admitted that some women were elected only to fill up the reserved seats, not because they would make good representatives or because of their commitment to a women's agenda. [Maha 'Amran, "Awal Na'iba Barlamanliya fi Misr wa al-Alam al-'Arabi" in Sabah al-Khayr (3/12/1987), p. 25.] Once they were elected, they did not contribute much to the general discussions or to pushing any particular agenda. [Tahani Sabah al-Khayr, "Al-Ma'lufa Min Malak al-Shahab " in Majmu'at al-Muhtamat, p. 23-24.] As a result, state feminism was unsuccessful in delivering what it promised in terms of the political representation of women. Women were still underrepresented in both the cabinet and parliament. [Ibid., p. 24.] Finally, some femocrats confessed that it is unrealistic of female constituents to expect them not to represent the interests of their party first. [Al-Sawabi, p. 28.] This is they point out is first political principle of state feminism.

This realistic assessment of femocracy led the representatives of women's social organizations (which include charitable and functionally specific organizations like the Egyptian Planned Parenthood) as well as the key female public figures (university professors, media personalities and active political and social figures) to call for the establishment of a non-governmental feminist union that would put the cause and the interests of women at the forefront. Beyond that demand, women were divided on the key questions that will govern its activities and strategies for change. For example, what should be the relationship between women and society? Which one should be the focus of struggle? Who should be the leader of this new union? What kind of relationship should develop between feminist (intellectual) women, the state, and its femocrats?[Iqbal Baraka, "Ala men Ta'qa Mes'uliyat ma Yahduth?", Sabah al-Khayr (3/12/1987), p. 26.]

This collective drive to organize middle class women was met by resistance from the Egyptian femocrats, headed by the minister of Social Affairs, Dr. Amal Osaman, who refused to give them institutional permission to establish a women's union. Even though the femocrats had been humbled by the discussion of the glaring inadequacies of state feminism, they have been successful in resisting the demand for the establishment of a women's union and which would spell their own political death. There were a few exceptional cases where this strategy did not work. Under pressure from leading public opinion figures and the threat of litigation, the ministry gave permission to Nawal El-Saadawi to form her Arab Women Solidarity association. They also gave permission to smaller groups outside of Cairo (e.g. the Bir al-Balad association) to organize. Both of these organizations have proven to be harmless cultural organizations, which joined the small fragmented public that was interested in women's concerns and issues and which did not pose a serious challenge to femocracy. This encouraged Egyptian femocrats, led by the minister of Social Affairs, to begin a serious search for new bases of social and political legitimacy among its Cairene professional constituency. For example, the ministry formed agencies that provide upper middle class women with domestic help. It also encouraged small businesses to provide that same affluent group, with ready to cook primary attention. Working class women are, for most part, active within constituency. For example, the ministry formed agencies that provide their problems. Working class women in both the rural and urban areas are voting, but they are not voting for women. Most of these newly registered voters were from outside Cairo (from Alexandria, the Egyptian Delta and even some Upper Egyptian governorates especially the very small governorates that the number of women registered to vote had doubled to 32% in 1988 and 38% in 1989. [Magda Mehanah, "Ma'ha fi Asu'ha", al-Ahram (12/22/1989), p. 13.] In an explanation of how this dramatic feat was accomplished, the undersecretary explained that the ministry had increased the number of registration places whenever any woman representative from the NDP or the Democratic Front, Sabah al-Khayr, "Tansim Nisa'i Sabab Kusur al-Mar'at al-Siyasi", in Sabah al-Khayr (3/12/1987), pp. 23-24.]

How will the increase of women registered to vote affect the prospects of the Egyptian femocrats and women's political engagement in the waning years of state feminism? It is very early to tell, but the 1990 elections already provide some tentative pointers. Most election reports note the heavy voter turnout among women. [Zakaria Abu Hiram, "Fazt al-Dimuqratiya wa Khasaral al-Mu'aradha", in Akher Sa'h (12/12/1990), p. 6.] Even though many turned out, the 1990 election brought smallest number of women representatives to parliament. Clearly, more women are voting, but they are not voting for women. Most of these newly registered voters were from outside Cairo (from Alexandria, the Egyptian Delta and even some Upper Egyptian governorates especially the very small governorates that the number of women registered to vote had doubled to 32% in 1988 and 38% in 1989. [Magda Mehanah, "Ma'ha fi Asu'ha", al-Ahram (12/22/1989), p. 13.] In an explanation of how this dramatic feat was accomplished, the undersecretary explained that the ministry had increased the number of registration places whenever any woman representative from the NDP or the Democratic Front, Sabah al-Khayr, "Tansim Nisa'i Sabab Kusur al-Mar'at al-Siyasi", in Sabah al-Khayr (3/12/1987), pp. 23-24.]

This poses a new challenge to the different women's groups and Egyptian femocrats who have been unable to reach and mobilize these new voters to vote women and/or their own interests. Finally, when women have voted for women in this last elections, they were more likely to vote for independent women whether they came from the working or middle classes, who have cultivated this constituency over the years and have delivered some important services. ["Kira'a fi Intikhabat 90", in Akher Sa'h (12/12/1990), p. 9.] This clearly spells trouble to Egyptian femocrats, who now must juggle the need for the support of the NDP with the importance of developing rapport with a constituency that is presently wooed by independent candidates. [=]

20119. Hatem, Mervat F. Demise of Egyptian State Feminism and the Politics of Transition (1980-1991): Part 09: Conclusion. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's Series. Working Paper 3. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 12-20, 1991, pp. 29-31. The political demise of state feminism simultaneously foreclosed some institutional options which had previously been available for women and opened up some new institutional spaces and strategies for the mobilization of women for change. Active middle class women still monopolize the debate on how to address the political interests and needs of women. They no longer have a single institutional voice, however. The attractiveness of Egyptian femocracy, as an institutional strategy of representation, has been seriously undermined by the many reversals that it has faced in the 1980's. For this reason, the Egyptian femocrats are busy redefining their bases of support by appealing more consciously to Cairene middle class women. Along their side, there are numerous formal and informal nongovernmental women's groups that are also seeking to appeal to Cairene middle class women by presenting alternative discourses on their problems. Working class women in both the rural and urban areas are not represented in these organization and their concerns are not given primary attention. Working class women are, for most part, active within their own communities and their labor union organizations. It is these women who are now voting in very large numbers and are supporting political candidates that represent their class and community. What is ironic is that working class women, who vote with their families to Cairo are the least likely to resist to vote in their new place of residence. [Mehana, p. 13.] The dislocation and the lack of a supportive community that encourages their political participation explain this change in their behavior. As a result, Cairo has one of the lowest rates of female registration in the country along with the very small governorates of Port Said, Suez, Ismailia, Matrouh, North Sinai and al-Wadi al-Jaddid.

For the Egyptian femocrats and the women active in the different groups that emphasize the importance of using women's electoral power to influence policy, a broader class perspective.
is essential to emphasize the importance of using women's electoral power to influence policy, a broader class perspective is essential for the success of their strategy. Unfortunately, however, the political and ideological struggles currently taking place between the state and different groups of women regarding the principle of adequate (minimal) political representation for women, which is the only remaining feature of the old state feminism, continue to focus attention on the mobilization of Cairene middle class women. This spells failure for both the declining state feminism and its middle class feminist alternative.

20120. Hirschhorn, Norbert. "Appropriate Health Technology in Egypt," in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. pp. 26-28. Primary health care has been the major focus of health workers in the last two decades, with their work including: immunizations, maternal care, education for hygiene, health and nutrition, family planning, availability of essential drugs, and first aid. One major advance has been the rehydration therapy (associated with the inevitable childhood diarrhea): UNICEF estimates that 5 million children die of diarrhea worldwide every year. Diarrhea is so threatening because the process of dehydration it brings about leads to malnutrition and further diarrhea. In the early 1960s, physicians discovered that glucose and water could provide quick and cheap rehydration: termed ORT (Oral Rehydration Therapy), initially, this was widely used in cholera hospitals in Dhaka and Calcutta; and by the mid-1970s was used worldwide. This very cheap and easy technique seems like it should have eliminated the problem of childhood diarrhea, but 80% of such episodes remain untreated by ORT. Worldwide, many parents and health workers continue to use ineffective constipation drugs or antibiotics (inf1980-1986, Egypt spent $78 million annually on useless antidiarrheal drugs, while the NCDDP effort cost $25 million over the first five years). Egypt has developed a network of primary care units that are accessible to 95% of the population; 80% of pharmaceuticals used in Egypt are locally produced. In 1977, the Ministry of Health started to distribute ORT packages (and in 1978 the packages were produced in Egypt). In 1980, ORT was systematically used in Dakahlia governorate, reducing child mortality by 40%; the National Control of Diarrheal Diseases Project (NCDDP) was started in 1982 (funded by AID) to distribute sufficient ORT packages nationwide. Since 1982, infant mortality has fallen 37%, and from diarrheal causes by 60%; ORT is available in 99% of the primary health care system, and 80-95% of mothers have been trained to recognize dehydration (which included the first massive public health TV advertising campaign). However, inappropriate use of antibiotics remains high (promoted by pharmaceutical companies), and increasing women visit physicians before using ORT, rather than using it through autonomous self-care. NCDDP has failed to adress causes of diarrhea. The NCDDP must now shift its emphasis to maintaining high levels of treatment of diarrhea, while broadening its efforts to reduce diarrhea.

20121. Hirschhorn, Norbert; Greenough, William B., III. "Progress in Oral Rehydration Therapy: Every Year, the Therapy--Feeding Feeds the Lives of a Million Children Who Become Dehydrated From Diarrhea: New Versions Are Being Developed To Improve That Number", in Scientific American, May 1991. pp. 50-56. While many medical procedures are complex and expensive, Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) is inexpensive and easy (including sodium chloride (3.5 grams), Trisodium Citrate (2.9 grams), Potassium Chloride (1.5 grams), and Glucose (20 grams) per liter of water). It replaced a more costly treatment, and was promoted by WHO beginningin 1978. The diarrhea group of diseases (including cholera bacteria Vibrio cholera, rotavirus and Escherichia coli) are the leading killer of small children in the Third World, leading to 5 million deaths per year. While new to modern science, a similar technique was described in ancient Hindu texts. The Cholera Research Center in Calcutta (now the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research) found that even the most severely affected patients could respond to the ORT treatment. The greatest success with ORT has been in Egypt, where the 100000 children dying from diarrhea in 1983 were cut to 50000 dead per year. The Egyptian success was based on an extensive network of public and private health providers, and a commited Ministry of Health.

20122. Hoertz, Peter J.; Pritchard, David I. "Hookworm Infection; It retards Growth and Intellectual Development In Millions of Children Yet Is Largely Ignored By Researchers; New Findings Suggest Excellent Possibilities For a Vaccine", in Scientific American, June 1995. pp. 68-75. Roughly one-fifth of the world population, some 1 billion people, mostly in the tropics, harbor hookworms in their small intestine. Each extracts a small amount of blood through the intestine walls; an individual can have 20, 100 or even 1000 hookworms in their small intestine. One result of hookworms is iron deficiency anemia and protein malnutrition (which afflict up to 25% of infected individuals, especially children and pregnant women). Severe infestation of children can cause severe retardation of growth and impair cognitive, motor and behavioral development. Sadly, there has been little research on hookworms in the last 25 years. New research indicates that vaccines can be developed against the hookworms of the two major genera, Ancylostoma and Necator, taking advantage of the strategies evolved by the hookworms to thwart the vascular and immunological defenses of the human body.

Typically, the barely visible larvae of A. duodenale can burrow through the skin of the legs and feet; reaching the intestines through the blood stream. Ingested larvae have an easier transition to the intestines. They soon mate and begin to release eggs within about two months of arriving in the body as larvae. Notably, researchers at the Institute of Parasitic Disease in Shanghai have determined that A. duodenal infections can be spread by breast milk.

Properties:

Ancylostoma duodenale (Peru, NE and SE coastal Brazil, North Africa and Middle East, Egypt, West-Central-East Africa and Madagascar, India and southern China): 0.3-0.5 inches long, eggs produced daily: 10000-30000; estimated blood removed daily per worm: 0.05 teaspoons; mouthparts: sharp teeth; natural adult life span: 1 year; ability to produce infection if ingested: yes; ability of larvae to lie dormant in host: yes.

Necator americanus (south India, South China, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, NE coastal Australia, Oman, West-Central-East-Southern Africa and Madagascar, Mexico, Central America, Amazon basin, Colombia, Venezuela and the Guianas): 0.2-0.4 inches long, eggs produced daily:50000-10000; estimated blood removed daily per worm: 0.004 teaspoons; mouthparts: cutting plates; natural adult life span: 3-5 years; ability to produce infection if ingested: no; ability of larvae to lie dormant in host: no. [TXT]

20123. Holloway, Marguerite. "Population Summit: Women's Health and Rights Shape Cairo Documents", in Scientific American, June 1994. pp. 14, 16. The once-a-decade population conference will be held in Cairo later this year. If the third and final preparatory conferences are any indication, the summit will see thousands of women delegates. One major goal of the conference is to stabilize world population, now at 5.7 billion. While new to modern science, a similar technique was described in ancient Hindu texts. The Cholera Research Center in Calcutta (now the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research) found that even the most severely affected patients could respond to the ORT treatment. The greatest success with ORT has been in Egypt, where the 100000 children dying from diarrhea in 1983 were cut to 50000 dead per year. The

20124. Holloway, Marguerite. "Population Summit: Women's Health and Rights Shape Cairo Documents", in Scientific American, June 1994. pp. 14, 16. The once-a-decade population conference will be held in Cairo later this year. If the third and final preparatory conferences are any indication, the summit will see thousands of women delegates. One

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Mr. Upton: Thank you. Sorry I am a little bit late. I am going to take a careful look at your testimony when I get back to my office shortly, but I just have a couple of questions that I would like answered. In looking ahead to the testimony by Elise Smith, who is going to follow you, I believe, she actually commends AID, and I quote her: "We have a longstanding partnership with the AID and over the years have worked closely with the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation." I think that is a nice, nice plug, and I would assume that you would have similar things to say about them—is that right?—with regard to this relationship.

Ms. Davies: Yes. The Overseas Education Fund (OEF) has been one of the finest organizations with which we have worked in the women in development field, and we have a good relationship with them.

Mr. Upton: One other question: I know that currently out of AID’s budget, $2 million is used for women in development. Is that right?

Ms. Davies: The WID Office Budget is $2 million.

Mr. Upton: Is $2 million, that’s right.

Ms. Davies: Yes.

Mr. Upton: But the same AID is responsible for getting funding from other sources to supplement that $2 million. Is that correct?

Ms. Davies: Many of AID’s programs already incorporate women in development. I explained before you came that there is some $100 million in the Egypt portfolio for women in development activities, for example, and another $1.2 million in Nepal, so the Agency is spending much more than it ever was 6 years ago when the policy was specifically encouraged. This is being done on a very significant level.

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Ms. Davies: Yes. The Overseas Education Fund (OEF) has been one of the finest organizations with which we have worked in the women in development field, and we have a good relationship with them.

Mr. Upton: Would it be possible for the record later on to submit the various earmarks from the various programs with a total showing the full range of funds from the other programs?

Ms. Davies: We can certainly give you a sampling, and I think that would be the best thing to do. One of the biggest difficulties we and all donor organizations that work on women in development have is the precise disaggregation of moneys for women. An example which I often use pertains to an ORT project in Guatemala. Part of that project was a $100,000 study on the effects of carbon monoxide from cooking stoves on pregnant women. It is very difficult for AID or any organization to try to determine the direct benefits to women. In this case, the mission decided to continue with the study, but how do we attach a dollar amount to that? It is obviously very difficult, so I would prefer that we give you a sampling.

Mr. Upton: OK.

Ms. Davies: It would be much easier.

Mr. Upton: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to above appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

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20126. House Select Committee on Hunger. "Hearing: Questions from the Committee: Part 8", in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 1-33. Ms. Davies: As I explained in my opening remarks, we try to leverage that money with resources from other bureaus and missions. It is very important, when we look at what AID spends on an annual basis, to understand the difficulties we have in disaggregation what we are spending account by account. However, we do not know that Egypt reported about $110 million in WID-related activities last year. Now I recognize that we have a very big program in Egypt, but $110 is quite significant for women in development. In a very small program like Nepal, the mission has reported about $1.2 million for such activities.

When you look at what we are spending in the Agency overall, it is hundreds of times more than what we are spending in the Women in Development Office. Frankly, the funding of the WID Office is not as much a concern as is the integration of WID issues throughout the Agency. We need to ensure that the Agency spends its money more appropriately and efficiently on WID issues and in integrating WID into our programs.

Mr. Dorgan: The point I was trying to make is, the amount of money in the WID office determines how much you can leverage, and it reflects the priority of the Agency itself, and it seems to me that with the 15% level and with some of the questions that we have here, that it may be that this is not a priority at AID, or at least not the kind of priority we think it should be.

Let me ask, in terms of priorities, 6 years ago when the Women in development policy paper was issued by AID, the suggestion was made that the data collection should be broken down by gender, and yet 6 years after that suggestion there is no such policy. Also, last year I believe you testified before this committee and suggested one of the biggest obstacles was the lack of disaggregated data by gender.

I feel this situation deserves a policy response by AID but the question is, Why has AID itself not mandated the disaggregation of that data by gender?

Ms. Davies: In the socioeconomic sections of AID’s handbook that explains the project process, the collection of disaggregated data is specifically encouraged. This is being done on a very significant level now, much more so than it ever was 6 years ago when the policy was brought to bear, or even 2 years ago. However, it is very difficult to collect data at all stages of project development.

There is now more data available in country and project and the program proposals from the field are disaggregating that data at a much higher rate than ever before. A great deal of our technical assistance to the field is to help them with that disaggregation issue. We recognize that this is a very complex undertaking, and more needs to be done. This is one of our priority areas in AID right now. [====]

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cells; disabled prisoners are often abused; foreign prisoners, some 5% of
the prison population, are usually held in isolation) and fierce punishment
within prisons; and numerous incidents of brutality by the guards. The
most serious incidents of brutality occur in the daiyo-kangaku. The
Ministry of Justice has tried to minimize such concerns. Japan retains
the death penalty for seventeen crimes: 53 prisoners are now on death
row, including 3 women. Executions are kept secret (even lawyers of
prisoners may have a difficult time obtaining information about their
clients). Three of them by the excessive use of lethal force. Three
civilian which began in the first half of the 19th century and was
largely under European influence. A preliminary period of enlightenment was followed
that during a surprise inspection of the New Valley Prison in 6/1995, article was originally written for the Encyclopedia of Islam
where it includes the very detailed regulations for prisoner labor. They are: Dr.  Essam El-Erian, a former member of the People's
Assembly and an official in the Egyptian Doctor's Syndicate; Mohammed
El-Sayed Habib, a former member of the Assuit University Faculty
Club; Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, secretary general of the Arab Doctors'
Federation; Mohammed Khairat El-Shater, chairman of the board of El-
Mohandes Bank; and El-Sayed Mahmoud Ezzat, a professor of medicine
at Zagzig University. Forty-nine other defendants received three-year
sentences. "In 1994 security forces in Minya Province demolished the
homes of 17 individuals. The Emergency Law empowers the Government
no wiretaps, intercept mail and search persons or places without warrants." [2]

20128.  Hussain, Adil. "Egypt: Oppression in the Land of the Pharaoh", in
Crescent International - Special Supplement. April 1996. p. 5. Egypt
receives an estimated $2 billion annually in aid from the US. The regime
of Husni Mubarak is vigorously defended as an important adjunct to US
policy to secure the surrender of the Arab regimes to Israel. US support
extends to framing the blind alim Shasha Omar Abdul Rahman and
sentencing him to two life terms because his followers have challenged
the pharaoh of Egypt. The Mubarak regime's record of torture and crimes
against his own people is horrendous. Even the US state department's
Mubarak regime. It makes grim reading. Here are some excerpts: "There were at least 71 reported deaths of persons in police custody...compared to 82 such deaths in 1994 and 97 deaths in 1993. Thirteen of the deaths occurred at the New Valley Prison which began receiving prisoners in 2/1995. "Reception Party: Under the supervision of a prison official and doctor, guards reportedly beat new arrivals for 30
minutes with fists and heavy plastic sticks. The inmates are then forced
to crawl to their cells on their hands and knees. Other prisoners allege
that they have been stripped to their underwear, forced to stand for
prolonged periods in cold water, burnt with cigarettes, and subjected to
electric shocks. Some claim that they have been threatened with rape or
the rape of their relatives." Authorities reportedly denied family
members permission to view the bodies of their reatives. While denying
charges of intentional mistreatment of prisoners, the Government stated
that during a surprise inspection of the New Valley Prison in 6/1995, inspectors found that the medical facilities were deficient and ordered
them brought up to standard. "Security forces killed approximately
181...some of them by the excessive use of lethal force. Three
civilian bystanders were killed inadvertently by security forces. Five suspects
died while attempting to escape arrest." "Eleven individuals...had disappeared in 1994, six have since been located in detention facilities,
but five remain missing." "Victims have reported the following torture methods: detainees
are frequently stripped to their underwear; hung by their wrists with their
feet touching the floor or forced to stand for prolonged periods; doused
with hot and cold water; beaten; forced to stand outdoors in cold weather;
and subjected to electric shocks. Some victims, including female
detainees, report that they have been threatened with rape." The report
also listed the following people who had died in custody: "Abdel Harith
Al-Madani, a lawyer, who died in custody under suspicious circumstances in 4/1994 [a day after he was taken from his office in
perfectly good health];" "In 1994 Saber Ahmed Mahmoud was beaten to
death by four policemen;" "1994 death of Hassah Salah Sayyed."
1994 death in custody of Eissa Taher Solomon. ... Gamal El-Shazly had been
tortured on 12/27/1994 in a police station in Manshatts Nayr. ... Fateh
Al-Bab Abdul Moneim who died in police custody in 1994. The 1994 death
of Sayyed Hassan Fetouh Eleiwa. ... 1994 death in custody of Amre
Mohamed Salwat. Mohammed Abdul Hamid Hassan, reportedly died in
police custody in 1994. State prosecutors also closed the books on the
following deaths in custody on grounds that the perpetrators could not be
identified: Mohamed Abdali Hamid Hassan, Effat Mohamed Ali Wal. El-
Mohamadi Mohamed Mohamed Mursi, and Mohamed Gomaa Abdul
Sayyed El-Sudani. "The Ministry of Interior continued to ban visits by
relatives and lawyers at Al-Aqrab Prison and Torah Istiqbal Prison.
"Security forces conducted mass arrests and detained thousands of
individuals without charge. The Emergency Law allows authorities to
detain an individual without charge. In 1/1996 security forces conducted
a large operation in the southern province of Minya, detaining over 3000
youngmen...local human rights group estimates that approximately
15000...are in detention. "From 10/1994 to early 1995, the Government
maintained a dusk-to-dawn curfew on Mallawi and several surrounding
villages in Minya province. "Use of military and State security tribunals
under the Emergency Law has deprived hundreds of civilian defendants
of their constitutional right to be tried by an "ordinary judge."
"The court sentenced five prominent defendants to 5 years of hard
labor. They are: Dr. Essam El-Erian, a former member of the People's
Assembly and an official in the Egyptian Doctor's Syndicate; Mohammed
El-Sayed Habib, a former member of the Assuit University Faculty
Club; Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh, secretary general of the Arab Doctors'
Federation; Mohammed Khairat El-Shater, chairman of the board of El-
Mohandes Bank; and El-Sayed Mahmoud Ezzat, a professor of medicine
at Zagzig University. Forty-nine other defendants received three-year
sentences. "In 1996 security forces in Minya Province demolished the
homes of 17 individuals. The Emergency Law empowers the Government
no wiretaps, intercept mail and search persons or places without warrants." [2]

20129.  Kasparova, V. "Zhenskoye Dvizheniye na Vostoke (The
The writer claims that the fact that in the Soviet Union women have been
put on an equal footing with men has been an encouragement to the
women of the East especially in Japan, China, Mongolia and India. In
Egypt the women's movement was initiated by Syrian writers living in
Cairo. At first it was intellectual, but women participated in the clashes
with the British forces in 1919 and 1920. The present movement to
improve social conditions and acquire political rights was the prelude to a
movement of a class nature by Egypt's women workers. [From: "Part IV:
Egypt: 1917-1930", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An

Literature)", in Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya, 1935. pp. 159-182. The
article was originally written for the Encyclopedia of Islam which
appeared in a somewhat truncated form. Krachkovsky defines new
Arabic literature as work produced in Arabic in a period of renaissance
which began in the first half of the 19th century and was largely under
European influence. A preliminary period of enlightenment was followed
by literary activity, first in Syrian, then among emigrants in America,
and finally in Egypt with the school of modernists beginning in 1907.
Krachkovsky enumerates the leading figures in different spheres,
namely poetry, the historical novel and fiction, drama, and other forms of
literature, under which he deals with journalists, essayists and
women writers. In the last part of the article he outlines the study of
Arabic literature of the given period in Europe and the US, attributing
its shortcomings to inadequate facilities and insufficient contact between
scholars. [From: "Part II: Arabs and the Arab World: Social Structure:
1931-1944", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An

20131.  LCOME; Lawson, Fred. "The Gulf War: The Labor Crisis That
Led to Bloodshed", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1991.

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LABOR POLITICS IN both Iraq and Kuwait played a key role in the Gulf war, something you are not likely to read about in the New York Times. Iraq, in particular, made a dramatic shift in 1988 and 1989 away from a state-controlled economy that was, at least in principal, committed to the objectives and principles of a socialist order; that is, an egalitarian order that meant to do away with exploitation in Iraq's domestic economy. The shift was away from this kind of order towards one in which market forces would determine virtually all aspects of the country's economy, particularly in domestic economic affairs. This shift away from socialism and towards private enterprise generated a severe crisis in virtually all sectors of the Iraqi economy and the Iraqi regime responded by building up the country's armed forces and in particular, by shifting them back into military occupations and away from the civilian economy. We will look at this in detail further on and trace the origins of the Iraqi move into Kuwait in terms of the labor relations at home. In the case of Kuwait, the labor force has been, since the 1950s, made up primarily of non-Kuwaitis, that is, Pakistanis and Indians, Bangladeshis and other Arabs, Palestinians and some Egyptians. The fact that the Kuwaiti labor force has come primarily from non-Kuwaitis has left advocates of liberal reform in Kuwait without any political allies at home, and left them weak when confronting the regime. The reformers, therefore, have been unable to force the regime to reestablish the parliamentary system that was present in the country in the 1970s. In fact, by 1989 and 1990, the severe conflict between the liberal reformers and the ruling family was creating enough tension in Kuwait society that one could argue that this tug of war convinced the leadership in Baghdad that there would be some factions within Kuwait that would welcome an Iraqi move into the country that would result in the overthrow of the ruling Al-Sabah family. Therefore, both in Iraq and Kuwait, labor politics escalated the conflict. Labor relations pushed this disagreement between the two governments in the direction of armed confrontation and finally war. Let us look first at Iraq. In the 1980s the regime put in place a whole series of policies that were designed to encourage the growth of private enterprise, and not only private enterprise; the Iraqi state tried to make market relationships, the prices associated with supply and demand, the primary way in which labor was bought and sold and in which goods were produced and sold — not only in the country's internal economy, but externally as well, as the government looked for outside investment from Western Europe and the US to come into the economy and encourage private enterprise. The shift away from Ba'athi socialism and towards a wholesale privatization of the economy had predictable consequences — the same kind of effect we see in Eastern Europe today. It generated severe shortages of capital within Iraq industry and generated inflation, particularly pushing up food prices, as food came to be bought and sold in the unregulated market, rather than distributed through state agencies. Privatization generated tensions between state managers who had run the public sector firms and the new private entrepreneurs who were being encouraged to buy up state factories. There was a whole range of consequences, but for our purposes, the most important component of the drive toward privatization was the government's effort to undermine the network of state affiliated trade union federations that had been set up during the 1960s and early 1970s at the height of Ba'athi socialism. In the Spring of 1987, the State repealed the laws that regulated local branches of the main trade union federations. In effect, the state abolished the local unions that together made up the national union federation and the State replaced these locals with company-based labor associations in the larger private sector firms. So no longer do Iraqi workers have a functioning national trade union association. Now, instead there are company-based unions run within the firm level and run with the collaboration of the owners of the larger private concerns. Saddam Hussein announced the shift in government labor policy by telling the General Federation of Trade Unions that the term "worker" had been abolished in Iraqi society and that from now on all people who worked, all trade union members would be called "officials." 

IRAQI WORKERS BECOME 'OFFICIALS': In light of this change, now that all Iraqi workers were to be called "officials," state employees, if you will, President Hussein continued, workers federations could safely be abolished. In his words, "Now that we are all becoming state officials," So the labor component in the drive toward privatization was to take away the distinct autonomous labor organizations and rework those labor federations in a way that would take away the collective aspect of the labor federations and treat all workers in Iraqi industry as autonomous employees of the central administration. This shift in terminology couldn't mask the growing level of unemployment that resulted from the trend toward privatization. As state-run factories were either shut down entirely or scaled down and forced to find other means of employment. Although there are no clear figures of the level of unemployment, anecdotal evidence indicates that the number of jobless workers was growing while the number able to find full employment in Iraqi society was dropping dramatically by the Spring of 1990. Furthermore, during the course of Iraq's eight year war with Iran, from 1980 to the cease-fire in 1988, Iraqi women had moved into virtually all sectors of the local economy. We had the equivalent in Iraq of the "Rosie the Riveter," phenomenon in the US in World War 2. Iraqi women moved into state agencies, they moved into the educational system and they moved into factory work, not so much farm work as we can tell, but certainly into the large industrial enterprises in the cities. The General Federation of Iraqi Women projected in the Fall of 1983, while the Iraqi-Iran war was still building up, that 28% of the country's industrial workers would be women by the middle of the 1980s. As a result of the war we do not have any clear figures. We are not certain how many Iraqi women moved into the factories, but it seems, again from anecdotal evidence, that the percentage of women in most industrial concerns was even higher than 28%. 

IRAQI WOMEN PLAY CRITICAL ROLE: Women moved into the labor force into occupations that had traditionally been carried out by men and this gave a great deal of strength, even influence in policy making, to the General Federation of Iraqi Women. By the Spring of 1990, the GFIW participated in the meetings of the Revolutionary Command Council and had, in particular, the ear of President Hussein, himself. Thus, the leader of the women's movement was in a major policy making position as a result of the importance of women in the Iraqi labor force. As a result of these two trends: growing unemployment and women's growing predominance within the industrial workforce, the regime found it impossible to demobilize the country's armed forces, or, after the Iraq-Iran war came to an end with the cease fire in 8/1988. So Iraq kept its large army, what has been called in the US press, its "million person" armed forces — the million people including the popular army, the not very well-trained popular militia in Iraq — virtually intact. In 9/1989, the Iraqi General Staff decided to democissor a major section of the military, after a great deal of debate — in which Saddam Hussein is reported to have taken part — to demobilize five regular army divisions, that is, throw some 35000 additional young men into the country's already bursting labor market. This decision accompanied the government's move to change the regulations under which foreign labor was operating in Iraq. During the course of the Iran-Iraq war, the government invited and encouraged foreign workers, especially from Egypt, to come to Iraq and take over some of the places left behind by Iraqi men, and the government allowed relatively generous exchange rates, so that Egyptian workers could send some of their salaries back to Egypt. In the Fall of 1989, the government changed those regulations (See MELB Vol. 2 No. 2) and severely restricted the amount of Iraqi funds that Egyptian workers could take out of the country. Most of the Egyptians, faced with these new regulations, therefore, moved into the educational system. The General Federation of Iraqi Women projected in the Fall of 1990 that 28% of the country's industrial workers would be women by the middle of the 1980s. As a result of the war we do not have any clear figures. We are not certain how many Iraqi women moved into the factories, but it seems, again from anecdotal evidence, that the percentage of women in most industrial concerns was even higher than 28%. 

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unemployment problem, but it certainly helped reestablish a higher degree of state supervision over the country’s internal economic affairs, and in particular took young men who might have caused problems for the regime at home — not being able to find work — and gave them something to do, keeping them off the streets and out of the country entirely. On August 2nd, the morning of the move into Kuwait, President Hussein issued an order reactivating 13 regular infantry divisions, even though the Iraqi army was already virtualy fighting a war. It is not clear who has much of a fight. The army was victorious, but the government bfeefed up the size of the armed forces, anyway. This move set the stage during the Fall of 1990 for re-introduction of state control over a whole range of the country’s domestic economic affairs. Rationing of vital food stuffs was reimposed at the beginning of September. Flour, tea, sugar and rice began to be distributed through state agencies again, rather than being left to private enterprises and at the end of the month, the Ministry of Industry and Industrial Relations took over the allocation of fertilizers to the country’s farms. Those trends can be viewed as redirecting the country’s economic policy away from the crisis ridden transition to private enterprise and back to a more centrally controlled state dominated economy. Meanwhile, during 3-4/1990, trade union groups in Kuwait joined with professional associations, lawyers guilds, engineers groups, along with student organizations to petition the ruler of Kuwait not to make any changes in the 1962 constitution until the parliament could be called back into session. The parliament had been disbanded in 1986 after its members began criticizing the way the government was handling an unofficial stock market crash in Kuwait. The cabinet responded to the petitions in late 4/1990 by announcing that elections for parliament would be postponed, but that elections would be held for a new national council. This new national council was given responsibility for reviewing the country’s parliamentary experience, seeing what had worked and what had not worked in the old constitution, and was going to set the future direction of political life in Kuwait.

ELECTION BOYCOTT PLANNED: The new council was to be composed of 50 members, 50 of them elected through popular ballot and 25 appointed by the Emir. Kuwaiti trade unionists immediately criticized the proposal on the grounds that the council had too many appointed members. The ruling family would basically get to determine the shape and policies of the new national council. Opponents of the regime, less say, the liberal reformers, announced that they would boycott the elections. On 5/9/1990, the Minister of Interior (the Minister of Interior in Middle Eastern countries and often elsewhere doesn’t have charge of national parks, but is the agency for the police and state security services) reported the arrest of eight of the most prominent leaders of the reform movement who had attended what the Minister called an illegal meeting in January to plan how to boycott the election and how to spread the word about the boycott. They were released three days later but on May 13th four more liberal reformers were arrested on broadly the same charges. The state didn’t really tolerate any open criticism of its plans to elect a new national council. The elections were held on June 10th as the diplomatic crisis with Iraq was escalating. It seems that after the war, the degree of Iraqi state supervision over the economy will continue to grow. The war re-introduced rationing and control over labor groups with prohibitions on any kind of criticism of the government and on efforts by labor to organize independently of the Ba’ath party and the central administration. But unlike the 1970’s, the new state control in Iraqi politics will probably contain little socialist content, won’t really be committed any more to socialist principles, won’t really have a major role for socialist institutions like the General Federation of Iraqi Workers. As a result, it seems that Iraqi workers will be left in even a weaker position in Iraq of the 1980’s than they were in the Iraq of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Iraqi workers will, no doubt, face the problems related to market relationships, that is, they will be pulled in and out of work according to the vagaries of supply and demand, and more and more will be subject to the dictates of the central authorities. Consequently, even if the Iraqi government goes through with its plans to establish a parliamentary system, to put in place a constitution and to have elections for a national parliament, maybe even for president, and the government, was in fact, moving in that direction in June and July of last year, and has said that it will reestablish a parliamentary regime) those elections probably won’t do much to improve the lot of the country’s industrial workers. The best a parliament might do is somehow reconcile the new state-dominated economy with the country’s new private bourgeoisie. The workers are more than likely to be squeezed out of the post-war political order in Iraq. Kuwait’s future is less predictable. I am confident that the degree of state control of Iraq is going to be strong but it is not clear who are the implications of the war will be for labor politics. In the rush of enthusiasm after the war, a whole range of Kuwaiti citizens announced that they will take over running their country, that they will not allow foreign workers back in in large numbers any more, that they do not trust foreign nationals; therefore Kuwaitis will take over all levels of the country’s economy. Should this happen, if Kuwaitis, in fact, become the oil workers and the factory workers, in addition to being the government bureaucrats and the bankers, then Kuwaiti nationals will become predominant in the country’s labor force and we might get an indigenous labor movement, made up of Kuwaiti citizens and not just the most vulnerable foreign workers who are in the country only at the pleasure of the state. The presence then of an indigenous labor movement might provide liberal reformers with potential allies to work with in opposing the ruling family and with whom to work in reestablishing a constitutional order. So the implications of the war for Iraq might not be all bad. However, it is hard to imagine that Kuwaitization will actually take place. There is a rush of enthusiasm, there is a rush of nationalism, but a program of replacing foreign workers with Kuwaiti nationals has been announced many times before and it has never worked. It never succeeded because Kuwaiti citizens, who are given stipends by the state and full welfare benefits by the state, don’t find it necessary to work in the factories and the oil fields and take out the garbage, etc. It seems that even in post-war Kuwait, Kuwaiti citizens will not really want to do many of the menial jobs that help keep Kuwaiti society going. It is probable that the current regime of the Al-Sabah family and the central administration will continue to dominate Kuwaiti politics for the foreseeable future and we may expect the regime to continue to import labor into the country to rebuild Kuwait with foreign workers rather than local citizens. (Fred Lawson is a professor of government at Mills College, Oakland, and is a long-time member of the Editorial Board of the Middle East Report. Prof. Lawson at this presentation at a conference in San Francisco, May 4th sponsored by Labor for Peace and Justice, an organization of labor activists who came together, initially, to oppose to Gulf War). [=]

20132. LCOME: Marlowe, Lara. “Saudi Arabia’s Guest Workers Victimized by Gulf Conflict”, in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1991. DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA – Every morning the pavement outside the Dhahran International Hotel is stacked high with unwieldy, heavily taped cardboards boxes containing the possessions of departing Filipino workers. Frightened by talk of chemical warfare and mindful of the fate of more than half a million Asians formerly employed in Iraq and Kuwait and now trapped in Jordanian refugee camps, Saudi Arabia’s ‘guest workers’ continue to leave by the thousands. Eight weeks into the crisis, Saudi Arabia has been added to the list of gulf nations forced to reestablish a consitutional order. So the implications of the war for Iraq might not be all bad. However, it is hard to imagine that Kuwaitization will actually take place. There is a rush of enthusiasm, there is a rush of nationalism, but a program of replacing foreign workers with Kuwaiti nationals has been announced many times before and it has never worked. It never succeeded because Kuwaiti citizens, who are given stipends by the state and full welfare benefits by the state, don’t find it necessary to work in the factories and the oil fields and take out the garbage, etc. It seems that even in post-war Kuwait, Kuwaiti citizens will not really want to do many of the menial jobs that help keep Kuwaiti society going. It is probable that the current regime of the Al-Sabah family and the central administration will continue to dominate Kuwaiti politics for the foreseeable future and we may expect the regime to continue to import labor into the country to rebuild Kuwait with foreign workers rather than local citizens. (Fred Lawson is a professor of government at Mills College, Oakland, and is a long-time member of the Editorial Board of the Middle East Report. Prof. Lawson at this presentation at a conference in San Francisco, May 4th sponsored by Labor for Peace and Justice, an organization of labor activists who came together, initially, to oppose to Gulf War). [=]
workers leaving and Yemeni, Jordanian, Sudanese and Palestinian candidates being refused entry because of their leaders' support for Saddam Hussein. The Indian government has refused even to issue visas for new laborers to replace their compatriots fleeing Saudi Arabia's eastern province. Many of the 1.6 million Egyptian workers forced to leave Iraq after the invasion are now expected to fill the gap. President Hosni Mubarak's dispatching of soldiers to Saudi Arabia's northern border has laid the political foundations for hiring displaced Egyptians. For the same reason, more Syrians will also now find work in the kingdom, although Saudis remain leery of what they call the Syrians "over-politicization." The Yemenis, Jordanians, Sudanese and Palestinians who remain are finding life more difficult. "We can't trust them anymore," a Saudi official said. "Those who leave won't be allowed to return. Although our government denies it, we are looking for reasons to deport them. They are watched by the police, and they are being very careful." The ability to control workers' movements has been central to the Saudi's importation of foreign labor. Immigrants are given entry visas and their passports are usually held by their employers for the duration of their stay to prevent their moving to better-paying jobs or leaving the country on short notice. Some laborers eager to leave because of the crisis have had difficulty obtaining exit visas or repatriating the earnings they have banked here. The government has for more than a decade attempted to "Saudi-ize" the labor force but has met with limited success. Saudi women rarely work, and men refuse to toil for the low salaries that Asians and poor Arabs accept. They will not perform menial tasks currently undertaken by Sri Lankans and Bangladeshis. "Before the oil boom, we lived without servants," an official at the Saudi Chamber of Commerce said. "If a war starts, Saudis may have to do some of these jobs-and they should." Indeed, poor Saudis are hard to find. A base income is not guaranteed by the government, but every citizen is eligible for free education and medical care and can receive lump payments to cover losses from unforeseen accidents. The only Saudis living in poverty are desert Bedouins, whose lifestyle is a matter of choice. Although Saudis are not expected to become janitors or ditch diggers, the government hopes that the gulf crisis will encourage more of its citizens to take low-level clerical positions. For the poorest of the remaining foreign workers, life in Saudi Arabia is a joyless, if remunerative experience. Luis, a Filipino driver, is supporting ten family members who live in Manila. "I work 12 hour days, and then I go home to a room that I share with nine Filipino men," he said. "We get on each others' nerves and sometimes there are fist fights. I have met a few Saudis, but I feel uncomfortable in their homes because I know the women cannot come out while I am there. There is nothing to do for entertainment." Many of the guest workers are political exiles or refugees from civil wars in Lebanon, Kashmir, southern Sudan and Sri Lanka. Mohammed, a hotel receptionist, fled Pakistan eight years ago, pursued by the government for his activities in the militant Muslim League. "YOU GET NUMB AND DON'T THINK OF HOME": "The first year, I thought I was going to die of loneliness and boredom," he said. "After that, you get numb. I don't even think about home anymore. Separation from families and fear of war are the most common complaints. Ranjan, a member of Sri Lanka's Tamil minority, believes he would have been murdered had he stayed in his strife-torn homeland. He has had no word from his wife and children for the past six months. Makhboul, a Pakistani, sees his wife and children only once every two years. Asian workers talk with emotion about the rules that affect colleagues who bring their wives to work in Saudi Arabia, where school-teaching and nursing are almost the only jobs open. Luis told of a friend who brought his wife under her maiden name so that she would be able to work. "They have to live in separate compounds," he said. "They cannot be together. They cannot sleep together. All they can do is meet for lunch in a cafe." [Lara Marlowe is a Middle East correspondent for the Financial Times of London and several US papers including the San Francisco Chronicle where this article appeared on September 22. Her description of the life and treatment of immigrant workers can be applied to the other gulf states.] [ ]

20133. Lederach, John Paul; Stork, Joe. "The Intervention in Somalia: What Should Have Happened: An Interview with John Paul Lederach", in Middle East Report, March-April 1993. pp. 38-42. While many Somalis and foreign relief workers believed that intervention in Somalia was necessary, the US approach may not have been the best way to address the problem. Focusing the food aid and relief effort only on the Mogadishu-Barbera-Kismayutriangleintensified internal displacement, without addressing any of the problems of regionalism that had shattered the country. The relief community sought a small peacekeeping force, but the 30000 troops deployed by the US was far out of scale. This massive deployment has paradoxically made all areas not held by peacekeepers more dangerous. The peacekeeping force's massive intervention also pushed all Somali institutions out of the decisionmaking process, including elders, womens associations, trademen, professionals and intellectuals. In Somailand, where the peacekeepers did not venture, these local groups are rebuilding civil society. Political Islam has little appeal in Somalia, although there are 2000 men under arms in Loscoray; their present modest ascendance is mainly due to the vacuum left by the peacekeeping forces. Many Somalis believe that Egypt and Italy are the foreign powers most likely to maintain a unified Somalia. [Lederach directs the International Conciliation Service of Mennonite Central Committee.]
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Sustainable Development to be given a monitoring role in this process.

20137. Lederer, Edith M. "Population Control: What Next? Conference OKs Plan, But Implementation is Voluntary", in Seattle Times, September 15, 1994, p. A22. UN Population Conference delegates have adopted a 20-year action plan to address the world population crisis by economic development and the empowerment of women. However, the agreement is not a treaty and is not legally binding. Individual nation delegations stated they would carry the program home for implementation, such as Nigeria’s Bisi Ogunleye of the Women’s Association of Nigeria and a founder of the Women’s Caucus at the conference. The Vatican failed to prevent abortion from being defined as a major public health issue. The plan calls for spending $17 billion per year by 2000, increasing to $21.5 billion by 2015, but provides no initiative as to where the money will come from (current spending is $6 billion per year). The Women’s Caucus, which numbered 1500 at the conference, has formed a post-Cairo task force to monitor funding, resource allocation and implementation of the World Population Plan of Action. The Natural Resources Defense Council called on nations to make their commitment to the platform real: it called on the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to be given a monitoring role in this process.

20138. Lederer, Edith M. "Population Meeting Agrees on Fertility Wording", in Seattle Times, September 12, 1994. p. A5. Wording believed by the Vatican and its allies to indicate approval of abortion, 'fertility regulation', was changed to 'regulation of fertility'. In addition, the First World succeeding in overruling the Third World in rejecting the right of Third World immigrants in the First World to family reunification. US delegate Tim Wirth was shouted at by an anti-abortion activist.

20139. Lee-hui, Lilian Lay-ean. The Impact Of Muslim Women On The ReligiousEducation Of Their Children In Egypt. Fuller Theological Seminary, School Of World Mission. Dissertation. 115pp. AAC 1352245. [Advisor: Woodberry, J. Dudley] This is a study on the status and roles of Muslim women in Egypt and how they affect women's ability to influence their children in religious education. The research aims to seek a potential means for evangelism among Muslims. The main methodology is literature research, and a very small portion is field research through questionnaires. Findings include the following: the subordination of women to men is a worldwide phenomenon. Muslim women have unique problems because of Islamic teaching. Although Muslim women do not possess visible power, they do have invisible power to influence the future generation for Christ if they can be empowered to educate their children in Christian ways. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [c]

20140. Lee-hui, Lilian Lay-ean. The Impact Of Muslim Women On The ReligiousEducation Of Their Children In Egypt. Fuller Theological Seminary, School Of World Mission. Dissertation. 115pp. AAC 1352245. [Advisor: Woodberry, J. Dudley] This is a study on the status and roles of Muslim women in Egypt and how they affect women's ability to influence their children in religious education. The research aims to seek a potential means for evangelism among Muslims. The main methodology is literature research, and a very small portion is field research through questionnaires. Findings include the following: the subordination of women to men is a worldwide phenomenon. Muslim women have unique problems because of Islamic teaching. Although Muslim women do not possess visible power, they do have invisible power to influence the future generation for Christ if they can be empowered to educate their children in Christian ways. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [c]

20141. Leo, John. "Clinton's Abortion Bullies Buckle At Cairo Conference", in Seattle Times, September 13, 1994. p. B5. The Cairo UN Population Conference will be recalled as 'one of the oddest adventures' of the Clinton Administration. The Clinton Administration is following its usual policy formulation pattern: initial bullying from a controversial stance, quiet collapse, followed by the excuse that the original policy was never intended. In 3/1994, the State Department ordered all Embassies to lobby host governments conform to the US policy that abortion is a 'fundamental right' of women (notably, this directive promised no funding to support this new fundamental right). Tim Wirth, undersecretary of state and leader of the US abortion lobbying effort notes that: 'a government which is violating basic human rights should not hide behind the defense of sovereignty'; that is, if a nation does not support abortion, its laws and constitution are void. In addition, the US is using its aid and trade to pressure countries to adopt the Clinton Administration abortion policy. Guatemalan and Peruvian diplomats fear that the US will immediately end their aid funding if they do not provide for universal abortion on demand. Notably, while the Vatican and its 20-30 nation-state allies forced the Clinton Administration to back down, the press was so intent on denouncing the Vatican that the Clinton policy reversal was overlooked in the US press. [TXT]

20142. Lutfi, Huda; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]: Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 06: The Mamluk Period: Manners and Customs of Fourteenth Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy versus Male Sharia Order in Muslim Prescriptive Treatises. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 99-121. Mid-fourteenth century Mamluk society was economically prosperous and politically stable. However, superstition was common and the routine visiting of the tombs of sufis was an important part of the daily life for women. Religious conservatives, such as Ibn al-Hajj (Abu abd allah ibn Muhammd al-Abdari al-Fasi, b. Fez, Morocco. d. Cairo 1336; here relying on his Al-Makdhal ila Yammiyat al-Amal bu Tahsin al-Niyyat (Cairo: Al-Matbaa al-Misyriya, 1929)), were critical of the mixing of sexes at shrines and on religious occasions; he argued that religious ignorance was attributable to Fatimid Caliph Hakim, whose orders to women to remain at home came during droughts, famines, plagues and periods of inflation. Like other medieval urban societies, Mamluk society saw the role of women as to remain in the home: Ibn al-Hajj was especially distrustful of the daily presence of women shoppers in the marketplaces and shops of the cities. Women had a strong presence in Cairene society and significant legal and traditional prerogatives.

20143. Macklin, William R. "Coptic Orthodox Church Split From Western Catholicism 1500 Years Ago", in Seattle Times, November 12, 1994, p. C4. The Coptic Orthodox Church, with 22 million members worldwide, is presently headed by Pope Shenouda III. The church split from Western Christianity 1500 years ago. Last month, the Coptic pope toured North America in the face of almost complete press silence. Much Coptic practice is identical to that of the Roman Catholic Church: a mutual call to unity in 1973 has resulted in the working of a panel of theologians to resolve doctrinal differences. Much of this is due to Pope Shenouda III, who was produced by the vast monastic establishment of the church, yet who became the first Coptic pope to visit the Vatican; his outspoken defense of Coptic minority rights in Egypt led Anwar Sadat to banish him to four years exile in a desert monastery (where he wrote 16 books); becoming one of the 1600 political exiles under Sadat's rule. Pope Shenouda was released in 1985 by Pres. Mubarak, after the assassination of Sadat. One major difference from the Roman Catholic Church is the requirement that priests who do pastoral work be married. The Coptic Church also does not oppose birth control, even if women remain barred from the priesthood.

20144. Maguire, Daniel C. "The UN Population Conference: International Consensus On Controlling Population Provides Hope For Planet", in Seattle Times, September 7, 1994. p. B5. International 'consensus' has been reached at the UN conference on six points: (1) women must be educated and empowered; (2) parents must be able to believe their children will survive; (3) rich countries like the US must
realize their consumption pattern makes them a more significant threat to the environment; (4) development must abolish poverty; (5) humans must limit their power to destroy the environment; (6) contraception and voluntary abortion must be universally available. [David C. Maguire is professor of moral theology at Marquette University, and president of the Religious Consultation on Population Reproductive Health & Ethics.]

20145. Mahmoud, Fatima Babiker. The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development: Part 06: Education and Consumption: Businessmen and Their Families. London: Zed Books; Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1984. pp. 102-117. Education in Capitalist Families: Access to education has always been rationed in Sudan, with higher education remaining the preserve of the wealthiest families. In the Turko-Egyptian period, few Sudanese were educated, most having attended religious schools. The first state schools were opened in 1867-1868 in Khartoum, Berber and Dongola. The British established the Gordon College in 1902 to "train a small class of competent artisans... and to produce a small administrative class for entry to the government service". The number of schools established in the first year after education was equal to all those established in six decades of colonial rule. However, educational opportunity remained maldistributed. In 1974-1974, while 64.2% of urban children attended primary schools (95%), and 100% of wives had domestic workers in the home. Capitalists homes had many appliances and consumer electronics products: 100% have private doctors; all traveled abroad for annual medical check-ups (70% to England, 27% to Egypt). For major surgery, capitalists travel to major hospitals in Khartoum (38%), Egypt (34%) or England (28%). Capitalists have the best housing (more than 79% had homes with 5 or more rooms), and 96% are also landlords to some extent. Most women married to capitalists remain in the home and have no paid employment (95%); 100% of wives had domestic workers in the home. Capitalists hospitals had many appliances and consumer electronics products: 100% have cooling systems, 96% have tape recorders, 100% in Khartoum had TV sets (TV service had just started there at the time of the survey), 20% had washers and driers; and 71% had modern kitchens.

20146. Mannin, Ethel. Women and the Revolution: Part 24: Women and Past Revolutions: The Women's Revolution in the East. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co Inc., 1939. An enormous amount of propaganda has been brought to bear, and is consistently sustained, in the interests of "the socialization of the East". Uzbek women are laying aside their veils and entering the universities of Samarkand and Tashkent with the men, and working with them in factories and offices; throughout the Republics Eastern women are being educated to Western ideas of mother-craft and demonstrations. They did most of the picketing work. They went in route for forbidden Samarkand, a guide was very eloquent about the socialization of the Persian women--Persians forming a considerable part of the cosmopolitan population. Before the Soviet campaign for their emancipation, she said, they had been mere chattels of men, subject to all the degradations the unenlightened East imposes on women as a matter of course; they were required to lie on the floor in childbirth, being regarded as unclean at such times; they had no rights, no freedom, no place in society; to-day, unveiled, socially and morally, they take their place as "useful Soviet citizens," co-equal with men; they are taught birth-control and personal hygiene, and go into hospital and receive proper medical attention when they bear their children; they rise to high positions in the State, become doctors and engineers and hold administrative posts. When the movement for their emancipation first began and they began to lay aside their veils and assert themselves as free individuals, they were called harlots by the men, and many of them were murdered by husbands and fathers who preferred to see them dead rather than succumb to Western ideas. But to-day in Baku there is a museum showing the emancipation of Persian women, though the ancient East still has a considerable hold, and women still squat on the ground outside their low, flat-roofed adobe houses, shapeless bundles in faded parajans, their faces hidden behind thick "velis" of horsehair, resisting both Westernization and attempts to persuade them and their families to move into the workers' barracks in the new town which is slowly but surely encroaching on the old in an on-creeping tide of new buildings.

The opposition to moving out of the hovels of houses into the modern flats is merely an Eastern version of the Western slum-dwellers and their preference for their slum houses rather than a box of a flat in a vast impersonal block. Russia has no more business in Turkestan than the British have in India--the right of free secession from the Soviet Union as laid down in the Constitution is, as Cecily Hamilton points out [In: Modern Russia (Dent, 1934)] concerning the Ukraine, "more theoretical than real"--and the emancipation of a people, both men and women, should come from within from themselves; it should not be imposed on them from without, "for their own good", which savours too much of the British in India and Africa, and Mussolini's "civilizing" campaign to the Abysсинians. The need is for an upsurge of the spirit of freedom and revolt in the people themselves, not a grafting on of ideas from without. The upsurge of spirit was manifested in India during the Civil Disobedience Campaign, when "women who had spent their whole lives in seclusion came out in thousands to walk unveiled in Congress processions". [Reginald Reynolds in The White Sahibs in India (Secker & Warburg, 1937).] At that time India was, in the words of the Congress leader Nehru, in the throes of "a great eruption, of human energies which make the hundreds of millions of India as well as that Empire which still holds sway here". Gandhi's campaign gave a tremendous impetus to the woman movement, linking it up with the general movement for national freedom. Brailsford describes that revolutionary year as opening "the doors of countless purdah homes. One heard, wherever one went, the ripping of curtains and veils. The Congress movement beckoned to women in every form of national service, and with courage and devotion they answered its call. They spoke at its mass demonstrations. They did most of the picketing work. They went in thousands to prison. They were often chosen as the 'dictators' of the local committees... I found them foremost in every public activity, and the men paid them the most generous tributes."

[In: Rebel India (Leonard Stein, publisher with Victor Gollancz, 1930).] What happened in India is an excellent example of the importance of the woman movement extending beyond purely feminist causes and allaying itself with the general revolutionary cause. It is when the women see that the fight against imperialism and the capitalist system is their fight, that their wrongs are rooted in these evils, and that their emancipation therefore lies in the overthrow of those evils, and seeing this are not content to be merely feminists, moulting the wrongs of women, protesting and fighting merely for their own sex, but become revolutionaries, fighting the system responsible for their wrongs along with the wrongs of men, that they make real progress. The revolution in social organization carried out by Mustafa Kemal in the nineteen-
twentyes, when Turkey became a Republic, gave women freedom from the veil, and a social and moral status in line with that of Western countries, polygamy was prohibited, and the laws governing marriage, divorce, inheritance, Westernized. The separation of religion from the State served the women of Turkey in their emancipation as the underlining of the power of the Roman Catholic Church served the woman movement in the French Revolution. (As Blaisdell has observed, “it is one of the greatest disappointments of a revolution esthetically to see the power of the Church to impose on a lay society the immutable reason of its dogmas relating to marriage.” [In: Rebel India.]) One of the first radical reforms Mustafa Kemal effected in the Republican Government was the handing over of all educational institutions (including the medressehs, religious colleges) to a commissariat of Public Instruction; hitherto they had been controlled by offices for religious affairs. In Palestine the women’s movement moves forward with the Arab struggle against British imperialism and Zionism. The nationalist spirit of freedom has penetrated behind the veils of the Arab women and given them boldness and courage, sweeping away the encumbrances of Islamic tradition as it were overnight. In 1929 the woman’s movement organized an Arab Women’s Congress at Jerusalem, and two hundred delegates faced the public gaze unveiled, meetingunder the presidency of Madame Kazem Pasha Hussein, wife of the late President of the Arab executive. It was the first women’s congress ever held in Palestine, and it had the courage not merely to stand openly for social and economic freedom for women, but to identify itself with the nationalist movement. It pledged itself to work for the mitigation of the sentences passed on nationalist political prisoners: it protested against the importation of firearms into Palestine for arming the Jews; it pleaded the cause of the oppressed peasants and asked the Government for legislation to relieve their distress; they demanded the establishment of a free, self-governing, democratic state.

Outside of the congress the women organized propaganda and demonstrations. In 1932, after Lord Allenby’s visit to Jerusalem, the women expressed their nationalist spirit by organizing mass demonstrations, and a procession first to the Musjid of Omar, where a Christian woman preached from the pulpit of the mosque, and then to the Holy Sepulchre where a Moslem woman preached before the tomb of Christ, symbolizing the nationalist solidarity of Arab womanhood. Not in addition to, but as part of its nationalist fight, the Arab women movement fights for better education for women and girls, and for the raising of their social status generally. A writer in the Congress Socialist [September, 1937] (the organ of the Congress Socialist Party of India) observes, “The part that women have played and continue to play in every struggle for freedom is one of the noteworthy features of every colonial fight. Everywhere the women’s movements have taken on a new orientation and they have entered upon a new phase of their struggle for complete emancipation. They stand to-day shoulder to shoulder with men with greater zeal and determination than ever, whether it be in China, Egypt, India, Spain, or Palestine.... And in this present fight against imperialist domination the Arab woman has risen to her fullest height and stature as an individual of exceptional courage.” In China it is again a story of the woman’s movement marching side by side, in co-operation with, the anti-imperialist movement. Anna Louise Strong, in her excellently concise study of the Chinese revolutionary struggles from 1927 to 1935, China’s Millions [Gollancz, 1936], says: “Nowhere on earth to-day is the social clash more picturesque and startling than in the fight for women’s rights in China. In this ancient land, with its primitive peasantry, where parents to get food still sell their daughters, and where respectable women remain indoors in retirement, there has arisen a generation of ‘bobbed-hair girls’ who declare that both sexes are equal citizens. They marched behind the Nationalist armies as propagandists in uniform; they aroused the countryside; they formed women’s unions. Many of them to-day are martyrs because of their activities. From time to time news dispatches from China describe the execution of a dozen or a score of women, who are condemned as revolutionists on the evidence of their bobbed hair alone.” During the Nationalist drive of 1925-7 bobbed hair became the outward and visible sign of the Chinese woman’s emancipation; it became, as Anna Louise Strong says, “a flag for which women die”; it is the challenge to the outworn traditions which enslaved women—challenge in the same way that the laying aside of the veil was a challenge on the part of the women of Turkestan, India, Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, Persia; a challenge and an act of self-assertion; a demand of these Eastern women to be regarded not merely as women, but as human beings, co-equal with man, individuals with a place in society and a duty to it. [↩]


The condition of women in most countries of the Arab world is in a state of flux. The reasons for this are many, but let us limit ourselves to three important causes: the first is religion, the second is economics and the third is politics. By religion I mean certain modern interpretations of Islamic teachings espoused by disparate groups of people who have been named “fundamentalists”, “activists” or “integristes” by the media. There is a strong current of integrisme sweeping the Muslim world, one which seeks to look at society holistically and to adapt institutions to an interpretation by such groups of “Islamic” norms. Because the integristes movements cover a wide spectrum of concepts and ideas which often differ from group to group within the same country, let alone different Muslim countries, there is little unanimity among them, save on the use of religious idiom in communicating with each other and with the public at large. The reason for the rise of such movements is the alienation of the public from governments and from any ideologies they espouse. When such an alienation and suspicion of the governing elite is widespread, anomie sets in, and one of the alternatives to that is a return to religion as the only constant ideology. Thus new interpretations of religious teachings are posited and supported by some of the population.

There is no unanimity among these groups regarding the role of women either, for various groups have interpreted that role differently. In Egypt, at one end we have those who believe that the role of women in society is limited to that of child bearing and nurturing which means nurturing children, older members of the family, and of course, the spouse. The woman is thus limited to the household and its functions and has no presence in the marketplace, here used in the wider sense to mean activities of a political/juridical/economic nature. Her space is limited to the family and the household and is, therefore, purely private. Accordingly, she is dressed with absolute modesty in loose flowing gowns that go down to her ankles, with long sleeves, high collars and a headdress that shows nothing of her hair or her neck. Even more extreme groupings prefer that a woman wear a niqab, a mask over her face, sunglasses that hide her eyes, and gloves that cover her fingers, and that she be kept secluded whenever possible. Yet, while positing such a retiring position for women, many of the same groups encourage their education.

Less extreme groupings are content with women who dress modestly and who may or may not cover their hair with a veil, a scarf, a bonnet or turban. A modest form of clothing is also enjoined on males who frequently allow their beards to grow. [Note: Fadwa El-Guindy.]

The attitude of integristes movements towards women and work also differs. Many of them believe that women have no place in the marketplace, for such “would lay them open to insult and harassment.” The underlying assumption here is that men are so susceptible to female charms that a woman is a walking temptation, whether dressed modestly or not. Al-Ghazali (died 1111) believed that woman’s voice was a Awa, a blemish. Others, motivated by economic factors, feel that women should be allowed to work. For instance, Sheikh Al-Ghazali in his “al-mara fi-l-islam” (1980) has sustained women’s right to work as specified
in the Quran and has stated that no part of a woman is a blemish. Those who tread the middle ground concede that women can go out to work but that they should be limited to work that services women and children, not men. Hence, some work is labelled "for males" and some "for females" (probably the work that men don’t want to do). Many, though, support training women as doctors for women and children, so they need not come into contact with a male doctor who is not kin. Unmarried women to dress modestly and do not seek work, for her modest garb will prevent gossip about her and will send a message that she is not to be sexually harassed. Thus her outer appearance is a sign of her inward uprightness and allows her to work side by side with strange men, not her kin, and earn her living without incurring criticism from neighbors and relatives alike. This attitude is usually found among the section of the bourgeoisie that had heretofore not encouraged their daughters to become enrolled in higher on and had not allowed them to work outside the house. They are the ones most fearful of what "the neighbors might think", but who, because of a stratified economy and a falling standard of living need the salaries earned by working women.

What needs underlining is while there is nothing in the Quran that prevents women from having a public as well as a private role, recent interpretations, or medieval interpretations of religious injunctions resuscitated by some men have relegated women to a private role which they describe as being in line with her ‘femininity’. Others have nevertheless encouraged women’s public participation as the junior partner in a world mostly run by men. Amazingly enough, Muslim women have been elected heads of state as frequently as western women. The use of religious interpretations can therefore encourage the emancipation of women or discourage it, depending on the interpreters and the agenda behind their interpretation. This brings us to the next cause of the condition of women. [=]

20149. Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. Women in Egypt: Gender Relations and Political Liberalization: Part 02. G.E. von Grunebaum Center’s Series. Working Paper 9. Pamphlet. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von GrunebaumCenter for Near Eastern Studies, January 1992. pp. 6-8. What, one might well ask, has all this to do with democratization? This brings us to the third rubric, that of politics. If in a liberal society there are lobbies which represent various interests, (unions, associations etc.) which take up the cause of the poor, the disinfected, the workers and so on. They may not be as successful as those which take up the causes of the affluent, but there is support for the weak in some fashion. That support then appeals to the lawmakers who disburse funds to help the poor through social security and medicare as well as old age pensions. But third world countries have no answers to social problems because the money is not there and the lawmakers have little or no clout.

During the parliamentary years in Egypt ie. pre-1952, parliament was dominated by landowners who never did a thing for the peasant. Only in the 30s did they begin to pass legislation forbidding child labor and limiting the working hours for women. Any social services that were introduced, women are shoved to the back of the line. As more new technology becomes widespread, some highly educated women benefit from their knowledge of it but the rest do not. Thus, education plays a key role. Those who can afford the expense of higher education can plug into shenanigans and all sorts of finagling, elicited funds from amongst the wealthy to set up clinics, dispensaries and hospitals for the poor. Indeed by 1952, before the government took over their enterprises, they had set up 2 million hospital beds in the country. It was women’s organizations who set up the nursing corps for the army and set up rehabilitation centers for the war wounded. It was benevolent organizations that set up Braille institutes, orphanages, and training schools for the needy. The government spent little or nothing on such institutions.

After the revolution of 1952, more funds began to be spent by the government on social work, but only government employees have been given old age pensions. There is a form of social security, but that pays a pittance, and individual enterprises are responsible for setting up insurance. The poor get short shrift in hospitals, that is assuming there is space to admit them, and they actually receive treatment. There is a saying that a medical student gets the best training in the Qaar al-airi, the largest government run hospital, but the patient gets the worst treatment, and if he/she comes out of the hospital healthy it is little short of miraculous.

The need for some sort of support in old age has led to a horrifying increase in the birth rate, so that one million babies are born every eight months, with people assuming that since a number of them will die, one or two of them might be successful enough to support their parents in their old age. This is especially the case among agricultural workers, who represent approximately 40% of the population.

Medical care is fine for the elite who can afford to pay for it, but even in the best of hospitals the nursing is below par, and that many prefer to fly to London, the USA, or Paris for treatment. Those who have
no option have to depend on their own families to bring them food and
to supervise their medication. Furthermore, because nurses and orderlies
are so poorly paid, a little bit of bakshish helps the nurse to show more
efficiency.

On the other hand, the integrists have taken up the slack and have
organized themselves to render social services for their members
whenever these are needed. They therefore run clinics, schools, and set
up networks for finding people jobs and helping each other whenever
necessary. These services, financed by donations from wealthy
members, have attracted an increasing number of adherents and have
been a positive element in the movements. Once again, the people using
alternative strategies have found means of self-help amongst the
community which enables them to survive difficult times. Much like the
early Quakers who stood guarantors for their workers, so integrists
find work for their members and guarantee them a support
system. [\textendash]

20150. Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. Women in Egypt: Gender Relations
and Political Liberalization: Part 04. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's

In authoritarian regimes repression is the means used by government,
ocasionally allayed by gifts from sugar-daddy governments. Thus the
government subsidizes essentials, but the rich benefit alongside the poor.
For example, the gas subsidy favors those with private cars as opposed
to public transportation. Most of the economic pie is reserved for the
army the main support of the government, and the high bourgeoisie,
which is the government's ally and main beneficiary. Because there is
no public responsibility, all is done according to the will of the president
and his circle of advisors; musical chairs are played with one minister
trying to bakshish the other in order to get more of the budget for his projects.

Until Mubarak came to power there was a one-party system
which had little or no clout in parliament and which represented little of
the commons about it. Political parties have now been reinserted but how
much clout does parliament have? For the time being very little, but one
assumes it will acquire more as liberalization proceeds apace; however,
it is a slow process and parliaments learn by doing. For the time being
the cabinet is appointed by the president and is responsible to the
president, but as time passes, parliamentary knowledge expands and
people begin to realize that they have more power to make decisions that
affect the good of the whole.

To-date, parliament is still in its infancy, but there are hopes for its
maturity. As far as women are concerned, their numbers in parliament
have radically decreased. Under Sadat, a number of seats had been set
aside for women. Mubarak has done away with that and women have to
compete with men for the seats. There is always one woman in the
committee as the Minister for Social Affairs, but no other ministry has ever
been given to a woman.

One can point out that in authoritarian regimes women as well as
men are not granted many rights, and that both sexes are indifferent to
governments with which they do not identify and which they consider to
to be "the other", yet they always expect the government to improve the
situation within the country. Nevertheless men are given preference over
women, even though the government claims to be an equal opportunity
employer. Government employees within the same cadre receive equal
salaries regardless of sex. There are, however, fewer women under-
secreteries of state, but their number is growing, as is a rising number of
women ambassadors, though their numbers are still exiguous. All over the
world, with few exceptions, men are still preferred over women. [\textendash]

20151. Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. Women in Egypt: Gender Relations
and Political Liberalization: Part 05. G.E. von Grunebaum Center's

As the issues of one parent families grow, or the issue of absentee
fathers among those who work abroad continues, women will have to
struggle harder in order to get what they need, especially when the
economic pie becomes smaller. Women who are married are invariably
told that they are taking a job away from a man "who is supporting a
family", as though she were working for the fun of it or to indulge in
consumer buying. This perception on the part of males may be because
according to Islamic injunction men are the ones who are responsible for
the family and its expenses, and maybe some men believe that women
work merely to buy expensive clothes, and maybe some among the
elites do. But most of those who work do so in order to support a family.
Women who work are normally given no more than the minimum
salaries to rely upon are encouraged to work. When the
first woman taxi driver appeared in Cairo, the male drivers helped
her, because they knew she was a widow, and I was told, "she is raising a
family" by male taxi drivers, but when the younger women began to
break into the field, the males were not as accommodating, and
slandered the women as unprofessional, sloppy etc.

Women still have a long uphill battle to acquire minimum rights
(though we not live long enough) but that struggle
can only go somewhere when the women's organizations acquire more
clothing than they have, and when the men's organizations begin to see the
need to parlay with women on common causes. Let us not forget women
have bought into the patriarchy; especially mothers, since once they
become a mother they rise in stature and in status. It is mothers
who socialize their children and who discriminate between the different sexes,
so that education at the primary level, the level of infancy, breeds in
discrimination. So long as women alone are left the task of nurturing and
socializing the family then we can expect this discrimination to continue.
So long as society educates men and women differently, the same holds
to be. Women are taught home economics whereas men are taught
calculus, even in government schools where the curriculum is supposed
to be the same. Furthermore, religious interpretations will continue
to feed discriminatory practices until a generation of women scholars, such
as Bint al-Shati and others like her, arise to defend the condition of
women in Islam.

Urbanized intellectual women have tried to organize associations
that concentrate on women's problems. At first they were refused
permission to organize, then when permission was finally given they split
into factions and one faction is now accused of wrongful handling of funds.

This may be normal, and in due course women's organizations
will become the mouthpiece for demands for women's rights, especially
as concerns personal status, divorce, marriage, child custody and
support. At the moment the government needs the support of the religious
establishment to combat the current of integisme which seeks to
overwhelm the government, so they dare not concede any rights to
women that might upset the ulama, the most reactionary element of
society. In due course, however, the government might realize that they
have stronger support from women than they could ever hope to get from the
ulama or the integistes.

Finally we must note that greater liberalization can only encourage
the creation of effective trade unions for both men and women. Only then
can we begin to assume that the rights of the common person can be
safeguarded, but that is still a long way away for both men and women.

In brief, the condition of women and their roles in society are
determined by a multiplicity of reasons in which religion, economics and
politics play a part. When the economic pie diminishes then religion and
politics come together to discriminate against women and thus reserve
the pie for the men. Much as Rosy the Riveter was hailed a heroine
during the war, and then told to go home and have babies after the war
because then she was "taking a job away from a good man"; so muslim
women, or rather women the world over, are manipulated by their
society and pushed either into the market place or out of it depending on
the needs of the day.

When women become more conscious of their rights and
organize themselves to oppose such discriminatory practices, then
religion and politics, as well as economics, all hasten to accommodate
the new realities and seek to co-opt certain groups among women. Such
electoptation may be at the expense of other groups of women, or may
benefit all women in the long run. In the final analysis, elite woman are
the greatest beneficiaries of any system, whether it encourages or
discourages women's participation outside the home, because they have
the option of choice, they have access to men with power, and they do not
fear or care for public criticism. By elite women I mean women who are highly educated, education being the ultimate channel for vertical mobility, or who come from prominent families, which is often a short-cut to power as in the case of Benazir Bhutto.

Women of the bourgeoisie, middle, and lower classes follow the example of elite women, but are slower in breaking through tradition and convention. They are the ones most susceptible to integrative movements, and who espouse the notion that a woman’s place is in the home. The working class woman, somewhat akin to elite women, (though with a limited number of choices and knowing that she has to work to support herself and her children) is not ruled by any traditional system that hinders her ability to seek a livelihood. Whatever works for her is good, as far as she is concerned. Lastly, the rural peasant woman, much like her male counterpart, is the one with the least choices, but she also is the one who all her life has been involved in work. She labors in the fields, at home, and in the marketplace where she buys, sells and barter whatever she has: butter, ghee, chicken, cottage industries, etc., as she has done for millennia. She is a basic element in the alternative market.

Poor countries have more limited choices than rich ones for both males and females. But whether poor or rich, the strategies used by both sexes to attain their needs are many in the face of governments which are limited in their possibilities for expansion. Alternative methods are therefore invented to by-pass the obvious and the traditional. It is therefore amongst alternative groups and strategies that one can detect the real workings of a society. [-]

20152. Mason, Isaac. Mohammedans of China: Part 3. Read before the China Society, March 15, 1922. It is interesting to read what is offered in the way of proof for these miracles, as follows: "Christians ask why it is that the cleaving of the moon was seen only in Arabia, and not elsewhere. We answer that some people from Persia also saw it; moreover there are differences of time and location to take into account; daytime in China is night-time in America, so it can be understood that all the world could not see the moon at the same time, But if you still doubt, look at the Old Testament in the book of Joshua, chap. x, 12, 13, and you will see that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still in the midst of heaven, and it hasted not to go down for about a whole day. Who witnessed that event? If it be queried ‘How could Mohammed ascend into heaven? Heaven is not a place of solid substance, how could it be pierced (by a material body)? We answer, have you not heard that Enoch, at the age of 365 years, ascended into heaven? Again, the prophet Elijah also ascended into heaven. Moreover, when Jesus was being baptized by John, the heavens suddenly opened, and a dove came forth and alighted upon Jesus. Are not these proofs that heaven has been opened, and that Prophet ascended into heaven?

Christians say that our Prophet used force to propagate his Faith; this was not so. The Prophet divided people into three classes; those who submitted were to be left alone; those who would not obey were to be punished; those who after punishment still remained obdurated, were to be killed. The women and children, and the aged, in all cases, were to be forgiven. The benevolence of the Prophet was unequalled. But Christians should know that the methods of Moses were the same as those of Mohammed. It is said in Exodus that Moses commanded the Levites to kill the worshipper of the calf, and they killed 230000 people. Again, it is said in the first book of Kings, that the punitive wars and other good deeds of David were pleasing to God. This is sufficient to prove the falsity of the Christians’ slander of our Prophet.

People of other religions consider that our Prophet acted contrary to reason and good principles in the matter of having nine wives. But these people only know one side of the matter. The wives of Mohammed were all women of excellent character, so they assisted in bringing out the perfect character of the Prophet. The case is not to be compared to one of inordinate desire and love of beauty. Moreover, the prophet Jacob married four women; David at first had seven, and afterwards more shall 90 wives; Solomon had 1000, one hundred times as many as our Prophet had; how can Mohammed be said to have been extravagant in this respect?"

It may be mentioned here that the biographers of the Prophet have so far considered Chinese ideas of propriety and good taste as to tone down or entirely change some of the facts. The Arabic records state that all the wives of Mohammed save one had been previously married; in the Chinese accounts the women are all virgins who, in view of the high destiny awaiting them, refuse advantageous offers of marriage in order to keep themselves unsullied for the Prophet. In the Chinese view there is no question of siring children, which may account for this change in the records. In the case of Zeinab, the wife of Mohammed's adopted son Zeid, who was divorced in order that the Prophet might marry her, the Chinese account says that she refused to marry anyone but the Prophet. The Arabs were scandalized at Mohammed's action in this case, and the Chinese would be equally or more so, hence the changed story.

Time does not permit me to deal more fully with the Chinese accounts of Mohammed, nor with the doctrines of Mohammedism. But I wish to say something about the Five Practices, or the Five Pillars, as they are called, of the Faith. The Recognition and Confession of the Only True God is regarded as fundamental; then follow Purification and Prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving, and the Pilgrimage.

(1) Recognition and Confession are briefly summed up in the words of the Kalima:—“I testify that there is no God but God, and Mohammed is the chief Prophet of God, the chosen and sent of God.” The Kalima is printed in Arabic and Chinese, and is widely circulated and well-known among the Moslems. Fuller statements of the Creed, and expositions of it are to be found in many of the books and tracts, but these probably interest the a-hongs more than the ordinary believers who have often no clear idea of the doctrines of Islam, and are content with a more or less satisfactory observance of the rites. In a small booklet in my possession, printed in green ink, and entitled "The Root of all Goodness," a statement of the Creed is as follows: “Verily there is no God but only the True God, and Mohammed is His Prophet. I believe in the True God; I believe in all the angels; I believe in all the Sacred Books; I believe in all the Prophets; I believe in the world to come; I believe that good and evil are determined by God; I believe in the resurrection.”

(2) The purification required as a necessary preparation for prayer is purity from outward and material, as well as from legal and ceremonial uncleanness. In China two kinds of outward purification are sufficient for the smaller ablution: representations of pitchers or other waterholding utensils are found on some signs of Mohammedan shops and inns. It is very important that at least the hands be thoroughly cleansed before one attempts to touch the Holy Koran. Shoes are removed at the door of the mosque, and ceremonial little round caps, which run up to a peak at the top, are worn by the worshippers. The imams and a-hongs who read the Koran wear turbans of white or green colour, the latter colour distinguishing the Haji, that is those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. It may be mentioned that an old term for Moslems is “ch’an t’ou ti”—the turbaned ones; but in Western China many who are not Moslems wear turbans.

The prostrations and bowings and other ceremonies of worship are similar to those of other Moslem countries. The prayers repeated are said in the first book of Kings, that the punitive wars and other good deeds many who are not Moslems wear turbans.

Sacred Books; I believe in all the Prophets; I believe in the world to come; I believe that good and evil are determined by God; I believe in the resurrection.”

(3) Fasting is observed in the month of Ramadan with more or less strictness throughout China among Moslems. During this month a devout observer will not allow any food or drink to pass his lips during the
hours that daylight permits a white thread to be distinguished from a black one. Eating and drinking take place freely after the sun has set each day; when the fastening month falls during the hot weather many allow themselves to rinse out the mouth with water, but without swallowing it.

(4) Almsgiving as a religious act has always been a matter of importance among Moslems; in China it is limited almost exclusively to the helping of their own poor; but on the occasions of funerals, alms are also given, a custom which, in many localities, is frequently observed.

(5) The Pilgrimage: considering the distance and the difficulties of travel it is not surprising that no large number of Chinese Moslems are able to obtain their heart's desire by a visit to Mecca. Yet pilgrims do go from all parts of China, and it is said there is a special part of Mecca where they congregate, and where they are looked after by Chinese who reside there. Those who have made the pilgrimage and are entitled to the name of Hajj are very proud of it, and often wear a distinctive badge; they are delighted to exhibit their Meccan passport. Those who cannot go will frequently contribute towards the expenses of an a-hong or other devout believer who can attempt the journey, hoping thus to share in the merit. Some few a-hong find their way to the Mohammedan University Al-Azhar at Cairo. Those who have been to Mecca sometimes complain of the bad treatment meted out to them in Arabia, where they have been fleeced by their co-religionists. The orthodox Turks and Arabs scarcely acknowledge them as good Moslems, this being probably due to the irregularities known to exist in China.

The Chinese character ch'ao which is used for the Pilgrimage, also means "acing towards," so the prostrations towards Mecca are considered to share, in some measure, in the merits of Pilgrimage. The first season of worship in the mosque in the morning is called "The Pilgrimage," and regular attendance at this service is held to make up, to some extent, for failure to visit Mecca.

The two great divisions of Islam are known in China as the White Caps (Sunnite) and the Red Caps (Shiite). There are many sects, and it is quite beyond the limits of this paper to discuss them; the reasons for divisions are often obscure. A few extracts from Mr. G. F. Andrew may be of interest, and must suffice on this matter. He says: "It is at the same time the most difficult to get at the root of these sectarian divisions. One suggestion is that before the coming of the Salars (to Kansu) there was but one sect, which was divided into sects which their co-religionists had lapsed, and determined upon a dissolution order. The order to dissolve AWSA was issued pursuant to the 1964 law that governs private nongovernmental organizations in Egypt. This law gives broad powers to the Ministry of Social Affairs to dissolve the organization. In addition, the Women's Rights Project, a division of Human Rights Watch, is distributing information about the local communities are perfectly independent of each other, and recognize no authority above them, in China or elsewhere. I have not been able to discover that Chinese Moslems pay any attention to any Caliphate, nor have they much, if any, regard for Turkey and the Sultan. The Caliphate is seldom referred to in speech or in literature, except in spasmodic magazines; in one of these I saw a reference to drunken foreign soldiers and sailors in Constantinople, which it was said was, without a struggle, occupied in 1517. The Sultan, however, was said to be "the first and greatest power in the East." The Caliphate lost its importance among Moslems; in China it is limited almost exclusively to spasmodic magazines; in one of these I saw a reference to drunken foreign soldiers and sailors in Constantinople, which it was said was, without a struggle, occupied in 1517. The Sultan, however, was said to be "the first and greatest power in the East." The Caliphate lost its

20153. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt, Part 1. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. The Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA), headed by Dr. Nawal El-Saadawi, a well-known writer and leading figure in the Arab women's movement, has been ordered dissolved by the Egyptian authorities. AWSA will contest the dissolution order in legal proceedings scheduled to begin on October 31 before the State Council Court. This three judge panel hears cases brought against the government that seek the reversal of administrative decisions or compensation for damages resulting from such decisions. Fourteen attorneys have volunteered to work on AWSA's challenge of the dissolution order. The order to dissolve AWSA was issued pursuant to the 1964 law that governs private nongovernmental organizations in Egypt. This law gives broad powers to the Ministry of Social Affairs to legally register private organizations, control their activities and order their dissolution (see below). The law has long been criticized by Egyptian human rights advocates and lawyers as a major barrier to freedom of association. The independent Egyptian Organization for Human Rights condemned the government's move against AWSA as "a new assault on freedom of expression, which is already severely restricted in Egypt." Middle East Watch sent a letter to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on August 30, protesting the decision to dissolve the organization. In addition, the Women's Rights Project, a division of Human Rights Watch, is distributing information about the case this month to women's rights organizations in the United States and abroad, in an effort to mount an international campaign of support for AWSA and the reinstatement of its legal status in Egypt. [a]

20154. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt, Part 2: AWSA's Activities and Status. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. The Arab Women's Solidarity Association, established in 1982, has been in the forefront of the controversy and difficult battle to promote equality between the sexes in the Arab world. The organization was founded by Dr. El-Saadawi, a

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women's organizations in Egypt are directed by a woman.

AWSA operates as an international nongovernmental organization, recognized by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and as a private domestic organization governed by the rules of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Egyptian branch of AWSA, located in Cairo, was legally registered with the Social Affairs Ministry in January 1985. AWSA was recognized as an international nongovernmental organization when the United Nations Economic and Social Council granted it consultative status in April 1985. AWSA receives funding from the United Nations and other international organizations for various program activities. 

20155. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt: Part 3: Law No. 32 of 1964: Broad Powers To The State. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. The order to dissolve AWSA was issued by the Deputy Governor of Cairo for the Western Region in an administrative decree dated 6/15/1991. [Decree No. 19 from the Governorate of Cairo, Office of the Deputy Governor for the Western Region, concerning the Dissolution of the Arab womens Solidarity Association, signed by General Abdel Raouf Abdel Rahman.] AWSA was not informed of the decree until almost a month after the date of the dissolution order, when it received a letter with the order attached. The order provides no specific reasons or justifications for the decision. On this basis, AWSA's lawyers intend to challenge the decree as illegal on its face. In accordance with provisions of the Law of Associations, the Deputy Governor's order appointed a liquidator and specified that AWSA's assets be transferred to another organization, Women of Islam. [The law states that when a society is dissolved, the authority that issued the dissolution order shall appoint a liquidator, for a set period and fee.]

Women of Islam, a Cairo-based organization registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides housing and other services for female students from the provinces who are studying in Cairo. An Egyptian journalist told Middle East Watch that the group is "an ordinary association, similar to hundreds of other such organizations in Egypt that are in the social-welfare business," adding that associations of this type do not address women's rights issues. Another source familiar with women's groups in Egypt said that Women of Islam "has no public image -- it is not terribly active." She commented that the choice of a little-known group such as Women of Islam as the recipient of AWSA's assets may have been intended as "the ultimate insult" to AWSA. AWSA's representatives informed Middle East Watch that the director of Women of Islam is Mr. Farouq El-Fiel. [Some women's organizations in Egypt are directed by men.] Mr. El-Fiel, who also serves as the Director-General of Social Affairs in the Ma'adi district, a Cairo suburb, was appointed the legal

Minister of Social Affairs to dissolve legally registered organizations on the following grounds: if it is proven that the organization is not capable of achieving the purposes for which it was formed; if the organization disposed of its funds in a manner inconsistent with its purposes; if the organization's general assembly was not convened in two successive years; or if the organization "committed a flagrant violation of the law or if it violated public order or morality. The law provides that members of an organization's board of directors and the heads of the inspectors responsible to the organization's dissolution are prohibited from serving on the boards of other organizations for a period of five years from the date of the dissolution order. The law also stipulates that an organization may appeal a dissolution order before the State Council Court. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights noted recently that the law has been used to dissolve organizations whose activities the authorities judge to be "political": The dissolution of AWSA is not the only case of the Egyptian government's violation of the freedom of establishing associations. Nearly two years ago, a decision was issued dissolving an association called Friends of Arab Media Club, thereby stopping the publication of the weekly paper Sawt al-Arab, issued by the association, the pretext being that the association dealt in political matters. [EOHR, "The Dissolution of the Arab womens Solidarity Association," 7/30/1991.] One Egyptian parliamentarian interviewed by Middle East Watch earlier this month described Law No. 32 as "absolutely obsolete. It provides for complete state control of private voluntary organizations. The groups are totally dependent financially on the Ministry of Social Affairs and have no freedom of initiative." Another knowledgeable source agreed, and commented to Middle East Watch: "The Ministry of Social Affairs creates lots of private voluntary organizations by handing over to them responsibility for day care, sewing courses or literacy courses, and a very small amount of funding. But these groups have no programmatic independence. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights is challenging the constitutionality of Law No. 32, in legal proceedings initiated over a year ago."
liquidator of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association in the dissolution decree. The decree further grants Mr. El-Fiell's ten percent of AWSA's assets as a liquidator's fee, and specifies that his tasks be completed within six months. Middle East Watch believes that the conflict-of-interest in Mr. El-Fiell's appointment as liquidator is apparent. Following a press conference by AWSA and press coverage of the government's order, additional information about the Egyptian authorities' position emerged. Several days after an Egyptian newspaper columnist wrote a strong defense of AWSA and condemned the government's action against the organization as incompatible with democracy, AWSA representatives said that the Deputy Governor issued a public statement. He claimed that AWSA was being dissolved for financial and administrative reasons, implicitly denoting criticism of the government's move as politically motivated. The Deputy Governor alleged that there was only one Arab Women's Solidarity Association in existence -- namely, the domestic group registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. He claimed that the international arm of AWSA was "a figment of the imagination." Therefore, he stated, AWSA improperly held two bank accounts: one for the Egyptian branch and the other for the international group. AWSA representatives told Middle East Watch that the bank account of the international organization had been opened with the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that AWSA had held its international conferences with the express permission of the Foreign Ministry; and that AWSA had engaged in regular correspondence with the Foreign Ministry about its activities. AWSA's position is that the Ministry of Social Affairs has chosen to ignore these obvious facts, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' own admission that AWSA is one of the organizations in Egypt with international status. In 8/1991 reply to a letter from Dr. El-Saadawi written after AWSA was notified of the dissolution order, the Foreign Ministry confirmed that AWSA has an international organization and that this entity is among the organizations in Egypt with status at the UN Economic and Social Council. The letter also pointed out that only the United Nations could revoke the organization's international status. Ironically, AWSA received official authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 18 to hold an international conference in Cairo from 11/24-27/1991, on the subject of women and development. AWSA already had received a $15000 grant from the World Bank in support of the conference, which was planned to include participants from across the Arab world. [---]

20157. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt: Part 5: Impact of the Dissolution Order on AWSA's Activities. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. "We're almost closed," Dr. El-Saadawi told M EW in an interview on August 29. "The order to dissolve our Egyptian association prevents us from continuing our activities, because the Ministry of Social Affairs says that the international organization does not exist." Based on the Ministry's contention, we cannot function on a pan-Arab level. Because of the dissolution order, it's illegal for us to continue the work of the Egyptian branch until the appeal is heard by the court, a proceeding that only commences on October 31. The Law of Associations states that the members, officials and employees of a society that is ordered dissolved "shall be prohibited from continuing its activity or disposing of its funds." "One Egyptian lawyer interviewed by Middle East Watch in August predicted that the case could turn into a lengthy legal battle which would, in effect, suspend AWSA's activities for the duration of the proceedings. Another observer made a similar observation in an interview. Dr. El-Saadawi also explained that the organization's two bank accounts -- one for AWSA's Egyptian branch, and the other for the international organization -- have been frozen by order of the authorities. The proposed liquidation of AWSA's assets apparently will include the funds in the international account, which AWSA points out are "donated by United Nations organizations" to carry out specific activities proposed by AWSA. Yet, Women of Islam -- which carries out work markedly different from AWSA's -- has been designated as the sole recipient of AWSA's assets. [---]
interviews with Middle East Watch, AWSA representatives said that while the organization viewed this letter as "threatening," AWSA nonetheless began a campaign against the Law of Associations, arguing that it was antithetical to democracy. [ ]

20159. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt: Part 7: Dissolution: An Extreme Measure. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. AWSA representatives believe that the authorities' move to dissolve the organization is an unjustifiably harsh measure. Middle East Watch agrees. If the organization is suspected of administrative or financial irregularities, a thorough investigation should be opened and the Ministry of Social Affairs should bring its concerns to AWSA's board of directors. If the investigation reveals that violations of the provisions of the Law of Associations were committed, the law provides that the board of directors can be removed and replaced by a temporary board appointed by the administrative authorities. Instead, a decision appears to have been made to short-cuts all public investigatory procedures and simply shut down the organization. Middle East Watch believes that this approach gives weight to the suspicion that the government's motives have a political dimension. [ ]

20160. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egyptian Government Moves To Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization: Court Challenge Set for 10/31/1991: A New Assault on Freedom of Expression in Egypt: Part 8: Human Rights Standards and Egyptian Constitutional Guarantees. New York: Middle East Watch, February 12, 1993. In the absence of detailed reasons and persuasive supporting evidence for the administrative order to dissolve the Arab Women's Solidarity Association, Middle East Watch believes that the Egyptian authorities' move is an arbitrary abridgment of the right to freedom of association and freedom of expression. These rights are set forth in human rights instruments and in the Egyptian Constitution. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Egypt has ratified, states that everyone "shall have the right to freedom of association with others" (Article 22) and that everyone "shall have the right to hold opinions without interference" (Article 19). With regard to freedom of association, Article 22 further states in part: No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Middle East Watch calls on the Egyptian authorities to demonstrate that AWSA's dissolution meets the tests established in Article 22. The Egyptian Constitution also provides for freedom of expression and association. Article 47 states: "Freedom of opinion is guaranteed. Every individual has the right to express his opinion and to publicise it verbally or in writing or by photography or by other means within the limits of the law. Self-criticism and constructive criticism is the guarantee for the safety of the national structure." Article 55 grants citizens "the right to form societies as defined in the law." It prohibits societies "whose activities are hostile to the social system, clandestine or have a military character." Middle East Watch believes that the burden is on the Egyptian authorities to produce compelling evidence that AWSA's activities fall within the categories proscribed by the Constitution. We share the concern articulated by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights in its statement of July 30: The Egyptian government, rather than respond to the demands of public opinion for more public liberties and, particularly for the freedom to form nongovernmental organizations, arguments and, rather than respect its international commitments to maintain basic standards of human rights and civil liberties, this government continues to adopt the course of increasingly tightening the constraints on basic rights and liberties in Egypt. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also provides that States Parties "undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights" set forth in the Covenant (Article 3). Article 26 provides additional protection against discrimination on the basis of sex: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, non-belief, age, or any other status. Thus, in the context of the standards established in Articles 3 and 26, it is impossible to ignore the irony of the Egyptian government's move to dissolve AWSA and thereby stifle the voice an organization committed to promoting women's equality and eliminating gender-based discrimination, goals to which Egypt also has committed itself by ratification of the Covenant. Middle East Watch believes that the women and men affiliated with AWSA should be afforded human-rights protection by the Egyptian government to fully exercise individual and collective freedom of expression, and esteem of association to continue to carry out activities related to their activities. The protection of these basic freedoms is crucial at times when internal or external political or religious forces may press the authorities for the curtailment or termination of the activities of legally established organizations with which they do not agree. [ ]

20161. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Egypt: Trials of Civilians in Military Courts Violate International Law; Executions Continue, No Appeal of Death Sentences to Higher Court: Part 12: Mistreatment and Torture of Two of the Defendants, Both Lawyers. New York: Middle East Watch, July 1993. Radwan al-Tuni himself was arrested on 12/5/1992, while he was walking out of the courthouse in Assyut with other lawyers. The group was surrounded by security forces, who took out their guns, chased the other lawyers away, and arrested al-Tuni. He was brought to the SSI office in Assyut and held overnight, then transferred to the Assyut police station for two days, and moved to the Central Security Forces paramilitary camp for one day. From there, he was transferred to Tora Istikbal prison near Cairo, where he was held for about twenty days. [Hundreds of suspected Islamist militants have been held without charge at this prison, some of them for over three years. For additional information, see Middle East Watch, Prison Conditions in Egypt (Human Rights Watch: 2/1993).] From the prison, al-Tuni was brought to Lazoughly, SSI headquarters in Cairo, where one lawyer (who visited him in prison after he was returned from SSI headquarters) told Middle East Watch that "he was treated badly to get him to confess to taking messages and money between the prisons and the outside. The lawyer said that he had been unable to obtain details about al-Tuni's mistreatment "because when I visited him at Tora Istikbal, an investigations officer sat between us for the entire visit. The officer was writing down every word we said. When we were saying goodbye, Radwan whispered that he had been subjected to very bad treatment at Lazoughly. [MEW interview, Assyut, 2/1993. Middle East Watch has documented the torture of detainees held incommunicado at Lazoughly and other SSI offices in Egypt. See Behind Closed Doors: Torture and Detention in Egypt (Human Rights Watch: 7/1992).] From Lazoughly, al-Tuni was brought before the state security prosecutor, who ordered his detention for fifteen days, following the expiration of his thirty-day detention order under the emergency law. Al-Tuni then was moved to the men's prison at Qanater, northwest of Cairo, and finally back to Tora Istikbal. Before al-Tuni's own arrest, he had visited in prison Mustafa al-Sawid, another lawyer and defendant in the trial who was acquitted by the military court in April. During this visit, al-Tuni learned that al-Sawid had been tortured. Al-Sayyid was held at SSI's Cairo headquarters for approximately twenty-five days after his arrest. According to an Assyut lawyer interviewed by Middle East Watch: He was blindfolded the entire time and tortured. They threatened to rape his wife. He was interrogated for sixteen hours a day. They took turns. He was naked and was forced to stand, while blindfolded. He was electric-shocked and beaten. After that, he was brought to Tora Istikbal, where Radwan visited him and learned what had happened. [MEW interview, Assyut, 2/1993. This lawyer had learned the details of al-Sayyid's torture from al-Tuni.] The allegations are consistent with SSI torture methods documented by Middle East...

The realization that anthropology has served imperialist interests in its study of the Third World, and the realization that the importance of women has been downplayed in anthropology, coupled with a general Middle Eastern critique of Orientalism, has led to a new appreciation of the value of research that can be conducted by Arab-American and foreign trained Arab women in their own societies. In her own graduate work in anthropology, she became especially aware of the devalued stereotypes of Arab women in Western thought, and became aware that these stereotypes did not have anything in common with her own family or personal history. Her status, reinforced by beginning to work in the village after everyone met her husband, a university professor also working in Egypt, was usually seen as acceptable in the village; however, there were a few people that were suspicious since she started to work in the village after the 1973 War and feared she might be a Zionist agent. The author's being female allowed her access to women as informants, and this allowed a redress of the normal anthropological bias that is both that of males and outsiders in Arab culture. Significantly, she rejects the idea that anthropologists act from a basis of social responsibility (advanced by some Jewish anthropologists who study Arab societies) and in fact notes that anthropologists conduct themselves from a position of relative powerlessness. One significant constraint over her conduct was the norm of the discipline of anthropology as objective and disengaged from the people studied; yet she developed a personal accommodation to her personal commitment to empowerment of the women she studied (termed "dynamic objectivity") by the feminist scholar Keller). This model of interaction tries to overcome the paradigm of anthropology as "mining Third World cultures", despite the reality that anthropology is conducted by people with considerable power among people who have less power and who are the objects of study.


Kuwait: 52% of males, 12% of females.
Colombia: 52% of males, 18% of females.
Romania: 52% of males, 9% of females.
Switzerland: 50% of males, 37% of females.
Turkey: 50% of males, 50% of females.
Ghana: 50% of males, data not available on females.
Ireland: 49% of males, 36% of females.
Guyana: 48% of males, 4% of females.
Austria: 46% of males, 13% of females.
Hungary: 45% of males, 23% of females.
Mexico: 45% of males, 18% of females.
Chile: 45% of males, 26% of females.
Venezuela: 45% of males, 26% of females.
Israel: 44% of males, 30% of females.
Soviet Union: 44% of males, 10% of females.
Czechoslovakia: 43% of males, 11% of females.
Cuba: 40% of males, data not available on females.
Norway: 40% of males, 34% of females.
Egypt: 40% of males, 1% of females.
East Germany: 40% of males, 29% of females.
UK: 38% of males, 33% of females.

Canada: 37% of males, 29% of females.
Australia: 37% of males, 30% of females.
Hong Kong: 37% of males, 5% of females.
Guatemala: 36% of males, 10% of females.
United States: 35% of males, 28% of females [current data (1987)].
New Zealand: 35% of males, 29% of females.
Peru: 34% of males, 7% of females.
Uganda: 33% of males, data not available on females.
Sweden: 30% of males, 30% of females.
Ivory Coast: 24% of males, 1% of females. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. [1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.] [•]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

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The Catholic Bishops of Oceania, commenting on the Cairo draft document, consider the 1993 Port Vila Declaration of Population & Sustainable Development, made by 19 leaders of Pacific Nations, as a far better presentation of population and development issues. The Vila Declaration, the Bishops say, rightly emphasises the respect needed for the social, cultural and religious beliefs of diverse regions, while the Cairo document is willing to use the power of the State and media to impose solutions. The Bishops point out that the Vila Declaration shows that these serious matters can be addressed in ways that respect the dignity of individuals and of peoples, and without recourse to the repression of fundamental human rights and the taking of human life itself. It is clear that the tragic history of the East Timorese people under Indonesian occupation, presents a clear example of the dangers of the approaches proposed by the Cairo conference draft document. The people of East Timor are profoundly religious. The basis of their society is the family. CNRM, conscious of the deeply rooted religious and family values of our people. The National Council of Maubere Resistance expresses its deep support for the insights and views expressed by the Catholic Church on this most important subject for human welfare, and calls upon delegates to the conference to study the tragic example of East Timor very closely, avoiding adoption of resolutions that may encourage states to follow the models provided by repressive dictatorships like that of Suharto’s Indonesia. [Jose Ramos Horta; Special Representative, CNRM; Sydney, Dir. Gen. International Relations-CNRM] [–]

20165. Nawar, Laila; Lloyd, Cynthia B.; Ibrahim, Barbara. “Gender, Population, Environment: Autonomy and Gender in Egyptian Families”, in Middle East Report, September-October 1994. p. 18. The Egyptian family is being changed by transformations in social and economic realities: for example, the extended family has declined, with the nuclear family now comprising 84% of Egyptian families. In Egypt, as in most societies, women are socialized to provide for their families, and typically women have wage earning jobs to support their families: in a surprising number of cases, women are the sole wage earners in their households. However, women’s autonomy seems to be increasing, with both the average marriage age of women and the number of years of education received by women increasing. Women have a strong voice in family matters that affect them, such as family planning, childbearing and child rearing practices. Urban women have more autonomy than rural women. Educated women in general delay the marriages of their daughters to allow them to gain more education. However, women continueto seek their husband’s permission for activities outside the home, and rarely are involved in civic activities. National population policies in the future will depend on the degree these trends of greater education and autonomy for women can continue.

20166. Nelson, Cynthia; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 17: The Modern Arab World: Biography and Women’s History: On Interpreting Doria Shafik. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 310-334. Doria Shafik was a militant Egyptian feminist of the 1940s and 1950s; she was put under house arrest in 1957 for protests against Gamal Abdel Nasser, and spent the remaining 18 years of her life in virtual seclusion, until she committed suicide by leaping from her sixth-floor apartment on 9/20/1975. Becoming acquainted with Shafik through her poems, the reconstruction of this other by the process of writing her biography was a gradual one. She was born into a modest middle class family, but obtained a PhD from the Sorbonne in 1940; becoming a French teacher in Egypt, she rapidly was transformed into an intense political activist, as well as a poet and publisher (French language magazine La Femme Nouvelle, and Arabic language magazines Bint al-Nil (Daughter of the Nile) and the children’s magazine Katkuk (Little Chicken)). She organized a feminist union and political party (Bint al-Nil Union), she stormed the Egyptian Parliament, attempted to illegally run for parliament, protested the British occupation, and undertook hunger strikes in 1957 starting a hunger strike at the Indian Embassy protesting Zionism in Palestine and dictatorship at home). Shafik saw her life as running in tandem to the political and social transformations that were underway in Egypt. As nationalism grew in Egypt, she gradually switched from French to Arabic in her writings, and through work in Bint al-Nil Union, came to appreciate polygamy and hasty divorce as a central evil in the lives of Egyptian women. Bint al-Nil Uniondeveloped a platform with three goals: “(1) to establish the constitutional and parliamentary rights of the Egyptian woman in order to defend her rights; (2) to diffuse cultural health and social services among poor Egyptian families through the promotion of literacy programs and the creation of small industries to augment their earnings; and (3) to call attention to the conditions of these families, especially maternal and child care, through the full use of all mass media, conferences and editorials and to adopt every means that would guarantee their protection and support. Yet her independent stance resulted in her condemnation by both the progressive left and Nasserites: arrested, her movement collapsed and she was forgotten.


The purpose of the directory is to facilitate networking, development of appropriate channels of communications, professional
advocacy, and building of expertise. For each entry, the directory provides (when applicable), the mailing address, telephone number, educational background, employment history, voluntary services, development expertise, community groups, international activities, conference participation, and publications. The guide is intended to facilitate: (1) helping local voluntary organizations and professional women to locate appropriate advisors and contacts; (2) helping national bodies to work more effectively and more appropriately; (3) providing regional bodies with much needed information and contacts; (4) supporting international bodies in their for appropriate resource persons; (5) promoting greater awareness of relevant projects of mutual concern to other professionals."

20168. New American View. "Foreign Policy; 'Dual Containment': Clinton's New Middle East Strategy", in New American View-News and Informed Commentary on the Pro-Israeli Lobby in America. Vol.8(11). June 1, 1993. (Editor's Note: The following is excerpted from an address by Martin Indyk to the Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, a pro-Israeli think tank. Indyk, the former director of the institute, is now senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Those in attendance at his address were a mix of pro-Israeli activists, academic specialists in the Middle East and government policy and intelligence officials. Indyk laid out the essentials of the Clinton administration's strategy for the region, particularly with regard to the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran.)

It is an honor to be addressing you on the occasion of Barbi Weinberg's departure from the Presidency of the Institute and her ascension to the role of chairperson. Most of you will know well that Barbi was the founding mother of the Institute, its inspiration and guiding light for more than eight years. Without Barbi there would be no Washington Institute—if it is as simple as that. And without Barbi, I would not be standing before you tonight, as a spokesperson for the Clinton administration. I would probably be engaged in some compelling research on Australia's relations with Vanuatu [a small island republic in the Southwest Pacific Ocean]. All of us in the Washington policy-making community owe Barbi a tremendous debt of gratitude. For without her vision and energy and wisdom, the policy debate on Middle East issues would have languished and a lot of people would have gone unstimulated and unfed. [Barbi Weinberg is a major financial backer of pro-Israeli causes and the woman who provided the primary funding for Indyk's institute.] I came to Washington with some thoughts on how to put Barbi's vision of a Middle East think tank into practice. I never imagined that the institute would come to be such an important source of research, scholarship and policy advice for the government, the diplomatic community and the media. We were—and you still are—are engaged in a noble enterprise. [Actually Indyk came to Washington to do graduate study and work at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).] Barbi and I now pass the institute into the very capable hands of Mike Stein and Dennis Ross [head of the planning staff at the State Department in the Bush administration] and Rob Satloff and John Hannah and Carole Stern and all of you in the hope and belief that you will together take its activities to new heights of excellence, and yet retain that sense of mission that marks the Washington Institute apart as a very special place. My task is to try to lay out for you the Clinton administration's approach to the Middle East. Despite the dramatic developments in the global arena in the past four years, we still have an abiding interest in reciprocating the friendship of those in the Arab world who seek good relations with the United States. We still have an abiding interest in the security, survival and well-being of the state of Israel. Changes in policy [from the Reagan-Bush years] stem from the dramatic global and regional developments that are impacting on the region's political dynamics. The end of the Cold War has had profound consequences for the Middle East. The superpowers are no longer competing for influence in this volatile region and that means that the United States no longer needs to view the region through a competitive global prism. For the first time, we can judge developments there more in terms of how they impact on our regional rather than our global interests. For the first time since the 1950s, the US is the unchallenged dominant power in the region and all sides now look to Washington to exert its influence. However, the absence of superpower competition also brings in its wake less influence over the policies of regional powers, let alone over our Cold War European and Japanese allies. We are tasked with greater regional responsibilities and yet have less ability to fulfill them. With the proliferation of ballistic missiles, on the one hand, and the success in containing Iraq but fails to contain Iran, it will have United States no longer needs to view the region through a competitive contain Iraq and Iran. To the extent that the international community should be compelling for another reason as well. Iran does not yet face dramatic global and regional developments that are impacting on the all responsible members of the international community. This argument should be compelling for another reason as well. Iran does not yet face the kind of international regime that has been imposed on Iraq. A structural imbalance therefore exists between the measures available to contain Iraq and Iran. To the extent that the international community succeeds in containing Iraq but fails to contain Iran, it will have inadvertently allowed the balance of power in the Gulf to have tilted in
favor of Iran, with very dangerous consequences. That imbalance therefore argues for a more energetic effort to contain Iran and modify its behavior even as we maintain the sanctions regime against Iraq. The president and the secretary of state made it clear that our approach to the [peace] negotiations will involve working with Israel, not against it. We are committed to deepening our strategic partnership with Israel in the pursuit of peace and security. Those who genuinely seek a comprehensive and lasting peace should recognize that this goal can be accomplished without Israel undertaking a withdrawal from territory, involving tangible risks to its security. And those who seek real progress should understand that it won't come without this kind of special relationship between the US and Israel. 

20169. New American View. "Israel's Navel Academy", in New American View-Monitoring the Special Relationship Between the United States and Israel. Vol. 5(1). January 1, 1990. Cairo is considered the capital of the belly-dance, but surprisingly the art of la danse de ventre, as Napoleon's soldiers called it, is also taught in Israel. Drs. Leah and Benny Gavish, who were first exposed to belly-dancing while studying at the University of Illinois, conduct dance classes for "pimpilyteenagers, elegantblonde matrons and plump housewives." The Gavishes teach only women because they found that the men who attended their classes did not come to dance, but rather to see "the girls and get a free show." (JP.) 

20170. OSS; Migration Project: M Project. Population Plan for Egypt. Memorandum Series M-173. District of Columbia: OSS, Migration Project (M Project); Library of Congress, January 2, 1945. During the past decade there has been a steadily increasing interest in the population problem and the accompanying social conditions. In the spring of 1937 the Egyptian Medical Association held a series of forums on the subject, and over the next two years the matter was considered top news by the local press. One hopeful development was the creation of the Ministry of Social Welfare in 8/1939, which was to be charged with all such questions. Although certain definite work was undertaken, the outbreak of war in September and the transfer of the Government's energies to problems of defense greatly hindered the new Ministry's growth. In 1949 the Royal Society of Political Economy appointed several Commissions to study postwar problems as related to Egypt, one being for social reconstruction. This Commission has been hard at work, the flow of events has intervened with its own type of solution through typhus and malaria epidemics and widespread destitution and malnutrition on a scale not experienced for many years past. The net effect of these conditions can not be measured accurately as the vital statistics have been scanty for the past three years. Five important conditions, specifically affecting population growth, are given: age distribution, health, natural resources, social standards and international relations. Cleland then outlines a population plan based on the increase and conservation of national wealth, emigration, reduction of births raising living standards, birth control and registrative legislation.


20171. Ode-Vasiliyeva, K. V.; Krachkovskiy, I. Yu. Obratpsy Novoarabskoy Literatury (1880-1925) (Specimens of New Arabic Literature). Leningrad: Leningrad Eastern Institute, 1928. The work is in two parts, part one containing the chrestomathy, and part two, which came out in 1929, comprising a dictionary. Krachkovskiy contributed a foreword to part one. It is reproduced in vol. 3, pp. 47-64 of his collected works. Krachkovskiy began by pointing out that whereas the differences between classical and modern Arabic were minor where grammar was concerned, in the case of style and vocabulary they were formidable. The chrestomathy covered the four decades from the 1880s, which was the beginning of the new period of Arabic literature, to the 1920s. It comprised forty writings by 21 authors in chronological order. The object was not only to acquaint the reader with the modern literary language of prose writers but also with the cultural and social life of the Arabs in the last fifty years. In particular it reflected the social and political life of Syria and Egypt in the given period, laying considerable emphasis on the movement for emancipation of women. Krachkovskiy describes the background and achievements of a number of the most eminent authors, among them are injections that this conclusion was confirmed that the material was confined to what was available in Leningrad. [From: "Part II: Arabs and the Arab World: Social Structure: 1917-1930", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. p. 17.]

20172. Ode-Vasiliyeva, k., "Otrazheniye Byta Sovremennoy Arabskoy Zhenschiny v. Novelle (The Life of the Modern Arab Woman as Reflected in Novels)", in Zapiski Kollegii Vostokovedov, 1930. pp. 293-306. The writer came from Palestine where she taught in the Russian Palestine Society prior to marrying a Russian and thus had first-hand experience of her subject. She says the question of the status of Arab women as a contributory cause of the backwardness of the Arabs was first raised in Syria in 1849 but had no impact on Arab life as it was put forward by Christians. The movement for emancipation of women was begun by the Egyptian writer, Qasim Amin. It developed in Syria where there was a women's society in most towns. In Palestine it made little progress but in Egypt the women had been able to take off the veil and some were taking part in public life. Emancipation of women was, however, a long way off. The low status of women was described in Egyptian literature and especially in the novels of Mahmud Timur. The question was of concern to all Arab countries. [From: "Part II: Arabs and the Arab World: Social Structure: 1917-1930", in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. p. 18.]

20173. Omar Abdel Rahman, Sheikh. "Shaikh Omar, Undaunted, Condemns America's War on Islam", in Crescent International, February 1-15/1996, p. 6. In The Name of Allah The Most Beneficent, The Most Merciful. Grace be to Allah and blessings and peace be upon the Messenger of Allah, Allah, the Almighty, says: "Never will the Jews and the Christians be pleased with you (O Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him) till you follow their religion" (2:120). And the Almighty says: "Neither those who disbelieve among the people of the scripture nor the mushrikun like that there should be sent down unto you any good from your Lord" (2:105). And He further says: "Many of the people of the scripture wish that if they could turn you away as disbelievers after you have believed, out of envy from their ownselves, even after the Truth (that Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, is Allah's Messenger) had become manifest unto them" (2:109). Allah also says: "And they will never cease fighting you until they turn you back from your religion (tawheed) if they can" (2:217). All four verses are from Surah Al-Baqarah. In another surah, the Almighty says: "They respect not, of all the land save the house of their own, and when the truth came to them from their own selves, they would have believed if it had been Allah's Will, but Allah willed to lead them astray, till He took from them their knowledge, and they believe not in Allah, nor of the Messenger, till He makes their hearts to be conformed to what they have written, till He makes manifest for them their hearts" (7:52).
can it erase the Qur’an?

If America contemplates such a horrible deed, Allah will annihilate it and remove it from the face of the earth, just like He eliminated the Soviet Union, because Allah has guaranteed the continuance of His religion. He is the Guarantor in preserving His book. Allah, the Almighty, says: “Verily We: It is We who have sent down the dhikr (i.e., the Qur’an) and surely We will guard it (from corruption)” (15:9). Speaking in manly tone, the US government or its representatives in Germany maintain that Allah has左手 the Qur’an, and that this religion has a strong current just like high voltage electricity, jolting whoever comes close. What America has done in this case is put on trial what I said in sermons and religious teachings, which is all from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah (traditions and teachings) of His Messenger. America put on trial the Book of Allah and the religion of Islam, and thinks that the killing of Islam is easy, like it perpetrates the killings of people worldwide. Muslims and others are now aware that America wants to kill Islam and destroy the Qur’an because all that I have done is preach Islam. I have spoken with the Words of Allah, and I am spreading the religion of Islam. I have not done anything else nor did I commit any crime. You [the American government and prosecutors] have confessed that I have not committed any crime, and was not charged with doing anything. All the charges are directed against the words of Islam, and not against my words. If we imagine the war when Muslims are on the eastern bank of the River Jordan, and the Jews are on the western bank (as told in the hadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him), or as (former US presidents) Nixon and Reagan imagined the war which will take place in Armageddon (as written in the Bible) in which they claim that they will defeat the Muslims, then this is a war. But this case against me had solely the purpose of destroying the word of Islam itself, because that is the only factual truth that I have come to know. I have not done anything but taught Islam.

I have legally obtained an entry visa to the US, and later became a lawful permanent resident (green card holder), and then I entered and departed, came and went, and moved throughout the US east to west. If I had committed any crime, I would not have travelled the way I did, but actually I would have fled. Have you been sleeping? A clear sign of your sleep is that you did not arrest me despite my continuous movement. Indeed you are more deserving of being put on trial, and if you were alert and you did not arrest me, then either you are traitors or stupid. This is not the case, then I am innocent. Another pointer to the fact that the US government was more concerned with my words and not my actions, was their continued listening to my press conferences and tapes of my public sermons. Are all of these not my words? No matter how hard they try to manipulate and distort the facts about my words, it is clear that they are only dealing with words. After their attempts to distort the facts, and their lies and fabrications about Islam in many matters and their manipulation of the facts, they did not allow us, an Islamic scholar (as an expert witness) to attach that my words is but the words of Islam, the Qur’an and the noble Messenger, and what Allah has ordered. As if the US government prosecutor is knowledgeable about Islam, he appointed himself an expert in the religion of Islam despite his complete ignorance of it. I only teach Islam in schools, universities and mosques. It is my only profession. Then the prosecution distorted the facts, manipulated the intent of my words and barred the jury from listening and knowing about what Islam and Qur’an really are saying. The prosecution has no evidence to present against me. It is impossible that I can build a bomb, or put one anywhere. That is not my profession. That is not the profession of a Muslim preacher. I could do that neither physically nor by virtue of my position as a Muslim scholar. That confirms that the attack in this case was only on Islam. The whole focus, activity and concern in my life is teaching Islam. I tell people in schools and mosques what the Qur’an says. And I tell couples how to resolve their marital problems. I advise businessmen about valid and prohibited transactions in earnings and profits. All that I have done is teach Islam.

The telephone is my only window to the world, and I use it as an effective tool in the call to Islam. Despite the fact that the US government did not use my conversations as evidence for conspiracy (against the US), they falsely told the jurors that my telephone conversations were incriminating. They presented to the jurors the persons I spoke with and their telephone numbers, but they never produced the recordings of these conversations which they claim were incriminating. Where is the truth and honesty, O prosecutor? America worked tirelessly to weaken the Muslims in Bosnia by imposing the arms embargo. The white house and congress abused diplomacy in deciding whether to lift or enforce the embargo. Such actions made America a partner of the Serbs in killing hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and in raping women and annihilating children, supporting the Croats, and Russia is strengthening the Serbs. We see that everyone, led by America, has united to isolate and weaken the Muslims, and the whole plan is for destroying Muslims in the Balkans. Behold, the whole world, listen! Islam cannot be stopped with violence or warfare. Nor can it be stopped by spending millions of dollars spreading lies, deception, corruption, and with fabricated trials like this one. The honorable can never combat Islam in this manner. What are you afraid of? Who are you working for? Why don’t you listen to the truth? Whether America wills it or not, the future belongs to Islam. The Qur’an indeed proclaims it, and history provide proof. You fill find that anywhere you go: in Nigeria, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, the Middle East, the US, and even in America’s prisons, you know that you will not find good prison behavior comparable to that of Muslims prisoners. The US, with its power and influence, must not bruise itself in stopping these Islamic forces. Whatever it does towards that end will only harm America. It will only bring upon itself bankruptcy and destruction if it tries to stop Islam. =]

20174. Palmer, Monte; Leila, Ali: Yassin, El-Sayed: Al-Omran Center for Strategic & Political Studies. "Chapter 7: The Attributes of Bureaucratic Performance", in The Egyptian Bureaucracy. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 121-146. While the aggregate productivity of the bureaucracy is low, some units have high productivity: at Aluminum Corp. high productivity is correlated with better communication, better match between skills and jobs, or rural origin, were more willing to remain at the rural location of the plant for higher wages, and had higher morale; one major part of job satisfaction at the firm was the belief that promotions were made on the basis of merit and were fair. Despite supervisor beliefs that low productivity is mainly a product of low skill levels among workers, additional training and education is not sufficient to raise productivity (notably, lowest productivity bureaucrats are also the less amenable to retraining). The entry of significant numbers of women into the bureaucracy since the mid-1970s has had no significant impact on the character of the bureaucracy.


Population:1962...estimated 27 million. 1977...estimated 38 million. 1982...estimated 43 million. 38% live in urban settings; 62% in rural areas. 99% live in the Nile Valley, the Delta and along the Suez Canal (3.5% of the total land). With 6000 people per square mile, Egypt is one of the most densely populated areas in the world.

Women’s Lives: The vast majority of Egyptian women are poor and illiterate. 46.7% of employed women are married compared to 78.2% of women working at home. Only 11% of women over 16 have never been married. In the urban centers, the divorce rate is 2% compared to 1.2% in the rural areas. 1923 the Women’s Federation was founded by Hoda Shaarawi. 1956 women gained the right to vote. 1962 first women cabinet minister.

Religion: Principal Religion: Islam, 92% of the people are Sunni Muslims. There are also about 7 million Coptic Christians.

Languages: Arabic is the principle language. The influence of the Egyptian Arabic (in film, radio, etc.) goes beyond the national borders.

Economy and Work Situation: GNP per capita $280. Main agricultural products: cotton, wheat, rice, sugar cane and corn. Main industries: Textiles and processing of food products. Egypt has become
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heavily dependent on financial assistance from abroad. In 1977, of the total employable work force, 50.6% of the men and 7.4% of the women were employed. Female participation in non-agricultural job categories: Professional...22.6%, White Collar...4.5%, Sales...5.5%, Manual Labor...3%, Service (including domestic)...16%; Industries: Extractive...0.3%, Manufacturing...3.3%, Construction...0.3%, Electricity and Gas...0.7%, Commerce...15.9%, Transport...0.9%, Public and Administration...7.3%. Most women living in the countryside work in agriculture, textiles, and other fields, but do not receive any income for their work. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30].


Perhaps the heartbeat suggested the first musical instrument, the drum. And perhaps the natural movements of a body needing to stretch evolved into dance. Today in many cultures, dance is entertainment. One watches dance, or one dances at a social function or on stage. There are also cultures living close to the harmony of the earth, to the natural cycles of the moon, the sowing, the harvest, where dance is an expression of the continuity of life, of the relationship between the people with their environment. It is, in its essence, a ritualistic expression.

Middle Eastern or Oriental Dance, commonly referred to as Belly Dance exists today, often misunderstood and ridiculed. Its roots and functions in traditional society are generally unknown. Nahed Sabry, an Egyptian dancer explains in an interview in Habibi, "The correct name is Raqs al Sharqi, (Eastern Dance) not Belly Dance. This misnomer is used by foreigners who are preoccupied by the stomach muscles to the exclusion of the hips."

Raqs al Sharqi is centered in the belly. Physical life begins there; energy is drawn into the body at this spot. The dance requires a knowledge and awareness of the different muscles of the body, and a strength and agility to isolate them. Body movement is constant and concentrated, occupying a small surface counterpointed by balance and fluidity to the motion. The movements echo the many rhythms of the music which vary in tempo, ranging from slow to fast with light or heavy drumbeats.

Figure eights, circular movements, and shimmies accentuate the hips and pelvis. The arm movements are sinuous and snake-like. The torso stretches and writhes like a serpent, highlighted by the belly rolls which undulate like waves or by stomach palpitations which flutter incessantly. The hands gesture gracefully, miming offerings, greetings, in the cities, most of the professional dancing is still performed in cabarets and cafes were opened to entertain the invading imperialists. As economic exploitation increased, more people flocked to the urban areas seeking employment. For many women, prostitution and/or dancing were the only options. Armen Ohanian, a famous Armenian dancer in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in her book The Dancer of Shamakha, describes her horror upon observing the dance in a cabaret.

"Thus in Cairo one evening I saw with sick, incredulous eyes, one of our most sacred dances degraded to bestiality horrible and revolting. It is our poem to motherhood, which all true Asiatic men watch with reverence and humility in the faraway corners of Asia where the destructive Occident has not yet penetrated. In this olden Asia which has kept the dance in its primitive purity, it represents maternity, the mysterious conception of life, the suffering and the joy with which a new soul is brought into the world."

Raqs al Sharqi is still practiced throughout the Middle East. The folk dancing of the peasants of North Africa, Egypt, and Turkey, in particular, contain many of the elements of the dance. Folk troupes are present in many of the countries. The dance is integral to life in the villages and entertainment in the cities.

United States dancer Donna Whitely in Habibi describes her impressions of the dance in Egypt: "The village dance is a celebration of life, a time to acknowledge your place in the community. Each dancer was different, based on her own interpretation. The foundation of her dance was what her mother taught her and what her mother's mother taught her, and so on. In one village, there might be lots of abdominal movements, in another there might be lots of shimmies, swinging and undulations. The dance is done with dignity as an expression of sensuality, not as a tasteless sexual invitation." In many villages, the women only dance for each other.

In the cities, most of the professional dancing is still performed in cabarets where a good dancer is highly respected for performing her art. It is difficult to transcend the conservative attitudes of one's family towards dancing in public. Maya Medwar, a well-known Egyptian dancer and actress talks about her experience in an interview in Habibi. "There was a fellow that sings. He wanted me to go with him to Lebanon to dance while he is singing. I wrote to my brother to tell him and my brother said, "Before you come I'll destroy the theater. Do you want to put us in disgrace? How would I feel when some guy says I saw your sister shaking her hips?" Nahed Sabry comments: "My family objected to the extent that when I would come home late they wouldn't speak to me."

Maya and Nahed acknowledge that much of the negative attitude is due to the independence a woman exercises in choosing an alternative to wife and mother. Ultimately, Raqs al Sharqi is a dance of the power of women, and the dancer celebrates herself.

20177. Peoples Translation Service [Trans]. “Raqs al Sharqi: A Woman’s Dance: Background”, in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 4, April 1, 1982. p. 21. Archeological evidence suggests that Raqs al Sharqi originated as a sacred dance to worship the Goddess, who for thousands of years was considered the supreme deity with other gods and goddesses occupying minor roles. All art forms were the manifestations of religious expression. song and dance, painting and sculpture were forms of magic ritual with themes of fertility: a plentiful harvest, a celebration of births, a grieving of deaths, and a promise for reincarnation.

Statues and Egyptian tomb paintings capture the images of the dance. In many of the paintings, the dancers are finger-snaping or holding cymbals, ritualistic instruments that honor the goddess. The word cymbal comes from the Goddess Cybele. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]

20178. Peoples Translation Service [Trans]. Interview: “Celluloid Politics; Interview with Egyptian Filmmaker Atiat El Abnoudi About International Feminist Film and Video Conference and Her Work”, in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 4, April 1, 1982. pp. 11-13. [From 5/25-31/81, the first International Feminist Film and Video Conference was held in Amsterdam. The conference was organized by a Dutch feminist film group called Cinemien and financially sponsored by the Dutch government. Two hundred women from 32 countries, all involved in filmmaking and video, came to Amsterdam to exchange ideas and information.

The following interview with Atiat El Abnoudi, an Egyptian filmmaker, was conducted in Cairo on 8/6/81. The women who worked on this issue had several discussions about some of the opinions expressed in this interview. We include this conversation with Atiat El Abnoudi as a contribution to the dialogue among feminists internationally. Special thanks to Diane Belle James for conducting the interview.] Q: What happened at the conference in Amsterdam? A: We talked about a lot of things, what we do, what are problems are. It was very interesting. Before the conference I received, from my point of view, a one-sided paper on feminist problems and women filmmakers making films for and about women. So I was very happy to attend the conference just to mention a different point of view. We third world women have other problems. We don't think we can separate ourselves from men's struggles, because both men and women are oppressed. How can we talk about women's liberation apart from national liberation? Q: Do you think the women there were closed to that point of view? A: Yes. Western European women, and Americans, Australians and Canadians, have a certain standard of living, a certain kind of infrastructure that helps them to get employment. They have the right to work. Their struggle is over how much they should get paid; here we are at the stage of getting the right to work. In my country, if a woman works she gets the same wage as a man. So it's different.

Western women talk about sexual liberation. Here we have sexual oppression. We can't walk in the street with a man without society talking about us. We have to be married; men in our country have the right to marry four women.

Q: It's not very prevalent though, is it? A: But he has the right. His economic situation might prevent him, because he has to support all of them, but by law he has the right.

Q: Did you discuss such things at that conference? A: This conference was for women filmmakers, so it dealt with a very specific subject. We did not discuss the whole women's issue. We talked about filmmaking and doing things with film and video. We realized that we are privileged, because in our countries not many women have the same kind of education. So what are we going to do with this privilege? I am a filmmaker. What kind of films am I going to make? If I am privileged and the whole society paid for me to be educated in England and in the film school here at the University of Cairo, and I have a law degree and so forth, I can't say that I'm just going to work for women because I am a woman. You see what I mean?

Q: Did you find that women from other third world countries shared the same problems? A: I think so. At the end of the conference we made a statement. We were obliged to because of all the things that went on around us. We found a lot of people didn't understand how we can talk about society or national liberation movements and not talk about feminist problems. We said we are not against talking about feminism or feminist films, but we want to express the other point of view. We want to inform you of what is going on in our countries.

At the conference some journalists asked a very racist question: “Did you get something out of this conference?” So I said, “Why do you ask me the question in that way? Why don't you ask me how much the conference benefited from me?” You know they always think about third world people as underdeveloped and coming to Europe to get something. Why don't they think I can contribute to the conference? It's good for other women at the conference to see us, to talk with us, and at least to think that there are other women in the world that have different problems and are militant and fighting.

So we made a declaration, supported by the whole conference, and I think we put in it everything we wanted to say. (See declaration at end of article.) For me it was like the manifesto I've been working on all my life. I've been working on films now for ten years and this is my statement too. Q: Did you show any of your films at the conference? A: They showed two of my films, the first one I made, Mud Horse, and my most recent film, Seas of Thirst, which is about a small fishing village in the delta, in the far north, surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea and the Borolos Lake. Although the village is surrounded by water, the people there don't have fresh water. They have to travel 12 kilometers to get it. The whole village works. They fish, then give their catch to the merchants who sit there and do nothing but take the fish and give them money, loans and things like that. The very old play of capital and workers. In the village, everyone on shore is also exploited. The children work; the old women knit the nets; the whole village works all the time. Yet they don't have the essential necessities, such as fresh water, that any animal must have to live. They are constantly looking for water.

Looking for water, the women walk along the shore of the sea until they come to a low point between the hills where the rain water has been caught and is less salty. Because they are poor women they can't afford to send a car to the nearest town for water. As a woman in the film said to me, “Every day I need six containers of water. A container [20 liters] is 15 piasters. So how much will I pay daily? If I want to wash and cook and drink and have a bath or anything, how much will I have per day, and how much can I afford to pay from my very limited salary, because I am the wife of a teacher [a teacher's monthly base pay is about US $40] and I have four children.” Q: You also went to Munich recently? A: My visit to Munich was for work. I'm working with Pierre Hoffman, a West German producer. He's a man, but has a very good idea of making eight 30-minute films under the title As Women See It, by women filmmakers in eight different countries. I'm making the film for Egypt. There's another one being made in Senegal, one in Nicaragua, Peru, India, France, West Germany, Italy and possibly Poland. They've already started some of the films. They've finished shooting in Senegal, and they've finished editing in Peru. As the artistic supervisor of this project, I'm going to Nicaragua next month to supervise the shooting. Later I'm going to India to supervise the shooting there. Every filmmaker
will choose her own subject and use her own people. The director, the crew, everyone will be local. That's what I like about this project.

The project is being financed by money from a variety of sources, such as the Dutch government, the West German Ministry of Education, the World Council of Churches. Some countries will finance their own film and will receive the entire program of eight in exchange. We may make a two-hour version of the eight films for theatrical distribution.

Q: They would have to be cut a lot for that.
A: Yes, but the eight-film program serves some purposes and the two-hour version serves others. I think it will be very interesting. I am excited about the project. But you know when Pierre Hoffman showed up at the conference, he was refused by the European women. I can't understand why these women don't like to work with men.

I can work with men and women. I don't really like this dishwasher machine level of struggle. Who is going to wash the dishes or who is going to take care of the children? That has nothing to do with liberation. If I have a well-off husband, he will buy me a dishwasher. So what else will I ask of him? Okay, so he tells me, don't wash, don't take care of the children; I will get you a baby sitter and a dishwasher. Liberation is something else. It's the conception of being a slave for a man, not who will bring up the children or wash the dishes.

Q: But the example of the woman with the rich husband doesn't work for all women.
A: I mean we are not sisters. We have conflict among each other. It's a class question. Maybe it's a naive point of view but I'll tell you anyway. When Marx wrote his book, there was another Marx on the other side who also wrote his book to fight the Marxist book. If you have a theory, someone else is going to make an anti-theory. So the capitalist made his book to fight the Marx book, which said the working class will make their revolution if they have solidarity. So the capitalist said okay, no solidarity. We will give them what they want. We will make them bourgeois. So the capitalists gave them a car, a house. In many countries, the working class has been split apart and now they are fighting for better cars and better houses, better education, and things like that.

Because a woman--in every society, in every class--is the most important and most oppressed person in the family, she has the most potential to be revolutionary. So I think this movement, coming from the old European society giving them these: you want a liberation movement, okay; solidarity with women: okay. Have your cafes and clubs and parties and be separated from your society. They encourage them to do that. Again they are splitting society, the way they split the working class. It means isolation. And it's not par hasard (by chance).

Q: How do you support your film work?
A: I got back from studying film work in England in 1976. I didn't get any work until 1978. Then the Egyptian Catholic Association [Coptic] asked me to make a documentary about their work in upper Egypt. The result was Move Into Depth. In this film I tried to accentuate the social conditions of the people and to show why the ECA concentrates their work in upper Egypt. The title comes from the Bible when Peter met Christ and he said to him, "I spent all night at the sea and didn't catch any fish." So Christ said, "Move into depth." It was a symbol of their work in the depth of Egypt to try and fish the real Egyptian person, and to help people to be themselves.

I finished that film in 1980. Meanwhile, the Catholic Relief Service, an American organization that has been working in Egypt some 25 years, wanted me to make a film about their projects. I spent two years going around the country looking at what they were doing and I was really trying to figure out what I could do because I don't make propaganda films. They were really good people and they understood my problem. Finally, I had the courage to say that I was going to make a film that could help the Catholic Relief Service. So I made a film of this village with no fresh water called Seas of Thirst.

Q: Has the film been shown yet in Cairo?
A: Yes, but I must explain. When you are making films in a third world country, there are many things to avoid to be able to show your work. I wanted to show the film before declaring to the censor that the film had been made, because I didn't know what the censor would do.

The Catholic Relief Service organized the opening at the American University and the invited the American ambassador and his wife, and so on. I had three showings at the American University without going through the censor. After that, I went to the censor and told them the film was an American production, so they passed it.

But if you want to participate in an international film festival, you have to go through the festival committee. They refused me. So, I said, okay, you refused this film as a representative of the official Egyptian cinema, but I am a private producer. So what are you going to do with me? It's a very delicate situation.

Q: But aren't they asking for a shortened version of the film for television?
A: Not here, abroad. Egyptian television had never shown any of my films until last year when Mud Horse was aired. Maybe in another ten years they will show Seas of Thirst.


"The Establishment of a New School To Educate Husbands on How To Share Housework" was the title of a report which appeared in the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Aharam, ten days after International Women's Day. The report explained, "Male and female characteristics are not stamped into us from birth as people are wont to think, but, in fact, they are a product of society. Society is what creates the individual and fashions him [sic] as male or female. In other words, this is a process of education and no more."

Relying on research in the field of social sciences and anthropology, the expert for sociology, Samia A-Sa'ti, claims that the social behavior of men and women is the result of social conditioning which penetrates into the realms of the family and dictates different behaviors to the male and female members of the family.

These things are not new. What is new, however is that the government of Egypt was willing to agree to the establishment of an experimental school which includes primary and intermediate grades in Medina-Nasser, near Cairo, in order to try to educate boys and girls in a more egalitarian way. Amedy Al-Kasas, principal of the school, said, "It is not fair that the woman should work exactly like the man, while at the same time fulfilling all of her duties as a housewife--cleaning, washing, doing laundry and cooking. Why doesn't the husband take part in these difficult duties just as she takes part in bringing in income?"

In order for the husband to take part in housework, adds Al-Kasas, "There is no choice but to teach boys how to do such work." The experimental school teaches all of its male and female students, side by side with their conventional academic studies, to cook, wash floors, do laundry, use household tools and appliances, and so on. All of these activities are considered basic learning subjects which students are tested on. Their grade in this test is written onto the report card next to the rest of their grades. This year, the first class of students will graduate from the school. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]
We were unable to meet with the Chairwoman of the Iraqi Women's Federation, Manal Younis, as at the time she was on a ship bound for Iraq with a cargo of medicines and milk. (Since UN sanctions against Iraq were imposed, over 4300 people have died in Iraq from lack of medicines.) The ship, however, did not reach its destination, as it was tear-gassed by American and other naval forces guarding the Red Sea. Two women were critically injured. When we left Baghdad, there was no further news of what happened to those on board, except that the ship had been forced to unload its cargo at the port of Kabbous, Oman. We sent a message of solidarity to the 250 women on board the ship, who had come from different parts of the world including the Arab Region.

Aims and Objectives: The objectives of the Peace mission were: 1) A plea for negotiations without preconditions since preconditions would only be an obstacle in the face of such negotiations. 2) To arrive at an Arab settlement of the conflict under the auspices of the UN. 3) Immediate simultaneous withdrawal of all troops (foreign multinational and Iraqi) and their replacement by Arab and UN troops under the supervision of the UN. 4) The convening of an International Conference to deal with the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait as well as other conflicts in the Middle East, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts over oil.

On 1/10/1991, our Delegation organized a press conference and held a demonstration in front of the American Embassy in Baghdad to protest against the dispatching of American military forces to the region. We handed in a letter of protest which insisted that the principles of the UN, including the solving of all conflicts by negotiations and peaceful means, should be upheld everywhere and at all times.

No conflict can really be resolved as long as these double standards prevail. We made it clear that in our views, the Western capitalist countries and their allies are not so much concerned over the "liberation of Kuwait" as they are over maintaining their monopoly over the oil and money of the Arab Gulf countries. We also published a joint declaration with the Iraqi Women's Federation which upheld similar ideas.

Before leaving, we paid a visit to the Volunteers in the Peace Camp. A large number of men and women had come to Iraq from all over the world to build a "human wall" between the armies on the Iraqi-Saudi border. Among them were women between 70 and 80 years of age, some of them using crutches.

After our visit to Baghdad, the Women's International Peace Delegation had been planning to visit the US to meet with Bush, but this was postponed when the attack on Iraq began on 1/16/1991.

Since then, in Amman, Turkey, the US and other countries, we have continued to organise various actions for peace and send appeals for a stop to the war. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, CA 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [s]


The woman, who was subsequently executed, amazed me by her strength of character." Saadawi says. The woman came to Cairo from her village with her uncle and was married off to an older man who ill-treated her. She ran away but was unable to find a job to support herself and so turned to prostitution. Her life was made a misery by the pimp who controlled her and whom she eventually killed without remorse. [The Middle East Magazine, a monthly English publication, 1/1984, No. 111]

This book, written 11 years ago in Arabic for an Arab audience, was published in Beirut in 1978. It was immediately banned in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, the author's country of birth.

On the face of it, it tells the story of a prostitute who was condemned to death for killing her pimp. It is a true story, or at least was...
inspired by an even that actually took place: Firdaus, the prostitute, really existed and was executed in 1974. The book tackles an issue that has become important in the Western Women's Movement only in the past three or four years—one which is only now being seen as part and parcel of every woman's struggle: who and what is a prostitute?

For Nawal El Saadawi, speaking through Firdaus, the answer is clear: "I now know that all of us were prostitutes who sold themselves at varying prices, and that an expensive prostitute was better than a cheap one." And again: "Men force women to sell their body at a price, and the lowest paid body is that of a wife."

Behind the story lies a major radical and feminist analysis of women's oppression, not only in the Arab world or the Third World, but the world over. [Liliane, Outwrite, English Feminist Monthly, 2/1984.]

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[Excerpted from a Connexions interview with Nadia Hijab 8/1988.]

As a first step in the discussion of women and religion, I think it is very important to distinguish between what is religion and what is religious custom or tradition. I'll take the example of female circumcision, because I couldn't help noticing that an article in Connexions n. 25 (The Politics of Health) says that Islam advocate female circumcision. That is actually just not true. Islam the religion--if you look at the Koran, the Word of God that Muslims follow, the sayings of the prophets, and all the ways of the life of the Muslims of the early days--does not advocate female circumcision. Interestingly enough, the misconception that it does is as prevalent among people in the region as it is among people in the West. And part of the fight to end circumcision involves pointing out to people the difference between what they think is attributable to religion and what is in fact religion. There are family planning groups in Egypt, for example, who are very aware of this distinction. They go around to the villages to talk with women and to point out the harmful effects of circumcision. They take with them social workers, doctors or medical personnel, and religious scholars, whose view has weight with the people. They point out that circumcision has nothing to do with Islam, that medically it's very harmful and so on, and that's where you begin to eradicate the practice at the grass-roots level. Another stereotype about Islam and women that's more complicated than it seems is the wearing of the veil. This is an issue that has a lot of visibility in the West. Women who don't wear veils don't get covered, excuse the pun, but actually I think it's a minority of women in the Arab world who wear Islamic dress now. Of course quite a number of women from the rural areas like to cover their hair with a scarf, simply because they feel better that way, they feel it's more respectable. But the women turning to the veil as symbolic of an Islamic revolution are still a minority. What often annoys Arab women is that wearing Western dress should be taken as a symbol of modernity. Why can't people dress as they like? But of course the use of the veil as a part of the Islamic revolution makes a statement not just about clothes but about women's position in society. The situation is that some women have been forced, whether they like it or not, to behave and to dress in a certain way. On the otherhand, some women turn to the veil (by this I mean the actual Islamic headdress) because they want to be able to go out into the society and work, and because it's fairly new that men and women work together outside the home; people are not used to this. Women find that if they wear respectable Islamic dress people won't look at them as sexual objects or as women, they'll just look at them as workers or as students. In this sense, ironically, Islamic dress has a liberating impact for them rather than a restrictive impact. And some women do turn to Islamic dress as part of the revolution against the West. They say to themselves "If the West thinks that our identity and our religious attitudes are not for them, that's tough. I'm going to turn to my own religion, to Islam, to define my identity." This gesture is tied to the belief that people in the region are still dominated and exploited by the West both economically and politically. It's a complex phenomenon. But the veil isn't necessarily imposed on women. In many cases, women take an active part in it themselves as a form of personal expression.

Also, in looking at the issue of religion and women in the Arab world, it's important to understand how Arab family law works. Throughout the Arab world, family law is based on Islamic law; Arab countries draw their civil codes from the sharia (canon law). There are 21 Arab states, and there are 22 members of the Arab League, which includes Palestine. In each of those states, there is a different system of law, yet all of those states claim that their family law is drawn from Islamic sharia, even if their other laws, like the commercial code or criminal code, have broken with it. Some of those countries, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, do not have a civil family law; the courts simply apply the Islamic sharia directly. Other countries like Egypt, have adopted a civil code based on sharia.

What I find fascinating is that although all the laws have this common base, there are significant differences between them. Tunisia, for example, has a very liberal family law based on sharia; it bans polygamy altogether because of the way it interprets the Koran. Although the Koran says that a man is allowed to marry one, two, three, or four wives if he can treat them equally, and thus interpret this passage to mean that polygamy is banned. Other Arab countries have interpreted it to mean that polygamy should be severely restricted, and in some Arab countries there are no restrictions at all.

There are other large differences as well. In Tunisia, men and women have equal rights when it comes to opting for divorce. But in other Arab countries, while a man can get a divorce at any time very easily, a woman has to petition for divorce on traditional grounds. If her husband doesn't maintain her, if there are no sexual relations between them for three months, or if he treats her harmfully, she has a right to petition for divorce. Whether she gets a divorce or not depends on the judge and how liberal or conservative he is.

The debate on women's rights in the Arab world is conducted within a religious framework; in fact, the main opportunity for the Arab world to debate the role of religion in society comes in the form of this debate on women's rights. For example, people say that women should have full and equal rights under the law based on the Koran, or they argue that religion should apply to the people themselves and not be state law. The role of religion in society in Western countries is based on the concept of a separation between church and state, but in the Arab world, it really hasn't been worked out in that way yet. It's quite an active and fascinating debate.

In some cases family law is being reformed for the wrong reasons—the reform hasn't developed from within the society but has been imposed from above, as in the case of Tunisia. There is a very strong Islamic backlash in Tunisia, and some women are worried that it may lead to a reversal of that progressive code. And even in the Tunisian laws, there are still two areas in which women are not completely equal. The man is still the legal head of the family, and inheritance proceeds exactly as it is defined in the Koran. That is, the man gets twice the share a woman does, which up to a certain point is fair—to the extent that he has to earn most of the income.

Family law reform was also partly imposed from above in Egypt. There wasn't an Egyptian family law until 1979; before that, there were certain laws on the family which had been improved in the 1920s because of lobbying by the early women feminists, and these laws had stayed the same until 79. At that time, largely as a result of initiatives by Gehan Sadat (wife of the late Anwar Sadat), a law was passed which improved the situation of women somewhat, but was nowhere near as progressive as Tunisian law. And although Sadat was a very unpopular president, even among secularists and leftists, feminists couldn't help but

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

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feel that there were improvements. For example, a husband's taking a second wife became automatic grounds for a divorce, whereas previously a judge would have decided whether it gave grounds for divorce or not. And the husband was required to inform both the first and the second wife that he was taking a second wife. But more importantly, the woman was entitled to be housed as long as she was bringing up the children, and because Egypt has severe overcrowding problems, especially in Cairo, this was a significant improvement.

The law was studied by top religious experts to make sure it was in conformity with the sharia. What I have gathered from reading the clippings is that they removed some things that were perhaps more liberal, such as a woman's not needing her husband's permission to work, so that this law got past the religious officials. Even so, Sadat did not want to submit it to the congress for debate because he thought that everything would be overemotional. So he passed it by emergency decree in 1979. Anwar Sadat was killed in 1981, and in 1985, the law was challenged on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, because there had been no emergency and the president had not been entitled to use his emergency powers to pass it by decree. The court agreed and the law was overturned.

A huge debate followed, with women and men on one side saying, “This is ridiculous; women are entitled to their equal rights, to their full rights;” and using examples from the Koran, and others saying, “No, women should be seen and not heard, their place is in the home.” (It was actually very similar to debates in other countries around the world.) The beneficial part was that the issue was debated—you couldn’t avoid it—it was on television, radio, and in the press. And the UN conference in Nairobi in 1985 played a large role in getting a new law passed—I’m not sure how far the women activists would have gotten if the government hadn’t wanted to avoid looking “backward” at the conference. So within a few months a new law was drafted and after debate in the parliament it was passed in 1983.

It made minor changes to the 1979 law. For example, it reversed the provision that gave the first wife automatic grounds for divorce if the husband took a second wife; instead the judge would have to decide if the wife was harmed by the second marriage. And the onus would be on the woman really to prove whether she was being harmed or not. This would all happen in the civil courts.

I think it should be mentioned at this point that although a man may be legally entitled to take a second wife, the tradition is actually one woman/one man throughout the Arab world. Polygamy exists in only 2% to 10% of marriages, with perhaps a higher percentage in the Gulf countries, where more people can afford it.

When I started to do the research for my book, I found that a lot of the writing about women in the Arab world or (especially) women in the Muslim world starts from the premise that Islam is a conservative religion, that it’s holding women back. I found this really irritating, and many people were making that assumption, economists as well, saying you don’t find many women in the work force because Islam is a conservative religion, and so on. I did not find this a convincing argument. As I said in the introduction to my book, I did not want either to defend or attack Islam. I wanted to try and see what the actual situation was and try perhaps to put the debate in a more rational framework. If the economic situation changes, maybe people will then turn to the religion to find new arguments to defend those changes, or maybe not.


20184. Policy Research for Development Alternative: UBINIG: Asian Women's Human Rights Council; AWHRC. Press Release: International Public Hearing on Crimes Against Women Related To Population Policies. To Be Held In Cairo, Egypt. Policy Research for Development Alternative (UBINIG); Asian Women's Human Rights Council (AWHRC), September 7, 1994. [Secretariat : AWHRC (Philippines) & UBINIG (Bangladesh), AWHRC : P.O. Box 190; 1099 Manila; The Philippines Tel: 9244824; Fax: (632) 9110513/9110535; UBINIG : 5/3 Barabo Mahanpur, Ring Road, Shaymolli, Dhaka 1207, Bangladesh, Tel: 811465/816420; Fax: (880-2) 813065; E-mail: Ubinig[a]dak.gn.apc.org] We would like to announce the "International Public Hearing on Crimes Against Women Related to Population Policies" which will be held on 9/7/1994, at 10:00 am to 6:00 pm in conjunction with the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt. The International Public Hearing will be open to all who are interested in attending, and will involve Testimonies by women for various regions on their experiences with population programs and policies. There will be two sessions, the first on women's Experiences with Reproductive Technologies used under population Policies and Programs, and the second on the linkages Between Population Policies and Women's Rights. The Juries will also help in formulating recommendations for the future that address women's real needs. We invite you to help us publicize this International Public Hearing and to participate in the audience. We also invite you to contact us if you wish to share your own Testimony, though the number of witnesses will need to be fairly limited, due to time. We believe it is important to inject women's reality into the debates on Population and Development, as many of these discussions have been stripped of their context. The International Public Hearing is an effort to put the reality of women's lives and women's real needs at the centre of the Cairo Conferences, in a way that builds on and validates women's experiences and Knowledge. For more information, contact the Secretariat: UBINIG (Policy Research for Development Alternative); AWHRC (Asian Women's Human Rights Council) [secretariat: awhrc@iafrica.org, ubinig@dak.gn.apc.org].

SPONSORING ORGANISATIONS: Terra Feminia, Latin America; Boston Women's Health Collective/Women and Environment, USA; WIDE (Network Women in Development Europe), Europe; AWHRC (Asian Women's Human Rights Council), Philippines; UBINIG (Policy Research for Development Alternative), Bangladesh; Arab
Women's Organisation, Egypt; People's Health Network, India; Women of Zagreb, Yugoslavia. [—]

20185. Pomeroy, Sarah B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra: Part 1: Introduction: The Status of Greek Women in Egypt. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1990. pp. xx-xix. Establishing the status of Greek women in Hellenistic Egypt is a difficult task, and comparative studies are best done vis-a-vis other classical societies: classical Greece (essentially ancient Athens) and the Roman Republic. The status of Greek women in Ptolemaic Egypt has provided a vast literature, and is conditioned by their membership in an aristocratic ruling class and of the dimished polarity between men and women in the Hellenistic world. Greek women in Ptolemaic Egypt exercised unusual power in both the domestic and public economy, and as queens managed to eliminate gender hierarchy for a brief period in Classical antiquity. [TXT]

20186. Pomeroy, Sarah B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexanderto Cleopatra: Part 2: Queens. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1990. pp. 3-40. In the Hellenistic period in Egypt, Macedonians were politically dominant and their queens provided the model for Greek women. Little is known of the patriarchal Macedonian social structure, but it is clear that many Macedonian wives were buried as warriors, possibly because they were 'Amazons' [sic]. In addition, the expansion of the small Macedonian tribal kingdom into a world empire created a period of extreme social change: as the army was abroad women took a fuller role in running society, and the small number of Macedonians in the vast empire maintained the new roles of Macedonian women.

The Hellenistic queens had a largely private role, and such a role is flexible and depends on individual personalities. Macedonian queens had great wealth and controlled their own resources; queens employed their resources in the same manner as kings but only on a smaller scale, such as gifts to gods and sanctuaries. While various Greek states allowed marriage between half-siblings, in order to better secure their legitimacy as Pharaohs, the Ptolemies adopted brother-sister marriage in the manner of at least some dynasties. In the second century BC, when Egypt was wracked by attacks and civil unrest, queens acquired greater political power: the populace increasingly accepted the powers of queens as legitimate. Cleopatra VII, well documented because of her interaction with many key figures in the late history of the Roman Republic, was typical of the later Hellenistic queens: conducting wars and foreign affairs independently. Both Hellenic kings and queens were deified in the Egyptian manner: while the deification of men followed the pattered drachmas. While various Greek states husband's obligations (especially clothing), and conditions for divorce (men were typically not expected to be monogamous, but such extramarital associations were expected to be casual and inexpensive). [Papyrus Elephantine 1] Marriage Contract from Elephantine, dated to 311-310 BC. In the seventh year of the reign of Alexander, son of Alexander, the fourteenth year of Ptolemy's administration as satrap in the month of Dous. Contract of marriage of Heracleides of Temnos and Demetria. Heracleides takes as his lawful wife Demetria of Cos from the father Leptines of Cos and her mother Philotis. He is free, she is free. She brings with her to the marriage clothing and ornament valued at 1000 drachmas. Heracleides shall supply to Demetri all that is suitable for a woman, which Demetria shall retain all that she has brought with her. But Heracleides shall prove whatever he charges against Demetria before three men whom they both approve. It shall not be lawful for Heracleides to bring home another woman for himself in such a way as to inflict contumely on Demetria, nor to beget children by another woman, nor to indulge in fraudulent machinations against Demetria on any pretext. If Heracleides is caught doing any of these things, and Demetria proves it before three men whom they both approve, let Heracleides return to Demetria the dowry of 1000 drachmas which she brought, and forfeit 1000 drachmas of the silver coinage of [Ptolemy bearing a portrait head of] Alexander. Demetria, and those representing Demetria, shall have the right to exact payment from Heracleides and from his property on both land and sea, as if after a legal action. This contract shall be decisive in every respect, where Heracleides may produce it against Demetria, or Demetria and those helping Demetria to exact payment may produce it against Heracleides, as though the agreement had been made in that place. Heracleides and Demetria shall each have the right to keep a copy of the contract in their own custody, and to produce it against one another. Witnesses: Cleon of Gela, Anticrates of Temnos, Lysis of Temnos, Dionysius of Temnos, Aristocamus of Cyrene, Aristocidas of Cos.

20188. Pomeroy, Sarah B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra: Part 4: Some Married Women in the Papyri. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1990. pp. 83-124. Marriage contracts on papyrus are the richest source of information on ideal relationships between wives and husbands of people who were not royals and were not figures in literature (few are from Alexandria). These contracts are from smaller Greek settlements, such as Ptolemais and Naucratis, and reflect a more conservative Greek milieu in Egypt, in contradistinction to Alexandria. The contracts were between men, since women could not sign a contract. The contract included: dowries, husband's obligations (especially clothing), and conditions for divorce (men were typically not expected to be monogamous, but such extramarital associations were expected to be casual and inexpensive).
dated to 92 BC (used to reused to wrap a crocodile mummy in the necropolis at Tebtunis). In the twenty-second year of the reign of Ptolemy also called Alexander, the god Philometor, the priesthood of the priest of Alexander and the other priests as listed in Alexandria, the eleventh of the month Xandicus which is the eleventh of the month Mecheir at Cercosiris in the district of Polemon in the Arsinoite Philiscus, son of Apollonius, Persian of the Epigone, acknowledges to Apollonia (also known as Cleaullitha, daughter of Heracleides, Persian, with her brother Apollonius as guardian, that he has received from her 2 talents and 4000 drachmas in copper coinage as her dowry agreed to by him. Apollonia is to remain with Philiscus, obeying him as a wife should her husband, owning their property in common. Philiscus is to provide everything necessary both clothing and whatever else is appropriate for a wedded wife, whether he is at home or away, according to the standard of their common resources. It shall not be lawful for Philiscus to bring home for himself another wife in addition to Apollonia nor to maintain a female concubine nor a little boyfrend nor to beget children by another woman while Apollonia is alive, nor to dwell in another house over which Apollonia has no rights, nor to throw her out, nor insult her or treat her badly, nor to alienate any of their common property to defraud Apollonia. If he is shown to be doing any of these things, or not to be providing her with necessities and clothing and other things as written, Philiscus is to pay the dowry of 2 talents and 4000 drachmas of copper in full to Apollonia, immediately. In the same way it shall not be lawful for Apollonia to be absent for a night or a day from the house of Philiscus without the knowledge of Philiscus, nor to have intercourse with another man nor to ruim the common household nor to dishonor Philiscus in whatever brings dishonor to a husband. And if Apollonia of her own free will wishes to separate from Philiscus, Philiscus is to return the dowry unaltered within ten days from the day the demand is made. If he does not return it, as written, he is to forfeit one and a half times the amount of the dowry to her immediately. Witnesses: Dionysius, son of Patron; Dionysius, son of Hermiascus; Theon, son of Ptolemy; Didymus, son of Ptolemy; Dionysius, son of Dionysius; Heracleus, son of Diocles (all six Macedonians of the Epigone); Guardian of the contract: Dionysius. Signed: I, Philiscus, son of Apollonius, Persian of the Epigone, acknowledge that I have the dowry of 2 talents and 4000 drachmas of copper as written above, and I have deposited the contract, which is valid, with Dionysius, Dionysius, son of Hermiascus; the aforesaid, wrote for him [Philiscus] since he is illiterate.

20189. Pomeroy, Sarah B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra: Part 5: Slaves and Workers. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1990. pp. 125-147. Slavery existed in all ancient Greek and Hellenistic societies: the numbers of slaves in Hellenistic Egypt remains a matter of debate (one reason for the difficulty is that there is a terminological confusion resulting from the use of the same words to designate slaves and young men or women). There is also considerable overlap in the occupations of poor freemen and freewomen and slaves. There was also considerable geographic variation in the number of slaves, and the number of slaves varied over time. The major source of slaves in early Hellenistic Egypt was conquest in Palestine and Syria: slaves were imported as war booty and their usual language was aramaic. Female slaves bore children frequently and their children were also slaves: when the father of the children was the owner of the female slave, manumission by testament was common (such manumission was the only form known in Hellenistic societies). Concubination was common among slaves, especially due to the shortage of Greek women. Reproduction of slaves was a more important source of slaves that slavery concomitant upon conquest. A small source of slaves was rescuing exposed infants: under law, such infants were presumed to be slaves (exposure was rare under the Ptolemies and became a general practice only under the Romans in Egypt). Women were often slave owners, although usually women owned female slaves. The ownership of slaves is documented in dowry documents, marriage contracts and wills.

20190. Pomeroy, Sarah B. Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra: Part 6: Women's Role in the Economy. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1990. pp. 148-173. The basis of the ancient economy was ownership of land: however, there is much uncertainty about land tenure in Ptolemaic Egypt. Gradually, land became alienable, and as early as the first century BC, a brotherless daughter inherited her father's kleros (cleruch land granted to soldiers). Women are documented as leaseholders of temple sacred lands (of 539 known leaseholders of sacred land, 48 are women). Of 664 documented owners of private land, 51 are women; the lands of women are documented to include vineyards, vegetable gradens and orchards of dates, olives and sycamores. Over time, women's ability to own land changed dramatically, with women winning more rights to own land, especially, finally, winning the right to own clerarch lands. The major means by which women became landowners was by inheritance; there is no dowry document that mentions the transfer of land to women.

In addition to agriculture, women worked in industry, were merchants, and held domestic worker jobs. Occupations known to have been held by women include food preparation, clothing manufacturing and wet-nursing. In wealthier households, such occupational nuches were pre-empted by slaves. The most common occupation of Greek women were working in wool: women of all classes worked in wool in Classical Greece.

Women played a larger role in the economy in Ptolemaic Egypt than in any other Greek society, acting as landowners, industrialists, and professionals, in addition to more lowly occupations that often competed directly with slave labor. Women owned the same kind of property held by men, but less of it. Women were active in money markets as both lenders and borrowers. While the Greek legal system required women to have the signature of a guardian (kyrios) on a contract, businesswomen could choose to operate under the Egyptian legal code which did not require a guardian. In no other Greek society would there be less economic distinction between genders as in Hellenistic Egypt.

20191. Powell, Eileen Alt. "Population Plan Approved Amid Continuous Hagglng", in Seattle Times, September 13, 1994. p. A7. The UN Population Conference approved a 20 year plan to slow population growth and to stimulate economic development. The Program of Action calls for empowerment of women as the keystone of this strategy. The non-binding platform was adopted by consensus with 20 delegations rejecting the abortion provisions [sic: consensus means unanimous and is here misused]. Libya, Iran and Yemen were among the 20 delegations noting objections to the abortion clause.

20192. Religious Interest Group of The US Network for Cairo "Press Release: Statement of Principles Regarding Population and Development. Religious Interest Group of The US Network for Cairo, August 17, 1994. You are invited to sign on to the attached statement of principles regarding population and development. This statement had been drafted by the Religious Interest Group of The US Network for Cairo in preparation for the International Conference on Population and Development to be held in Cairo, Egypt on 9/5-14/1994. This statement is also intended to be a part of a study package the Religious Interest Group is preparing for use by communities of faith in discussing the results of the Cairo gathering and the issues of population and development. This package will contain this Statement of Principles, as well as statements, pronouncements, and study guides prepared by religious communions or communities of interest. [Rev. Douglas B. Hunt, Convenor, Religious Interest Group, c/o US Network for Cairo 94; fax: 202-332-2302 tel; phone: 202-332-2200]. Religious Interest Group, US Network for Cairo 94: Statement of Principles: Economic and Social Context: As members of religious organizations, we believe that it is essential that statements of principle regarding population and sustainable development be grounded in our shared belief in a common Creator. All existence is a gift from that Creator who calls all into relationships based on world justice, equity, and respect for the integrity of all creation. Economic and social systems that rely on exploitation or exacerbate gender, race, age and class inequalities are, therefore, an
affront to God. Likewise, our respect for the integrity of creation dictates that no people or species has the right to live in ways that threaten the ability of others to sustain their own lives. The world’s dominant economic system relies on ever-expanding production and consumption. This system has historically exploited the labor and resources of women and the poor, and enslaved and oppressed communities of color and indigenous people. We also see that the focus on maximizing profits by any means needed for results in imbalances between the environment and their access to and control of local resources; contributes to seemingly intractable poverty; and causes environmental degradation that threatens the diversity of life on the planet. This system also enables a minority of the earth’s people to consume a majority of the earth’s resources, threatening all of creation more immediately than any population pattern or pressure. We call upon all people of conscience to take steps to redress these situations.

Principles: Within the context of our shared religious commitments to justice, equity, peace, integrity of creation, and respect for human dignity; and recognizing the importance of the Programme of Action developed by the International Conference on Population and Development for the next generation; we have identified the following religious and ethical principles that we believe should be at the heart of concerns about population and development: Respect for human dignity calls all people and communities to acknowledge the basic human right of every child to be wanted, loved and nurtured; and to ensure that each child has the opportunity for a productive, happy and fulfilling life, and a future free from hunger and violence. Justice demands that control of one’s own sexual and reproductive life be recognized as a basic human right. Justice, equity, and respect for the integrity of creation require that health care, education, other concrete resources necessary for healthy, dignified lives, and the opportunity to secure a livelihood should be available to all people. Special attention must be given to lives and livelihoods of women, people of color, and indigenous peoples. Equity and justice require that all family partners share responsibility for family planning and that family and community life be based on full partnerships, respecting individuals’ responsibility for their own lives. Respect for human dignity compels societies to provide access to comprehensive quality health care, including information, education, and a full range of reproductive health care services. Equity and justice demand that all peoples be free to develop population and development policies and programs in accordance with their own needs and cultures, so long as these policies and programs are not coercive, respect basic human rights, and do not impinge on the rights of others. Equity and justice demand that in a world with a plurality of belief systems, no single system should be imposed on or held up as the standard or norm for all life. Equity, justice, and respect for the integrity of creation require that societies provide education and resources to empower personal and community decisions for sustainable lives. Respect for the integrity of all creation dictates that no species, including the human, has the right to propagate indefinitely or to live in ways which threaten the ability of other species or future generations of its own species to sustain their lives.

Religious Interest Group Drafting Group: Affiliation is listed for identification purposes only and does not imply endorsement. In some cases the position of a participant or the participant’s religious community may not be in agreement with this document or some portions of it.

[Douglas B. Hunt, Convenor (Network for Environmental & Economic Responsibility/United Church of Christ); Carol Benson-Holst, Ramona Brown (Ministry for Justice in Population Concerns); Kolya Braun (United Methodist Board For Global Ministries-Women’s Division); Sylvia Diss (North American Coalition on Religion & Ecology); Jane Hull Harvey (United Methodist Board for Church in Society); Karen Lombardi (Catholics for a Free Choice); Bernadine McRipley (Presbyterian Church, USA); Elmira Nazombe, Suzanne Paul (Church World Service).] [x]


Through half-closed eyes she looked at her husband. Lying on his right side, his body was intertwined with hers and his head bent over her right shoulder. As usual at such times she felt that he inhabited a world utterly different from hers, a world from which she had been excluded. Only when she became aware of the movements of his body, and of his and her access to and control of local resources; contributes to seemingly intractable poverty; and causes environmental degradation that threatens the diversity of life on the planet. This system also enables a minority of the earth’s people to consume a majority of the earth’s resources, threatening all of creation more immediately than any population pattern or pressure. We call upon all people of conscience to take steps to redress these situations.

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performed, she seated herself on the edge of the prayer carpet and counted off her glorifications of the Almighty, three at a time on the joints of each finger. It was late autumn and the time for the sunset prayer would soon come and she enjoyed the thought that she would soon be praying again. Her five daily prayers were like punctuation marks that divided up and gave meaning to her life. Each prayer had for her a distinct quality, just as different foods had their own flavors. She folded up the carpet and went out onto the small balcony.

Dusting off the cane chair that stood there, she seated herself and looked down at the street from the sixth floor. She was assailed by the din of buses, the hooting of cars, the cries of street vendors and the raucous noise of competing radios from nearby flats. Clouds of smoke rose up from the outpourings of car exhausts veiling the view of the tall solitary minaret that could be seen between two towering blocks of flats. This single minaret, one of the twin minarets of the Mosque of Sultan Hasan, above it a thin slice of the Citadel, was all that was now left of the panoramic view she had once had of old Cairo, with its countless mosques and minarets against a background of the Kokkattam Hills and Mohammed Ali's Citadel.

Before marriage she had dreamed of having a house with a small garden in a quiet suburb such as Maadi or Helwan. On finding that it would be a long journey for her husband to work in the centre of the city, she had settled for this flat because of its view. But with the passing of the years, buildings had risen on all sides, gradually narrowing the view. In time this single minaret would also be obscured by some new building.

Aware of the approach of the call to sunset prayers, she left the balcony and went to the kitchen to prepare her husband's coffee. She filled the brass kanaka [coffeepot] with water and added a spoonful of coffee and a spoonful of sugar. Just as it was about to boil over she removed it from the stove and placed it on the tray with the coffee cup, for he liked to have the coffee poured out in front of him. She expected to find him sitting up in bed smoking a cigarette. The strange way his body was twisted immediately told her that something was wrong. She approached the bed and looked into the eyes that stared into space and suddenly she was aware of the odour of death in the room. She left and placed the tray with the coffee cup, for Peace. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 36, July 1991. pp. 26-27.

Almost automatically, we associate the Arab women's question" with fundamentalism. Even men talk about Islam as enemy number one for Arab women in their struggle for more individual and social self-determination. But the discrimination toward women has less to do with the economic and political relations of a patriarchal social structure.

Overwhelming economic problems are characteristic of many Arab countries. Together with the renewed hatred of the West, these conditions have given fundamentalist groups a new popularity. This tendency goes against the interests of women and has, since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, become more pronounced. These indirect consequences of the war are apparent to women in the Arab world, in particular, the tendency toward an increase in violence against women.

Over 50 billion dollars in debt before the Gulf war, Egypt had to deal with over half a million returnees from the Gulf states for the second time since 1989. Many women, who had lived in relative freedom and self-determination as the heads of the household during their husband's absence, were forced to take up traditional roles and accept control of the family by their husbands. In addition, the tourist industry suffered a 100% absence, were forced to take up traditional roles and accept control of the family by their husbands. In addition, the tourist industry suffered a 100% absorption. Worsening economic conditions meant more for Peace. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 36, July 1991. pp. 26-27.

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associated polarization of the Arab world into forces for or against Iraq or the US, could be a set back for politically engaged women’s groups and cause serious disruptions in the work of international/Pan-Arab women’s groups such as AWSA (Arab Women’s Solidarity Association). At the international Women’s Peace conference in Geneva last 1/1990, it became obvious that differences between the Arab and the international women’s groups had been exacerbated. Demands for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, which are widely accepted by Arab women, are ignored by the Arab states, and even by the Permanent Council of Women’s Organizations. The “Women in Black,” Israeli and Palestinian women who have demonstrated weekly against the occupation of the West Bank since the beginning of the Intifada, staYed at home for the first time this 1/1991, because of the “complicated situation.” Thus women’s solidarity begins to fall apart.

In Arab countries the discussion of women’s liberation is in danger of being silenced by conservative political forces in the atmosphere of renewed nationalism and fundamentalism, cancelling gains made during the ‘80s. Just as the independent Arab women’s movement, represented by Fatima Mernissi and Nawal El-Saadawi among others, has been affected by the crisis and war in the Gulf, so have the fragile beginnings of democratization in the Arab world. When fighting-off foreign attack, in this case that of Iraq or of the USA, becomes the dominant political goal, the struggle for human rights, democracy and the debate over the position of women can easily get derailed—put on the back burner. One sign that this is happening is the recent mass arrests of countless human rights activists and journalists in Egypt. These events get scant coverage in Western media. Instead, fundamentalism is once again held up as an apparition/bogeyman, without any serious discussion.

The demonstrations of support for Saddam Hussein were met with a lack of understanding, evoking the myth of “holy war,” and firmly establishing a simple equation in Western minds: Arab equals Muslim equals fanatic. The impression is given that fundamentalism is a characteristic only of Islamic countries, in spite of the fact that there is a worldwide spread of fundamentalism.

For a long time, Arab social scientists have been resisting the concept of fundamentalism and searching for more adequate formulas: the social movements which define themselves in terms of Islam are described as “political Islam” or “Islamic movements,” for example. In this way, they attempt to account for the diversity of social programs and ideas that are propagated in the name of Islam, everything from the country of God to a social market economy.

Western feminists and some Arab feminists see Islam as the primary cause of Arab women’s oppression. A large number of Arab women activists vehemently resist ascribing so much importance to religious and cultural factors. In her book about women’s work in the Arab world, the Palestinian journalist Nadia Hijab shows that, in Jordan, for example, it is quite possible to interpret the Islamic moral creed so as to urge more women into the labor market, if the necessity arises.

Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist and feminist researcher, notes, “At a level deeper than laws and official politics, Muslim social order conceive of woman as a powerful, aggressive individual, who can use her power to infiltrate the social order when she is not pushed into the corner. In the long run, this orientation could make women’s access to decision-making positions and power easier. One of the main obstacles for western women is that in their society women are seen as passive, subordinate beings.”

For Fatima Mernissi, current religious fundamentalism is more of a marginal problem. In her eyes, the biggest fundamentalist is “the state, because it officially discriminates against women through laws.” She holds the Arab states responsible for creating a feminine proletariat, easily manipulable on the national and international market, which can be sent back to the family hearth in emergencies on the pretext of marrying later and having smaller families. Young men have to wait for the family land to shrink further as population pressures become too intense. Overcrowding and land shortages are important factors (among such others as poverty and poor governance) in the tragic inter-ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. Overcrowding reaches terrible proportions: in the country as a whole, there are 405 people for every square kilometre -- and this rises to as many as 560 in Ruhengeri Prefecture. These are densities more usually seen in urban areas, imposed on a rural country. Crowding on the country’s limited agricultural land is already almost unthinkable high -- and before the current civil war, the population was set to double in just two decades. In 1990 there were 6.2 Rwandans for every cultivatable hectare; this will almost certainly rise to 9.1 by the end of this decade, and to 12.6 by 2010. Landholdings have fragmented. Even 10 years ago, families of up to eight children were living on plots as small as 0.13 hectares (approximately 30 by 40 metres) in Gisenyi and Cyangugu Prefectures. And these tiny plots will inevitably shrink further as population densities increase.

Land under pressure: In Rwanda -- as wherever fertilizers and the other high-technology inputs needed to increase yields are scarce -- population pressure causes more marginal land to be brought under the plough. Pastureland and forests are turned into cropland. Fallow periods are reduced, giving the soil less time to recover. All of this leads to soil erosion and, in the long run, to reduced soil fertility. Between 1970-1986, the amount of cultivated land in Rwanda increased by more than 50%, from 528,000 to 826,500 hectares. As a result, the amount of fallow land was cut almost in half and 60% of the pastureland disappeared, as it shrank from 4,980,000 to 1,990,000 hectares. This has particularly affected the minority Tutsi people, traditional pastoralists. People do modify their social behaviour under such pressures, and Rwandans have been marrying later and having smaller families. Young men have to wait longer to acquire the rugo - - the small plot of land necessary for raising a family; and when they do, they know they will have difficulty supporting the same number of children as their parents had. Knowledge and use of family planning have risen rapidly in the last decade, if from a very low base. In 1983, only 1% of people used modern methods of contraception; by 1992, this had risen to around 13%. Over the same period, the average age of marriage for women rose to 23 -- the highest in Africa -- and the

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Sai, Fred T.; International Planned Parenthood Federation. Press Release: Hope and a Warning of Africa. New York:International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), August 26, 1994. At the very heart of the Arab world, the Palestinian journalist Nadia Hijab shows that, in Jordan, Landholdings have fragmented. Even 10 years ago, families of up to eight children were living on plots as small as 0.13 hectares (approximately 30 by 40 metres) in Gisenyi and Cyangugu Prefectures. And these tiny plots will inevitably shrink further as population densities increase.

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total fertility rate fell, from 8.5 to 6.2 children per woman. But the relentless increase in population continues to outpace the ability of the land to sustain its people. The evidence is all too clear: nearly half of all Rwandan children under five suffer from chronic malnutrition, stunting their growth. Despite better antenatal care and increased vaccination, the child mortality rate remains high: 150 of every 1000 children die before their fifth birthday. All beings react to overcrowding, and there is no doubt that it has reared its head, quite literally, in the form of one of the greatest tragedies of human history. It serves as a warning for the rest of the continent.

A rapid rate of growth: It has often been said that land is the one thing Africa has in plenty. So, the argument goes, population growth is no problem. This is simplistic. It fails to take into account both the low natural carrying capacity of much of the continent’s land and the capriciousness of its climate. It also conveniently ignores the fact that it is the rapidity of population growth which causes so much stress and suffering. Africa’s average growth rate of 3% per year is far higher than those in most other developing regions, and much greater than those experienced in the past by the now developed world. 29 of the 36 poorest countries in the world are in Africa. Inevitably, illiteracy rates are high, infrastructure is inadequate, and health services are rudimentary -- all making it especially difficult to introduce family planning programmes. In recent decades, urbanization and the breakdown of traditional values have led to more childbearing than used to be socially acceptable. Every day, some 10000 African women resort to unsafe abortion -- evidence of their frustrated desire to control their fertility. Over half the population of most African countries is under the age of 15 providing a vast pent-up demographic momentum throughout the continent. Even if Kenya, for example, were to attain the two-child family overnight, its population would continue to grow for another two generations, eventually doubling. Encouraging signs: There are encouraging signs of the beginnings of change - - but they are only sporadic and the tempo is still slow. In recent years, most African Governments -- nudge by global advocacy efforts and their own family planning associations -- have come to accept that fewer, better spaced births produce healthier children and mothers. All but a fanatical few have dropped their earlier opposition to family planning on the grounds that it is imposed by the West, or a neo-colonialist plot designed to decimate African populations. Many have simply found themselves unable to cope with the development demands of their rapidly growing populations. The first African population policies were adopted as long ago as 1967 (in Kenya) and 1969 (in Ghana). But there was little further progress until the Kilimanjaro Plan of Action was agreed at the Second African Population Conference in Arusha in 1984 -- which was held to prepare for the last World Population Conference in Mexico City that same year. A new generation of population policies followed and many countries strengthened their family planning programmes. By the time of the Third African Population Conference in Dakar in December 1992 (part of the preparations for the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo) African delegates were almost unanimously speaking of the importance of family planning both as a human right and a development issue. The Conference declaration included Africa’s first targets for reducing the regional growth rate to 2.5% by the year 2000 and 2% by 2010; for increasing contraceptive prevalence to “about 20%” by 2000, and 40% by 2010; and for lowering maternal mortality, through quality family planning services and a reduction in unsafe abortion by 50% by the end of the century. That was a tremendous step forward, although I still do not think African Governments are putting enough effort into their programmes on the ground. In sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, only 9% of married women are using contraceptives, as against 36% in North Africa and the Middle East, 40% in South and South-East Asia and 60% in Latin America. Only a few countries -- such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Kenya -- have family planning programmes successful enough to increase contraceptive use to around 50, 45, 35 and 33%, respectively.

A good example: Kenya provides the most dramatic example. Contraceptive use rose threefold in the 1980s in Kenya. Fertility fell 22% from 8.3 to 6.5 children per woman, and the average desired family fell 35% from 7.2 to 4.7 children. Traditional Kenyan values favour many children. But rapid population growth has put farmland under pressure in many areas, making big families less advantageous. Higher female literacy has helped promote new attitudes to family size. Increasingly, parents want to send their children to school, and rising school costs have made it much more expensive to educate large families. These trends have fuelled the demand for family planning. The Government is strongly committed to providing diversified and accessible family planning services -- an essential feature for the success of any population programme. Kenyan Governments have always been strong upholders of the tragedy of Rwanda. It serves as a warning for the rest of the continent.

Facing the facts: Many of them wonder how they will provide the schools, hospitals and jobs for the next generation. Many are concerned about food supplies: only a few countries, such as Zimbabwe, have carried out agricultural policies that have enabled them to become self-sufficient in food. Some are deeply worried about the growing incapacity of the environmental resource base to sustain still more people. In many regions, particularly the Sahel, population growth has already exceeded the carrying capacity of the land. Some 200 million people, out of the present African population of 550 million, receive less than 90% of the minimum of 2200 calories a day needed to maintain an active working life; another 150 million are subject to acute food deficits, and 30-50 million are actually starving. African countries face many other desperate situations which are precipitated or made worse by high birth rates. But Governments do seem to have faced up to the fact that high population growth rates are among the factors preventing them from satisfying their peoples’ development aspirations. And this offers hope that the Rwandan warning will be heard. [Dr. Fred T. Sai is President of the International Planned Parenthood Federation and a 1993 United Nations Population Award Laureate.]

20197. Salloum, Habeeb. “Umm Kalthum: Legendary Songstress of the Arabs”, in Al-Jadid, November 1995. p. 9. Umm Kalthum, called by some as kawkab al-sha’r (Star of the East), can still be heard on radios and in coffee shops throughout the Arab World, even though she died over two decades ago. She was born in Tamayeyt el-Zahayra, a tiny Egyptian village, in 1908, to a humble peasant family. As a child she sang and chanted the Quran in a voice that made her locally famous. In 1924, she moved to Cairo where she developed a devoted following for her concerts. Her songs became Pan-Arab events, with people from throughout the Arab World assembling to hear her sing. Her songs were typically celebrations of Arab history, and is widely cited for keeping Islamic heritage alive. During WWII, both Axis and Allied radio stations used her music to try to legitimize their message. She became a close friend of Abdul Gamal Nasser, and the two are often seen as the two leaders who emerged in the 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s she became a national cultural heroine, and was nicknamed the “Ambassador of Arab Arts” as she traveled through the Arab World. During her later years, and unlike many modern Arab artists, she remained proud of her Arab-Islamic heritage. Her funeral in 2/1975 was attended by thousands. Over 300000 of her tapes are sold annually in Egypt alone. In Egypt, it is said that two things will never change: the Pyramids and the voice of Umm Kalthum. [TXT]

20198. Sameh, Catherine. “The Rebel Girl: Family Planning Without Women??”, in Against The Current, November-December 1994. p. 7. The UN Third International Conference on Population in cairo has accomplished very little: while women’s organizations were promised some role by the Clinton Administration, the US instead used the conference as a stage on which VP Al Gore could strut his cynical political agenda. The mass media coverage focused only on the conservative Vatican and the ‘liberal’ Gore-ist factions, completely excluding all other points of views and groups. The Clinton Administration’s proposed $585 million for family planning conceals a
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‘deeply racist and musogynist’ program that holds poor women responsible for global environmental devastation. Feminist Betsy Hartmann observes that women’s fertility have become the new ‘Evil Empire’ that threatens the world. In the absence of any analysis of the distribution of wealth in a society, ‘family planning’ is merely a system for scapegoating and manipulating women. While family planning is important, the poor of the world also need adequate health care, housing, education, jobs and child care; and Third World countries need relief from the international debts. [TXT]

20199. Schlick, Yael Rachel. Travel, Education, And The Pathways Of Feminism in Post-revolutionary France. Duke University. Dissertation. 221pp. AAC 9332218. [Advisor: Schor, Naomi] My dissertation, “Travel, education, and the pathways of feminism in post-revolutionary France,” is a study of the theme of travel in the writings of nineteenth-century French authors. It highlights the historical link between travel and knowledge, and shows how the theme of travel in women’s texts is part of an emancipatory feminist discourse for greater freedom and equal education. Though I began with the intent to discuss women’s travel alone, it became apparent that travel was inextricably linked to boundaries of what was socially acceptable or desirable for women, and that those women who did not abide by limitations to the domestic sphere were perceived as transgressive. I begin to trace these themes with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile ou de l’éducation (where women are excluded both from the voyage and from education). Subsequent demands for equal education for women did not succeed in getting them out of the home; but with Stael’s Corinne ou l’Italie, travel begins to challenge domesticity and to pose more strongly the issue of women’s presence in the public space. Stael’s public woman of talent inspired future feminists and Flora Tristan in particular to argue for women’s greater freedom and increased access to travel. I conclude my study by focusing on two texts (an autobiography and a novel) in which travel and education have become one: Suzanne Voilquin’s account of her Saint-Simonian missionary work in Egypt, and George Sand’s Nanon, detailing the life history of a peasant woman highly skilled in map-reading. Other authors discussed in the dissertation include Louis-Damien Emeric, Stephanie-Felicite de Genlis, and Gustave Flaubert. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [↩]

20200. Semedo, Joan D. African American Art And Artists In The Elementary Art Curriculum. University Of Massachusetts. Dissertation. 129pp. AAC 9420688. [Advisor: Wellman, Robert] The purpose of this study was to implement and assess a curriculum on African and African-American art and artists appropriate for elementary school children in a multicultural urban setting in the northeastern part of the United States. The program involved 145 students in a curriculum that includes biographical sketches, slide presentations, studio visits to prominent artists, and hands-on activities. The students were in grades three, four and five. The students learned the three eras of African-American art: the Apprentice, the Journeyman, and the Harlem Renaissance. They also studied the art of Egypt in the time of King Tutankhamen, as well as that of Nubia. More recent African art, including the artifacts of the Dogon people and the thumb painting of the Ndebele women, exposed the children to techniques and designs they could copy. The effects of the program were qualitatively evaluated through a pre-test and post-test administered to these classes. Two sets of open-ended questions were used to assess changes in the children’s understanding. The students’ perceptions of themselves as artists and their awareness and appreciation of art in their communities were also important components of this program. The program had an impact on the children and can become a segment in the elementary art curriculum guide. At present, there is none included in the guide representing the art of Africans and African-Americans. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [↩]

20201. Sen, Gita; Grown, Caren; Development Alternatives With Women for a New Era; DAWN. Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Persepectives: Part 6: Alternative Visions, Strategies and Methods. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. pp. 78-96. At its core, Feminism is a political movement that must remain responsive to the needs and issues of women worldwide. But underlying this diversity, is the conviction that gender subordination must be overcome and that women and men must be equal participants at all levels of societal life. The most fundamental approach to poverty is the complete uprooting of unequal access to resources, control over productive property and trade, and overt and covert race, class and gender differences. These broad changes will require changes in laws, civil codes, systems of property rights, control over our bodies, labor codes, systems or property rights, and social and legal institutions. Strategies to achieve these goals must be based on de-colonization, demilitarization and a reduction in arms spending, and establishing a regulatory regime to control the TNCs. Of course, this program is far from being implemented in a policy environment where, as recently was announced, the Reagan Administration will curtail aid to all African countries that lack geo-strategic value [maintaining aid, for example, to Egypt].

Organizing for this feminist program can be built on traditional women’s enclaves in societies (YWCA, All India Womens Congress, Associated Countrywomen of the World, National Council of Women’s Societies in Nigeria), on newer and more progressive institutions such as the Green Party now established in many countries, unions (such as SEWA, Working Women’s Forum in India, Makulamada in Sri Lanka, 9 to 5 in US, as well as women’s initiative in organizations such as the Malaysian Trade Union), cooperatives and project organizations (such as soup kitchens in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, or Casa da Mulher (Sao Paolo) which encourages self-help and provides sex education, SOS Mulher (Recife) and Casa de la Mujer (Colombia) which focus on domestic violence, Flora Tristan (Lima) which provides legal aid, Gonoashastyo Kendra (Bangladesh), Womens’ Resource Center (Papua New Guinea), Muvman Liberasian Fam (Mauritius)), and research groups (Association of African Women for R&D (AAWORD (Senegal)), Asian Womens Research & Action Network (AWRAAN (Asia)), Women & Development Unit of the University of the West Indies (WAND (Caribbean)), Pacific & Asian Womens Forum (PAWF (Asia-Pacific)), ALCEA (Latin America), Institute for Womens Studies in the Arab World (Middle East); Alliance Against Sex Tourism (Southeast Asia), Greenbelt Movement (Kenya), Chipko Movement (India), Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFAC), Black & Favelas Movement (Brazil); or groups organized around issues of rape, abortion and women’s rights at work including the Mexico Coalition, CARIWA, ISIS International and the International Feminist Network Against the Trafficking of Women). While the UN Decade for the Advance of Women, which was announced under the goals of ‘Development, Equality, Peace’ has delivered little of these promises, millions of women have now realized that development must proceed from women’s perspectives.

20202. Shiva, Vandana. Press Release: Whose Choice? Whose Life? Transcending the Politics of Demographic Fundamentalism and Religious Fundamentalism. Egypt: August 30, 1994. From September 5-13th, governments of the world will meet in Cairo for a Population and Development Conference. While they will be largely discussing policies for the rapid spread to technologies to control of women’s fertility, women’s voice are already being silenced. Two delegations are already out of the home; but with Stael’s Corinne ou l’Italie, travel begins to challenge domesticity and to pose more strongly the issue of women’s presence in the public space. Stael’s public woman of talent inspired future feminists and Flora Tristan in particular to argue for women’s greater freedom and increased access to travel. I conclude my study by focusing on two texts (an autobiography and a novel) in which travel and education have become one: Suzanne Voilquin’s account of her Saint-Simonian missionary work in Egypt, and George Sand’s Nanon, detailing the life history of a peasant woman highly skilled in map-reading. Other authors discussed in the dissertation include Louis-Damien Emeric, Stephanie-Felicite de Genlis, and Gustave Flaubert. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [↩]
peculiar history of reproductive politics of the US. A century ago, when the whole medical establishment wanted to take control over childbirth, it used the criminalization of abortion of enter the domain hitherto controlled by female health experts and practitioners. The first attack on abortion in America did not come from the general public or from the churches. The first anti-abortion activity came from doctors. Abortion was a central element in the efforts of physicians to control their proportions and stop the manpower-intensive wars taking place in the US. Population control is also something “like a war” as Deepa Dhanraj and Abha Bhaiya have documented in the film with the same name. It is also something like war if one goes by US foreign police and defense approach to the population issue. According to US policy, population control activities are a security issue. A summary of the Department of Defense perspective on the effects of worldwide population trends for America's ability to influence events abroad was published in 1989 in the Washington Quarterly, a journal of the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). The report stated: “As difficult and uncertain as the task may be, policy makers and strategic planners in this country have little choice in the coming decades but to pay serious attention to population trends, their causes and their effects. Already the United States has embarked on an era of constrained resources. It thus becomes more important than ever to do those things that will provide more bang for every buck spent on national security. Policy makers must anticipate events and conditions before they occur. They must employ all the instruments of statecraft at their disposal (development assistance and populationplanning)very it as much as new weapon systems”. The Clintonadministration is focusing on the environment, population and women’s rights as driving forces for its foreign policy in a new global politics. Third World populations need to be controlled because the natural resources they use must be freed up for the growth of US corporations. As a National Security Study says: growing population will create growing domestic needs. As a result “...concessions to foreign companies are likely to be expropriated or subjected to arbitrary interaction. Whether through government action, labour conflicts, sabotag, or civil disturbance, the smooth flow of needed materials will be jeopardized...the US economy will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad-especially from less developed countries, and in structural terms, from the developing states. Economic and social stability of the supplying countries. What this imperialistic view on the relationship between resources and population growth does not perceive is that population growth is triggered by appropriation of resources from the common people. Such appropriation which is necessary for diverting resources from people to corporate investment in free trade regimes also fuels social and political instability and unrest, as the Zapatista uprising in Mexico highlighted on New Year's day, 1994. Thus while the objectives of US foreign policy might be stabilisation, the consequence is actually destabilisation. At a deeper level, the urge to control the resources and populations of the Third world comes from fear. There is a fear of the hordes taking over, guided by the realisation that by the year 2010, 80% of the world's population will reside in the Third World. The CSIS report finds that because the types of conflicts likely to dominate in the years ahead are manpower-intensive regional conflicts, developing states may indeed accrue added power and influence. Paul Kennedy in “Preparing for the Twenty First Century” explains that the current demographic strategy of the North reflects the belief that “as in a Darwinian struggle, the faster growing species will encroach upon and eventually overwhelm, a population with static or declining numbers”. Demographic imperialism thus arises out of a sense of demographic marginalisation. However, by couching this policy in the language of “choice”, a North/South conflict over natural resources projected as an issue of woman's rights.

As a National Security Study which has recently been declassified states: “The US can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with the right of the individual to determine freely and responsibly to have or not have children,appear as free choice in the marketplace of contraceptives. However, poor Third World women who are the targets of population control programmes are not “free consumers”. Coercion rather than choice characterises their situation in population control programmes, which are becoming a major component of international aid packages. Due to popular resistance to population control, governments call “family planning” and the World Bank disguises it as “Safe Motherhood”, even though the contraceptives pushed through these programmes are not very safe for women. The World Bank has emerged as a major funder of population control, during 1969-79 it only spent $278m on population programmes. In 1987, the then President promised this would rise to $500m in 1990. In 1995 it had already shot up to $1.3b Preston has now promised to make it further to an annual basis of $2.5b by 1995. Population control policies emerging from Washington D.C., both from US foreign policy and from World Bank policy, are not giving Third World women a chance to present their perspectives on issues that are so central to their lives and their health. The rallying cry of “All against the Holy See” detracts from the economic issues of structural adjustment and unfair trade, and non-sustainable resource use. It also fails to recognize that Catholic fundamentalism is not the fundamentalism most women have to deal with in the Third World.

While the Vatican might be right in calling these policies “demographic imperialism, the Church cannot be treated as the best protector of women’s interest and well-being in matters of health and population planning in the Third World, both because it is an irrelevant institution for a large majority of our people, and because it is a patriarchal institution for women who belong to the Christian religion. The most important challenge in Cairo will be to transcend the politics of Washington DC and the Holy See, and put Third World women at the
centre of the "population" discourse—as subjects, determining their lives and health not as objects of state, or super state policies or as pawns in conflicts between the patriarchies of religion and the patriarchy of the super state systems and the demographic establishment. It is only in transcending patriarchal polarisations that women will be able to set an agenda for economic and social justice, environmental sustainability, and women's right to health. [2]

2003. Sipress, Alan. "Islamic Scholar Accused of Heresy Wins Court Case [charges against Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid dismissed; charged with apostasy for his linguistic research at University of Cairo into the origins of the Quran; apostacy] would void his marriage to a Muslim woman; he has received death threats", in Seattle Times, January 28, 1994. p. A8. [TXT]

2004. Smith, Morna Oruch. Desired Family Size And Desired Child Education Among Recently Married Women In Egypt (Daughters' Education). The Johns Hopkins University. Dissertation. 279pp. AAC 9327662. [Advisor: Sirageldin, Ismail] This study investigates the questions (1) do women who desire more schooling for their daughters desire less children? and (2) do women who desire more children desire less schooling for their daughters? The sample consists of recently married Egyptian women from the Egyptian Fertility Survey of 1980 to approximate the conditions of a static model at the beginning of a married couples' planning period. The sample is 1413 women within seven years of marriage. A representative subsample of 422 women contains additional economic variables. The model assumes that desired family size and desired education for daughters are endogenous and allows them to be simultaneously determined as suggested by the child quantity-quality model of the new home economics. A two-equation model is estimated using Two-Stage Least Squares. The equation for desired family size is specified as a function of desired education for daughters and a series of exogenous variables representing income and wealth, costs, efficiency effects, tastes, supply of children, and region of residence. Desired education for daughters is specified as a function of desired family size and variables representing income and wealth, costs, efficiency effects, tastes, supply of children, and region of residence. Not all variables are available for the full sample, so a series of specifications is used to estimate the model. The results show that desired education for daughters is only a significant determinant of desired family size for total Egypt in the subsample for one specification, though it has the expected negative sign in all equations. Desired education for daughters is not significant in the full sample or for urban or rural Egypt separately. Low variance in desired education for daughters due to high levels of desires in all but rural Upper Egypt may explain these results. This high level of education desired by mothers for daughters may be due to a high perceived rate of return to education. Desired family size has a consistent significant and negative effect on desired education for daughters. The relationship between desired family size and desired education for daughters may be an important factor in Egyptian fertility transition. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [2]

2006. Souley, Abdoulaye; Alouma, Gado. "Islamic Renewal in Niger: From Monolith to Plurality", in Social Compass-International Review of Sociology of Religion, June 1996. pp. 249-265. In the 1988 census, 98.7% of the people of Niger reported themselves to be Muslims, with Animists less than 1% and Christians 0.4%. While Islam has undergone some changes in Niger it is still Islam, and while Niger society has been changed by Islam it remains a distinctive society. The Islam of Niger, which includes for example more freedom for women that in Saudi Arabia, is based on a large literature written by ajamis in Hausa, Fulufude, Kurnouri and Songhai but in Arabic characters. Islamization in Peace. The ideas and tasks fundamental in many other fields such as women's groups, five newer Islamist groups have emerged: AEMUN, ARCI (Association for the Diffusion of Islamic Culture), ANASI (Niger Association for the Call To Islamic Solidarity), Al-Hourci, and Al-Adine Islam. Many of these groups have benefited from subsidies paid by Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait and Iran vying for influence in Niger. For example, in 1972 Libya provided FCA77 million for Islamic education, and in 1972 established the Niger-Libyan Friendship Association. The Kuwaiti African Muslim Agency has built 15 mosques in Niger, five in Niamey alone. Despite competition among Islamist tendencies in Niger, successive waves of Islamization have created a power movement in the country; the Westernized elite is faced, for the first time, with competition for political hegemony within the state.

2007. Soviet Womens Committee. Soviet Women's Committee: Part 9: International Womens Year. Tashkent: Soviet Women's Committee, 1976. The 27th session of the UN General Assembly has proclaimed the year 1975, International Women's Year. This decision, taken on the initiative of the Women's International Democratic Federation, is of immense importance for women the world over. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women which inspired the decision to observe International Women's Year, states that "the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of universal peace require the maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields. "Discrimination against women is incompatible with human dignity and with the welfare of the family and of society, prevents their participation, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries and is an obstacle to the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity." The UN decision to observe International Women's Year represents an important success for the democratic women's movement throughout the world since it indicates recognition of the new role of women in modern society. The Programme for the observance of International Women's Year adopted by the United Nations sets three principal objectives before the governments and the public: to intensify activities with a view to achieving women's equality, assuring their participation in the economic, social and cultural development of their countries and enhancing their role in the development of friendly relations and cooperation between all nations and in the strengthening of world peace. Thus the following motto has been formulated: Peace: Peace and Development. The ideas and tasks fundamental to International Women's Year have attracted the attention of the world public and provided a sound basis for joint action; for example, the UN Women's Commission has been sponsored and initiated within the framework of International Women's Year by international and national women's, trade union, youth, cooperative and religious organizations, by movements for peace and national independence. The Soviet Women's Committee took part in a symposium of women from 280
Asian and African countries sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization and held in Alexandria (ARE) in 3/1975. Its theme, "Women and Social Development", attracted the attention of women's and other organizations in 55 countries. A delegation of the Soviet Women's Committee told the participants in the seminar held by the All-Africa Women's Organization in Mogadishu, Somalia, in April 1975, how Soviet women contribute to the country's economic development and rearing of the younger generation.

Another Soviet delegation attended the regional seminar held by women's organizations of European countries on the theme: "Economic independence of European women on the threshold of the 21st century". It took place at Brussels and was sponsored by the Belgian National Committee for the observance of International Women's Year. Another seminar was held at the UN Headquarters in early May on the initiative of the Women's International Democratic Federation and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. It was attended among others by a number of women's and other organizations from America. A Soviet representative read a paper entitled "Disarmament and its Social Aspects. Contribution of Soviet Women to a Solution of These Problems". The UN World Conference of International Women's Year held in Mexico City in June-July 1975 was a landmark of International Women's Year. It was attended by delegations from 133 countries and by representatives of national-liberation movements and almost one hundred international non-governmental organizations. Most speakers at the Conference were concerned with the social causes of inequality and discrimination to which women in many countries are still subjected; ardent appeals to secure and strengthen peace, the main condition for the realization of the objectives set, were repeatedly voiced. The Conference devoted much attention to the question of solidarity with all fighters for freedom and national independence. Resolutions pledging solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine and the patriots of Chile fighting against reaction for the re-establishment of democracy in their country were adopted as well as a resolution on rendering aid to the Vietnamese people in restoring their war-ravaged economy. The main documents adopted at the Conference-the World Action Programme and the Mexico City Declaration-emphasize the following points: The problems facing women who constitute one half of the world population are in effect problems facing society as a whole, for equitable and growing participation of women in the development of their countries serves to sharply accelerate the rates of their development and preserve peace; To ensure women's equality and their broad participation in the development of their countries, it is necessary to carry out basic socio-economic reforms and create a system which would rule out any possibility of exploitation; The strengthening of peace and security of nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, disarmament, liquidation of colonialism, neocolonialism, racialism and apartheid, the fostering and maintenance of new economic relations based on the principles of peace and justice are indispensable to achieving women's equality and upholding human rights. The Soviet Women's Committee is a participant in and initiator of many international events which are conducted within the framework of the Year both within the Soviet Union and abroad. For example, a Committee sponsored seminar of representatives of women's organizations of Asian countries was held in July in Alma-Ata the capital of Kazakhstan. The seminar was also attended by representatives of the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, UNESCO, and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The delegates discussed the questions of women's participation in the economic development of their countries and the rearing of the younger generation. The international meeting held in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, the theme of which was "Women in the Struggle Against Fascism, for a Lasting and Just Peace on Earth", discussed the struggle for peace and disarmament. Second World War veterans told the delegates about Soviet women who took part in the underground movement and fought as partisans in the last war. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the great victory over fascism, which coincided with the time of the forum, a monument to the "Soviet Mother-patriot" was unveiled in the town of Zhodino. Its prototype is Anastasiya Kupriyanova, the honorary citizen of Zhodino who lost her five sons in the war.

A World Congress devoted to International Women's Year is due to be held in Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, at the end of 10/1975. It will be an important event. The proposal of the Women's International Democratic Federation to conduct this forum on a wide basis with the participation of not only women's organizations but also youth, working-class, religious and other organizations, and movements for peace and solidarity was supported by more than one hundred international, regional and national organizations, noted public figures and statesmen, parliamentarians and UN representatives. An International Preparatory Committee was set up, consisting of representatives of 45 international and 54 national organizations of all continents. At the consultative meetings held in Paris and Tihan (Hungary) it was agreed that the Congress would discuss problems associated with women's equality on the job, in society and in the family, and questions of ensuring peace and national independence of peoples and social progress. Thus, the theme of the Congress transcends the question of women's equality. This opens up wide opportunities for joint action by social forces of different political orientations pursuing the common aims of strengthening peace and security, halting the arms race and assuring national independence and social progress. Soviet women acclaim the holding of the Congress. They are convinced that the joint effort of the progressive forces of the world will achieve much in 1975 for the cause of women's social emancipation, the consolidation of peace and development of cooperation and friendly relations between nations. [The UN World Conference of International Women's Year was held in Mexico City from 6/19-7/2/1975. The documents adopted there denote the contribution women are making to the struggle for peace and international cooperation. Photo shows the assembly hall at the Juan de la Barrera sports complex where the Conference opened.] [=]


20209. Stork, Joe. "Political Aspects of Health", in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. pp. 4-10. Health is a fundamental part of every individual's life: the WHO definition of health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not simply the absence of disease or infirmity", poses health as a social construct (WHO stated this as the world goal for 2000 at a conference held in Alma Ata in 1978, mainly through primary care). However, health also has a political dimension, which is defined in terms of class: that is, will health resources be used to improve nutrition, sanitation and the workplace environment, or be used to import expensive, high-tech technologies for the benefit of the elite. While the Middle East has seen dramatic improvements in health for children, its still poor child health will mean that 5 million needless child deaths can be expected from the present population. Oil money provided the basis for the import of hospital technologies (Saudi Arabia opened 80 hospitals in 1970-1985; the UAE now has 31 hospitals with a population of 1.5 million). Racial and gender differences exist in health care throughout the region (while on the West Bank among Palestinians girls are three times as likely to be malnourished than boys, Israelis discriminate systematically against Palestinians in the health care system). Health care is also rationed by wealth, as in the US: the oil states offer all their citizens health care, while in Egypt, the huge and chaotic health system provides excellent care to the rich while masses of slum dwellers have no health care. In Israel, the medical sector is complex, with Histadrut controlled Kupat Holim (receiving government subsidies) competing with lower paid doctors at the government socialized medical sector (only the opposition of Histadrut has prevented the emergence of Israeli socialized medicine.

Among the first communications of Arab Problems. Here students from different countries study Arabic duties in the Field. United States Army in World War II: Special Studies.

renaissance of the Arab East. Since 1945 it had been the headquarters of a number of writers and especially from Abdullah Nadim. With the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 the situation changed radically. Thus there was a setback to education which had got to be paid for. Nevertheless, the development of national culture could not be prevented as was shown by the activities of numerous writers and especially Mustafa Kamil. The years 1919-1930 were called Egypt's period of national renaissance. As a result of the hopes inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1917, there was a national rising against the British in 1919. It had enormous influence on the development of a national culture and on belles lettres. A group of writers, prominent among them whom was Taha Husain, expressed the strivings of progressive circles of the nationalbourgeoisie. The creator of the Egyptian novel was Mahmud Husain who was greatly influenced by Chekhov. After the Wafd government took office in 1942 new journals with progressive tendencies were brought out until they were closed down by subsequent governments with reaction tendency. In 1952 and 1956 a school of progressive writers came out in favor of realism and nationalism (narodnost') and against reactionary romanticism and individualism. The hero of novels was the builder of a new Egypt. The new tendency which spread to the theater and music received recognition in all Arab countries. Cairo became the center of a renaissance of the Arab East. Since 1945 it had been the headquarters of the Arab League. In 1953 the League set up a Higher Institute for the Study of Arab Problems. Here students from different countries study Arabic literature and history, economics, and the question of Arab unity and of the formation of an Arab nation. [From: “Part IV: Egypt: 1955-1958”, in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. p. 28.]

20211. Torjesen, Karen J. Women Were Priests: Women's Leadership in the Early Church and the Scandal of Their Subordination in the Rise of Christianity. San Francisco, Calif.: Harper San Francisco, 1993. Although most modern Christians believe that women played little or no role in the early church, there is ample evidence that women were even bishops in the early church, and that this history has been forgotten through centuries of often deliberate concealment. One major reason that this early role has been lost is that in the division between public and private space, with the the role of women restricted in Hellenistic/Greco-Roman societies to the private sphere, that the development of Christianity from a private, often persecuted faith, to a public faith resulted in the eclipse of women. Women did have some public religious role in the Hellenistic culture, as in the role of prophetesses, found among Christians from Rome to Phrygia to Tertullian's Tunisia, yet this role was an uneasy one, and against the prevailing gender roles of Hellenistic culture, could provide no general paradigm. An instance of this gender role conflict can be seen in the Gospel of Mary, found in 1945 at Nag Hammadi in Upper Egypt that preserves a long forgotten tradition of the leadership role of Mary Magdalene and her gender role conflict with Peter. As Christianity entered the broader Hellenistic society, it adopted the norms of gender roles for women, if only through a process characterized by harsh rhetoric and demands that women accept their ordained subordinate role. Similarly, Rabbis argued that for women education was comparable to lechery (in the Mishnah tractae 'Sotah' (On the Suspected Adulteress), Rabbi Elezer states: "If a man gives his daughter a knowledge of the Law, it is as though he taught her lechery"), and generally Jews adopted the prevailing Hellenistic/Greco-Roman gender sociology. Unlike Jews, who could (as did the Alexandrine Jews) win special privileges as a recognized race, Christians, a hodge-podge of converts, could not win this same status, and were seen dismissively by Romans as the "Third Race"; this lack of legitimacy within the Hellenistic-Roman social order would sustain the prominent role of women in what was by necessity a group that remained outside the mainstream (ethnically, socially, politically and in gender roles). Ultimately, the assertion of a leadership role by women in religion could not be equated with fornication: John the Seer wrote to the church in Thyatira: "Yet I have this against you: you tolerate that Jezebel, the woman who claims to be a prophetess, who by her teaching lures my servants into fornication and eating food sacrificed to idols. I have given her time to repent, but she refuses to repent of her fornication..." (Rev. 2:20-23). Hence, in this new era of Christian virtues as gendered Hellenistic virtues, women's virtues were chastity, silence and obedience. The final consolidation of this submissive paradigm of women's conduct came as Christian communities acquired prestige and sought to conduct themselves in imitation of municipal councils in the same manner as did Jewish communities: with this normalization of the Christian community through normative politico-religious institutions, their institutions necessarily (as had comparable Jewish institutions) acquired legitimacy as they normalized themselves, and especially their gender roles, in the Hellenistic/Greco-Roman manner. [Oddly, although the author assumes a misogynist convergence between Jews and Christians, the status of the two communities is clearly quite different: the processes that sustained the prominence of women in the early Christians communities were absent among the Jews; similarly, the process of assimilation followed by Christians was specifically absent among Jews, as the author does note. It seems that the author draws a false analogy between Jews and Christians perhaps due to a simple lack of interest in the question of the status of women in the Jewish community.]

specialists to reach the field were the bilingual telephone operators in the first overseas unit, which reached North Africa in 1/1943. Two WAAC officers also went to the Eighth Air Force in England, even before arrival of the European theater staff director, to plan for Signal Corps Waacs in that command. A considerable percentage of the first WAAC unit to reach England consisted of telephone operators and other communications personnel, sent with the approval of the Chief Signal Officer but without Army technical training.

At about this time, the first units began to reach the Signal Corps' own installations in the US. First to arrive, in 3/1943, were units assigned to Camp Crowder, Missouri, which by the end of the WAAC totaled some 489 enrolled women and 100 officers. Another unit under Signal Corps control went to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in 6/1943, and still others were on requisition. However, most women in these units were not technical specialists, but clerical and overhead workers to aid in running the schools. [SigC Stf Dir file.]

From the first there was no doubt of these units' success in the assigned duties. In Allied Headquarters in North Africa, the assistant chief signal officer stated:

The manner in which they picked up the work was outstanding...Had we had enough of them, we could have used them to operate all our fixed communications installations--telephones and telegraph--throughout the rear areas. Every one...released some man for Signal Corps duty up in the combat zone.

The former chief signal officer of the AAF in North Africa added:

Don't tell me a woman can't keep a secret. Why, their own company commander doesn't even know where the board is located--we've tested the girls again and again. [The WAC in the SigC, Speech by Col Oveta Culp Hobby, SigC file, OCMH. See Ch. XX, below for North African Theater of Operations details.]

The Chief Signal Officer, Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead, on a visit to the area, was informed by the theater commander that approximately 1300 more Signal Corps Waacs in ten different specialties would be required if obtainable. The same good reports were received from the European theater, where, after a one-week indoctrination course, 100 WAAC telephone operators were assigned to operate multiple switchboards at five command headquarters. The officer in charge reported, "Very soon I received praise of the improved service, as the good results were noticed almost immediately." [Appendix to SigC WAC Narrative.]

Another early success was the participation of twenty-nine WAC telephone operators in the Quebec Conference in 8/1943. Rushed from train to switchboard, the women were on continuous duty for eighteen hours and doubled as secretaries and stenographers when a shortage of these occurred. After seventeen days of secret duty, each member received an individual commendation. Waacs also served successfully on the switchboards at the Cairo Conference and the Potsdam Conference. The manner in which they picked up the work was outstanding. [Ibid. (2) Speech cited n. 15. (3) Interv with Capt Jane Reeves, SigC WAC Stf Dir, 5/3/1946.]

Requests from Signal officers in the United States continued to indicate an urgent need for more Waacs, since current directives required release of their general service men. Civilian replacements were scarce, and available limited service men often were unsuitable. [Ltr, Post SigO, Ft Bliss Texas, to Chief MPB OCSigO. SigC 322 WAC 1943.]

In general such requests also indicated a desire for Signal Corps technical training for the women. In England the using agencies, desiring telelypists, had been obliged to train WAAC typists in the theater, which they protested was a task more properly assumed by the Signal Corps in the United States. Studies showed that women could, with training, fill 78 different Signal Corps jobs. Therefore, in 5/1943, Brig. Gen. Henry L. P. King's successor, Col. Duncan Hodges, put the long-delayed WIRES plan into effect. The women were to be trained first in Signal Corps duties in an inactive WAAC status, and then sent to basic training. Objectives were set at some 2000 women, the first of whom reported in late 5/1943 to a training course at the State Teachers' College at Livingston, Alabama, with eleven other schools scheduled for later opening. [Ibid. (1) Ltr, Hq AAF to AACS, 7/31/1944, and incis WD G-1 220.3 WAC (8/7/1944).

SigC WAC narrative. (3) Memo, Dir MPD ASF for Dir Pers ASF 10/26/1943. SPAP 341 WAAC (2/26/1943).]


The first request for Wacs in Cairo was received in the fall of 1943 from Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce. General Royce at this time asked only for twelve WAC secretaries "to prevent the constant and sometimes serious leaks in information." [Memo, MPD ASF for TAG, 11/10/1945, sub: WAC Pers for Gen Royce per Msg JM 1814, 10/27/1945 (CM-IN 16628). SPGAR 220.3 WAC, Dir Pers ASF, DRB AGO.]

The request was approved, and in 12/1943 ten enlisted women and two WAAC officers were flown to the area. Capt. Josephine Dyer headed the group and later served as staff director. Other requests followed: one for 240 women for theater headquarters, which was approved; one for 600 women for Tehran, which was disapproved on the grounds of nonavailability of WAC personnel; and two others, of 150 more Wacs for theater headquarters and 104 for the 19th Weather Squadron, which were disapproved by Operations Division of the War Department on the grounds that no military vacancies existed in the command. Before making these requisitions, the theater had entertained some hopes of on-the-spot enlistment of American women living in Cairo, but it was found that 49 out of 50 eligible civilian women refused to enlist, and the idea of local recruiting was abandoned as it had been in Europe. [(1) Cbl CM-IN 1072, 2/4/1944, Cbl 2442 2/3/1944. (2) Memo, Stf for Dir WAC, 1/31/1944, WDGAP 320.2 sec 8a. (3) WAC AMET Summary.]

The shipment of 240 women for the Cairo area was accordingly organized in the US in 2/1944. It reached the theater only after an exhausting four-month struggle to get shipping space, during which the unit spent a month at Fort Oglethorpe, a month in one area at Camp Shank, three weeks in another area, a week at Camp Patrick Henry, three weeks on shipboard, and ten days in Naples. The delay proved trying for the women, who were so eager to get overseas that 118 of them, 13 in the first three grades, voluntarily relinquished their ratings in order to comply with the theater's requisition for unrated personnel. The women were described as "dejected and disillusioned" during the months of waiting, but their morale rose rapidly as soon as they were in transit. [Unit Hist Cairo Det; WAC AMET Summary; and esp Unit Hist Camp Huckstep, p. 4.]

Arriving in Cairo on 6/16/1944, the women were sent to Camp Huckstep, where living conditions were pronounced by detachment officers to be "far superior to any experienced by the unit since its inception." The brick-and-wood barracks were clean, modern, and airy, and latrines were in the same building. There was plenty of hot water, and a laundry with ironing boards and washing machines. In this the women's barracks were superior to those of some of the men's units, which did not all at this time have hot water. Barracks had single-decked beds, pillows, bedding, and shelves and hangers for clothing; there was also a well-furnished dayroom with recreation equipment. On the whole, the accommodations were described as being "in striking and overwhelming contrast to the haphazard facilities encountered in the US." The only difficulty was a temporary one when, on the first morning, it was announced that Maj. Gen. Benjamin L. Giles was to review the Wacs immediately, and 240 travel-wrinkled women descended simultaneously.
on ten electric irons. [Ibid. All quotations from Unit Hist Camp Huckstep.] Within a week, 126 of the women moved to Cairo for duty with Headquarters, Africa-Middle East Theater; the remaining 114 at Camp Huckstep were assigned to the Middle East Service Command. The unit in Cairo was billeted in the New Hotel, two to five women to a room. At the end of the year, after winter rains had flooded parts of the building, and after the arrival of more Wacs left it overcrowded, the Wacs moved to new quarters in a modern building with a bedroom for every three women and a complete post exchange and hairdressing shop. [Unit Hist Cairo Det, p. 3.]

As the women were interviewed and assigned to duty, a fundamental problem emerged: the theater was already at full authorized strength and not in desperate need of personnel. If Wacs replaced enlisted men, the men were idle, and if Wacs were merely added as supernumeraries, there was only part-time work for all concerned. The majority of the women were stenographers, clerks, and typists; others were messengers, bookkeepers, telephone operators, and teletypists. Many were assigned as secretaries to ranking officers, and others were placed in almost every staff section of the two headquarters, with the largest numbers in the adjutant general's office, the Signal Corps, and the Censorship Section. [Asgmts at Hq not listed 7/1944 asgmts at Camp Huckstep given in Unit Hist.]

While most women were well satisfied with the type of work assigned them, the fact that it was not full-time caused a continuing morale problem among both men and women. At Camp Huckstep, the WAC historian reported:

MORALE was affected by the exigent morale at Camp Huckstep, which was poor and contagious. The majority of the men, and consequently of the women, felt that they were not actually needed and that what they were doing was not important to the war effort. Wacs were resented by some of the men. [Unit Hist Camp Huckstep, p. 20.]

Promotions could not be given to any of the Wacs, even to a few who had replaced master sergeants, so long as the command remained overstretched. The Cairo report added:

Comfortable living quarters and opportunities for enjoyment seem to be secondary in building morale...the important factor is the feeling that they are needed and that individual assignments keep them busy. [Unit Hist Cairo Det, 8/1944 9/1944.]

During the first summer, only 56 of the 240 Wacs replaced enlisted men. Toward the end of this time, the theater appealed to the War Department for authority to return the surplus men to the US. By 10/1944, enough men had been removed from the theater so that 157 promotions were made among the Wacs, chiefly to the grades of private first class and corporal. These were followed by others at intervals. By East. (2) Incl 3 to Craighill IBT Rpt.]

The morale for the past period has improved...due partly to the fact that most of the women are now fairly busy, and also to the fact that they have a feeling of being generally accepted as a part of Headquarters. [(1) WAC AMET Summary. (2) Ltr, ME to TAG, 8/15/1944. AG 320.2, Hobby files. (3) Quotation from Unit Hist Cairo Det, p. 7.]

The theater consistently directed its efforts toward devices to maintain troop morale, and in these the Wacs were allowed to share fully. At Camp Huckstep, women were admitted to the excellent recreational facilities—a theater, a service club with cafeteria, game room, and library, and sports equipment. In Cairo, women were allowed to join a club with swimming, tennis, and golf facilities. At both stations, Wacs shared athletic programs in league baseball, volleyball, hockey, basketball, and even touch football, although such programs appealed only to the younger women. Women were also admitted to off-duty classes offered by the Armed Forces Institute in such subjects as French, Arabic, shorthand, and photography. Social activities were also encouraged, with organized parties and holiday celebrations, but the Wacs reported that such activities soon became burdensome and most women declined unit invitations. [Unit Hist Camp Huckstep, 7/1944 and 10/1944 appendices.]

Wacs likewise were given the same amount of leaves and passes as the men, and were provided with equal transportation and accommodations to visit various points of interest for sightseeing or recreation. There were frequent conducted tours of the environs of Cairo, and visits by some of the women to Bengasi, Alexandria, Cyprus, Palestine, and other areas.

Restrictions were seldom sufficient to cause complaint. Marriages were permitted, suitable married quarters were provided, and women were allowed and even encouraged to spend furloughs with husbands stationed elsewhere. Nevertheless, WAC marriages in the theater were not frequent. [WAC AMET Summary gives 16; Unit Hist Cairo Det gives 17.]

Considering the climate and the sanitary hazards of the surrounding cities, the women's health remained good. A sanitary mess was maintained, and the nature of the area caused only minor discomforts. During the winter a water shortage was suffered, and cold weather made the unheated buildings chilly, but kerosene stoves were soon obtained and men's pile jackets were issued to the women. Heavy winter rains found a small Nile coursing through the WAC area and the improved view was enjoyed by both women and men until the fence was put back up. None of these minor environmental difficulties had any appreciable effect on morale or health.

Major Craighill, who visited the area late in 12/1944, found the women's health good and illnesses "relatively less than in other units in the area." In the Cairo unit, women suffered the usual respiratory and gastrointestinal conditions, but in less degree than the men, and there had been no cases of venereal disease, pregnancy, malaria, or the hepatitis that was prevalent in the area. Emotional maladjustments had been minor, only one case requiring return to the US.

Camp Huckstep Wacs had likewise had no unusual medical conditions except an increase of appendectomies to a total of almost 10% of the group. There had been no cases of venereal disease, and only one pregnancy, which had existed before arrival in the theater. However, Camp Huckstep Wacs had experienced a number of minor maladjustment problems and two serious psychiatric cases, one of which had to be sent back to the US. These cases were not more numerous than similar cases among men and, according to Major Craighill, "were reflections of the enlisted men's attitude of frustration in an area removed from the combat zone." Improvement in this respect was noted when surplus personnel was shipped out. Gynecological conditions were minor and caused no loss of time from work or any evacuation of personnel from the area. [Passage on health, including quotations and statistics: (1) Memo Maj Margaret Craighill for The SG USA through Chief Surg USAFIME, 1/8/1945, sub: Health Conditions of Nurses and Wacs in USAFIME. SGO Hist Div 319.1 Spec Rpt--Middle East. (2) Incd 3 to Craighill IBT Rpt.]

The only policy problem noted by historians was a minor version of the Pacific and European theaters' major problem: the question of direct commissions for enlisted women who were secretaries to ranking general officers. As soon as the news of such commissions elsewhere reached the theater, General Royce was repeatedly applied to the War Department for permission to commission his secretary. The request, with others like it, was refused upon the insistence of Director Hobby, who had secured a ruling against any further such action as a result of the bad publicity accompanying earlier cases. The director suggested instead that the woman, if qualified, be selected by regular board procedure and returned to officer candidate school with promise of return to the area upon graduation. General Royce instead preferred to appoint the secretary a warrant officer, which he did. No further comment resulted except sharp newspaper criticism of the commanding general's wisdom in using public funds to make his personal plane available to the secretary and her husband for an extended honeymoon tour of the Mediterranean. [Memo, Dir WAC for CoIS USA, 4/14/1944. WDWAC 314.7. Approved by CoIS, 4/18/1944, forwarded to TAG, 4/21/1944. WDWAC 210.1.]

As the end of the war neared, restlessness increased, and both men and women were heard commenting that they wished they were in Italy, France, America, or almost any other place. Luckily the waiting period was not long, and soon after V-J Day shipment began, with the last Wacs returning home in 10/1945. Colonel Boyce, who stopped in Cairo
shortly afterward on her way home from India, interviewed the chief of staff and stated that "The Wacs were highly commended for their work and they were released only when there was no longer a job to be done. [Boyce Rpt of visit to WAC Pers in Overseas Theaters, 9/21/1945-11/26/1945, Tab F: AMET. Hobby files also OCMH.]

Although recommending a two-year limit on the tour of duty, Major Craighill stated that the theater's experience with the employment of Wacs and nurses had proved that "Women service personnel are capable of adjusting satisfactorily to difficult environmental problems under proper administrative control." Other authorities concurred, with the additional comment that employment in an inactive theater would possibly always present problems of full-time employment and therefore of morale. [=

20214. United States House; House Committee on International Relations. Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Appendix: Prepared Statement by Terrence J. Brown, Deputy Asst. Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development: Egypt. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia; Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995, pp. 29-31. USAID assistance to Egypt reflects Egypt's essential role in the peace process. Since the Camp David Accords, Egypt has been a strong ally of the US, a moderating force in the Middle East, and a strong supporter of an overall settlement between Israel, its neighbors, and the PLO.

With our support, Egypt has been able to shift its effort from maintaining a 30-year state of war to addressing major development challenges, including rapid population growth, ineffective economic policies, poor infrastructure, and a sluggish economy. As a result, Egyptians now have access to dependable electricity, cleaner water, improved health care schools, more reliable telecommunications, better village infrastructure and services, new technologies for agriculture production, and better access to credit for small business development. Population growth rates have fallen, and child maternal health have improved.

America's partnership with Egypt is aimed at enhancing stability, democracy and prosperity in Egypt and the region. USAID's programs are designed to help Egypt pursue sustainable development by bringing its population growth rates to more manageable levels, accelerating the economic policy reforms necessary for job-creation in the private sector and foreign investment, strengthening civic society and democratic institutions, and addressing environmental concerns affecting nations health and economy.

The Commodity Import program, whereby Egyptian companies purchase US goods, has benefitted over 1400 American manufacturers and exporters from approximately 46 states. In addition, US firms in construction, services, services, manufacturing, and technical services are heavily involved in implementing Egypt's project assistance.

The impact of USAID's assistance to Egypt has been substantial. USAID programs are responsible for saving over 80000 Egyptian children each year through use of USAID finance oral rehydration therapy and immunizations. Infant mortality rates have declined from 97 deaths per thousand in 1998 to 61 deaths per thousand in 1992, a 37% decline. The population growth rate has declined from 2.9% to 2.1% over the past ten years. In education, more than 1 million students are enrolled in 1950 USAID-financed primary preparatory schools. These children likely would not be able attend school otherwise.

Over 23 million people benefit from improved water and wastewater systems. USAID has financed the installation and rehabilitation of over 5000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity, 40% of Egypt's total capacity. USAID support has contributed to major policy reform measures including stabilization of the foreign exchange rate, a major reduction in the budge deficit, liberalization of the economy, and a removal of agricultural controls. The latter has led to a 46% increase in the cultivated land area devoted to major crops, and has led to production increases of approximately 36% for wheat, 26% for rice, and 28% for maize over the last few years.

Despite this progress, however, much remains to be done if Egypt is to realize its potential as a stable and prosperous economy in a peaceful Middle East. Since 1991, the Egyptian Government has begun instituting the macroeconomic reforms that are necessary to stabilize and stimulate the economy after 40 years of state intervention. Subsidies and trade barriers have been reduced, the foreign exchange rate has been unified and stabilized, the budget deficit has dropped from 20% of gross domestic product to under 4%, and interest rates have been liberalized. But the pace of reforms has been disappointing, and little progress has been made on key areas such as privatization. We are concerned that the government is not meeting targets for economic policy reform negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

We are pleased, however, that the Egyptians have just agreed to the economic reform benchmarks for USAID assistance, including reducing tariff rates, reducing administrative costs to exporters, privatizing at least 15 additional public enterprises, and promoting private banks' participation in financial markets.

Finally, we expect that the new Gore-Mubarak Initiative announced last 9/1994 will bring greater focus to the US-Egyptian partnership for economic growth and development. USAID is funding a number of new activities spurred by the initiative, including providing technical assistance to improve quality standards for Egyptian exports, creating manufacturing technology centers, and addressing Cairo's air pollution problems with lead abatement measures. Sustainable economic growth in Egypt must be built upon an expanding private sector, competitive in the world marketplace. [=

20215. United States House; House Committee on International Relations. Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Statement of Mr. Terrence J. Brown, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development: Part 01. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia; Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995. pp. 5-7. Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I will submit my written remarks for the record and would like to briefly summarize some of its major points.

First of all, in the Middle East, the USAID program is clearly an essential tool to the US foreign policy. For a lasting peace to be realized, the people of the region themselves must believe their lives and that of their children will be better.

Secondly, the USAID program in the region has a clear record of success. We have improved people's lives and created hope for the future. For example, in Egypt, the same level of assistance over a number of years has successfully reduced infant mortality by 50%. 80000 children are now being saved each year as a result of the USAID child survival activities and approximately 23 million Egyptians benefit from improved water and wastewater systems.

Third, while success can be cited, critical development problems still must be addressed. We are tailoring our aid program to address these problems to build the conditions that will support peace and prosperity in the region. In no part of the region is the urgency of action more clear than in Gaza and the West Bank. I, therefore, want to focus the rest of my remarks on the West Bank-Gaza program and what we are doing to address the situation there.

In response to the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn in 9/1993, the US mobilized the donor community to translate the dreams of peace into tangible results for the lives of Palestinians. The US pledge of $100 million a year over the next 5 years includes $75 million a year in USAID-managed funds.

The vast majority of these funds finance specific activities that build the infrastructure, institutional, and human capacity for a stable, productive West Bank and Gaza. These projects will be carried out by American private voluntary organizations, by private sector firms, and international organizations such as the UNDP.

Thus far, USAID has built or upgraded more than 1200 clinics, houses, and schools. We have funded training for more than 7000 Palestinian men and women. We have helped create more than 4000 jobs for Palestinians. In addition, a portion of our aid was contributed to a multilender fund supporting the startup costs of the Palestinian Authority.
This support has been essential to the delivery of public services in the West Bank and Gaza.

However, the complex political situation creates unique challenges for the implementation of any assistance program. Therefore, despite our commitments and those of other donors, many Palestinians complain that they have yet to see the benefits of peace.

USAID has responded to this fragile and changing situation by working with the State Department to refocus our program to maximize support for the peace process. We have just restructured our current program to emphasize job creation and the improvement of basic infrastructure. We needed a program which would be more visible and be delivered more rapidly than previously.

The USAID program will focus on Gaza where the needs are most urgent. To produce visible results quickly, we will work primarily with international and nongovernmental organizations that are already on the ground and have the capacity to mobilize people and resources quickly. These new activities include paving streets, renovating community buildings, rehabilitating housing and upgrading sewer and stormwater systems in Gaza. Upgrading the stormwater and sewage systems will have a significant environmental and health benefit for over 125,000 people by eliminating flooding and removing raw sewage from the streets of Gaza City.

When I was recently in Gaza, I visited a site with the chief engineer for the city of Gaza. As we were walking around what is a pretty abysmal situation, a number of people approached him, as they usually do, he said. For the first time, he was able to say that, yes, some relief was coming in a situation which, at the individual local residence, is truly awful.

USAID is also supporting a wide range of activities designed to generate employment through private sector development through technical assistance and marketing and production and loan guarantees for small and medium businesses. In addition to changing the focus of the program to better respond to the current situation and the needs on the ground, USAID has cut through its business as usual procedures to speed up the delivery of resources to people.

For example, it normally takes 9-12 months to design a project, and sometimes longer. In the case of Gaza, for the job creation and infrastructure activities, we have been able to compress that time to less than 4 weeks. This is an example of the sweeping reforms USAID has been making in the last 18 months.

In addition to our efforts, there is a great deal of effort at the local level and through donor coordination. The World Bank and the UN have resident representatives who are in the leadership role in a group called the Local Aid Coordinating Committee. This committee has become fundamental in helping to coordinate all donor assistance in the West Bank and Gaza.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Middle East is of vital interest to the US. USAID programs are helping to support our national interest by building a foundation for economic growth, for social development and stable and democratic political systems.

While many countries in the region have achieved remarkable successes in some sectors, many still face significant development challenges. The cost of failing to deal with these challenges today will be far higher tomorrow. Sustained and concerted effort today will help attain the comprehensive peace that will give all countries in the region a chance to thrive.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown appears in the appendix.]


Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Egypt

www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads

Condemn Practice of Female Genital Mutilation or Female Circumcision", in Congressional Record, 103rd Congress, Second Session, September 21, 1994. p. S13100.

20222. Valenzona, Rosa Linda G. "Population Control, The New Imperialism: To Argue As Population Planners Do That A Poor Woman With Many Babies Is Unhappy Is Disgenuous, and To Call Unplanned Pregnancy "Unleashed" Is Unfair", in Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1994. p. A14. On Cebu, recently many women feared to have government tetanus shots since there were rumors that the injections were really contraceptives. Many Filipina women are fearful that government health plans are family planning efforts: all too often, poor women receiving medical treatment are automatically recommended to have abortions when they are pregnant. However, "having babies is a poor woman's only inalienable right". Robbing Third World women of this right is demographic imperialism: with the rich white countries targeting individual Third World women. Reproductive choice cannot be created by government order, but only as economic development gives couples a reason to buy contraceptives with their own money. [Valenzona is a former undersecretary of Philippine Department of Social Welfare & Development.] [TXT]

20223. Van Impe, Jack. Perhaps Today (Newsletter), Jack Van Impe Ministries [Box J, Royal Oak, MI 48068], March 1992. The collapse of the Soviet Union is bringing a worldwide surge in anti-semitism worldwide, but especially in the United States and Russia. Cupied with the prophecies of the closing of General Motors' plants, unnamed rabbinc scholars forecast the end of the world on Rosh Hashanah 1999. Spain's growing military power may be used to back the Palestinians against Israel, and it may be possible that Butros Butros-Ghali is the king foretold in Daniel.

20224. Vilner, Meir. Two Years Since the June 1967 War: Part 11: Recognition of the Right of Palestinian Arab People. Pamphlet. New York: Jefferson Book Store, April 6, 1969. This is indeed a true, scientific analysis of the situation, of the official Israeli policy. We, the Communists, have always said that the policy of relying on imperialism and the policy of repudiation of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and even of its very existence, are interconnected. Therefore we have always maintained that an Israeli policy according with the cause of national independence and peace must include these two elements: stopping the dependence on the imperialist powers and recognition of the just national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and in the first place of the right of the refugees to choose between return to their homeland and receipt of compensations. It is possible to solve the Palestinian question on the basis of the right to self-determination of the peoples. Prof. Talmon writes on this subject: "In the eyes of the world, and in my eyes too, recognition of non-recognition of the Palestinian Arabs as a group entitled to self-determination is the basic question. It is the criterion which will determine if our intentions are towards respecting the rights of others, or towards ignoring them. This is the measure for ascertaining the democratic character and the moral essence of our state. Those who claim that by recognizing the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, we call in question our own right to live--in this country and to constitute a state in it, do not know what they are talking about. The truth is diametrically opposed--the recognition of the rights of others gives unshakable moral validity to our claim, and their negation deprives us of any moral right, at least in the eyes of the gentiles, who cannot be told that we have a 'kushan' (certificate of registration of immovables, according to imperial Ottoman law, still applicable in Israel - trans.) from God, blessed be He, entitling us to Jenin and Nablus."

These principles were correct and have remained correct till this day. Life has proved that negating or ignoring them has brought nothing but new wars. These principles of a patriotic Israeli policy, which are air-conditioned buses and countless security checks swarmed the Cairo "Call", in EcoNews Africa, Vol 3(19). Armed forces, guarded air-conditioned buses and countless security checks swarmed the Cairo Conference Centre. Delegates in fashionable albeit formal outfits solemnly miled the corridors of the air conditioned venue - looking set to round up the last leg of the controversial International Conference on Population and Development -ICPD. Despite the hue and cry by Muslims

20225. Vrazo, Fawn. "Close-Up: New Sterilization Tack a Savior or a Menace?", in Seattle Times, December 4, 1993. p. A3. The 'revolutionary 'quinacrine pellet' has started being used throughout the Third World to sterilize poor women. The technique involves release of a small amount of a quinine like drug that causes scarring in the fallopian tubes (95% sterilization rate): the cost is a few cents per sterilization. The Quinacrine Pellet does not have FDA approval. Already, 80000 women have been sterilized with the technique, including 30000 in Vietnam. Critics warn the health impact of the technique is unknown and that governments may force the sterilization on women who do not understand that its effect is permanent. The Center for Research on Population & Security in North Carolina has distributed the drug in Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela, Chile and Vietnam. The Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception reports that some sterilizations in Vietnam may have been forced. [TXT]

20226. Walker, Dennis. "British Colonial Rule in Egypt: The Cultural and Political Formation of Mustafa Kamil's Independence Movement", in Hamdard Islamicus (Karachi) v. 16 (Spring 1993) 1: pp. 81-127. The "Patriotic Party" (al-Hizb al-Watanii) launched by Mustafa Kamil (d. 1908) was the main movement for the independence of Egypt during British colonial rule (1882-1922). Kamil's movement and constituency were overwhelmingly made up of acculturated, bilingualized Muslim Egyptian modern-stream students and professionals. British attempts to marginalize classical Arabic out of modern education and government ignited the resolve of the multi-lingual nationalists around Kamil to restore classical Arabic within a linguistic language-obsessed nationalism than prefigured later Egyptian pan-Arabism. The article shows how, under cultural pressure and racism from Westerners, the party of Mustafa Kamil maintained a cultural duality sometimes blending into synthesis. On one hand, they called for wholesale adoption of a constitutional parliamentary order and a laissez-faire economic regime modelled on West Europe. From adolescence, French Enlightenment concepts of the rights of Man and law offered a rallying-point against Britain and Kamil and his colleagues cited them to persuade the European states to eject Britain from Egypt. On the other hand, the Kamilists called for classical Arab works, such as Caliph 'Ali's Nahj al-Balaghah to have input into politics and demanded that "Muhammadan civilization" preserve non-Western patterns for the life of women in Egypt. [author abstract]

20227. Wambui, Mercy. "Mirror Mirror on the Wall...Taking Stock of the Cairo Call", in EcoNews Africa, Vol 3(19). Armed forces, guarded air-conditioned buses and countless security checks swarmed the Cairo Conference Centre. Delegates in fashionable albeit formal outfits solemnly miled the corridors of the air conditioned venue - looking set to round up the last leg of the controversial International Conference on Population and Development -ICPD. Despite the hue and cry by Muslims
Sexual relations especially among adolescents. Further, decisions largely the result of unfair terms of trade and neo-classical economic controversy. While the more liberal Western Nations were in agreement an emigrant has no right to be rejoined by his/her immediate family. Two, the “rights of individuals” became an issue of religious and cultural “family reunification”. It implied that a person living in another country as an emigrant from the South. The bone of contention lay in the wording of the draft text regarding contraceptive or abortion...people needed to live and eat” During the first plenary session, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland spoke on the need to reduce northern over-consumption of resources - a fact that was reiterated by US Vice President Al Gore.

The Swiss delegate even gave a practical proposal that read... “To achieve sustained economic growth and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, economic and regulatory measures should be taken. Such measures should include fiscal incentives, environmental accounting the application of the “polluter pays” principle and environmental impact assessments.” This was acceptable to Southern delegates but when it came to push and shove, it was rejected by the north. The now watered down proposal reads: “....modify unsustainable Consumption and production patterns through economic legislatively and administrative measures as appropriate, aimed at sustaining sustainable resource use and preventing environmental degradation.” Southern countries suffering under the brunt of World Bank instigated Structural Adjustment Programmes were particularly bitter with the lip-service paid to the issues of development including Northern over-consumption that is the root causes of the survival crisis in the South. During a workshop on World Bank and NGOs at the NGO forum a participant from Egypt expressed concern that population issues were being looked at as though Africa is the one overpopulating the earth and therefore threatening the survival of the globe. “The issue here is that the debate on abortion is making it very easy for the Ills of the North towards the South go by unhiltighted.” “This Conference is looking at population in itself as a problem while the issue should be developing our economies to meet people’s needs and improve their quality of life and thus enable them to make informed decisions about their own families” said Anthony Aijok a development worker from Sudan. Annoyed by the lack of attention on development issues, African delegates wrote a letter to the ICPD secretariat highlighting issues not being dealt with. These included sustainable development, Structural Adjustment Programs and external debt. The debt burden constitutes a major constraint in government efforts to support social and economic programs. The Chair made it clear that it should be understood that these issues are being discussed within the context of development and environment. The document has nothing substantial to that supports this premise.

Family Reunification: Another issue that created an emotional tangle between the North and the South was International Migration. The North has been leveling sterner measures to control emigrants from the South. The bone of contention lay in the wording of the draft text regarding “family reunification”. It implied that a person living in another country as an emigrant has no right to be rejoined by his/her immediate family. Two broadissues were at interplay. One, emigrants from the South have increased in number due to political strife in their countries or socio-economic constraints leading them to the North in search of greener pastures. The North is aware that economic and political difficulties are largely the result of unfair terms of trade and neo-classical economic
policies that continue to undermine the developing world, and should therefore not close doors to individuals and their families seeking safety and the ability to meet their own needs in the industrialised world. According to a Nigerian journalist living in the United States "Nobody wants to live and work in another country unless there are constraints - usually political or economic...they (read the North) create problems in the south and expect us to gladly accept those problems." Secondly, this being the International Year of the Family, the Youth Laureate and Panelist Bore said that the wording of the draft text denying a documented migrant the right to be rejoined by their family which is the basic core of society, contradicts the purposes glorifying the concept embodying the International Year of the Family. The conference agreed on a compromise that said that Governments of countries receiving immigrants "must recognise the vital importance of family reunification and promote its integration into the national legislation in order to ensure the protection of the unity of the families of documented migrants."

Losses and Gains for Africa: Although it is difficult to talk about losses and gains in black and white, one thing was clear, fundamental issues of priority for Africa were given lip service. Africa is facing many forms of crises largely attributed to Northern control over the South especially in the economic arena. The question of Africa's population was constantly subtly regarded as a problem without due recognition of the origin of the problem - unfair distribution of resources. Mr Ajok argued "Europe has a great population density - higher than Africa put together but nobody complains about over-population. Why? Because they are industrialised and "developed" materially." He felt that the West's concern is that they have a big problem in their hands - that Africa's growth is in the form of human resources which is bound to threaten their own diminishing growth in numbers." Many felt the whole issue of population was regarded as an African problem and the conference boiled down to controlling "this problem" by targetting women. Putting women's empowerment at the centre of the solution to the question was a very difficult task. A lot of critiques felt the document did nothing towards improving their lot. "The document reads women women everywhere but some sense of humor - he cranked up the volume of his radio to the sound of Ace of Base singing, "all that she wants is another baby..."

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Egypt

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Transnational Corporations for the sake of making money at the expense of people's health. Additionally, they included the need to recognise that second generation side-effects of contraceptives do exist and should be taken into consideration in the research for new or existing contraceptives.

Money Money Money: The greatest challenge lies in the implementation of the Action Program. Countries committed themselves to total annual population spending of $ 3 billion for the developing world over the next century or three times the current expenditure. An important underlying question is whether the funds for population programs will be geared towards the distribution of contraceptives aimed at demographic targets (to cut down on the numbers) or there will be an emphasis on narrowing the gap in gender with regard to nutrition and education, child survival programs and providing health care to women of all ages. Will donors provide funds for improved health services without attaching conditionalities for distribution of contraceptives? There is an important role for NGOs here: to monitor future funding in population related issues. They must continue to insist on all-rounded funding that takes into consideration the quality of life; form alliances with Northern NGOs for effective lobbying against dumping of banned contraceptives in the South; access information on ongoing research in contraceptives and in line with the Conference Document, monitor the activities of Transnational Companies that are out to make money at the expense of people's health; find ways of working with Governments to avoid funding of population programs that promise people better lives when they reduce their families but do not take into consideration other factors such as overall economic structures that may inhibit attaining economic empowerment. For future conferences, it would help to have training sessions for NGOs on lobbying skills. Manuals on the issues at hand and how to lobby delegates would be useful methods to ensure active NGO participation and input. As some angry delegates from the South, incensed by the watered down compromise document that emerged from Cairo, boarded a bus to head for the hotel, the Egyptian bus driver made attempts at some sense of humor - he cranked up the volume of his radio to the sound of Ace of Base singing, "all that she wants is another baby..."

20/20 Vision - Cairo's Unfinished Business: Forwarded to the Social Summit to be held next year in Copenhagen was the 20/20 proposal. It calls for developing countries to devote at least 20 percent of their national budget to providing basic social services such as primary health care and that donors dedicate a similar proportion of aid allocations to basic social services such as primary health care. The problem is not only that of providing much needed social services but also making them accessible and welcoming to young people especially young women. "Africa is poles apart from the rest of the world," said Elisa Wells, President of Action International (ELCI) and the International Outreach Program of KENGO. It is supported by the Humanistic Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (HIHOS) and NGONET based in Montevideo, Uruguay. The views expressed in the features do not necessarily reflect those of EcoNews Africa or of its member organizations and donors. Reproduction of the material contained in the "features" is encouraged with acknowledgement of source. Postal Address: EcoNews Africa, P.O. Box 76406, Nairobi, Kenya. Visitors: 1st Floor, No. 27 Uchiuru Road, Off Ole Shapara Avenue, Nairobi South "C". Tel. and Fax: +254-2-604682. Email: econews(a)ukula.gn.apc.org or econews(a)elci.gn.apc.org. EconAfrica is also available on electronic conference at econews.africa(a)gn.apc.org and locally at econews.africa(a)ukula.gn.apc.org.a.n.[]=

2228. Wells, Elisa; Perkin, Gordon W. "Clinton Renews US Role in Key Population Issues". In Seattle Times, February 16, 1994, p. B7. Every minute, 180 people are added to the world population; in the next ten years 1 billion people will be added, bringing world population to 6.5 billion in 2000. By 2025, this growth rate will bring world population to 21 billion. The International Conference on Population & Development

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been coerced to barter their reproductive functions for a pittance to feed similarly low `income inequality' - have dramatically reduced birth rates.

Various pressure tactics to get them to accept or comply. Or they have same four countries - and certain other poor countries which have (and sometimes men) have been subjected to `social marketing' and which look at population trends in different countries, point out that these are often in provinces of new towns and rural areas, long accustomed to unwanted pregnancies and fetal deaths. They are more likely to accept family planning. In the current debate over population policy, what both protagonists and critics have failed to emphasise strongly enough (although both refer to it in passing) is the strong link between fertility rates and socio-economic security.

There is a wealth of evidence which demonstrates that birth rates are much more substantially and sustainably reduced by increasing social equity than by pushing family planning. Both current events and history bear this out. There is a wide range of examples that show how population growth rates decline as societies succeed in providing guarantees for meeting the basic needs of their whole populations. Socially disadvantaged parents tend to have many children as a way to provide the security that society fails to provide. For many families, both rural and urban, who live marginally by day-to-day subsistence, their children from an early age contribute to family income. Children provide a source of support and care in times of parental unemployment, sickness, and old age. In short, for a family that is desperately poor, to have many children is an economic necessity. The worse the family's socio-economic situation, the more children are needed. And where child mortality is high, a makeshift insurance plan (for those who have no other) is to have lots of children. Alternately, when societies begin to assure that the basic needs of the whole population are met, low-income families can afford to have fewer children. Hence population growth rates begin to decline. This decline is obvious when we compare the population growth rates of Northern industrialised countries to many of the poor countries in the South. Those European countries that have adequate minimum wages, universal health care, and equitable social security for all have almost zero population growth (and many would have declining populations, except for the influx of immigrants and refugees). By contrast, the United States, for all its enormous wealth, also has colossal inequities: one of every four children lives in poverty, 22 million persons daily go hungry, and nearly 40 million have no health coverage. Not surprisingly, the USA is experiencing a higher birth rate than more equitable European countries.

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widespread killing of baby girls by parents who want a boy). However, Kerala, Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica all have lower fertility rates than neighbouring states, in spite of less aggressive family planning campaigns. In contrast, countries like Mexico and South Africa, with relatively high per capita incomes but great ‘income inequality’, have higher birth rates. Cuba, both historically and compared to neighbouring countrires, also validates the above observations. During the Batista dictatorship, whereas the gap between rich and poor was very wide and people had few social guarantees, Cuba had one of the highest fertility rates in Latin America. After the overthrow of Batista, the revolutionary government introduced one of the world’s most equitable systems, in terms of basic physical needs (if not always political rights). These included: housing and sanitation for all; full care for the elderly, equal rights and opportunities for women, etc. Although Cuba made a variety of contraceptive methods available, for many years it had no policy to promote family planning. Yet during the first decade of the Revolution, the birth rate plummeted dramatically - far more than in those Latin American countries with strong family planning campaigns but few social guarantees for their impoverished masses.

John Ratcliffe, a population scientist formerly with the Berkeley School of Public Health, has done some interesting macro studies of population trends, comparing fluctuations in growth rates of different countries at different times and under varying socio-economic and political systems. His studies confirm that fertility rates are determined much more by societal factors (relative equity and social guarantees) than by the presence or relative aggressiveness of family planning initiatives. Those who are genuinely concerned about population growth (as distinct from those who harp on ‘population’ to divert attention from social injustice as the root cause of our global crises) need to take the above facts very seriously. What the hard facts imply is that population growth cannot be substantially reduced through family planning programmes alone. The only way to bring about substantial and sustainable reduction of fertility rates is through far-reaching social change. Such change entails more equitable systems, with policies to guarantee that the basic needs of all persons are met. Only under conditions of social justice can most people afford - and experience substantial advantages to having - few children. Unfortunately, many of the world’s high-level planners have little commitment to a sustainable development model based on fair sharing. They are blindly committed to the dominant development model with its so-called ‘free market’ policies that place higher priority on economic growth of the few than on the well-being of the many. They are unwilling to see how the globalisation of the market economy - with its massive debt burdens, impoverishing structural adjustment policies, increasing net flow of wealth from poor persons and countries to rich, and authoritarian puppet governments armed by the global powers to keep such inequities in place - is the root cause of today’s global crises. Nor do they admit that these same injustices give rise to the apparent shortages and very real strain on resources for which they blame ‘overpopulation’. Tragically, today’s global decision makers are too attached to their disproportionate wealth and privilege to see how the avid pursuit of economic growth contributes to the rapid population growth which they fear and wish to control. It is therefore the job for those of us who are concerned about our children’s and the planet’s present well-being, to organise in struggle for a more healthy and sustainable world order. We must mobilise action from the bottom up, both locally and globally, so that all people’s basic needs and basic rights - including their reproductive rights - are met. In preparation for the forthcoming global conference in September, we must help decision makers realise that if they want to reduce population growth rate they must first look to social justice… and above all else, make sure all children get enough to eat.

Healthier people make (and demand) healthier decisions. --Third World Network Features. [About the writer: David Werner has authored numerous books on health and society, his most famous being Where There is No Doctor, which has been translated into more than 20 languages. When reproducing this feature, please credit Third World Network Features and (if applicable) the cooperating magazine or agency involved in the article, and give the byline. Please send us cuttings. Published by Third World Network 228, Macalister Road, 10400 Penang, Malaysia. Email: twn@igc.apc.org; Phone: (+604)-2293511; Fax: (+604)-364505.]

20231. Wickinger, Deborah. Experience and Expression: Life Among Bedouin Women in South Sinai. Cairo: Papers in Social Science, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, Summer 1991. The Tarabîn Bedouin believed to originate in Arabia, live along the coast of Southeastern Sinai, and are the largest tribe among the 90000 nomadic or semi-nomadic people of the Sinai. There is little historical documentation on the Bedouin if Sinia, and even less on women, since while men had contact with travellers as guides, women were isolated in herding and household duties. The sedentarization and monetarization of Sinai Bedouin life was intensive under Israeli occupation, and Bedouin provided a labor force for Israeli economic development: the largest Israeli employer was the Ministry of Defense. While Israel has labor shortages, Egypt does not and the return of Sinai to Egyptian rule has slowed economic progress among the Bedouin, and most women remain engaged in subsistence herding activities.

While there has been tourist development in Tarabîn, it is men who provide services and goods to tourists, while women both engage in economic activity in isolation from tourists and walk along routes that are separate from areas in which tourists recreate (route separation in Tarabîn is illustrated by a map). Women rarely handle money, since in group activities are done on a barter or in-family basis, while exchange with tourists is undertaken in cash; however, the major contribution from the subsistence economy is that of women.

While Arab society emphasizes fearlessness, alertness, bravery and self-control among men, women are publicly deferential, modest and retiring. Yet the image of Arab women in traditional settings as powerless is incorrect, since women, even within the “context of hierarchical structure based on a moral code of honor segregation of men and women”, a segregation based on protecting family honor through protecting the sexuality of its women through sexual segregation, women are active in kin and friendship networks, are brokers of marriages, are political activists, holders and conveyers of vital information, and are often individuals with specific and significant power. The principle social interaction of women is with other women: this provides the basis for women being the major conduit for the flow of information in the community. Despite public modesty, among women sexual joking is common, and women earn the respect of other women by being brave, strong and self-confident, illustrated by the life-stories of Aida, a tribal woman admired for her bravery, independence, self-control and stoicism.

20232. Williams, Ian. Letter: "We Resent Your Odious Accusations", in Wall Street Journal, November 5, 1996, p. A23. [TXT] [Williams is president of the UN Correspondents Association.] Reporters at the UN have a quaint notion of freedom of the press that involves allowing unpopular and unofficial figures to state their case. I am sorry that Pedro Sanjuan does not share it in his piece (10/30/1996 editorial page, "Match Made at the UN"). Nor does he share our equally quaint journalistic attachment to truth. The UN Correspondents Association is not ‘controlled’ by anyone in the UN Secretariat, and UN officials had absolutely nothing at all to do with the invitation to Louys Farrakhan. In fact, the association has been in dispute with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali for four years over his refusal to admit Shen Tong, the Tiananmen Square dissident, to address correspondents when we invited him. We are also vigorously contesting the UN’s refusal of accreditation to Taiwanese correspondents. In fact, we have a proud record of inviting controversial speakers in the face of official disinterest, ranging from Kurds from Turkey to Gerry Adams of Provision Sinn Fein. A member suggested the invitation to Mr. Farrakhan, and in the same spirit of press freedom our executive endorsed it. We informed the Un of our decision, but at no time did it seem to influence us either way. Despite Mr. Sanjuan’s quasi-racist assumptions about the Arabic nationality and motives of the staff at the UN’s Department of Public Information, they are sophisticated enough to realize that an endorsement by Mr.
Farrakhan is of somewhat dubious value to the secretary-general’s reappointment. Eventually, the Libyan Mission hosted the press conference because we insisted on reducing the size of the retinue Mr. Farrakhan wished to bring with him. Like my colleagues, as a correspondent, I have personally exposed cases of financial and sexual abuse at the UN, including some perpetrated by officials appointed by Boutros-Ghali. We are not controlled by anyone and deeply resent Mr. Sanjuan’s inaccuracies. [Sanjuan is president of the Institute of West-East Dynamics, and was assistant secretary of interior for international affairs and as director for political affairs in the UN Secretariat. The Institute of West-East Dynamics reportedly receives indirect funding from Israel.]

20234. Wirth, Timothy E. "Cairo Conference: US Goals at the Cairo Conference Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Program of Action", in US Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1994. The goals of the United States at the Cairo Conference are threefold. In other words, we would like to come out with a Program of Action: First is a broad, comprehensive program of action. The world is sharing in Cairo a sense of urgency about the fact that we will not be able to reach economic development, maintain political stability, or sustain ecological structures in the world without population stabilization. This is a sense of urgency felt by countries all over the world—East-West, North-South, rich-poor—and the program of action is the template that will come out of Cairo outlining what effective population stabilization programs can be. That program of action—product number one or outcome number one—of Cairo has been more than 92% agreed to. For those of you who are into UN documentation, UN documents are done by consensus. And going into the final negotiations, if areas of a document are not agreed upon, they have brackets around them. Going into the Rio Conference in 1992—the Earth Summit on Environment nearly 50% of the document was bracketed. Less than 8% of this Cairo document is bracketed. So there has been an enormous amount of work done and consensus reached on just about every issue. I will come back to the remaining issues. [=]

20235. Wirth, Timothy E. "Cairo Conference: US Goals at the Cairo Conference Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Program of Action", in US Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1994. The goals of the United States at the Cairo Conference are threefold. In other words, we would like to come out with a Program of Action: First is a broad, comprehensive program of action. The world is sharing in Cairo a sense of urgency about the fact that we will not be able to reach economic development, maintain political stability, or sustain ecological structures in the world without population stabilization. This is a sense of urgency felt by countries all over the world—East-West, North-South, rich-poor—and the program of action is the template that will come out of Cairo outlining what effective population stabilization programs can be. That program of action—product number one or outcome number one—of Cairo has been more than 92% agreed to. For those of you who are into UN documentation, UN documents are done by consensus. And going into the final negotiations, if areas of a document are not agreed upon, they have brackets around them. Going into the Rio Conference in 1992—the Earth Summit on Environment nearly 50% of the document was bracketed. Less than 8% of this Cairo document is bracketed. So there has been an enormous amount of work done and consensus reached on just about every issue. I will come back to the remaining issues. [=]
services available shortly after the turn of the century to every woman and family in the world who wants them. That will be an expensive proposition. Currently, spending is somewhere around $5-6 billion a year in the world on family planning. The cost of making sure that family planning is available to all individuals in the world who wish to have it will be in the neighborhood of $1 billion. So there must be an increase around the world. The United States has begun to work very hard on that. We have increased our own contribution to close to $600 million per year directly into family planning. The US is the largest contributor in the world. We have persuaded the Japanese to increase their contribution from $40 million a year to more than $400 million a year for population and AIDS. The Canadians, the Australians, the European Union, the British, the Nordic —have all increased their contributions. The World Bank has made population the number-one agenda for them in 1994, and it was the lead issue that Lou Preston, the President of the World Bank, spoke about at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions. Mr. Preston will be one of the opening speakers at the Cairo Conference. We think we are making very significant progress on our second goal, which is the development of the financial resources necessary to provide family planning to everybody in the world who wants it. [=]

20237. Wirth, Timothy E. "Cairo Conference: US Goals at the Cairo Conference Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Opening Remarks at a Department of State Press Briefing, Washington, DC, 8/31/1994: Part 3: Program Delivery Mechanism", in US Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1994. The third goal is the follow-up mechanism—the delivery mechanism—for the program of action and the funding, and a very ambitious program of predominantly women-centered programs around the world, focused not only on family planning but on the full range of women's reproductive health care services. Child mortality programs, the education of children, and the role of women in economic development are all part of that follow-up mechanism which is being developed in each country. Some countries, such as Indonesia, Egypt, and Bangladesh, have very aggressive programs now. Others want to learn from the successes of countries that have done very well. So there are three goals in Cairo—the program of action, the funding, and the follow-up mechanism—and we think that we are very close to achieving very, very good results in all three. [=]

20238. Wirth, Timothy E. "Cairo Conference: US Goals at the Cairo Conference Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Opening Remarks at a Department of State Press Briefing, Washington, DC, 8/31/1994: Part 4: Issues In The Program of Action", in US Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1994. Finally, in the program of action, those items that are bracketed or still in disagreement are threefold: the issue of adolescence, the issue of women's reproductive health care services, and the issue of abortion.

Adolescence. On the issue of adolescence, I would remind all of you that by the year 2000 there will be more than 1 billion teenagers in the world—a billion teenagers—moving into their reproductive health care years. And it is because of the very rapid growth of this group of people that there is a sense of urgency. While the world's rate of population increase has in fact gone down from where it had been at a high point, it is still well above the replacement rate, and having so many people moving into the childbearing years means that there is potentially a very sharp increase in the rate of population—world population. Today, it is increasing by almost 100 million per year. That is the equivalent of a Mexico every year or a China every 10 years or, to put it in our terms, a New York City every month. The adolescence issue is very important. There has been controversy surrounding the availability of family planning information and services to adolescents. The Canadians have been working on and in the lead on language to sort through the adolescence issue. We have had very extensive discussions with Father Martin—the head of the Holy See's Delegation—and with others, and I think that the adolescence issue is well on the way toward being resolved.

Women's Reproductive Health Care Services. The second issue is the range of reproductive health care services available to women. This issue is of concern to the European Union, which is floating a draft proposal on that front which picks up on the World Health Organization recommendations related to reproductive health care services, and we believe that that is well on its way toward being resolved.

Abortion. The third issue upon which there probably will not be agreement at the Cairo Conference is how to deal with the abortion question. Out of 189 countries who participate at the United Nations, 172 allow abortion in some form. Some allow the full range of access to abortion. Others do so when the health of the mother is in danger. Others do so in the case only of rape and incest. It varies all the way across the board. It had been our proposal with Colombia in the spring of 1994 that we deal with the abortion issue as part of the reproductive health care services package and say very clearly that reproductive health care services would, of course, be made available in any country based upon the framework of law, culture, and religion existing in that country. The UN has no right or authority to impose anything on any country, and putting this in the context of the laws of each country we think is the way in which the abortion issue can be resolved to the point where we can end up with that issue also, we hope, close to agreement at the conference. There is very good progress being made on our goals, and the remaining three issues—adolescence, reproductive health care services, and abortion—we think are also on the way to being resolved, especially the issues of adolescence and reproductive healthcare services. [=]

20239. Wirth, Timothy E. "Cairo Conference: US Goals at the Cairo Conference Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Opening Remarks at a Department of State Press Briefing, Washington, DC, 8/31/1994: Part 5: Security in Cairo", in US Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1994. Finally, Mike McCurry released yesterday a statement by the United States on the issue of security in Cairo. We have been working very closely with the United Nations and with the Egyptian Government on issues of security. It is clear that the Egyptian Government has been anticipating this conference. There was a successful, very large conference of tourism people from all over the world held there last spring. There were, despite allegations of problems, no problems whatsoever. The American embassy personnel in Cairo had no problems at all for a long period of time, unlike almost any other embassy in a large city anywhere else in the world. The issues that have been illustrated on a security measure occurred south of Cairo—halfway between Cairo and Aswan—in an area that has been for 1000 years the home of a number of more radical revolutionary groups. That is where the problem occurred the day before yesterday with the unfortunate killing of the young Spanish student. We have advised all Americans not to travel through that area of Egypt. We have put out very careful advisories to people on just being careful as you would be in any large city, and the United States has no intention of changing its plans, and we don't know of other delegations who, on the basis of security, have made changes in their plans. We are monitoring the question—the issue—obviously, very closely and are in very close touch with as many of the US NGOs—citizen groups—that are going to Cairo that we know about, and have, again, as I said, worked very closely with the UN and Egyptian authorities. [=]

20240. Wirth, Timothy E. "Population and Sustainable Development: Defining an Agenda; Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department: Statement at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the UN International Conference on Population and Development, New York City, 4/3/1994: Part 1: Introduction", in US Department of State Dispatch, April 11, 1994. Mr. Chairman, Madame Secretary General, and distinguished delegates, my government is honored to be working with you as we begin the final preparatory meeting prior to the International Conference on Population and Development. We are fortunate to once again have the skilled chairmanship of Dr. Fred Sai, to have benefited from the tireless work of the Secretary General, and to be supported by the able conference secretariat. Two weeks ago, I had the privilege of visiting Cairo, where I was warmly received by President Mubarak; the Honorable Interior Minister Al-Alaf; and the Honorable Professor Maher Mahran, Minister
of Population and Family Welfare and our chief host for the ICPD. I also met with the national Egyptian NGO steering committee chair, Aziza Hussein. We are greatly indebted to the Government of Egypt for the extensive preparations they are making to ensure the success of this historic conference. [=]

20241. Wirth, Timothy E. "Population and Sustainable Development: Defining an Agenda: Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department: Statement at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the UN International Conference on Population and Development, New York City, 4/5/1994: Part 2: The Foundation For a Program of Action", in US Department of State Dispatch, April 11, 1994. During the past year, the foundation has been laid for the most successful effort ever to link population and development as shared priorities and common cause for nations the world over. Almost one year ago, meeting here at the second Precom, a successful partnership was initiated—between North and South, between nations and this international institution, between governments and citizens. It is a partnership increasingly reflected in the extraordinary new common ground shared by many women, environmentalists, demographers, health professionals, and development experts alike. This partnership is also reflected in the draft Program of Action developed by the secretariat, which comprehensively defines an agenda for our future recognizing that:

(1) A humane and effective population strategy must be comprehensive and integrated with other development imperatives for education, especially for girls; increased economic opportunities for women; and the elimination of legal and social barriers to gender equality;

(2) Population growth and consumption patterns play major roles in the constellation of factors which cause environmental degradation;

(3) Development and family planning can work independently to slow population growth, but they work best when pursued together;

(4) There is widespread agreement—echoed in the 199 World Develop Report—that family planning programs should be a core element of global efforts to provide comprehensive reproductive and primary health care initiatives.

These broad themes underlie our common efforts to mobilize the world and implement the Program of Action on an international scale. Our job over the next three weeks is to sharpen the program's focus and help make it a clarion call to citizens everywhere. The United States believes that the ICPD can help launch a renewed and revitalized process of development—development that is in the long-term interests of all nations. Successfully realized, this concept of sustainable development will promote broad-based economic growth and protect the environment; it will enhance human capability and uphold democratic values; it will improve the quality of life for current generations and increase that opportunity for future generations. [=]

20242. Wirth, Timothy E. "Population and Sustainable Development: Defining an Agenda: Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department: Statement at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the UN International Conference on Population and Development, New York City, 4/5/1994: Part 3: Agenda Priorities", in US Department of State Dispatch, April 11, 1994. What might we then realistically define as a central agenda for the Cairo Conference and for sustained, priority action in the remainder of this century and on into the 21st? Let me offer a few suggestions. These priorities do not fully define our agenda for sustainable development. But if Cairo could launch action on these challenges, we could make significant progress toward stabilizing the world's population, improving the quality of life for millions of individuals, and realizing the promise of sustainable development.

First, a determined, cooperative effort must be launched to make good-quality, voluntary family planning and the full range of reproductive health services universally available early in the next century. Broadening—through research—the contraceptive methods from which individuals can choose, expanding the reproductive health services offered, and improving the distribution and the professionalism with which services are delivered will greatly enhance people's lives and augment our chances of realizing voluntary family-planning goals. Coercion must be absent from all such programs. And, as President Clinton has said to our nation, "Abortion should be safe, legal, and rare." Every effort should be made to prevent unwanted pregnancies, but—in the interest of public health and as a matter of principle—women should have access to safe abortion services and to humane services for complications due to unsafe abortions.

Simply investing in the wisdom of women is a second priority. The failure to educate females is tragic not just for human intellectual development but also because it contributes to the low status of women, infant and maternal mortality, and poverty. We must strive to close the enormous gap in educational opportunity that exists—for gender reasons alone—so that girls are able to fully realize their intellectual, economic, and political potential as well as their basic rights. As recent reports have indicated and common sense tells us, gender equity in education promises to yield enormous dividends for our population and development objectives.

Third, all countries should, over the next several years, assess the extent of the national unmet need for antenatal care, childbirth care, immunization, and the monitoring of growth and development, paying particular attention to the most vulnerable and under-served groups in the population. Further, it must be the goal of public and private child survival programs to remove all program-related barriers in the next decade to increase the ability of women and families to access these resources.

Fourth, we can reinforce health, education, and economic objectives by paying special attention to the needs of young women and men. In addition to emphasizing to adolescents the importance of interpersonal relationships and the responsibilities of sexuality, we need to have girls recognized for their full social and economic potential. We know that this strategy is not only the right thing to do for individual wellbeing and justice but that it also will help delay pregnancy and slow population momentum. We can hardly imagine the potential that would be unleashed if young women had—and believed in the possibility of—roles in addition to marriage and child-bearing.

Fifth, as women are empowered, so must we empower—some would say enlighten—men to act on their responsibilities related to fertility and sexual and reproductive health—and rights. As ever, men exercise more than their fair share of power in decision making related to family planning and reproductive choice. Men the world over need to accept and fulfill their responsibilities for promoting the rights of women, for pre- and post-natal care, for child rearing, and for prevention of sexually transmitted diseases.

Sixth, we must encourage responsible, mutually respectful sexual behavior among both men and women and teach the importance of such behavior to both boys and girls. No one has the right to be irresponsible, particularly when the lives and wellbeing of people—especially our children—are at stake.

Seventh, any discussion of responsibility must also include emphasis on the family—the basic unit of societies the world over and challenged globally as never before. Strengthening the family and intergenerational bonds and engaging citizens in their communities are ideas with greater currency today than ever before and are ideas of highest value to my government and its 260 million constituents.

Eighth, we need to take the opportunity of the Cairo Conference to discuss today's unprecedented migrations of human populations around the world. Two aspects of this problem are particularly relevant to the ICPD: the link between environmental degradation and migration and the potential effect of development programs on population movements.

Finally, together we are nurturing North-South partnerships, recognizing the mutually reinforcing roles and responsibilities of all countries for sustainable development. In the North, a commitment is necessary to help provide the financial wherewithal to realize an integrated global population strategy and to take on the difficult issues of wasteful resource consumption and the disproportionate impact the developed world has on the earth's environment. In the South, a corresponding commitment is needed to make family planning, health care, and women's empowerment among the highest national priorities. [=]
20243. Wirth, Timothy E. "Population and Sustainable Development: Defining an Agenda: Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department: Statement at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the UN International Conference on Population and Development, New York City, 4/5/1994: Part 4: Conclusion", in US Department of State Dispatch, April 11, 1994. Everywhere we must have and we must generate the political will at the highest levels of government to live up to these responsibilities. These are daunting challenges, but there are sound reasons for optimism. For all the suffering still in the world, in the last 50 years we have made more progress in alleviating human misery than in the previous two millennia. If we could do that while burdened with the political and economic costs of the Cold War and other regional conflicts, how much greater should be the goals we set for ourselves in 1994? Last fall, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, President Clinton outlined the high priority that the Clinton-Gore Administration gives to the various elements of sustainable development. Under his leadership, the United States has begun the process of shifting its priorities to reflect the changing nature of national security and long-term international cooperation. Much has been accomplished in this first year, and we look forward to working with all parties to create a vigorous agenda for Cairo and the decade ahead. Together we are working on the most important contribution which we can make to future generations—no other group in the world today has a greater opportunity to serve posterity. Let us hope that history will have reason to judge us well. [•]


Dear Friends: We have received the news that AWSA--Arab Women Solomon Association—has been banned in Egypt on 6/15/1991. Founded by Nawal El Saadawi after her release from jail nearly ten years ago--where she was detained for her writings on women--AWSA is a precious symbol of women's struggles in the Muslim world. Its dissolution is the sign of difficult times to come for women; it is a blow which hits all women's struggles in the Muslim world.

We appeal to all of you to write strong letters of protest to the Egyptian government, to demand this decision be revoked immediately, to inform the media in your country and call all democrats to protest, to send delegations to the Egyptian embassies, etc...

Since AWSA was in consultative status with the United Nations, letters of protest should also be sent to the UN and to international human rights organisations.

Do not allow AWSA to be silenced. Do not allow women from Muslim countries and communities to be silenced. Defend and demand our rights.

A Statement on the Dissolution of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights

Egyptian governmental authorities have ordered the dissolution of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association in accordance with a decision of the deputy governor of Cairo on 6/15/1991. The decision represents a new assault on freedom of association which is already severely restricted in Egypt.

The Arab Women's Solidarity Association, headed by the nationally and internationally renowned writer Dr. Nawal El Saadawi, one of the most prominent figures in the Egyptian women's movement, had succeeded, in 1985, following a two-year-long rejection, in obtaining a legal permit for its establishment from the ministry of social affairs. The permit was numbered 3282/1985.

Representatives of AWSA report that the association has, since its establishment, been exposed to numerous occasions of pressure and harassment from the ministry of social affairs on the pretext that it was engaged in activities prohibited by the law of associations.

In the above as in the recent decision to dissolve AWSA, the ministry of social affairs and other relevant authorities refused to acknowledge the existence of two distinct organizations of the same name, one an Egyptian organization registered in accordance with the law of associations, while the other is an international organization that enjoys consultative status in the UN Economic and Social Council, and works in Egypt under the approval of the Egyptian foreign ministry.

AWSA officials say that they have replied satisfactorily to all the ministry's queries in this and other respects. Nevertheless, the decision to dissolve the association was made without prior warning and without an official investigation of the association. AWSA has initiated an urgent legal appeal before the State Council Court seeking the annulment of the dissolution decision.

EOHR believes that the dissolution of AWSA is yet another serious violation of the freedom of organization and association and is deeply concerned that the Egyptian government, rather than respond to the demands of public opinion for more public liberties, and particularly for the freedom to form non-governmental organizations, and rather than respect its international commitments to maintaining basic standards of human rights and civil liberties, continues to adopt the course of increasingly tightening the constraints on basic rights and liberties in Egypt.

EOHR condemns the dissolution of AWSA, calls upon the Egyptian government to revoke the dissolution decision immediately and calls upon it to revise the legal framework regulating the establishment and operation of non-governmental organizations in the country in such a way as to guarantee respect for human rights in Egypt.

AWSA's Dissolution Update: AWSA challenges in court the decision of the Egyptian government to dissolve their association. They demand the revocation of the decision and challenge the constitutionality of Law 32 (1964) on Associations.

The trial will be heard on 10/31/1991 in Cairo. Fourteen lawyers, including one woman, volunteered to defend AWSA in court. AWSA's dissolution has created an uproar among democrats and democratic organizations in Egypt who publicly expressed their support to AWSA and wrote to the President of Egypt to demand the revocation of the decision against AWSA. They also challenge the constitutionality of Law 32 which controls and restrains their freedom of organization.

Support is starting to come from outside Egypt too, and AWSA needs massive international support before the trial. AWSA's compilation of declarations of support will be published under the title "Solidarity with Arab Women's Solidarity Association.

Nawal El Saadawi, founder of AWSA and well-known writer, is invited to the Frankfurt Book Fair and by a writer's association in Paris during 10/31/1991. She is under fierce attack by the fundamentalist press in Egypt.


20245. Zahradnik, Rich. "PLO-TV: The Medium is The Message: We Are In A Unique Situation, We Will Have Television before We Have A State", in Wired, September 1994. pp. 82, 84, 86-87. Daoud Kuttab of the Jerusalem Film Institute is a strong advocate of Palestinian television. Kuttab sees the emergence of Palestinian TV even before elections are allowed, and the possibility of Palestinian television has led to an active debate over the content and direction of programming. Israelis will continue to control the spectrum and can jam Palestinian TV at will, but that is a constraint that Palestinians struggle against in all their efforts (the peace accords grant the Palestinians one VHF television and one AM radio station frequency, but the Israelis do not honor their agreements; Khoury fears self-censorship may be necessary to prevent Israeli jamming). Palestinians are seen by Kuttab as too independent minded to accept the heavily state controlled television broadcasts that are beamed in from Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Saman Khoury, named head of the Palestinian Broadcast Corp. sees the TV as an important pillar of the emerging Palestinian state. However, Hanan Asrawi argued,
at the Palestinian Broadcasting-Promises and Challenges conference held in Jerusalem, that Palestinians should not follow the kind of strict government direction of television that is common in other Arab countries. PBC has committed itself to presenting the broadest possible range of Palestinian opinion, despite the careful path that will have to be followed between the Fatah and Hamas factions in the Palestinian polity. The European Union has granted a 2 million ECU grant to purchase television equipment, and technical assistance will be provided by France 2; UNESCO has also committed $500,000 for the station. Six Palestinians have been sent to Paris for training. Initial PBC programming will run 3.5-4 hours per day, with a half-hour news show in Arabic and three 5-minute news bulletins in Arabic, English and Hebrew. The market for the broadcasts are seen as 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 1 million Palestinians in Israel. Kuttab hopes for street smart low-cost video productions that can make Palestine a center for ‘pan-Arab television and filmmaking’. [TXT]
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Iran

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Iran

22000. -------. "Controversy Continues Over Orientalist Slated to Receive German Book Trade Association Prize", in Week in Germany, September 22, 1995, p. 6. With the Frankfurt Book Fair only weeks away, the controversy over the recipient of this year's Peace Prize of the German Book Trade Association shows no sign of abating. This prize has been awarded annually since 1950 at the close of the Frankfurt Book Fair; this year, the publishers' association is planning to bestow it upon scholar Annemarie Schimmel (73). Schimmel, the author or translator of over 70 books on Islamic religious thought and Arabic poetry, was cited by the Book Trade Association for her efforts to promote engagement rather than confrontation between the Islamic world and the West, but she drew the ire of many German writers and intellectuals earlier this spring when, during an interview, she said she could understand the sentiments behind the death sentence against Salman Rushdie for his novel The Satanic Verses (cf. TWIG 5/1995, p. 7; 5/26/1995, p. 6). So deeply wounded had Muslims been, she said, that she had "seen grown men crying."

Opposition to Schimmel found outlet earlier this month both in an open letter to President Roman Herzog, who is scheduled to speak at the prize ceremony next month, and a second protest statement issued by 150 German publishing houses. The open letter, signed by over 100 German writers, publishers, intellectuals and at least two high-ranking politicians, Heiner Geissler (CDU) and Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens), called on Herzog to cancel his appearance. The prize is supposed to be a recognition of courageous engagement on behalf of human rights, but Schimmel, the letter contends, has spoken out against neither the death threats against Rushdie and Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasrin nor human rights violations in the Islamic nations. Schimmel is a "welcome guest" of totalitarian regimes and appeals "adoringly and without objectivity for understanding of her special favorite, Iran," the letter said; she has demonstrated that friendship by writing for a publication of the Iranian embassy. The second letter described the award to Schimmel as "a slap in the face to all those members of the Book Trade Association who for years have defended free speech against the threat of religious terror."

Herzog and the Book Trade Association have indicated their intention to stick by Schimmel. The Association, a spokesperson told the press on 9/7/1995, had carefully considered the accusations against Schimmel, and found them unsound. Four days later, the prize selection committee likewise announced that it would not withdraw its decision.

Schimmel has her supporters as well. Udo Steinbch, director of the German Oriental Institute in Hamburg, defended her work and called the protest a "pale smear campaign." The appeal to Herzog, added writer and former German ambassador to China Erwin Wickert, was "hysterical, foolish and ill-informed." A group of Schimmel's supporters countered the open letter to Herzog with a public statement of their own on 9/12/1995. The accusations against Schimmel, the statement maintained, "abound in arbitrariness, simplifications and the deliberate citation of unrelated passages (from her works)."

Shortly after the Book Trade Association announced it would not revoke its decision, journalist-novelist Ralph Giordano made public a letter Schimmel had written this spring. In the letter, Schimmel acknowledges having said that Rushdie deserved to die and she would be willing to do the deed herself. In presenting this letter, Giordano said Schimmel's comments were flippant, but were nonetheless indicative of her unsuitability as a recipient of the Peace Prize.

Schimmel has been sparing in her responses to the furor. She described herself as "appalled and disappointed" by the letter to Herzog and insisted that she was anything but an apologist for Islamic fundamentalists. [v]

22001. -------. "Female Presence [Minister of Interior Ali Mohammed Besharat states progress and social and cultural advances of women in Iran is a 'source of great pride' for Iran]." in Granma International (Havana), November 9, 1994. p. 15. [TXT]

22002. -------. "Iran Enacts Family Size Rule [government seeks to encourage couples to limit family size to three children; government benefits for families will be provided only for the first three children; law takes effect in one year in the nation of 52 million]", in Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1993. p. A13. [TXT]

22003. -------. "Japan Crucified in UN Dock", in Peoples Korea, April 27, 1996. p. 6. [Here is a wrap-up of recent developments concerning the report on violence against women submitted by the UN special rapporteurRadhika Coomaraswamy and adopted on 4/19/1996 at the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Commission (hereafter called the Report). Her Report was supported by government delegates and NGOs across the world in their oral statements, press conferences, and other activities during the session, making Japan look an odd man out.]


4/2/1996: The DPRK delegation in a press conference welcomed the Report, criticizing Japan's counterreport which commented that the Report was not well founded on international law and depended "too much on limited sources of information." The DPRK demanded Japan apologize for its wrongdoings done before and during WWII. The south Korean delegation said: Inaction on the part of the international community had exacerbated mass and systematic human rights violations in various parts of the world. The Republic of Korea was convinced that those who committed, directed or facilitated violations of human rights must be held accountable. It was also important to develop a mechanism for dealing with those violations of human rights which were committed by States. Franciscans International (FI) said: The Subcommission had recommended that the Commission approve appointment of a Special Rapporteur. The FI and the women from Japan for whom it spoke asked for immediate support by the whole Commission for adoption of the resolution to appoint the Special Rapporteur. There should be no further delay.

The Fact-Finding Team on the Truth About Forced Korean Laborers in Japan under the umbrella of Liberation said: After WWII, a total of 34 suspects had ben prosecuted by the allies for "forcing prostitution." A total of 115 suspects had been prosecuted for mistreating civilians. That number included suspects accused of forcibly recruiting laborers for the Hanaoka Mine in Japan. They had been convicted of crimes against humanity after standing trial in Yokohama, Japan, from 1947 to 1948. Japan had been trying to cover up related materials and documents to deny its war crimes and crimes against humanity. Japan was afraid of being punished for its war crimes; it had burned many documents during the last two weeks of 8/1945.

The Committee on Measures for Compensation to Former Korean "Comfort Women for Japanese Army" and Pacific War Victims (COMA) in the DPRK under the umbrella of International Federation of Women in Legal Careers said: Resolutions of great importance had been recommended by the Subcommission in relation to Japan. It was time for justice. Similarly, recompense was needed for Korean men who had been drafted into forced labor during the war. The compensation fund to atone for "comfort women" created by the Japanese government was not sufficient. Legal compensation was required for individual victims in accordance with international law.

The (south) Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan under the umbrella of the World Council of Churches (WCC) said: The Commission should support appointment of a Special Rapporteur on wartime sexual slavery. Sexual slave's taken by Japanese forces during WWII were called "royal gifts" by the Emperor to his soldiers. The WCC strongly urged support of the Subcommission's resolution to appoint expert Lynda Chavez as Special Rapporteur to study the issue, as she had so far approached these problems with deep understanding, honor, and dignity. The problems must be studied on the broadest, most far-sighted scale possible, so that clarification could be
achieved.

The International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) supported the Report which stated that Japan and its government should be held responsible for the violation of these international humanitarian law principles even though Japan was not a signatory to the particular convention.

4/9/1996: Some fifty NGOs gathered in Geneva for the session from around the world and they announced that they had formed an International Alliance Supporting Radhika Coomaraswamy’s Report on Military Sexual Slavery in War Time.

The DPRK distributed a paper as its official UN document (E/CN.4/1996/148). The DPRK criticized Japan for its attitude of evading its responsibility for the wartime crimes. Commenting that Japan should take legal and moral responsibility, the country said that the compensation should be rendered to individual victims by the State.

4/10/1996: Ms. Coomaraswamy reported on her activities and explained the outline of her Report. After that, all the audiences welcomed her report with thunderous applause.

The Chinese delegation referred to its “comfort women” issue in its own country and vowed to continue negotiations with Japan for the benefits and the honor of the victims. The Netherlands delegation said: We welcomed the resolution 1994/45 of this Commission, which proposed to create a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. Mrs. Radhika Coomaraswamy is doing an excellent job. Her work is of very high quality and of commendable thoroughness. The Chinese delegation said: The Report has exposed the crime of recruiting “comfort women” by the Japanese militarist government during WWII. We appreciate the Rapporteur’s constructive efforts and the results achieved.

The Chinese government has deep sympathy for the women victims who have suffered unspeakable miseries. Today, half a century after the end of the war, the Japanese government must submit itself squarely to history and reality and adopt a responsible approach to this problem for its appropriate settlement.

The Japanese delegation said: With regard to the legal aspects of the Report on missions to Japan and other countries issued by the Special Rapporteur, the government of Japan reserves its position as contained in the UN document E/CN.4/1996/137. The south Korean delegation said: The Government of the Republic of Korea is firmly of the view that if the Japanese government is really determined to “squarely face the historical facts and take them to heart as lessons of history,” as was stated by the former Chief Cabinet Secretary, the first step it should take is to publicly acknowledge its past offenses, and then to assume due responsibilities in a straightforward manner. Accordingly, the south Korean government calls upon the Japanese government to take the necessary steps in implementing the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations voluntarily and in an expeditious manner.

International Educational Development (IED) said: We are aware of current plans to provide individual compensation through a government-initiated private fund and that the government has announced an intention to distribute not less than 2 million yen per victim through that mechanism beginning as early as next month. Our organization has consistently urged direct compensation through a government-established compensation tribunal as the best way to meet Japan’s international responsibility to compensate its victims. We are not convinced that the proposed fund mechanism fully meets that obligation. IMADR expressed its full support for the recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur concerning the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime. The organization said: It is regrettable that the Japanese government refuses to acknowledge the State obligation to compensate the victims, arguing especially that an individual cannot be a subject of rights under international law. IMADR considers that the case of the so-called “comfort women” constitutes an example where the perpetrators of sexual slavery in wartime should not be allowed to avoid their legal responsibility vis-a-vis the victims.

4/11/1996:

Some NGO members from around the world staged a protest demonstration against the Japanese government, while the Japanese side refused to accept their letters of demand as was previously agreed.
the basis of Coomaraswamy's report, the 'Asian Women's Fund' will still remain, and we will continue our efforts to collect private donations to this fund." Japan's stance met with severe criticisms on the same day from the NGOs' alliance which held a demonstration in front of the Japanese Mission to the UN in Geneva. Forty delegates from 12 countries attended the protest. "The 'Asian Women's Fund' established by Japan is, in essence, an attempt to evade its state responsibility for its crimes and to offset the unprecedented crimes against humanity by a small amount of money of civilian character," the DPRK delegation said in its statement. A vote on whether to adopt the report is scheduled for later this month. Although the report has no legal force even if adopted, many NGOs working in support of the former sex slaves hope it will act as pressure on Tokyo to pay individual compensation. [ ]

22005. ------. "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry", in Beijing Review, May 8-14, 1995. p. 22. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian announced on 4/20/1995, at one of the ministry's regular news briefings, that at the invitation of Premier Li Peng, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama will pay an official goodwill visit to China from 5/2/1995 to 5/5/1995. He also announced that at the invitation of Premier Li Peng, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea Lee Hong-koo will pay an official visit to China from 5/9/1995 to 5/15/1995. Then he opened the floor for questions.

QUESTION: Some reports allege that the facilities built by China in the reefs of the Nansha Islands are not conducive to navigational safety in the South China Sea. What's your comment on this?

ANSWER: China holds indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their nearby waters. The fishing department of the local Chinese government has built shelters for Chinese fishing vessels in the Meiji Reef in order to protect the fishermen's lives and their catches. While safeguarding its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its marine rights and interests, China will fulfill its duty of guaranteeing freedom of navigation for foreign ships and air routes through and over the international passage of the South China Sea according to international law. There are ulterior motives behind the spreading of the rumor that China's peaceful activities in the Nansha Islands affect navigation.

Q: Will the Chinese government permit AIDS patients or carriers of HIV to participate in the Fourth UN World Conference on Women to be held in Beijing in September?

A: According to Chinese law and regulations, foreign AIDS patients and those carrying HIV are not normally permitted to enter China. Considering that the Fourth World Conference on Women is a UN meeting, China will make inquiries about relevant international practices and extend necessary quarantine treatment to the delegates, including AIDS patients and carriers of HIV, to facilitate the widespread participation by women around the world and to assure the smooth convening of the conference. Those delegates afflicted with AIDS or carrying the virus will be permitted to enter China.

Q: What's your comment on Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's visit to China, especially as there is no time for the Diet to review the promotion of the Treaty of Friendship and the Joint Statement, which are known to all.

A: In their recent talks Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher held different views on the Iranian nuclear issue. What's your comment on this?

A: China and Iran are both signatory states to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Their nuclear cooperation is fully subject to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and such cooperation is legitimate and unimpeachable. The promotion of the peaceful use of atomic energy is conducive to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Q: What effect will the recent meeting between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd exert on the visit to China of British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Michael Heseltine next month?

A: Maintaining cooperative relations will benefit both China and Britain and the settlement of the Hong Kong issue as well. The meeting (between Qian and Hurd) will strengthen mutual understanding and reduce friction and is conducive to Michael Heseltine's visit to China. [ ]

22006. ------. "News In Brief: Islamic Republic of Iran", in Crescent International, August 1-15, 1996, p. 2. An olympic first was the participation of Lida Fariman from Iran, an athlete in proper hijab. She competed in shooting. "We have to show the foreign media that Muslim women can participate in many areas of sporting activities, provided we abide by Islamic rules which means we have to be covered," said Ms. Fariman, age twenty-four, in an interview with Agence France Presse. She carried her country's flag as the delegation marched into the Olympic stadium during the opening ceremony. [ ]

22007. ------. "News in Brief: Islamic Republic of Iran", in Crescent International, April 16-30, 1997, p. 2. A United Nations' report presented at a United Nations' Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva on 4/3/1997 said that the women's lot had improved under the Islamic government and that there are significant signs of further improvements in the future. [ ]

22008. ------. "Russia's Nukes: New Deal: Shusterovich's Ties to the Master of the Russian Nuclear Complex Has Given Him an Inside Track To Buy Billions in Nuclear Material", in CounterPunch, November 1, 1996. pp. 4-5. The US and Russia are locked into a struggle over 50000 tons of weapons grade nuclear material from dismantled Soviet warheads: this could allow production of 25000 low-grade nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration undertook to buy the stockpile for $12 billion, through the United States Enrichment Corp. (USEC) but now a new buyer has emerged in Russia. Minatom chief Victor Mikhailov, who tried to earn some money selling nuclear technology to Iran, was delighted with the promised 20-year deliver contract with the United States. His previous effort to sell uranium in the US, through Nucexo, failed when that firm went bankrupt, and owing Minatom $430 million.

Now a Delaware based firm, Pleiades, has announced it hopes to buy USEC: the firm is little known but has Alexander Shusterovich as president. Shusterovich has enigmatic business interests in Russia, allegedly based on pornography (Shusterovich denies, but Penthouse officers confirm that Shusterovich made an offer to buy the magazine), art speculation, a brewery and scientific publishing. However, Shusterovich has close ties to Mikhailov, who is backing Shusterovich's bid for USEC. Shusterovich has recruited some big names to Pleiades: Max Kampelman, Steven Hadley, Ron Rozenzweig (until the travel scandal an aide to Hazel O'Leary at DOE), and Wyche Fowler (US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia). Some see this growing morass as the epitome of contemporary corruption: allowing a mafia-like group to manage the flow of enough enriched uranium to make 25000 nuclear weapons, simply so that profits can be skimmed off by members of both
the US and Russian governments can become rich, is the height of irresponsibility. [TXT]

2009. -------. “SIS Member Receives Honor”, in SIS News (Society for Iranian Studies), Fall 1996, p.2. Homa Sarshar was honored with the America-Israel Friendship Media Award for her past and ongoing work in journalism. The award was presented by the Bnai Zion Foundation in 8/1996 in Los Angeles. ["]

2010. -------. “Secret Clinton, Yeltsin Re-Election Pact Reported”, in Seattle Times, March 27, 1996, p. A13. President Clinton and Pres. Boris Yeltsin in a direct political exchange at the anti-terrorism summit in Egypt this month agreed to provide political assistance to each other to boost each’s chances of re-election. In the last two weeks, Yeltsin has muted Russian criticism of the expansion of NATO and expressed a greater interest in a nuclear test ban treaty, and Clinton has promised to assist Yeltsin’s re-election. Clinton stated he “wanted to make sure that everything the United States did would have a positive impact”. Clinton asked for Yeltsin to make arrangements to accelerate the import of US poultry [from major campaign contributor Arkansas-based Tyson Foods Inc.]. Yeltsin has ordered greater US-Russian cooperation against terrorism, and agreed to help the US ‘enforce a settlement’ on Bosnia.

White House Mike McCurry confirmed the accuracy of a transcript of the meeting and agreement obtained by the Washington Times. McCurry admitted that Clinton and Yeltsin had coordinated their political re-election campaigns, subordinating the foreign policies of both countries to the re-election campaigns of the two presidents. On a ‘lighter note’, the transcript, Yeltsin offered an ‘attractive instructor’ to be both Russian language instructor and prostitute to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. However, McCurry stated that the FBI would be interested in finding out how the secret document was leaked. [q.v. Dobbs, Michael, “In Bid To Support Yeltsin, IMF Lends Russia $10.2 Billion; Though Western Governments Have No Illusions About Yeltsin After the War in Chechnya and His Sporadic Record on Economic Reform, He Is Seen As Preferable to Any Of His Rivals”, in Seattle Times, March 27, 1996. p. A17, which describes the lobbying of the Clinton Administration to provide IMF financing for Yeltsin’s election promises.] [TEXT]

2011. -------. “The Relections By Region: Beirut: Hoss List Overwhelms Solh”, in Lebanon Report, September 1992. In Beirut, candidates were vying for nineteen seats, and elections took place on the basis of the muhafazah. Because of the boycott in the Christian quarters of the capital, most of the campaigning and virtually all of the voting occurred in the predominantly Muslim western part of the city. Six lists competed against each other in Beirut, but only two of them could be considered major lists: an “official” one headed by Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh, and an “opposition” one headed by former prime minister Salim al-Hoss. Two candidates close to Sunni fundamentalist circles, Mr. Adnan Traboulsi and Mr. Zuhayr Ubaydi, each on separate lists, also won seats in parliament, as did a Hizballah candidate, Mr. Muhammad Birjawi. Except for Mr. Robert Debbas and Mr. Muhyiddin Dughanj, all the candidates on Mr. Hoss’s list won seats to the new parliament. Because Mr. Hoss’s list was incomplete, however, a number of candidates on the Solh list, including Mr. Solh, as well as five Armenian representatives, were elected to parliament. The results in Beirut were as follows: the six Sunni seats in the capital were won by Mr. Salim al-Hoss (30990 votes), Mr. Zuhayr Ubaydi (12570), Mr. Muhammad Ghabban (12285), Mr. Ousama Fakhoury (12122), Mr. Adnan Traboulsi (11819), and Mr. Rashid al-Solh (11428). The two Shi’a seats were won by Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Baydoun (23559) and Mr. Muhammad Birjawi (12666). The two Greek Orthodox seats were won by Mr. Bishara Merhej (10576) and Mr. Najah Wakim (22952). The one Armenian seat was won by Mr. Hagop Jokhadarian (6051). The one minoritly seat was won by Mr. Asmar Asmar (8645). Reflecting a nation-wide trend, the turnout in Beirut was a very low 13%.

Even Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh, a stalwart supporter of elections, admitted on August 31 that “voter participation was excessively low.” After one makes provision for the number of dead people, emigres, and displaced still on electoral lists, the figure rises somewhat to about 21%. Even among the Christian boycotted elections, observers estimated that participation in Muslim areas was only some 20%. It is significant that Mr. Hoss, who won more votes than any other candidate in Beirut, was elected by no more than 9% of the officially registered electorate. Among the notable Muslim candidates who “froze their candidacy” in the electoral race was Mr. Tammam Salam, the son of former prime minister Sa’ib Salam. On August 16, the former prime minister called for the postponement of elections, noting that the government was unjustly ignoring the opposition.

This, he added, was threatening national coexistence between Christians and Muslims. In the wake of Mr. Tammam Salami’s move, a number of the Salam family’s political allies also pulled out of the race. More surprising, however, was the severe defeat of the list headed by Prime Minister Solh. Of the candidates on his complete nineeennember list, only Mr. Solh, Mr. Bishara Merhej, and the Armenian candidates who won by default, won seats at parliament. Mr. Solh won a mere 11000 votes and finished last among Sunni candidates. In forming his list, Mr. Solh had calculated that by placing all the major Armenian representatives on his list, the Armenian community would provide a significant swing vote for his list. In turn, observers noted that Mr. Hoss gambled that by not putting Armenians on his list, he would effectively neutralize Armenian participation in elections, since the Armenian community was already assured that its major candidates would pass on the Solh list. This is precisely what happened: a tiny portion of the Armenian community voted, and most candidates on the Solh list were left hanging without the Armenian vote. Mr. Hoss’s victory was also due to the very effective electoral machine which he ran. According to some estimates, the candidates on Mr. Hoss’s list did not spend more than $15000 on their campaigns, in part because they employed a large number of young volunteers. In addition, the Hoss campaign refused contributions larger than $4000. The success of the Hoss list is significant, since candidates in Lebanon are often elected depending on the liberality with which they spend their money. Mr. Hoss, however, is known as an honest man who does not render favors, a characteristic which paradoxically seemed to have played in his favor among an electorate increasingly disgusted with the corruption pervading the official class. The result thus seemed to indicate another trend common in most regions where elections took place, namely a tendency in places to reject candidates who are perceived as being too close to the government. The victory of Mr. Traboulsi and Mr. Ubaydi was significant because of their ability to use a network of charitable Islamic organizations to mobilize support for their candidacy. Unlike Hizballah, however, the Sunni fundamentalists both in Beirut and Tripoli tended to present a secular image, and did not tie their candidacies to a specific political agenda. One observer noted that the low participation in Beirut was due to the non-participation of the middle class. While there is no way yet of confirming this, it can probably be assumed that Mr. Traboulsi and Mr. Ubaydi were voted in by the poorer socio-economic classes. If this is true, then one may begin seeing in a number of predominantly Islamic areas in Lebanon, the outlines of a phenomenon found in other socioeconomically troubled Arab states: namely the ability of Islamic organizations to organize and mobilize for electoral purposes those who are suffering most from social and economic conditions in the country. While this trend might have been less evident in Lebanon had participation in elections been high, it remains a phenomenon to watch in the future. [=""]

2012. -------. “Trade; China Avoids US Punishment: Technology Sale: United States Opts Against Punishing China For Nuclear Related Exports To Pakistan”, in Olympian, May 11, 1996. p. A3. The Clinton Administrationdecided not to punish China for the sale of $70000 in magnets to Pakistan. The magnets were sold by the China Nuclear
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www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads

Energy Corp. and would be monitored by Chinese technicians to assure no application of the magnets to production of enriched uranium. Sen. Jesse Helms stated that the Clinton Administration had "finessed" the issue of sale of magnets to Pakistan, as well as questions of forced abortions and sale of technology to Iran.

20013. ------. "UN Report on Sex Slave Wins Worldwide Support", in Peoples Korea, April 20, 1996, p. 7. A large number of governments and nongovernmental organizations have supported a report by a UN expert which recommends Japan to pay compensation to the former sex slaves and punish those responsible for establishing the system. Delegates of Asian and European governments in the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Commission, which opened 3/18/1996 in Geneva, made statements on 4/10/1996 and 4/15/1996, expressing support for UN special rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy's report which was submitted to the commission. Delegates from both north and south Korea welcomed the report and urged Japan to follow the Sri Lankan jurist's recommendations. The DPPR delegation highly appreciated a year-long investigation by Ms. Coomaraswamy into the issue of women who were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers before and during WWII. In a statement made on 4/15/1996, Ambassador Ri Chol, head of the country's delegation, denounced the Japanese government for rejecting therecommendations, saying, "Japan is still indexed as the criminal state, since it has not yet completely settled the issue of its crimes with all the victimized countries." If the crimes of Japan are acquired any longer, a similar crime which will violate peace and stability, human rights and fundamental freedom can be incurred," he said. South Korea's AmbassadorSun Joun Young, head of the country's delegation, said, "The first step (Japan) should take is to publicly acknowledge its past offenses, and then assume due responsibilities in a straightforward manner." He urged Japan to pay individual compensation to the victims, clearly demonstrating a shift in Seoul's stance on this issue from its 3/1993 announcement that it would not demand "any material reparations at a government level." China also expressed its strong support for the report which "has exposed the crime of recruiting 'comfort women' committed by the Japanese militarist government," and said Beijing appreciates the special rapporteur's constructive efforts and results achieved by her. The governments which backed up the UN recommendations, also included the EU, the Netherlands, Ukraine, India, Brazil, Australia, Ethiopia, Canada, Uganda, the Philippines and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Meanwhile, some fifty NGOs, gathered in Geneva for the session from around the world, announced on 4/8/1996 that they formed an International Alliance Supporting Radhika Coomaraswamy's Report on Military Sexual Slavery in War Time, to spread support for the investigator's mandate. The international alliance requests the Commission on Human Rights to strongly support Ms. Coomaraswamy's report and follow up her work on the issue of military sexual slavery, and to encourage Tokyo to act promptly in accordance with her recommendations. Member NGOs of the alliance had increased to 70 from 30 nations as of 4/11/1996. They include the American Association of Jurists, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, the Institute for Women, Law and Development and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. [=]

20014. ------. "US Demonstrations Say: Hands Off Mexico's Rebels: New York City", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), January 23, 1994, p. 4. 1/10/1994: In New York City, 200 people demonstrated in front of the Mexican Consulate to "support the uprising in Mexico" and "stop the US-CIA intervention and protest Mexican government repression." It was initiated by the International Action Center and endorsed by many individuals and groups including: The 500 Years Coalition of NYC, Indigenous Women's Network, Federation of Iranian Refugees and Immigrants Councils, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, MariaJimenez (American Friends Service Committee, Houston, Texas), Haiti Proges newspaper, the Native Youth Alliance in Washington, D.C., the US Puerto Rican Solidarity Network, the National Lawyers Guild, the Patrice Lumumba Coalition, Ramsey Clark, the December 12th Coalition, Workers World Party, Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr., and the Jersey City All Peoples' Congress. Many of those who took part in the action were immigrants from Mexico and other countries in Central America and South America, as well as Dominicans, Haitians and other people from the Caribbean. There were also many political activists, members of unions, a contingent of anarchists, students and youth. The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru had a contingent. People were angered by the repression of the rebels by the Mexican government. One Mexican woman spoke to the crowd saying, "My grandmother lived at the time of the Mexican revolution and she saw the massacres of all our people. And now the invasion is still going on. And our people are still fighting for their land and their liberty." After the action in front of the Mexican consulate people marched to the headquarters of ITT, a multinational corporation that was one of the main companies that fought to pass the NAFTA agreement. [=


20017. ------. Statement of Demands For Legal Reforms On The Occasion of International Womens Year. [Presented by a coalition of 27 Turkish women's associations] 1975. (1) Husband and wife should be entitled to represent the marital union. (2) The wife should not be obliged to adopt the husband's family name. (3) The prerogative of a husband to forbid his wife the practice of a profession or employment should be abolished. (4) Legal, educational and administrative measures to abolish the 'bride price' [basilik] should be implemented. (5) The prohibition of a religious ceremony before a civil marriage has been registered and should be enforced. (6) In order to equalize tax obligations, individual tax declarations for husband and wife should be required. (7) Women civil servants and workers should be able to take one paid year's leave of absence after childbirth. (8) Rural women should be able to benefit from social security rights. (9) The exploitation of apparently 'adopted female' children, employed in domestic service should be prevented by legal provision. [Reprinted in Abadan-Unat, "Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women", in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 177-194. [=]

20018. ------. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: General Discussion: Afternoon Session: Part 01. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 59-62. Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Dabashi, for such a philosophical analysis of the topic of our discussion, "Theocracy, Human Rights and Women." Now we are going to open the session to the audience; if there are any questions from the floor, you can direct them either to Mr. Dabashi or any of the speakers this morning. But before I do that, let me see if any of the speakers has a comment to make about what Mr. Dabashi said. No comments? Then we open the floor for any question from the audience.

Question: I'm from Iran, and I've lived in America almost 20 years. Professor Dabashi, you gave us so much, it's impossible to digest. It was exciting to hear about all the poets that I grew up with in a very sophisticated, Perhaps political, historical, documentary type of speech and to realize the importance that you gave to the poets. I enjoyed it very much and I thank you and Professor Pirouz who organized such a conference.

But to get back to the practical aspects of women and human
rights on a global level, not only in my country. As you mentioned, women constitute more than 50% of the earth's inhabitants. They do most of the work, they are nurses, and as mothers, they are the ones who have produced all the leaders, but little has been done to give them not only the recognition they deserve, but also their share in shaping the future. I don't have to tell you about the inheritance laws, which are not equal for women, lower wages for the same work, the positions of power that women do not occupy, specifically in Iran. I would like to hear some comments about that. Thank you.

Dabashi: You're absolutely right, the point of my presentation has been to try to figure out, as best as I know how, what exactly is a "woman," created as a living, breathing, historical human being, not as a totally conceptualized thing. Ferdowsi, Sa'di and many of our great poets are witnesses to what happens in terms of our collective sensibilities. So, they are certainly much more reliable than our historians. I'm sure you'd agree with me. By the way, I don't think that my references to the poetic imagination are marginal; poetry is not something tangential or luxurious in our collective culture. Let me give you a specific example; those of you who know the Shah Nameh, and I'm sure you do, recall that in the story of Siyavush we encounter an absolutely brilliant human being called Sudabeh, who is infinitely more interesting as a character than both Kaykavos, her husband, and Siyavush, her step-son, to whom she is attracted. But in Ferdowsi's narrative there are two or three occasions in which there are passing references to the effect that women are not trustworthy, or his advice that one should not marry an evil woman, and things to that effect. So there are these references to women in our pre-modern poetry, and they are stereotypes; we don't know who exactly these "women" are. If we want to figure out something more tangible, we have to begin to read very closely, between the lines.

Our present situation is not separated from the rest of the world. As a result, I am totally opposed to segregating the fate of Iranian women and treating them with criteria other than those of human rights. That is, separating them and artificially creating so-called cultural differences. I don't exactly know what these alleged cultural differences are. They seem to me to be either racist or political reasons for separating the fate of Iranian women from that of Iranian men. These current debates are not monolithic. You cannot find two feminists, for example, who agree on every point, on what it is exactly that "feminists" as such stand for. But it is imperative for the fate of Iranian women to be part and parcel of the universal struggle for their rights, and separating them, isolating them, into this presumably culturally specific pattern is not productive. Or at least if it is to be articulated into those terms, it has to be done so by Iranian women themselves, not by anybody else.

Whitley: I'd like to ask you a question myself, and I don't know whether or not to phrase it philosophically or pragmatically. Let me try. You made the judgment that the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the women's role has been the formation of autonomous, independent organizations that act as a buffer between the atomized individual and the state apparatus. You can extend that argument more or less to the Iranian case. The period of the past ten or fifteen years has witnessed an extremely volatile revolutionary situation. That is, people without much training in political participation have been mobilized to participate in a revolution. The sheer ecstasy of being able to participate in a massive political act ought to be seen against the background of a political culture that generally believed, between the 1950s and the 1970s, that any configuration of five Iranians had to have a member of the SAVAK among them. So there was a euphoric explosion after a long period of suspension of political participation. What we should be looking at in the emerging parameters of the post-revolution society, other than for individual voices, is the formation of autonomous civil organization. Civil organizations and group affiliations beyond the state, that have absolutely nothing to do with the state. These groups are beginning to emerge—that is, individuals are beginning to form professional organizations, for example, and it may be hoped that these organizations will grow, will be translated into the context of Iranian society proper. So, at a very theoretical level, the question is: Can there be a future for the creation of autonomous, secular groupings within which an atomized individual, divorced from his or her historical bonds, can have a life and be protected against the overpowering state apparatus? That in my judgment is politically more important than the formation of individual consciousness. Such consciousness inevitably finds its way into literature, poetry, painting, etc. These are things that can be permitted, and you know, as anyone who has been exposed to Iranian culture will acknowledge, that women in particular will be involved.

Let's take an example that you and I both know: Moniru Ravaripur, an Iranian novelist who is right now in the US. Just think of it: In an "Islamic" Republic, with all that such a Republic connotes, a divorced woman, somebody who simply told her husband to "go to hell", without any support at all, has been able, out of sheer conviction, to create a voice for herself, to write a major novel, which is critically acclaimed, to be compared to Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and then continue to write and participate in international conferences. She is a joy to talk to and be with, as you and I know from the past week. Now, there is no historical explanation for that. This is not a verification of the virtues of an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Revolution. This is simply a development which is a further continuation and, I hope, a verification of an inner, deeper process that you described was not much, and you reached the conclusion that the birth of the individual, of men and women as historical persons, is irreversible. I have to disagree with that judgment. However, it runs counter to popular perceptions, both within and outside Iran, about the role of the individual, in contemporary Iranian society. Contemporary images of Iran, in this country at least, are of the mass, the mass that participated in the revolution, the mass of the wave of the Basiji that took part in the Iran/Iraq war, and the masses that took part in demonstrations outside the American Embassy. The concept is there, apart from a towering historical figure, Ayatollah Khomeini, and a few other individuals. But the idea is not one of the individual, but of a group force.

My question to you is really about the problems that are created for historical development, obviously mismatched between the underlying reality of intellectual life in the country and the perceptions that Iranians act collectively and not individually. Is this discrepancy going to create some struggle between what the role of the individual ought to be in Iranian life, given that Iranians—as all this audience will know—are highly individualistic people in normal social and political interactions? Can we see some means of bringing to greater public life the role of the individual to balance that to the role of the state?

Dabashi: As for the question of mass society, which as a sociological category has been a term in circulation at least since Tocqueville's time, it was primarily a Tocquevillian insight that the rise of democracy and egalitarian tendencies poses the creation of mass societies in which the individual becomes atomized. Now, let's proceed with this insight: what Tocqueville observes in Democracy in America is that the creation of democracies and egalitarian conditions obviously goes beyond the traditional boundaries that bind individuals together and creates a massive state bureaucracy which atomizes the individual. He does not argue, however, that the salvation of democracy has been the formation of autonomous, independent organizations that act as a buffer between the atomized individual and the state apparatus.

You can extend that argument more or less to the Iranian case. The period of the past ten or fifteen years has witnessed an extremely volatile revolutionary situation. That is, people without much training in political participation have been mobilized to participate in a revolution. The sheer ecstasy of being able to participate in a massive political act ought to be seen against the background of a political culture that generally believed, between the 1950s and the 1970s, that any configuration of five Iranians had to have a member of the SAVAK among them. So there was a euphoric explosion after a long period of suspension of political participation. What we should be looking at in the emerging parameters of the post-revolution society, other than for individual voices, is the formation of autonomous civil organization. Civil organizations and group affiliations beyond the state, that have absolutely nothing to do with the state. These groups are beginning to emerge—that is, individuals are beginning to form professional organizations, for example, and it may be hoped that these organizations will grow, will be translated into the context of Iranian society proper. So, at a very theoretical level, the question is: Can there be a future for the creation of autonomous, secular groupings within which an atomized individual, divorced from his or her historical bonds, can have a life and be protected against the overpowering state apparatus? That in my judgment is politically more important than the formation of individual consciousness. Such consciousness inevitably finds its way into literature, poetry, painting, etc. These are things that can be permitted, and you know, as anyone who has been exposed to Iranian culture will acknowledge, that women in particular will be involved.

Let's take an example that you and I both know: Moniru Ravaripur, an Iranian novelist who is right now in the US. Just think of it: In an "Islamic" Republic, with all that such a Republic connotes, a divorced woman, somebody who simply told her husband to "go to hell", without any support at all, has been able, out of sheer conviction, to create a voice for herself, to write a major novel, which is critically acclaimed, to be compared to Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and then continue to write and participate in international conferences. She is a joy to talk to and be with, as you and I know from the past week. Now, there is no historical explanation for that. This is not a verification of the virtues of an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Revolution. This is simply a development which is a further continuation and, I hope, a verification of an inner, deeper movement that has been taking place. We are the heirs of at least 200 years of secular imagination in the modern history of Iran. It is of course a fact that those 200 years, when push came to shove, did not amount to very much. That is the religious sensibility was so powerful that it overwhelmed the secular imagination. Yet, institutionally difficult to establish though it might be in political terms, in terms of ideology, sensibility, literally imagination, or simply an alternative conception of being, such secular impulses continue to exist; they may come out and manifest themselves first among Iranians in Europe or the United States, or Japan, or Australia, or India, but they will have, I'm confident, a significant effect inside Iran. So briefly, formation of institutional groupings, independent of the state apparatus, the elementary formation of a civil society, and the continuation of individual voices, are emerging patterns and possibilities that will balance both the dangers of the mass society and the overpowering state apparatus.
important role in Iran too.

Dabashi: Absolutely, and as you know, now we are connected with a number of our colleagues through E-mail and are constantly in contact with one another. At this stage, it has to do more with checking manuscripts in Shiraz University or things of that nature, but the political implications of these developments are just mind-boggling. A satellite dish, I hear, is not that expensive in Tehran. And Madonna and Michael Jackson are not the only images transferred through these satellite dishes. The irrefutable dignity of an individual woman or man is what is at stake. Technology, now perhaps more than ever, has devastating implications, for or against repressive regimes.

Chair: Especially the artistic part of it.

Dabashi: Yes, that’s one example, but there are many others, including more superficial ones like T-shirts of Michael Jackson in Tehran, Madonna and what have you. These and other more substantial exchanges serve to bring Iran into that technological revolution that is occurring everywhere and as a result makes control extremely difficult, no matter how totalitarian the state may be. Madonna is a superbly subversive figure, and the domains of that subversiveness are not just sexual. They certainly include taboos of a cultural, social, and political nature. [-]

20019. ------. Thiecracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: General Discussion: Afternoon Session: Part 02. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 62-64. Question: Mr. Dabashi, you have a very interesting approach. I think you’ve made it quite clear that Iran is fast joining this global village, indicating that Iranian society is approaching that interactive age in a sense, so Iranians just like some of us here, can sit down and converse through their own media. Now, I wonder, despite the great differences between Iranian and western traditions, what do you think will be the impact of such influences on traditional Iranian culture? My impression is also that these mass media, rapid transportation and technological advancements have already undermined traditional values. Right now, we are in fact in a crisis. What do you think will be the impact on that society, with such long-standing traditions?

Dabashi: I must take exception to the premise that in the case of Iran, or any other so-called traditional society, we are dealing with an unchanging monolithic culture that has so-called “traditional values” which have never altered over the course of history and that now all of a sudden in the 1990s are being given a cultural shock by a massive and empty abstract thing called “the West.” In my opinion, culture is always in a state of flux. When you want to start in the course of Iranian history to account for the influences of our cultural development, you have to go back to the Zoroastrians, as you know. Then a military invasion occurred, and our religion was gradually changed. That was a major rupture in the going to present a special challenge to that delusion. But a new breed will be the impact of such influences on traditional Iranian culture? My impression is also that these mass media, rapid transportation and technological advancements have already undermined traditional values. Right now, we are in fact in a crisis. What do you think will be the impact on that society, with such long-standing traditions?

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these stories? They have been handed down from generation to generation. What are these historians doing? Why is it that in the course of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Mottahari found the significance of these stories so appealing and began to rewrite them for revolutionary purposes? It is such anecdotes which carry weight, carry cultural significance, and as a result cultures are transformed. They begin to redefine; new elements begin to be introduced into them. It is so with all traditional languages, stories, sensibilities, and aesthetic imaginings. And by aesthetic imagination, I don't mean anything elitist; just look at the effect of the revolutionary art during the recent events in our country. Where all these images came from. We are not even talking about those artists who are hired by the Islamic Republic in order to generate and mobilize revolutionary sentiment, but by graffiti, by murals spontaneously created; these images are simply in our minds as we speak, as we remember. As a result, when I say culture, I don't have any literary or so called "Hoch Kultur" point of view but an historical amalgamation of language, custom, habits, literally and aesthetic forms of coming to terms with the absolutism of reality.

Look at Nuruz for example, how it is constantly being redefined. What is the significance of this? Or our religious sentiments; look at the image of Imam Hussein, how it is being constantly reconstructed for both revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, pious and impious purposes. These are sentiments, memories, anecdotes--Zarbul Masal, as we say in Persian--that are with in us and as such define the most enduring elements of our sensibilities. This is the constellation of senses through which we see the world; we participate in its revolutions or condemn its revolutions. As a result, as we continue to redefine what they are, they continue to define who we are. New images are constantly being formed, new myths are being created. Again read the work of Monir Ravanipur,-in fact I highly recommend Ahi-e Gharb--and see how she begins to resuscitate a panorama of folkloric traditions in the southern part of Iran that Tehran readers have a difficult time following, and always she has to footnote what she is referring to. But here you have a whole repertoire of symbolic references that are perfectly understandable and innate to the southern part of the country that she is now resuscitating for a revolutionary redefinition of what it means to be a woman. She, along with Simin Behbahani and Shahrnush Parsipur, are re-inventing what it means to be a woman, and I give you my word, what they are writing today is much more important than any institution of the Islamic Republic. arsipour'sZanan-eBedoun-eMardan, Ravanipur'sAhi-eGharb and many of the most recent lyrics of Behbahani will be the central texts of a future history of Iran to which the Islamic Revolution will constitute a long footnote.

I'm not underestimating the element of official power in any way; I know what it means when you have organized violence denying your inalienable human rights. I do not live in the Islamic Republic, but I lived under the brutally repressive regime of the Shah. Organized violence is a fact and continues to be a historical fact. Yet there are events that are happening that contribute to our continual redefinition of our culture which cannot, and must not, be ignored. Otherwise, we become subjects of these passing political powers and totally deny ourselves historical authenticity. We are all historical agents. Iranian culture is there to be redefined precisely by Iranians. This myth of a monolithic monstrous state dominating everything is absurd; it couldn't do so even if it wanted to. It represents the past; it is dehumanizing and it must simply be ignored, rendered irrelevant.

Whitley: Can we draw a distinction here between the means and form of communication, and the substance or the content? This is really following on the same discussion, in that during the revolutionary period, and I'm now addressing a subject that you are working on and are a specialist in, in the iconography of the revolution, where are the symbolic references and the ideas that were conveyed through those poster arts, which might, for example, be from deep Iranian roots? At the same time, the actual communications form, the artistic form that was used, was derived purely from revolutions elsewhere, from the Soviet Revolution, from the Chinese Revolution, from revolutionary iconography. So therefore they are borrowed media that are important but using an Iranian content.

In the same way, I'm going to ask a question which may be too theoretical at this stage. You have laid stress on the importance of language as being an essential element of continuity in traditional values and concepts of what is a people, a national culture. Is it possible, given the large size and longevity now of the Iranian Diaspora community, maybe a million and a half, two million strong, that for this community to begin communicating in languages other than Persian, and yet retain its own Iranian identity?

Dabashi: Yes, absolutely. Ervand Abrahamian's book on Khomeinism is out and in it is a chapter that deals with revolutionary posters in exactly the way you attest. Namely, there are posters that come straight out of the Russian Revolution that were very successfully adapted by Iranian graphic artists, and yet put into the context of the moment, and now we cannot culturally categorize them any more because at this period in Iranian culture there was not a centralized production of icons. Production of icons has always been at the disposal of centralized powers to generate, manipulate, and put to political use. But at this point, the moral destruction of the Pahlavi regime had rendered everything up for grabs. There were the leftists, there were the Mosaddeqians, there were all kinds of nationalists who were continuing to create and construct their political agenda. What happens is that there are certain elements that all of a sudden become so constitutional to the iconography of the revolution that the artists use them without even being aware of it.

A vivid example is the use of the red tulip in revolutionary iconography. For those of you who are students of Iranian revolutions, remember that the tulip became for Ara'f a symbol of revolutionary zeal during the constitutional revolution of 1906-11. It was the emblem of sacrifice for revolutionary purposes. Now look at the symbol of the Islamic Republic, which is also in the shape of a tulip. Here is one case which is specifically nationalist: Ara'f was a staunch nationalist secular poet who was for the constitutional revolution in specifically secular terms, wrote a secular poem in which he celebrated Mellat and Jomhur. Yet this same symbol was successfully appropriated by graphic artists for the purposes of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. My point is that no artist worthy of the name gives a hoot about the genealogy of icons. Every artist creates and paints anew. Yes, there are Russian, French, and even Chinese motifs in the iconography of the Islamic Revolution. There is nothing wrong with them when a series of posters of the clerical leaders done in an Andy Warhol sort of frame. But they are all cast in the dominant imperative of making that revolution "Islamic", and that not in a grand, a historical sort of "Islam," but Islam as it is being re-invented for very specific political purposes.

In response to your second point, you're absolutely right. In my judgment, it is perfectly possible to be an Iranian and yet to speak English. Don't we claim that Al-Ghazali and Avicenna were Iranians? And yet most of their major work is in Arabic. English now is a universal language. Very much as Arabic was in its medieval heyday. In fact, Ibn Khaldun knew the relation between power and language and observed in Al-Mughaddimah that in the East, meaning Iran, Arabic had declined because Arabs were not powerful any more. We are now beyond Kipling, imagining that the moment you speak English you are part of the British Empire. A rainbow of brilliant theorists and novelists from the Indian subcontinent, from Chatterjee and Spik to Rushdie and Nandy, have decolonized the English language for all of us. You may speak and write impeccable English without necessarily being a part of the British Empire. Here we are dealing with a transnational phenomenon. Look at India, look at the whole unbelievable body of English-speaking Indians expressing their national aspirations. Dare I mention Salman Rushdie in particular who, in effect, has contributed massively to decolonizing the English language, with which you can express the deepest anxieties of exile (which, by the way, is what Satanic Verses is essentially concerned with ) in the language of the former masters. I think it's perfectly possible for the Irish community, Italian community, Jewish community, etc., to express their sentiments in this way. Creating an identity is not something that happens in isolation but always arises in response to external factors. As a result, we are now beginning the reconstruction of the Iranian identity in English, and thus the journal Pardis rightly is in
English because you are dealing with a group of young Iranians who are beginning to find out who they are, and at this particular moment of their cultural identity you cannot tell this new generation, first go and learn Persian, then you will know what your heritage is. No, it is perfectly possible to understand what it means to be an Iranian even if we decide to define it in English or, for that matter, in Chinese. This is not to suggest that the Persian language, as a cultural heritage, is not a crucial, perhaps even central, aspect of our identity. But there is more to the politics of identity than just language. The significance of Edward Said is not just in being the most eloquent spokesman for Palestinian identity and national aspirations. His writings constitute, that is to say define, the forms, and construct the symbolics, of that national identity. And most of Said’s writings are in English, the language of urban intellectuals throughout the world, from China to India, from Scandinavia to Australia. That it is English which is now the hegemonic, culturbuilding language is an entirely historical phenomenon. Arabic and Latin used to perform that function for a long time. Persian, in fact, was the hegemonic language of culture building for much of the Eastern world from Asia Minor to India. The British were adamant in substituting English for Persian as the administrative and cultural language of India. Language is power. From Ibn Khaldun to Foucault, we have ample arguments to that effect. [a]

Chair: Thank you very much Mr. Dabashi, Janet Bauer, Andrew Whitley, Elis Sanasarian and Mohsen Milani. I know we all benefitted from what you had to say. I deeply appreciate your participation in our conference, and I hope that you found it worthwhile. We look forward to seeing you next year. [b]


Dabashi: We should of course always be afraid of such hegemonic powers, but these days it is extremely difficult for any state to achieve such domination. I realize there is a plague among us Iranians concerning conspiratorial theories, simply a plague, a disease. So that anything that happens, the Americans did it, or the British did it. They come up with insane theories for such assumptions. But we have to assume historical responsibility for what we have done. Among those historical responsibilities is that we have a say in the future of our culture, history, politics, who we are and what we stand for. People are petrified by “agents” of the government or of a foreign power. This is simply dehumanizing. Like many of you, I used to live in a police state. It is a frightfully dehumanizing experience. I refuse ever again to live under such a system in which I would be afraid to speak out for fear of persecution. Yes, I share your concern at hegemonic powers gaining control over our home culture. But I refuse to make that fear the condition of my entrapment in a theocratic totalitarianism.

Chair: Thank you very much Mr. Dabashi, Janet Bauer, Andrew Whitley, Elis Sanasarian and Mohsen Milani. I know we all benefitted from what you had to say. I deeply appreciate your participation in our conference, and I hope that you found it worthwhile. We look forward to seeing you next year. [b]

22022. ------. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: General Discussion: Morning Session: Part 01. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 35-38. Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Whitley, for your thoughtful presentation on such a sensitive issue. We are now going to open our session for dialogue between the audience and the speakers, but before I do that, I would like to see if any of the speakers has comments about the other presentations. No comments? Well then, let us open the session to any questions the audience may have.

Question: I want to thank Dr. Pirouz and his staff for providing us these past four years with such exceptionally stimulating sessions. I must say this is a unique opportunity and a great chance for dialogue.

I have two comments with regard to the presentation by Mr. Milan. One really has to do with the issue he raised: that is, the relationship between policy and the state and religion. It seems to me if we now look back over the western experience in terms of how it has dealt with religion, particularly with the experience in the US that we know well, the conclusion is that it was not only a matter of
disassociating politics from religion, but rather it seems to me that the founding fathers here were quite wise to protect religion from the state; they came up with the separation of religion and state. In your closing remarks, you asked us what we think of the relationship, or what you refer to as the lack of conspiracy, between Hojatol-eslam Rafsanjani reflecting the new Republic and Ayatollah Khamenei. But I want you to tell us in terms of your own perspective, do you really see differences between these two? At this point, and if you do, what are the social and socio-economic bases of the differences between these two who represent separate constituencies?

Chair: I will take one more question from the audience so we can move faster. Yes, please.

Question: I'd like to know if other people agree, or disagree, with my observation, but in my opinion it was a very interesting panel representing a balanced perspective. I want to know what that balance is about. My sense from hearing the speakers was that the Iranians on the panel, Moshen Milani and Eliz Sanasarian, chose to emphasize, even with their critique within the critique of what is taking place in Iran, the fact that there are voices of debate, sent and so on, that are pushing the notion, as Professor Milani put it, of Islamic law towards a new philosophical direction. And I understood that also to be part of what Dr. Sanasarian was saying in terms of women's intervention in the Islamic sphere; they are not merely passive victims of a system that tries to keep them out but do have a say in how things develop and so on.

My sense of Mr. Bauer and Professor Whitley was that what came across from their observations was something viewed very much from a Western perspective, of rights, individual freedom, etc., and that there really isn't a way within the current definition of Islam, of the Islamic government of Iran, that would allow for the kinds of improvements that you would like to see universally extended to women and others. I was very much struck by that difference in your presentations. I want to know if that is the correct perception or not. And I'd be interested in hearing more about what Professor Milani said on this new direction of Islamic philosophy.

Milani: Let me start with Mr. Whitley's presentation and the few comments he made about the lack of a neutral body in Iran to make judgment about the conflict between the theocratic and the republican aspects of the new order. So far as I know, there is no such a neutral body in England, nor is there one in this country. The members of the US Supreme Court are selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In England, as you know better than I do, the Parliament is supreme and sovereign, and represents the wishes of the masses and the majority party. The Parliament establishes the law and it becomes the law in England. In Iran, there is the Council for Determination of the Interest of the Islamic Republic whose members have the ultimate say in settling the major disputes among different organs of command in the Islamic Republic. The judiciary is also independent of the executive and legislative branches, at least theoretically.

In terms of the presidential elections, I agree with you. There were about 1000 candidates who wanted to become Iran's president in 1992. That should tell you something about job opportunities in Iran! Of the 1000, so far as I know (and I was in Iran when that happened), four candidates were given the okay by the Council of Guardians to campaign for the presidency. I must confess that I found the level of the debate between those four candidates quite engaging. Finally, how do we enlarge the so-called freedoms that the elites enjoy in Iran? I think, number one, that we must not apply our Eurocentric criteria when we evaluate Iran. We must be more accurate and careful about what we say, too. I was, at one time, an opponent of the Shah's regime. I remember very vividly that Amnesty International used to declare that there were over 100000 political prisoners in Iran. I was one of those who would go around and spread that nonsense. After the Shah's overthrow, we learned that 100000 was a highly exaggerated number.

Now, we are doing the same thing again. We keep complaining about this or that, that Iran is insensitive to this minority, or insensitive to that minority, and that it is violating the basic human rights. While I agree with many of these valid criticisms, it is important that we look at the bigger picture, too. If we observe any positive trends or actions, no matter how small, we should not disregard them. Instead, we should build on them. In that bigger picture, we can see that a new breed of Iranians has come to power, and political participation has been expanded to the lower classes. Dr. Sanasarian talked about the new constituency of women. The fact that there are elections is a positive development and we should encourage that. The fact that they are controlled is negative; we should try to make them freer.

And finally, the last point someone raised was about the development of a new Islamic jurisprudence. I think the only hope we have, at least the only hope I've had, is for a sort of Shi'i renaissance, an Islamic renaissance, to be orchestrated by those people who have the authority to render judgment about Islam and Shi'ism. If I am not mistaken, the process of reformation in Europe began by someone who was a cleric himself. In Iran, I think there are individuals who are moving in that direction and are trying to make Islamic laws compatible with the modern world. The greatest challenge facing the Islamic Republic is this: Can it make Islamic law compatible with the needs of the modern world? If it succeeds in this imperative, it will survive. If it fails, it will not survive.

Chair: Mr. Whitley, would you like to make any comments?

Whitley: Yes, I think both by addressing Dr. Milani and also Dr. Sanasarian, we are continuing the same debate. She'd asked us whether rights and individual freedoms can be accommodated within an Islamic political system. I believe they can. I think that it's not incompatible. I think, as Dr. Milani has said, there are certainly well-meaning, intelligent people in Iran who believe that it is possible to preserve the broader ideological framework and the preeminence of Islam as a guiding philosophical political system, and at the same time provide a degree of protection for individual rights. I think there are some problem areas that we could discuss, in particular concerning religious minorities. Nonetheless, I am hopeful, and I don't wish to appear as negative as perhaps Dr. Milani thought that I was being, intaking a particular occidental point of view.

I sometimes wish I didn't have a British accent and therefore can be held accountable for the British political system. Believe me, I don't approach this subject as one who feels he has to justify all the practices in England. I would simply make one small side note, which is that when he says there is no neutral body in England, there is. There is the judiciary which is an independent body. The judiciary remains one that can ultimately provide a judgment in Britain. In Britain unlike the US, there are no elected judges. I think your point about the Expediency Council in Iran is well taken. At the same time, it is a body which is acting to adjudicate disputes and interpretations within a political framework—one that was set by Ayatollah Khomeini in the first instance, a certain interpretation of political Islam if you like—of an Islamic polity is what I mean to say—which a single individual brilliant as he was with certain flaws maybe, had chosen for the nation.

There has been very little opportunity to challenge the basic premises of it. Those who have attempted to do so have found themselves marginalized. You find that Ayatollah Montazeri, prominent religious authority that he is, is no longer able to speak publicly, to act as an individual. You find that Abdul Karim Soroush, an Islamic reformer within the society, is having his voice silenced today. Although for a while he could open up and speak, he's now been silenced again. This is not just a mark of intolerance from a human rights point of view; it's stupidity from my point of view, as far as the regime is concerned, because they're restricting the scope of debate, rather than opening it up.

It is perfectly true that you can have this huge electoral base in which individuals can vote for the President. But at the same time, the control that is exercised means that your choices are going to be more limited, to the poverty of the nation ultimately, and that's a theoretical argument rather than a practical argument. I agree with you that political participation is much broader and deeper now than it had been under the monarchial system. There is no doubt about that. It is one that extends the debate more broadly. So I think we're arguing about tactics as much as goals.

I agree with you that the issue of how to make Islamic law compatible with the needs of the modern world is a central one and a
very difficult problem for the regime. [\ldots]

22023. 


Chair: Yes, please.

Whitley: I've been observing these issues for many years, and I'd like to try to change the direction of this argument and get to some of the more fundamental issues. One aspect which I think is at the core of much of the problem, which I heard mentioned only once, is that of gender and sexuality. We haven't talked about the concept of sexuality. It seems to me that you don't see this so much any more, but in the 1970's before the revolution, if you went to Islamic organizations and campuses, you heard over and over about this image of the female as the temptress, the male as the weak victim, etc. Much of this arises, if you go to a Fagheh or go to the basis of many of these restrictions, from this issue of the sexuality of women. What I want to ask Mr. Sanasarian is: In these debates has anybody, any of the women activists, begun seriously to address this issue? This seems to me, in my personal view, the core of the issue, and this is where the debate and the discussion should be.

Chair: Yes, please.

Question: I have a few comments I'd like to make. I think we don't have serious quarrels with Islam. It is our religion. It is the dominant factor. Rather, it is the so-called Islamic Republic that has betrayed religion as a vital and effective force. Many of those who practice the religion as supporters of the regime are terrorists. Also, they have admitted to using religion as a political tool for their revolutionary goals.

Mr. Milani asked why there is such media hype about what goes on in Iran, particularly with respect to Hezbollah and Hamas. When Hezbollah was formed in 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini sent about 2000 revolutionary guards to Lebanon. Since then both factions have been financially supported by the Islamic Republic in Iran to the extent of $30 million annually, or a total of around $300 million. There are documents. Politically it is a corrupt regime. Socially and economically it is bankrupt, and I think that's what it comes to. I am not trying to say that the previous regime was ideal and everything was great, but when we are dealing with issues like these I think we have to be more to the point. Thank you.

Chair: Dr. Sanasarian, would you like to first address the issue of sexuality of women?

Sanasarian: Yes, that was a good question, and a very important one. I think what you were referring to was the argument that has been made especially in scholarly literature coming out of the Islamic world. A lot has been written on the way in which female sexuality is viewed, merely as a hindrance to men's relationship with God. In fact, the first book about this was written under a pseudonym, and then it was translated into French and eventually English. Woman in the Muslim Unconscious is the first work that we ever knew that addressed female sexuality. Of course, this perspective is within orthodox Islam, rather than the more spiritual Islam, more common among Sufis, which doesn't see women so much as a hindrance but as forming a direct link with the Creator. In the case of Iran, we haven't seen this discussion. Definitely, women who have been active in the government have not been able to address this issue in this fashion. I think partially because they are politicians they focus on more immediate issues, and concentrate on legislative changes. What they have done is try to address the issue of sexuality in the context of what goes on in the real society. For example, on the issue of prostitution, their language is very different from the language of the men. Instead of condemning it or saying it's immoral they often raise the question of why a female becomes a prostitute and what is wrong with a government and with a society that makes a woman earn her living through prostitution. This has been the general trend in discussing womens issues.

Chair: The other question was, I think, contrary to what has been discussed here, the assertion that the system is socially, politically, and economically corrupt and also the fact that $30 million was mentioned as being given to Hezbollah and at some point this rose to several hundred million dollars. Let me ask Mr. Whitley if his organization actually has any figures about the support for the Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations by the Iranian government.

Whitley: That's really not an issue that we deal with. I'm not concerned with the sponsorship of foreign political organizations. It's not one that we would consider to be within our mandate at all.

Chair: Okay, then I should ask Mr. Milani to comment, because I think the consensus here is that the system is not corrupt and that if making progress on all fronts.

Milani: No, I'm not here to say there is corruption or there is no corruption in Iran. This is not my topic. My topic was to talk about the two different sides, or the two different forces, that operate in the Islamic Republic--the push for Islam and the push for popular sovereignty--and that's all I have talked about and that's all I will defend. Now, as far as the Hezbollah and the Iranian operation, I would like to see the documents that show Iran is contributing some $200 or $300 million. Thank you.

Chair: Yes, please.

Question: I have a brief question for Mr. Whitley. Does your organization have any information on habeas corpus, and how's that being treated in Iran?

Chair: Can we take one more question before we go to panel?

Question: My question to Mr. Milani concerns cooperation between the Fagheh and the President. The way I see it is that each of them can function only if the other is not opposed. The ultimate power is the essence of what the Valayat-e Fagheh seeks, and I don't observe any cooperation between the two. I'm just wondering, how do you see that cooperation develop, as it is against the nature of both?

Whitley: Just briefly, habeas corpus is not an established legal concept in Iran. In fact, to the contrary, and Ayatollah Yazdi in his Friday prayers address a couple of weeks ago made a remarkable observation on the fact when he said that charging somebody with a crime was in effect an acknowledgement of his guilt. So, therefore, by this statement he defended the system whereby individuals can be arbitrarily held, and they're often held for lengthy periods, supposedly undergoing questioning. It is difficult to gain access to them or for lawyers to determine their guilt or innocence. Thus, one does not have the check on the arbitrary power of a variety of arresting bodies in the country who can then hold people in detention.

Chair: Mr Milani, would you like to discuss the conflict between Fagheh and the President?

Milani: As long as Ayatollah Khomeini was alive, as you will recall, that conflict didn't exist because: (a) Ayatollah Khomeini was the dominant force, and (b) the President was the symbolic head of state and had no power to formulate policy. Now, under the revised constitution, I think there is a balance. In actuality, at least during the past four years, there has been a remarkable cooperation between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. This cooperation has been based on the recognition by both men that if they do not cooperate, the system will collapse. Therefore, they have been on the same side, at least on important issues. Yes, there have been some minor differences. But on major issues they have supported each other. I can give you a number of concrete examples, the most important of which was the cooperation between the two during the Persian Gulf crisis, during the Kuwait crisis. Ayatollah Khamenei supported President Rafsanjani, although he rhetorically attacked the US.

Sanasarian: May I say something?

Chair: Yes, please.

Question: I've been observing these issues for many years, and I'd like to see making progress on all fronts. Politically it is a corrupt regime. Socially and economically it is bankrupt, or innocence. Thus, one does not have the check on the arbitrary power of a variety of arresting bodies in the country who can then hold people in detention.

Chair: Mr Milani, would you like to discuss the conflict between Fagheh and the President?

Milani: As long as Ayatollah Khomeini was alive, as you will recall, that conflict didn't exist because: (a) Ayatollah Khomeini was the dominant force, and (b) the President was the symbolic head of state and had no power to formulate policy. Now, under the revised constitution, I think there is a balance. In actuality, at least during the past four years, there has been a remarkable cooperation between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. This cooperation has been based on the recognition by both men that if they do not cooperate, the system will collapse. Therefore, they have been on the same side, at least on important issues. Yes, there have been some minor differences. But on major issues they have supported each other. I can give you a number of concrete examples, the most important of which was the cooperation between the two during the Persian Gulf crisis, during the Kuwait crisis. Ayatollah Khamenei supported President Rafsanjani, although he rhetorically attacked the US.

Sanasarian: May I say something?

Chair: Yes, please.

Sanasarian: On the issue of theocracry in Iran, I think one thing that Dr. Milani is not mentioning, and a very important one, is the relationship and the conflict between the Maraji' taglid and the Velayat-i Fagheh. Where one begins and the other one ends, and vice versa. This issue was raised again after the death of Grand Ayatollah Khoi. Both are being defined by the state. Regarding Mr. Milani's comments, I really don't think that the two of us see things exactly the same way. I believe I'm much more open to the discontent that I have seen and heard Iranians express, and this discontent is coming not only from women who've had a Western education, it's coming from Islamic women as well, traditional women, and indeed all sectors of Iranian society. It is true, and I think you were correct in your comment, that the issue of corruption is a major issue now in Iran. Sometimes the government tries to address this but
people are cynical. They have great difficulty simply earning a living. Many people hold two or three jobs and then another job on weekends. Your point was well taken.

Whitley: I just want to follow, briefly, really to endorse Dr. Sanasarian’s marks about the centrality of this issue, between an innovative political concept such as Velayat-e Fagheh and the long-standing religious societal traditions behind the concept of Marja-ye Taghli. I thought it’s interesting that we have had such a change coming about and so different, and that it has been driven by the new generation coming about that hasn’t the whole culture is bad and everybody in it is bad?” They were arguing about groups of women. During these 14 years there have been many changes. How can we criticize male dominance in the society without implying that dominance, but we don’t want to be critical of Iranian culture and some rather than a question. Feminists were saying to Iranian women: “You have to be the ones to ask Mr. Rafsanjani the answer is obvious. This is just a comment Betty Mahmoody’s book, “Not Without My Daughter”, many German promised a sort of third channel of TV, which people have been expecting make the distinction between the government and the people, and what change things but haven’t succeeded. Just to give you four examples: 1) calculated toward getting a certain image or response in the audience. Women within the Majlis as a whole? You mentioned several because they are different physically. And then women can come back office and their relationship to other groups, and what are the dynamics of women who were very outspoken and more vocal in terms of women’s and argue, but we’ve been doing that kind of work for centuries. That’s the Majlis that you mentioned. What types of women are qualified to run for different ways and exemplified or implemented in different ways. You see behind Islamic thinking, in general—I mean, the Islamicist perspective or philosophical perspective, which that the central premise of the basic issues there is a merger taking place which is interesting to watch. On some other issues there are differences, which is a healthy trend.

Question: I have a question addressed to Janet. You characterized, as I gathered from your talk, the perspective of the regime on women as separate but equal, and we need to talk more about what you mean by that or what you mean by characterizing the regime as emphasizing the concept of separate but equal.

Bauer: I’d like to respond to that question and I have two comments about previous questions that were asked; particularly the question about the use of language and the observation that Andrew and I both focused more on this term “rights” than the other speakers. As for separate but equal policy, I see in a lot of Islamic writings a tendency to emphasize that women are naturally different from men and a tendency to assert that although they are equal, that equality can only be achieved, because of men’s and women’s very different natures, by creating different roles for each. Maybe not a very good example, but one I’m going to use, is the language used by philosophers when they talk about a public policy and make the distinction between treatment as equals and equal treatment. And the distinction they are usually trying to make is that the best policy in treatment as equals is creating a situation where people can experience equality.

Now that can mean different things, however you define it. But an example is when we construct public buildings now in the US, we are supposed to provide an access ramp for people who have to use wheelchairs or mobilized vehicles of some kind because they are not able to enter easily on their two legs. This is different treatment for people who are in wheelchairs, but it is designed to allow them to achieve equality like everybody else; not the same, but to be equal with others. And I see behind Islamic thinking, in general—I mean, the Islamicist writers like Maboodi from Pakistan—an acceptance of the idea that Islam suggests that men and women are different, they are naturally different, and therefore their roles in life have to be different in order to create a better society, in order to be fair to both of them. And that can be achieved in different ways and exemplified or implemented in different ways. You might say, well, women are not capable of doing heavy agricultural work because they are different physically. And then women can come back and argue, but we’ve been doing that kind of work for centuries. That’s what I mean by separate—but equal or a difference perspective.

I would also like to make two other comments—one on the difficulty of making criticism and related to that, the issue of the language that we use. Some of the shades of difference that I see in the comments by the speakers and by people in the audience seem to me to be calculated toward getting a certain image or response in the audience. When we say things we are not always sure how people are going to interpret them, and in this society it is very difficult to be critical without being negative. Westerners are not like Iranians who are very careful to make the distinction between the government and the people, and what the government does and what people do in a particular culture and so, for example, in Germany a couple of years ago after the publication of Betty Mahmoody’s book, “Not Without My Daughter”, many German feminists were saying to Iranian women: “You have to be the ones to speak out on this issue. We want to criticize patriarchy, or male dominance, but we don’t want to be critical of Iranian culture and some aspects of the book are ethnocentric and are critical of the culture. And how can we criticize male dominance in the society without implying that the whole culture is bad and everybody in it is bad?” They were arguing that Iranian women, as representatives of their culture, were in the best position to make critical statements. It is very difficult sometimes to
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make observations without being perceived as taking one side or the other.

On the issue of rights and the language that we have used to discuss our particular topic today, Andrew mentioned that his topic was human rights and he was interested in supporting them. My use of language [the language of Rights] comes from probably three factors: one is I was raised in a liberal Western tradition so it is very difficult for me to exclude, maybe exclude altogether and very difficult for me to envision a world where people don't have some rights to decide for themselves how their life is going to be and what choices they are going to have. Secondly, I take the language also from the women whom I interviewed, both those in Iran before the revolution (some of whom had very little education) and refugee women and their relatives who come from Iran, who do talk about the rights of women to do certain things. And also I see that, at least as voiced by Eliz Sanasarian when she talks about women in the Islamic Republic, the regime is taking steps to change laws so that women can do certain things. And third, I really was trying to suggest that in all societies there is a tension between individuals doing certain things and controlling their decisions, and the social good—the good of the community, the good of the family. We really should not think that western society represents complete individualism and other societies represent complete communitarianism where the welfare of the society or the culture is held above everything else. I see that feminists are also beginning to debate this issue by saying that an individual's ability to control decisions—individual rights, if you will—has to be created within the context of communities, of social organization and of families. I was trying to get at that debate as well. I think Iranian acceptance of women's rights actually characterizes that very well. Women want the ability to decide certain things, and yet they have always been responsible to their families and to their communities and have tried to make choices with those social responsibilities in mind.

Chair: Thank you. Mr. Milani, would you like to make any comments?

Milani: I read somewhere that back in 1947, when the UN came with the plan to partition Palestine, somebody asked David Ben Gurion, who later became Prime Minister of Israel: How do you think the Jews should react and how do you think the Arabs will react? Ben Gurion said, well, I know my Arab friends and I know my own countrymen. We Jews will accept what is given to us now and we will think about the rest later on. Whereas our Arab friends will reject the plan outright because they want the whole thing and they want it now. There are those who would like to see democracy established in Iran quickly and now. If I say I see some encouraging developments, my point is let's build on those encouraging developments. It is in that spirit that I have talked about some positive developments in Iran. Of course, there are certainly many many things I do not like about the situation there.

Now, going back to the last question. Specifically, as far as I know, the concept of Marja'eya'at was eliminated. I have the original book Ayatollah Khomeini published when he was in Najaf. Therefore, it was not doctorated. If you study it there Ayatollah Khomeini makes it very explicit that the Fagheh does not have to be a Marja. He argued that the Fagheh must be an expert on Islamic jurisprudence and must possess all necessary political and economic skills to manage the government. As far as the three or four cases you talked about, the Iranian position on PLO-Israeli accord, Iran and the US, etc., I think you must keep in mind that Ayatollah Khamenei and Mr. Rafsanjani represent two different constituencies. The job of Ayatollah Khamenei is to keep the core support of the Islamic Republic happy, and therefore he has to be more radical than Mr. Rafsanjani, whose task it is to run the country. [=]

22025. --------. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: General Discussion: Morning Session: Part 04. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 46-48. Question: I have a question for Ms. Bauer. It's a twofold question—it has to do with the veil or hejab. As an anthropologist, have you done any research on the hejab with respect to the distinct Persian culture or present culture of Iran and given that there are no laws pertaining to hejab within Islam either in the Qur'an or Hadith, why are non-conformists in Iran being punished so harshly by the regime?

Bauer: I think it goes back partly to Ayatollah Nouri's comment, mentioned in my talk. Yes, there are variations in the way the Qur'anic verses about being modest and covering oneself are interpreted across Islamic cultures and within them by different groups, but in Nouri's interpretation, to maintain social order in Iran we have to continue what has been a social tradition. So he was admitting that the hejab wasn't necessarily attributed directly to Islam but to interpretations that have developed over many centuries. The studies of the origins of the veil are many, and it's been attributed to customs that developed among the women relatives of the prophet Muhammad or to traditional Hindu society. There are many explanations for where this kind of full cloth covering originated. It seems to have been a practice associated with the status of elite families, whether you believe it was the religious elite of Muhammad's family or whether you believe it was the economic elite landowners and government officials at some point in time. The best explanation of how it developed is cultural and social. Why people are punished in Iran for not wearing hejab has to do with the particular understanding and interpretation of Islamic texts and the traditional [in the sense of historical] interpretations of these texts. People have decided that to be a good Muslim, a woman must conform to these dress codes. I see it as a reflection of the power certain people in groups have to make that decision, not necessarily as deriving from Islam itself, I mean from the texts and the spirit of Islam. Eliz Sanasarian mentioned differences in Sufi practice and even before the revolution, but I'm sure it's also more true now. People would say to me, "Why do you go to Sufi religious services and interview Sufi women? They aren't real Muslims." and "Don't listen to what they say about Islam because they are not really Islamic, and they don't really know what they are talking about," so other interpretations are discredited.

Chair: Thank you very much.

Question: On the veil I've read that some research finds that women are not particularly opposed, but rather like it. Have you found the same thing?

Bauer: There has been a great deal of research, but I think if you look at it closely, those women who provide positive explanations for wearing the veil talk about the convenience, not having to decide what you're going to wear everyday. I mean I think I was in Iran, for most of the time in Tehran but in other places as well I actually wore the veil to be accepted more readily. Eventually, I discovered that women didn't care whether I wore it or not. They said that in America you don't do that. Many others said we'd really not be doing it ourselves anyway, so why do it if you don't have to? The freedom of not thinking about what you wear, not being exposed to the matalak from men on the street when you are walking around, relaxes you of a certain kind of burden. Many of these women who wear the veil, for example in Egypt, are working class, middle class, religious women. They are slightly more educated, usually slightly more urban than maybe some other women in society, and as one woman told me in Iran: "We take our religion seriously and we are scientific about it." Maybe the women were studying the texts and trying to adjust their behavior to what they saw and what they were told were the correct interpretations. There is a segment of women who believe that to be good Muslims they have to wear it, and they can offer you many other kinds of rationalizations—it will avert stares, it's convenient in terms of deciding what to wear. I don't think that those reasons are given by all women who are wearing the hejab because not all of them do it for the same reasons, not all of them do it from choice. Muslim women in Mindanao (the Southern Philippines) for example, wear a sort of hat, like Catholic women in Europe and America wore scarves in churches. They don't wear a full cloth covering.

Chair: Thank you. Yes, please.

Question: I would like to comment that the veil is not just Islamic. The Hindu religion prescribes veils. In India we have seen with scarves. Christians also have covered heads. And Jewish women have veils or scarves. So it is not just Islamic; all religions use them.

Chair: Thank you. Does anyone else have any comments to make? Yes, please.
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Whitley: Before this conference ends, I just wanted to have the opportunity to bring the debate back to issue that's been a subtext in much of our discussion on balances between individual and collective rights. I wanted first, though, to make a professional disclaimer. On the one hand I have been invited here as a representative of an organization which is concerned with upholding human rights, and so therefore you should expect at I would speak on behalf of that institutional mandate. We have a point of view to uphold, whether or not you agree with it. At the same time I have my own individual point of view which I am free to express under some limitations in a public forum such as this. I would like to say though, as a disclaimer, that neither I personally nor my organization, holds any particular prescription for the appropriate or the right balance between individual and collective rights. Being British, being European I would prefer to say, I am extremely conscious of the differences in the interpretations or the emphasis in the United States and Europe as to where that balance ought to lie. As an individual, I would veer more towards the collective rights than the extreme emphasis, as I see it in the United States, on individual rights and the individual freedom of choice. So, therefore, from an ethno-cultural perspective, I believe that I am sensitive to some of the considerations that Dr. Milani mentioned. I don't wish to be prescriptive to the Islamic Republic about where that balance ought to lie. At the same time, beyond the fundamentals of physical integrity, which I believe transcend any cultural considerations, I think we can address the issue without talking specifically about rights, with all the cultural baggage that comes with that term in the US. We can talk about it more, at least for some aspects of it, in terms of liberties; and we can talk about individual liberty, or liberty to be able to act as a free citizen in a society. These are philosophical questions we're getting into now, as to what the limits of a citizen's role should be in society and in participation in public life. These are difficult issues for the Islamic Republic to grapple with. They are issues that deal with the issue of rights. But there is a debate about it, even though at the moment it's a debate which is confined to the elite.

Chair: Thank you very much. We have to brake our discussion for now as we are running out of time. We can have more discussion in our afternoon session. [=]

22026. ------. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Official Welcome: Gregory Waters, Deputy Provost. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. p. vi. Good morning. One of the distinct pleasures of my job is to serve as the official welcomer for conferences at Montclair State. This conference is of particular interest to me because I have observed the richness of the programs that have been put together in the past four years. Montclair State is a growing and complex institution. We have almost 14000 students, over 250 majors, minors and concentrations. We recognize that the state of New Jersey as well as the state of the world is changing very, very rapidly, and consequently we have embarked on a program to enrich all of our international programs and to infuse a concept of global education across the curriculum. This program is a hallmark and has become a tradition now and we are very proud of its strength. I am particularly pleased with the distinguished panel that has been put together and again I welcome them to our campus.

I wish to apologize for the weather, however; our campus is particularly striking at this time of year and I know some of you had a chance to walk around before the sessions. I don't know if we're going to have much of a chance to walk around after the conference, but I know that there will be a good deal of rich discussion going on within the walls of this room so that we don't have to worry about shuffling you outside. This is a conference that is striking because it's on a topic that I believe experts and people from the inside need to reflect upon. I believe it is all too easy for folks like me with backgrounds like mine to have opinions on subjects like this. They are unformed on the traditions of the country. I think that we all are here to learn a great deal and I wish you all well. Thank you for coming. [=]

22027. ------. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Opening Remarks. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. p. vi. On behalf of the Office of the Global Education Center and the Department of Economics & Finance at Montclair State University, I would like to welcome you to our one-day conference on "Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: the Iranian Experience." This is the fourth conference in the past four years, in a series dealing with issues related to Iran and the Middle East, sponsored by the Department of Economics & Finance at Montclair State.

At the outset I would like to thank some of the individuals and institutions that have made this conference possible. First and foremost, I want to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Irvin Reid, the President of Montclair State University, who has always been very supportive of interdisciplinary programs with an international content such as the one we are holding today. Thanks are also due to the Office of the Global Education Center within the Office of the President for a grant which has financed this project. I would also like to thank Dr. Albert Rossetti Dean of the School of Business Administration, and Dr. Phillip LeBel, Chairman of the Department of Economics & Finance, both of whom have been very supportive of this program and a source of encouragement. I would like to thank Tom Cassilly of the Department of Political Science, who having served in the Foreign Service in Iran for two years, had a special interest in this project and has given a generous amount of his time to help me with its implementation.

I would like to thank John O'Brien of the Media Center, and Gary Rideout, Director of the Office of Publications of Montclair State University. I also want to express my appreciation to my wife Homa Pirouz for her art work. In addition, I am grateful to all members of the Department of Economics & Finance for their support and encouragement.

Last, but not the least, I thank Arunava Chakraborty, George Melkonian and other student members of the Economics Society. Thanks are also due to Lakisha Roberts and Beth Wymbus, student aides to the Department of Economics & Finance, and in particular Mrs. Ida Fazio, the secretarial assistant to the Department, without whose help and careful attention this program would have been impossible.

I will now ask Dr. Gregory Waters, Deputy Provost at Montclair State University, to formally open our session by giving the official welcome. [=]
Speeches, as well as general discussion between the audience and speakers, were taped and later transcribed. The transcribed version of presentations as well as general discussion between audience and the speakers were edited by each speaker, by myself, and by my colleague Tom Cassilly of the Department of Political Science at Montclair State, who as a Foreign Service officer served in Iran for two years in the late 1950s. I am extremely indebted to Professor Cassilly who gave a generous amount of his time to help me with the editing, and without whose dedication and cooperation this project would have not been possible.

All the speeches were informal and not in the form of scholarly papers. The participants are all internationally recognized scholars and, in the case of Andrew Whitley, an experienced human rights observer. I thank all of the speakers who, despite their busy schedules, accepted my invitation to take part in this conference, and to the audience whose support and contribution has been very vital for the success of these conferences. Kamrouz Pirouz; Conference Coordinator, Upper Montclair, NJ 10/1994. [=]

22029. Afshar, Soraya; Azuri, Farah [editor]; Iranian Womens Solidarity Group; IWSG. Women of Iran. The Conflict With Fundamentalist Islam: Part 3: The Economic Base for the Revival of Islam in Iran. [Iranian Womens Solidarity Group (IWSG), London] London: Ithaca Press, 1983. pp. 72-89. The question of economic development in Iran and its implication for women's rights has been ignored the Iranian left. However, at the same time that the Islamic political movement is historically based in mercantile capitalism, it is industrialization that has created the socio-political milieu that has supported movements for women's rights. In Iran, as in many Muslim countries, the economic isolation and domination of women by men has been strongest in the centers of the mercantile capitalist economy: in the towns and cities. The value of women's labor was too high in the rural and tribal areas for the artificial and enforced isolation of women in cities to be possible.

The White Revolution of the Shah began the transition to industrial capitalism in Iran. In 1962-1964, 39% of the capital in the economy was involved in trade (the bazaaris), in 1967-1976, the contribution of the trade sector in Iran grew 360%; while the dominate role in the economy was held by the state-owned oil sector, its impact on the socio-economic formation of Iranian society was limited by the fact that it employed only 0.6% of the labor force. In 1977, while Iran had 2.5 million industrial workers, 72% of the industrial work force was employed in enterprises employing ten or less people. Of these small workshops, some 430000 were located in villages and were directly controlled by the socially- and ideological-cohesive trade sector. Significantly, in the immediate post-Revolution economy, the share of foreign trade held by the bazaaris increased (even though overall trade declined), rising from 7.5% in 1977-1978 to 10.5% in 1980-1981. This economic strength, and the continuing central role of the bazaaris in the Iranian economy, creates stronger downward pressure on wages of women: this structural problem is one of the central issues limiting and eroding women's rights. [TXT]

22030. Afshar, Soraya; Azuri, Farah [editor]; Iranian Womens Solidarity Group; IWSG. Women of Iran. The Conflict With Fundamentalist Islam: Part 5: The Attitude of the Iranian Left to the Women's Question. [Iranian Womens Solidarity Group (IWSG), London] London: Ithaca Press, 1983. pp. 157-169. Only the Tudeh Party predates 1970: so much of the political left in Iran has a very limited institutional history (the author dismisses Tudeh noting it lost its "credibility" in 1953 and today is insignificant). Between 1970-1979, the two major new left organizations, the Mujahideen-e Khalq and the Organization of Peoples Fedayeen, ignored the woman question (using formulas such as: "Let's solve the problem of democracy and then we will get to women's issues."). Even now, most leftists believe that the woman question will be solved simply by the transition from capitalism to socialism. It was only after a protest march of 200000 women in Tehran denouncing the mandatory veiling regulation that the left addressed the question of women's rights: even then, for example in articles by Organization of Peoples Fedayeen, the problem of women's rights was noted without any suggestion of how the problem might be addressed. While the Socialist Workers Party (Hezb-e Kargaran-e Socialist (HKS)) called for abortion rights, the Tudeh controlled Womens Democratic Organization of Iran praised women for "the sacrifice by Iranian women [in] not giving priority to their own rights... women have shown to the world that they hold the rights of a nation higher and more important that their own." However, despite discussion of women's rights in principle, no leftist organization in Iran has a program of action for women's rights or has offered a definition of 'equal rights'. This unsympathetic attitude of the left has been especially disappointing since the majority of political active women in Iran were leftists. [TXT]
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Women: 32.
Housewives: 11.
Total: 240.

Islamic ideology regards women with a mixture of fear and paternalism, seeing them both as the source of evil and as the most vulnerable member of the household in need of constant surveillance and protection. This is reflected in the laws and policies of Muslim states, which often equate women with children and the insane.

During the 80 years preceding the Islamic revolution, Iranian women fought for and gained access to education (1910), the abolition of the veil (1936), the vote (1962), a curb on the unequivocal male right of divorce and the right to contest for the custody of children (1973), free abortion on demand (1974), and a ban on polygamy and right to maintenance after divorce (1976). Although equal opportunities were still a long way away, the women's movement had great expectations of success in the 1970s.

There were, however, divisions amongst women. Middle class and educated women were demanding and gaining access to the public sphere and seeking control over their own sexuality and the freedom to express it. Devout and less wealthy women equated sexual freedom with immorality, imperialism, and corruption, and found the pecuniary rewards for their menial jobs insufficient; this in turn made access to paid work more of a loss than a gain for many women, who felt that they had lost the honour and dignity bestowed on them by their religion without gaining any material benefits in return. As a result the advocates of domesticity for women found a large support base among the poor and working classes, both male and female. Khomeini, on his return in 1979, exploited this support and embarked on an intensive campaign to drive women back to the sphere of domesticity. Within months of his return women had been redefined as "unequal" and "impetuous" and biologically and naturally "inferior." Their mere presence in public was "salacious," and they were forced to don the Islamic hejab, covering them from head to toe, and to return to the home fires. Their hard-won rights--to education, the vote, abortion--were seriously eroded or completely revoked.

A series on The Ethics of Marriage written by Hojatolah Abasqoly Akhtari, a well-known cleric, makes clear the extent to which control over a woman's body is exclusively given over to her husband. Marriage exists for the purpose of satisfying male sexual urges. The "comfort" of marriage is that of the husband; its "solace" is also his. Wives are there to quench the "ever blazing fire of lust" and placate the "obsession" with "sexual urges" which renders men "desperate," overriding all dignity and judgment. Ardour is the preserve of men; a woman is required merely to "give herself unquestioningly to her husband" and to obey his every command.

But there is a major problem for "obedient" women in the contradictions of an ideology that prescribes total innocence, chastity, and modesty for young girls, yet expects these puritanical creatures to turn into lusty lovers as soon as the brief marriage prayer has been pronounced. Women are supposed instantaneously to abandon modesty ("their greatest asset") and "when alone with their husband take off all their garments and exhibit all their beauty." They are required to be "generous with giving themselves to him and to satisfy his every desire"; in fact they are told not only "to seek and satisfy his desire, but also to augment his lust," to "seek out his secret fantasies and by enacting them gain hold of his heart."

The young girl is told that "the worst wives are those who, when alone with their husband, refuse his advances and deny his pleasure and do not submit to his will." At the same time, these desirable sex objects are expected to revert to their previous modesty as soon as the man is satisfied. "When the man leaves, then the wife should put on her garments of modesty and cover herself from the eyes of the strangers." It is not clear how young girls can go through these repeated metamorphoses at such short intervals.


"Arab Culture and Writing Women's Bodies," by Leila Ahmen, in Feminist Issues, vol 9, no. 1, Spring 1989. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O.
The Sandinistas still need to say this. Stalin did. It is best to claim the goals of Marxism in opposition to the united front against those who want to break the revolution. And both confine socialism to one country and try to run it bureaucratically, as we will grant you your democratic rights if the Sandinistas had been on the revolutionary side on the other side of the barricades. It is best of years of being oppressed as a nation; we will be better than Somoza; extend democracy all the way, rather than face those people who should you all the way, we recognize that you have had hundreds and hundreds determine the destiny of the revolution. It is better for revolutionaries to agree with your demand, we recognize you as a nation, we support to the church and to the economic structure. And the correct answers will though the majority of MISURASATA are not on the contra side—to join revolution and any vanguard party must answer. They concern the Indios who should be natural allies of the revolution to join the other side. Why should they replace capitalism with socialism? Why? Why, if they right to autonomy is a counterrevolutionary demand! This is an anti-equality and nationhood under a Marxist government, why the hell should people who belong on the revolutionary side. This is what is currently revolutionary struggle. As a Marxist I expected more than the Sandinistas

need to change their policy towards the Indian Nations of Nicaragua immediately. Not to grant the demand of autonomy, land and resources to the Indios will result in cultural genocide. This is how serious this issue is. Without land the Indios do not have a basis for their culture—they will cease to exist. Ask any Indian. Most Native Americans in this country I am sure would agree. That is why historically Indians have fought like hell for their land, even if it meant they were the last ones left to fight. The Sandinistas have been in power for almost five years, but they have made only very little concessions, concessions on words; concessions on terms, yes, but when it comes right down to it they are still making the same mistakes that have cost lives. For example, in 1981, MISURASATA was asked to come back to the Sandinistas with a study of land ownership and a map of Indian lands, and, in the meantime, the Sandinistas agreed to stop further Indian land seizures. Matters looked hopeful. But the Sandinistas broke their agreement. They opened Sumo land to logging, they started to relocate the Indians by force, and, one week before the Indian land study was to be presented to the Nicaraguan government, the Sandinistas arrested all Indian leaders and declared them "separatists," outlawed MISURASATA, and killed four Indians in a church. Thus began the Indian-Sandinista War in Nicaragua. As a result some dissident youth joined the contras in Honduras. And MISURASATA picked up arms in self-defense and started to fight back. How do we help resolve this conflict? What do we say to our Indian brothers and sisters? And what do we say to our Sandinista compaeras and companeros? We say to our Indian brothers and sisters, we unconditionally support your democratic right to autonomy and your demand to control your own lives, your own territory and your own resources. And we support you in putting pressure on the Sandinista government to change their Indian policy. And we are with you in support of the revolution. We say to our Sandinista companeros, for the sake of the revolution, for all our sakes, grant the Indios their democratic rights. After all, isn’t a Marxist revolution above all a democratic revolution? If the Spanish independence movement against imperialism, the Sandinistas’ reason for the right to self-determination is that they are only an “ethnic group.” But, efforts to portray the Indians as an “ethnic group” cannot change the truth. The Indians are a nation; they have the right to separate if they so choose. Lenin was very clear on the obligations of socialists towards oppressed nations: “Socialist parties which did not show...that they would liberate the enslaved nations and build up relations with them on the basis of a free unity—and a free union is a false phrase without the right to secede—would be betraying socialism.” Lenin practiced what he preached. Virtually the last political struggle of his life was conducted against Stalin’s Sandinista-style “integration” of the Georgian Republic into the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics. Marxists who hodge on the right of sovereignty are issuing an invitation to anti-Marxism among people who belong on the revolutionary side. This is what is currently happening in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are saying in essence that the right to autonomy is a counterrevolutionary demand! This is an anti-socialist and anti-Marxist position, and one that is bound to drive some Indians who should be natural allies of the revolution to join the other side. The Sandinistas, by not granting Indian nations their right to autonomy—to control their land and resources—are driving some of the Indians to pick up arms against the Sandinistas in self-defense, or—even though the majority of MISURASATA are not on the contra side—to join the counterrevolutionaries. If the Sandinistas had reached out and said “We agree with your demand, we recognize you as a nation, we support you all the way, we recognize that you have had hundreds and hundreds of years of being oppressed as a nation; we will be better than Somozas; we will grant you your democratic rights”—if the Sandinistas had done this from the beginning—the Indios would have joined with them in a united front against those who want to break the revolution. And both sides need this kind of unity. The Sandinistas still need to say this. They need to change their policy towards the Indian Nations of Nicaragua immediately. Not to grant the demand of autonomy, land and resources to the Indios will result in cultural genocide. This is how serious this issue is. Without land the Indios do not have a basis for their culture—they will cease to exist. Ask any Indian. Most Native Americans in this country I am sure would agree. That is why historically Indians have fought like hell for their land, even if it meant they were the last ones left to fight. The Sandinistas have been in power for almost five years, but they have made only very little concessions, concessions on words; concessions on terms, yes, but when it comes right down to it they are still making the same mistakes that have cost lives. 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The effect of the Constitution was to strengthen enormously Jewish self-respect, and at the same time to enhance the status of the Jews in the eyes of the Muslims. The field covered by the schools was limited and the educational task enormous. But illiteracy among the Jews has gradually decreased to about 75%, even though Jewish secondary education could be much improved. Today, there are some 22 Alliance schools in Persia, with approximately 8000 pupils. The Anglo-Jewish Association has also contributed towards education in the Persian Jewish community.

In addition, the last few decades have seen the establishment of other Jewish schools, numbering about 30. The total number of pupils attending these latter schools, however, is less than that of the Alliance schools. Their syllabus is in accordance with the requirements of the Persian Ministry of Education.

Although the mother tongue of Persian Jews of all classes is Persian, the influence of the Alliance schools and the more international atmosphere of the capital have contributed greatly towards the dissemination of European languages, especially French and English.

In view of the limited capacity of the Alliance classes and the growing demand for education, many Jewish parents send their children to Government schools, which are open to Jewish as well as Muslim children.

A few 22 Alliance schools in Persia. Although today there are no obstacles to higher education for women, the fact that this has only been so for a comparatively short time explains why Jewish girls have so far attended courses only in nursing. It should be remembered that only 15 years ago no Persian woman, Muslim or Jewish, could go out without the Chador, a long draped garment concealing by its shapelessness any suggestion of seductive curves, plus a black veil.

Late as Western habits and ideas spread among Persian Jews, they have none the less done something to vitalize their hitherto hemmed in lives. Young people, in particular, have been quick to adopt the standards of the West, with their doctrines of emancipation and their comparative absence of restrictions.

All the more bitterly have they resented the many disabilities under which the Jewish community has had to exist for so long; for the deeply rooted prejudice of the Muslim towards the Jew, and his traditional contempt for the non-believer, could not be abolished merely by the introduction of a new law.

Eventoday, for instance, a Jew cannot be elected Member of Parliament in the ordinary way, and only one Jew is allowed to represent the Jewish minority. A new Bill, still under discussion, at the time of writing, providing for the election of an Upper House or Senate, entitles Jews to vote for Muslims, but does not allow them to stand as candidates themselves. By virtue of a recent resolution of the Council of Ministers, no Jew can become a judge. Many other restrictions make it almost impossible for a Jew to enter the civil service. The National Bank of Persia to this day refuses to employ Jews.

Apart from these official and legal disqualifications, there is a good deal of social discrimination, of which the Jews are deeply and increasingly conscious.

Under these conditions it is only natural that Zionism has made considerable headway all over the country, and particularly among the youth in Teheran. Nothing can better arouse the self-respect and confidence of the still humiliated Persian Jew than the idea of Israel, an independent Jewish nation. The Jewish Agency is extremely active through its branch in Teheran. Modern Hebrew has been introduced into the syllabus of the Jewish schools, with the consequence that a growing number of people have acquired some knowledge of it.

For a time the Zionist Organization published a weekly called Ha-Gelilah ("Redemption"). When this was discontinued, another magazine called Israel, edited by Dr. R. Cohen (Persian delegate at the 22nd Zionist Congress), appeared. The revolutionary fervor of this paper, however, oscillated between Zionism and extreme Leftism. It was forced to cease publication when the Arab States invaded Israel. The mixture of extreme Left wing politics and Zionism in this periodical is symptomatic of the alternative solutions to current problems which present themselves to the Jewish youth of Persia. [="
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Iran

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22036. Azuri, Farah; Azuri, Farah [editor]; Iranian Womens Solidarity Group; IWSG. Women of Iran. The Conflict With Fundamentalist Islam: Part 1: Islam's Appeal to Women in Iran: Illusion and Reality. [Iranian Womens Solidarity Group (IWSG), London] London: Ithaca Press, 1983. pp. 1-71. Despite the "massive participation" of women in the revolution that led to the fall of the Shah, the government that came to power was dominated by Muslim clergy and which tried to undo the few advances won by Iranian won in the few previous decades. This massive participation by women in the revolutionary movement was unprecedented in the Muslim world, and if for many young women the revolution had a revolutionary-Islamic content, they were greatly disappointed by the regimes persistent attempts to limit the job and educational opportunities of women. The attempt to restrict the rights of women must be seen in the context of a general attack on human rights by the regime, including the denial of self-determination to the Kurds (which led to a regional war), the persecution of religious minorities, censorship of the media, and attacks on free trade union activities.

The origins of the treatment of women in Islam is the product of the patriarchal nature of Islamic religious thought, as well as the persistence of certain traditional, pre-Islamic modes of treatment of and conduct by women (e.g., the persistence of tribalism). Significantly, many elements in early Islam, especially those in the conduct of the life of the early Muslim community by Prophet Muhammad, that emphasized the autonomy of women in a social milieu in which tribalism was disintegrating, have been overwhelmed by the new social dispensation after the 'Disaster of Uhud', in which many early Muslim males were slain and Muslim society had to be restructured: at that time the patriarchal character of Arabic tribal society was reinforced in the new Islamic polity. Iranian civil laws were instituted in 1928 with the establishment of a modern judiciary, but Islamic Law was the basis of 'civil' law, especially that dealing with relations between men and women. In the White Revolution, the Shah granted women the right to vote, and granted other concessions that were likely to increase the participation by women in the workforce; this led in 1967 to the Family Protection Act (1967) which made divorce a (largely) civil process. The act also brought improvements in polygamy and custody of children.

One of the main proponents of the post-revolutionary Islamic ideology of women has been Ayatollah Motahari; he has published several books on women in Islam, including a book on the veil and another on women's status. Motahari defends the traditional role of women in islamic society, with a few exceptions. His argument is based on the idea that the difference in "nature" between men and women calls for different rights and duties in both the family and society. Motahari also dismisses women's liberation in the West as largely an illusion that has led to the industrial exploitation of women by capitalism. Radical Shiite social philosopher Ali Shariati also was dismissive of women's liberation in the West, seeing the real struggle of Shiites to be against "world imperialism, international Zionism, colonialism, exploitation, oppression, class inequality, cartels, multinational corporations, racism, cultural imperialism, and the blind worship of the West." Indeed, Shariati saw women as defenders of the traditional Islamic order against the West, yet he also observed of genuine women leaders, like Angela Davis: "on the contrary, she has advanced so far as to represent a people's ideal, a source of liberation and pride for a race." Yet Shariati's argument that the movement towards greater women's rights under the Shah haddegraded women: "A woman is not a thought-inspiring being any more, a receiver on sincere emotions, a beloved of great loves, a mother, a companion, a source of inspiration, a truthful mirror reflecting the man's rightful self, she is just a commercial good that is bought and sold depending on the level of her sexual attraction." This 'moral crusade' against such movement away from the Islamic ideal of women would pass into the hands of the clergy. In the 1975-1977 recession, which followed the social and population displacement of the oil boom, provided the opportunity for mobilization of the pervasive national discontent by the network of mosques and mullahs against the Shah: women even resumed wearing the veil as protest against the political order instituted by the Shah. The popular participation of women in the revolution resulted in the imposition of a more traditional order than had emerged before the revolution, and this dismaying result was unforeseen by the secular and leftists critics of Ayatollah Khomeini and clergy.


1957:
Rural: 1.2%.
Urban: 22.4%.
Total: 8%.

1972:
Rural: 8.5%.
Urban: 38.3%.
Total: 26.3%.

Figure 22037. Percentage Literacy Rate Among Iranian Women 1977 (estimated).

1977 (estimated):
Rural: 17.4%.
Urban: 56%.
Total: 36%. [=]
women were especially militant in the step requiring the veil. Very quickly, pro-Islamic women's organizations have seen a brief florescence confront the national imposition of the "traditional Muslim restrictions of women with a vigor reminiscent of the Qajar dynasty". The limited rights granted to women after the Revolution, including the right to vote, improvements in marriage and divorce law, and improved job opportunities, did not reflect any commitment to women's rights, but rather an attempt to improve the efficiency of the capitalist economy of Iran. These changes are not the product of a genuine commitment to women's rights in Iran. The repression, including the control of all channels of public expression, has silenced the women's movement.

The repression, including the control of all channels of public expression, has silenced the women's movement.

The energy of the feminist groups that organized the International Women's Day march is captured in the report, 'Women's Re-Awakening' (Nos. 3-4), issued by the organizing coalition that planned the march: "Their suspicion and hostility was further invoked when they heard that the occasion was organized by women themselves and for women. What shame and audacity that women want to celebrate their own day! An International Day! What hurtful words and goals! Who has given them the right? The permission? and so on... The words 'woman' and 'international' resurrect nightmares of blasphemy in their tiny brains and they naturally conclude that 'this is an international conspiracy by corrupt and promiscuous women'. But such thoughts are far from our conscious and freedom-loving women. Our militant and suffering women have born [sic] the weight of such slanders and bullying from their homes to their farms, factories, offices and schools. Today, when the greatest source of bullying and dictactorship in the past fifty years of the rest of our country has been overthrown by the determined and brave struggle of these women and their menfolk, they will not tolerate any more exploitation and coercion. Consciousness and freedom cannot be limited and temporary. They are like drops of rain that will find their way through narrow streams, into rivers and onto the seas. How mean are the efforts of those who want to dry up the seas only to find little ponds in their own backyards." The march started with 15000 women rallying at Tehran University, and swelled during the march to 30000; some 3000 women marched in Shiraz; both marches followed by one day a speech by Ayatollah Khomeini that denounced International Women's Day as a product of a genuine commitment to women's rights in Iran. The Women's economic activities were restricted to the household. The most prominent woman dissident of the period was Ghoroatolein (1815-1851) who converted to Bahaism and demanded the emancipation of women. She also embraced socialist ideas. Women first participated in political affairs by joining in the national boycott of tobacco in 1891-1892 in protest of the granting of a tobacco monopoly to the British owned Regie. Women played an even more aggressive and public role in the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911): during fighting in Tabriz women even carried guns in the defense of barricades.

The period of 1931-1951 saw the emergence of more Iranian women's organizations: the first women's newspaper was established in 1910; the establishment of women's schools in the 1910s in Tehran (in Fars in 1921, in Isfahan in 1926) created a cadre of women activities who founded women's publications and writing articles on women; this period saw Parvin Etesami (1907-1941) emerge as a nationally prominent feminist poet; in 1936 the Shah abolished the veil; in the 1930s the modernization policies of the Shah drew women into the workforce in a more significant manner.

In the late 1940s, the largest women's organization in Iran was the Women's Organization of the Tudeh Party, later renamed the Democratic Organization of Women; the group mainly recruited middle class women and was subordinated to the men of the Party's central committee. The Shah's White Revolution beginning in 1963 led to a greater role for women in the workforce, and it gave more formal rights to women. In the Qajar period (1827-1925) Iranian society had a rigid traditional implementation of these norms through various Islamic institutions. The importance of virginity and chastity in Islamic management of women's sexuality, the role of women in family alliances, and the socio-economic significance of prostitution is discussed. The article concludes with an outline of the implication for women's sexuality of the Revolution and provides a Reichian analysis of sexuality in Iran, Shiite societies and Islamic societies.

22039. Azari, Farah; Azari, Farah [editor]: Iranian Women's Solidarity Group; IWSG. Women of Iran. The Conflict With Fundamentalist Islam: Part 4: Sexuality and Women's Oppression in Iran. [Iranian Women's Solidarity Group (IWSG), London] London: Ithaca Press, 1983. pp. 90-156. A comprehensive review of the question of sexuality in Iran begins with the traditional Islamic definition of women's virtue in having appropriate prescribing and social and controlled sexuality. The article provides a summary of the theoretical basis for the inexorable growth of women's group activism in the context of traditional implementation of these norms through various Islamic institutions. The importance of virginity and chastity in Islamic management of women's sexuality, the role of women in family alliances, and the socio-economic significance of prostitution is discussed. The article concludes with an outline of the implication for women's sexuality of the Revolution and provides a Reichian analysis of sexuality in Iran, Shiite societies and Islamic societies.

22040. Bahar, Sima; Azari, Farah [editor]: Iranian Women's Solidarity Group; IWSG. Women of Iran. The Conflict With Fundamentalist Islam: Part 8: A Historical Background to the Women's Movement in Iran. [Iranian Women's Solidarity Group (IWSG), London] London: Ithaca Press, 1983. pp. 170-189. Until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, all women's dissident organizations had been associated with the main ideology of the groups of which they were a part; such women's groups were not based on feminism. The February Revolution of 1979 stimulated demands among organized women to meet the specific needs of women. In the Qajar period (1827-1925) Iranian society had a rigid social and political system and women's activities were very restricted. Women's economic activities were restricted to the household. The most prominent woman dissident of the period was Ghoroatolein (1815-1851) who converted to Bahaism and demanded the emancipation of women. In the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911): during fighting in Tabriz women even carried guns in the defense of barricades.

Despite political pressure by the Islamic Republican Party and its allies (including the Muslim Women's Organization (Nehzet-e Zanan-e Mosa' man), and local groups like Muslim Nurses, Muslim Teachers that are auxiliaries to larger male-dominated groups) on women's groups, the Feminists continued to grow through the period of the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. When the government ordered mandatory veiling in 6/1981, one supporter of the policy was the Tudeh Party, which made fierce attacks on women who protested the mandatory veiling. The attacks on women were part of a general political and police offensive against the left, which ultimately would sweep up much of the membership of Tudeh, and which led to frequent executions and an official figure of 10000 political prisoners. Cyrichly, perhaps despairingly, some Iranian feminists see the reverses for women in Iran as energizing the future struggle for women's rights in Iran. [TEXT]
organizations were established, including the Muslim Women's Movement (Nehzet-e Zanat-e Mosalman).

22041. Bauer, Janet. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Fundamental Dilemmas? Modernity, Islam and Women's Rights: Part 01. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference, Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993, pp. 13-17. Thank you very much. When I first started working on this presentation about women's rights and Islam a fundamental dilemma for me was how to maintain an anthropological appreciation of cultural relativism--that is, respect for different ways of doing things--and at the same time develop what some might call a feminist view, that women should have the basic right to be treated as equals and have equal opportunity.

So I want to approach this question: Can or should there be fundamental rights for women across cultures? And I use the Iranian case to discuss that question. Some women's groups and the UN committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women are committed to the adoption of a universal set of criteria. Critics, on the other hand, maintain that universal human rights can only become a reality if they are consistent with particular cultural traditions, and they argue that women's rights, or ideal women's rights, are based on western traditions of individual rights, something which they say is unfamiliar to the more social communitarian bases of non-western culture. One problem, I believe, for both those who try to develop or define universal rights and those who reject this notion is a view of culture as monolithic. That is an assumption that everyone within any particular culture adheres to the same values and beliefs. This position fails to give attention to the views not only of cultural minorities but also of women and other dissenting members of the majority culture or religion. And it too easily leads to another presumption that in Islamic societies, communal loyalty or consensus about standards for women's behavior has to take precedence over the individual's right to choose.

Fatma Mernissi, the Moroccan sociologist writing about Islamic societies, has claimed, "Modernity means the emergence of women as citizens and this emergence suddenly transforms the nature of the state." In other words, whether voiced through religious nationalism, socialism or secular humanism, the issue of women's rights is a challenge and a source of debate in modern societies. A look at Iran reveals how concern with women's rights has become a focal point for all sides and what great diversity of positions exists on women's rights. Women's positions and behaviors were used as symbols of modernity and progress and for the construction of the good society in both Pahlavi and Khomeini Iran, and I argue they are focal points in the reconstruction of the Iranian community.

Najmabadi and some other Iranian writers who generally support individual or women's rights have drawn one basic distinction or a basic line between those people who criticize the Islamic Republic for limiting women's rights and those who support the regime, claiming that their standards and codes actually represent liberation for women. This characterization oversimplifies the complexity of the various Iranian positions. Even the Islamic Republic admits it faces dilemmas in redefining and asserting its vision of appropriate behavior for women. In 1992 Dr. Habibi admitted the government was having problems getting people to comply with certain dress codes. On the other hand, feminists face dilemmas in contemplating the possible benefits of recent struggles by women within the regime to change laws affecting women's rights, as they did this summer at the Iranian women's studies conference in Vienna. Could reform measures sponsored by Islamicist women really contribute to improvement in women's situations?

So being an anthropologist I would now like to proceed with the broad range of ordinary women's opinions and voices on the issues of women's rights using material from my research with rural, working class, and middle class (some religious) urban women at the time of the Revolution and later with refugee women, some non-refugee visitors and relatives, and students in Germany and Canada. And some of the opinions and ideas voiced by these women may challenge our ideas or stereotypes of traditional Iranian views on the rights of women.

Perceptions of women's rights before the Revolution, both by Islamicists and non-Islamicists, have not been fully investigated, and many people assume that working class and rural women, before and after 1979, simply supported the Islamic definition of appropriate behavior for women. Leftist women asylum seekers who worked among poor women in south Tehran after the Revolution told me that they were surprised to find out that their stereotypes of these women were not true, that they were not as religious or conservative as they had thought. Of course before the Revolution the Pahlavis had made changing women's position a hallmark or a banner of development--unveiling, education for women, the right to divorce. The actual situation for ordinary women may not have changed substantially to provide greater opportunities for them, but the interviews that I conducted with poor urban and rural women suggest that on the whole they supported the rights of women to education, to choose spouses, to work, or to go unveiled. On the whole they found women to be intelligent and as capable as men but with fewer opportunities. In the migrant, working class areas of Tehran, for example, among the women I interviewed about 54% said they wore the veil for social reasons. Whereas about 24% said they wore it for religious reasons. On the other hand, among the more middle class and some lower middle class religious women who had more education, who live in one neighborhood, about 5% of the women said they wore the veil for religious reasons and 20% for social reasons. [So almost the reverse.] These are the women who attended religious services regularly (routzesh or Qur'an classes) and they basically subscribed to the position that we now identify with the Islamic Republic. That is, women's activities and roles must be separate from men's; they should concentrate on their duties as housewives and mothers. They shouldn't speak to unrelated men, but they also insisted that women were equal to men and that the Islamic code of behavior actually liberated women and allowed them to become equal or to enjoy equal opportunity.

The impact of the Revolution on the debate on women's rights is obviously enormous. Refugee women have described to me how revolutionary events had a dramatic impact on the thinking of ordinary people (like their mothers and their fathers), with respect to equal rights for men and women. It was not just their revolutionary experiences, but also women's lack of opportunities under the Pahlavis, their experiences in the Revolution (perhaps in leftist organizations or in prison) and living in the Islamic Republic that helped to stimulate their interest in women's rights.

Today when their relatives come to visit them abroad, these relatives express frustrations at women's lack of opportunity or the inconveniences of cumbersome clothing in Iran. Women in Iran are not unaware. Talking about picture brides in Europe, one woman explained to me that refugee men who bring brides from Iran don't really realize how much women's thinking, ordinary women's thinking, has changed with the times, with more information, education and aspirations. And they often find that their brides are not as conservative or as reticent as they had hoped. On the other hand, it has become very difficult for me to assess how women in Iran now feel about women's rights and I think there needs to be further research to address that issue in more detail.

Among Iranian refugees, especially political exiles, there is lively debate over women's rights. For many refugee women in Germany and Canada, studying the situation of women has become an avocation. But it is a mistake to think their interest in women's rights began in exile. Women in what I would call nationalist feminist groups in Germany generally describe themselves as supportive of women's rights and equality. They differ from some of the other Iranian women and other women's groups in Germany, by taking a women centered approach in their activities. Some of them also argue that feminist is a western tradition of individual rights, something which they say is religious reasons and 20% for social reasons. [So almost the reverse.] Women's Rights: Part 01. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
women's occupations which is a result of gender segregation policies. [Women are needed to work in certain occupations because men are not allowed to have contact with women.]

Meehan, who is one of the women who participated in this group’s activities, presents public talks on changes in women’s status in Iran. Unlike some of the other members in this group, she had been a member of a women’s branch of a leftist organization in Iran before the Revolution. In Iran, she said, even those men, such as leftists, who professed to hold different ideas about women’s roles, found some way to control the household and get women to do most of the work. And she tells many stories of how her interest in political work conflicted with her husband’s. [He was unwilling to share the housework and child care responsibilities, while he expected her to provide those services when he had political meetings.] A supporter of women’s rights and equality for women, she has not been able to implement her goals in her own life, either in Iran or as an exile in Europe. Her education was interrupted by the Revolution and by marriage, and even in exile she finds that her cultural socialization prohibits her from taking advantage of certain opportunities like going out on dates or going to bars.

For women in what I’ll call the more leftist women’s organizations in Germany, class (along with democracy and sexuality or sexual issues) is still the central concern. They argue that the effects of class are just as important as gender in understanding women’s position and achieving women’s rights. These individuals are generally receptive to the idea of cross-cultural feminism and to the potential for working class and rural women to make contributions to it. For them, democracy is a prerequisite for equality and some of them see fundamentalist Islamic politics as a real threat to Iranian women of all classes, and they criticize vigorously what they see as the suppression of women’s rights in the Islamic Republic which outweighs any advantages that might be gained from some of its other policies.

One of these women, Farzaneh, said that it was important to understand the framework under which people were operating and how they thought. She said change for women cannot ultimately come from within Islam. She’s certain about that, but she is not certain about what kind of feminism or what other kind of approach might work. She believes, for example, that women must work with men because although men are generally not supportive of women’s rights, they also have their own battles with patriarchal socialization. In other words, it’s a shared battle between men and women to achieve equality for women. In retrospect, she feels she experienced inequality in her political organization in Iran, but it wasn’t important at the time. She is very active in various committees to improve human rights and prison conditions in Iran, and she believes that she has benefited from her association with German feminists, but they have also benefited from their association with her.[6]

22042. Bauer, Janet. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Fundamental Dilemmas? Modernity, Islam and Women’s Rights: Part 02. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference, Montclair State University, Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 17-21. In Canada, women's organizations are just beginning to really break away from immigrant and refugee organizations to establish their own independent organizations. One of these immigrant societies that I interviewed in 1992 was a married student I had interviewed in Tehran years before. She had been religious before the Revolution and she was veiled. Now she tells me that she is able to study and pursue her profession in college orally because she has a good Muslim husband who shares the housework and child-rearing with her. She believes that women's liberation can only come through observing Islamic principles correctly, as her husband does. She's convinced, of course, that the government has brought enormous improvement in women's status and provided them with more opportunities for education, for child care and so forth. On the other hand, she's lived and studied abroad for ten years, although she does plan to return to Iran.

Whenever I have interviewed Mojahedin women, of the one so-called opposition socialist group, who publicly claim to abide by Islamic traditions, I have, interestingly enough, been required to contact them through male relatives. Nevertheless Mehr and others empathically recount their organization’s commitment to women's rights—the right to choose, to male/female equality, and to democracy. The Islamic Republic’s Islam, she believes, is just not the right Islam. In her own case she is frustrated in her life because her husband does not share the housework and child care with her so that she can pursue her education.

There are of course a lot of other women, refugee women, whom I have interviewed, some of them wives of political asylum seekers, who generally support women’s equality, democracy and choice but are not members of organizations, are not active in publicly debating women’s rights. They tend also to accept the universal definition of feminism and the idea of women’s equality, but they’re very critical of women’s groups, leftist groups, and other organizations for the way they are trying to achieve this goal. For example, Mahnaz feels that other Iranian women don’t understand working class women, like her own mother, who she said “may not have an education, or know about women’s rights, but they are not satisfied and they really know oppression at the hands of men.” Monir, another who participated in the refugee society in Canada and is herself an immigrant, claims men take advantage of women everywhere in whatever kind of society, industrial, agricultural, urban, rural. “Women must support each other and need a women’s group. Not that men and women shouldn’t work together, but do you really think feminism is necessary?” she asked.

Well, I think it’s important for the Iranian Revolution to control and define women’s behavior simply to the predictable outcome of Islamic or Islamic views on women’s rights, diverts attention from these very diverse ideas or opinions about women’s rights, both within and outside of the Islamic Republic, and also diverts attention away from the role of political power in achieving certain kinds of legislation concerning women in Iran. It also assumes that emphasizing individual rights is the only way to achieve equality at a time when many western feminists are in fact beginning to question this perspective. So I’m suggesting that just to say the situation of women in Iran, the legislation that’s being created that affects women, just to see that as the predictable outcome of Islamic moral codes is drawing attention away from the fact that there is diversity
of opinion and that political power is very important in creating the situation that we are experiencing in Iran now: it's not just purely Islamic views on women and men. How should the rights of women or others be defined or supported in the modern world and what type of political system or society is necessary for achieving justice for women? Some western observers of religious nationalism and democratic secularization, like Juergensmeyer in The New Cold War, have pointed out that the constitution of the Islamic Republic does provide for the rights of minorities and women. He goes on to say that political religion, that is religion that is used in the service of politics today, is fueled by democratic impulse, providing outlets for some sectors of society who have few other options for controlling their lives and their status. Indeed, in sources like Islam, the Misunderstood Religion, Islamicists explain at length their commitment to democracy, justice, and rights. And since pluralism does seem to be a condition of modern nation states, rights for minorities (however defined) are clearly an issue, particularly in Iran. The country is having problems not only with women's general compliance with the dress code as described by Habibi, but with Islamic women within the regime who are disputing some of the laws, claiming current legislation is unfair to women.

Juergensmeyer, however, goes on to describe, and to accept, a basic incompatibility between Islam and western secular notions of rights. He says "Religious nationalists will always be more reluctant than secular nationalists to extend rights to individuals because the notion of individualism goes counter to the logic of religious nationalism: that a nation should reflect the collective values of the moral community that constitutes it." While this collectivism in non-western societies has been overestimated in my opinion, there is of course enormous attention being paid to a set of restrictive behaviors imposed upon women by the Iranian state, which insists that men's and women's natures are different or distinct. This is what western feminists called the difference paradigm. Women's natures and needs are different and they must be assigned different roles in society in order to produce a better, more ordered and more moral society. Western feminists have generally challenged the separate-but-equal policies that this perspective creates, pointing out that they have not been shown to provide women with really equal access to resource control, opportunities, or choice. However, western feminists are also beginning to re-examine the use of individualism and equality (as sameness) as the bases for establishing women's rights. Increasingly, they are turning to some conception of individual rights within the context of social responsibility or community. Some call it relational individualism. They argue that western individualism has been exaggerated that people have always been some what dependent upon social relationships in communities, and that rights must be more grounded in the community. On the other hand, they recognize that women's rights have not been protected within traditional communities of family and state.

Some feminists recommend what they call a justice approach based on treatment of women as equals within a pluralistic, democratic society, which assures that women have the power to control their own choices. These suggestions are supported by the experience of Iranian women for whom the state, social networks and family control, even in exile, have limited individual opportunities and choices, but where these women, the exiled feminists, show concern and responsibility toward this community. [They take social responsibility for their communities at the same time.]

I would like us to entertain these questions for a moment. Is it possible to guarantee women's individual rights within an Islamic society, or any religious patriarchal community, in some other way, some other perspective than the difference perspective? In other words, can something other than the separate-but-equal approach be created within the Islamic framework, and what are the possibilities for expecting tolerance for competing moral codes or interpretations on women's issues? Juergensmeyer suggests that there is no absolute reason why Islamic or religious regimes in general must be intolerant on moral issues, because there is room for tolerance on those issues in Islamic regimes. Across Islamic cultures, of course, there is a great deal of diversity in perspectives on women's rights (from the Islamic animists in the Philippines to people who try to follow very closely some kind of textual interpretation in the Middle East). In fact, Ayatollah Nouri told me in an interview in 1978 that these kinds of variations were necessary to sustain the social order of existing cultures. In some other sources, like Human Rights and Conflicts of Cultures, the authors, relying on the ambiguity of Islamic texts and interpretations, have concluded that the flexibility of the Islamic framework allows for an insistence on compliance with one specific moral code, but they also wanted to point out that neither Christianity nor Islam has supported the kind of religious liberty advocated by contemporary human rights organizations. There is also ample evidence that with in the Islamic Republic, policies and ideas about gender roles have changed to reflect social and economic realities. That suggests that there might be some room for different interpretations of Islamic mores but also draws attention to the importance of political power instilling any particular reforms. For many religious Muslims, the actual erosion of women's opportunities in the Islamic Republic is explained by the failure of the government to be faithful to the right Islamic interpretations.

Some Pakistani feminists are using the Qur'an to argue for restoration of many of their rights, but it's not clear how successful they will ultimately be because in Pakistan, as in Iran, contemporary Islamicists have grounded women's rights in separate-but-equal policies, which leaves patriarchy essentially untouched and accepts differentiation in the roles of men and women as a natural phenomenon. There are various Muslim, Christian and Jewish women who are trying to provide women-centered analyses of religious texts, and one example is Memissi's The Veil and the Male Elite, in which she challenges the presentation and verification of Hadith. But as one of my feminist friends says "Interesting book, it's too bad that she wrote it because no one will take it seriously" Those fundamentalist women seeking status through Islam, who have important roles in public organizations in the Islamic Republic, often find some kind of empowerment, but at the same time they realize that they lead the very lives that they do not prescribe for other women. That is, they suggest one way of living for a majority of women in the community, but as leaders and as public persons they lead quite different lives for themselves. In their own lives, for example, they do not focus on the housewife/mother role. This has been observed also for conservative Christian women activists in the US, like Phyllis Schlafly, for example.

Regardless of what society they live in or their backgrounds, Iranian women share common social and familial constraints by which men generally enjoy disproportionate power to set standards, even to decide which religious prescriptions are authoritative. Men or the male elites (in Bruce Lawrence's Defenders of Defenders) make the rules in Islamic society and provide the interpretations. They are able to use religious and cultural traditions to maintain hegemony over women. In my research I asked women not only about their beliefs in women's rights, but also about their relationships with men and their communities. In Germany and Canada, women are accused by men in their communities of losing themselves; women from leftist organizations find that men have defined their issues, women's issues, as less important and also expect certain kinds of behavior from them. In Iran, Islamicist women have had to fight against the implementation of religious laws that they find unfair to women. In exile or at home, women have found that their brothers have advantage that they don't have. The real challenge for women is to create, negotiate and assert their rights in a society (East or West) where men, in particular those with political power, have a vested interest in preserving their privileges and defining women's rights in inequitable social arrangements. Women's own comments in the interviews with me suggest that they generally reject the offers of greater respect or status from Islam or from their culture in favor of as much real choice and control in their lives as they can have and as soon as possible.

If I were to add a concluding statement to my presentation, if I were forced to give you a summary in one or two sentences and answer the question of whether universal human rights for women are a possibility or in fact should be pursued, I would say that these common
Ten Siberian cranes fly through Iran each year; while conservationists pay taxes on past contributions to the Institute, which was officially


a friend in Iran; Bird Lover Fllows Rare Flock Threatened by Hunting; No precedent allowing the agency to act against a public-interest legal

under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as a tax-exempt

Shahriyar of Turkic works, very different from his earlier Persian works: recommendation of a regional office to revoke the Institute's classification

Azeri grammar; and the diffusion of popular Azeri verse forms. One PREPARING TO MOVE AGAINST INSTITUTE In a related

the long run effects of this literary period included: a wider familiarity with organization. The average Federal sanctions order is $4000. If the

The socialist realist imagery). After the reintegration of the region into Iran, largest financial penalty imposed to date on a public- interest law

were followed by the denouncement of the formation of the Tudeh Party. the Institute's attempt to appeal the original sanctions order was also

socialist realist imagery). After the reintegration of the region into Iran, largest financial penalty imposed to date on a public- interest law

poetry described supra. In much of the social realistic works of this Administration. But now the Institute faces additional penalties. In

military events related to Soviet Russia. As younger poets of the Poets & classification. The Institute has already paid a $1.2-million punitive

be published under Soviet guidance. Soviet writers Samad Vurghun, Suleyman Rustam, M. Rahim, Jalal Khandan, Ghulam Muhammadi and others published on the independence of Azerbaijan and its historical ties with Soviet Azerbaijan. Literary criticism, usually as articals in periodicals or in the form of introductions to monographs, also guided local poets and writers on content and form. The development of Azerbaijan letters (in Arabic script) in Iran was guided by the Soviet-Iranian Society for Cultural Relations: its accomplishments included publishing eleven Azerbaijan letters of decades that had remained unpublished in Iran and the literary journal Shaqaf. The goal of this movement was to 'purify and revitalize' the Azeri language, which in practice meant making it identical to the Baku dialect of Azeri, with its heavy inclusion of Russian language elements (this included replacing French forms of certain European loanwords with Russian forms). The filtering of publications by the editorialship of Soviet men of letters in Tabriz was more hostile to Persian elements in Azeri than to Arabic elements. The poetry produced in this period combined traditional themes with elements of Soviet socialism; gradually Persian elements, so common to the older generation of writers, receded. The major themes in poetry became: (1) 'love of the homeland,' 'the mother tongue', and 'the historical and cultural past of Azerbaijan'; (2) 'Democracy and the the local Democratic Party' and poems to commemorate local events, Soviet holidays and politico-military events related to Soviet Russia. As younger poets of the Poets & Writers Association became more important, older Persian themes faded: some had genuine talent, such as Mohammed Birya, Azaroghil and Ali Tudeh. In the same period, there was a large volume of novels, short stories and press sketches, similar in content and development to poetrydescribed supra. In much of the social realistic works of this period, the historical theme of the condemnation of the previous regime, was followed by the denouncement of the formation of the Tudeh Party. The socialist realist content of the works was consistently reinforced by strict criticism (an example cited calls for presentation of a stronger, more autonomous image for the main woman character, in keeping with socialist realist imagery). After the reintegration of the region into Iran, the long run effects of this literary period included: a wider familiarity with and interest in Azeri history and language; the republication of Azeri classics; the organization of Azeri folk materials; considerable work in Azeri grammar; and the diffusion of popular Azeri verse forms. One measure of the lasting value of this achievement was the works by Shahriyar of Turkic works, very different from his earlier Persian works: this work was published abroad in both Turkey and the USSR. [TXT]

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classified as a tax-exempt organization in 1980. Donations to the Institute will continue to be tax-deductible until the IRS takes formal action—not expected until June at the earliest. The Bush Administration began to investigate the Institute last year after a postcard campaign organized by the ‘Arigan’ defendants demanded that the IRS move against the private-interest law center. A group of conservative members of Congress, led by California Republican Bob Dornan, accusing the Institute of “legal terrorism,” also pressured the IRS to strip the organization’s tax-exempt classification. The ‘Arigan’ defendants may attempt to move against the Christic Institute’s bank accounts and office buildings within the next few weeks. “If the Institute is unable to pay the additional $400000 fine, US Marshals will then proceed to seize the Institute’s payroll, office buildings, and computers,” said Sara Nelson, the Institute’s executive director. “If we survive the sanctions, the IRS may attempt to cripple the Institute financially.” “It would be no exaggeration to say that this could be the first time since the anti-communist hysteria of the 1950s that the Government is preparing to use its judicial power to seize the assets and property of a tax-exempt organization founded to defend civil liberties.” warned Ellie Smeal, former president of the National Organization for Women. “The Institute’s record in civil- rights law is beyond reproach, but its exposure of national security crimes went far beyond the Iran-contra scandal and became a threat to the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The government is now putting public-interest law firms everywhere on notice that they face massive penalties if they seek justice for clients abused by government or corporate power.” Officials of other non-profit groups fear the political misuse of judicial sanctions will block future lawsuits against job discrimination, environmental hazards and other threats to the public interest. “The outrageous nature of the sanctions order in this case threatens every public-interest group that seeks to use the judicial system to correct injustice,” Alan Morrison, director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, wrote in a brief defending the ‘Arigan’ plaintiffs. [–]

22046. Coalition for Democracy in Iran. Iranian Women: Self Immolation As The Only Way Left To Protest. Brochure. Seattle, Wash.: Coalition for Democracy in Iran [c/o PO Box 3935, Seattle, WA 98124-3953]. N.D. [1995?] An Iranian academic woman burned herself to death in Tehran on Monday February 21st. Psychiatrist Homa Darabi, 51, set herself on fire in a northern public center of Tehran, before hundreds of people, passing by, in protest against “the appalling situation of Iranian women”. Dr. Hima Darabi was born in Tehran in 1940. After completion of high school she attended medical school of Tehran University in 1959. She married her colleague Dr. Keyhani in 1963, with whom she came to the US for her continuation studies. She became a pediatric specialist in psychology and went back to Iran in 1978 to serve as a professor of psychology at Tehran University. In 1990 she was dismissed against dress codes and the authorities misconduct and abuses. During her political life she worked with Iran Nation Party, a group of the Iran National Front. Thousands of people turned out to mourn her on Friday the 25th of February at a ceremony at Djawad Mosque in Tehran, despite danger of being persecuted by the authorities. The ongoing human rights violations by the Islamic Republic of Iran which finally put this woman in a situation to resort to self-immolation as her only choice to protest must be stopped. International human rights organizations have constantly condemned these violations. But unfortunately in reality nothing has been done for the people of Iran in general and Iranian women particularly under pressure of religious extremists.

I was born a girl; [The poem ‘I was born a girl’ by Mahvash Qadiri, a woman poet living in Iran, reflects the adolescent resentment that women feel at the discrimination and constraints they endure these days in the Islamic Republic of Iran.]

I was born a girl
so that I’d be given a doll and broom
To sew the hew of men’s shirts with gold lace
And to sweep the dust from the home.
My brother is playing in the street.
He takes off with his bicycle,

And I remain in the corner of the house.
I was born a girl, In the chapter of questions and search
My questions are left unanswered and
My search is futile.
My brother, in the winding streets,
By playing with the dirt and pebbles, is experiencing life.
My experience does not pass beyond these walls.
I do not know the streets.
I was born a girl,
So that in the dawn of puberty
(My frightful eyes,
Like the eyes of a restless deer,
Would give away my secret,
My brother didn’t come home tonight,
He is considered a man now.
I was born a girl
So that I’d be the loser in the aftermath of each war
When they make peace,
I’d be the sacrifice.
In war,
The Mongol soldiers and Timur’s attendants
Will make my painful cries echo against the blue dome of the sky
An in peace time
The Amir and his servants will.
After each war
My sisters put on the ugly dress of the prostitutes
And in the tranquility of each peace
They circle around the wine at the lustful feasts of their masters. [–]

22047. Cowell, Alan. “Vatican Rejects Compromise on Abortion at UN Meeting”, in New York Times, September 7, 1994, pp. A1, A6. Cairo, 9/6/1994: An American female representative of the Vatican blocked an abortion plan put forth by Pakistan. The decision was booed by other members of the conference. Even though Al Gore had tried to assure the Vatican that legalized abortion and teenage sexuality would not be considered as human rights in the conference program, the Vatican issued a statement saying that they would not support any type of population control that condoned abortion or gave teenagers sexual rights without parental consent. The Vatican also claimed that Gore had misrepresented the conference’s intentions.

Gore, who heads the American delegation, met with the Archbishop Renato R. Martino to discuss their misunderstandings, but Gore reported later that the Vatican and US would continue to disagree over the issue of abortion at the population conference. The US delegation promoted abortion when it was safe, legal and rare.

The abortion compromise stated that abortion should not be used as family planning, that each nation should be given its own power to legalize it, and that where abortion is legal, it should be safe. The US opposition was put forth by Pakistan. The decision was booed by other members of the conference. Even though Al Gore had tried to assure the Vatican that legalized abortion and teenage sexuality would not be considered as human rights in the conference program, the Vatican issued a statement saying that they would not support any type of population control that condoned abortion or gave teenagers sexual rights without parental consent. The Vatican also claimed that Gore had misrepresented the conference’s intentions.

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The abortion compromise stated that abortion should not be used as family planning, that each nation should be given its own power to legalize it, and that where abortion is legal, it should be safe. The document is part of a 20-year plan to control population, encourage economic development, and promote women’s rights. The UN and World Bank estimates that the 5.7 billion world population will soon exponentially rise into unmanageable numbers.

Islamic delegates also oppose the conference’s abortion compromise. An Islamic paper, Al Shaab, called the abortion outline amoral by promoting sexual promiscuity. Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto earlier called the policy on abortion as unacceptable, but later approved, along with Iran, the language in the compromise. The Vatican hopes other delegations from Latin American countries will also oppose the compromise and call for a new compromise to be drawn-up. The Vatican considers the next topic of discussion, reproductive health, to just be a cover for abortion rights. The Vatican has been able to persuade the conference to accept a compromise concerning teenage sexuality, saying that confidential sex counseling for adolescents should be first approved by parents, and that parental rights come before the rights of teenagers.

Gore reported on 9/7/1994 that there should be no illusion about the Vatican changing its stance on abortion and signing the
compromise document. [TXT]

22048. DS. "Europe and Canada: Turkmenistan: Introduction", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by the President and his closest advisors, made little progress in 1994 in moving from a Soviet-era authoritarian style of government to a democratic system. A national referendum held on 1/15 extended until 2002 the term of office of Saparmurad Niyazov, head of the Communist Party from 1986 to its dissolution and President since 10/1990 when the post was created. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, the old Communist Party under a new name, retained its monopoly on power, the Government registered no opposition parties in 1994 and by its actions continued to inhibit opposition political activities. Only government-approved candidates were permitted to contest the 12/11 parliamentary elections, in which all 50 candidates ran unopposed. Emphasizing stability over reform, the President's nationbuilding efforts continued to focus on renewing Turkmen nationalism, a feature of which has been a personality cult around the President. The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), with membership and operations essentially unchanged. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the criminal police which works closely with the KNB on matters of national security. These agencies have been responsible for human rights abuses in enforcing the Government's policy of repressing political opposition. Turkmenistan remained a centrally planned economy, although the Government continued to take small steps to reduce state intervention, e.g., by phasing out the state order system. Turkmenistan is the world's fourth largest producer of natural gas and is heavily dependent on revenue from natural gas exports. Payment problems by its major customers in the former Soviet Union have led it to consider construction of new gas pipelines toorthunderneighboring Iran. Agriculture, particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total employment. Turkmen authorities continued severely to restrict political and civil liberties and maintain tight controls over opposition political organizations. They completely controlled the media, censoring all newspapers and rarely permitting criticism of government policy or officials. All trade unions are government controlled. The Government generally gave favored treatment to ethnic Turkmen over minorities and to men over women. [=]

22049. DS. "Iran: Introduction", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. [The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. Accordingly, it draws heavily on non-US Government sources.] The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a Populist revolution toppled the monarchy. The Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergymen and their lay allies. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and functions as the Chief of State. He is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, first elected in a popular vote in 1989, was reelected in 1993. The Constitution, approved in 1980 by popular referendum and revised in 1989, provides for a 270-seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The Government seeks to ensure that public policy is consistent with its view of political and socioreligious values, but serious factual differences exist within the leadership. The Government reinforces its power by arrests, summary trials and executions, and various forms of intimidation. Several government agencies are responsible for internal security, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force established after the revolution which is coequal with the regular military. These organizations regularly commit such abuses as arbitrary arrests and torture. Iran has a mixed economy. The Government owns the petroleum and utilities industries and the banks. Oil exports are the primary source of foreign exchange. The economy is still recovering from the disruptions of the 1979 revolution and the destruction from the Iran-Iraq war. Iran remains isolated from international financial markets. Economic performance is adversely affected by corruption and government mismanagement. Unemployment in 1994 was estimated at 30%, and the annual rate of inflation was about 60%. The Government continued to be a major abuser of human rights. There was no evidence of improvement in 1994. In March, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) concluded that the Government's continuing abuse of human rights justifies international scrutiny. The United Nations extended for another year the mandate of Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, its Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran. Systematic abuses include arbitrary arrests and detentions, widespread use of torture, lack of fair trials, summary executions, and repression of the freedoms of speech, press, and association. A prominent social critic and historian, Ali Akbar Sadiq-Sirjani, died in detention in November, 10 months after his arrest on improbably criminal charges. The Government claims Sadiq-Sirjani died of a heart attack but did not permit an independent autopsy. The Government failed to provide adequate protection for three Evangelical Christian leakers who were murdered in 1994. Women face legal and social discrimination, important worker rights are restricted, and the Government continues to persecute the adherents of the Bahai faith. There is a lively and open debate on political issues but the ruling clerics effectively control the electoral process, thereby denying the people the right to change their government. The Government conceals its abuses and obstructs the activities of human rights monitors. [=]

22050. DS. "Iran: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution states that 'reputation, life, property (and) dwelling(s)' are protected from trespass except as 'provided by law'. However, security forces enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and operate email without court authorization. The wife of a dissident reported that, after her husband's arrest in March the Anti-Vice Department of the Revolutionary Prosecutor's office raided her home seized her husband's papers, and sealed the library (see Section 1.a.). Paramilitary volunteer forces known as the Basiji and other security forces monitor the social activities of citizens. Such organizations may harass or arrest women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of the body except hands and face or those who wear makeup. Enforcement of such standards of public morality varies with the political climate and the jurisdiction. [=]

22051. DS. "Iran: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders and their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of Shi'a Islam. There is no separation of state and religion. The clerics dominate all branches of government completely. The Government represses any movement seeking to...
separate state and religion, or to alter the State's existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates is effectively controlled by the ruling clerics, consequently depriving citizens of the right to change their government. Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members of Parliament (the Majles), and members of the Assembly of Experts, a body responsible for selecting the successor to the Leader of the Revolution. The Majles exercises a considerable amount of influence over executive branch decision. Debates and laws are reviewed by the Council of Guardians (see below). Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various issues, and in some cases the Majles has defeated laws proposed by the executive branch. Most deputies are associated with powerful political and religious omisals, but often vote independently and shift from one faction to another. The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of six Islamic clergymen, and six lay members who review all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also screens political candidates for ideological and religious suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state but clerics who disagree with government policies have also been disqualified. Women are under represented in government. They hold 9 out of 270 Majles seats, and there are no female Cabinet members. [=] 22052. DS. "Iran: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There is no known pattern of child abuse. [=] 22053. DS. "Iran: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Discrimination against women has increased since the revolution. On January 31, Mina Kalout was reportedly stoned to death in Evin Prison. Kalout, a married woman, was accused of committing adultery with her cousin, Abdul-Hossein, who was executed for the offense. On 2/22/1994, Homa Darabi, a pedestrian, reportedly immolated herself to protest the Government's discriminatory policies. Prior to her death, Darabi had been dismissed from an academic position for failing to adhere strictly to the Islamic dress code. On March 2, Tahereh Ghane'a a married woman with children, was reportedly stoned to death in Qom for alleged adultery. On May 6, a female student of medicine and women's activist at Beheshti University was found strangled to death. Her arm had been broken, as well. Although the Government claimed the student had committed suicide, 1000 female students staged a sit-in on May 9 to protest what they believed to be her murder. Although domestic violence is known to occur, little is known about its extent. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom discussed publicly. There are no official statistics on the subject. In general, women suffer discrimination in the legal code particularly in family and property matters. It is difficult for many women, particularly those residing outside large cities, to obtain any legal redress. Although women may be educated and employed in the professions, social constraints tend to inhibit their educational and economic opportunities. Illiteracy and the lack of university degrees also affect their standing. The enforcement of conservative Islamic dress codes has varied considerably since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Nonetheless, such dress codes persist and are arbitrarily enforced. Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Majles passed a 12-article law on marriage and divorce that limited the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional interpretations of Islamic law. The 1986 law also recognized divorced women's rights to share of the property couples acquire during their marriage and increased alimony Government's views on women's rights were exemplified in 1994 by an open letter to the UN Special Representative from the President's Special Advisor on Women's Affairs, Shailia Habibi. In the letter, Habibi explained that legal restrictions on a woman's freedom to travel—a woman needs permission from a close male relative to obtain a passport are "consensual" because such restrictions 'are designed to preserve the unity and sanctity of the family.' She also accused 'Western emancipation of causing 'corruption, prostitution, Lesbianism, and widespread venereal disease'. [ ]
is staged publicly, it is generally because the prisoner has already been forced to confess to a crime. Persons tried by the revolutionary courts (including in drug trafficking cases) enjoy virtually no procedural or substantive safeguards. The accused are often indicted under broad and all-encompassing charges such as immoral corruption, anti-revolutionary behavior," and "siding with global arrogance." Trials lasting 5 minutes and less are common. The right to a defense counsel is theoretically provided for in Iranian law and in the Constitution, but in the revolutionary courts defendants are not known to have access to a lawyer; moreover, they are not able to call witnesses on their behalf or to appeal. Courts have failed to investigate allegations by defendants that they were subjected to torture during pretrial detention. Some persons have been imprisoned beyond the limit of their sentence and even executed after the formal expiration of their prison term. There was again no evidence in 1993 of any judicial reform that would bring Iranian courts into compliance with international standards. The Special Representative noted in his 1/1993 report that a new law on legal representation—which provides that any Muslim is eligible to represent the accused in court does not in fact provide for qualified legal counsel. The judicial system is further weakened by the fact that revolutionary courts may consider cases formally under the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts. Assignment of cases to regular rather than revolutionary courts is haphazard and apparently occurs mainly when arrests are made by regular police. Revolutionary courts may also overturn the decisions of the civilian courts. The review authority of the Supreme Court is limited. For common criminal offenses, many elements of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive, and the accused often have the right to a public trial with benefit of lawyers of their own choosing. Even this judiciary is not fully independent, however. Many of the former judges were retired after the revolution, and new judges were selected. One criterion for new judges is grounding in Islamic law; political acceptability is a requirement for any government position. According to the New York based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the 1982 Law on Judicial Personnel, which exempts agriculture, domestic service, family businesses, and, to some extent, other small businesses, forbids employment of children under 18. In the education sector, the law effectively bars pupils under 15 from attending school, although there is no official statistics on the subject. In the past, there have been credible reports of the torture and execution of women detainees. Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce their husbands, and regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the number of grounds for which a woman may seek divorce.

A husband may obtain a divorce without stating a reason or going to court. In 12/1992 the Council for the Discernment of Expediency reversed itself and ratified a bill already passed by the Parliament which added somewhat to a divorced woman's right to financial support from her ex-husband. It is not clear yet whether this adjustment has had any impact in practice. [–]

22059. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Iran: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Iranian law includes provisions that prohibit the use of child labor in industry. No information was available on the enforcement of these statutes. [–]

22060. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Iran: Part 21: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. In common with many countries, Iranian labor law, which exempts agriculture, domestic service, family businesses, and, to some extent, other small businesses, forbids the employment of children under 15 years of age (compulsory education extends through (June 11) and places special restrictions on the employment of minors under 18. In addition, women and minors may not be used for hard labor or, in general, for night work. Information on the extent to which these regulations are enforced by the Labor Inspection Department of the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs and the local authorities is not available. [–]
independent following a referendum on October 27, 1991. During its first year of independence it became a member of the United Nations and a participating state in the CSCE. Turkmenistan's stated commitment to CSCE principles, laudably reiterated in President Saparmurad Niyazov's public statements during the 1992 Helsinki Summit, was not consistently reflected in its actions. Turkmenistan's record during its initial year in CSCE has been mixed, and in the human dimension, poor. On security matters, for example, Turkmenistan's reports to CSCE missions on its obligations, initiated peaceful relationships with neighboring states, and avoided participation in regional conflicts. In the economic sphere, its transition from a command economy to a free market system moved slowly, but by the end of the reporting period the pace quickened. On the human dimension front, however, no progress was made in the development of democratic processes based on respect for human rights. There is no free press, opposition viewpoints and parties are not tolerated, and elections are one-party affairs. Government in Turkmenistan is not accountable to the people it purports to serve.

Security: Turkmenistan has not yet developed its own independent military structure; its armed forces remain under the command of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) military establishment, with a largely Russian officer corps. Possibly for this reason, Turkmenistan did not provide VD-92 data for 1992. The Government of Turkmenistan signed an agreement with the Russian Federation in 1992 which called for joint control of CIS forces within the territory of Turkmenistan. The agreement also laid the groundwork for the gradual withdrawal of most Russian troops and the conversion of the remainder into a new national army of Turkmenistan. In addition to its cooperation with Russia, Turkmenistan entered into friendship and cooperation agreements with other neighboring states, including fellow CIS members and Iran. Through its membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it developed contacts with North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, sent military officers to Turkey for training, and had discussions about possible training and other cooperative activities with several NATO countries, including the United States. As a successor state to the USSR, Turkmenistan inherited responsibilities under multilateral security agreements, including the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces. Generally, it developed responsible security policies and demonstrated adherence to its international and bilateral commitments. Turkmenistan has not used or threatened to use its military forces in any hostile manner, and it has not interfered in the internal affairs of its neighbors. The Government of Turkmenistan offered humanitarian assistance to war-torn Tajikistan, but declined to participate in a peacekeeping force to be drawn from the armed services of other neighboring states.

Economics: The Government of Turkmenistan announced its intention to undertake a ten-year transition period from a command economy to a free market system. Movement toward privatization and the transformation of the legal framework to encourage the development of private business, private land ownership, and foreign investment were slow. The government maintains control of virtually the entire economy, and continues to subsidize some essential goods to cushion the consumer from inflation. Old-style bureaucratic requirements hindered the development of private enterprises, and a slow-to-reform banking system discouraged many potential investors. Nevertheless, progress on the economic front was achieved, and the quickened pace of reform during the latter portion of the reporting period suggests greater commitment to change. New laws concerning economic activity, foreign investment, and banking were passed in 1992. The government also introduced a program of free economic zones to attract foreign investors through tax and other incentives. In 1993, the government announced an agricultural land privatization program which will open up small plots of land to private farmers and make larger plots available for rental and eventual ownership by joint-venture investors. A new presidential decree of January 1993 promises financial credits for aspiring local entrepreneurs and increased government support for the development of private business. Turkmenistan countered its lack of economic and business expertise by seeking advice and assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and regional development banks as well as the European Community, foreign governments, and international private businesses. While movement overall was slow, the Government of Turkmenistan seems determined to meet its CSCE economic obligations. Turkmenistan has a serious problem of environmental degradation. The life expectancy of its people is among the lowest in the former Soviet Union, and its infant and mother mortality rates are the highest. The government acknowledged the existence of environmental problems, but was slow to develop concrete policies to deal with them. Turkmenistan participates in some international fora on ecological issues (such as the Aral Sea environmental disaster area). These issues are becoming more important in its relations with its neighbors, other countries, and international organizations.

Human Dimension: Turkmenistan made no progress in its transition from a Soviet-era authoritarian style government toward a democratic system during the reporting period. The ruling Democratic Party (the former Communist Party) has a monopoly on power under the leadership of President Saparmurad Niyazov, around whom a cult of personality appears to be developing. The government used laws on the registration of political parties to control the opposition and thwarted attempts by opposition elements to organize. Opposition members were placed under house arrest to prevent them from meeting with visitors to Ashgabat and were prevented from travelling to other CIS countries. The constitution prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion or ethnicity. The 1992 constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. In practice, however, it remains a one-party state dominated by the president and his closest advisers within the Cabinet of Ministers. Citizens have no real ability to change the government peacefully and have little influence on government policy or decision making. Elections remain, by and large, one-candidate affairs. In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was President Niyazov, who, according to official results, received 99.5% of the vote. The refusal to allow more than one candidate. Freedom of speech is severely restricted in Turkmenistan, and there is no freedom of the press. Radio and television are completely government controlled, and the government censors all newspapers. The views of opposition political elements are not allowed to appear in the local media, and criticism of government policy is permitted only in those areas where the government has already decided to implement reform. Opposition publications have been declared illegal and copies of them confiscated. Turkmenistan largely avoided abuses against the integrity of persons during the reporting period, but did place travel restrictions on political critics. The government failed to issue passports to some persons wishing to participate in international human rights conferences, and has threatened others. The court system has not been reformed from Soviet days, and adherence to due process rights is not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural areas. The government gives preference in job advancement and opportunities for international training to males and ethnic Turkmen over females and minority members. [=]
mechanism for admitting a refugee when the applicant is among those persons of particular interest to the United States. With respect to persons applying overseas for admission to the United States as refugees, an initial review is performed to evaluate cases based on US national interests, the refugees' situation in temporary asylum, the conditions from which they have fled, and other humanitarian considerations. Applicants who meet the criteria specified above and who fall within the priorities established for the relevant nationality or region, are presented to the INS for determination of eligibility for admission under Section 101(a)(42) of the INA.

(2) The Worldwide Priorities System: The worldwide priorities system sets guidelines for the orderly management of refugee admissions into the United States within the established annual regional ceilings. The issue of whether a person is a refugee under US law, and the priority to which a refugee should be assigned for resettlement are separate and distinct. Assignment to a particular priority does not make that individual either more or less a refugee although it may reflect an assessment of the urgency of the need for resettlement. Indeed, refugees could well be qualified for the resettlement program of another country. Just as qualifying for refugee status does not confer a right to resettlement in the United States, assignment to a particular priority does not entitle a person to acceptance into the United States refugee program. The US refugee priorities system sets guidelines for the orderly management of refugee admissions into the United States within the established annual regional ceilings and is subject to change during the fiscal year.

Refugee Processing Priorities-FY 1993:
Priority One. Compelling concern/interest: exceptional cases of (a) refugees who are in immediate danger of loss of life and for whom there appears to be no alternative to resettlement in the United States, or (b) refugees of compelling concern to the United States such as former or present political prisoners and dissidents.
Priority Two. Former US Government (USG.) employees: refugees employed by the USG. for at least one year prior to the claim for refugee status. This category also includes persons who were not official USG. employees, but who for at least one year were so integrated into USG. offices as to have been in effective and appearance USG. employees.
Priority Three. Family reunification: refugees who are spouses, unmarried sons, unmarried daughters, or parents of persons in the United States. (The status of the anchor relative in the United States must be one of the following: US citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, refugee, asylee or member of certain groups of public interest paroleses).
Priority Four. Other ties to United States: (a) Refugees employed by US foundations, US voluntary agencies or US business firms for at least one year prior to the claim for refugee status; (b) Refugees trained or educated in the United States or abroad under USG. auspices;
Priority Four (Iran and Cuba). In addition to (a) and (b) above: (c) Refugees who have served in positions of leadership or played a conspicuous role within a religious denomination whose members are subjected to discrimination, including the clergy, prominent laymen, those who have served in denominational assemblies, governing bodies or councils; (d) Refugees who because of their minority religious affiliations have been deprived of employment, have been driven from their homes, have had their business confiscated or looted, have been denied educational opportunities available to others similarly situated in the same area, or have been denied pensions that would otherwise be available; and (e) Refugees who have become targets of persecution because of a perceived identification with the United States or the other nations of the West (including Israel).
Priority Four (East Asia). In addition to (a) and (b) above: (f) Persons previously in the civil service or armed forces of the former governments of Indochina who were associated with USG. policies or US-supported programs; (g) Persons who played a meaningful role in the social, economic, political, religious, intellectual, or artistic life of the former societies of Indochina, including such persons as professors, philosophers, monks, or other transmitters of the cultural traditions of these societies.
Priority Five. Additional family reunification: refugees who are: (a) married sons or married daughters of persons in the United States; (b) unmarried siblings of persons in the United States; (c) married siblings of persons in the United States; (d) grandparents of persons in the United States; (e) grandchildren of persons in the United States; or (f) more distantly related individuals who are part of the family group and dependent on the family for support. (The status of the anchor relative in the United States must be one of the following: US citizen, lawful permanent resident alien, refugee, asylee or member of certain groups of public interest paroleses).

Priority Six. Otherwise of special humanitarian concern: other refugees whose admission is in the national interest.

(3) INS Refugee Processing Authority for refugee processing is provided in Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to admit any refugee who is not firmly resettled in a third country, who is determined to be of special humanitarian concern, and who is admissible as an immigrant. In both overseas refugee processing and domestic asylum proceedings, INS has the statutory role of decision maker, determining who meets the requirements for refugee status.

INS Overseas Operations: The Immigration and Naturalization Service's overseas offices have a variety of responsibilities administered by three District Offices located in Bangkok, Mexico City, and Rome. The INS overseas office corps currently consists of 21 officers in the Bangkok District, including suboflicies in Manila, Singapore, Seoul, and Hong Kong; ten officers in the Mexico City District, including suboflicies in Monterrey, Guadalajara, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana; and 50 officers in the Rome District, including suboflicies in Frankfurt, Vienna, Athens, Moscow, London, Nairobi, and New Delhi. One of the most important responsibilities of INS' overseas program is refugee processing. The percentage of time each office devotes to this activity depends on the refugee workload, as well as the staffing pattern and priorities within the office. The permanent staff are augmented by temporary duty personnel from stateside offices, as needed. Circuit rides to processing posts are arranged by the office having geographic jurisdiction over the post.

Presentation to INS: In general, a refugee applicant proceeds through the following steps before his interview with an INS officer: an applicant is determined to be in need of protection and resettlement by the INS. The USG. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); he or she is referred to a voluntary agency (VOLAG) or Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) for pre-screening; if the applicant is of a nationality of special humanitarian concern and within a processing priority eligible for US consideration, the VOLAG or JVA prepares the case for submission to INS by assisting the applicant in filling out a request for refugee status, a biographic information sheet and other documents. Processing priorities are administrative guidelines designed to order the refugee admissions process within the established ceilings. Priorities do not address the quality of an individual's claim to refugee status, but rather are an assessment of the relative degree of US interest in resettling an applicant, made by ranking an applicant's ties to the United States based on factors such as relatives in the United States and prior employment by the US Government or private US firms. Nationalities of special humanitarian concern to the United States are determined annually by the President in consultation with Congress.

The Eligibility Determination: Eligibility for refugee status is determined on an individual, case-by-case basis. A personal interview of the applicant is held by an INS officer. The interview is non-adversarial and is designed to elicit information about the applicant's claim for refugee status. Questions are asked about the reasons for the applicant's departure from his country, his political or religious beliefs/activities, problems he may have had or fears having to do with the authorities in his home country. A determination of well-founded fear of persecution requires judging both objective and subjective elements of an applicant's claim. Conditions in the country of origin are taken into consideration and the applicant's credibility is assessed. Persecution is the most difficult element of the refugee definition to analyze and apply. There is no internationally accepted definition of the term "persecution," but it includes a threat to life or freedom. Discrimination in the treatment of
various groups is not, per se, persecution but at times an accumulation of discriminatory measures may involve such significant denials of opportunities to participate in society that it constitutes a threat to freedom. Economic hardship is not itself a basis for eligibility for refugees status but persecution may take the form of economic reprisals, such as denial of the opportunity to work.

Post-Interview Processing: After interview, applicants found eligible for refugee status must have a medical examination and sponsorship assurance. A refugee admission number, subtracted from the annual ceiling, is allocated. Transportation arrangements are made through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the refugee signs a travel loan, promising repayment of the cost of airfare. At the US Port of Entry, INS admits a refugee to the United States and authorizes employment. After one year, a refugee is eligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. Five years after admission, a refugee is eligible for naturalization.

Asylum Issues: Last year, INS implemented new asylum regulations published in FY 1990, which established not only a specialized corps of asylum officers, but an entirely new organizational structure for processing asylum applications. Regional asylum offices were opened at seven sites with a newly-hired corps of 82 Asylum Officers who inherited a backlog of 114000 applications for asylum. During FY 1991, approximately 60000 new applications were submitted; receipts are expected to be even higher in FY 1992. An additional workload burden was imposed by the December 1990 settlement in the case of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. Under the terms of the settlement, INS will provide asylum interviews to 45000 Guatemalans and up to 200000 Salvadorans over the next several years. During much of FY 1992, trained Asylum Officers were detailed to Guantánamo Bay to pre-screen Haitian migrants, leaving some asylum offices with fewer than half of normal staffing levels. Some 68 new Asylum Officers were hired and underwent a four-week training course in March. A total of 150 adjudicating officers and 24 supervisors are now onboard, ready to face the challenges ahead. INS has regional asylum offices in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Newark, Arlington, Miami and Houston, and the asylum program is administered from these seven locations, under the direction of INS Headquarters. The Resource Information Center exists within the Asylum Branch to provide asylum adjudicators with easily accessible information on the human rights situations in refugee producing countries of origin. The Center produces country profile reports as well as periodic "Alerts" on new or evolving situations of direct interest and impact on the work of the Asylum Officers. The Center is located with the main Asylum Office headquartered in Washington, DC, and is linked to it and to each of the seven Asylum Office sites. Section 209 (b) of the INA permits the adjustment of status of persons previously granted asylum in the United States who have been in the United States as refugees for at least one year and who continue to qualify as refugees. The INS intends to adjust to the status to permanent resident alien 10000 persons during FY 1993. [=]

22063. DS. Report To The Congress On Proposed Refugee Admissions For FY 1993 Submitted With The World Refugee Report On Behalf Of The President Of The United States To The Committees On The Judiciary, United States Senate And United States House Of Representatives, In Fulfillment Of The Requirements Of Section 207 (E) (1) - (7) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act: Part 12: Resettlement Needs in FY 1993. Private Sector Initiative. District of Columbia: Department of State, June 30, 1992. The PSI is a joint private and public venture in which the basic costs of admitting and resettling refugees are paid for by the private sector. The program was first approved in June 1988 with a project for the admission of Cuban refugees from third countries proposed by the Cuban American National Foundation. The Cuban program, now administered by the Foundation’s independent office for immigration, the Cuban Exodus Relief Fund (CERF), was renewed for FY 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992. About 730 privately funded refugees were admitted in 1988, 1500 in 1989, and 3000 in 1990. For FY 1991 and 1992, the Fund proposed that some of the PSI admissions to be admitted receive Federal assistance for part of the cost of their health care. Plans call for the foundation to resettle 1000 privately funded refugees, plus an additional 1000 refugees who would have normally been publicly funded, in return for federal coverage of part of their health care cost. HHS recently approved this proposal. Cuban refugees in third countries admitted through the Private Sector Initiative Program may be processed if they fled Cuba on or before 1/1/1992. Since the program began, three other smaller privately funded sponsorship projects have been approved: one administered by the Catholic Relief Services of North America, for Vietnamese refugees from the Vietnamese Resettlement Association, and for Ethiopian refugees from the Ethiopian Community Development Council. Additional proposals for admitting refugees from the Near East and other regions are under consideration.

[=] 22064. Dabashi, Hamid. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: The Shattering of the Wor(l)d: Part 02. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993. pp. 53-56. The pre-modern history of worlds categorically designated as "Islamic," is the history of a relentless struggle between the theocentric forces of the sacred imagination, sustained by a Biblical (i.e., Qur’anic) metaphysics, and the anthropocentric forces of the poetic imagination, generated by a cosmopolitan multiculturalism that embraces effectively all the cultures of the region, from Arabic and Persian to Indian and Turkish, eastern Mediterranean and northern African. To be sure, subservient forces in the poetic have invariably offered their services to the forces of the sacred to further its claim and authority over "Man." While in the Biblical tradition, Aquinas, al-Ghazali, and Maimonides are the supreme examples of onto-theological logocentrism at the service of he sacred, Dante and Rumi are the prime examples of the poetic at the service of the sacred. The hegemonic power of the sacred was thus fortified by both its appropriated anthropocentrism of "Reason" (‘aqd) and the poetic power of "Imagination" (khayal). That subservience notwithstanding, the anthropocentric imagination in the poetic did manage to claim limited territories for the domain of "Man" as an autonomous entity, however dialogically created in response to the sacred imagination of "God." From Aristotle to Avicenna, a hesitant logocentrism carved a space for the anthropocentric possibility of a vision of reality independent of the sacred. From Aeschylus to Sophocles, Homer, Ferdowsi, Nezami, Abu Nuwas, Khayyam, Abu al-'Ala al-Ma'arri, Sadi and Hafez, the poetic postulated a mode of being (through that moment which Heidegger in Unterwegs zur Sprache called "the shattering of the word") which is anthropocentric in the core of its self-imagination. In the Islamic tradition proper, while Sana'i, Attar, Rumi and Jami subserviently put their poetic imagination at the service of the sacred, Ferdowsi, Nezami, Khayyam, Sadi and Hafez managed with nothing more than a lip service to the sacred, and shattered the word for a poetic possibility of being autonomous and independent of the sacred. This poetic imagination is the key anti-metaphysical-counter-intelligibility to the Biblical transcendentalism in which—whether monotheocentric in "Islamic Law" (Shari'ah ) or logocentricized in Islamic Philosophy (Falsafah) or theo-eroticized in Islamic Mysticism (Tasawwuf)—"Man" is de-historicized and essentialized.

Despite the alternative anthropocentric spaces that the anti-logocentric poetic created for a non-sacred possibility of being, the "Man" thus conceived was as abstract and essentialized as "God" of the theocentric imagination. This abstract essentialized, de-historicized "Man" could only be conceived as the dialogical counter-intelligibility of a "God" who was, as a matter of doctrinal and creedal conviction, supremely abstract, essentialized, pre- and supra-historical. If we follow the Heideggerian lead, more recently re-articulated by Vattimo, in considering language as the inaugurating event for all subsequent questioning/answering of being, then the apposition between the theocentric language of the sacred and the anthropocentric language of the poetic assumes fictional historical significance. Equally significant is Vattimo’s adaptation of Rorty’s call for a sort of cultural anthropology into which collapses the Heideggerian hermeneutics. The first step towards
that anthropological hermeneutics, which is also the first step away from the Biblical "Man" and towards "the historical person," is the full, operative recognition of the historical thrown-ness of the Heideggerian Dasein.

"(Wo)man" as a historical person could not have been born until much later in history. In European history, the Reformation, the Renaissance, and ultimately the French Revolution were birth channels of "(Wo)man," as a historical person. In The Order of Things, Foucault carefully traced the historical formation of "man" as an epistemic category through the so-called "human sciences." Not long after the French Revolution of 1789, a group of five Iranian students travelled across Europe and went to England early in the 19th century. They were sent by Abbas Mirza, a reformed-minded Qajar prince, to learn the technological achievements of Europeans so that they could help the Qajars remedy their miserable defeat at the hands of the superior Russian army. While four of these five students learned what they could about the new military marvels at the heart of the colonial power, one of them, Mirza Saleh Shirazi, kept a long, sustained, and insightful diary in which he recorded his observations while in Europe. The travelogue of Mirza Saleh Shirazi must be considered a turning point in the course of Iranian political culture. In a simplified Persian prose, Mirza Saleh reported of the French Revolution, of the rule of law in England, of parliamentary democracy, of universal suffrage, of mandatory elementary education, and of much more. When here turned to Iran, he brought with him the first printing press, and with it published the first newspaper in Iran. Mirza Saleh Shirazi's Safarnameh must thus be considered a turning point in the historical reconfiguration of the Iranian political culture, a turning point through which was delivered the first sign of "(wo)man" as a historical person.

The movement that thus started ultimately concluded with the gradual formation of a potent political ideology that by the early twentieth century led to the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The ultimate result of the Constitutional Revolution in the Iranian political culture was the birth of Iran as a "nation." The conception of a "nation-state" rested on the political necessity of "The People" (mellat, mardom, etc.) as the most potent political rhetoric of the period. It is in the bosom of "Iran" as a "nation-state" that "The People" as a necessary political community comes to life. Both in the ideological and the institutional rhetorics of the Constitutional Revolution, which expanded from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, "Iran" was born as a "nation-state," and with it the idea of "The People" as the first historical categorization of a political community. This individuation of "Iran" as apolitical category was the result of a number of factors that one may categorize in the two internal and external machinations that Vattimo, following Rorty, postulates for cultural anthropology. That is to say, the construction of a cultural "Other" (which was "The West" in the case of Iran, as indeed in the case of much of the so-called "East") and the individuation of essentialized and de-historicized categories (which again in the case of Iran and much of the so-called "Middle East" were such categories as Ummah, Muslims, or even more specifically Ajams or the Shi'ites). Neither "man" nor "woman" can be either the essentialized, metaphysical counterpart of "God," nor the metaphysical object of the "human sciences." As historical persons ("person," as in Latin persona and Etruscan phersu, both meaning "mask;" or alternatively as in the Arabic shakhs, from Shakhasa, "He rose, or became raised, or was distinguished, or individuated").

"Man" was born in and through the poetry of Forough Farrokhzad. Thus in the relentlessly anthropocentric imagination of the poetic, and from Nima the father and Forough the mother, the historical and existential Iranian "man" and "woman" were born very recently in our shared memory. [~]

22065. Dabashi, Hamid. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: The Shattering of the Wor(l)d: Part 03. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993, pp. 56-58. It is only by virtue of these successive generations of events that today we can talk about a potential juxtaposition of Islamic theocracy, human rights and women in Iran, or any other post-Islamic society.

That process inevitably continues. The very recent birth of "broad and white" as a historical person, barely begun in Iran, is a further existentialization of "the individual." We have just begun to face the powerful formation of the idea that not all individuals are men, that women constitute a distinct, historically denied and suppressed, constellation of sensibilities, aspirations, hopes, fears, and anxieties.

Thus permanently under (re)construction as historical persons, neither "man" nor "woman" can be either the essentialized, metaphysical counterpart of "God," nor the metaphysical object of the "human sciences." As historical persons ("person," as in Latin persona and Etruscan phersu, both meaning "mask;" or alternatively as in the Arabic shakhs, from Shakhasa, "He rose, or became raised, or was distinguished, or individuated"). The individuation of "man" and "woman" thus, ipso facto, yields to material forces that continue to shape and form them, (re)define and (re)inform them. As we have gathered here today, asking the question of "Theocracy, Human Rights and Women," we are these "man" and "woman" in this very specific sense.

If we follow this history, this genealogy of our question, we already find ourselves in the middle of our answer. What has been the impact of the "Islamic Revolution" on this long historical process? Not much. These are historical gains; they were not easily occupied or easily lost. Reza Shah or Muhammad Reza Shah did not give them to Iranians so that Khomeini or his successors can take them back. The birth of "the people," "the individual," the historical "man" and the historical "woman" are all irreversible. Historical "men" and "women" massively participated in the revolution on all sides, Islamic and other.
But in the meantime the world outside Iran is changing. If we are to believe Heidegger, the song of Being has just begun. If we are to believe Foucault, "man" is already, or about to be, dead. The post-modern imagination has already suspended and superseded the primacy of reason and progress. The deconstructionist imagination has laid bare the mere linguisticity of all--sacred, rational, or poetic--acts of signification. The historical unfolding of existential being seems to have moved beyond "The People," beyond "the individual"--beyond this insult to the Turk's long quest to find "woman" and reached deep into the abyss of what Derrida and Spivak consider a bottomless pit, the pitch darkness of an absence of any act of signification, where nothing signifies, nothing means, nothing matters, nothing is. Can the Iranian experience be separated and isolated from these vanguard events in the world of ideas? I seriously doubt it.

In the mean time life goes on. In Iran there has been a theocratic revolution. The state apparatus rests on an ideology that rules with the sacred certitude of having the same Abstract, Essentialized and pre- and post-historical "God" on its side. We lack any autonomous secular institution that can protect the rights of the individual--man or woman--vis-a-vis a massive state bureaucracy. All the potential alternatives to the Islamic Republic, whether monarchical, nationalistic, Marxist, or equally religious, oppose the government on its own terms, without the slightest inking as to their programs for the formation of a civil society, democratic institutions, secular and independent of the state apparatus.

But the next revolution, ladies and gentlemen, as the last one, will not be fought in the streets. The cultural revolutions always precede the political ones. Political revolutions always linger, by a measure of decades and centuries, behind the cultural transmutations that take much longer to incubate until they crack their shell. In historical scales, the poetry of Simin Behbahani and the fictions of Shahrnoush Parsipour and Moniru Ravanipour are infinitely more important for the self-re-configuration of "woman" in contemporary Iran than the entire state apparatus of the Islamic Republic. The next battle, as the last, will be fought on the pages of books, screens of personal computers, flickering images of cinema and television. What precisely the configuration and the out come of that battle will no one knows. But this much is clear: If Madonna and Michael Jackson tapes are readily available in Tehran, and I am told they are, then much more than that is equally available. The world has irreversibly shrunk to a village. What happens in the bigger tents reverberates throughout the smaller ones. The future of Iran is not separable from the future of the world of ideas that surround us all: ideas that proclaimed the death of God, and that now proclaim the death of man; ideas that anchor all acts of understanding to all acts of being; ideas that completed by a bed, but in the Orient divans are used instead of beds.

One might have imagined oneself in the room of any Parisian Lady if the furniture had been separable from the future of the world of ideas that surround us all; ideas marble mantelpiece with a pillared clock upon it. One might have imagined oneself in the room of any Parisian Lady if the furniture had been separable from the future of the world of ideas? I seriously doubt it. Nothing is. Can the Iranian experience be separated and isolated from coarsest insults only end in the triumph of one or the other in the opinion of the bystanders. But, as the Pasha looked on with astonishment, my companions, who had, at first, done nothing but laugh at the man's mistake, explained that I was a Frank. I only mention this scene to show the fanaticism which still exists among the lower classes which, though it has considerably calmed down so far as Europeans are concerned, is always strong between the different seers. Moreover, it is very much the same with the Christians: a Roman Catholic would rather have a Turk than a Greek. The Pasha was highly amused, and began to chat with the painter. We re-embarked after these refreshments, at the same time as himself, and as our boats had to pass before the Sultan's summer palace, which is on the Asiatic side, he gave us leave to visit it.

This summer seraglio, which should not be confused with the other, on the European side, is the most delightful residence in the world. Great gardens, laid out in terraces, reach right to the top of the mountain, from which Scutari can be clearly seen on the right, and, in the far distance, the bluish silhouette of the Bithynian Olympus. The palace is built in the eighteenth-century style. Before we went in, we had to change our boots for slippers which we were lent then we were taken to see the apartments of the Sultanas, then, of course, unoccupied. The lower rooms are built upon piles, most of which are of precious woods. We were even told of aloes wood piles, which are better able to resist the decay which the seawater produces. When we had visited the huge rooms on the ground-floor which nobody lives in, we were taken to the apartments. In the middle was a great hall, out of which opened twenty or so smaller rooms with separate doors, like those in the galleries of a bath-house. We were allowed to go into all the rooms, each of which was furnished with a divan, a few chairs, a mahogany chest of drawers, and a marble mantelpiece with a pillar ed clock upon it. One might have imagined oneself in the room of any Parisian Lady if the furniture had been completed by a bed, but in the Orient divans are used instead of beds. Each of these rooms was that of a cadine. I was struck by their symmetry and perfect uniformity; and was told that the most absolute equality reigns among the Sultan's ladies. The painter gave me the following example: Then His Highness orders boxes of sweets, usually from a French confectioner at Peræ, they have to be made up of sweets exactly alike. One comfit too many, one sugar-plum of a peculiar shape; too many pastilles or too few lozenges, and there would be serious complications in the relations between these beautiful creatures. Like all other Musulmans, whoever they may be, they are believers in strict equality. In the principal room a musical clock was made to play for us. It played several airs from the Italian operas. Mechanical birds, singing nightingales, peacocks spreading their tails, added to the attraction on this little masterpiece. On the second floor were the quarters of the odaleur, who are divided into singing and serving women. Higher still were the rooms of the slaves. In the harem there is the sam order as in a well-kept boarding-house. The oldest established of the cadines has authority over to others, but she is always subject to the Sultana-Mother whom, from time to time, she must go and consult at the old seraglio in Stamboul. So much I learned of the interior-arrangements of the seraglio.

In the meantime life goes on. In Iran there has been a theocratic revolution. The state apparatus rests on an ideology that rules with the sacred certitude of having the same Abstract, Essentialized and pre- and post-historical "God" on its side. We lack any autonomous secular institution that can protect the rights of the individual--man or woman--vis-a-vis a massive state bureaucracy. All the potential alternatives to the Islamic Republic, whether monarchical, nationalistic, Marxist, or equally religious, oppose the government on its own terms, without the slightest inking as to their programs for the formation of a civil society, democratic institutions, secular and independent of the state apparatus. But the next revolution, ladies and gentlemen, as the last one, will not be fought in the streets. The cultural revolutions always precede the political ones. Political revolutions always linger, by a measure of decades and centuries, behind the cultural transmutations that take much longer to incubate until they crack their shell. In historical scales, the poetry of Simin Behbahani and the fictions of Shahrnoush Parsipour and Moniru Ravanipour are infinitely more important for the self-re-configuration of "woman" in contemporary Iran than the entire state apparatus of the Islamic Republic. The next battle, as the last, will be fought on the pages of books, screens of personal computers, flickering images of cinema and television. What precisely the configuration and the out come of that battle will no one knows. But this much is clear: If Madonna and Michael Jackson tapes are readily available in Tehran, and I am told they are, then much more than that is equally available. The world has irreversibly shrunk to a village. What happens in the bigger tents reverberates throughout the smaller ones. The future of Iran is not separable from the future of the world of ideas that surround us all; ideas that proclaimed the death of God, and that now proclaim the death of man; ideas that anchor all acts of understanding to all acts of being; ideas that suspect reason and progress with the same intensity that deconstruct the naive assumption that what one says is what one means, or that one means what one intends, or that one intends what one imagines. In the equality reigns among the Sultan's ladies. The painter gave me the following example: Then His Highness orders boxes of sweets, usually from a French confectioner at Peræ, they have to be made up of sweets exactly alike. One comfit too many, one sugar-plum of a peculiar shape; too many pastilles or too few lozenges, and there would be serious complications in the relations between these beautiful creatures. Like all other Musulmans, whoever they may be, they are believers in strict equality. In the principal room a musical clock was made to play for us. It played several airs from the Italian operas. Mechanical birds, singing nightingales, peacocks spreading their tails, added to the attraction on this little masterpiece. On the second floor were the quarters of the odaleur, who are divided into singing and serving women. Higher still were the rooms of the slaves. In the harem there is the sam order as in a well-kept boarding-house. The oldest established of the cadines has authority over to others, but she is always subject to the Sultana-Mother whom, from time to time, she must go and consult at the old seraglio in Stamboul. So much I learned of the interior-arrangements of the seraglio.

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was the case with the Franks in the Middle Ages.

It would seem that the Sultan, for his part, is ready to help forward the repopulation of the Turkish Empire, judging by the number of births of princes and princesses which are made known to the city by the booming of cannon and the illuminations of Stamboul. We were shown the cellars, kitchens, reception rooms and concert hall. Everywhere things are arranged so that the women can take part, without being seen, in all the amusements designed for those who are invited by the Sultan. There are raised boxes everywhere which, like tribunes, look out upon the rooms, so that the ladies of the harem can, in spirit, associate themselves with matters of politics or with pleasure.

We admired the bath-room, which was made of marble, and the private mosque of the palace. When we were taken out through a peristyle which leads to the gardens. It is adorned by columns, and closed in by a conservatory with arbutus-trees, and plants and flowers from India. So Constantinople, which is cold, because of its mountainous position and the frequent storms which come from the Black Sea, has its hothouses for tropical plants, just as we do in our more northern lands. We went round the gardens again, and were taken into a pavilion, where we were served with fruit from the garden, and conserves. The Pasha invited us to this feast, but himself ate nothing, for the moon of Ramadan had not yet risen. We were quite overwhelmed by his politeness, and somewhat embarrassed, because we had no way of showing our gratitude except in words. "You will be able to say," he said, in reply to our thanks, "that you have eaten a meal with the Sultan. Without making too much of the honour of so kind a reception, one may at least see in it much goodness of heart, and that absence of religious prejudice which is now almost complete in Turkey. [4]

22067. Deo, Veena. "Review Essays: Celebrating the Emergence of Iranian Women Writers From Behind The Veil: Farzaneh Milani", in Journal of Critical Studies of Iran & the Middle East, Fall 1993. pp. 88-93. Milani's "Veils and Words" (1992) provides an important overview of the emergence of women writers in Iran. Milani draws upon Western feminist literary criticism in the examination of the relationship between movements to unveil women and the efforts of women to become published writers. The veil has historically been used mainly to regulate attitudes and relations between men and women in societies; the veil solidifies separate world for men and women within society, imposing silence between men and women in both textuality and sexuality.

22068. Engram, Sara. "The Vatican's Campaign Against Population Control", in Seattle Times, September 2, 1994. p. B7. In mid-1993 world population was 5.5 billion and growing by 90 million per year. As the world's nations prepare to meet at the UN Population Conference (UN International Conference on Population & Development) and draft a commitment to slow population growth, mainly by increasing the power of women to determine their family size, the Vatican remains rejectionist. The Vatican continues to oppose abortion and contraception. The Vatican's alliance with Islamic groups (including Iran) has been widely criticized. The Vatican has a minority opinion and it should be denounced by the world community.

22069. Eritreans for Liberation in North America. "Eritrea: The Revolution Surges Forward -The Current Situation", in Eritrea Liberation (Eritreans For Liberation in North America), March-April 1976. Since 2/1975 tremendeous changes and progress have been made in the Eritrean struggle against Ethiopian colonialism. US imperialism and Israeli Zionism. In the following few pages we can only attempt to give a glimpse of what is done and what is being done at this present time. The present ongoing battles show that a new chapter has been opened in the Eritrean struggle. A qualitative change has taken place. The balance of forces between the occupation army and the Eritrean revolutionary army has basically and decisively changed in favor of the revolutionary army. The enemy is receiving humiliating defeat every day. The revolutionary army has changed its tactics from that of a guerilla warfare into that of predominantly mobile. Mass mobilization is leading towards complete participation of all Eritrean patriotic forces in the struggle. The liberation army has liberated practically the entire countryside and some fairly large towns. We find, at this time, entire provinces completely liberated. Now the Ethiopian troops are concentrated inside fortified camps in large towns. But these fortifications have not prevented the liberation forces from constantly attacking, constantly harassing, and terrorizing and demoralizing the enemy troops. The fascist occupation army is finding it increasingly impossible to get out of its forts and the towns, and when they do, it is driven back to its forts. The Ethiopian navy is also rendered incapable of doing anything. The naval base is in disarray. The only way the Ethiopian occupation force is able to function is through its planes. Ethiopian planes have made their target anything that has life and that moves. They are brutally bombing villages and napalm all crops. But the Eritrean fighters and people have vowed to silence these planes and add them to the number of planes already downed. Though the criminal activities of the fascist forces weigh very heavily on the Eritrean people, the people, undaunted and disregarding all the horrors of war, are working hand and glove with the fighters, and despite the enemy and show their defiance by continuing their productive activity. For all practical purposes the Ethiopian fascist junta has lost the war. The might of the Eritrean people is coming out victorious every day. But a colonizer or an oppressor never realizes its defeat and never gives up until physically thrown out or completely demolished.

Instead, it persists in committing senseless crimes and continuing its aggression and war of genocide. So does Ethiopia. Even though Ethiopian colonialism continues to suffer heavy human and material losses, has lost the entire countryside and, with its troops unwilling to fight any more, cannot defend even its fortified camps, it still goes on begging its imperialist and Zionist masters for more military aid. These masters, the enemies of all justice and progress loving peoples of the world, and who never learn from experience, deliver more destructive weapons either directly or indirectly through their puppets the Shah and his like. But isn't this a too familiar picture? Haven't we witnessed the same in Vietnam and Cambodia? National unity is one of the main factors for the success of the Eritrean revolution. This is well understood by all patriotic Eritreans. Thus national unity is demanded by the Eritrean masses; democratic forces within the ELF want it and the EPLF has always taken a principled and correct stand on it. Moves towards the unity of the two fronts—the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Forces (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), are one of the most important items in the Eritrean struggle today. Since the civil war between ELF-revolutionary council and EPLF stopped at the end of 1974, many important steps have been taken towards genuine unity, though other steps have also been taken to frustrate this unity. While the forces of progress are pushing for a principled unity, the forces of reaction are pushing for a sham unity; a unity, which in the long run will result in disorder and in consequences far more worse. At this time revolutionary and brave fighters from both fronts are daily meeting to discuss various issues. By drawing a common program, they are fighting against the Ethiopian fascist junta and reaping joint victories, thus laying the ground for further cooperation and creating favorable conditions for principled unity of the fighters and the people. In addition, two committees whose members are elected by the fighters of both fronts have begun working together, moving around to meet with fighters of both fronts and the people to discuss unity and the correct steps to be taken for a principled unity. Great successes are being recorded by these two committees. While these are among the positive developments of the revolution, there has also been a negative aspect obstructing the moves toward genuine unity. Under the guise of uniting the Eritrean masses, the rightist elements have attempted to consolidate their unity first—a unity of reactionarions and opportunists. These parasites by exploiting the genuine sentiment of the people for unity, are trying to mislead and trap the people into an exploitative and oppressive system.

But these elements are being isolated while progressive and democratic forces are clearly winning dominance. The vanguard of the Eritrean revolution, the EPLF, in its special declaration of 1/1976, makes it clear that one of its highest priorities is unity and firmly states that a unity that is not based on the politicization and full participation of the Eritrean people and fighters is no unity. "Whatever is tried, whatever is
done, principled unity of the people or fighters will reach its correct conclusion through the ideological and practical struggles undertaken by the people and fighters according to concrete situations. No reactionary force can stop this historic course. All attempts taken to frustrate the will of the (Eritrean) people and fighters by the oppressor classes and opportunist groups will fail. The EPLF declares that “the success of the Eritrean revolution and the guarantee for its continuation is the participation of conscious masses; hence to raise the consciousness of the masses and to organize them is one of the things that we tirelessly work.” The result is, in a very short time, the EPLF have been able to organize thousands and thousands of people, and help them raise their consciousness and realize their role in the revolution. Now, we find different classes and sections of Eritrean society - workers, peasants, students, women, etc. organized in a democratic way. Women participation in the fronts has tremendously increased. The number of women fighters has hit the thousand mark. Women are involved in all aspects of the revolution in the Press and Information section, medical section, in the front lines fighting etc. Extensive road building is being undertaken by the EPLF. In the last six months, hundreds of miles of roads have been built. The engineering section of the EPLF is busy building new roads and maintaining old ones. Transportation of goods and people by camel alone is increasingly becoming a thing of the past. Big trucks and Land Rovers—captured from the enemy—are in wide use now. In the past when the fronts were on the defensive, they had to destroy all the strategic bridges and important roads. Now that the liberation army is on the offensive, it is building new roads while controlling the ones that the enemy might attempt to use. At the same time a good use is made of the abandoned old roads built by the Italians. All of these roads are being effectively maintained by the EPLF engineering section. At present, a good number of medical doctors, "bare foot" doctors and nurses are found in the rank of the fighters. This has enabled thousands of peasants to get medical attention - an attention they never got before under the colonial regimes. Various surgeries are now performed in the field. Two big hospitals with 300 beds each, six smaller ones and several clinics have been set up in the liberated and semi-liberated areas. It is very seldom that sick or wounded EPLF fighters are now sent outside of Eritrea for medical treatment. It is to be remembered that all the hospitals in the towns under the control of the occupation army has been turned into military hospitals and serve only the wounded and dying Ethiopian troops. Thus, even the people in the areas under the control of the Ethiopian occupation troops depend on the liberation army for medical treatment. Though such is the case, with the number of diseases prevalent in Eritrea, there is always chronic shortages of medicine, and lack of sufficient medical equipment has hindered the doctors from exploiting their skill to the utmost. The EPLF, the vanguard, has created a new section—Trade and Retail Section—which is in charge of coordinating mainly the supplies and markets in the liberated areas. The liberation army has declared a total economic embargo against the towns under the control of the occupation army. The peasants have stopped going to these towns to sell their products. To meet the demands of the peasants, markets are created in the liberated and semi-liberated areas, thus bringing exploitation through trade to a good end. The EPLF provides peasants with their basic needs and buys all their products when necessary. A recent visitor to one of the EPLF markets recounts thus: “The EPLF has introduced in its markets the ratio card. This avoids peasants with more money buying more than others. The family’s size determines the quantity to be supplied. The exchange is simple barter in most cases. . . . If a peasant needs something but cannot pay for it EPLF helps him by other means, but not through the market. The peasants are well organized, they know the market rules and respect them. . . . ‘our (an EPLF fighter speaks) markets have started very recently; they are a new stage in our revolution. . . . by means of these markets, we control the prices and avoid the inflation that is found in the cities under the Ethiopian control.’” The Eritrean struggle is now surging forward towards final victory. The contradiction between the Eritrean people on the one hand, and the Ethiopian fascist junta, its supporters of many colors, and its masters, US imperialism and Israeli Zionism on the other, is ever sharper. At this stage, it is important for all progressive and democratic forces to closely follow and give active support for the Eritrean revolution. [↩]

22070. Evans, Kathy. "Women's Rights To Fore in Iran Poll", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 25, 1997, p. 5. The status and rights of women have emerged as a major issue in Iran on the eve of national elections. Last week, without explanation, the Council of Guardians rejected nine female candidates for public office. Since the Iranian revolution 18 years ago, women have been working behind the scenes to gain a greater role in governance. In recent months, women have become deputy minister, a district mayor in Tehran and a senior diplomat overseas. Now Iranian feminists are determined to gain a greater role in politics: the conservative candidate Nateq Nouri has clearly lost the woman vote.

22071. Fallahi, Mitra. Foundations Of Education In Iran And Education After The Cultural Revolution Of 1980. Marquette University. Dissertation, 218pp. AAC 9325676. [Advisor: Dupuis, Adrian; Marlaire, Courtney] The government of Iran changed from a monarchy to an Islamic republic after the Revolution of 1979. In the spring of 1980, the regime closed the universities for a Cultural Revolution. The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to redefine and redesign the educational system, which was a duplication of western education, and adapt it to the culture and politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Upon the closure of the universities, Ayatollah Khomeini assigned a Council to review the educational system and propose a new program adaptable to the philosophy, culture, and religious foundations of Iran. This study reviewed the role of educational institutions in the uprising and the victory of revolution in 1979 and the reasons why the universities were closed during the Cultural Revolution. This research also reviews the proposal submitted by the Council for the Cultural Revolution. Historical methodology has been utilized for this study. A variety of literature including books, journals, government documents, and dissertations were reviewed. Some literature has been translated from Farsi by the researcher. Also, the researcher's background, as having been educated and an educator in Iran, has added an ethnographic dimension to the study. The findings of the study suggest that the regime of the Islamic Republic has been, successful in certain areas such as: (1) promotion of seminars, conferences, and symposiums, (2) promotion of extracurricular activities, and (3) expansion of universities, majors, or programs within the universities. However, the weaknesses of the educational system are in areas like: (1) the education of ethnic minorities, (2) the role of women in education; (3) teacher education programs, (4) dropout rate/literacy, (5) shortage of human power, (6) credentialism, and (7) expansion of schools and school facilities. The regime has not been able to overcome these shortages mainly due to the weak economy which is a result of eight years the war with Iraq. Among the suggestions for improvement of the educational system are: (1) to allow the private sector to get involved and invest in education, and (2) to use the media to promote education and to make the people aware of the benefits of education. A brief outline of the research will give you a better understanding of the subjects discussed. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [↩]
mainstays of their political campaign. [pp. 118-120]

Ferraro's campaign staff included (at the advise of consultants Maxine Isaacs and Anne Wexler), former Carter aide Pat Bario, Charles Atkins from the Platform Committee as deputy campaign manager; Steve Engelberg handled domestic policy; Madeleine Albright handled foreign policy (professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a National Security Council staffer during the Carter Administration); [pp. 17-119] (when both were House Majority Whip Tom Foley and Patrick Muyihaen of the Senate Intelligence Committee attend, just as Mondale was briefed by James Schlesinger, former CIA director, and Amb. Max Kampelman, later to become Reagan's chief arms control negotiator [pp. 138-139]); Samuel (Sandy) Berger, former speech writer for Cyrus Vance, beacomm speechwriter; Addie Guttag became fundraiser; and Kate Schaeffer became trip director. [p. 155]

Ferraro became the vice presidential choice largely because of her opposition to Palestinian human rights (which she notes correctly is the mainstream of the Democratic Party); by contrast, Jesse Jackson's support. [p.64] Ferraro's strong support for Zionism placed her in a critical role in discrediting Arab-Americans and Jesse Jackson for their support of Palestinian human rights. One crisis came as Jackson sought to have the head of the American-Arab Anti-Defamation Committee testify on his views before the platform committee. The Jewish community, especially in New York, was furious that the platform committee would allow Arab-Americans to have input into the political process. The confrontation was defused when Jackson advisor Dr. Ronald Walters, at Howard University, scheduled the Jews and Arab-Americans in separate rooms at the same time, since the Jews refused to testify in the presence of Arabs. In Los Angeles, Ferraro would defuse Hispanic anger at legislation that would target them as possible illegal aliens: she met with them and managed to erase their concerns from serious discussion as part of the platform development process, dismissing the concerns of Hispanic Democrats such as Sal Alvarez as irrelevant (since his pleas for protection of Hispanic civil rights 'had driven me crazy'). [pp. 83-84] Ferraro notes that Jesse Jackson's advocacy of Palestinian rights was frankly anti-semitic; when Reagan criticized the Democrats as being anti-semitic during a speech at a Long Island synagogue, the lack of specific platform plank denouncing anti-semitism became a major political liability, especially since Jesse Jackson had not been expelled from the party. Jewish leaders were demanding that the Mondale campaign guarantee that Palestinian rights would never be part of the policies of a Mondale Administration. Ferraro speaking at Temple Kehilath Jeshurun in New York on 10/29/1984, denounced Reagan for stating the Democrats were 'soft on anti-Semitism' and stated that in fact Reagan was soft on anti-semitism; she denounced Reagan for citing the Holocaust as a justification for sending the Marines to Lebanon, and instead insisted that the Democrats were the true exponents of the lessons of the Holocaust. [p. 284] Ferraro notes that a massacre did occur at Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps (expressing her surprise at discovering that refugees can be poor, in an aside, 'which held in Doctor Siddiqui's memory, the first in London last November and the second in Tehran in August. It is clear that his absence is greatly felt.' [pp. 125-128] Ferraro notes that on a speech on 11/2/1984, she spoke on 'the tragedy in Ethiopia'. [p. 292] [TXT] 22074. Friedl, Erika; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Part 11: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Dynamics of Women's Sphere of Action in Rural Iran. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 195-214. Shifts in gender roles in Iran in recent decades has been complex, contradictory, and included even relatively isolated rural areas. The common good could be enforced only from a position of overlapping making any "gender role norm" almost meaningless. Such contradictions allow one to either describe women as "downdropped beings without much of a face or a voice" or "powerful personages to be reckoned with in the domestic and political sphere". Rural women have much freedom, but it rests on the fragile basis of circumstantial, largely economic, necessity, and takes place within a milieu of a traditional "patriarchal feature set", which allows for limited "women's identity formation". Little of the recent shift in gender policy in Iran should be attributable to the Islamic Republic: two decades of 'modernization' had prepared the basis for the marginalization of women. Economic development has largely empowered men, just as sedentarization of nomadic groups has more constrained the mobility of women that of men. Modernization of housing (e.g., with private baths) has reduced traditional extra-kinship gatherings of women (at bath-houses). As single-family homes replace larger family homes, the range of normal kinship interaction is reduced. In recent years women have lost access to sources of power that they were once assured of: this is a product of socioeconomic modernization that erased contingent freedoms for women that were "not embedded in a gender-equalitarian ideology." 22075. Gani, Saadia; Kalla, Sumayya; Shakoor, Fatima A. World Conference Pays Glowing Tribute to the Late Doctor Kalim Siddiqui, in Crescent International, April 16-30, 1997. pp. 1 and 11. Glowing tributes were paid to the late Doctor Kalim Siddiqui at the international memorial conference held in Pretoria, South Africa from 3/28-30/1997. Among the conference participants were colleagues and friends from around the world, as well as thousands of admirers of the late Islamic scholar and activist. Coinciding with the first anniversary of his death, the conference was marked by an air of nostalgia about the life and work of Doctor Siddiqui. However, there also prevailed a strong sense of optimism about the future of the Ummah despite the immense suffering of Muslims at the hands of the west and its puppet regimes in the Muslim world. It was fitting that the conference should take place in Pretoria because it was here that Doctor Siddiqui passed away shortly after attending a similar conference last year, organized by the "Crescent International. He had visited South Africa on numerous occasions in the past two decades, his first visit dating back to 1975. He was very fond of South Africa and often referred to it as his "second home." Two previous conferences have been held in Doctor Siddiqui's memory, the first in London last November and the second in Tehran in August. It is clear that his absence is greatly felt worldwide. The recent conference theme, "The Muslim World: Towards a New Destiny," was based on one of Doctor Siddiqui's earliest books, published soon after attending the International Muslim Youth Conference in Tripoli, Libya in 1973. It was there that he met a number of young Muslim activists from South Africa, among them Ismail Kalla, with whom he struck a lifelong friendship in the service of the Global Islamic Movement. As has now become customary, this year's conference also included a massacre did occur at Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps (expressing her surprise at discovering that refugees can be poor, in an aside, 'which held in Doctor Siddiqui's memory, the first in London last November and the second in Tehran in August. It is clear that his absence is greatly felt.’ [pp. 125-128] Ferraro notes that on a speech on 11/2/1984, she spoke on 'the tragedy in Ethiopia’. [p. 292] [TXT] 22074. Friedl, Erika; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Setting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 11: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Dynamics of Women's Sphere of Action in Rural Iran. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 195-214. Shifts in gender roles in Iran in recent decades has been complex, contradictory, and included even relatively isolated rural areas. 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message who had repeatedly stressed that "Islam is incomplete without the Islamic State," which represents as the authority bestowed by Allah upon His faithful servants. The participants were formally welcomed by Ismail Kalla, the conference chairman, who paid tribute to Doctor Kalim Siddiqui and his intellectual contribution and dynamism. Throughout the day, other speakers—Doctor Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, leader of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, and Zafar Bangash, editor of the "Crescent International,"—highlighted numerous aspects of his active and fruitful life. Zafar Bangash narrated the circumstances in which Doctor Siddiqui grew up and the events that led to the realization that Muslim regimes were incapable of defending Muslims or Islam. He concluded that Muslims needed an intellectual revolution before change could be affected in Muslim societies. This led in 1973 to the establishment of the Muslims Institute for Research and Planning in London which has acted as the intellectual engine for Muslim Political Thought over the last twenty-five years. The first day's final session was captivated by Imam al-Asi's tremendous exposition of the political thought of Doctor Siddiqui.

The result was an overall impression of the late scholar/political activist as a giant figure in the history of the Global Islamic Movement whose intellectual energy forged a vision that will guide the Ummah in the realization of its new destiny, insha’Allah. Doctor Siddiqui was a leading exponent of the idea of the Global Islamic Movement. His last book, "Stages of Islamic Revolution," was published just before his death. He himself called it his final will and testament. In it, he outlined the processes through which change can be brought about in Muslim societies. A compilation of his works, "In Pursuit of the Power of Islam," was also published last year, edited by Zafar Bangash.

The second day of the conference was dedicated to women's issues. This in itself was a paradigm shift from previous conferences, where at most, a workshop was devoted to such discussion. A number of qualified and motivated sisters addressed the conference and left a very strong impression on the participants with their clear and incisive analyses. A wide range of issues were discussed, providing a platform for the political and social upliftment of Muslim women. Sister Merve Safa Kavakci, head of international relations and Women's Affairs of the Reffah Party, outlined the activist position of Muslim women in Turkey. She shared many innovative strategies for mobilizing women in the Islamic Movement. Another theme strongly conveyed by Sister Waheeda Kassim, "Crescent International's" representative in South Africa, Shaikh Saadullah Khan of the Islamic College of South Africa and Lubna Siddiqui and Faiza Siddiqui, both of the Muslim Women's Institute in London, was the inherent sense of respect and dignity conferred on Muslim women by Islam fourteen hundred years ago. It was pointed out that nowhere in the Qur'an is it categorically stated that men are superior to women. The parity between men and women, Islam ensures was contrasted with the unnatural attempts by western women in their frantic resolve to attain absolute similarity with men. This has led to all kinds of skewed relationships and problems. A living example of the strength and endurance of Muslim women in the Islamic Movement was encapsulated by Zafar Bangash. He rendered a moving account of the heavy contribution of Sister Seyyeda Asiya Andabi of the Dukhtar-e-Millat in Kashmir. She has spearheaded the movement rendering yeoman service to the widows and orphans in Kashmir. The sister's organization has also resolved to resist the indignity inflicted by Indian soldiers and the process of Indianization of Muslim culture in the State.

A unique contribution to the conference was the heart-rendering account of Professor Mohamed Shishani, head of the International Congress of Chechens. His testimony on the struggle for the supremacy of Islam in Chechnya (Ichkeria) was an inspiring revelation of the sacrifices of the Chechen muslims. Not only were they committed and united under the banner of Islam but also unshaken in their confidence that Allah subhanahu wata'ala will crown their efforts and sacrifices with victory. The mercy of Allah manifested itself with the healing balm of victory on 8/31/1996 when the Russians were forced to sign a peace treaty agreeing to pull all their troops out of Ichkeria. The Chechens are a remarkable story of human perseverance and jihad. With a total population of barely one million, four hundred thousand of whom became refugees, they fought the two million-strong Russian army. While the Russians were massively armed, the Chechens had only light weapons. What they lacked in weapons, however, they more than made for with the strength of iman. After a two hundred-year-long struggle, they won a great victory but found that their entire country had been virtually destroyed. The infrastructure would cost an estimated $150 billion to rebuild. The "Crescent International" immediately launched a Chechen Relief Fund to help with medicines and rehabilitation in Ichkeria. Other speakers included Mohamed Sabu, PAS member of parliament from Malaysia, Doctor Perwez Shafi from the "Crescent International" office in Pakistan, Iqbal Siddiqui, research fellow at the Muslim Institute London, Doctor Feizal Kalla of Lenasia, Doctor Anwar Hoosen of the Islamic Medical Association and Sister Ayesha Khan of Johannesburg. To once again revive the memory of Doctor Kalim Siddiqui, Ayatullah Amid Zanjani, head of a research institute in Tehran and member of the Majlis in Iran, made a surprise visit on the last day of the conference. Ayatullah Zanjani, a long-time friend of Doctor Siddiqui, paid rich tribute to the late Islamic scholar.

This was appropriately followed by the revolutionary stance of Imam al-Asi in his critical evaluation of the Hajj, Haramain and Al-Quds in the crucible of history. He meticulously exposed the corruption of the House of Saud and highlighted the Qur'anic commandments of the true meaning of Hajj. He urged the assembled participants to work for the liberation of the Haramain. He expressed the view that visa restrictions imposed by the Saudi regime not only subverted the Hajj experience but also the essential role of the Global Islamic Movement. The closing address by Zafar Bangash constituted a brilliant follow-up to Imam al-Asi by confirming the fallacy of the world's self-declared supremacy. He gave a factual outline of the moral and social decline which contains the seeds of the world's eventual self-destruction. The myth of its invincibility was effectively demolished by the end of his address, leaving the Muslim Ummah with a sense of reassurance as it set out to face the challenges ahead. In a touching moment, Doctor Kalim's son, Iqbal, read the statement of his mother, Suraiya Siddiqui. She thanked the conference participants for remembering and honoring her late husband. She also emphasized the importance of continuing his work. The Conference Declaration presented by Sister Waheeda Kassim then achieved a sudden sense of urgency as it posited the reassertion of Islam as the dominant force for the establishment of social justice in the world. This will be achieved by transforming the present crop of nation-States into Islamic States through the process of the Islamic Revolution. The Muslims of South Africa also expressed their commitment to promote the work and vision of Doctor Kalim Siddiqui. The conference similarly drew inspiration from the living example of the Chechen's struggle. It concluded with calling upon the South African Muslim community to define and address its problems living in a minority situation in the transforming social and political climate of South Africa. Ismail Kalla, the conference chairman, delivered the final word of thanks before it concluded with a moving dua by Imam al-Asi. [-]
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(1) Decides to consolidate the role of the Committee on Information as its main subsidiary body mandated to make recommendations relating to the work of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat;

(2) Calls upon the Secretary-General, in respect of United Nations public information policies and activities, to implement the following recommendations in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and in the light of General Assembly decision 47/469 of 5/6/1993 and General Assembly resolution 47/199 of 12/22/1992:

(a) Continues to disseminate information about the activities of the United Nations in coordination with the information services of other relevant agencies in accordance with the United Nations medium-term plan, the programme budget and their relevant revisions, pertaining, inter alia, to: (i) International peace and security; (ii) Disarmament; (iii) Peace-keeping operations and peacemaking; (iv) Decolonization and the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the light of the International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism; (v) The promotion and protection of human rights and in that context the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna from 14 to 25 June 1993; (vi) The elimination of all forms of racial discrimination; (vii) The advancement of the status of women and their role in society; (viii) The promotion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; (ix) Problems of economic and social development, as well as international economic cooperation aimed at resolving external debt problems; (x) The least developed countries; (xi) The environment and development; (xii) The elimination of foreign occupation; (xiii) The campaign against terrorism in all its forms in accordance with General Assembly resolution 40/61 of 12/3/1985; (xiv) International efforts against drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking; (xv) Crime prevention and criminal justice; (xvi) Support for the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s and for the tremendous efforts of the African countries aimed at recovery and development, as well as the positive response by the international community to alleviate the serious economic situation prevailing in Africa; (xvii) International efforts towards the total eradication of apartheid and support for the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa and, where necessary, the role of the United Nations in this context; (xviii) United Nations activities pertaining to the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine in particular, also including current developments in that region and the ongoing peace process; (b) Provides the necessary level of information support for the activities of the United Nations in situations requiring immediate and special response; (c) Continues its efforts at promoting an informed understanding of the work and purposes of the United Nations system among the peoples of the world and at strengthening the positive image of the system as a whole; (d) Continues its briefings, assistance and orientation programmes for broadcasters, journalists and other media professionals from developing countries focused on United Nations-related issues; (e) Provides, on the basis of its activities, information to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization about new forms of cooperation, at the regional and subregional levels, for the training of media professionals and for the improvement of the information and communication infrastructures of developing countries; (f) Continues its policies of cooperation with all agencies of the United Nations system, in particular with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; (g) Continues its policies of cooperation with the news agencies in and of the developing countries, in particular the News Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries.

(3) Welcomes the decision by the Department of Public Information to establish a task force to look into the allocation of office space to the media at United Nations Headquarters;

(4) Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General regarding the continuous and major publications of the Department of Public Information and urges all efforts to ensure timely production and dissemination of its major publications, in particular the UN Chronicle, the Yearbook of the United Nations and Africa Recovery, maintaining consistent editorial independence and accuracy, taking necessary measures to ensure that its output contains adequate, objective and equitable information about issues before the Organization, reflecting divergent opinions wherever they occur;

(5) Expresses regret at the circumstances leading to the discontinuation of Development Forum, and encourages the Secretary-General to suggest ways and means to revive this publication, which has continued to receive a mandate of the General Assembly, and to report thereon to the Committee on Information;

(6) Requests the management of the Department of Public Information to review the Department’s publications and proposals for publications to ensure that all publications fulfill an identifiable need, that they do not duplicate other publications inside or outside the United Nations system, and that they are produced in a cost-effective manner, and to report to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth substantive session;

(7) Reaffirms the importance attached by Member States to the role of United Nations information centres in effectively and comprehensively disseminating information about United Nations activities and the optimization of the resources allocated to the Department of Public Information;

(8) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth session for the purpose of evaluating the need for any subsequent integration, the results of the current trial of integrating eighteen United Nations information centres with field offices of the United Nations Development Programme, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General, as well as the views of the host countries, bearing in mind the concerns of Member States that the integration of the United Nations information centres with the United Nations offices could adversely affect their functions in the developing countries;

(9) Reaffirms the role of the General Assembly in relation to the opening of new United Nations information centres and invites the Secretary-General, as well, to make such recommendations as he may judge necessary regarding the establishment and location of these centres;

(10) Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his proposals relating to the structure, functions and activities of the seven United Nations interim offices in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan fully comply with the mandates of the relevant General Assembly resolutions pertaining to operational activities and dissemination of information, taking into account the observations and recommendations in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, General Assembly decision 47/469 of 5/6/1993 and relevant General Assembly resolutions, especially resolution 47/199 of 12/22/1992;

(11) Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General regarding the allocation of resources to the United Nations information centres in 1992 and would appreciate information on the status of the relevant General Assembly resolutions as well as a detailed breakdown of resource deployment between centres and, while welcoming the action by some Governments with regard to the financial and material support for United Nations information centres in their respective capitals, calls upon the Secretary-General to study ways and means to rationalize and effect equitable disbursement of available resources to all United Nations information centres and to report thereon to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth substantive session;

(12) Notes the substantial contribution by the Government of Poland and requests the Secretary-General to continue to consult with the Polish authorities, with a view to finalizing arrangements for a United Nations information component at Warsaw;

(13) Also takes note of the report of the Secretary-General regarding the enhancing, reactivation and establishment of United Nations information centres and again calls upon the Secretary-General to implement fully and expeditiously the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of its resolution 47/73 B of 12/14/1992 regarding the establishment of an information centre at Sana’a; the reactivation of the information centre at Tehran; the enhancement of the information centres at Bujumbura; Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania; and Dhaka; and to submit the implementation report to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth substantive session;

(14) Calls upon the Secretary-General to submit a report on the
implementation of the aforementioned recommendation to the sixteenth session of the Committee on Information;

(15) Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General and encourages continued enhanced cooperation between the Department of Public Information and the University for Peace in Costa Rica as a focal point for promoting United Nations activities and disseminating United Nations information materials;

(16) Takes note of the requests by Bulgaria, Gabon, Haiti and Slovakia for information components;

(17) Expresses full support to the wide and prompt coverage of United Nations activities through a continuation of United Nations press releases;

(18) Calls upon the Secretary-General to enhance the efficiency of regional radio units in the Department of Public Information;

(19) Also calls upon the Secretary-General to make every effort to create conditions more conducive to achieving parity in the press coverage of meetings in English and French by appropriate utilization of existing equipment;

(20) Takes note of the recommendations and observations by Member States contained in the report of the Secretary-General and invites Member States that wish to do so to submit their observations and suggestions to the Secretary-General by 1/1/1994, on ways and means of furthering the development of communication infrastructures and capabilities in developing countries, with a view to consolidating recent experience in the field of international cooperation aimed at enabling them to develop their own information and communication capacities freely and independently, and requests the Secretary-General to report thereon to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth session;

(21) Recommends, in order to facilitate continued contact between the Department of Public Information and the Committee on Information between sessions, that the Bureau of the Committee on Information, together with representatives of each regional group, the Group of Seventy-seven and China, in close contact with representatives of the Department, should meet, as required, and consult at periodic intervals with representatives of the Department;

(22) Supports decision 5 of the Preparatory Committee for the World Summit for Social Development, requesting the Secretary-General to develop and launch, on a priority basis, in cooperation with relevant specialized agencies, funds and programmes, a specific programme of public information on the core issues of the Summit as well as on its objectives;

(23) Also supports the decision of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Population and Development, to be held at Cairo in 1994, requesting the Secretary-General, in cooperation with competent United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, to develop and launch, on a priority basis, a coordinated public information programme;

(24) Takes note of the request by Belarus and Ukraine to consider the development and implementation of a system-wide programme for the tenth anniversary in 1996 of the Chernobyl disaster;

(25) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Committee on Information at its sixteenth session in 1994 and to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session in 1994, on the activities of the Department of Public Information and on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present resolution;

(26) Decides that the next session of the Committee on Information should last twelve working days and invites the Bureau of the Committee to explore ways and means of making optimum use of the Committee's time;

(27) Requests the Committee on Information to report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

(28) Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled Questions relating to information. [-]

In 9/1982, the Islamic Parliament sanctioned The Bill of Retribution as Iran's new criminal law. The bill, which includes a series of bloody punishments, was another surprising shock to Iranians. The law is based on patriarchal relationships which date back to pre-Islamic tribal Arabia, 14 centuries ago. In the case of murder, the bill permits retaliation against a murderer by the murdered person's guardian, traditionally a man.

Article 33 of the bill denies a woman's ability to serve as a witness in the case of premeditated murder. Willful murder "...is proved only on the basis of two righteous men's testimony." This means that if an intentional murder occurs in the presence of hundreds or thousands of women, but no men, it cannot be proven. In the case of non-willful or unintentional murder, two women may testify as one voice only if accompanied by one man's testimony.

The bill also includes provisions for blood-money—money paid to the murdered person's guardian for the loss of that person's life. Blood-money translates into the economic value of someone's life in terms of her/his social and economic position in society. It is the price paid for murdering another human being. Behind the bill is the reasoning that only men have an economic role in society and are the only source of a family's income; women are considered consumers. In the end, a male killer ends up with a higher status than a female victim.

If a man murders a woman, her guardian has the choice of carrying out the retaliation, or demanding the woman's blood-money from the murderer and letting him go free. But, if the guardian of the murdered woman forgives the killer, he can receive the woman's blood-money. If the guardian retaliates and the killer is killed, the guardian has to pay the killer's family one half of his blood-money. Not surprisingly, if a woman kills a man, she is executed.

To legalise the Bill of Retribution in Iran, the regime has converted Iranian courts into Islamic tribunals, and mullahs [members of the clergy] are appointed to rule the courts. In cases where non-mullahs are judges, they are supposed to have Islamic knowledge and education to the level of a Mojtahed [religious leader].

How these courts determine the amount of blood-money has not been mentioned in the bill or any other official document. What is certain is that the law is being forcefully executed in the courts and blood-money is taken and given. This means that women living in Iran in the 20th century have been sentenced to the legal status they held in the Middle Ages.


...surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [-]

22077. Gol-Mohammadi, Fereshteh; Peoples Translation Service

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[trans.], "Women Inside and Out: Blood Money: Iran", in Connexions, An International Women's Quarterly, n. 14, Fall 1984, p. 9. [This article was written for Connexions by Fereshteh Gol-Mohammadi, 8/1984.]
case is referred to the Shah. If the Shah approves of the view of the Legislative Assembly he will endorse the subject. But if he does not, the case will have to be kept in abeyance for a period of six months before it can be taken up again. Any of the Articles of the Constitution or the Supplement thereto, which defies the above procedure shall be considered as revoked.

A third amendment to the the Constitution was made in 1957 by the Joint Congress of the two Houses of Parliament, extending the term of the Majlis from two years to four years. The number of deputies was also altered:

"The total number of deputies for Tehran and the provinces shall be 200. After ten years, in case of an increase in the population, as shown by official census figures, there shall be one additional deputy for each Constituency to represent 100000 individuals. The Constituencies shall be determined by a separate law."

"The term of the Majlis is four complete years and this applies to the 19th Majlis as well. Before the expiry of its term, new elections shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the Law."

The Constitution was amended a fourth time on 9/9/1967 designating the Shahbanu, mother of the Crown Prince, as the Regent if upon the transfer of the Throne the Crown Prince should not have reached twenty years of age. Please see Articles 38, 41 and 42 of the Supplement to the Constitution. [=]


Article 36 (as amended 12/12/1925): The Constitutional Monarchy of Iran is vested by the people through the Constituent Assembly in the person of His Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi and his male descendants in succession.

Article 37 (as amended 12/12/1925): The (right of) succession to the Throne shall rest with the eldest son of the Monarch, whose mother must be of Iranian origin. If the Monarch has no male child, the nomination of the Crown Prince shall be made at the suggestion of the Monarch and with the approval of the National Consultative Assembly, on condition that this Crown Prince shall not be a member of the Qajar family; but at any time, if a son is born to the Monarch, he shall be Crown Prince by right.

Article 38 (as amended 9/9/1967): In the event of the transfer of the Throne, the Crown Prince shall personally perform the functions of Monarch when he has reached 20 years of age (to be calculated on the basis of the solar year). If he has not reached that age, the Shahbanu, mother of the Crown Prince, shall assume the Regency, unless another person shall have been designated by the Monarch for that office. The Regent shall form a Council composed of the Prime Minister, the Heads of both Houses of Parliament, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and four other sagacious, reputable personalities of the country to be selected by the Regent, and (the Regent) shall, in accordance with the Constitution, assume the duties of Monarch in consultation with the Council until (such time as) the Crown Prince reaches the age of 20. In the event of the demise or resignation of the Regent, the Council shall temporarily carry out the duties of the Regency until another Regent—not a member of the Qajar family—is appointed by the Houses of Parliament. Remarriage by the Shahbanu Regent shall constitute resignation (from Regency.)

Article 39: No Monarch may ascend the Throne unless, prior to his coronation, he appears before the National Consultative Assembly, and in the presence of the members of the Assembly, the Senate and the Cabinet, he shall have taken the following oath:

"I call upon God Almighty as witness, and I swear upon the Glorious Word of God (the Qur-an) and upon all that is ascribed to God to exert all my efforts to preserve the independence of Iran, to protect the frontiers of the country and the rights of the nation to be the guardian of the Constitutional Law of Iran and to reign accordingly and in conformity with established laws, and to endeavor to promote the Ja'fari doctrine of the (Shi'ah) sect of Twelve Imams, and in all my deeds and actions, I shall remember God, Most Glorious, as being present and watchful, and shall have no aim but the happiness and greatness of the State and the Nation of Iran. And I seek the aid of God, whose help is begged (by all) to serve the progress of Iran with success, and I seek the help the Holy Spirits of the Great Saints of Islam."

Article 40: Likewise, no one chosen as Regent may assume his functions until he has taken the above oath.

Article 41 (as amended 9/9/1967): In the event of the demise of the Monarch, the provisions of Article 38 shall be complied with. In such an event and also in the event of the transfer of the Throne, if a Regent shall not have been designated in the manner prescribed in the said Article, the Houses of Parliament, in special joint session, shall appoint a Regent who shall not be a member of the Qajar family. Until a Regent is appointed, a committee composed of the Prime Minister, the Heads of the two Houses of Parliament the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and three former Prime Ministers or former Heads of Parliament (to be selected by the Council of Ministers) shall temporarily perform the functions of Regency.

The Regent, who in accordance with this Article or Article 38 takes over the functions of the Regency, shall also have to take the oath as prescribed in Article 39.

Whosoever assumes the office of Regent shall be forbidden to ascend to the Throne.

Article 42 (as amended 9/9/1967): Whenever appointment of a Regent by the Houses of Parliament is required, a Joint session of Parliament shall convene within 10 days (after such an appointment becomes necessary)

In the event that the term of one or both Houses shall have expired or new members shall not have been elected, the joint session of Parliament shall convene with the presence of the former members.

In the event of the dissolution of one or both Houses of Parliament the functions of the Regency shall be performed by the Committee as prescribed in Article 41.

The Monarch may, when travelling abroad, appoint a Regency Council or a Regent who, in consultation with the Council, shall temporarily perform the duties of the Monarch during his absence.

Article 43: The King cannot take charge of another country without the consent and approval of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate.

Article 44: The Monarch is free of responsibility. The Ministers of State are responsible for all matters to both Chambers.

Article 45: All decrees and rescripts of the Monarch relating to the affairs of the country shall be put into effect only when they have been signed by the Minister who is responsible for the correctness of the contents of the decree and rescript.

Article 46: The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the decree of the Monarch.

Article 47: It is the prerogative of the Monarch to confer military ranks, decorations and other honorary awards in conformity with the law.

Article 48: The nomination of the heads of Government departments, for home or foreign service is the Monarch's right with the approval of the responsible Minister, except where the law provides otherwise. However, the nomination of other officials is not a concern of the Monarch, except as expressly provided for by the law.

Article 49 (as amended on 5/16/1957): It is one of the rights of the Monarch to issue decrees and give orders for the enforcement of laws, without ever having the power to delay or postpone their enforcement. If His Imperial Majesty the Shah finds a revision necessary in the laws relating to the financial affairs of the country which is the prerogative of the National Consultative Assembly, he may send such laws back to the Assembly for re-examination. In case the National Consultative Assembly confirms its previous view by a majority vote of three-fourths of the members present in the Capital. His Imperial Majesty shall sign the law.

Article 50: The Commander-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces is the Monarch in person.

Article 51: The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are
functions of the Monarch.

Article 52: Treaties the secrecy of which is essential as provided by Article 24 of the Constitutional Law of 12/30/1906, must, as soon as the reasons which necessitated such secrecy cease to exist, and interests and security of the country allow, be brought by the Monarch to the notice of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate with all necessary explanations.

Article 53: The secret clauses of a treaty may not nullify those made public.

Article 54: The Monarch may order an extraordinary meeting of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate.

Article 55: Money shall be coined in the name of the Monarch, in conformity with the law.

Article 56: The costs and expenses of the Royal Court shall be determined by law.

Article 57: The prerogatives and powers of the Monarch are only those expressly mentioned in this Constitutional Law. [=]

22080. Gururdke, Rasit. “An Islamic Revolution Unlikely In Azerbaijan: Fundamentalists Reopen Mosques, Start Up Schools,” in Seattle Times, February 6, 1994, p. A15. An Islamic revolution in Azerbaijan seems unlikely, despite the efforts of Iranian and Turkish fundamentalists there. Iran is actively promoting Shiasm, spending $50-100 million in religious newspapers, associations, charities and scholarships; Iran has funded the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan; and is financing a planned religious TV station. While Turkey is secular, the Turks activists in Azerbaijan tend to be Sunni fundamentalists. While Islamic fundamentalists have emerged for as a powerful faction in Tajikistan (even if not in power), in Azerbaijan, fundamentalism has made few inroads. Haji Salman, deputy of the Caucasian Muslims Administration stated that after 70 years of atheism reviving Islam would be difficult. There are now 500 mosques in Azerbaijan, but segregation of men and women at prayer is not practiced (as in Iran). One heritage of Soviet rule is that women reject Iranian style roles. [TXT]

22081. Halle, Fanina. Women in the Soviet East: Part 15: The Dawn of a New Era: October and the Question of Nationalities. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1938. Lenin's designation of Tsarist Russia, with its countless oppressed nationalities, as "the great prison of the peoples" was not inapt. Tsarist policy towards the conquered colonial peoples, or those who had been incorporated in the empire without actual conquest, the "alien races," was a policy of exploiting such natural riches as were most easy of access, a policy of the most wide-scale robbery of the land and the soil, of the most ruthless "clearing of the country of the native savages," in short, a policy of annihilation. In order to be able to colonize the land with reliable Russian elements, the Tsarist Government expropriated over a hundred million acres of the best land of the Kirghiz Kazakhs alone and drove them into the deserts of what is now Central Kazakhstan. These, and similar governmental methods, were repeated against the Cherkesses, Bashkirs, Uariat Mongols, Kalmucks, and other peoples. Practically nothing was done to develop the annexed territories economically and culturally. The cotton of Turkistan was all manufactured in the mills of Central Russia; the hunting tribes of Northern Asia, who supplied the whole Russian fur trade, still used bows and arrows, and in many districts people still used the most ancient and primitive agricultural implements. Little wonder, then, that a Russian writer, Pissemksiy, who had the opportunity in 1885 to become well acquainted with the lives of the Kalmucks on the Caspian Steppes, observes in his diary that, compared with a Kalmuck, the Russian peasant lived like a prince. The same might have been said without hesitation of the other colonial peoples of the Russian Empire. As regards the cultural policy of the Tsarist Empire, it was confined to this inhuman exclusion of the alien peoples from anything like culture and education, a mockery of all historical progress. There was not a single university among them, no secondary schools in their native language, no national cultural institutes, but all the more illiterates (in many districts as many as 100%), sombre superstition, horrifying lack of hygiene, serious illnesses and pestilences. The hatred between the several nationalities was systematically fomented. Thus the instructions to the President of the Orenburg Commission contains the following brazen command: “If the Bashkirs or Kirghiz show an inclination to rebel, they are to be played off against one another, and the Russian army spared.” In consequence of this Tsarist colonial policy, many peoples were destroyed and many were in process of dying out when the Revolution broke out. With the fall of Tsarism in 2/1917, a new chapter begins in the history of Russia’s national minorities. The economic, political, social and cultural rule of the alien peoples, the “step-children and wards of the Great Russian State,” were roused by the spreading vibrations of the great earthquake that had overturned the Tsar’s throne. But Kerenski’s February Revolution failed to make use of their new mood. The protagonists of the middle-class, democratic revolution had no programme for the alien nationalities, no key to this most burning problem of the tottering empire, in which only about 52% of the population was GREAT RUSSIAN, and so belonged to the dominating race. It is true that they were the heirs of Tsarism, but in spite of empty phrases about self-determination and cultural autonomy they were not disinclined to continue the policy of their predecessors with, perhaps, less despotic methods. But meanwhile the days of the middle-class revolution were numbered, even in Central Russia. Within a few months the discontent of the war-weak masses, clamouring for a radical revolution, grew under Bolshevism to an irresistible force, and found natural allies in the intellectual leaders of the oppressed nationalities, from whom the February Revolution withheld the longed-for liberation, and had, moreover, no guarantee of a better future to offer. And so the non-Russian peoples underwent a constant process of radicalization in the months from February to October. “The most retrograde of the retrograde were forced to seek allies in the revolutionary class,” writes a historian of the new Russia. “And so the left wing elements in their youthful intelligentsia paved the way to Bolshevism for the Voltaiks, Chuvashes, and Syryenians and the peoples of Dagesthan and Turkey.” Unlike the February Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks whom the rising revolutionary wave in October bore aloft and made the arbiters of Russia’s destiny, had a ready-made plan for the solution of the nationality problem.

Like all the principles which guided the proceedings of the Party before and after its accession to power, the validity of this formula is associated with Lenin’s name. In his book, Who are the People’s Friends? Lenin had traced the essential lines as early as 1894 along which the solution of the minority problem in the territories of the former Tsarist Empire was later to be achieved. Conscious of the importance of the problem, the October Revolution lost no time in realizing its leader’s programme, for only by its solution could the goodwill and aid of the non-Russian peoples be assured to the country that had gone red overnight. It was a programme calculated to throw everything into the shade that had hitherto been achieved in this matter, by its boldness and its consistency. For Lenin is ruthlessly radical in his nationality programme, as in everything else. Avoiding all half-measures from the first, he proclaims the necessity of self-determination, political and economic, of all peoples, including the right to secede and form independent states; mere cultural equality he opposes. His prime object is the interest of the Soviet power to secure the solidarity and help of the masses formerly scorned as “alien” in its struggle to assert itself. “In order to overcome the suspicion of the working masses in the oppressed countries against the proletariat of the country that formerly oppressed them,” says Lenin, “it is essential to abolish all privileges of all national groups, to make the nations absolutely equal in rights, and to recognize the right of the colonies, as nations enjoying equal rights, to form separate states.” It is hard to see how it would have been possible to go further, without directly encouraging the alien races “to separate from Russia. Needless to say, that was not the aim of the victorious party. And so we can understand how it is that Western Europe refused to see anything but a Bolshevist “war stratagem” in the whole Communist programme for the nationalities. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the right to political independence was quite clearly formulated. The Declaration of the Russian Workers’ and Peasants’ Government signed by Lenin and Stalin, and issued on 11/1917, two days after the victory of the October Revolution, includes, besides the recognition of the equal rights of all the
The prime necessity is to allow the non-Russian peoples in the Union to catch up; now we have Bolshevism, but that will not pass over. Ssanan conditions of production and standard of life. And, as regards national midst of his speech he suddenly turned to one of the members of the number of peoples in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Northern Asia, An anecdote illustrates this point. At the first Conference of socialist revolution, although it is in some measure European and there was a dim urge towards freedom in the Eastern masses, but the Socialist theorists have always declared Russia to be unripe for the age-long servitude hardly took any notice of the programme. It is true that warfare into these countries? Even now it appears strange to European cultural standard in the areas inhabited by national minorities, had indeed, oppressors and oppressed, but neither middle class nor oppressed peoples at once for the new rulers. But that could only have question had not even reached the Russian stage of capitalist culture and speech. It might have been expected that so radical a fulfil the promise in practice. For, especially in the East, the countries in and it will be seen that they particularly stress the fostering of native easy, therefore, to concede on paper "separate state organization on the schools, both general and technical or professional, in the native tongue." and of the Tsarist nationality policy, was the backwardness of the seventy education, the theatre, and club organization, as well as other cultural and of the Kirghiz area and Kazakhstan, whilst the Transcaucasian Union was divided into three independent member states (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Within the separate member states there were further constituted fifteen autonomous republics and nineteen autonomous regions which, like the member states, were founded on the principle of national self-determination. Within this federal structure the nationality programme of Lenin and the Communist party was incorporated in the constitution of the Soviet Union and, in a general way, realized in practice. Even the principle of free union was retained, of which Lenin had written that "without the right of separation it was an empty phrase."

Thus the Soviet Union is a union of nationalities; its supreme legislative organ, the Central Executive Committee (Vtisk), consists of a COUNCIL OF THE UNION and a COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES. The latter consists of representatives of the eleven member states, the autonomous Republics, and the autonomous Regions. It is of particular interest in connection with our subject that the ten representatives of each member state, as well as the five representatives of each autonomous Republic, must include women. The autonomous Regions only send two representatives each to the Council of Nationalities. Here too, then, the fact that the political structure of the Union is built upon a federal and national basis finds expression. The difficulties confronting such a development were many and various, and the unhappy experiences of the nationalities, who remembered their former Russian oppressors and, as I have said, continued to foster suspicion, were only one of the most important. What seemed an insuperable difficulty, a heritage of history and of the Tsarist nationality policy, was the backwardness of the seventy million non-Russians living in the territory of the present Union. It was easy, therefore, to concede on paper "separate state organization on the basis of national culture," as officially formulated, but all the harder to fulfil the promise in practice. For, especially in the East, the countries in question had not even reached the Russian stage of capitalist development; gentile organization frequently prevailed, and there were, indeed, oppressors and oppressed, but neither middle class nor proletariat. How was it possible to introduce the "proletarian class warfare" into these countries? Even now it appears strange to European readers when, let us say, a Tungus newspaper uses the well-known expression "capitalist exploitation," whereas many Western European Socialist theorists have always declared Russia to be unripe for the socialist revolution, although it is in some measure European and capitalist. And what had to be done, at least in theory, was to raise a number of peoples in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Northern Asia, who had not even reached the capitalist stage, to the "higher socialist conditions of production and standard of life." And, as regards national culture, which, according to the programme, was to serve as a basis and guide for each separate state organization, it existed at best for a minute section of educated men, whilst the mass of the "alien races" lived their lives in the profoundest ignorance. The protagonists of the new development in Soviet Russia have never been blind to the fact that the prime necessity is to allow the non-Russian peoples in the Union to catch up Russia proper in economic and political progress. Everything that has been done since the October Revolution, and is still being done, belongs to this transitional programme, the accomplishment of which is to create the prerequisite conditions for the real nationality programme. The right of self-determination of the peoples of the Soviet East finds unambiguous expression in the political structure of the Soviet Union, but it has been left to further progress to fill in the outlines, which progress, however, is actively encouraged by the whole Soviet policy. And so we may not always ask whether Socialism will not disappear, but whether the economic and cultural progress of the backward peoples, to which every effort is directed, will not produce results other than those expected at present: whether, when once these peoples have reached a certain stage of economic and cultural progress, they will not try to make use of their chartered right of self-determination in an unwelcome manner. It does not appear that these anxieties are felt in the Soviet Union itself. Only occasional doubts are expressed. Thus the Buriat Mongols addressed the following question to Stalin, which we should rather expect from the lips of a professor of philosophy than from the representatives of a plain and straightforward nomad people: "Since it is the admitted aim of Communist policy to create a uniform human civilization, how must we picture the transition of national civilization, as evolved in the several national republics in the Union, to this general human civilization, and how will the particular characteristics of the various national civilizations be approximated to it?" For the rest, people in the Soviet state today see in the manner of solving this cultural problem a striking example of historical dialectic, since by strengthening the national character of the peoples and fostering their hitherto neglected culture, they are meant to be brought nearer to one another, and actually are so brought, not divided. Be that as it may, the encouragement of cultural, and of course no less economic, progress is the alpha and omega of the Bolshevik programme, or rather, of the transitional programme, of the present Government in all the non-Russian territories of the Union, and first and foremost in the Soviet East. Two aspects of the constructive programme of the Soviet Government-economic and cultural-emerge unambiguously in the principles of the dominant party, formulated in 1922. According to these it is the task of the party's nationality policy to "help the working masses of the non-Russian peoples to catch up the more advanced Central Russia." This was to be achieved on the one hand "by the systematic establishment of industries in the frontier districts, especially by the fostering of the economic and social development of the backward national areas," but, on the other hand, "by consolidating the native systems of justice, administration, industrial management, and government under persons with a knowledge of native conditions and of the psychology of the inhabitants; further by encouraging the Press, education, the theatre, and club organization, as well as other cultural institutions; and finally by creating a widespread network of courses and schools, both general and technical or professional, in the native tongue." These, briefly stated, are the guiding principles of the nationalities policy; and it will be seen that they particularly stress the fostering of native culture and speech. It might have been expected that so radical a programme, which combined all tactical advantages, would have won the oppressed peoples at once for the new rulers. But that could only have been if the most important point in the programme itself, the raising of the cultural standard in the areas inhabited by national minorities, had already been realized. The reverse, however, was the case. At first the peoples to whom the Bolsheviks promised and brought liberation from age-long servitude hardly took any notice of the programme. It is true that there was a dim urge towards freedom in the Eastern masses, but the call from the West sounded too strange and uncustomed to them.

An anecdote illustrates this point. At the first Conference of Eastern Peoples Lenin read a report lasting for several hours. In the midst of his speech he suddenly turned to one of the members of the Conference, the representative of the Kalmucks: "What do the Kalmucks say about Bolshevism?" The man addressed, the author Amur Ssanan, whom I have already mentioned several times, leapt to his feet and was ready with a prompt answer: "The Kalmucks says: We have had the plague, and that passed over; we have had the cholera, and that passed over; now we have Bolshevism, but that will not pass over." Ssanan writes that the answer called forth general mirth. As regards the few
intellectuals among the minorities, some of them had not taken the social revolution so very seriously, some were allied by ties of blood and class interest with the feudal possessing classes and the native clergy, and, finally, they did not evince any very great readiness to miss the historic opportunity of real political independence; for in each country there were feeble rudiments of a national mass movement to which the advocates of a final secession from revolutionary Russia could attach themselves. Taking all this into account, the effects of the October Revolution in the countries of color, and gays fought back successfully, and even the "alien races" did not work out as had been expected. Everywhere arose an armed barrier to the forward march of Bolshevism. In October itself there arose a strange and short-lived political structure known as the "South-Eastern Union of the Cossack Armies of the Mountaineers of the Caucasus and the Free Peoples of the Steppes." Everywhere a motley jumble of national governments assumed power and established independent democratic states under middle-class leadership, intended partly as the realization of long-standing national aspirations, partly as a check to the Red menace.

Most of these governments survived longer than they would otherwise have done because the Russian counter-revolution and foreign intervention came to their aid. Thus the "Democratic Republic of Daghestan" was occupied by the Turks in 1919 after some months of rule by the White Guards; then it was under British control for two months, and finally served as a basis of Denikin's operations, who fought with Kornilov and General Alexeyev's army of volunteers against the Russians and extended his authority for a time throughout the whole of southern Russia. Transcaucasia, too, separated from Russia and was the scene of a bloody struggle between the three newly established independent republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In the proletarian city of Baku, where a Soviet Government was set up soon after the October Revolution, the civil war, in which English troops sometimes took part, lasted two whole years, until the "Mussavet" Government was overthrown and Bolshevikism triumphed. Armenia wassovietized in 1920 Georgia not till a year later. During all these years, rivers of blood were shed in Transcaucasia. By way of example, I will only cite the little mountain territory of Karabagh, now an autonomous part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Of its 212 villages, fifty-nine were razed to the round, and a quarter of the population lost their lives in the struggle carried on by the democratic Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the tiny territory. No less bloody was the struggle in Central Asia. The revolutionary fever spread most rapidly to Bukhara the centre of Islam in Turkistan and the capital of the Emir, who still ruled with oriental despotism. In 1920 the Emirate was overthrown, but a further four years passed before Uzbekistan joined the Soviet Union as a Soviet Republic and a member state. In the same year Turkistan adhered to the Union. But meanwhile the fiercest struggles raged in Central Asia, led by the basmaches, successors of the nomad robbers formerly well-known in those parts, and supported by the beys, the large landowners, and the Mohammedan clergy. Kishiksks destroyed, settlements burnt and laid waste, and only now slowly reviving, still mark the trail of the basmaches. They were fanatical Mohammedans, and assumed the title "Hoats of the Faith"; they violated women and murdered them, tore their tongues out, and turned the fruitful valleys of Fergana into cemeteries, and fields that had born golden harvests into sandy deserts. For years afterwards the fields were populated by wild beasts and boars instead of the horses, cattle, and camels of the dekhkans, the peasants of Central Asia.

From Persia, too, the basmaches received aid and support, and it was not till 1922 that the victorious advance of the Red troops succeeded in subduing them. But it was only in 1925 that the Soviet regime began to consolidate itself and spread in Central Asia, only with the realization of the land reform, of which I shall have more to say, since it is connected with the law of marriage. [=]

22082. Hatch, Marcel. "Tories Slam the Door on Neediest Immigrants," in Freedom Socialist (Seattle), July-September 1993, p. 8. Last year, while Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was peddling the "free trade" pact between Canada, Mexico, and the US, he was simultaneously restricting the free entrance of immigrants and refugees into Canada. The message of his harsh new legislation, known as Bill C-86, could provide the copy for a wanted poster from a corporate head-hunting agency: "$250000 or rare skills in the nuclear, computer, or aerospace industries guarantees Canadian citizenship. Third World workers and political refugees need not apply." But the crackdown on immigration is producing angry counter- organizing, as in the case of a young Iranian woman served with deportation papers in 11/1992. A coalition led by immigrant women of color, and gays fought back successfully, and even gained ground: It established a first by forcing the government to grant a woman refugee status because of sexist persecution in her country of origin.

Welcome Mat for the Well-off: Historically, Canada has used immigration to meet the needs of a hungry market for low-paid labor. Bill C-86, passed by parliament in autumn 1992, marks a shift to feeding an economy now desperate for capital and technological expertise. The bill stipulates that the majority of arrivals be highly skilled workers in high-tech fields of "Investor" or "Business" entrants with a minimum of $250000 ready cash. It drastically cuts back on immigration geared to reunite extended families. Like most of its provisions, this primarily penalizes immigrants of color. Political refugees get short shrift. Bill C-86 forbids entry to those who were tagged as dissidents in their native country. Also, new sanctuary-seekers can't work until their claims are settled, forcing them onto welfare. As well as causing poverty and privation, this gives ammunition to right-wingers who scapegoat refugees for the country's increasing economic woes.

Sexism Creates Refugees: Five thousand refugees were deported last year. The story of why twenty-year-old Vancouver resident Caroline Teghizadeh was not one of them provides a model for how to challenge xenophobic legislation. In Iran, Teghizadeh had been imprisoned and tortured for not wearing the veil properly. After fleeing to Canada, she was denied political refugee status. When all her regular legal appeals went nowhere, she went public and became a leader in the Caroline Teghizadeh Defense Committee (CTDC). While fighting for her own life, Teghizadeh connected all the issues facing immigrants. She demanded a declaration of amnesty for all refugees from repressive countries and the extension of the definition of refugee to include those discriminated against because of their sex or sexual orientation. CTDC included the Coalition United to Fight Oppression, International Federation of Iranian Refugee Councils, Freedom Socialist Party, and Radical Women. It educated about conditions for women in Islamic countries and organized a broad outcry from unions, feminists, lesbian and gay groups, and ethnic and immigrant associations against Teghizadeh's expulsion. Just days before police were to apprehend her, the Tories backed down and waived the deportation order.

Takes All of Us to Win: In contrast to Teghizadeh's precedent-setting experience, a 2/1993 hunger strike by 10 other Iranian refugees achieved only meaningless government promises that their appeals would be considered on a case-by-case basis. The leaders of the hunger-strike campaign opportunistically relied on media melodrama and closed-door negotiations with immigration bureaucrats, rather than on all-inclusive grassroots coalition-building. And they refused to criticize the Canadian government for its culpability in the fate of the refugees once sent back to Iran. The fight for immigrant rights unites the issues of class, race, sex, and sexuality inseparably, and Teghizadeh's case points the way to victory. An open-door united front that is feminist, internationalist, and critical of capitalist injustice in every form can turn the anti-immigrant tide.[=]
While women did tend to remain in or near the home, the home was also the center of much business and political activity. Women were known as astute managers and entrepreneurs, and some had trade businesses that reached out to the periodic camps of the Qashqai nomads who pass through the area. Regional development has changed the context in which women’s political activity takes place: Land Reform (1962) fragmented the extended networks of women and reduced their political power; the Islamic Revolution gave women an acceptable political voice (by many men as religious in content and hence appropriate); and the post-revolutionary period, which appears to have centralized many decisions that, perviously local, would have been more accessible to women. The public-private myth obscures women’s actual role in politics in Aliabad: “it becomes clear that domestic is political, that private is public, that all activities performed in the domestic, private realm are significant for the public and political realm”.

22084. Helms, Cynthia. An Ambassador’s Wife in Iran. New York: Dodd mead & Co., 1981. The author’s husband, Richard (Dick) Helms, retired as director of the CIA on 11/20/1972 and was offered the ambassadorship to Iran by Pres. Richard Nixon. Dick had long been a friend of the Shah; after a brief introduction for Cynthia in Oriental Art by Dr. Esin At’l at the Smithsonian Institution, they were on their way. En route, the Helms’ were told that Black September might be planning to kill them: but no attack was ever made. Cynthia at once busied herself with redecorating and selecting new plants. During shopping trips in the cities she became aware of the prominence of the bazaaris, who continued to have a significant role in the economy and whose wealth allowed them to provide modern educations for their children; among the merchants, she was comfortable only with the Jews. However, her travels in Tehran would be more restricted after the assassination of Lt. Col. Lewis Lee Hawkins of the American Military Assistance Group by terrorists. But poor Cynthia soon came to understand that she would never understand the Iranians, “even if I could clear my mind of Western thought and logic... the Iranians do not think the way we do...”

Her duties included entertaining: she had a private bet with her husband that most US dignitaries and experts visiting Iran would not know that Iran was not an Arab country, and few did know; one US Senator thought that King Hussein of Jordan was the Shah of Iran. She sometimes met humble local people, like the members of the International Iranian Bridge Team (“Iranians are fierce card players”). Cynthia also explored rural areas and visited several tribal groups, sometimes traveling with an Israeli anthropologist.

Cynthia does note that SAVAK, the secret police exists, but only to note that if the personable Shah was better known, that his potential popularity would preclude SAVAK from casting such a shadow over Iran (seemingly considering the secret police to be a mere public relations problem), but she dismisses the unpleasant question of torture by observing: “These is no doubt that SAVAK is tough, but Iran has a brutal heritage. The penitents whipping themselves with chains on the religious commemorations of Ashura is public witness to this.” (pp. 93-94) “We listened to the intermittent rhythmic clanking of the chains all evening, and eventually we walked to the gate and stood in the shadows to watch. The flagellants work themselves into a fervid hypnotic state and appear to feel no pain.” (p. 137) The Shah’s modernization against such an environment found three major opposition groups: religious leaders, students and the bazaaris. Yet political discourse was stifled because, Cynthia notes, people were too afraid of SAVAK to speak openly. At the same time, the Shah tried to cultivate more understanding for Iran through subsidies to US university Persian studies departments through the Pahlavi Foundation. In 1975, the Helms’ participated in the visit of the Shah to the United States: the graceful events at the Carter White House were rather marred by anti-Shah protests. This was followed by a state visit of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who confined “his admiration for the Shah’s understanding of world problems”. [sic] (p. 192) At the end of the visit, Helms stated his intention to resign as ambassador, and at the end of 1976 the Helms’ returned to the United States. Later, visiting the exiled Shah hospitalized in New York, the Shah constantly wondered why the West had betrayed him and allowed his government to fall.
reducing women’s options is the tendency of divorce courts to grant custody to the fathers. There is a strong contradiction between the government’s emphasis on improved access to education by women, and the limits it imposes on women’s participation in the workforce: such contradictions are openly debated in Iran by a ‘pragmatic feminism in Muslim costume’. The necessity of moderating population growth has made the regime accommodating to women’s demands in Iran, with many conservative religious leaders adopting some interpretations of women, even if high unemployment in Iran will slow women’s entry into the workforce. Nevertheless, the improvement of women in Iran is the product of a pragmatic Iranian understanding of their social and political realities. [TXT]

22086. Howell, David L. “Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary Japan”, in Journal of Contemporary History, pp. 171-190. Japanese homogeneity has been dynamic, masking a greater ethnic diversity than generally recognized. The process of redefining Ainu culture as the ‘essence of Japaneseness’ illustrates this process. Traditionally, Japanese identity was based in a cultural identity that was opposed to the barbarian periphery. So, in the early twentieth-century, there was a serious effort to redefine Korean history in terms of its ‘forgotten’ roots in Japanese culture. Minorities in Japan today are divided into three groups: (1) Ainu (perhaps 30000 in Hokkaido; now recognized as indigenous people), Ryukyu-Okinawans, and Burakumin (outcasts emerging in Tokugawa, now organized through the Burakumin Liberation League); (2) Koreans brought to Japan from the Empire as laborers and their descendants (700000 at present, and gradually becoming unlinked from Korea); and (3) recent immigrants from Asia (Iranians at 40000 in 5/1992 being the largest and most conspicuous illegal worker population; Filipinas have been recruited in large numbers as wives for farmers) and Latin America seeking work. Violence against the minorities is rare, but psychological pressure is intense. Conflict is moderated by having state minority relations moderated by minority organizations having official recognition: this allows for the institutionalization of ethnic relations and largely supercedes individual action. This institutionalization does moderate conflict within a hostile social milieu, but tends to perpetuate the persistence of such minority groups as exogenous to mainstream society.

22087. Humayuni, Sadeq; Chelkowski, Peter J. [editor]. "An Analysis of Taziyeh of Qasem", in Taziyeh: Ritual and Drama in Iran. [Based on the Proceedings of the International Symposium at the Shiraz Festival of Arts, August 1976.] New York: New York University, 1979. pp. 12-23. The Taziyeh of Qasem is the story of Qasem son of Umam Hussan, who desires to fight, but is young. Qasem struggles to be allowed to fight, and his mother comforts him: she prepares Zainab, sister of Imam Hussein, to whom he is betrothed for their marriage. After his marriage, before the marriage is consummated, he promises to meet her at judgment day, and leaves for the battlefield. After a courageous struggle, he is killed. Throughout this drama, Hussein remains the center of the action. Throughout this drama, ancient and enduring Persian traditions are used: this ties the events of the drama closely to the lives of the audience. Central themes include the heism and self-sacrifice of women.

22088. Iranian Women Students Federation (USA); Iranian Student Association (USA). Press Release: February 1979 Uprising By Kurdish Forces Against the Islamic Republic. Chicago., Ill.: Iranian Women Students Federation (USA), Iranian Student Association (USA), February 1984. In 9/1979, less than seven months after the February uprising, the Islamic Republic’s regime waged a major military attack against Kurdish towns. The fighting that had been going on since the declaration of de facto autonomy by Kurdish nationalist and leftist forces in 3/1979, had reached new dimensions. The indiscriminate bombing of towns, coupled with the advance of tanks on Kurdish cities in 9/1979, was the first of steps in a continuing war. The many attempts by the government to ‘wipe out Kurdish resistance’. Far from bringing about the quick victory sought by the regime, it proved to be a major victory for the Kurdish people. It proved to the world that, contrary to the claims of the Islamic regime, it was not small ‘groups of bands’ that had taken over Kurdish cities. It proved that the Kurdish nation, men and women, young and old, were united and determined to fight for the right to self-determination.

In the first year of the civil war, in many Kurdish cities, women took up guard duty. In the city of Morivan, women shared guard duty in most of the posts set up around the city. In later battles for the control of the cities, most eyewitness reports mention especially the role of and the courage of women: nurses who stayed in the hospitals throughout the fighting, while hospitals were shelled by army tanks and planes; women who, with little military training, went to the trenches built throughout the city. Soon after the first war, most of the guerrillas were forced to leave the cities in order to stop further destruction of life and property. The women who stayed behind took over the political organizations. Their immediate task concentrated on collecting financial and material support for the pishmargehs (Kurdish guerrillas) in the mountains. Their role in maintaining the link between the guerrillas in the liberated areas and the Kurdish people in the towns and villages under government control has been a crucial factor in keeping the revolution alive. Women regularly cross the government road blocks, defeating the economic sanctions imposed on the liberated areas. They supply the guerrillas with everything from food and medicine to books and gunpowder. Women have been instrumental in maintaining the level of political activity in Kurdish towns, in both the publication and distribution of revolutionary newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets. In the Kurdish countryside, the remnants of feudal and tribal customs still govern day to day life. In many villages the custom of ‘Zen be Zan’ (exchange of women) prevails. A family will allow the marriage of their daughter only if they can gain a woman from the groom’s family (i.e., if their son can marry a daughter from the groom’s family, usually a sister). This tradition shows clearly most peasant families’ dependence on the chores taken up by women. Housework itself is a difficult task in the harsh weather conditions of this mountainous region; women have to carry water from distant fountains, break wood for heating and cooking, and wash dishes and clothes in freezing water. But in addition to their housework, Kurdish peasant women have to work in the fields, look after the cattle or weave carpets day and night. In many areas, polygamy is common. Because of the patriarchal family relations, men often beat up their wives and daughters.

During the last four years, the living conditions of Kurdish peasants have deteriorated considerably. It is the women who bear the burden of the difficult conditions as they have to feed the family despite the severe food shortages caused by the government sanctions and the destruction of agriculture. In recent years many peasants have become homeless (forced to flee their homes after the capture of their village by economic sanctions on the liberated areas, executed thousands of revolutionaries, massacred hundreds of Kurdish peasants and bombarded civilian areas. During this period Kurdish men and women have shown exceptional courage and determination to stop a far better equipped and stronger army. In this underdeveloped region of Iran, women suffer countless forms of exploitation and deprivation, yet they have played a unique role in defending the Kurdish revolution. In paying tribute to the present article, we will try to describe some of the aspects of their lives and their struggles.

In Kurdistan, like all other areas of Iran, the division between the town and countryside is very wide. In the urban areas women participate in social production. Sections of petit bourgeois women are employed in service industries or by the bureaucracy, while the poorer women find work in small manufacturing firms. Inevitably the participation of women in politics started in the cities. Kurdish women who had participated in the demonstrations prior to the overthrow of the Shah, took an active role in opposition to the Islamic Republican regime when it refused to grant autonomy to Kurdistan. In the first major attack against the city of Sanandaj (southern capital of the Kurdish region), as the army advanced on the main road to town, Kurdish women and children lay down on it, physically blocking the entrance to the city. The retreat of the Iranian army tanks, in the face of such a resolute resistance, was a major victory for the Kurdish people. It proved to the world that, contrary to the claims of the Islamic regime, it was not small ‘groups of bands’ that had taken over Kurdish cities. It proved that the Kurdish nation, men and women, young and old, were united and determined to fight for the right to self-determination.
the army and the revolutionary guards). Most villages in the liberated areas face new problems because of overpopulation. For the refugees it is difficult to adapt to their new conditions, they are left landless and penniless in a region of Iran where basic food prices are enormous. But the sense of solidarity is very high; most families in the village share their meagre food rations with the refugees and the guerrillas who are staying in or passing from the village. There can be no doubt about the solid support expressed by Kurdish men and women for the nationalist cause. In the fierce battles of 1983, waged to recapture villages, Kurdish peasants fought alongside the guerrillas. In many villages, middle-aged Kurdish women stayed on during the fighting, helping the guerrillas by bringing ammunition, looking after the injured, preparing and distributing food amongst the fighters. Since the February uprising and the initial formation of the liberated areas, many women have joined the ranks of the guerrillas. Most of the women guerrillas work in areas traditionally associated with women: welfare (both in the field hospitals, the village clinics, etc.) or in the publication of revolutionary newspapers in the liberated areas. All women pishmargehs take part in military training but only a small number participate in military operations.

The success of women pishmargehs has been in raising the consciousness of peasants, especially peasant women. Initially their arrival in the liberated areas caused an uproar amongst the peasants. Many villagers did not respect women guerrillas, nor did they take them seriously. Peasant women were even more hostile as they found the idea of women in men's clothes, armed with rifles' distasteful and alien to their culture and traditions. Yet, after the initial difficulties, with patience and perseverance, the women guerrillas proved in practice their seriousness in revolutionary struggle. Today they play a very important role in the social welfare of villages in the liberated areas, working as teachers, nurses and political activists, as well as taking up guard duty in defence of the village. Because of strict Islamic traditions, Kurdish women, especially in the countryside, rarely speak to male strangers. But women guerrillas usually find a receptive audience amongst the peasants and the youths in the villages they visit for political propaganda, thus transforming the general support for the nationalist cause into active participation of peasant women in the people's war against the Islamic Republic's regime. On the military front, the government, despite using heavy artillery and tens of thousands of soldiers and pasdars, has been unable to recapture a considerable section of the liberated areas, especially away from the main roads. But even in the areas where the regime has gained control, the special relations between the guerrillas and the peasants stemming from the experience of the last four years, have insured the continuation of the support of the population for the guerrillas. The Iranian army and the Pasdaran are treated as an occupying army, and the government is, indeed, a very long way from wiping out Kurdish resistance. [5]

22089. LCOME. "Kurdish Unionist Executed By Iranian Government", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Summer 1990. KURDISH LABOR organizer Jamal Cheragh-Veisy was one of at least 17 people executed by the government of Iran in Kurdistan province on April 21, according to a report by the Los Angeles-based Iranian American Labor Solidarity Committee. Cheragh-Veysi, who worked at the Department of Water Supply in Sanandaj had been the main speaker at a May 1st rally in Sanandaj last year where he spoke of demands raised by the workers on that occasion. These included recognition of workers organizations, such as sovets, syndicates, unions and arbitration committees, equal rights for women and men in all fields, prohibition of child labor below age 18, pay rises linked to inflation, a 40-hour working week with two days off, prohibition of contract and piece work, unemployment benefits for all men and women ready to work and suitable housing and health services. The resolution also expressed solidarity with all workers throughout the irrespective of nationality, race, religion or sex and asked that May 1st be declared a national holiday. (For further information, contact the Iranian-American Labor Solidarity Committee, POB 25472, Los Angeles CA 90025, 618-342-1351) [5]

22090. Larin, Veniamin; Burambayev, Gaziz. Kazakhstan Soviet Republic of the Soviet Union: Part 04: Pages of History. Moscow, 1980. Many centuries ago the territory of Kazakhstan was roamed by many nomadic tribes known to students of ancient history as the Saki. They were pointed felt hats, while their breeches and wide tunics, caught at the waist with a wide belt, were of leather. Their footware, too, was of soft leather. The Saki roamed the steppes with their cattle from one grazing ground to another. The men were on horseback and the women and children travelled in covered wagons. The territory of present-day Kazakhstan was the scene of many bitter battles over the centuries. The armies of many a conqueror swept across the wide plains between the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains. Early in the Middle Ages a number of large farming settlements appeared in the oases. Their population settled down and began to grow grain, vegetables, fruit and melons. Several feudal towns grew up and traded with such neighboring lands as China, Iran and the states of Central Asia. In the early 13th century the hordes of Genghis Khan invaded Kazakhstan. They left a trail of fire, destroying in their path everything people had created over the centuries. Most of the towns were pillaged and burnt. The harsh Tatar-Mongol yoke continued for 250 years. But even when it ended, Kazakhstan remained extremely backward both economically and politically. It was a land torn by feudal strife. At the beginning of the 18th century conquerors again came from the Dzungar khanate that had emerged on the territory of Mongolia in the 17th century. The land of the Kazaks, which was just beginning to find its feet after the Tatar-Mongol invasion, was once again plundered and burnt. Torched as it was by feudal strife and war, it faced the threat of total enslavement by the Dzungar khans, by China and the Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, behind which stood the British and Turkish colonialists.

It was then that the Kazaks turned to their neighbour, Russia. The Kazaks had always traded with Russia, obtaining from it the industrial goods they needed. Moreover, Kazaks had on many occasions sought refuge from foreign invaders on Russian soil, where they found both sympathy and help. Union with Russia brought to an end the primitive subsistence economy and the clan structure of society. It helped to abolish both economic and political isolation. The discovery of rich deposits of copper and lead ores in Central and Eastern Kazakhstan led to the emergence of a mining and manufacturing industry. By the end of the 19th century something like 10000 workers were already employed in the industry. The once nomadic people now had a working class of their own. Kazaks worked together with revolutionary minded Russian workers at factories, oil fields, gold mines and on the railways. Together with them they took part in the strikes and other industrial actions that led up to the first Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. The tsarist government looked upon the distant Kazakh lands as a convenient place to which it could exile its political opponents. These latter mingled with the local population and thus was largely responsible for the spread of revolutionary ideas to the Kazakh steppelands. Kazakhstan's union with Russia drew the Kazakh people into the Russian revolutionary movement that subsequently led to the Great October Socialist Revolution. [5]

22091. Larin, Veniamin; Burambayev, Gaziz. Kazakhstan Soviet Republic of the Soviet Union: Part 13: Spiritual Revival. Moscow, 1980. At the beginning of this century officials of the tsarist Ministry of Education estimated that it would take at least 4600 years before illiteracy could be wiped out in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This figure was given in an article in the magazine "Education News" in 1914. On what basis were these estimates made? Chiefly on the allocations for education made by the tsarist government. These were miserly. In 1910-1912, for example, only 22 lopkops per person were allocated in Kazakhstan. But it not only took a few decades after the October 1917 Revolution to wipe out the backwardness and illiteracy that were the dire heritage of the past.

For many centuries the Kazaks had no written language. It was the poet Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) who laid the foundations of the Kazakh literature and literary language. He was greatly influenced by progressive Russian literature and by the Russian intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was with their help that the first books and newspapers in the Kazakh language were published at that time. Following the establishment of Soviet government in Kazakhstan work
continued on perfecting the Kazakh literary language with the help of Moscow and Leningrad linguists. Many textbooks were written, as well as other aids, in the Kazakh language. For the task facing the republic was a formidable one—practically the entire population had to be taught to read and write, since before the revolution those who could do so were few and far between.

The spiritual revival of the Kazakh people began in the twenties with the opening of schools where tuition was in the Kazakh language. The separation of the church from the state, the elimination of illiteracy on a wide scale, and the first steps in training scientists and teachers from among the local population, the opening of college preparatory courses for working people—all this was part and parcel of the cultural revolution which was an integral part of Lenin's plan for building socialism.

Today the people of Kazakhstan are just as accustomed to the wonders of the modern world as are the people of Western Europe. Even the oldest men, those who started their lives as nomads and stared open-mouthed at the first locomotive they saw, today read newspapers in their own language, listen to the radio, watch TV, travel by train and plane and drive their own cars. As for their sons, they are launched into space from their own land, they smelt steel, probe the secrets of the atom, lecture in universities, write books, compose operas, produce films and design new machines... They also look after the health of the people. At the beginning of this century there was no such thing as medical aid for the Kazakhs—witch doctors were the only people they could turn to. Today there are more than 42000 doctors in the republic and about 150000 junior medical staff. There are five medical colleges and dozens of scientific research institutes with a staff of over 3000. Yet before the October 1917 Revolution there were none at all. Few children had the chance of attending school in Kazakhstan before the revolution. Today there are more than 10000 general schools to cater for nearly 3.5 million children. A transition is now being made to a secondary education for all. One cooperative farm in Semirechaye—the "22nd CPSU Congress" farm—spends more money on education each year than was spent by the tsarist government for the whole of Kazakhstan. The farm pays maintenance grants to its members studying in colleges, specialised secondary schools and vocational schools. It also finances the building of a secondary school for 900 pupils in the village. Today 654 people out of every 1000 engaged in the Kazakhstan economy have either a higher or secondary (complete or incomplete) education. The changes described by Morban Yesembayeva, secondary school teacher in Kzyl-Saya, are typical of the republic as a whole. "I have been teaching the children in my native village of Kzy-Saya for a long time," she said. "First we had a seven-year school, then tuition was extended for another year, and today our school provides a complete secondary education. There was a time when children from neighboring villages were brought in on horseback, if the weather permitted. If there was a snowstorm or it was very cold they did not attend school at all. The premises were small and classes had to be held in three shift. Later dormitories were built for children coming from other villages. Now a big modern building has gone up side by side with the old single-storey one. Various subjects are taught in specialised study rooms. We have been able to open a number of workshops that are of great help in giving our pupils vocational guidance."

Twenty-five years ago, when illiteracy had already been wiped out, the teacher was still the only person in the village with a higher education. Today there are 17 specialists with a college education and another thirty with a specialised secondary education, while many others are taking correspondence courses at colleges or specialised secondary schools. The first elementary school in the village was opened 50 years ago. It was a great event and people from neighboring villages came to watch the children at their studies. Last year the thousandth pupil to complete the ten-year course of education left the school. Its former pupils are now working in various parts of the republic. Hundreds of people from this small village, which lies far from the main highways and once did not have a single person who could read or write, have now received a college education. Fifteen former pupils have returned to the school to teach. Many other graduates have become scientists, teachers and journalists. Kazakhstan has 52 higher educational establishments with a student body of 220000, and there is another quarter of a million students attending specialised secondary schools. Kazakhstan alone now has three-and-a-half times as many specialists with a higher education as all tsarist Russia had.

The leading higher educational establishment in the republic is the Kazakh State University named after Kirov. When it was founded in Alma-Ata 45 years ago, it had two departments: physics and mathematics (combined) and biology. 54 students were enrolled, 2 of whom had received a higher education. Today the university has a student body of 12000. The students are taught by seven Members and Corresponding Members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, 40 doctors of science and professors and 250 candidates of science and assistant professors. A new university building is now going up at the foot of the snow-capped Alatau Mountains. The buildings of the arts and biology departments have already been completed, along with the tall administration block, the assembly hall for 2000, sports facilities and the refectory. Kazakhstas has its own Academy of Sciences and is the site of the Eastern Department of the USSR Academy of Agriculture. Among the staff of its research institutes are more than 600 people with doctor's degrees. The founder and first President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences was Kanysh Satpayev. He was not only an outstanding geologist and an able organiser of scientific research, but he also played an important part in the establishment of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. The range of Satpayev's studies increased every year. First he sought copper in Djezkazgan, then he worked in Central Kazakhstan and, finally, his prospecting embraced the entire republic. Satpayev and his colleagues were convinced that copper was not their republic's only mineral wealth. Thanks to their efforts, Kazakhstan became the USSR's supplier of many other non-ferrous metals. In prewar years Kanysh Satpayev was bus, starting up the production of pig-iron and steel in the republic: After the war he concentrated on analyzing the results of geological engineering prospecting expeditions in the Mangyshtal Peninsula. At the same time he worked on maps showing probable ore deposits in his republic. These proved of great help to field geologists pinpointing deposits. For this work a group of scientists led by Kanysh Satpayev were awarded a Lenin prize.

Today Kazakh scientists are working on some 500 problems of applied science. Over the past five years they have introduced into production twice as many projects as during the previous five-year period, and the economic effect of their innovations has tripled. The work of the Institute of Hydrogeology and Hydrophysics, for instance, is of great practical significance. In regions that used to be regarded as lacking fresh water its scientists have discovered as many as 70 ground water basins extending over more than two million square kilometres. They contain as much water as 25 Seas of Azov, enough to irrigate five million hectares of pasture and to supply water for many towns, settlements and industrial enterprises. Good work is done by the Institute of High Energy Physics, the second of its kind in the USSR.

A major event in the cultural life of the republic was the Fifth Conference of Afro-Asian Writers held in the capital, Alma-Ata, in 1973. It was attended by writers and public figures from 70 countries. Some of the participants in the conference said later they had expected to see a land of wild nomads. What they had in fact seen and the Kazakh people's achievements in the economic and cultural fields impressed them immensely. The great Russian proletarian writer Maxim Gorky once remarked: "There are two forces that are most instrumental in shaping the culture of man: the arts and science. Both are combined in books... It is therefore quite correct to measure the cultural standards of a nation by the number of books and newspapers it publishes."

Kazakhstan today has eight publishing houses issuing more than 2000 titles a year in a total of 25 million copies. The books are put out in the Kazakh Russian, Uigur, German and Korean languages. The Kazakhs can now read in their own language the works of Lenin, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Pushkin, Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky, Dickens, Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo, Ernest Hemingway, and many other authors. More than 400 newspapers are published daily and about 30 magazines with a total circulation of over five million copies. The central newspapers published in Moscow are relayed by wire and printed in Alma-Ata. Right after the revolution Lenin paid a great deal of attention to
the opening of more libraries, regarding them as an important indicator of
cultural standards. He dreamed of the day when Russia would have
50,000 libraries and reading rooms. Today Kazakhstan alone has
over 12,000 libraries. The Republican Library alone has three and a half million
books on its shelves. Its new premises have 14 reading rooms, which
together can seat more than 1,300 people. The book repositories are
linked with the reading rooms by pneumatic dispatch and conveyor belts. An
Automatically signalled readers when their orders for books are
ready. A special office can order books from any library in the USSR, as
well as from abroad. The cultural revolution that took place in the early
years of Soviet government was instrumental in the establishment of a
Kazakh national theatre (the first company was formed in 1925). It also
offered great scope for the growth of professional music. The fine arts
were developed, especially drawing, painting and sculpture, which until
then had been unknown. People of other nationalities of the Soviet Union
with centuries-old traditions in these arts helped to teach the Kazakhs.

How about the cultural life of the republic today? A few words
about its musical life. No figures, just a conversation we had with
composer Gaziza Zhubanova. She recalled receiving a letter one day from
the German Democratic Republic. The return address surprised her.
She could not imagine who living at 8 August Bebel Strasse, Berlin
could have heard of her. When she opened the letter she found it was
from Professor Karl Fritz Bernhardt, a name familiar to a great many
women composers, for he had devoted many of his studies to them as.

As the first professional composer in Kazakhstan, Gaziza Zhubanova had
aroused his interest. Soon a lively correspondence began between the
German professor and the Kazakh composer. Professor Bernhardt was
particularly interested in the composer’s latest work, her score for the
ballet “The Legend of the White Bird”, one of the first Kazakh national
ballets. Gaziza met the professor in Moscow later and he told her about
his work. His file contains the names of 3,600 women composers, most of
them in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and the
German Democratic Republic. The professor returned home with the
score of Zhubanova’s symphonic poem “Aksak-Kulan,” which he intended
offering to one of the symphony orchestras in the GDR.

Something like ten years ago, at a congress of music critics in Hamburg,
Professor Bernhardt had argued that women were quite capable of
becoming composers. The example of Gaziza certainly provides an
excellent illustration of his point. Gaziza had chosen music as her career
when she was still a child. Her abilities were manifested at an early age.
While still at school she wrote the music for a number of songs. On
leaving school she travelled to Moscow to study at the Conservatoire first
as a student and then doing postgraduate work. She wrote choral, instrumental and chamber pieces but her talent was best revealed in the
field of symphonic music. Telling us about her plans, Gaziza said that she
was completing an opera about Kurmangazy, the outstanding Kazakh
folk musician of the 19th century. All who know Zhubanova are full of
admiration for the way she combines her work as a composer with her responsibilities as rector of the Alma-Ata conservatoire and her public activities as Deputy to the City Soviet (council) and secretary of the
Union of Kazakh Composers. She is also the mother of four children.

When anybody asks her how she manages, Gaziza replies: “Well, that is
what life consists of. it all adds up to happiness…” For centuries women
in Kazakhstan had no rights at all. They were confined to the home and
their life was governed by feudal laws and customs. Today, women
make up 47% of the labor force in Kazakhstan, including scientists,
engineers, writers, actresses and musicians.

Kazakhstan is proud of its talented women who have brought fame
to the republic. The singer Kulyash Bayseltova became widely known as
“the Kazakh nightingale” and at the age of 24 was made a People’s Artist
of the USSR. Equally familiar to music lovers throughout the country are
the voices of Bibigul Tulegenova, Rosa Baglanova, Rosa Djamanova and
the young Rosa Rymbayeva. The flourishing of the amateur arts in the
Soviet period is a clear sign of the higher cultural standards of the
people. More than one million people are involved in the work of people’s
theatres (opera, ballet and drama), folk-instrument and symphony
orchestras and in choirs and variety groups, and participate in the various
contests and art festivals. Kazakh workers in the arts and culture often go
on foreign tours. In 1975, for instance, they took part in the Soviet art
festival in France. Kazakh actors have performed in Britain, Malaysia,
Singapore, India, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Denmark, Czechoslovakia and
Iran. In the last five or six years they have toured a total of more than 40
countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa. Three folk Kazakh
groups—“Saltanat” from Karkaralinsky district in Karaganda region,
“Ulutau” from Dzhezkazgan, and “Alatau” from Djambl—have also
successfully performed abroad. [—]

22092. Lederith, Edith M. “Women Invisible Victims of World Conflict;
Amnesty International: Cities Killing, Rape, Torture”, in Seattle Times,
International Womens Day that names women as the major victims of
wars in which they “have taken no part”. The report asserts that women
are treated worse than men in every country. Women are reported to
make up 80% of the world refugee population, and that all governments
approve of rape or torture of women, especially women refugees. The
report accused the Zapatistas of mass rape of women in Chiapas, and
cited torture of women in Mexico, Indonesia, El Salvador, Burma, China,
Iran and Uzbekistan. Oddly, ignoring Israel, the only country in the world
where torture is legal, and a country where rape is a routine interrogation
technique used on women and boys, and cited hundreds of women being
killed in fighting in Mali and Somalia.

22093. Mahomed, Farida. “Life Style: Experiences of Muslimahs at the
8. (Sister Farida Mahomed is a lecturer in Arabic and Islamic Studies at
the University of South Africa in Pretoria. This is an abridged version of
her report that she prepared after returning from the Hairou conference).
The fourth international women’s conference was preceded by the non-
governmental organization (NGO) women’s conference in Hauirou. This
beautiful town is some fifty-five kilometers from Beijing. Since all the
hotels and boarding houses were occupied by the thousands of delegates
attending the conference, many were obliged to stay in Beijing and
commute daily. The lush green willows and exquisitely landscaped gardens
welcomed women from all over the world. The South Africans
enjoyed special attention in some workshops and plenary sessions.
Women from other countries were curious to know about our human
rights and equality situation. South Africa, it seems, lags behind many
other countries. My first day at the conference was a euphoric affair.
When we did not understand the language but we still related to each
other. We hugged and shook hands in solidarity. We received a two-
hundred page schedule of activities for the ten day conference. There
were some three hundred and fifteen papers/seminars a day. This was
indeed an intellectual bonanza and a challenge to all participants to select
the workshops of their interests. Themes included economy, governance
and politics, human/legal rights, peace and human security, education,
health, environment, spirituality and religion, science and technology,
media, art and culture, race and ethnicity, and youth. In a very emotional
workshop on Bosnia, women signed a message to the United Nations
demanding an end to the war and the degradation of women. A male
participant who listened and watched, said with deep emotion: “It has just
occurred to me, if women ran the world, there would be no wars.” In this
workshop, the genocidal war against the Muslims in Bosnia was shown
on video, narrated through poetry and through the personal experiences of
women.

It is, however, encouraging to note that some Muslim women have
risen above the violent repudiation of contemporary traditional patriarchal
forces within the Muslim society and have emerged as progressive
Muslim women who believe that solidarity is the way to consolidate their
power. Rights without power often become ineffective and insignificant.
My own workshop on ‘Muslim women in the struggle for human rights
and equality in South Africa’ generated considerable interest and lively
discussion. Every day, I attended the NGO Muslim Women’s caucus.
This forum was mobilized because the Muslim women realized the need
to network, discuss and analyze the platform of action contained in the
United Nations’ Document. The Muslim caucus strongly criticized the
major errors in the United Nations’ Draft. In particular, its lack of
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Iran

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recognition of the relevance and importance of the moral and spiritual values that actually guide human judgement and action in all social contexts, came in for strong criticism. Muslim women from the Gulf States, South Africa, Iran, Kuwait, the United States, United Kingdom, Sudan, Tunisia, Palestine, etc., unanimously urged all participants to take a unified stand against objectionable parts of the United Nations’ draft declaration which is incompatible with Islamic principles and traditions. Muslim women were highly motivated to defend their God-given right concerning equality as enshrined in the noble Qur’an. I made a special effort to meet with university women and NGOs who were involved with reviewing educational programs and materials to eliminate stereotypical images of women. I emphasized that women have played an important role in history and continue to play a crucial role in social life and family well-being. I also contacted women who encouraged the participation of women’s groups in the preparation of teaching material to avoid the introduction of discriminatory messages against women. I was actively involved in a demonstration on ‘femicide’: the killing of the woman especially because she is a woman. The African women NGOs warned that unless States take a much stronger stand on ‘femicide’, more and more women will die as a result of the physical abuse in their homes. States must realize that such violence is intolerable and that patriarchal societies provide no protection to women.

Some workshops generated a severe undercurrent concerning issues of Muslim women and abuse in Muslim countries. Lively and sometimes heated debates focused on the issue of Hijab. At times, western women marginalized some Muslim women in hijab. I realized this on the third day of the conference when my sisters from the Arab countries reported that one western woman walked up to them and said, ‘O you stupid girls, you here again.’ Upon hearing this, I decided to go into the next day’s workshop in hijab. To my great shock, I was marginalized and ignored, experiencing a sense of exclusion. The chairperson ignored my hand when I raised it to make a point. I wanted to deconstruct the stereotyped thinking by European women concerning religious matters. They think that a Muslim woman in hijab is not capable of thinking! Muslim women need to mobilize and present their point of view where world issues are concerned. The atrocities committed in Bosnia against the Muslims, mass rapes and genocide present further challenges for sisters and brothers to become more dynamic and vocal at international conferences against violence and abuse. Muslim women also empathized with the victims of atrocities in Iraq and Palestine. They were vocal at the Beijing conference challenging the United Nations’ document concerning issues affecting their lives, especially inheritance, moral laws and structural adjustment programs. The South African women from NISAA, Jubeida Dangor and Julekha Adam presented a workshop on the Prevention of violence against women. Their workshop was well-attended and their experiences augmented lively discussion. Their strategies and prevention techniques concerning the abuse of women were shared by other women working in the same field. Among the many Muslim women from South Africa, Suraiya was actively covering the media for South African television and news programs. Mrs. Koebra Najjar was very active in attending all the workshops concerning Islam. [–]

22095. Millard, Betty. Women on Guard: How The Women of the World Fight For Peace: Part 10: In Iran At Four. New York: New Century Publisher, February 1952. IN IRAN, CROWDS OF unemployed beg and hunt for their food in garbage cans. Thousands of children from the age of four work in the carpet factories. They crouch before their machines, 14 hours a day, breathing wool dust, spitting blood; 99% of them suffer from TB, ulcers or smallpox, and die before they reach the age of 10. “Often,” said the Iranian delegate, her voice full of bitterness, they lie down and die right there in the workshop, and the other doomed children look on and know that their turn will come soon, too.” This is the way the beautiful Persian rugs are made that we all admire so much. But the Iranian women, in spite of jailing and torture, were fighting the rule of the British oil company which was the chief factor in the impoverishment of their country. And since then, as we know, the struggle has grown irresistibly. Huge numbers of women have come out in the streets to demonstrate for the nationalization of oil. On International Women’s Day 15000 women assembled before the headquarters of the Iranian Peace Committee in Teheran, and paraded through the streets carrying the Peace Dove and posters with the slogans: “Bread, not guns!”; “Return Iranian oil to the people!”; “We will not allow our country to become a base of aggression”; “Down with the war in Korea!” The women have collected hundreds of thousands of signatures demanding a meeting of the Big Five. [–]


22097. Miskin, Al. “Mediations: The Prophet Made Me Do It”, in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. p. 39. Iranian population, now at 50 million, is growing at 2.5 million per year. Ali Khameini has stated that while large families may have once been needed to spread Islam, now such large families are not needed. He stated that he would not endorse or criticize large families, but that Islam is no reason for having large families. [TXT]

22098. Mohammed, Jahangir. “Role of Kufr Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in Ceres Intl International, September 16-30, 1996. p. 7. [Jahangir Mohammed, deputy Leader of the Muslim Parliament of Britain, recently visited Sarajevo.] While in Bosnia last month, I had the opportunity to witness, first hand, the role of the west and their forces. My first thought as we drove through the devastation of Sarajevo and other
parts of Bosnia and the number of IFOR and UN agencies was to recall the colonial policies of the British in India. After sending Indian soldiers to destroy a village and rape its inhabitants, the British would go in to provide medical help and repair the damage. The natives would thus get the impression that the British are decent and civilized people. This is precisely the role the west is playing in Bosnia today. It facilitated the Serb/Croat-perpetrated genocide while preventing the Bosnian Muslims from acquiring arms or self-defense forces in Bosnia which was already destroyed. A building with glass in the windows is a rare sight. Windows everywhere have been temporarily subjected to a humiliating passport scrutiny. The look on the face of the soldier flicking through our passports was one of disgust and hostility. We experienced this from western forces, and the Serbs and Croats throughout our journey. After this checkpoint we went through another before being allowed to board the flight. This time our passports disappeared for 40 minutes. Our official told us they had gone to the UN generals for recording our details. They had their headquarters there and videotaped everyone and everything that went in or out of Sarajevo.

Our Bosnian brother said in Arabic: “You see how we are treated; we are hostages in our own country. We have to get their permission to enter our land.” I asked him why Sarajevo airport was not operational despite being ready for months. He replied, “Why open it when the UN can make money from us. We have to pay the UNHCR for these flights. One day, insha’Allah, we will have our own airport and airlines and our Muslim guests will not be subjected to such humiliation.” He said this with great determination. We witnessed such determination and high morale among all the Muslims we met in Bosnia. Upon arrival at Sarajevo we were greeted by a delegation of senior Muftis and officials. They embraced us with great affection and warmth, making the IFOR the first Bahai Spiritual Council, the Spiritual Board of Counsel was recognized the Bahais as a separate community and punished the prominent Shiite merchants; they had hoped a general massacre of the local population is told that the west is doing work out of goodness and concern for humanity. International agencies also spread un-Islamic western culture. In Bosnia, western soldiers roam the streets drinking alcohol and searching for Bosnian women to fulfill their sexual desires. Poverty has forced many women into prostitution. No doubt AIDS will now spread rapidly in Bosnia. Also visible in Bosnia is the dumping of cheap cigarettes on the local market. Alcohol has now reached epidemic proportions with almost every male and female smoking. Then of course there is Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Warehouses and factories throughout the country are being stocked up. Surely these huge quantities cannot be just for use by the forces. Christian missionaries are also busy at work. Bosnian government officials told us how orphans are being looked after by missionaries and how educational exchange visits between young Bosnian Muslims and Christian families are being arranged. It seems that the real war in Bosnia has only just begun. Resentment toward the "occupying forces" is growing among the Muslim population. Graffiti bearing the phrases “IFOR=DOGS” and “IFOR=DOGS+PIGS” is beginning to appear on walls. =)
was destroyed, and the House of Worship was converted into a Soviet art gallery. The Ashkhabad Bahai community was an important place of refuge for the Bahais, and was a key staging area for Bahais escaping the persecutions of Khurasan. The Ashkhabad community was also the first community which tried to implement a Bahai community along the lines prescribed by Bahai writings. However, the Ashkhabad model was a dead end, and the Bahais have remained a diaspora community until recently, when a few larger Bahai communities, scattered around the world, have emerged, almost a century later.

22100. Naghshevareh Theatrical Group; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Womens Words: A New Birth: Iran: A Play by the Naghshevareh Theatrical Group", in Connexions. An International Women's Quarterly, Number 13, July 1, 1984. pp. 23-25. [The following play was collectively written by the Naghshevareh Theatrical Group, an Iranian theatre company currently residing in the US. It was performed in Farsi for the first time at the Julia Morgan Theatre in 9/1983 in Berkeley, California. It was translated and adapted for Connexions by the authors.]

The Naghshevareh Theatrical Group was formed in 4/1983 by a group of Iranian citizens concerned with social issues. Out of this concern, and at the impetus of the women in the group, the following play, Tavvalody Gar [A New Birth], was written. Essentially avant-garde in style, the play examines the traditional chauvinistic view of women from two different angles: that of a sheik and that of a bride's father. Especially important is the concept of possession, be it a wife, house, or the camels of a sheik. In keeping with the play's message, the group has titled it after a poem by the contemporary Iranian poetess, Forough Farrokhzad. Forough, who died in 1966, has been long admired for her accurate portrayals of the life and aspirations of the Iranian women.

The stage is abstractly decorated with black and white background canvasses. The only props are three chairs: two set together at center stage right, and one set to the rear of center stage. The female performers wear black and white leotards with their faces painted white so that they are essentially indistinguishable from each other. Their social identities and the time periods in which they are set are revealed through their words alone. By contrast, the male performers are costumed according to the role they portray.

As the scene opens, the stage is dark. At the sound of a gong, a single spotlight appears at the far right, front of the stage illuminating a woman standing, facing the audience. She is the Narrator. Act I Scene I: Narrator: Often, perhaps always, they treat women in ways that they wouldn't want women to treat them. They buy a woman like they buy a carpet. They put her down with all their might. In the end, she, like the carpet, is sold to another. Caliphs sold women. Islam buried them under a veil, and today, they imprison them in the house, in the kitchen. (Sound of the gong. Another spotlight appears at stage left illuminating a woman who slowly, and with great fatigue, moves mechanically across the stage as if sweeping the floor. She exits at the other side) There are scars in life that slowly eat up one's soul in solitude. These scars can be expressed. (Sound of the gong. Light off. Scene II: Three spotlights illuminate the stage: a woman stands lighted at stage right; a man in sheik's garb is seated at center rear; and two more men, dressed in modern attire, are seated at stage left. As the performers in each position speak, the others remain frozen. This is to give the impression that each position is a separate world unto itself; even while a relationship is maintained between them through their words. The pair of men are the fathers of a bride and groom soon to be married. The woman is a bride. The third man is a sheik of old. Groom's Father: Anyway sir, I'm asking you to allow your daughter to marry my son. We were young once and we know how hard it is to be without a wife.

Sheik: (apparently to an unseen servant) I demand that you bring me a woman.

Bride's Father: Praise Allah, it would be a good deed to give my daughter's hand to your son.

Daughter: (protesting) I don't even know him!

Bride's Father: No matter that she doesn't know him; it's none of her business anyway. We are older and have much more experience in these things.

Sheik: (commanding) Bring her with whatever it takes. With the sound of a flute, with jewels, with a trap...or with a rope. Bring me a woman who...

Bride's Father: (humbly yet enticingly like a bazaar merchant) Praise Allah that she is a clever girl!

Daughter: Am I something to be sold?!

Sheik: And of course housework, you have nothing to worry about. Sheik: She should be light and fast as a deer.

Daughter: I am not an animal!

Bride's Father: What are your son's prospects?

Groom's Father: (proudly) He has a very good job, a house, a car, and a lot more.

Sheik: (arrogantly) Tell them that the Sheik has 50 acres of land, 200 camels, 22 wives, 41 tons of...

Daughter: (crying out NO!...) Groom's Father: It is time for him to start his own family; he must find a wife who...

Bride's Father...Gives warmth to a man's house.

Sheik:...Brings happiness to the harem.

Groom's Father...Will be a good mother to her children.

Sheik:...And brings up brave men like me.

Bride's Father: Anyway sir, there is a saying, as you know, that a good, obedient, and faithful woman can make a beggar a king. After all, a wife's duties are...

Sheik:...To take orders, to obey...

Bride's Father:...And to be loyal and pure, quiet and demure.

Sheik:...When needed she will keep silent, and when necessary, she will be entertaining...

Bride's Father:...To be comforting to her family.

Sheik:...So that I can relax and enjoy her company.

Daughter: (desperately) I am a human being!

Groom's Father: Anyway, humans--I mean men need help at difficult times in their lives. Of course, there were other girls that we were considering...

Sheik (dreamily) Beautiful eyes, tall, thin waisted, white or black.

Groom's Father:...But your daughter is educated, and even on an intellectual level she might be of some service to him.

Sheik: (still imagining) A wise woman, to become my first lady of the harem.

Bride's Father: As for the dowry, what can I say? A Koran, a rose...and of course 100000 Toomans.

Sheik: I will give 100000 Dinars! Now go but beware, if you come back empty handed, I will have you beheaded! (gong sounds; lights go out.)

Act II, Scene I: In this scene, three new women appear still dressed in black and white leotards, and indistinguishable from each other in outward appearance. They are, however, different from one another insofar as they represent different levels of feminist consciousness. These differences are made clear in their interactions with the Sheik's servant who has come to find him a woman.

As the scene opens, three spotlights illuminate the stage in the same positions as before. In the spot where the Sheik was, the Sweeper and the Daughter stand immobile, facing the audience as if witnesses to the proceedings. In the spot where the two fathers were, the heretofore invisible servant of the Sheik is seated. He appears to be playing a flute. If in the spot where the Daughter was, another woman now stands half facing the audience, half facing the Servant. The gong sounds.

1st Woman: Hello brother.

Servant: (lowering his invisible flute) Hello sister.

1st Woman: How well you play the flute, and such jewels you have! Where do you come from?

Servant: (come from the Sheik's palace to find him a woman)

1st Woman: (naively) Who is the Sheik? What kind of man is he? What does he do? And who are you?

Servant: (proudly) The Sheik is a brave man and a great ruler. I am his servant, and all these jewels are his.
1st Woman: (becoming interested) What did you say the Sheik sent you for?
Servant: A woman that he can make first lady of his harem.

1st Woman: (eagerly) Would the Sheik feed this woman? Would he give her jewels and silk? If he would... Servant: (contemptuously) Listen, woman, this time the Sheik is not looking for a hungry woman or an idiot. He wants a wise woman. (she drops her head) He ties women like you with a rope, and if they do not obey him, he throws them in a lion's cage, or imprisons them in the kitchen where they cannot see the sunlight for years.

With each of these images, the woman shrinks back in horror toward the rear of the stage where the Sweeper and the Daughter stand. She moves in cadence with his words, freezing when he pauses, and moving again when he speaks. When she has taken her place with the two others, the Servant goes on dreamily to himself.

Servant: Ah, those were such good times, those days when I could hunt and trap whoever I pleased. I would play my flute, and the women would come to watch. Then I would trap them and tie them... (the narrator suddenly reappears in a spotlight at the extreme right, front of the stage.)

Narrator: Didn't they scream?
Servant: I had a whip.

Narrator: (matter of factly) You were cruel, too.

The gong sounds and all the lights go off simultaneously. Within moments the spotlights come back on. A different woman has taken the place left by the First Woman, but otherwise, the stage is as it was before with the Servant seated, miming playing the flute, and the three woman standing at the rear. The Narrator has disappeared.

2nd Woman: (suspiciously) What are you doing here?
Servant: (innocently, lowering his flute) I am playing my flute.

2nd Woman: Who are you playing for?
Servant: For myself. I feel depressed.

2nd Woman: (softening) Are you a stranger here?
Servant: Yes, I am.

2nd Woman: What brought you here?
Servant: I am looking for someone.

2nd Woman: Who?
Servant: (vaguely) A woman.

2nd Woman: Has she left you?
Servant: No.

2nd Woman: What's her name?
Servant: I don't know.

Then how will you recognize her?

Servant: She is wise.

2nd Woman: She is wise? How did you fall in love with her?
Servant: I am not in love with her. The Sheik wants her.

2nd Woman: (suddenly understanding who he is; she is frightened but aggressive) Sheik! No. YOU are the one who kidnaps women for the Sheik! YOU kidnapped my sisters! Get away from me! (with each exclamation she retreats, pointing accusingly at him, until she reaches the other three women at the rear of the stage. She takes her place next to them. Now a third woman enters from stage left and steps into the spotlight vacated by the 2nd Woman)

3rd Woman: (addressing both the servant and the audience in a slightly confrontational tone) Hello man.

Servant: (cautiously) Hello, my sister.

3rd Woman: (abruptly) Is it your greed that's brought you here?
Servant: (agreeably) No, I am not greedy.

3rd Woman: (pressing her accusation) I've heard that you've come to steal again.

Servant: This time I don't intend to steal; rather I have come to find a wise woman. The Sheik has sent me.

3rd Woman: Why did the Sheik send you?
Servant: Because I am his servant. He trusts me. I've gotten all his women for him.

3rd Woman: And just how did you get them?
Servant: (matter of factly) I got each one with a different trick and a different story.
Bride's Father: Gives warmth to a man's house...Groom's Father: Will be a good mother to her children...Bride's Father: Who is loyal and pure, quiet and...

Groom's Father:...Comforting to her family. Of course, there were other girls we were considering...(gong sounds, lights go out replaced by the spotlight on the narrator)

Narrator:...There are scars in life that slowly eat up one's soul in solitude. These scars can be expressed.


22101. Naim, Mouna. "Mullahs Tighten The Screws on Rafaqanji; As Iran Sinks Into Deeper Economic Crisis, There Is Mounting Evidence of Repression In The Face of Growing Protest," in Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 27, 1994, p. 14. Iran has seen growing, violent unrest as the economy has continued to deteriorate. In 2/1994, there was an assassination attempt against Rafaqanji. In Zahedan, Sistan-Baluchistan, demonstrators clashed with police, and bombs exploded at the city council and a mosque: the bombings were blamed on a militant Sunni faction. On 3/10/1994, there was an attack on the Syrian embassy by a deranged man; this follows attacks on Western embassies in 1/1994. Ali Khamanei has transferred some of his powers to Interior Minister Ali Mohammed Beshari, who has become the commander in chief of the 50000 man paramilitary police for three years: this move is seen strengthening the repressive powers of the state. At the same time, career officer Gen. Mortez Rezaei has been made commander of the Revolutionary Guards. The liberalization of the economy started four years ago, with falling oil revenues, has plunged Iran into desperate economic straits. The government is apparently planned to respond to the crisis by repression. Rafaqanji has become increasingly isolated, with his brother Mohammed Hashemi being replaced as director general of the Iranian radio and television by hardliner Ali Larijani; the new culture minister Mostafa Mir-Salim is also close of Khamanei. The general Iranian response to its present crisis has been to intensify ideological indoctrination. One woman, former Tehran University prof. Homa Drabi, set fire to herself to protest the plight of women in this ideological climate. All this ideological ferment has increased the separation between the national government and the people, without solving economic problems, which include a foreign debt of $20-30 billion. Opposition movements continue to support the US embargo, which they see hastening the collapse of Iran. [TXT]

22102. Najmabadi, Afsaneh. "Zanha-yi milleti: Women or Wives of the State" in Revolutionary Studies, Winter/Spring, 1994. pp. 51-71. This article critically examines the role of women in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, discussing in particular the contested concept of the term 'zan' (woman and wife) and the ambiguity surrounding the defining of a new womanhood.

22103. Nakanishi, Hisae. Creating The 'Ideal' Woman And Reconstructing 'Islamic' Women: Ideology, Power, And Women's Consciousness In Post-revolutionary Iran. University Of California, Los Angeles. Dissertation. 272pp. AAC 9425774. [Advisor: Keddie, Nikki] This study examines the interactions of discourses between the post-revolutionary government of Iran and Muslim women on woman's rights and roles. It focuses on how Muslim women have reinterpreted passages from the Qur'an and other Shi'i texts. Their interpretation of women's images and rights demonstrates how it is possible to defend women's rights within the framework of Islam: women can reverse the regime's stereotypical images and denials of rights for women. The analysis of the bi-weekly newspaper Payem-e Hajer (Hajer's Message), published by the Women's Society of the Islamic Revolution of Iran (WSIRI), is the focus of this study. The WSIRI's "middle of the road" approach--oriented toward neither Western feminist nor a rigid interpretation of the Qur'an--provides women with an indigenous base to push for reform, while avoiding the label "Westoxicated" (plagued by Western culture). The WSIRI's Islamic reformism is of great importance in shaping the improvement of women's rights in future Iran. Oral accounts of Muslim women show that they have flexibly internalized the meaning of the hejab (Islamic veil and dress) for their personal, psychological, and political use, while accommodating their own interpretations of "Islam." Thus, both the hejab and the Qur'anic passages are used by Muslim women as political tools. The recent development of the reform-oriented posture of the government reflects a tension between how to maintain its legitimacy of power and how to negotiate with the increasing demand of women activists. The tension will continue to grow between what "Islamic" shape the Islamic Republic should and can take, and the "Islamic" society women seek to realize. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.][=]

22104. Nawab, Syed Amir. Two Asian Revolutions: Two New Democracies: A Sociological Appraisal. Origins of Basic Democracies: Pakistan's Political Innovation. Karachi: Free Lance Bureau, November 1960. p. 98-100. Pakistan in its life of 12 years had a semblance of a democratic tradition, as it had come into being on the basis of the 1935 Act, in which 13.5% of the electorate had taken part, under the Parliamentary system. In doing away with the edifice which had identified it as a democratic nation formally recognizing the right of the individual, the country apparently ran the risk of being saddled with a national Fascist or Totalitarian Regime. In the absence of an alternative political principle worthy of replacing the socio-political principles of the older system, guaranteeing political rights, a political vacuum was apparent. Therefore misgivings and skepticism of new declarations was a natural process of thought in the intelligentsia and the educated circles of our society. Though this denoted democratic consciousness in a small section of the upper and middle class, with a misplaced concern for the parliamentary type, it was by no means a concern for the essence of democracy or for the rights of the poor common man, whose spontaneous reaction was quite different.

The promulgation of the order bringing into being another type of a democratic set-up within one year, by the Revolutionary Regime, dispelled doubts and forebodings to a large extent, yet much has to be said and done in this respect.

New ideas are, however, slow to find groundings, as in the first place habitual process of thought (and action) takes time to change from one thought-current, which has become a fixed idea, to another; and secondly, no two individuals have the same standard of judgement, and it follows that interpretations vary.

It goes to the credit of the makers of Pakistan's October Revolution that they could adopt such an innovatory idea, based on realism and shape it so as to suit local conditions. ["It is a lesson of history that important and fundamental changes in the ways of thought, ushering in an era of new standards of socio-economic measurements, have generally been brought about by a group of individuals belonging to that section of society which is the most conscious of its environments and by reason of its intellectual ability and enlightenment is able to think and look ahead. In our country too we have such well meaning individuals, fairly educated, cultured and discerning...."] From "Pakistan and Communism," published as "A Report from Pakistan," by S. A. Nawab in Radical Humanist, Vol. XVI, No. 35 of 8/31/1952. The concept of Basic Democracy - democracy at the roots, or a radical interpretation of democracy in a manner that in application its essence and spirit is not contaminated by traditional formalism attached to it - is an innovation in socio-political thought here. For the common men and women this political concept in this shape - in this country - has its political, social and economic aspect; and its sociological genesis is of interest and concern to the of Islamists and the thinkers in our society and elsewhere, as it is pitted against older theories of State, from the medieval monarchic to the modern totalistic. That is, an all powerful, highly centralized State versus the idea of a State with defused powers, which derives its strength from the conscious participation and therefore the
support of the individual member who exercises effective power within his immediate limited circle and at the same time his or her socio-political ideas can find manifestations in the higher tier of the state.

Appraised from this aspect, the concept of Basic Democracy offers a positive alternative to other Asian countries - so impressed by the "centralized" system of the Totalitarian State, as the only alternative to the Parliamentary type of Democracy. To the intellectuals and political thinkers in Asian countries, this contribution of the concept of Basic Democracy is its greatest achievement, as it has halted the one-way traffic towards the totalitarian concept of state. [After my first article, "Democracy in Pakistan - A Critical Appreciation," was published in "Times of Karachi" dated 12/12/1959, Mr. Jaipuraksh Narain, leader of the Swatantra Party of India, speaking later at a reception in Hotel Metropole, Karachi, highly appreciated Pakistan's Basic Democracy. As an "aid d'memoir" he was given a copy of the paper containing this published article.] Later, in 1960, it was reported in the local press that Iran, too, had declared to adopt the system of Basic Democracy of Pakistan.)


22106. Noah, Timothy. "New Single Issue Pressure Groups Sprout Up On The Right To Support the Republican Agenda", in Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1995. p. A18. The Fair Government Foundation sounds like Common Cause or Public Citizen, but in fact it is their direct opponent; it was established with a $70000 contribution by the National Republican Senatorial Committee. Increasingly, pro-Democratic organizations are finding themselves confronting pro-Republican groups. Conservatives have long been frustrated by the march of pro-Democratic single-issue lobbies, and have now started to respond by creating their own grassroots organizations. The Frontiers of Freedom was formed to confront pro-Democratic-environmental groups; the Center for Effective Compassion (headed by Arianna Huffington) faces the Childrens Defense Fund; the Independent Womens Forum (headed by Barbara Ledeen, wife of Iran-Contra/CIA figure Michael Ledeen) fights affirmative action.

22107. Pahlavi, Mohammed-Reza, Shah; Government of Iran. "Part 2: Speech From The Throne (10/6/1967)", in The Revolution: New Dimensions. The Revolution Of The Shah and the People. London: Transient Press, October 1967. "By The Grace of God, We open the answers to the requirements of our own society, as well as, I think, of any other society no matter what its regime. Our revolution, which is based on social justice, on the one hand requires that economic democracy - agrarian, urban, and industrial - should complement political democracy - be based on these cooperatives: i.e., cooperatives for production, cooperatives for distribution and cooperatives for consumption without middlemen who do not perform any positive work."

On the other, the same revolution requires that the welfare of every Iranian should be ensured from the day he is born to the day he dies through various kinds of insurance such as against disease, accidents, retirement, old age and others. This is an objective for which careful efforts will be made. The second principle of the Iranian revolution is the nationalization of some twenty million hectares of forest and pasture lands which are part of the national wealth, and in the creation of which no human being has played a part. Up till the Sixth of Bahman Senatorial Committee. Increasingly, pro-Democratic organizations are finding themselves confronting pro-Republican groups. Conservatives have long been frustrated by the march of pro-Democratic single-issue lobbies, and have now started to respond by creating their own grassroots organizations. The Frontiers of Freedom was formed to confront pro-Democratic-environmental groups; the Center for Effective Compassion (headed by Arianna Huffington) faces the Childrens Defense Fund; the Independent Womens Forum (headed by Barbara Ledeen, wife of Iran-Contra/CIA figure Michael Ledeen) fights affirmative action.

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On the other, the same revolution requires that the welfare of every Iranian should be ensured from the day he is born to the day he dies through various kinds of insurance such as against disease, accidents, retirement, old age and others. This is an objective for which careful efforts will be made. The second principle of the Iranian revolution is the nationalization of some twenty million hectares of forest and pasture lands which are part of the national wealth, and in the creation of which no human being has played a part. Up till the Sixth of Bahman Senatorial Committee. Increasingly, pro-Democratic organizations are finding themselves confronting pro-Republican groups. Conservatives have long been frustrated by the march of pro-Democratic single-issue lobbies, and have now started to respond by creating their own grassroots organizations. The Frontiers of Freedom was formed to confront pro-Democratic-environmental groups; the Center for Effective Compassion (headed by Arianna Huffington) faces the Childrens Defense Fund; the Independent Womens Forum (headed by Barbara Ledeen, wife of Iran-Contra/CIA figure Michael Ledeen) fights affirmative action.
The effects of these efforts will be visible within a very few years. Obviously, if it is found necessary, shares of other industries will be sold in the same manner as those which are now put up for sale. The fourth and definitely the most important point of the revolution was profit-sharing by workers in the factories where they worked. This revolutionary measure not only gave a better income to the labourer for his toil but at the same time it gave to him the human dignity and personality which was his birthright because he felt that he was no longer being exploited. He felt that he was a shareholder in the factory where he worked. For the correct enforcement, and to make sure that the Iranian labourer gets his 20% share of profits, legislation will be brought in as and when necessary. The fifth point in the Revolution of the Shah and the People was amendment of the Electoral Law, to abolish discriminations which altogether favoured the influential class and which prevented entry of other people into the Parliament. Perhaps one of the most important results of this programme was the freeing of Iranian women from many unfair restrictions and granting of rights to them equal with men. We all know that until the amendment of the Electoral Law, the Iranian woman was treated in the same manner as the mentally unbalanced or financially insolvent and was deprived of her right to vote or contest an election. This meant that nearly half the Iranian population had no say in its own affairs. Our revolution gave millions of Iranian women their human and natural rights: so much so that even in this gathering there are a number of women sent in by the nation to sit beside their brothers and discharge their national duties. At this point it is not out of place to recall one of the most important laws passed by the outgoing House. That is the Family Protection Law which, I hope, will play an effective role in stabilising the family and provide our society with needed security. Perhaps it is not necessary to say much about the Literacy, Health and Development Corpsmen who bear the proud name of the Soldiers of the Revolution, because these soldiers have truly won respect for Iran in foreign countries. The Soldiers of the Revolution represent the highest ideals of civilisation and progress: learning, health and creativity. They take these to the farthest corners of the country and it is only just that the Iranian nation should be proud of its selfless, sincere and responsible sons. Perhaps it will be sufficient to cite these figures to show the output of work by these young men. At present nearly half a million children or adults are going to more than 7000 rural schools run by the Literacy Corpsmen. So far nearly 40000 Literary Corpsmen have served in the countryside. It should, however, not be forgotten that the efforts of these young men are only part of a much wider campaign going on in Iran for the eradication of illiteracy. It will, therefore, not be out of place to mention that at present 2.5 million students are attending more than 15000 primary schools, 600000 students are attending 17000 secondary schools and about 400000 students are going through university education. The number of technical and vocational schools, which did not exist a few years ago, now exceeds one hundred which provide education to more than 17000 young men and women. We are firmly determined that in our country, where more than 80% of the people were illiterate until recently, we shall eradicate illiteracy completely in a few years. Not confining ourselves to this country alone but on the contrary, we have derived inspiration from nations in removing the scourge of illiteracy from human society. The first step was holding a Literacy Congress in Tehran in 1344. Our efforts and the results obtained from the work of the Literacy Corps led to the recognition of Iran by UNESCO as a pioneer and model country in the drive against illiteracy. You are aware that we have decided to make financial contributions from our own budget to UNESCO. In order to ensure faster progress in the eradication of illiteracy, it is necessary that, like male Iranians serving in the Literacy, Health and Development Corps, a number of educated women should be required by law to teach illiterates or help in the improvement of health facilities in the cities and towns where they live. Studies have been launched to determine the best way. The services of the Health and Development Corpsmen are laudable in their own fields both in view of the heavy responsibilities that were entrusted to them and the manner in which they discharged them. Let it be sufficient to say that at present 500 medical groups forming the Health Corps are working in more than 13000 villages for more than six million people. Similarly 2500 Development Corpsmen are working in some 10000 villages. The ninth principle of our revolution was the establishment of the Houses of Justice and Arbitration Councils. These courts transformed the complicated, and often cumbersome and unnecessary, legal procedures by solving ordinary disputes simply. This eased pressure on the Ministry of Justice as well as saving considerable time and expense for the litigants. They gave the villagers an opportunity to spend their money in more productive fields. At present nearly 1000 Houses of Justice are operating in the countryside while fifty Arbitration Councils have been established in the cities. These institutions have jurisdiction over about 1.5 million villagers and about the same number of city dwellers. All the achievements dealt with here briefly show the consequences of the revolution over the last five years. What is important at this stage is to say that to fulfil the revolution we should maintain the spirit which has been the main moving force behind the changes, and work for increasing it. It is for this reason that we have decided to add three other points to our nine-point reform programme so that the changes in Iranian society can move faster and in many directions. One of these three points is the nationalization of water because our physical and atmospheric conditions do not allow us to waste even one drop of water. We must make sure that modern science and techniques assess our surface and underground water resources, both underground and surface. Then with maximum economy we should determine the priorities for the uses of water on the basis of returns for domestic, urban, agricultural and industrial consumption. However, because we have little water in our country, we must use it in the first place on land which is the most productive, so that agricultural centres can be created across the country. Obviously, we shall participate with interest in activities now underway all over the world for the desalination of water and take maximum advantage of any new developments in this field. The second point which must be added to our revolution is the launching of a nationwide programme of reconstruction to provide a better life for Iranian families. These programmes should be launched in both the villages and cities and should be compatible with Iranian social conditions, aiming at the utilisation of our vast natural resources and manpower, for which I hold a high opinion. To achieve this objective our entire resources, intellectual and material, should be brought to bear with the same spirit of change, which is necessary for the accomplishment of such a programme. No complaint should be left unused. The third point relates to an administrative and educational revolution which will meet the requirements of present day society. The meaning of this reform is that any person employed in administration and working in government agencies whether in high or low position, should discharge his duties with complete honesty, sincerity

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Iran
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and responsibility. The spirit of time wastage, paper work and bureaucracy should be eliminated. Every worker should know that in the first place it is his duty to attend to callers who approach him with work and help solve their difficulties quickly, through correct interpretation of law and without personal bias. It is these people who pay the worker’s salary through their taxes. Our offices should be cleansed of the spirit of time killing and indecision. On the other hand, unreasonable and illogical centralisation in which the capital should be the main hub of administration in the provinces and districts should be given an opportunity to show their talent and enterprise in their work. It may even be desirable that service in the capital and other big towns may be made inter-dependent with service in the villages. Similarly, basic and profound reforms are needed in the educational plan of the country. Iranian youth should be given the opportunity to show their talent which should be used in the sphere to which it is best suited. Jobs should be given to people according to their specialisation and experience. It is for this reason that the government has been ordered to launch wide-ranging studies as to the changes required in the educational system in view of the increasing need for trained personnel and top-flight managers. The main aim of the reeducation reform is that the sense of self-reliance and personality of our youth should be developed so that they can shoulder national responsibilities later. In fact, our society should change itself constantly to keep pace with new development and other developed societies, and to walk ahead of them, if possible. In foreign policy we continue on our well-defined path: we follow a national independence policy based on international cooperation and understanding, protection of our own national rights and respect to those of others. We firmly believe that this international understanding and cooperation is a vital prerequisite for all societies, anywhere in the world and with any kind of government. In this field we not only believe in co-existence but also peaceful cooperation between nations of different regimes. The success achieved by us in many spheres of national rights speaks well that we are on the right and wise path. From the point of view of international relations, we continue to abide by the principles and regulations of the UN Charter, and although recently signs of weakness have been visible in the world body, we firmly believe that it is still the best body to solve international disputes. We hope the day will come when the world organisation is able to make decisions and enforce them. As one of the founder members of the United Nations, we reiterate our allegiance to it and sincerely back it.

It is for this reason that we believe that any country recognised by the UN should have the right to exist and no other country should threaten its destruction. We support non-proliferation of atomic arms, declaration of atom-free zones and complete and general disarmament through controlled supervision. But at the same time, while guaranteed disarmament is not a reality we have no option but to strengthen our defences to safeguard our territorial integrity despite all the friends in pacts of which we are members. Unfortunately, recently events occurred in the Middle East which have hurt our feelings based on Muslim brotherhood. Naturally our sympathies were immediately aroused. We announced immediately and repeat today that occupation of any country’s territory by another country is unacceptable. This truth should be understood clearly: the days of speaking through force and military adventurare are over for ever. Quick military victories should have no intoxicating or blinding effects. We hope that this House of Parliament, which will consider the Fourth Development Plan and witness the 2500th Anniversary of Iranian Monarchy, will have as much success in its work as the previous one. We hope that the Fourth Plan will prepare the ground on which the Fifth and later plans can be drafted, and within the course of one generation we may catch up with other developed societies, and to walk ahead of them in foreign policy we continue on our well-defined path: the new development and other developed societies, and to walk ahead of them if possible. In the field of international relations, we continue to abide by the principles and regulations of the UN Charter, and although recently signs of weakness have been visible in the world body, we firmly believe that it is still the best body to solve international disputes. We hope the day will come when the world organisation is able to make decisions and enforce them. As one of the founder members of the United Nations, we reiterate our allegiance to it and sincerely back it.

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First and foremost as an Iranian, then as one devoted to the principles of democracy and freedom, and finally as the lawful heir to the Iranian throne, I come forward, in these critical times, to join voices with my fellow countrymen to speak as one, to strive side by side and to save our country from the brink of destruction.

In these bitter days of separation from my homeland, not even for a fleeting moment, have my thoughts drifted from you and our country.

Above the day to day political gamesmanship and maneuverings, I have been continuously studying ways and means of taking advantage of conditions and trends conducive to the liberation of the Iranian people.

Ever since I assumed my lawful responsibilities, my efforts have been directed, on the one hand, toward bringing the voice of the oppressed people of Iran to the attention of the world, thereby exposing the cruelties inflicted upon them, and on the other hand, toward creating situations which would assist us in the struggle to liberate our country.

It has been necessary to carry out all efforts with caution and sagacity. With your participation and without any foreign intervention, we shall direct ourselves toward a path leading to independence, national sovereignty and the good of our countrymen. On this path I have, like all those who strive for right and righteousness, shunned all fears and hesitation.

I have separated myself from my kith and kin, dedicating all my being to the service of Iran and its people. Although young in years, destiny has thrown me into the path of events from which I have gained a great deal of experience.

My sole desire is to see the sacred land of Iran once again; not for reasons of pomp and glory, but rather, in the hope of breaking the shackles of tyranny so that we may all achieve freedom together--free from fear, free from want and joblessness, and free from violations of religion, thought, life and property. Like thousands of Iranians who are sacrificing their lives for their country, I too am prepared to tread the same path. There is nothing holding me back from such a sacrifice. Together with you, we shall eradicate cruelty and oppression. We shall destroy the oppressors and vindicate the oppressed. I do not advocate vengeance, rather I support the establishment of law and justice.

I believe this to be my destiny, and I have no doubt that in the end, light shall conquer darkness. Our ancestral land has witnessed and shall direct ourselves toward a path leading to independence, national sovereignty and the good of our countrymen. On this path I have, like all those who strive for right and righteousness, shunned all fears and hesitation.

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I believe this to be my destiny, and I have no doubt that in the end, light shall conquer darkness. Our ancestral land has witnessed and survived many such vicissitudes in the past.
Let us not stray. A glance at the events of nearly 80 years ago which triggered the Constitutional Revolution, will prove this point.

With the dawn of the industrial economy in Europe, the relationships between countries underwent a drastic change. Industrial development became the main instrument of power in the world. Through industrial expansion, European countries gained access to the non-industrialized world. Analogous with this change, the closed economy of the latter took a new form. The era of colonialism had begun. Asia, Africa and Latin America became exporters of cheap raw materials and importers of expensively manufactured goods from Europe and, later, North America. Political trends became dependent upon a system of production and distribution of commodities. The industrial powers divided the world into spheres of influence.

In the meantime, by virtue of its geographical location, Iran became subjected to the political influences of two strong powers from the north and the south. [Russia and Great Britain.] The influence of these two powers, together with that of their Iranian puppets, kept the country in a state of chaos and backwardness. At the same time, their rivalries and efforts to gain the upper hand in Iran, opened the eyes of the people to certain realities. The idea of the Constitutional Revolution, springing as it did from the midst of these rivalries, and supported by the efforts and endeavors of the progressive elements in Iran, was designed to save the country from such foreign influence.

The nation suffered poverty and illiteracy under the yoke of despotism from which it knew no respite. Intellectuals, politicians, the clergy and those merchants who had visited foreign lands and were aware of the economic and social changes in the West began to orientate and guide public opinion covertly and otherwise. Despotism and despots resisted. The nation revolted. The political and religious institutions--those two main pillars of Iran's social structure--each became divided. Freedom-loving clergymen sided with the liberal politicians. Reactionaries rushed to the aid of the despots. But liberty was victorious and autocracy was supplanted by a constitutional monarchy.

The aims and objectives of the Constitution were:
— to change the administrative and social order,
— to entrust the destiny of the people to their legally elected representatives,
— to create a strong central Army, Police and Gendarmerie Corps in place of a scattered and ill-equipped force,
— to codify civil and penal law,
— to organize the department of justice, and to replace the contradictory verdicts of so-called religious leaders by a just implementation of the law,
— to establish legal security,
— to secure participation for women in national affairs,
— to establish and expand modern educational facilities, in order to develop and give conformity to elementary and secondary schools, universities and technical and vocational institutions; a program similar to that which had been initiated by Amir Kabir [Nasser-ed-Din Shah's Chancellor, 1848 A.D.] and which was thwarted by strong opposition from reactionary clergymen,
— to increase the number of Iranian students sent to the developed countries for higher education—something previous progressive monarchs had initiated and that led to an awareness which gave life to the idea of constitutional monarchy.

Thus the aims of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran and the results obtained therefrom, allowed the nation to fall in line with the march of world civilization. [=]
more day-to-day experiences. And basically everybody was concerned with their own life and interests.

I enrolled in school, hoping I would meet people. At the beginning, I felt very invisible, as I had at my primary school. I stood on the outside looking in; I could watch other people interacting, but they couldn’t see me. After a few months of taking classes, there was some interaction with some of them, but not really any kind of friendship. It always amazed me how people said “hello,” called me by name, but never ever were further than that. I still wonder why they bothered learning names. I only ask for someone’s name if there is further interest in interacting, and that is the way it was back home. I finally realized that saying “hello,” calling you by your name, and even stopping to ask “how are you?” are just routine—-they even do it in the supermarket.

After a period of resistance, anger and depression, I started to see how I could fit into this new kind of friendship. Soon I realized I could talk about my feelings much more freely than I used to, and if at any moment I did not feel like doing something, even though I had made a prior arrangement to do it, I could say “no.” Certainly, saying no was much easier. I could be more and more of who I am.

I had a lot of time to myself and started viewing myself in a very different light. I could express my feelings and became less trapped in my head. Therefore I could talk about my very deep feelings without any fear of judgment. I remember back home when we were hurt we never really talked about it. It was a matter of withdrawing for a few days, followed by the intervention (meddling) of other friends, who would finally bring the two parties back together.

After moving to Northern California, I entered a world where I could be more and more myself. I came out as a lesbian and therefore started to spend time with lesbians. It was very exciting. I never felt so comfortable and joyful being with women who are like me, who no longer have to accept me, but we share a world, view. So close to my own identity. There were many times while speaking to my lesbian friends that I felt so close, I found myself forgetting that I was speaking a language different from my own.

What I am most enjoying is again a sense of freedom of expression and sharing very deep feelings that I cannot share with my Iranian friends. I can easily say no, and if I am hurt, I can easily acknowledge it. As for my Iranian friends, I still have a strong bond, a lifelong connection, although I can’t talk about my feelings, and especially not my hurt feelings, very easily or directly. Every time we start talking about it, the focus shifts from “I feel hurt and angry” to “You are this or that or basically you are the cause of my misery.” A great part of it is that in my culture, individuals essentially don’t hold themselves responsible for much of anything. As individuals, they barely accept any responsibility for their actions or feelings. I would like to make a few references to this: Unlike here, where everyone feels responsible for their misery or happiness in life, in Iran, most people blame the circumstances, such as the order of the cosmos, for their shortcomings in life. Approximately 20000000 people participated in the revolution, but at this point, a large majority of Iranians believe the revolution was made by the US or UK, or by a collaboration between those two powers. There could be some truth to this, but not being responsible certainly fits other parts of our culture. A very simple example is that instead of saying “I cut my hand,” we usually say “the knife cut my hand.” At any rate, when it comes to friendship, no one focuses on herself or himself, her or his needs and responsibilities, and that makes it hard to talk about such things. So now I understand why friends withdraw when they are hurt.

Despite this, there are still other valuable aspects of my relationships with my Iranian friends that I haven’t yet discussed, and those are sharing and giving. Being generous and willing to give and share is part of being able to extend yourself for another person; there is mutual joy in sharing. And in giving, whether of material or non-material goods. If I invite a friend out or buy her something, it is not expected that she pay me back right away, or if we go out, there is almost a fight between those who want to pay. And of course if I pay today, it is because I like to pay. Also, when I am in a relationship that feels timeless, and there is a strong sense of trust, it is almost like a “karmic rule” that you receive what you give out. Life is a give-and-take, and so is friendship:

what you give out you will receive someday, somehow, whether it is the same or not.

Being at the place I am now and looking back at my different friends and relationships, I can’t say which one I like better; I enjoy every one of them in a different way. There are, of course, positive and negative points in both cultures. In sum, what I like with my Iranian friends is the eternal sense of trust and giving, and what I like with my American friends is sharing the same feelings, being free to say “no,” and feeling free to express my resentment without fear. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][—]


Iranian women are the primary losers of Khomeini’s regime, although there are no winners in a country where human rights are suppressed and peace has long been gone. Khomeini’s policy against women stems from a reactionary view that promotes the idea that women’s primary tasks are housekeeping and pleasing men.

To establish this society based on strictly delineated male and female roles, and where women are completely dependent on men, requires limiting women’s independence in every way. Obviously, education is viewed as a potentially dangerous activity.

In fact, Khomeini’s policy targets a century of struggle by Iranian women for literacy and better education. At the turn of the century, women’s education became a focal point for women as well as the state which saw it as a way to “modernize” Iran. Women’s efforts and the official policies together gradually expanded women’s educational opportunities. Education for girls became compulsory, and girls’ primary schools sprang up all over the country and developed into high schools, colleges and universities. Initially, boys’ and girls’ education was completely separate, but mixed schools began to appear on the primary level about 20 years ago. Even so, there were very few, if any, mixed high schools but college level classes were mixed. Nonetheless, illiteracy remained high, especially among rural women for whom it had decreased from 99% in 1956 to 91% in 1971.

However, the product of a century of effort did result in professional women gaining access to academic, technical, administrative, management, and business jobs. Today the situation has been reversed by the Mullas (Shi’a priests). Their policy has sharply reduced the number of girls attending schools and prevents those who do from pursuing higher education.

The following report from Iran Liberation, 1/4/1985, is an account of the Mullas’ policy on girls’ education in Iran.

The views and decisions of the Iranian Education Ministry have been described to reporters by a senior official of the Ministry His comments reflect the regime’s attitude towards girls’ education.

The Undersecretary for Research and Planning, Hadad Aadel, speaking about a new plan which seeks to educate girls in housekeeping, said: “On the whole, the administrative, educational and labour regulations in the Islamic Republic have not yet been adjusted in accordance with the nature of women. Our colleagues in the technical and vocational training department have decided to create a new course in housekeeping for high school girls, so that their life and energy is not spent on courses which are of no use to them.”

The truth is that this regime, step by step, has implemented its plan to completely bar women from economic, social and cultural activities According to the regime’s programmes, only a limited number of women are allowed to study and specialise so that they can meet women’s medical and educational needs, the latter of which will gradually diminish in time.

In a revealing story, the official newspaper Ettela’at reports: “Two years ago, the Education Ministry issued a circular totally banning mixed classes at all levels. In addition, all classes were required to have at least
ten pupils. But in many villages the number of pupils was less than ten and so the classes were closed. Girl students in a village in Takestan said: ‘The education authorities of Takestan refused to send a teacher to our village because they said there are too few of us. But in fact there were twenty girls in the first grade of high school and eleven girls in the second grade. So they have denied us education.’

The next step was to undertake an extensive propaganda campaign in schools. Agents of the regime working as ‘Education Affairs Instructors’ extensively encouraged girls to marry. They stressed the futility of girls receiving education. In many girls’ high schools, mathematics courses were closed on the pretext that there was a shortage of teachers and facilities. Girls are told, ‘Find a husband and lead a normal life!’

The so-called ‘Headquarters of the Cultural Revolution’ has issued a circular which deprives women from studying many university subjects. Women are barred from enrolling in courses in agriculture, farming and gardening, oil refining, gas and chemical industries, mining, construction, iron and steel production and chemical engineering.

Girls also came to face serious restrictions in studying other subjects. The percentage of seats open to female applicants is 25% in pharmacy, 20% in genetics, and a mere 5% in dentistry. Female graduates can go on with their studies and specialise in only a few select courses [and must occupy the back seats of the class while the men sit up front].

Today, out of about 1.8 million primary school girls, less than a third enter high school. About 1.3 million have no choice but to give up schooling in order to find employment in workshops and factories, or to work without reward in the home. In the academic year 1980-81, only 38,000 girls managed to enter high school. All indications are that this number is still falling.

Further Readings: Women of Iran: The Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam, edited by Farah Azarit, Ithaca, Press, London, 1983. Connexions, see articles on Iran in issues on Militarism (n. 11), Prostitution (n. 12) and Women’s Movements (n. 19). Contact: Iranian Women’s Independent Group, P.O. Box 9829, Berkeley, CA 94709. Slide show on Iranian women available for San Francisco Bay Area viewing. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, CA 94712, Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [=]


Men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the other, and because they [men] spend their wealth to maintain them [to support women]. Good women are obedient, they guard their unseemly parts because God has guarded them. As for those from whom you fear rebellion or disobedience, admonish them and send them to beds apart and BEAT them. Then if they obey you take no further action against them. God is high supreme. —Sureh Nisa-34

These are the words of God as depicted by his prophet Mohammed, justifying violence against women by men. But not all women. Only the rebellious or the disobedient ones. How are these women treated in present-day Iran? Violence has many dimensions and it appears in many different forms, circumstances, and places. But let us look at the violence that has existed in public places. Whether during the Shah’s regime or Khomeini’s, the harassment has always been there (but in different forms). It was never easy for women to go out in public and not get abused—either verbally or physically.

Walking in the streets and shopping was always a hassle. Any man who would walk by us, if he could get close, would commit some kind of physical abuse, or if he was not close he would be verbally abusive, or even both. So as women, we learn to look and act fast. We were constantly watching and zigzagging across the street.

During the Shah’s era, there was no official dress code for women. The behavior of the harassing thugs was not morally or socially accepted. They could get in trouble if an officer was around. Although the government could prevent the harassment perpetrated by men against women, they didn’t care enough to impose laws against it. On one level, the actions of these thugs were subject to punishment; on the other level, they were not taken seriously enough be stopped completely. The abusive behavior was an avenue for the men to let out their frustration.

After the Shah was overthrown, women hoped that they would have real protection and voice in the government. Instead, their situation worsened. The harassment continued, but now it was sanctioned by those in power. Official Islamic policy enacted a dress code for women. Those who didn’t abide by the code were subject to severe punishment. The dress code is called Hijab-e-islami. Hijab means any partition that separates two things. In the Koran it has the sense of a curtain or a veil. In Iran, it has a more specific meaning, covering. A woman is supposed to cover herself from head to foot. She is only allowed to show her face and her hands. The shape of the garment sworn over the clothes must be loose so as not to show any curve of the body. The color should be dark or dull. An ideal Moslem woman wears a black chador—a fabric that loosely drapes from head to toe. She also wears flat shoes. High heels are forbidden because they make noise that supposedly excites men. Makeup is also forbidden because it supposedly excites men. In fact, the discreet woman hides all but her eyes beneath her chador.

A clergyman described this incident on T.V.: ‘A man was passed by a beautiful woman on the street. The woman was fully covered, except for her face, which was too beautiful to be ignored. The man, of course, desired her, so out of frustration he went home and beat up his wife. The moral conclusion of the story is that if the beautiful woman’s face had been uncovered, nothing would have happened, and everyone would be happy.

In order to prevent any “disobedient” woman from appearing in public, there are four revolutionary guardsmen and women (male-identified women) marching the streets all day and night. They will arrest any woman who is not behaving according to Islamic law or to the guardsman’s personal law:

There is no predictable punishment for women. Once a woman is arrested she could be subjected to 80 lashes, imprisonment, verbal abuse, or she could go free, depending on her behavior. If the arrested woman lowers herself and plays it humble, she might be free, but to argue or even resist arrest is very costly.

The revolutionary guards are not the only people who could execute punishment. Every good Moslem has a duty to warn, or attempt to arrest women who he or she thinks are wrongdoers.

Four years ago, I was in Iran, and I went to the Caspian Sea with two other women to take care of some family business. One day we decided to go for a walk in a place where we used to do a lot of hiking. As we were walking, a man approached us and asked us what we were doing there and who we were. Since we had dressed according to the official code, we told him he had no right to disturb us, especially since he was not a guard. He told us that in the Islamic republic, every man is a guard and it was his Islamic duty to prevent us from going walking. We got into a long and disturbing argument. Meanwhile, other men approached, in order to support him. Finally, he told us that he did not trust our “brain,” and went to call the guards. In frustration and anger, we went back, fearing we might be stopped and taken away at any time.

We were at the Caspian Sea for four days and we were stopped and questioned three times. The last time, we were heading back to Tehran. As we were getting gas along the way, four guards stopped us and took us back to our place to question us, as well as other people with whom we were staying. They cross-examined us and after two hours, because we played it really humble, they let us go.

In every crisis, in order to distract people, the government focuses on women, and the harassment escalates. The media starts attacking the improper wearing of hijab, the streets, and the school. Workplaces become dungeons. A few months ago, during one of these attacks on women, the administrators asked the girls’ schools to watch their students. A girl aged 16 who had been given warnings a few times for her “bad” behavior was expelled from school. According to her mother, after
The shoddy state of the film industry in Iran. to drive there every day. The Revolutionary Guards guarding the economic poverty usually leads to cultural poverty. This is reflected in cinema. Pars Theatre was located exactly opposite a Mosque. We used Iranian cinema was. There are a lot of poor people in Iran, and I think that power struggle that went on between the Mosque and the theatre and society would change. It did not take long for my dreams to be shattered. I appear in films or theatre)?

Q: How did you become a Mam Nou Ul Chehreh (forbidden to Britain. I was not allowed to see my son for 12 years—not until I arrived in Once I had a Kurdish-style scarf instead of the government-designated convenience did not work; I got a divorce, and lost custody of my three-had any make-up on. They would threaten to execute me in the house. My mother supported me by telling him that I wanted to attend my brother's piano classes. I went to rehearsals for a short while, until one day my father turned up at the rehearsal. He was furious. He took me home and would not let me out of the house until my sister convinced him that I should learn English. I pretended I was going for English lessons while I was really attending rehearsals. This is how I managed to appear in my first TV play.

After this my father agreed to my appearing in other plays as long as he could turn up at the first rehearsal to put me in the care of the directors or producers. This made me think that if I married an actor my Forces on my back. They would enter my dressing room without guaranteeing that I would never again give interviews. It was like signing a severe depression, she committed suicide.

But women are resisting the oppression, and the suppression by the state. Women utilize any avenue they can to express themselves. In their day-to-day lives, they resist hijab-e-islami. There are more women writers now than during the Shah's era. One of them was arrested and imprisoned for her book, The Women without Men. Women are appearing in public places more and more, and they talk against the government, despite the extremely dangerous situation. They have not given up. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]


Farzaneh Taidi is an actress. She was smuggled out of Iran a few months ago, and now lives in exile in London. What she has gone through in Iran under the Shah and then under the Khomeini regime typifies the life of many Iranian women. The interview was conducted by Rana Bahar, who has chosen to live in London rather than under the Khomeini regime.

Q: You must have faced many problems before you became a wellknown actress; could you tell us how you coped?

A: I was committed to becoming a professional actress, and to fighting against all difficulties. I have now been an actress for over 18 years. My first and most important obstacle was my father. He was against my becoming an actress because—the majority of Iranians—he considered acting an unsuitable profession for women. Women in Iran are expected to get married as soon as they leave school; by the age of seventeen they have had their first if not their second child. Women are not expected to work outside the home.

Q: How did you manage to overcome this fate?

A: I had to think of ways to free myself of my father's hold on me. I was lucky to have the support of my sister and certain friends of the family. Coming from the upper middle classes also helped me to be in the right place at the right time. This accounted for my first TV appearance. A friend who knew people in the Office of Dramatic Arts in Teheran told me that they were looking for someone to play the role of a European woman. My blonde hair and Nordic features made me ideal for the role. When my father came home, this friend mentioned that this play was being rehearsed and asked if it was all right for me to attend the rehearsal. My father agreed, and the next day I went to audition and got the job. The problem was then how to trick my father into letting me out of the house. My mother supported me by telling him that I wanted to attend my brother's piano classes. I went to rehearsals for a short while, until one day my father turned up at the rehearsal. He was furious. He took me home and would not let me out of the house until my sister convinced him that I should learn English. I pretended I was going for English lessons while I was really attending rehearsals. This is how I managed to appear in my first TV play.

Q: But we know that those who produce films are upper-class, highly educated men. Why have they not been able to create an alternative world view for the Iranian culture?

A: If you are asking me why Iranian cinema has been so sexist and commercial, I would argue that it is related to the structure of our poverty-stricken society. The fact is that the majority of Iranian women and men are illiterate and poor. This means that they are not making intellectual demands upon the intelligentsia who do not bother to produce any meaningful, realistic, or responsible art forms. Those who have a lot of money own the film industry and make their own films. These people are the most reactionary people in Iran in terms of cultural values and standards. Men who want money and fame meet young, lower-middle class women, and promise to make them movie stars. They introduce these women to commercial directors, who first spend a few days and nights with them in bed. Then they introduce them to drugs and ask them to act in their pornographic films. Many such women, betrayed and abused emotionally, physically, and sexually, commit suicide.

Q: Have directors and producers treated you similarly?

A: I never appeared in commercial films because they had no place for serious female roles. But even alternative and so-called progressive filmmakers were very patriarchal in their attitude to women. There are no positive and active roles for women other than those of prostitute and mother/housewife. I appeared in 10 films between 1973 and 1978, I played serious female roles in nine out of 10, yet my roles in all of these films were minimal. The leading character was always a man. Iranian history has produced several strong and distinguished women, such as Parvin Etesaami, a poet and philosopher, and Gorat ul Aine, a women's rights campaigner of the 18th and 19th centuries. But filmmakers in Iran never consider making a film about either of these two women.

Q: Couldn't you try to write your own script and direct your own films, so that you could portray women in a different manner?

A: When I turned 30, and had just begun to feel confident and experienced enough to do such things, the Islamic Revolution took over. And that compounded the obstacles I faced. My first troubles with the Islamic Republic began in 1979, only seven months after Khomeini's takeover. In 2/1979, a journalist from the German magazine STERN asked me to comment on the impact of the Islamic Revolution on women. I said that I was very concerned about the future of women under the Khomeini regime. I explained how some 50 years ago, because women were not supposed to be seen in public, male drag artists played women's roles in the theatre and cinema. I was concerned that those days might return. I said that the revolution was a disaster for progressive women. Immediately after it was published, my statement was picked up by the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Since then I have become the subject of unprecedented mental and psychological torture.

At the time I was working with my husband, Behrooz Behnezad, in Pars Theatre in Teheran. I was about to go on the stage when the phone rang and I was summoned to the Courts immediately. They interrogated me for three days, at the end of which they forced me to sign papers guaranteeing that I would never again give interviews. It was like signing away my own personal freedom.

From the moment of my arrest until the day I left Iran five months ago, I have had the Revolutionary Guards and the Committee's Armed Forces on my back. They would enter my dressing room without knocking. Their impression of actresses is that they are sexually available. They would pull out handkerchiefs to make sure we did not have any make-up on. They would threaten to execute me in the revolutionary manner if I refused to observe Islamic uniform on the stage. Once I had a Kurdish-style scarf instead of the government-designated black, grey, or navy blue. Armed guards immediately appeared backstage and stopped the show.

Q: How did you become a Mam Nou Ul Chehreh (forbidden to appear in films or theatre)?

A: It was a long process, which I saw as an integral part of the power struggle that went on between the Mosque and the theatre and cinema. Pars Theatre was located exactly opposite a Mosque. We used to drive there every day. The Revolutionary Guards guarding the

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Mosque and the Mullahs running it were not happy to see hundreds of our fans rushing towards our car every day. Pars Theatre had 850 seats and gave three shows a day, which were always sold out. On Fridays we had an extra show at 3 p.m. for those who attended Friday prayers at the Mosque; that show, too, was always sold out. People would travel from as far away as Mashhad (over 1000 miles) to see our plays. Theatre at that time was a very powerful means of communication, while the Mosque had only just begun to be a power base. The Mullahs did not like our growing popularity. They started to compete with us, offering talks by Islamic leaders together with free three-course lunches. Eventually they demanded that Pars Theatre remove displayed pictures of women actresses. Some months later they demanded that women's names not be mentioned in any form of advertising, not even in the box-office area. They knew that our life-line was our audience, and they were trying different ways of attracting them away from us. Fortunately, none of their attempts worked—we were always fully booked. That's when they started threatening us with death. Then and there I gave up acting.

Q: Did they ever approach you with suggestions of cooperation with the Islamic system?
A: Yes, on numerous occasions we were approached by the Ministry of Information and Guidance with scripts for films. My part in one film was so ridiculous and so obviously propagandist that I was disgusted. According to the script, I was to play a village wife with several children. I am standing on the roof of my house; my few-months-old baby is there too. I become furious with anger for some reason. In blind anger I pick up the baby and throw it down from the roof. Before the baby touches the ground, I am to realise what I have done and scream, "Allah Ul Akbar" (God is great) and "Ya Khomeini," and two magical hands are to appear from nowhere and hold the baby, save it just before it touches the ground.

I refused to act in such a film. The film was to be directed by younger Mullahs or their relatives, with money provided by the government. I wrote back saying I would not be party to the spread of naivete and ignorance among village women. That was the ultimate disobedience. I was forbidden to appear in any films or plays.

Q: The Islamic Republic is repressive and offensive to Iranian women. Why don't they revolt against the state?
A: The major barrier is that the majority of women, about 70%, are illiterate. This is because parents do not believe in educating their daughters; women are supposed to be wives and mothers only. Another barrier is the isolation women in the cities face. They have no experience of organizing together to fight for their rights. Forming a liberation movement is a historical process that does not happen overnight. In the Western societies of today, women have the benefit of historical experiences such as the fight for the right to vote, to own property. But we don't have such experiences, or knowledge of them is denied to us by the dictatorial governments we have been living under since the early 18th century.

Q: Is there anything women in the West could do to support Iranian women?
A: The feminists in the West should raise their own awareness of how their imperialist governments contribute to the repression of women in Iran. What is happening in Iran today is the result of concerted Western support for the Islamic government. Do Western feminists know that their state machinery was involved in bringing Khomeini to power? They should fight against their own governments' involvement in Iran. Only when Western support is withdrawn, only then, Iranian women will find some breathing space to think of organizing themselves and fighting for their own liberation.

Contact: Women Living Under Muslim Laws, International Solidarity Network, 34980 Combaillaux (Montpellier) France. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]
discussion groups on Iranian history, migration and biculturality and workshops on American customs should be organized to help Iranians deal more effectively with the integration of the two cultures. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] =*


The Iranian revolution of 1979 remains a turning point in the recent history of the entire Middle East. This epochal event unleashed a whirlwind of historical forces that has swept across the region and has had serious repercussions throughout the world. From Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and on to Kuwait, Islamic ideology is challenging autocratic and corrupt secular governments. While high officials in these countries point their fingers to foreign interference notably from Iran as the cause of their troubles, the main reason for the success and spread of Islamic ideology in the region is economic inequality, lack of political freedom, and corrupt governments. The imitation of Western type democracies in the Islamic countries of the region in the 20th century has not provided a viable vehicle for growth in the economic sphere, nor has it provided a sound political mechanism in which masses can participate in the decision-making process. Islamic ideology is more indigenous to the culture of these countries, and it preaches an economically egalitarian system and politically one in which people can have a voice. For some countries like Egypt the Islamist groups hardly have to look to Iran for inspiration or ideas. The origins and activities of, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood date back to decades before 1979.

Presently Iran is the only country in modern times to have instituted a theocratic regime, with a cleric as the head of state and a Fagheh (highest religious authority) with supreme political power. With all its shortcomings, Iran's post-revolutionary government is a curious kind of Persian-style democracy. The country's 270-seat Majlis (or parliament) is a lively and important forum for debate. However, the Majlis' decisions are subject to long reviews and approval by the Council of Guardians, a watchdog group of six clerics and six laymen with veto power. Moreover, it is the Council of Guardians that must approve the legitimacy of all candidates for elections. Therefore, its political system is a controlled and distinctive kind of democracy. To address this issue one of our panelists today will examine the evolution of Iran's theocratic regime since its inception in 1979.

When dealing with the issue of the role of women one has to understand the culture of the region. One cannot consider this problem in a Western frame of mind. The culture of Middle Eastern countries is basically male-dominated, probably no one has expressed this feeling better than Iran's late and legendary woman poet Forough Farkhizad when she says:

"Come here, o self-centered male creature, come open the door of the cage. / I am that bird, that bird who for a long time / has had thoughts in her head of flying... / Come open the door so that / I might spread my wings.../ toward the bright sky of poetry./ If you allow me flight/ I will become a flower/ in the rose garden of poetry..."

To get a flavor of this male-dominated mentality it is worth mentioning that just this month the Iranian Majlis defeated a proposal by women members to create a committee on women's issues. One opponent of the bill, Deputy Abbas Abbasi who is a cleric, maintained, "Women must accept that men rule over them, and the world, too, should know that man is dominant." Abbasi then further argued that, "If a women's committee is to be set up, we should also form a men's committee. If this motion is carried, we will be hearing murmurs tomorrow about a minister for women's affairs."

In the Western frame of mind, the veil or hejab, is a sign of repression. But for true Islamists, the veil is a sign of modesty and purity. It is a rejection of the allegedly Western idea of woman as a commercial and sexual object. Paradoxically, under the clerical regime Iranian women are gaining some form of political power. In the last elections to the Majlis in 6/1992, 9 of the 270 deputies elected were women. This is more than the number of females in the US Senate. Under current clerical rule women seem to have gained a greater sense of participation and identity than under the previous regime when all norms were Western and irrelevant to native traditions. "Zan-e Ruz, a women's magazine, which before the revolution devoted its format to Western fashions, housekeeping, and child care, has been drastically transformed into a journal of social and cultural debate surrounding the issues of women and their place in today's Iran. By wearing the veil, the badge of modesty and purity, women are able to move around freely and are beginning to compel the state to back up its claims to the equality of men and women in Islam."

Two of our speakers - one a westerner and the other an Iranian (but not a Muslim) will examine, from their own perspectives, the sensitive and vital issue of women in Iran today.

Any revolutionary movement promises a utopia in which human values are going to be respected and freedom of expression protected. Iran was no exception. Recently, Iran and a few other countries have adopted a defensive attitude on what they maintain are uniquely western criteria used to judge violations of human rights. One reason for this stand is that by western standards Iran's record is not a good one.

In post-revolutionary Iran, despite all the claims of the Islamic regime to a just and free society, the limits of discourse have been strictly defined. There are no independent newspapers. Books and films are issued a permit only after passing a process of close religious and political scrutiny. Magazines are generally precluded from covering political matters and every issue of a publication must first be submitted to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Artists and intellectuals run the risk of censorship or banning. In the case of books and films such banning can be financially ruinous to the creator.

Radio and television, the two important mass media, are under direct control of the government. For a country in which at least 50% of the population is illiterate, this provides an effective means of control.

Freedom to organize political parties with views not aligned with the prevailing ideology is strictly prohibited. For '91 Amnesty International documented 775 executions, of which at least 60 were the result of convictions on political charges; and for 1992, there were 330 executions, of which at least 140 had been formally charged with political offenses.

To examine this controversial issue one of our speakers who, at Middle East Watch, a human rights organization, has been closely monitoring Iran's record, is going to present us with his observations.

The Department of Economics & Finance is proud to sponsor this conference which will examine such vital issues. Personally, and on behalf of Montclair State, I would like to thank each of the speakers for accepting my invitation to take part in this session. We are honored to have them with us today and hope they will benefit from this discourse as much as we do. [Kamrouz Pirouz: Chair and Conference Coordinator]


Iranian women have never been passive in their pursuit of freedom. From the tobacco strikes at the turn of the century to the student movements and mass uprisings in the 1960s and '70s, Iranian women have been active in social and political protest. However, they have not formed independent women's organizations, although they have demonstrated on several occasions for women's rights. After Khomeini came to power, women constructed several groups, but these were subsets of liberal, leftist and other groups in which the "women's issue" was always the last to be considered.

In the nineteenth century, two patriarchal orders confronted each other. One was the secular patriarchy presenting a new but contradictory policy towards women, and the other, a clerical patriarchy committed to upholding the Islamic law. The history of women's oppression and women's struggle in Iran is embedded in the modernisation movement.
on the one hand, and the power of Islam on the other. The modernisation movement in Iran first began in the early 19th century when students and merchants, travelling in Europe, were impressed by the achievements of the European Industrial Revolution. During the second half of the 19th century, modernisation took on a more direct form of exploitation. Iran was a buffer zone between the empires of Tsarist Russia and Britain, both of which forced their own banks upon Iran, thus imposing a direct form of exploitation. In 1890, a British company obtained the monopoly over production, sale and export of Iranian tobacco. This concession produced a massive wave of popular discontent as Iranian merchants and workers were ruined. The clergy, who were opposed to all foreign influence, joined the opposition and called for the boycott of tobacco use. Strikes and street demonstrations made the anti-concession campaign highly successful. In a mass movement like this, women could take part in demonstrations, and they did, despite apparent general religious sanctions against women smoking.

The anti-concession uprising was the first modern struggle of the Iranian masses and the lessons of that campaign led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The Constitutional Revolution was the result of the combined efforts of opposing forces—the liberal intellectuals and merchants who desired a fair chance against foreign capital and the religious leaders who desired the return of religious power and tradition, as well as the closure of western-style schools that educated girls. The girls' schools, originally established by French and American missionaries, were opened in 1875 to Muslim girls. A small number of young middle class women learned about French women's involvement in the Paris Commune, British women's fight for the vote and Russian women's struggle against the Tsar. These stories were repeated from woman to woman, in family circles, in mosques and even in public baths. Many graduates of these schools themselves established girls' schools despite opposition from the Islamic clergy.

During the Constitutional Movement of the 1900s, women, still wearing the chador (which means tent, the outward sign of women's inferiority), were jailed by the Shah for their activities. Thus, many women during this period developed as speakers, orators and leaders. The girls' schools, originally established by French and American missionaries, were opened in 1875 to Muslim girls. A small number of young middle class women learned about French women's involvement in the Paris Commune, British women's fight for the vote and Russian women's struggle against the Tsar. These stories were repeated from woman to woman, in family circles, in mosques and even in public baths. Many graduates of these schools themselves established girls' schools despite opposition from the Islamic clergy.

In Isfahan, in southern Iran, Seddighe Dowlatabadi set up the Sazeman (which means tent, the outward sign of women's inferiority), which was an essential condition in Islamic marriage. They began their struggle for equality. Because of their sanctioning of Russian imperial intentions, the Tudeh Party lost much of its support.

In 1936, Reza Shah outlawed the veil and women were forced to parade in the main streets unveiled. At the same time, however, the leaders of women's groups called Payke Saadat who were fighting against the veil were jailed by the Shah for their activities. Thus, many considered that the Shah's law was not written with the intent of giving women greater freedom.

The Tudeh Party was formed in 1941 by a group of 53 intellectuals who were under Russian protection and encouragement. This party was a new marriage between popular front tactics and committed to a Stalinist strategy. The women members, some of whom had been involved in earlier women's organisations formed the Tudeh Party's women's wing. But the fight for women's rights did not go further than adopting slogans for equality. Because of their sanctioning of Russian imperial intentions, the Tudeh Party lost much of its support.

In 1952 mass demonstrations and strikes led to the rise of the National Front government headed by Dr. Mossadegh. The nationalization of Iran's oil and various social reforms were priorities of the new government.

However, two years later the Mossadegh government was overthrown in a CIA-engineered coup. In exchange for "saving" Iran from nationalism, the US demanded half of Iran's oil from the newly installed government of Reza Shah, the son of the former leader. With the return of the Pahlavi dynasty and with the help of the US, harsh political restrictions were imposed and the notorious Iranian secret police force, the SAVAK, was created.

Despite vast US aid to the Shah, the regime tottered towards a deep economic crisis by the early '60s. The demand for radical reforms was growing. By 1962, there were mass student demonstrations and university occupations. Hundreds of men and women were injured and some were killed when Tehran University was stormed by troops. In 6/1963, after two to three days of street fighting in Tehran, the Shah ordered that his government immediately launch a programme of reform, known as the White Revolution of the Shah and the People.

The twelve initiatives of the White Revolution were land reform, nationalisation of forests and pastures, the public sale of state owned factories to finance the land reform, profit sharing for workers in industry, votes for women, the formation of a literacy campaign, of a health corps for the rural areas, a reconstruction and development corps, rural courts of justice, nationalisation of waterways, national reconstruction and an administrative revolution for the education service.

As a result of land reform and industrialisation, the need for female child labor on land increased. In the rural areas women and children constituted the majority of the seasonal work force, for which they were paid only half as much as male laborers. The carpet and cloth weaving industries are also concentrated in rural areas and the majority of workers are women and girls, ten to twenty-year-old girls. According to government statistics, female employment in towns was running at around 11% in the mid-1970s, with the majority of women in the service sectors.

In the mid-1970s, although much was made of "liberating" women from the veil, and of granting women the right to vote, they were still inferior beings under the reformed version of Islamic law. Young women of the modernised middle class, however began to fight the traditional way of life within the family. They fought for divorce and refused dowry (which is an essential condition in Islamic marriage). They began temporary or permanent relationships with men, including sexual relationships outside marriage. The family considered this not only an unforgivable disgrace, but also an act of prostitution. The modernised middle class bought virginity with their money. Sewing up the woman's hymen became a profitable business for Iranian doctors.

Many women during this period realised that as long as poverty and repression exist in Iran, women would continue to be regarded as inferior beings. They played an important role in the fight against the system. Out of an estimated 45000 to 100000 political prisoners under the Shah, the official statistics estimated that 4000 were women. While torture was a common fate for all political prisoners in the Shah's jails, the women were subjected to particularly cruel and degrading forms of torture, including rape and other sexual abuses. Despite these severe conditions many women during this period developed as speakers, orators and leaders. The girls' schools, originally established by French and American missionaries, were opened in 1875 to Muslim girls. A small number of young middle class women learned about French women's involvement in the Paris Commune, British women's fight for the vote and Russian women's struggle against the Tsar. These stories were repeated from woman to woman, in family circles, in mosques and even in public baths. Many graduates of these schools themselves established girls' schools despite opposition from the Islamic clergy.

In the northern region of Iran many people were in some way involved with the anti-Tsarist struggle in Russia. As a result, nationalists and merchants led a movement in 1915, calling themselves the Jongalis (the forestmen). The government statistics, female employment in towns was running at
guerrilla fighters and some even fought their way to the political leadership of some organisations. The majority of the women political prisoners were members and sympathizers of the guerrilla organisations.

The Revolution: In 9/1978, following an oil workers' strike, a wave of blue and white collar workers' strikes shut down the oil refineries, the oil fields and the petrochemical complex in the south, the banks, the copper mines and many large industries. The workers demanded political rights as well as economic concessions. A rapid succession of strikes organised by strike committees (which by now were functioning in all factories, plants, all other work places, schools and universities) crippled almost all the bazaars, universities, railways, newspapers, customs and port facilities, airlines, radio and T.V. stations, paper and tobacco plants, textile mills and other large factories.

Violent demonstrations broke out in all cities and even large numbers of peasants from neighboring villages joined the urban rallies. Millions of women participated in demonstrations every day without wearing a veil. They were given scarves by the march organizers, who pleaded with them to wear them as a sign of unity for the overthrow of the Shah. A woman activist showed me a whole wardrobe full of scarves which she collected every day at the demonstrations.

What was important for all these women, veiled or unveiled, workers, peasants or from the middle class, was the fact that they all felt that this was the time to fight not only against the Shah's repression but against all the repression they face as women imposed on them for so long by their fathers, brothers, husbands and even by male comrades. They were women who spent all day everyday fighting. For many women, to wear the scarf or not seemed irrelevant at that point in time.

In early 2/1979, after 18 months of violent clashes, demonstrations, sit-ins and strikes, the Shah was forced to leave the country and one of the regime's best-known opposition leaders, Ayatollah Ruholiah Khomeini returned to Iran after his long exile in France. On 2/26/1979, Khomeini's regime began reestablishing Islamic patriarchy.

Khomeini's attack on women began with a decree on 2/26/1979, that suspended the Family Protection Act—the Shah's minimal reform of women's rights. Khomeini returned the exclusive right of divorce to men, and permitted them to take four permanent and an unlimited number of temporary wives (sighe) without the first wife's permission. A few days later on 3/3/1979, another decree forbade women judges to work with men, according to Islam, women are not fit to judge. On 3/6/1979, the Ministry of Defence barred women from military service (which some women had used as an opportunity to get military training). And finally, on 3/7/1979, Khomeini proclaimed that women, while not prohibited from taking jobs, must wear the Islamic veil (hejab, the head scarf).

The following day, 3/8/1979, hundreds of thousands of women who had been preparing to celebrate International Women's Day after so many years of repression, understood that they had to turn the day into a day of action against the regime. Mass meetings were organised in girls' schools, colleges and at Tehran University against Khomeini's Islamic laws. The demonstrators marched in the streets of Tehran to the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister's office and shouted the slogans: "In the dawn of freedom, our freedom has been taken away." "Down with dictatorship." "We gave our lives for freedom, and we will fight again."

The Hezbollahis (members of the Party of God), the Islamic thugs, attacked the demonstrators with stones, shouting: "Our belief is not your belief, get lost;" "Either you put scarves on your heads or we will hit you on the head." "Either hejab or tisab [acid]." These slogans were and are the essence of Islamic ideology towards women.

This was the first mass demonstration of women since the revolution where women marched without the veil against Khomeini and not the Shah. For a whole week there were further protest meetings and demonstrations against Khomeini's anti-woman legislation. Meanwhile the regime instituted further attacks on women's rights such as prohibiting women's participation in sports with the argument that the atmosphere of sports events was dirty and implementing restrictions on women's education which in many cases excluded girls and women from schools altogether.

On 7/12/1979, for the first time, three prostitutes were executed. This followed Khomeini's speech in which he said, "If you flog four prostitutes, prostitution will end." Later in the year, Chalie Shahrre Noe, the Tehran prostitution quarter, was officially closed down by the Bureau for Fighting Corruption. In 1980, it was turned into a center for Islamic temporary marriage-Islamic prostitution (sighe).

Today, Iranian feminists in exile are organizing independent women's groups all over Europe and in most of the US. They write articles, translate books, and try to keep in contact with women living in Iran in order to build an Iranian feminist movement. The image of the thousands of Iranian women marching and shouting in the streets on 3/8/1979 under Khomeini's regime has not been forgotten.


22117. Prose, Francine. "Gender Defender: Want to Challenge Your State's Abortion Laws? Call Janet Benshoof, the Tireless Pro-Choice Litigator and Activist", in Harpers Bazaar, March 1, 1993, pp. 146, 148. Janet Benshoof, 45, founder of the nonprofit Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, has a long history in public-interest and reproductive law. Benshoof graduated from Harvard Law School and began working at Brooklyn Legal Services, fighting landlord-tenant cases. She was recruited by the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project, and during her 15 years there, she expanded the budget from $70000 to $2 million, and increased the staff from 2 to 12. In 1990, she was arrested in Guam for soliciting abortion; she had read the address of a Honolulu Planned Parenthood office within a press conference, which put Governor Joseph Ada and Guam in the media spotlight (Ada signed the antiabortion law in March 1990).

In June 1992, Benshoof left the ACLU Project and started her own, the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy. Since then, Benshoof's organization has upheld and is arguing womens reproductive rights in various cases: Challenging Guam's appeal to reinstate its ban on abortion (Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), in which Guam's appeal was turned down; an upcoming case concerning Utah's restrictions on abortion and challenge of Roe v. Wade (the Center placed an ad in the New York Times, stating that Utah would shoot a woman who got an abortion); an international case, where Iranian women are seeking asylum in the US for helping a woman in Iran get an abortion, which is a capital crime there; and, the fighting to pass a Freedom of Choice Act before the US Supreme Court.

The Center, which is the only one of its kind, fighting solely for women's reproductive rights, is concerned with abortion laws, state restriction laws on clinics, sex education for minors, rights of pregnant women involved with drugs, fertilized embryo status, vitro-fertilization, and anything that affects women and reproduction and women's bodies. Benshoof states that men are not legally required to give blood to children, and pregnancy should be viewed the same; women's bodies, not just men's, should be Constitutionally protected.

Benshoof says that the Center is vastly underfunded, and that the spotted owl issue receives more money than women's reproductive rights. With a budget of $2.5 million now, and a staff of 21 (other important Center lawyers include: Kathryn Kolbert, Simon Heller and Lynn Paltrow), Benshoof says that $10 million would make them effective. The Center has received support from the MacArthur Foundation, which gave her the "genius grant" in 1992, and from the art district: Warren Buffett, Jessica Lange, Barbara Musbacher, Felicity Gund. Besides more funding, Benshoof says they also need a stronger
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www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

22118. Quaataert, Donald; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 09: Modern Turkey and Iran: Ottoman Women, Households and Textile Manufacturing, 1800-1914. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 161-176. Little is known about Ottoman households in the nineteenth century, but it is clear that households were major production of even manufactured goods, such as textiles. While in the period there was a decline in textile production, the fall off of production by male guilds may conceal the growth of informal textile production by the household sector and the growth of a female-staffed modern industrial textile industry.

In the nineteenth-century silk industry of Bursa, silk production included a complex sexual division of labor. In 1812, silk production was 150000 pounds, but production plummeted in the 1830s as guild production fell. The new industrial silk sector relied on women workers, and rose from 10% of production in 1850 to 98% (of reeling) in 1860, when raw silk output reached 1.5 million pounds. Excepting factory supervisors, the Bursa silk industry workforce was entirely female. The major problem for the industry was recruited female workers (in the 1860s, the Pope (in Rome) issued a decree allowing Armenian girls to work in the mills) The overwhelming role of women in these factories was largely a product of the traditional labor shortage in the Ottoman Empire; also, the variable and parttime nature of the work was seen as inadequate for men but appropriate to women (“that corresponded well with Ottoman society’s view of female labor as supplemental”). Between 1820-1870, some 160000 Ottoman women FTE were freed from manual cotton spinning at home by the growth of industrial production: continuing home spinning was typically a mark of the poverty of the household (yet the almost universal presence of hand looms in the homes allowed women temporarily unemployed to shift back to handmadecloth production). The nineteenth-century growth in silk reeling, lacemaking, and carpetmaking, was fueled by European demand and sustained by very low wages paid to women workers. However, whether engaged in house-centered textile production, or working in the new industrial sector, women’s economic contribution to the Ottoman household and to the emerging Ottoman industrial sector was crucial, even as the reallocation of female labor between these two sectors highlights the pragmatic flexibility of the Ottoman gender division of labor.

22119. Sanasarian, Eliz. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Politicizing Gender: Reflections on Fourteen years of Theocracy. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics, Business Administration, October 30, 1993, pp. 23-25. Thank you for inviting me. Much of the discussion here revolves around the state (including government organs, official representatives, leaders, and policies) and a community of women (not individual women) who have actively participated in organizing groups, running for public office, or have directly raised women’s issues with the state. To “politicize” means: “To bring a political character or flavor to; to make political...” Under the Pahlavi regime gender issues were politicized nationally on only two occasions: (1) the unveling law of 1935/36, and (2) the 1963 legislation which gave women the right to vote and to be elected to public office (one among a series of reforms known as the White Revolution). Both aroused opposition from the clerical groups and temporarily highlighted women’s issues. Yet there never was a rigorous public debate on gender in the Pahlavi era. The rigid-brutal authoritarianism of Reza Shah and the controlling-coopting style of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule prevented a debate. This hindering of debate was not only on women’s issues but on other issues of public policy in Iran. National media rarely addressed serious and complex problems, and when they did, the problem was dismissed as an isolated incident caused by provincialism and religious backwardness.

After the 1979 Revolution the most restrictive measures against women were launched during the first three years. They included abrogating the meager family laws with a clear disadvantage to women, forced Hejab, the criminal code known as Qesas, and restrictions on women’s choices of work. These restrictions got worse as, for example, female students’ choices of fields of studies in higher education were severely curtailed. Briefly, all legal and social changes were reversed except one, women’s suffrage.

Yet the message was loud and clear: women’s political and social participation is accepted in Islam and Iran. This avenue set in motion a process that was difficult to stop or to reverse. Women’s activism began to acquire a life of its own as it got entangled with the male elite. Sometimes it went along with them and other times it went against them. Also, different female voices were heard on a variety of issues.

Politicization of gender has come from different quarters: (1) the regressive policies and legislation of the regime, (2) the prominence and close attention given to women, sexuality, and gender differences through mass media and clerical pulpits, (3) obvious contradictions between what was preached and actually done. For example, women served in a non combat military capacity and learned how to use arms yet they were told that the fields of agriculture and geology were not suited to their nature. (4) government failure to live up to its promises of protecting mothers, widows, and poor women... This despite the fact that motherhood was officially endorsed and legislatively encouraged. Here, women not only experienced deficient services by government organs, they also saw a conflict among them over the interpretation of gender-related issues. For example, the government organ responsible for implementing legislation on divorce, the Special Civil Courts, was severely criticized in the mid-1980s by a myriad of women’s groups. The criticism circled around the inefficiency and male bias of the courts and issues such as expediting a man’s request for divorce with no regard to the welfare of the wife and granting custody of children to the husband regardless of his character. However, years before this controversy, the women’s press had identified some of the reasons for high divorce rates in Iran: moral corruption and drug addiction of men, age difference between the spouses, the meddling of relatives, polygamy, and male machismo. In fact, in 1986, a round table of professional women and one female deputy discussed the issue and prepared a list of suggestions including having female legal and family counselors and setting up new family courts. (5) The male elite continuously addressed gender issues in political, religious, and social settings. This prompted the reversing of some issues and contradiction in concept and meaning of what was being said. For example, despite favoring polygamy, President Rafsanjani in a 1989 speech declared that having more than one wife is not to the advantage of a man.

Ayatollah Khamenei, when he was President, made the following speech at the inauguration of the first international congress on women and the Islamic revolution which was held in Tehran in 2/1988: “Islam urges women to strive and reach perfection which has no limits, nor does it stop at any point and therefore has granted them the right to serve society as a scholar, inventor, philosopher, teacher, physician, or even an active politician.” Increasingly, women outside and inside the Islamic Assembly became the spokespersons for the female constituency. This constituency is generally non Westernized, religious, comes from a traditional (rather than modern) family structure, and is socially conservative.

During the first, second, and third Majlis only four deputies (out of some 270) were female. During the fourth Majlis beginning in 1992, nine deputies are female. If one looks at the male/female ratio, it does look dim. Yet, the larger picture shows slow but incremental improvement. Legislative allowing more conditions under which a woman can get a divorce has been expanded. Limits placed on the fields of study by university students have been reduced. Today, for example, women can major in the field of agriculture, a reversal which was prompted by an avalanche of women’s protests well exemplified in a comment by Azam Talegani: “Two-thirds of the women in this country live in the rural areas; they perform much of the agricultural labor yet women cannot study the field of agriculture?” Already the female deputies of the one-year-old fourth Majlis have...
targeted two issues: demand to set up a special commission to address women's issues and grievances, and to reverse the legislation preventing females from travelling abroad for higher education unless they are accompanied by their husbands. The first was voted down recently in Majlis, while the second is being worked out in special committee as of this date.

The conceptual and theoretical aspects of these changes in individual Islamic women community activists and the Islamic state have been discussed in much more detail in my article in the Journal of Developing Societies. Suffice it here to say that politicizing women's issues has prompted a demand by women to be included in state development. I would like to end by reading a quote from my article: "Every time they compared Muslim women to Western women and argued that women have been oppressed in the West but not in Islam, they raised awareness. Every time they reasserted female equality and praised women's abilities, they raised expectations. Every time they admitted that oppression of women is ongoing in Iranian society, they raised demands. Every time they met with women's groups, they gave them recognition. The state officials unwittingly entangled themselves in gender discourse." Thank you. [x]

22120. Schauf, C. Hart. The Lower Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Part 43: The Mekong River Scheme-The Awakening of a Giant: Organizing For Action: Good Will International. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co Inc., 1963. The report of the Wheeler Mission engendered two reactions. On the one hand there was jubilation at the confirmation of earlier assessments, and applause for the establishment of a clear, itemized program of work. But on the other hand there was apprehension at the extent of the effort recommended, and the estimated cost of $9.2 million. This uneasiness was somewhat countered, of course, by the announcement that France was placing funds at the disposal of the Committee, which as noted had been made at its First Session. At the Second Session of the Mekong Committee the representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board reported an allocation of $200000 by its Executive Chairman from the TAB contingency fund. Further world-wide response was gratifying. At the annual session of ECAFE in 3/1958, New Zealand's Prime Minister offered $100000 and the United States $2 million to the program. Within a year the Committee's resources exceeded $ million. By the beginning of 1961 they reached approximately the Wheeler Mission target of $9.2 million; and by the end of 1961 they neared $1 million-then to launch virtually all the data collection program as suggested by the Wheeler Mission and to advance beyond data collection to the commencement of planning of ten multiple-purpose component projects, three of them on the mainstream, and to begin actual construction of navigation aids in some reaches of the river. The total resources contributed or pledged to the Mekong Scheme in approximate U. S. dollar equivalent by the Spring of 1963 came to some $37 million. In addition, the Ford Foundation has provided a number of travel grants; and the Pan-Pacific South East Asia Women's Association has offered to participate in social studies. It will have been noted that the figures are given in "US dollar equivalent." When cooperation in the Mekong Scheme is in cash, expenditure is in some cases authorized globally, and in others limited to a particular country. Many contributions are not in cash but in kind. Thus despite handicaps of currency restrictions and adverse trade balances, an effective channel of cooperation in the Mekong Scheme can usually be worked out with any country, agency or organization which desires to participate. The full list of participants by the Spring of 1963, in addition to the four riparian states themselves (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam), were Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States through the Colombo Plan; the Republic of China, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Philippines; the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations (BTAO), Technical Assistance Board (TAB), and Special Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Labor Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation, the Pan-Pacific South East Asia Women's Association, Resources for the Future, and a number of private companies. Each item of cooperation, large or small, it is clear, must be carefully fitted into the overall plan of the Mekong Scheme; this emerging master plan is described in the next chapter. [x]

22121. Schatzman, Dennis. "Race War Is Bot Coming. It Is Already Here", in New York Amsterdam News, November 16, 1996. pp. 11, 44. [Schatzman is a former district court judge in Pittsburgh and is now a journalism professor at CSU-Fullerton.] Carl Rowan's prediction of race war in the United States is not correct because it is already here. Black Americans are under intense attack by intense but carefully concealed attacks. Former Pres. George Bush and retired Col. Oliver North used the Contras and CIA to pour crack cocaine into inner-city neighborhoods to finance their war in Nicaragua. California's pete Wilson has been unapologetic in his efforts to "create a race war" by eliminating Affirmative Action (Wilson fired his Black staffer Paulette Matthews for treason when she balked at his plan to end Affirmative Action). ADL leaders like Clifford Savaran in Cleveland and Abraham Foxman in New York, who denounced anyone they disagreed with as "anti-semites". CNBC "propagandists" Geraldo Rivera and Charles Grodin attack on O.J. Simpson and the Blacks who support his acquittal. A similar role is played by the big three newspapers: the New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times. Everywhere in America, the "militia...foot soldiers" who murder Black men in the streets are the cops: "like soldiers, they have a license to kill while defending the honor of the nation." [TXT]

22122. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 94: The State of the Israeli Economy: Part 1 of 2. Israel, January 20, 1992. In spite of the uncertainty over whether Israel is going to obtain American guarantees, their first expected yearly installment, to the tune of $2 billion, has already been included in the 1992 government budget. This fact prompted the best economic correspondents of the Hebrew press to reflect at some length about the real state of Israeli economy. On this occasion, the same correspondents were also comparing the current economic realities with the reports which the Israeli Treasury had been submitting to the Americans. This report will confine itself to a summary of how things in this respect are and how are they presented, without probing into the deeper causes of the current Israeli economic decline: at least beyond the obvious point that the long-standing policy of recent Israeli governments (not just Shamir's!) to use maximal financial resources for the sake of the former USSR.

But let us begin with the facts. On 1/1/1992, Gideon Eshet published two articles in the Yediot Ahronot Financial Supplement. The first, summarizing the economic data for 1991 on the basis of the preliminary report of the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, bears the title: "For the first time in the last decade, the [Israeli] GNP per capita decreased by 1% in 1991". True, "the [aggregate] GNP grew by 5.2%" in that year: the decrease in GNP per capita having being due to the population growth, largely accounted for by the immigration of Jews from the territories of the former USSR.

Eshet's detailed analysis of the Israeli GNP figures contains much useful information. Much of the GNP increase can be accounted for by a 33% growth in apartment housing construction. By comparison, industrial production increased only by 6%, while agricultural production decreased by 14%. As is well known, new immigrants, by and large willing to accept no matter how menial jobs in the towns, absolutely refuse to work in agriculture. At the same time, beginning with the summer of 1990, the Israeli government radically restricted the issuance of work-in-Israel
permits for the Palestinians from the Territories. Many thus denied their right to work had been employed in agriculture. Economic considerations, however, pale in Israel in importance when confronted with racist and "security" considerations. There is no reason to suppose that this order of priorities may be reversed, especially as long as American money continues to flow. Hence it can be expected that as long as the US lavishes on Israel free money (whether in form of "aid" or of guarantees to the Israeli government) it will stick to its racist policies regardless of their economic consequences.

Eshet’s second subject is the analysis of the patterns of Israeli consumption in 1991. It seems that the largest increase occurred in the sector of "security imports", which grew by more than a third as compared to 1990. I have already discussed this matter and its implications in my report 89. What remains to be added here, is only that an expenditure of such magnitude, even if fully paid for by the American taxpayer, is bound to have an adverse effect on Israeli economy. Helicopters, for example, have to be operated by handsomely paid crews which otherwise could perhaps be more usefully employed in production for export. Moreover, storage and maintenance of helicopters also drain resources without commensurable returns. According to Eshet, however, consumption also increased, even if only to the extent of 8%, in the sector of private luxuries, like the cars, expensive TV sets, videos etc. As was noted by other commentators, for example by Lily Galili ("What are the new immigrants eating?", Haaretz, January 9), the aggregate consumption of food remained in 1991 stationary, which means that consumption of food per capita decreased. Galili, who reports that the pertinent data "astonished the senior officials at the Treasury", argues that "since the new immigrants and other poor Israelis must eat something, we must presume that they eat little: probably mainly waste vegetables and other dirt@cheap produce obtainable in the markets, which are not even covered by any statistics". Indeed, her conclusion is well corroborated by the press stories about new immigrants and other poor Israelis looking for discarded food in garbage cans, or about their children who come to school without a single slice of bread in their bags. Such stories no longer count in Israel as news. Indeed, the gap between the poor and the middle class and rich can be assumed to grow steadily, 1991 being the year of a further and quite dramatic polarization.

In regard to the future, the two crucial economic indicators are the investments and the balance of payments. Eshet reports that although in 1991 investment increased by about 40%, following an increase of only 17% in 1990 and near zero investment growth in 1985-89, the bulk of this increase occurred in the sector of apartment housing construction. Hardy any other construction was in 1991 in progress, which means that no new industrial projects are planned for 1992. A large part of that construction, variably estimated as between 25-40%, took place in the Territories. In regard to the balance of payments, the total trade deficit rose by $2.5 billion, or 50%, in a single year, to reach the sum of $7.5 billion, thus equalising what Israel expects to obtain from the US in aid during two and half years. As Eshet notes, this deficit was caused "by the decrease of exports by 2% and the increase of imports by more than 10%". He finds it strange that this deficit was amassed in spite of some favorable world trade circumstances, such as "the drastic fall in oil prices which in 1991 saved the Israeli economy as much as $0.5 billion". Eshet also provides data on wages and income distribution. These data are quite illustrative of the trends the Israeli economy is now undergoing. Thus the real wages of Israeli employees "declined in 1991 by 1.2%, while within the last three years the decline amounted to 5%". The decline of real wages needs to be contrasted with the growth of productivity which in 1991 increased by 1.7% and in three last years by about 7%. Together, the decrease of wages and the increase of productivity have contributed to the changes in proportion of wages and of capital to the [Israeli] GNP: the former decreasing and the latter increasing. "The proportion of the capital to the [Israeli] GNP increased by 16% in 1991, after increasing by 11% in 1990".

In his second article "The failure in figures", Eshet tries to interpret his data. "By any accepted standard of assessing it, 1991 ended up badly [for Israel]. If economic data are to be taken as an indication of the government policy’s success, then the data of the Israeli Bureau of Statistics (in particular the decrease of the GNP per capita by about 1%) point to a devastating failure". After pointing out that the Israeli budget for 1992 does not seem to provide any remedies, Eshet proceeds to discussing the steady growth of unemployment. According to official data, unemployment in December 1991 already exceeded 10%, but its real extent is probably higher, because a lot of Israelis from the three most affected categories (the demobilized soldiers, the new immigrants and the Israeli Arabs) no longer bother to apply to the official Employment Offices.

Features of the recession documented by Eshet find their confirmation in writings of other commentators. Thus, Tzvi Zerakhyah and Judy Meit ("The percentage of unemployed is highest [in Israel] since 1966", Haaretz, January 14) rely on the data published by the Bank of Israel and the Ministry of Labor and Welfare to show the 30% increase of unemployment in 1991 alone. If the trend continues throughout 1992, the authors forecast that the number of officially unemployed "will by the end of that year reach more than 250000", as compared to "104000 at the year’s beginning". Those figures, however, "do not include a great majority of new immigrants. According to the official data, no more than 50,000 new immigrants have joined the national labor force. But the unemployment figures don’t include 35000 new immigrants who in 12/1991 passed their first year in Israel and thereby ceased to be entitled to a relief from the absorption basket [i.e. the subsidies for their living expenses, apartment rentals, etc.]. Those 35000 should by now begin to work, but judging from the press reports, only few of them actually did. Nor do the unemployment figures include those new immigrants who attend the fully government-subsidized vocational retraining courses. No wonder under such conditions immigration to Israel has since several months dropped sharply. (This fact seemed to escape both the US media and the official Israeli estimates published in the US). The arrivals of new immigrants in 1/1992 are reported to be in the vicinity of 5000, and since the monthly figure is steadily declining, the official Israeli forecast of a quarter of a million as due to arrive in 1992 is clearly delusory. The bulk of the brand-new arrivals originate from the Muslim Asian republics of the former USSR, such as Uzbekistan.

Even more elucidating is the authors’ breakdown of the unemployed by profession. The two professional categories in which the unemployment is the highest, turn out to be the academics (including engineers)and the skilled industrial workers. By contrast, in sectors requiring mostly unskilled work, such as agriculture or construction, the unemployment is relatively mild. As noted above, Israel is still forced to rely on Arabs from the Territories for work in these two sectors; whereas in "sensitive areas" in which the Palestinians are denied employment, Israel relies on other foreign workers still imported from countries as remote as Poland or Thailand. The concentration of unemployment in skilled occupations makes nonsense of rosy anticipations which various "Israeli sympathizers" frequently publish in the US press. In such anticipations, Israeli, provided it receives the American guarantees, can with the help of trained academicians and engineers from the ranks of new immigrants easily turn into another model of successful economic development: another Singapore or Taiwan. The opposite is true. Regardless of the settlements and of the Israeli policies in the Territories, further doses of free American money can in no way cure Israeli economic ills. They can only aggravate them.

Extrapolations of the present trends beyond 1992 yield an even grimmer picture. In the conclusion of this report I will yet state my personal opinion that there is no point in making such extrapolations. Still, I am reporting one such extrapolation to prove that if the Israeli policy does not change, it can only lead to economic disasters. The extrapolation in question is based on a document commissioned by the Israeli government from Ya’akov Lifshitz, a former Director General of the Israeli Treasury. The document is due to be submitted to the Americans in order to persuade them to grant the guarantees. "The economists forecast unemployment at 480000 in 1996 if Israel does not get guarantees from the US", Hadashot, January 17), and as such, it is meant to replace another official document to be described below. The most revealing part of Lifshitz’ document deals with the status of the
Israeli debt, disclosing facts which the Israeli censorship had banned from publication even during the annual budget debates in the Knesset. According to Lifshitz, “Under the rubric ‘other loans’, the Israeli budget for 1992 includes loans to the sum of 8 billion Shekel, equivalent to $3.5 billion, due to be received from abroad on the basis of guarantees for the $2 billion expected from the US”. Lifshitz informs that in addition to the $2 billion “already included in the Israeli budget [for 1992] on revenues’ side, another $3 billion are included as well. No one else has information. But it claims “that without getting the $10 billion American guarantees in the next five years, as looked forward to, Israel will not be able to obtain the needed $20 billion from any other source... since in the financial world no one will want to loan any money to Israel after the US refuses to grant the guarantees”. I am omitting Lifshitz’s rosy anticipations of the upswing of the Israeli economy once the guarantees are granted and the loans dependent on them received. I am doing this because economic (and other) information which Israel feeds the Americans with can be safely assumed to be fabricated. Except that the Americans usually want to be cheated and accept Israeli fabrications knowingly. The contents of Lifshitz’s document stand in glaring contradiction with another Israeli official documentary presentation of the state of the Israeli economy which was submitted to the Americans a short while earlier (Nehama Du’efek and Gideon Eshet, “How deceptions are being sold to the Americans”, Yediot Ahronot Financial Supplement, January 10). The latter document, drafted by the Treasury itself, was conceived to ad supplement of sorts to the first Israeli request for guarantees submitted 4 months earlier, “which had consisted of no more than a dozen pages” and which had lacked any real information. But, as the authors report, “even this new and already thick document, is no more than a strenuous exercise in self-beautification. Israel presents itself there as embarking on an exemplary economic policy, certain to succeed, more than anybody else ever has”. Israeli production and exports are promised “to boom instantly”, allowing Israel to repay the guaranteed loans with ease. Noting that “the chapters of the document contain both the analyses of [Israeli] economic past and the predictions of future miracles”, the authors wisely prefer to confine themselves to discussing the former, and thus show the document’s crude mendacity.

Let me cite a few of their findings. For example, the Americans are assured in that document that a new government-owned company “Yozma” (“Initiative”) was founded “to encourage investment in an almost of 26,000 new businesses in modern projects in the private sector”. The authors acutely comment that the document “forgot” to mention “that ‘Yozma’ was then for many months [to be exact since 4/1990] still in the process of formation” not yet completed due to a factional dispute within the Likud over the choice of its directors. The Americans are also assured by the document that “the [Israeli] government had already decided to slash state subsidies for water and public transportation. Yet for some unknown reason, the document conceals that the Knesset reversed the government’s decision regarding the subsidies for water and that the minister of Transportation publicly announced that the decision regarding the subsidies for public transportation would not be carried out”. It can only be added that both decisions were fully approved by Shamir, although it can be hardly be doubted that at least the former was never meant to be carried out, its real aim having been to deceive the Americans. While opining that “the Americans love nothing as much as privatization” of government-owned enterprises, the authors quote from the discussed document a number of Israeli promises of the privatization of all and sundry government-owned companies. They further say that “promises of this kind have already been made for several years”, and express their utter disbelief that they may be ever carried out. Indeed, there are good political reasons for paying no credence to such promises. For example, no less than 25% (!) of the Likud Council membership is now comprised of members of directorates of government-owned companies or of close relatives of theirs, while among Labor party stalwarts the corresponding percentage is smaller but still quite significant. Under present circumstances, with Israeli policies unchanging, I cannot figure out who the prospective buyers of the Israeli government-owned businesses might be. There is no point in listing other examples of Israeli official deceptions which the two authors provide. But their conclusion by all means deserves to be quoted. “Our message to the Americans is true-to-type Israeli: ‘Give us money and have confidence in us! Everything will be OK. And besides, why should you worry? What do $10 billion really matter between friends?’ As long as the Americans so desire, they will anyway keep swallowing all [Israeli] deceptions”.

However, in all fairness it must be pointed out that the Israeli ministry of Finance deceives not only the Americans, but other Israeli ministries as well. Far from it. Furthermore, the minister of Trade and Industry, Moshe Nissim (who, like the minister of Finance Moda’i, is a member of Likud) during an interview with Nehama Du’efek (“I was a year of freeze and of missed opportunities”, Yediot Ahronot Financial Supplement, January 14) said that “the figures supplied by the [Israeli] Treasury are not true. They are all lies and deceits”. Nissim said it in response to the Treasury’s announcement, addressed both to the Americans and to the Israeli citizens, that in 1992 it allotted more money for creating jobs than in 1991. In rebuttal, the minister of Trade and Industry said “that allotment for creating the jobs was in this budget not by a single penny higher than in the previous one. I showed how the presented figures were lies and at the government meeting I voted against the budget in protest. But everyone knows how the [Israeli] government makes its decisions”. Although Nissim is right about Moda’i (and perhaps also vice versa), this is no proof that the former is any better economist than the latter. Nissim’s currently avowed aim is that Israel should emulate the example of “Mexico and Chile”. When questioned by the interviewer why don’t we see here, then, a long line of the same investors who now invest in Mexico and Chile?” he answered “because we don’t know how to sell ourselves”. His proposals, apart from his Mexico-and-Chile idea, don’t anticipate any other change, whether political or economic. Like Moda’i, he is on record as prioritizing the progress in settlement formation over anything else, including the US guarantees. He only hopes that “through good and quiet work in the Congress”, Israel can get both.[=]

22123. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 94: The State of the Israeli Economy: Part 2 of 2. Israel, January 20, 1992. Nissim said it during the same week during which the Hebrew press was filled with headlines like “Children come to school hungry” (Yediot, January 13), “Money urgently needed for 8 roads in the densely populated central area of Israel has under settlers’ pressure been reallocated for 3 new roads in the Territories” (Yediot, January 9), or with a number of news items about the growing number of “Russian Jewish women working as prostitutes” (e.g. Kol Ha’ir, January 10, which reports that their prevalent motive is to feed their children). Although I could quote such headlines from other papers as well, I chose them mostly from Yediot which has circulation higher than all other papers combined. I could therefore presume that the Likud ministers and their underlings at least scan it.

In addition to that, around January 7 the entire Hebrew press reported that the number of Israeli breadwinners officially defined as “being below the poverty line” increased in 1991 by over 100,000, to reach the magnitude of 538000 within the nation-wide population (including East Jerusalem) estimated on January 1, 1991 as amounting to 4.8 million. The number of Israelis in the 20-54 age cohort was on the same date 2.024 million. Even if to discount the relatively high percentage of non-working Israeli women, and even though the nationwide population in 1991 increased, it would not be far of the mark to anticipate any other change, whether political or economic. Like Moda’i, he is on record as prioritizing the progress in settlement formation over anything else, including the US guarantees. He only hopes that “through good and quiet work in the Congress”, Israel can get both.[=]
the sake of Greater Land of Israel, the settlers and the religious parties whose constituency amounts to less than 20% of the Israeli electorate? True, in the short-range, certainly in 1992, the incitement of Shamir and Sharon not only against "the Arabs", but also against Labor and Left-to-
Labor parties, which have already been exorcized by Likud as "Arab
lovers", will probably yield an electoral victory in elections which are
now scheduled for 6/1992. A prediction of that effect was made by David
observed that during a meeting of Likud's Center held barely few
days before, Shamir and Sharon heaped all the abuse they could against
the Labor party as a whole, after the latter not only carefully refrained
from attacking Likud, but also supported Shamir's conduct at the Madrid
Conference and during its aftermath. On that basis Padatzur concluded,
righly in my opinion, that Shamir "emulated the hysterics" of Begin in
1981 electoral campaign, when "Labor was accused of treason, of not
caring about security of Israeli citizens, of harming national interest and
breaking national unity. Through such appalling incitement, Begin
succeeded in shifting the focus of the electoral debate with Labor from the
deeep economic crisis to political and security issues". Essentially the
same tactics was used by Shamir in the 1984 electoral campaign. Padatzur
predicts that by "diverting attention of voters from the present
government's economic failures... Likud will focus in the coming
electoral campaign on what it considers the top national priority for the
present and future generations, namely on 'guarding the Land of Israel'...
Hundreds of thousands of [Israeli] unemployed, of homeless, of
materially deprived and of those in need of more extensive welfare
services, for the most part don't understand not only what they read, but
also what they see and hear. They are doomed to be deeply affected by
the scare propaganda". I concur with Padatzur's prediction regarding the
next elections. But how long can such tactics work? I cannot envisage it
as working for years.

Another explanation of Shamir's policies, as offered by some
commentators, is in terms of Israeli intention to scare the Americans.
Two above quoted official Israeli documents addressed to US authorities
do contain the threat that failure to grant the guarantees on the part of the
US can only lead to Israel's economic and the military collapse. As
Nehama Du'ek and Gideon Eshet put it, "in trying to scare the Americans
of their wits, and thus make them believe that there exists no alternative
to their guarantees, the official Israeli request exhibits a range of horror
scenarios. Foremost among them is the answer to the hypothetical
question: what will be the economic consequences of our receiving the
guarantees for only the half of what we request, i.e. for $5 billion?" In
that event, the document anticipates a drastic decrease of personal revenue
levels, with the consequence of "mass emigration of young Israelis of
army service age" and the resultant decrease of Israel's military power.
The document does not say where could those young Israelis emigrate to.
It only promises the US that granting the guarantees in the amount
requested is going to entail an economic miracle owing to which the
young Israelis will stay at home and serve happily in the army for ever
after.

As I indicated above, the documents produced by Israeli Treasury
need to be viewed with suspicion. The horror scenarios are certainly a
clumsy concoction. After all, the generous terms of a settlement offered
Israel via Baker by the Saudis and their allies in 4/1991, which were
rejected by Shamir out of hand, would in all probability have sufficed
to solve Israel's gravest economic problems for some years to come. But
questions remain. One of them is whether after the collapse of the USSR
the US will keep supinely accepting everything Israeli says. The second
question is whether Shamir wants Israel to depend on the US good will.
My own best guess is that Shamir's policies do not depend on such
uncertainties. When the US economy is itself in bad shape, even the
power of the Jewish lobby in the Congress may not help for long.

In making this guess, I rely to a certain extent on what I have heard
from my private informants, but, much more crucially, I take into all due
consideration the warnings of an imminent Israeli aggression against
Syria or a raid against Iran or both. I described those warnings in a series
of my reports, most recent having been nos. 89 and 90. To a considerable
extent, such predictions rest on the analogy with the situation Israel found
itself in before and after the 1967 War. As mentioned by Tzvi Zerakhyha
and Judy Melz "the percentage of unemployed is [now in Israel] highest
since 1966". Indeed, from the beginning of 1966 till June 1967 Israel was
in deep recession. Many observers, myself included, believe that Israel
then planned a war, also in order to stem that recession. As it was
planned, the war was intended against Syria, possibly also against
Jordan, but Egypt, which at that time was heavily engaged in a guerilla
campaign by Israel, was not in the planners' consideration. (A fine rendition of these events in the excellent book by Andrew
and Leslie Cockburn "Dangerous Liaison", frees me from
necessity to retell the story here.) What is of concern to me here, is that
the economic effects of that war proved to be most fortunate for Israel,
until the next war, that of October 1973, reversed the economic situation
again. The years 1967-1973 marked an economic prosperity unsurpassed in Israel's history. The prosperity was not due to US
financial aid, whose size was until October 1973 minuscule and flow
sporadic. Nor was it due to Israeli exploitation of the Territories, which
certainly existed, but still without yielding sizable economic benefits.
Its main factor was private investment which right after the victory in the Six
Day War reached an unprecedented scale, at once extricating Israel from
its recession. This flow of investment continued uninterrupted for 6 years.
In a part, in my estimate a minor one, it was Jewish investment activated
by chauvinist frenzy gripping many Jews after the victory. But in its
major part it was motivated by nothing else but profit considerations. And
the profit seekers of that time were not disappointed. If the minister of
Trade and Industry, Moshe Nissim, wants Israel to emulate "Mexico and
Chile" as investment-attracting countries, he probably has in mind the
investors of the same type as those in the aftermath of 1967. And when
Nissim says that "the same investors who now invest in Mexico and
Chile", shrink from investing in Israel "because we don't know how to
sell ourselves", he may well think about "selling Israel" in the classic
Israeli manner, that is by a military victory. As noted in my reports 75
and 77, the Israeli generals share this viewpoint. I personally think that
an Israeli victory in a war of aggression is far from assured, and that the
world economy of 1992 is very different from that of 1967. But I also think
that the present Israeli power elite, both political and military,
handicapped by its own racist myths, low intelligence and its inadequate
knowledge of the outside world, is quite incapable of taking such factors
into consideration. But it is by far not the only power elite like showing signs of an increasing deterioration of their intellectual faculties.

In my opinion Likud in general and Shamir in particular, although
well aware of Israeli economic problems, do not even attempt to solve
them because they hope to solve them by means of a victorious war.
They expect such a war to entrench the Israeli rule over the Greater
Israel (perhaps within expanded borders), to establish an Israeli hegemony over the entire Middle East, and thus to solve Israel's
economic problems. There are some who refuse to even consider this
prospect as too ghastly to be plausible. But if so, they should offer an
alternative explanation of Israel's present policies, consistently pursued
for quite some time already. An explanation in terms of Shamir's foolishness won't do. After a series of successes prior to his becoming a
prime minister, Shamir has already been lording over Israel for a longer
time than anybody except Ben-Gurion. He clearly intends to  stay in
power, and to ensure that Likud stays in power after his retirement. In any
event, economic data presented in this report warrant utterly grim
predictions of Israel's economic future, even if the US guarantees are
granted. This is why the question stands: apart from a victorious war,
what else can offer hopes for an economic improvement? [–]

22124. Shahak, Israel. The Election of Netanyahu the Leader of Likud
and Its Significance: Part 1 of 2. Shahak Report 119. Israel, March 30,
1993. Israeli politics is now said to be in the process of its
Americanization, as shown by the increasing role of a party leader.
In Likud, and earlier in its predecessor Herut party, the tradition of leader-
worship has always been firmly ensonced. The tradition dates from the
days of the movement's founding father, Ze'vev Jabotinsky, and it
flourished under Begin to become tarnished under Shamir. This why the
election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the next leader of Likud, who by virtue
this election automatically becomes the head of the Right Wing opposition against Rabin's government, is bound to have deep political significance. The circumstances of his electoral victory only add to its significance. The Hebrew press realized it immediately. It refrained from writing much about Netanyahu until after his victory, presumably in order not to let him use press criticism to his electoral advantage, which would have been easy when the bulk of Likud party membership perceived the press in a similar way. But right after the victory, the press began and this was announced, the press began to make amends for its earlier reticence by publishing a lot of stuff about Netanyahu, most of it quite derogatory. The Labor leaders, Rabin among them, have grasped the importance of Netanyahu's election as well. Rabin responded at once by leaking to the press his intention of designating general Ehud Barak, the current Chief of Staff, as his successor and - to smooth his path - as his likely imminent appointee as the Defense minister. Right now, Barak happens to be nearing the end of his two year term as a Chief of Staff, and the press has kept itself busy discussing his personality and career. The bulk of this report will be devoted to an analysis of Netanyahu's victory, but I will conclude it by briefly discussing Barak's present standing and his political chances in the future.

Under Begin's leadership Likud comport itself with all due respect for formalities. In Shamir's years [1983-93], however, it fell into unprecedented disarray. As the press has rightly pointed out, Likud now has neither a valid convention, nor valid statutes, nor any revenues. To make things even messier, its major leadership figures are constantly at each other throats, especially after Shamir's retirement in 6/1992. The last time Likud's convention met was in 1986. It did admit some (mostly moribund) small parties to its ranks, and it did elect the party Center which functions as the decision-making body in between the elections. But it annulled the old party statutes without bothering to start drafting anything in their place. According to the old statutes a convention was to meet every four years. But it hasn't met since 1986. Even the Center meets infrequently. The crucial decision to hold primaries, which in Likud are total novelty, was adopted at informal meetings of Likud's major leaders.

In Likud the party's ongoing affairs were always conducted primarily by "the leader". Until the latest elections to the Knesset, Shamir acted in that capacity. Under Begin the leader's decisions were unchallengable. Anyone who dared challenge them had to leave the party at once, as happened to Ezer Weizman, now elected by the Labor-led Knesset majority as the next President of Israel. Under the much less charismatic Shamir, his decisions were sometimes challenged, in which case things had to be subsequently patched up by informal agreements between the party's recognized "secondary leaders", concretely by Arens, Levy and Sharon. After Likud's electoral defeat, followed by the resignation of Shamir and Arens and by the political eclipse of Sharon, Netanyahu became virtually leaderless, and thereby lacking an inner cohesion. But what Likud has in abundance, properly, the fact that Netanyahu won despite a widely-publicized scandal, can be considered proven, But Netanyahu didn't have a jot of evidence incriminating "the gangsters". Curiously, he told the story on TV first, and submitted a complaint to the police the only the next day. Naturally, most observers assumed that if the police fail to find evidence supporting Netanyahu's accusations, he will be discredited. Also, one has to understand that a high proportion of Likud's members are part-religious (the so-called "traditionalists") or full-scale religious. Such members could have been expected to refuse to vote for an adulterer as their leader and a prospective Israeli Prime Minister. It was also expected that at least some Israeli rabbis, ever quick to denounce the Laborites and "Meretz" leaders for much lesser transgressions, would find words of severe condemnation for the grievous sin of Netanyahu. After all, the same rabbis and the same public quite recently hounded Shulamit Aloni for the mere eating of non-kosher food. In Orthodox Judaism adultery is regarded as one of three most heinous sins, much graver than eating non-kosher food. But none of these expectations materialized. No rabbi said anything about Netanyahu's sex life. But Netanyahu's electoral campaign was too well-managed to make too many Likud members unduly concerned about this matter. The now retiring chief commander of the Israeli police, Superintendent Terner, is now blamed by the Police minister for conniving with Netanyahu by deliberately stall the investigation. Supposedly the two struck a deal: Netanyahu is said to have promised to return Terner's favor by advancing his political career. (Terner denies everything, but without sounding very convincing.) But regardless of whether the police has or hasn't investigated the affair properly, the fact that Netanyahu won despite a widely-publicized scandal, and against the expectations of practically all analysts, has a political significance of its own.

Before analyzing the reasons for his victory, it would be useful to provide information on Netanyahu's biography. Its best accounts so far have been by Orna Kadosh (Maariv, March 28) and Binah Barzel (Yedioth Ahronot, March 26). Netanyahu was born in Jerusalem, 46 years ago, to a wealthy family of extreme right wingers. His father, professor Ben-Zion Netanyahu, an editor and historian by profession, was on close terms and thereby lacking an inner cohesion. But what Likud has in abundance, properly, the fact that Netanyahu won despite a widely-publicized scandal, and against the expectations of practically all analysts, has a political significance of its own.

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As she points out, “these 13 years constitute a black hole” in his biography. Little is known about what he did during much of that time since his family has adamantly refused to disclose anything about it. It is rumored that he might have then worked in some Israeli secret ventures whose very existence on US soil has always been staunchly denied by Israel. Yet Bibi, as he became known from his childhood on, did leave the US to report for military service in Israel. Following in the footsteps of his brother, he was observed in the most prestigious of the Israeli “elite units”, the “General Staff Patrol”. Subsequently, however, Yoni chose to make a professional career in this unit, advancing to the rank of a major, whereas Bibi left Israel for the US upon the termination of his service. The whole thing constituted a breach of the army’s rules which do not allow two brothers to serve in the same “elite unit”. But the fact that such a breach occurred only testifies to the strength of the Netanyahu family’s “connections”.

Yoni Netanyahu was killed in 1976 in the Entebbe Raid, enabling Israeli propaganda especially in the English speaking countries, to make him into a hero of heroes. (In Israel this effort was a failure, and he is now rather forgotten.) Kadosh writes: “On 7/4/1976, the youngest brother Ido phoned Netanyahu in the US notifying him [of Yoni’s death]. As a result, the whole family returned to Israel at once. Yoni was turned into a myth. Bibi and Ido didn’t spare any effort in producing this myth. Already during the [religiously prescribed] seven days [of mourning] they began to review Yoni’s private letters for publication. In the end they decided that the best way to perpetuate his memory would be to establish an institute for helping combat international terrorism to be named after him”. The institute was officially opened by Begin in 1979, but the whole idea had been energetically pushed forward by Peres, who during the Entebbe Raid in 7/1976 was Defense minister. Kadosh comments that “for all his efforts in mythologizing the memory of his brother, Netanyahu was not above using this occasion for generating publicity around himself. Major political figures would sponsor the formation of the institute. Golda Meir, Shimon Peres and Menahem Begin and [the then] Secretary General of Histadrut, Yeruham Meshel, made all their international contacts available for the purpose. In this way he began corresponding and actually meeting in person a lot of VIPs with international renown. Since then he became well-connected. In no time, American TV studios opened for him. Taking advantage of Israel’s influence in the US, he used this opportunity to preach to the Americans that they were much too ‘soft’ toward the Arabs”.

Those endeavors reached their culmination at the First International Symposium Against Terror, held in Jerusalem in the fall of 1979. Netanyahu was the symposium’s star. The modern media, however, get easily tired of the stars. According to Kadosh, “soon after the Symposium the Netanyahu family was forgotten”. Bibi had to leave the institute and take a job as a sales manager in the furniture company “Rim”. He performed this job quite successfully. Aggressive advertising he designed induced the customers to “invest” in new furniture at a time anything ever spent on political undertakings in Israel.

He performed this job quite successfully. Aggressive advertising he designed induced the customers to “invest” in new furniture at a time anything ever spent on political undertakings in Israel. “Rim”. He performed this job quite successfully. Aggressive advertising he designed induced the customers to “invest” in new furniture at a time anything ever spent on political undertakings in Israel.

...
Netanyahu's wealthy diaspora friends, they not only assured his victory in the campaign, but, even before that, adapted that campaign to the tastes of not only the Likud members but also an entire segment of the Israeli Jewish society. What I have in mind, is what is referred to as "Israel No. 2", within which Likud is indeed the core party, and the main recipient of votes. During the campaign, a considerable number of Yeshiva students joined Likud in order to vote for Netanyahu. They were undeterred in the least by his acknowledged adultery, nor by this literal interpretation of their rabbis, nor even by those rabbis' threats of punishment in hell for so doing. Those interdictions and threats, incidentally, had little to do with Netanyahu's moral qualities or his secularity. They were made on the ground of a more general principle forbidding a Haredi [ultra-pious] Jew to join a secular party which lets non-Jews be its members. The social gulf separating the two segments of the Israeli Jewish society was particularly pronounced during Netanyahu's campaign. The same things which exhilarated "Israel No. 2" would repel and disgust the secular and modernizing "Israel No. 1" to the utmost. This factor might well helped Netanyahu defeat the other contestants in the race for Likud leadership so decisively. 

22125. Shahak, Israel. The Election of Netanyahu the Leader of Likud and Its Significance: Part 2 of 2. Shahak Report 119. Israel, March 30, 1993. Among other differences, the mettison gulf between the two segments of Israeli Jewish society implies very different uses of the term "peace". The difference is not in political behavior, since Labor hawks can well compete with and even outdo Netanyahu. Rather, the difference lies in deeply ingrained manner-of-speech habits. "Israel No. 1" feels compelled to reassure itself and the world about "its deep and unwavering desire for peace", especially at the time of major Israeli atrocities (invariably perpetrated "for the sake of peace") or preparations for a war. Of course it is sheer hypocrisy, but it nevertheless implies a notion of desirability of peace with the Arabs, on Israeli terms for sure, in some more or less remote future. It is indicative that when "Israel No. 1" spokesmen, the Laborites included, talk about the ethereal peace with the Arabs, they like to compare it to peace Israel has with friendly non-Jewish states like Denmark or Holland, or with peace between the Scandinavian states. The attitude of "Israel No. 2" is poles apart. Since all the Gentiles, including even Reagan or Bush can be assumed to be potential or actual anti-Semites, Israel can have no real peace with anyone, not just with the Arabs. In that worldview, the Holocaust is not attributed to the German Nazis, but to Gentiles who happened to be German. Accordingly, in that imagery Hitler is conceived of as no different from, say, the Roman emperors Vespasian and Titus who in 70 AD destroyed the Temple (leaving the Jews throughout Roman Empire free of persecutions), or from other enemies of the Jews, whether mythical like the Pharaoh, or real ones. This is why the above quoted statement by Netanyahu's that Arafat was worse than Hitler could be accepted by many as a foregone conclusion. When one departs from such assumptions, it is perfectly logical to claim that the only Israeli "answer to Palestinian terror" could be to use ever more force, in fact more terror.

This point was well grasped by Doron Rosenblum (Haaretz, March 5) who collected a lot of Netanyahu's enthusiastically received statements on such topics. They show, incidentally, that in campaigning against David Levy he took full advantage of the latter's reputation as somebody associated with the "peace process" by the very virtue of serving as Foreign minister in Shamir's government. Following the recommendations of his PR advisers, and adapting himself to the tastes of the public he was addressing, he chose to speak for the most part in the form of short and simplistic sloganeering, without bothering about its inner contradictions which "Israel No. 1" would have detected and resented. Here is a sample of his statements: "Who can guarantee to us that a peace we would sign will work?" "Major wars usually break up between states which were at peace". "Peace is just a slip of paper". "We can give the Arabs peace for peace". "Peace with Syria, perhaps - but the return of the Golan, never". "The choice we have is between a war with the Golan in our hands or without". "We can influence the [US] Administration in our favor". "The answer to terror is that every Jew should carry a revolver". Replying to a heckler objecting that many Jews are too poor to buy themselves a revolver, he reached what can only be described as high point of absurdity: "The state should distribute revolvers to the people". This statement, although berated by the press (which the Likud supporters tend to consider "hostile to the nation"), was received enthusiastically by his audience.

The mentioned gulf separating the two halves of Israeli Jewish society is by no means insurmountable, with the distinction between Ashkenazi and "Oriental" Jews. It is true that for reasons which can not be discussed here, large numbers of "Oriental" Jews tend to congregate in "Israel no. 2", But so do plenty of Ashkenazim, while not a few "Oriental" Jews stand firmly in "Israel no. 1". Professor Ya'akov Shavit (Hadashot, March 26) traced the roots of Netanyahu's speech style to the Revisionist movement of the late 1930s. Shavit recounts how, after Jabotinsky founded his "New Zionist Organization, he went on a tour of Jewish communities in small towns of Poland. Emulating the style of the Polish 'generals regime', he promised to Jews all kinds of things impossible to achieve, provided they would support him". For example, he assured them that "Jewish pressure will force Britain" to soon establish the Jewish state in Palestine and Jordan, not bothering about his simultaneous description of Britain as hardly less antisemitic than Nazi Germany. Using such speechmaking style, he quickly persuaded 700000 Polish Jews, (i.e. about 20% of the Jewish population of Poland), most of them religious, to sign a declaration supporting his demands, while knowing, as Shavit points it out, that his action "could not but be devoid of any political significance". Other Jewish leaders of the time compared Jabotinsky's demeanor to a that of a movie star, and this comparison could be applied to Netanyahu as well. But at the same time, Shavit points out that "Netanyahu couldn't care less about Jabotinsky's ideology" which, even if meant to be followed by his party members alone, has always had some importance. "He reduces Likud to a party whose only aim is to exploit the public's mood". If he means that Likud under Netanyahu's leadership is likely to lack any worldview apart from some banalities, Shavit may be quite right.

Throughout his campaign, Netanyahu laid heavy stress upon his own personality. In particular at the late stages of his campaign, when he frequently appeared in medium size towns and poor neighborhoods in large cities, inhabited by Jews of "Oriental" extraction who might have been assumed to be potential supporters of Levy, he entertained his audiences with stories about his soldierly qualities of more than 20 years past, including his training in the "General Staff Patrol" and his success in overcoming the hardships of such training. Such prattle would not have any political significance. Other Jewish leaders of the time compared Netzahinazi and Orientals alike: namely the army service. It had a side advantage of conveying an image of a warrior valiant enough to make his adulteries forgivable. Notions of this sort are cross-cultural and accepted by many as a foregone conclusion. When one departs from such assumptions, it is perfectly logical to claim that the only Israeli "answer to Palestinian terror" could be to use ever more force, in fact more terror.

An analysis of electoral returns shows that Netanyahu won handsomely in big cities, especially in disproportionally religious Jerusalem, and rather convincingly in the medium-sized ones. In Bnei Brak, a medium-sized city with a considerable Haredi majority, Netanyahu received no less than 90% of votes. The Moroccan-born Levy had to content himself with some votes of North African (primarily Moroccan) Jews concentrated in medium-size towns, but above all else in the poorest towns located far away from big cities which Netanyahu avoided during his campaign. It seems that other "Oriental" communities were far from willing to vote for Levy. The weakest contender, Katzav, who is of Iranian extraction, apparently attracted only the vote of other Iranian-descendants. Therefore Benny Begin doesn't seem to have been influenced by communitarian affiliations.

As I already indicated in report 99, written on 4/14/1992, dealing with Levy's aborted departure from Likud after a quarrel with Shamir, the constituency of Levy's faithfulness is much too small to serve as his power
base letting him play an independent role in national politics. Insofar as the results of Likud primaries can be extrapolated, they would indicate that his Knesset strength wouldn't exceed 3-4 seats. Netanyahu's victory has finally convinced all Israeli political observers that there is no such thing as united "Oriental" vote. All that exists, is the votes of separate "Oriental" communities. But even this vote is not something to be taken for granted, as its extent may vary widely depending on extraneous factors. Long sections of the mass media are now sounding the warning that all-Israeli ideas will defeat an appeal to communalist separateness. In any event, Levy's defeat is so great that it forecloses for him an option of leaving Likud and forming an independent party, at least for a foreseeable future.

On election day Netanyahu's superior financial resources turned out to decisive. Uzi Benziman (Haaretz, March 26) describes the enormous fleet of minibuses and other vehicles which Netanyahu hired in order to bring his voters to the polling stations. He also describes crowds of Netanyahu's hired henchmen drowning every outcry of Levy's supporters in "an organized loud chorus of 'Bibi, Bibi, king of Israel' outlasting all the others". Voting formulas were 3 page long, containing over 100 entries to fill. The majority of the Likud's members would find it difficult to fill them, but the candidates were equipped with computerized forms given to their prospective voters. One of the tasks of Netanyahu's hired hands was to push his forms into the hands of the voters, while often "buying" for few Shekels a form of rival candidate in a voter's possession. While calling the manner in which some Netanyahu voters were brought to the polling stations, "herd-like", Benzimor deplots the fact that Netanyahu's rival candidates failed to demand "other voting conditions under which democracy in Likud could have been seen to a better advantage".

The smashing victory of Netanyahu leaves open many question about Labor's response to it and his conduct as Likud's chief. Let me raise two pertinent questions. The first concerns the contrast between Likud's virtual bankruptcy and Netanyahu's riches. In Likud's central building in Tel Aviv, now taken over by Netanyahu, the elevators are in disrepair and the telephones, in any case outmoded, are time after time disconnected as a result of non-payment of bills. Is Netanyahu going to pour his riches into Likud's chest? Under Israeli law the State Comptroller inspects the financial affairs of the parties but not those of the factions within the parties: accordingly, the question cannot be easily answered. The second question concerns the danger posed to Likud by the Tzomet party and its leader Rafael Eitan, who not only once was a Chief of Staff but also had had a much longer and more impressive army career than Netanyahu before reaching the C-o-S rank. Although Tzomet has only 8 Knesset seats compared to Likud's 32, it is rising in the polls much more rapidly than Likud. In addition to that, Eitan is certainly capable of coming out with slogans no less simplistic than Netanyahu's. A translation of Netanyahu's vague campaign promises into a coherent program is another problem. As the head of the largest party in opposition he will now be surely pressed to come out with some program. This point was raised Yosef [Tommy] Lapid, one of the rare press commentators of distinctions who supports Likud. Writing in Maariv (March 26), Lapid didn't shy of opining that Netanyahu's "style of leadership reminds me of Mussolini's style in Rome when he emulated Caesar and at the same time Bonaparte". Lapid does express his general agreement with Netanyahu's slogans, but with the qualification that he "will refrain from asking questions about those slogans which can in no way be realized". But he does ask some specific questions, for example: "What concrete plans for the future do you have as Likud's leader? Are we permitted to know what do you propose? If we are, why can't I find a single feasible idea in all your speeches, declarations and ads?" After more such questions, Lapid continues: "Don't keep telling us that you want 'peace for peace'. This is at best a delusion and at worst a nonsense bad enough to insult the intelligence of at least some of your listeners. You must know it yourself and you also know that we know it. Spare us the shame, then. You can say: 'I renounce peace. I will never sign any agreement with the Arabs. I want 'peace for peace'. This is at best a delusion and at worst a nonsense qualities into action".

Other recently retired generals are also said to communicate to Rosen that "Barak loves to speak but hates to hear other generals speak. He makes speeches at the General Staff meetings long enough to exhaust his listeners and antagonize them. He always implies that his listeners are incapable of understanding what he means". More such stuff can be quoted, but I will omit it. Clearly, Barak is
now nearing the end of his two year term as the Chief of Staff without basking in public popularity. For Rabin’s scheme this is the main obstacle. Both Rosen and Levitzky discuss this factor, but due to military censorship, both cannot say much apart from vacuous generalities, e.g. that “Barak’s way of coping with the Intifada doesn’t presently add to his popularity”. They both say that “Barak is doing very good work in the army, but its nature cannot be reported”. In my own view, although Rabin has always been his popularity, his power remains absolute because the ministers fear that if they oppose him the government will collapse. The same fear may well influence the Labor Party to approve Barak’s ascendency. However, whether posting Barak against Netanyahu can contain the latter is another question which only the future can resolve. It can be said that, if the Israeli army keeps blundering as gravely as to date, parachuting Barak to Labor leadership will be of little avail. But if the Israeli army still under his command gains something perceived by Israeli public as tangible enough, whether against the Palestinians or against any other enemy, Barak will have his chance to defeat Netanyahu and Eitan. In either case, the victory of Netanyahu and the possible ascendency of Barak will mark the further shift of Israeli politics to the right. [—]

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Women's rights and economic independence is often restricted in practice. Women's lack of education and access to income often contributes to their vulnerability and exploitation. In developing countries on all continents, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has programs to increase women's access to education, health care and income. A number of USAID activities include legal rights education, along with other basic services targeted to women. The terrible custom of female genital mutilation is widespread in many countries in Africa and also occurs in Yemen and Oman, as our human rights reports note. Female genital mutilation is estimated to affect over 70 million women worldwide. This ritual, when practiced in its most extreme form, can lead to hemorrhage, shock, infection, inability to consummate marriage, urinary tract infection, pelvic inflammatory disease, infertility, psychological trauma, increased maternal mortality, and death. The United States views female genital mutilation as both harmful to women’s health and as a violation of their right to physical freedom.
We cannot allow women to be the exception to the fundamental principle of human rights universality. The US affirms the principle of cultural diversity, but does not believe cultural tolerance should be used to justify abuses of human rights. We believe we should help to promote local women's groups' efforts to improve the status of women, and we should continue to make clear to governments that we are concerned about systematic gender violence and gross discrimination. Governments that promote or turn a blind eye to gender-based violence are denying basic human rights. The Clinton Administration regards promoting the cause of women's rights as a key element of our overall human rights policy. Addressing abuses against women is a complex and difficult task, and we are committed to moving forward in the following specific areas:

(1) By supporting ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we will demonstrate how seriously we take our international legal obligations to protect the rights of women. This treaty requires states parties to it to condemn and to work to eliminate discrimination against women. Among other measures, states must embody the principle of equality of men and women in their constitutions and laws; adopt laws and other measures—including sanctions if necessary—prohibiting all discrimination against women; and take measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise. States must also act to ensure the full development and advancement of women in the political, social, economic, and cultural fields.

(2) As we press for implementation of the recommendations of the World Conference on Human Rights, we will focus particular attention on the agenda for women's rights. We were pleased that the conference's Final Declaration endorsed positions taken by the US Human Rights Action Plan. The Vienna Declaration calls for the integration of the human rights of women into the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity and stresses the importance of working toward the elimination of violence against women, sexual harassment, exploitation, and trafficking in women; gender biases in the administration of justice; and harmful traditional practices. The declaration also calls for universal ratification of CEDAW by the year 2000, reaffirms the right of women to accessible and adequate health care and the widest range of family planning services, and urges governments to facilitate the access of women to decision-making positions and activities. Another important provision that calls for support, by the UN Human Rights Commission, of a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. Finally, the declaration urges that the human rights of women play an important role in the deliberations of the 1995 World Conference on Women.

(3) The World Conference on Human Rights also called for the establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The United States strongly and actively supports this proposal and believes that the creation of this position will enhance the integration of women's issues throughout the UN's human rights machinery. We will also consider introducing resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Human Rights Commission to address issues raised in this subcommittee's hearings on women's human rights.

(4) As the War Crimes Tribunal moves forward with prosecuting crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, the United States will press for the assembly of evidence to prosecute systematic rape as a war crime and a tool of ethnic cleansing. We are pleased that the US candidate for 1 of the 11 judgeships on the tribunal. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, was elected to the tribunal and received more votes than any other candidate.

(5) The elimination of abuses and discrimination against women will be an important factor in our overall consideration of the human rights records of countries interested in receiving US aid and trade benefits. Our efforts to promote democracy, which include the administration of justice and broad citizen participation in social and political life, will be a major vehicle for advancing women's rights in new and emerging democracies around the world.

(6) As I noted above, an integral part of our human rights reports is examining the ways in which women are subject to gender-specific discrimination and abuse. In addition, our Embassies abroad report on women's human rights throughout the year on the status of women in host countries. This year's annual reports emphasize the abuses targeted at women should be included throughout the report in the appropriate section. For example, rape by government of women's rights would be covered in the section on torture, restriction of voting rights would be covered in the section on the right to choose one's government, and so forth. There is also a separate paragraph in the instructions cable specifically requiring that our Embassies and Consulates report on trafficking in women.

(7) I am aware of proposals by both the House of Representatives and the Senate to create a full-time position within the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to address women's issues. I note that an employee within the bureau has always included women's rights in her portfolio. Whatever the outcome of the Senate and House proposals, I can assure you that I plan to assign someone to work on these issues fulltime. Promoting the equality of women is an essential component of this Administration's human rights and democracy policy. As Secretary Christopher said when he addressed the World Conference on Human Rights: "Violence and discrimination against women don't just victimize individuals; they hold back whole societies by confining the human potential of half the population. Guaranteeing human rights is a moral imperative with respect to both women and men. It is also an investment in making whole nations stronger, fairer, and better. We look forward to working with the Congress toward the realization of this common goal".
smells revolution," said one student visiting the Pathfinder booth for the first time. Many who bought Pathfinder books in previous years have come back looking for new titles. One doctor from a village near the town of Uroimeh in the northwest (Azerbaijan) came back this year and bought Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism by Carlos Tablada. A group of young men who bought To Speak the Truth - Why Washington's 'Cold War' Against Cuba Doesn't End by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara last year, came back to buy several more books on the Cuban revolution. There is an increased interest in Pathfinder titles on national self-determination, particularly among young people who are Kurdish. The best-selling titles so far are New International no. 10, containing the article, "Imperialism's march toward fascism and war," and Evelyn Reed's Problems of Women's Liberation. "Pathfinder is offering 200 titles of books and altogether 2000 copies for sale, mainly on politics which are the writings of great philosophers, politicians and world leaders such as Carl Marx, Fidel Castro, Lenin, Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X, etc..." pointed out the Tehran Times in an article about the book publisher's participation in the fair. [8]

22128. Steining, Judi. "Young Israel On The Move: Students Join The Fight For Freedom For Israel's MIAs", in Jewish Press (New York), June 14, 1996. p. 79. American Jewish students are transfixed by the plight of Zvi Feldman, Yehuda Katz, Zachary Baumel, Rachamim Alsheich, Yossi Fink and Ron Arad. Now, hundreds of American schools have been visited by the American Coalition for Missing Israeli Soldiers (ACMIS). For example, Ron Arad was captured after parachuting from his fighter bomber after a peacetime airraid on a Lebanese village on 10/16/1986. Reportedly some of the MIAs are held in either Iran or Syria. ACMIS is sponsored by the National Council of Young Israel and the International Coalition for Missing Israeli Soldiers based in Jerusalem.

ACMIS' 'programming' operations are in place in the metropolitan area schools including: Beth Jacob-Beth Miriam School, Frisch School, Hebrew Academy of Nassau County, Hillel Yeshiva, Shal & Miriam Tawil High School, Magen David Yeshiva, Manhattan Day School, Marsha Stern Tamudic-Yeshiva University High School For Boys, North Shore Hebrew High School, Rambam Mesivtim Samuel Wang Yeshiva University High School For Girls, Rabbi Joseph H. Lockstein Upper School of Ramaz, Westchester Day School, Yeshiva of Central Queens, Yeshiva of Flatbush Elementary, Joel Braverman High School, Yeshiva Steela K. Abraham High School For Girls (HALB), and Yeshiva Mizrachi L'Banim. The Bnei Akiva of North America has been established as a national organization to establish Israel MIA programs throughout American schools nationwide. [TEXT]

22129. UN. Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Part 1: Agenda. (Third session). September 1994. Chairman's suggested draft agenda of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1) Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee (2) Election of the President of the Conference (3) Statement by the President of the Conference (4) Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (5) Submission of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee (6) Adoption of the Rules of Procedure (7) Election of Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (8) Election of Vice-Presidents (9) Credentials of representatives to the Conference (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (b) Report of the Credentials Committee (10) Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General (11) Adoption of the Agenda (12) Programme of work (13) Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (14) General debate

(15) Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII, Paragraph 3: A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security: (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 1-13 (3) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in A and B. B. Security assurances: (1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council (2) The CTBT, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones: (1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraph 1-3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV (3) Article VII D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy: (1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1), (2), (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II (2) Article V E. Other provisions of the Treaty (16) Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty (17) Decision on the extension of the Treaty as provided for in Article X, paragraph 2 (18) Reports of the Main Committees (19) Other questions (20) Preparation and adoption of Final Document(s). [X]
session of the Committee was scheduled to start half an hour later than usual. It took up item 1.1 on "Rules of procedure" beginning with a progress report by the Chairman of the informal working group on the rules of procedures, Ambassador S.A. Adekanye of Nigeria. The last part of the afternoon session dealt with item 1.3, the agenda for the 1995 NPT Conference. The Chairman of the third PrepCom, Ambassador Ayewah of Nigeria, presented his draft agenda. The first 13 points are of formal nature. The rest of the agenda items (abbreviated):

(14) general debate
(15) review of the NPT
(16) role of the NPT in the promotion of non-proliferation and disarmament
(17) decision on the extension
(18) reports of the Main Committee
(19) other questions
(20) preparation and adoption of Final Document(s)

The discussion of the individual points proceeded well, but then started a struggle about the order of the topics. Iran suggested to decide on the extension of the Treaty as the last point and after adopting the Final Document. Ambassador Hoffman of Germany questioned how this could possibly be done. He argued that review and extension are dealt with parallel and that no artificial order should be introduced. He said that if order would be of no importance one could as well treat item 17 before item 15, i.e. decide on the extension of the treaty before it is reviewed. This appeared to many observers to be meant as a joke. But next the Russian delegation took up the German contribution as a suggestion to which it agreed and added that this would be the only way acceptable to them. The Chairman then proposed a compromise order which begins with 18 and 19, 17 will be treated before 20. The Russians didn't agree questioning whether there would be anything to do at all at the Conference if there is no decision on the extension. At that point the US delegation joined the Russians in endorsing the German proposal, while preferring no reordering of the items as drafted by the chairman. During a lengthy debate Mexico, Indonesia, and Syria backed the proposal made by the Chairman, while Italy joined in with Germany, too. Eventually agreement was reached on a compromise according to which the sequence of items will remain as in the Chairman's draft but without numbers given on the left so as to indicate that the order is without prejudice to the chronological sequence of agenda items which will later be adopted by the NPT Conference itself. [ ]

22131. UN. Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Part 3: NGO Activities. (Third session). September 1994. The major event of NGOs during the week was a two hours briefing held this afternoon. Speakers of 30 NGOs presented their short statements. It was organized by the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament at Geneva. It is mentioned in italics letters on the official timetable of the PrepCom which started this afternoon later than usual to give delegations the opportunity to attend. More than 50 people of NGOs were present and more than 20 representatives of delegations. A reader with one-page-statement of the NGOs will be distributed to the delegations. Most speakers endorsed an extension for limited periods (rolling extension). The Main argument is that with indefinite extension NNWS would be deprived of their possibilities to put pressure on the NWS to disarm. In the following, the complete list of speakers is given. A rather personal selection of points that were made is noted here. (1) George Bunn, Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) (2) Alyn Ware, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (3) Roland Timerbaev, Monterey Institute for International Studies (4) Sheila Oakes, National Peace Council (5) William Epstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York (6) Helge Hagelund, No to Greenpeace International: Additional thought to the broadly discussed steps towards nuclear disarmament is a new energy deal addressing the question of civil nuclear energy in the future. Long term planning and financing required therefore he regards long term safeguards necessary to get public acceptance. (14) Michel Monod, War Resisters International: The time is over where a state can measure its own power by the number of warheads. All steps considered are partial. Necessary now: Nuclear Weapons Convention. (15) James Leonard, Washington Council on Non-Proliferation: Not reasonable to expect the 5 NWS to come up with a common timetable, but to expect that they provide their ideas how to reach a joint action. Extended indefinitely best way. Limited extension weakens the treaty; current process of disarmament which nobody would have imagined some years ago to go so fast might come to a halt. (16) Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation: Nuclear testing is continued by proxy-testing now called Scientific Based Stockpile Stewardship. Its officially declared purpose it to ensure the technical competence of weapons research, enhance the ability of research teams to design new nuclear weapons in the future. In the view of the Western States Legal Foundation inspectors and guards would suffice for stockpiles stewardship. (17) Bill Pace, World Federalist Movement: He quotes Albert Einstein saying that it would be a murderous contradiction to believe that countries can at the same time prevent and prepare for war. (18) Solange Fernex, Julie McKay, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: Endorses no indefinite extension because it would be arbitrary and set a self-serving standard for NWS to define and evaluate progress in nuclear disarmament. (19) Romesh Chandra, World Peace Council: World public opinion against the indefinite extension of the NPT as being a discriminatory treaty because it gives a monopoly to NWS. They still stockpile nuclear weapons and continue unashamedly the vertical proliferation. He demands to put an end to nuclear weapons. He believes that can be done now. (20) Kate Morgan, Campaign Against Militarism: Racisms in the world is perpetuated by the double standards of the NPT as an instrument of western foreign policy in the age of the cold world to control a nd threat those countries which are not allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Attention is always focused on weapons programs in the third World and the real power to destroy the whole world in the arsenals of the NWS is overlooked. Any extension of the NPT would legalize the NWS to threaten the rest of the world and it would be destabilizing the world by cementing the discrimination between the two sorts of countries. (21) Janet Bloomfield, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: NPT extension should be conditional on the start of negotiations to a treaty to ban all nuclear weapons in the world completely.

(22) Joseph Cirincione, Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Mentions several steps, including negotiation on a global verified cutoff of fissile material which all are possible by 4/1995. The NPT is more than a leverage; it is in itself important. It deserves to be extended, maybe even indefinitely. This has to be seen in April 1995. (23) Jim Walsh, Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT: (24) Dorrie Weiss, Economists Allied for Arms Reduction: Must not risk a period without a Treaty and must not legitimize the Status Quo of NWSs. The NWS should pledge not to make qualitative improvements in weapons This can be done without verification and cannot be included in the CTBT. (25) Pasahat Syet, FRIENDS - Foundation for Research on National Development and Security: Though it has been said that Pakistan had achieved the ability to produce a nuclear weapon its NP policy implies neither have made a bomb nor the intention to do so. He said Pakistan would sign the NPT, if India does the same. (26) Remi Permentier, INESAP - International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation: He mentions doubts about the nuclear energy regarding areas such as security, safety, economy, environment, waste, and development. As a consequence, an
In this regard, we should not forget that the destructive power of the herein is based on analyses of primary data collected in Iran in tandem with extension of this treaty seems to be a contradiction in itself. Regrettably, the primary case—post-revolutionary Iran—are compared with relevant proliferation as well as promoting (nuclear) disarmament. Indefinite. This is a comparative study in which qualitative and quantitative data for at the core of the long-term project of both avoiding horizontal and vertical view state legitimation, development strategy and revolutionary effects. The attempt to narrow the debate to the question of limited or indefinite evaluate the fruitfulness of this model. In this study, health policy as controller of nuclear energy and technology. populist development strategy or an economic growth approach to useful; and finally, as the main agent of the NPT, strategies. Building on James Malloy's argument that post-revolutionary proliferation policy should strive for unambiguous credibility, for proliferation resistance of nuclear energy programmes, or a convincing transferability to other states. Such a policy should aim at (a) recognizing civil-military ambivalence, (b) avoiding the maintaining of scientific-technological prerequisities for all kind of weapon programmes and (c) reducing discrimination. It should be realized that one important bottle-neck is the production, use and trade of weapon-grade materials (i.e., highly enriched uranium, plutonium in all isotopic compositions, and tritium).

Unilateral commitments and multilateral agreements should lead to an end of all production and use of weapon-grade material in significant amounts (comprehensive cut-off having a real effect); to an end of the use and further development of specific sensitive nuclear technologies, such as reprocessing or laser isotope separation or inertial confinement fusion; to the internationalisation of all existing stockpiles of weapon-grade nuclear materials and to its elimination; to full-scope safeguards of all nuclear facilities in all states. Furthermore, a comprehensive test-ban should strive for reducing obvious loopholes presented by some technologies which allow circumvention; this should go hand in hand with the ending of all nuclear weapon related research and development. Further deep cuts in nuclear arsenals of all nuclear weapon states are imperative within a binding framework of a nuclear disarmament time-table towards zero. All these measures mean moving beyond the NPT. Unambiguous and credible steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free world are much more important than only discussing specific procedures for NPT extension alone or enforcing indefinite extension. Negotiations should be started aiming at a Nuclear Weapons Convention being undiscriminatory, and which may replace the NPT one day. This convention should govern the transition of the existing non-proliferation regime to a nuclear-weapon-free regime in pending negotiations of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The lack in civil-military ambivalence, (b) avoiding the maintaining of scientific-technological prerequisities for all kind of weapon programmes and (c) reducing discrimination. It should be realized that one important bottle-neck is the production, use and trade of weapon-grade materials (i.e., highly enriched uranium, plutonium in all isotopic compositions, and tritium).

These problematic aspects have to be included into the debate on development, I introduce an alternative model, which incorporates the policy of an ideological strategy, informed by notions of individual and social transformation. The Iranian post-revolutionary state is examined to evaluate the fruitfulness of this model. In this study, health policy formation and implementation in Iran serve as a window through which to view state legitimation, development strategy and revolutionary effects. This is a comparative study in which qualitative and quantitative data for the primary case—a revolutionary Iran—are compared with relevant data for selected semiperipheral national-states. The research presented herein is based on analyses of primary data collected in Iran in tandem with secondary data from Iranian and international sources. The revolutionary Iranian state's development strategy and its implications for
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health policy changes are examined on the basis of qualitative data. To get at the further question of what consequences these policy changes have effected, pre- and post-revolutionary health status outcomes, primarily as reflected in changes in infant and child mortality rates, are compared. Finally, the question of whether these outcomes can be attributed to international forces rather than revolutionary policies is addressed by contrasting health outcomes in Iran with outcomes in other semiperipheral nations. The conclusions drawn are threefold. First, qualitative analyses of health policy in Iran since the revolution indicate that an ideological strategy predominates, though political and economic considerations continue to play a secondary role. Second, taken as a whole, these data indicate that the revolution had a positive and significant effect on health policy and outcomes in Iran. And, third, though both types of data indicate significant changes, the qualitative data provide somewhat more compelling evidence for a revolutionary effect than do the quantitative data. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [5]

22135. Valinejad, Afshin. "10000 Watch as 'Tehran Vampire' Killer is Flogged, Hanged", in Arizona Republic, August 14, 1997, p. A21. The taxi driver Ali Reza Khoastryan Kordiyeh, who became known as the 'Tehran Vampire' for his campaign of stalking, kidnapping, raping, stabbing and arson, who terrorize the city for three months, was flogged by the relatives of his victims and then hanged. His victims included nine women. Unusually, the time of the punishment was publicized to reassure people that the crime wave was done.

22136. Valinejad, Afshin. "Iran President Says Choices For Cabinet Fit Times Ahead", in Seattle Times, August 19, 1997, p. A7. President Mohammad Khatemi has appealed to parliament to accept his choises for the 22-seat cabinet. A televised debate on the selections has begun in Iran. The nomination process is seen as an early test of Khatemi's support in the Parliament after his upset, landslide victory in recent elections. One nominee has drawn particular criticism: Atollah Mohajerani, named to head the Ministry of Culture & Islamic Guidance, who has suggested direct talks with the US in the past. The culture ministry controls the media, film and music industry in Iran. Abdullah Nouri, nominee to head the Ministry of Interior, is also controversial, since he is seen as a moderate who might ease some social restrictions. Newspapers state he will name one woman, US-educated Massoumeh Ebtekar as VP. [TXT]

22137. Wakin, Daniel J. "Champion of the Secular Vows To Defy Fundamentalists, Publish Rushdie Novel", in Arizona Daily Star, January 16, 1994, p. A17. [TXT] Leftist writer Aziz Nesrin in Turkey has vowed to publish the works of Rushdie in Turkey. He has been dogged by attacks against him since the announcement. He is the author of about 100 books and a newspaper column. His literary earnings fund a home for needy whatever their religion, or their faith, or their gender, are convinced that this belief is shared by others), most people around the world, around so lightly, and obviously means different things to different people. Let me say that I believe, (and it's not just a matter of personal credo, I think this belief is shared by others), most people around the world, whatever their religion, or their faith, or their gender, are convinced that there are certain fundamental human rights and that these fundamental human rights will affect any individual in society.

22138. Waldman, Peter. "Divorce Iranian Style: In Court, Islamic Law Honors The Husband; The Wife Has Few Rights The Mullahs Will Concede; Battering Is No Grounds", in Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1994, p. A1, A14. The current court system in Iran is dominated by reactionary clerics who came into office with the triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini.Before such judges, domestic violence is no reason for women to seek a divorce: 'women have paid the price' for this reaction. Men may divorce women at will, but women can obtain divorce's only with the consent of their husbands. Family law expert and former member of the Council of Guardians Hoosein Mehrpour in Iran argue the major problem in Iranian courts is not their Islamic character, but rather that the draconian environment is very 'un-Islamic' in its drastic and radical siding with men in courts against the claims of the wives. So, the claims of women for custody of their children are rarely accepted by courts, even when the ex-husbands are degenerates or drug-addicts. In addition, a further pressure for young wives who seek divorces often are rejected by their own families, who are sometimes pleased to have one less mouth to feed.

22139. Whiley, Andrew. Theocracy, Human Rights and Women: The Iranian Experience: Iran's Mixed Human Rights Record: Part 01. Proceedings of a One-Day Conference. Montclair State University: Department of Economics & Finance, School of Business Administration, October 30, 1993, pp. 27-31. Thank you Dr. Pirouz for that introduction and I would also, like the previous speakers, like to thank Montclair State for holding this event. In particular, I would like to commend Dr. Pirouz for his balanced choice of panelists. It certainly makes my life a lot easier being the fourth speaker today after allowing three such well-rounded speakers; they have made my life easier in I don't have to deal with the issue of women's rights, or at least, will defer those questions to people who are more expert than I am. Although, that I would correct him on one tiny point, which is that when said we will now turn to the issue of human rights, that's not the case; we've been dealing with human rights throughout this morning's session. And my task today, as I try to define it, is to theorize a little bit about the differences in approaches towards human rights in the West and in Iran, try to explain some of the considerations which affect the Islamic Republic's approach towards human rights matters and avoid being too judgmental. Inevitably, since you have a human rights activist speaking to you, you will expect me to draw some usions or at least make some statements about the nature of the beast that 'we are examining.

Unfortunately, there is a tactical and peripheral problem since the quality of evidence available to us in sifting and weighing the situation is extremely poor. As an organization, we have been able to visit Iran twice in the last 18 months, which is better than other human rights organizations have done. Amnesty has yet to be given permission to go there and most other NGOs, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, have been barred from the country. In the case of the Special Rapporteur, he has not enable to go there for the last two years. So, we lack the data that we would like to have in order to draw balanced conclusions.

At the same time, the government, as we all know, is extremely defensive on this subject and attempts to address the issues from the point of view of a cultural and Islamic defense, rather than necessarily to argue the facts. So, when organizations such as ours attempt to question the government, or to ask for information, it's rare that we get any feedback from them.

I think before I get in to my formal remarks because I'm addressing a specialist audience concerned with a particular region, it's worth just diverting your attention for a few minutes to say what it is we are speaking about with respect to human right a phrase that is tossed being the fourth speaker today after allowing three such well-rounded speakers; they have made my life easier in I don't have to deal with the issue of women's rights, or at least, will defer those questions to people who are more expert than I am. Although, that I would correct him on one tiny point, which is that when said we will now turn to the issue of human rights, that's not the case; we've been dealing with human rights throughout this morning's session. And my task today, as I try to define it, is to theorize a little bit about the differences in approaches towards human rights in the West and in Iran, try to explain some of the considerations which affect the Islamic Republic's approach towards human rights matters and avoid being too judgmental. Inevitably, since you have a human rights activist speaking to you, you will expect me to draw some usions or at least make some statements about the nature of the beast that 'we are examining.

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In the last couple of months, three additional cases coming to trial after a long time; German courts will also be coming to trial after a short time; those involved in the assassination of Opposition leaders in the KDPI, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Mr. Sadegh Sharifkhandi and three others in 9/1992. The importance of this case is that the German Federal prosecutor has publicly stated that the prosecution has evidence linking those involved in this plot to the Iranian government. And the Iranian who is in jail at the moment facing trial is said to have been sent by the Iranian authorities. The importance here is that, despite a considerable amount of anecdototal evidence, and considerable suspicion on the part of many people, the Iranian government to this day continues to deny that it has had any direct role in the assassinations of opponents of the regime, some of them peaceful opponents, which have taken place periodically over the last fourteen years. If this case indeed leads to a judgment that the Iranian authorities were directly involved, it will be a first, with far-reaching implications. The significance of this case for Tehran was indicated by the fact that the intelligence minister, Mr. Fallahian, visited Germany fairly soon afterwards, and this subject was believed to be one of those under discussion at the time. There are other cases which in the next couple of months will also be coming to trial after a long time; those involved in the interrogations of Kazem Rajavi in Geneva and Shahpur Bakhtiar in Paris. By coincidence, those three cases coming together could blow a devastating hole in the Iranian government's arguments that it has not been involved with these assassinations. I must say that based on the evidence that my organization has gathered so far, it does appear that there has been an authorized pattern of targeted assassinations abroad against Iranian opponents, attacking the very central premises of the right to life.

My third example is perhaps, on the surface, a smaller one, but it's one which I believe indicates the lack of tolerance of the Islamic authorities to criticism, even of the mildest form. Their sensitivities, I believe, indicate the insecurity of the regime, its extreme defensiveness and its inability to cope with critics who pose no harm other than satirizing the regime itself. Earlier this month, Ayatollah Yazdi, the head of the judiciary, took it upon himself in a Friday prayers address, an occasion that is usually reserved for important announcements of government policy to speak about the case of a cartoonist Manuchehr Karimzadeh who had been originally sentenced by a Revolutionary Court. Despite the provisions that he should have been tried openly, he was tried in a closed court. He was originally given a one-year jail sentence, and now he's been given a 10-year sentence. The fact that a cartoonist should have suffered in this particular way simply by having, or deemed to have, insulted the Islamic authorities, and in particular, the late Ayatollah Khomeini—the sacrosanct memory of the late Imato mind suggests an extraordinary sensibility on the part of the authorities, in particular to the sensibilities of the Hezbollah revolutionary element of society, suggesting that people were making fun of them too openly.

So, in these three examples, then, we have looked first at issues of discrimination in employment, the controls over individuals' appearances and actions which we've heard about in the case of women's rights in the streets. Women's rights has become a political football in Tehran, in the
push and pull of society between those favoring a more pragmatic approach and those favoring an approach that emphasizes what are to be considered to be revolutionary values more consistent with the line adopted by the late Imam. Secondly then, we addressed the issue of the right to life, which also as a subsection involves the role of ethnic and religious groups in Iran today. What is the role in Iran of the minorities? The country is often spoken of as if it were a monolith; clearly, as this audience well knows, it is not. It is a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-confessional society. [=]

(2) Fight against illiteracy among women.
(3) Mobilization and organization of women.
(4) Fight against prostitution and moral decadence.
(5) Fight against the exploitation of women and young girls in factories; establishment of specific work hours, more jobs, paid weekends and holidays, and equal wages for women and men.
(6) Prohibition of child labor.
(7) Two-months paid sick leave for pregnant women.
(8) Free child care for working class mothers.
(9) Free kindergarten for the children of working class women.
(10) The establishment of training workshops for the poor young girls.
(11) The establishment of centers and libraries for women.
(12) The establishment of a journal for women.

[Reprinted from Bidary-e Ma (Our Awakening), 1944.]

22142. World Confederation of Iranian Students (National Union); Mujahideen-i Khalq. In Defense of People's Struggle in Iran: The Last Defense of Ali Mihandoost: Part 4: Mihandoost's Last Defense: Sociological Concept. Pamphlet. Frankfurt, West Germany: World Confederation of Iranian Students (National Union), June 1974. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, struggle for independence in the poor and exploited countries started. Their objectives, of course, was to break the chains of colonialization and exploitation in their countries. As these struggles grew, the enemies of the masses had no choice but to gradually retreat. Among many countries, even the small African nations achieved their independence. There are however some questions which remain unanswered. Do these countries achieve their economic as well as political independence? Even though colonization appears to be gone; is exploitation also gone? Are the masses of the third world rules of their own destinies? At the beginning of the 20th century, the answers to above questions might have appeared to be difficult. Today however the answers are very clear. Imperialist countries with the United States as their leader had to find new means of exploitation, because the masses have become more aware and resisted domination by foreign countries. Imperialists realized that direct colonization is no longer a workable solution because they feared that their open and outright presence can cause resentment among the masses and can lead to a general uprising. In other words, imperialists, initially under the name of development of the third world countries have come to exploit and colonize them and any direct intervention in their affairs could have resulted in unmasking their ugly face. Colonialization, therefore, has become old and no longer serves their purpose.

Their appearance had to be changed, and the dependent and obedient regime could very well accommodate them with this change of appearance. Internal security could also be maintained with providing help and direction for local armies. Is not exploitation the objective of imperialism? Then economic dependence provided them another means to achieve the same objective. This time again because of growing awareness of the masses and their new revolutionary strategies, especially in China, Viet Nam and Cuba, the imperialists should realize that their days are numbered and they will be soon destroyed. One should not expect, however, that those, who live like parasites and exploit poor and defenseless people simply abandon their lust and desire for wealth.

Imperialists, therefore, desperately try to device new means which could destroy revolutionary movement and appear to erase the existing contradictions in the exploited countries. In some countries, many programs which are reformist by nature, have been put into effect and apparently have temporarily delayed insurrection of the masses. The objectives of these so-called revolutionary programs are not to solve the real and fundamental contradictions, but to change the appearance of an ugly and dying face of colonial power. White revolution, in Iran, has the same character. These programs cannot and will not be able to solve the fundamental contradictions in our society. On the contrary, these contradictions become more acute as the class differentiation increases. In the past, the peasants were exploited by the land owners. Today, the foreign and local capitalists exploit the farm laborers. Our sociological structure does not change and unemployment increases daily. Peasants, in search of bread, constantly move to cities and end up living in slums of Tehran. This emigration of peasants from the rural areas to the cities, in fact, symbolizes the conditions of our peasants. On the other hand, farm laborers are also exploited by such a project called Farm and Industry. Under this project, they have to hand out their meager earnings to those who exploit them. Iran's regime claims that the chain of land ownership has been broken and the peasants own their land. The truth, however, is that without money, water and tools, they have to go back to the same
capitalists and pawn their land. After the so-called White Revolution, contradictions among the class have, indeed, intensified and exploitation has increased. Our country has become more economically dependent to imperialists and this regime, being their puppet, protects their interests. Is it possible for capitalism to grow in our country without dependence on foreign interest? The answer is negative.

The capitalists in our country are totally dependent on foreign capital and the regime has increased and have no self dependence. Industrialization in this country cannot take place independently and domination of foreign capital is evident in all aspects of our industry. Assembly type of industries form a major part of our industries and they are designed in such a way that makes foreign and local capitalists richer and richer. Is it really an honor to assemble engines and parts that are manufactured by British Hillman Co. and sell them for many times over the production cost to our consuming society as cars made in Iran? Is it not true that these tactics intensify exploitation of our labor force and bring stronger pressure upon the consuming public! Even these types of growth are not designed to raise the standard of living in our country, but, for instance, try hopelessly to solve the problem of unemployment. In addition to other internal problems of the dependent countries, the imperialists want, with propaganda campaign and talking of social progress and industrial growth, to reduce the contradictions between the exploited masses and themselves. At the same time, the imperialists employ cheap labor available in the third world countries and take advantage of the tariff exemption without reducing the prices of their manufactured products. They are, therefore, able to make extremely high profits which they partly share with the local capitalists. This is the way our industries are controlled and this is why it is not possible to achieve a real industrial growth in ours and other dependent countries. For instance, to keep these countries economically dependent, the imperialists know that the local regime constantly needs weapons for preventing any local insurrections. Even though the need for weapons are characteristic of these puppet regimes, they are not manufactured in their own country.

This causes the military budget in the third world countries to increase continuously. In our country the military budget has rapidly increased. In 1351 (1972), 42% of the total budget for our country was spent on military hardware which corresponds to 23% increase in recent years. The people of Iran pay for such a wasteful expenditure with their sweat and blood. It is a shame, while millions of people are hungry and are forced to travel hundreds of miles for a piece of bread or their children are sent to graze like animals; we have Phantom jets fly over their heads and missiles which are worth millions of toomans shine in hand, the people's thoughts and beliefs are limited and, on the other hand, many times that these weapons have been used by their imperialists and will be more and more dependent on them and will be much easier to manipulate our minds and push us toward our animalistic instincts. In the industrial field, about which unlimited propaganda is made, I want to discuss the administrative and educational revolutions of this regime. When the objective of a government is not to solve fundamental contradictions, it will not be able to solve any other problems of a society. In other words, this government is crippled and cannot, by its nature, solve any kind of contradiction. Administrative revolution is a good example of this disability. When all the high administrative posts are filled in by persons who are lacs for corruption, then no meaningful changes will be allowed to take place in this administrative mess. In such a situation, what then can one expect from the people who are in the lower administrative posts?

This contradiction will not and cannot be solved as long as this corrupt and rotten regime is in power. On another front, the regime claims that the objective of educational revolution is to have better education for everyone and increase the number of universities, elementary and high schools. The problem, however is that better education and more educational facilities will also increase social awareness among young people and how can the regime, then, prevent the growth of the revolution? The regime therefore makes education available to only those who can afford it and not to those poor and deprived masses. As a matter of fact, this is the real objective of this regime's educational revolution. Otherwise, the result of higher education for young people is to become revolutionaries and stand in trials like this one. Just look around you, all of us here have bachelor or master degrees. The regime realizes this fact and because of this, it has made a definite effort to make education available to people of the upper class. This is why, on the one hand, tuitions are continuously raised and the number of private colleges with very high tuition are rapidly increased. On the other hand, a number of public schools and universities have reduced and the quality of education has been lowered. Experienced high school teachers and professors are attracted to private institutions because of higher salaries (four to seven thousand tooman initial salary in a private school compared to one thousand in public schools.)

This of course has an adverse effect on the quality of education in the public institutions. In addition, armed guards are continuously kept in the universities. It is also clear that educational revolution is designed to initiate blindly the American culture and make the younger generation of this country more receptive to bourgeois values and culture. Foreigners influence and rule us in every facet of our lives. The consumer economy is the best example of western influence on our culture. Consumption of luxury and unnecessary items in the whole country are growing very rapidly and this is exactly the objective of the imperialists. On the one hand, the people's thoughts and beliefs are limited and, on the other hand, the people are psychologically pushed to buy luxury and unnecessary items. For the purchase of these items, people of course, have to get loans and become dependent on banks and loaning institutions. Yes, indeed, we are pushed towards such a rotten objective. In other words, the objective of the imperialists is to make us consumers of their products; for which we will have to pay very dearly. In this way, people will be more and more dependent on them and will be much easier to make the people accept their culture. The newspapers, movies, radio and television programs are geared for realization of this goal. They want us to lose our national characters and ignore our correct standards of decency. They want to brain wash us so that they will be able to manipulate our minds and push us toward our animalistic instincts. In Iran, they try to manipulate the minds of our youth and intellectuals so that they accept the western values and in the process lose their identity and character. False and unlimited propaganda are an inseparable part of this system and certainly without this propaganda the regime cannot survive. Our press, even in the domain of western ideology and limited colonialization, do not have any freedom of expression. Freedom of ideas and their expression are a basic part of human rights; and reflected in the United Nations Charter, are ignored in this country. The opposing views are simply suppressed by force and imprisonment. The killing and torture of revolutionaries have continuously increased simply because they stand for the rights of the masses and their better living conditions. Every day more revolutionaries are imprisoned. The torture methods have become more scientific. In trials which are more ceremonial than
anything else, the revolutionaries are condemned to death or long term prison sentences. The regime does all these because it is afraid of opposition and the opposition's views. Yes, this is the way the regime deals with revolutionaries because its very life trembles with their existence. In a society which military and police rule; in a society where judicial and legislative branches of the government are only puppets, there is no other way to struggle but with arms and force. Our masses have experienced all the non-violent ways of struggles but when your voice for equality, justice and freedom is suppressed by guns and machine guns, the only way out is the armed struggle. Coup d'etat of 28th of Mordad [This coup d'état was engineered by the CIA which overthrew the Popular Democratic government of Dr. Mossadegh in 8/1953.] and the massacre of the 15th of Khordad [On 6/5/1963 following a 3-year period Or severe economic crises, the people in a spontaneous movement rose in anger to demand their democratic rights. The regime retaliated, murdering more than 6000 people. This event marked a turning point in our movement and revolutionary struggles became the main trend.] have shown us clearly that we have to rise up and undertake an armed struggle. The form of struggle in Iran like other exploited countries in the world has changed from non-violent to an armed struggle. At the beginning of this decade 1350-1360 (1971-1981) is the start of this period of struggle for the Iranian masses. We have taken up arms to show the path of armed struggle against this regime.

Mr. Prosecutor, between you who represent the regime and us, only bullets can rule and I do not want any part of you. Right now, if I had a submachine gun I would have killed you. Here, of course, I am talking in general terms and I mean all of those who cooperate with this regime and you are only one of them. We have started our struggle with the knowledge of revolutionary death. We are not afraid of death and when our death is for the masses, we will welcome it.
Iraq

24000. ------. “22000 Iraqi Children Die Because of UN Sanctions [surplus deaths in first two months of 1994 reported by Iraqi Ministry of Public Health due to lack of medicines and starvation; 140000 people per month are treated for malnutrition]”, in Granma International (Havana), April 13, 1994. p. 15. [TXT]


24005. ------. "A Trade Union Worker Deported and His Wife Compelled to Divorce", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab, April 13, 1960. p. 22. [TXT]

24006. ------. "Chicago Protesters Prepare to Defy US War of Sanctions", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), February 25, 1996. p. 10. [TXT]

24007. ------. "Countries Where Depo-Provera Is Marketed", in Multinational Monitor, February/March 1985. p. 10. [TXT]
Events of the Week: Baghdad Masses in Other Funerals

In the afternoon of 7/7/1959 the masses of Baghdad marched in the funeral of yet another victim of reaction; this time the martyr, Nassif. Nassif is a student and member of the Popular Resistance Forces from Tikrit. This is the third victim from Tikrit since the conspiring elements were released. The crime took place on the eve of 7/7/1959 when some hooligans attacked the headquarters of the Democratic Youth Federation. Earlier, the members of the local DUF were warned that the building would be burnt if the members did not close down their headquarters.

The body was borne by the angered citizens to the Headquarters of the General Students' Union in Baghdad from which the funeral procession started.

Behind the coffin was the emblem of the Iraqi General Students' Union and banners on which were written: "The Third Victim: The Student Nassif Latif" and "Every day we have a Martyr...While the criminals are free." People from Baghdad and Tikrit marched in their organizations: Student Unions of of various Colleges and Secondary Schools, the League for the Defense of Women's Rights, Trade Unions and other organizations in addition to thousands of ordinary people. Throughout their march, to the Ministry of Defense and back, the masses raised their voices in unity demanding punishment of the criminals, the carrying out of the death sentences passed by the People's Court, purging the State and military organs and consolidating the democratic line of our Republic by strengthening the National United Front.

24008. Events of the Week: Preparations for Youth Festival

The Iraqi youth, who are looking forward to meeting their friends from all over the world at the 7th International Festival of Youth and Students, due to be held in Vienna at the end of 7/1959, started preparing several months ago. A General Committee, including such organizations as the Iraqi Democratic Youth Federation, the General Union of Students, General Federation of Trade Unions, General Union of Peasants' Associations and the Women's League, was formed in order to organize these preparations. Sport, music and folk-dancing groups of the various nationalities of the Iraqi Republic are now busily training for the Festival. Thanks to the 7/14/1958 Revolution, the Iraqi youth delegation can now participate with complete freedom in this festival of peace and friendship.

24009. Preparations for Youth Festival

An Iraqi youth delegation can now participate with complete freedom in this festival of peace and friendship.

24010. Fundraising: Looking for Cash Cows: Here and in the Gulf

You have probably seen the commercials on TV or the full-page ads in newspapers boldly proclaiming: "Support President Bush and the brave men and women of Operation Desert Shield working to free Kuwait." The ads have appeared in most major American newspapers and on all the national TV networks. It has been a costly advertising campaign. The group sponsoring this media blitz, the Coalition for America at Risk (CAR), describes itself as "an ad hoc organization which supports a strong response to Saddam Hussein's aggression in the Persian Gulf." It claims to have raised nearly $1 million dollars to continue its mission, and to have received 2600 calls a day on its two toll-free numbers from people who want to receive its Emergency Action Kits. CAR operates out of the offices of Keene Shirley Associates, a lobbying and public relations firm in Alexandria, Virginia. What the people don't know take the group at face value and respond to its advertising is that its moving force, one William Kennedy, is a bankrupt precious metals dealer and failed magazine publisher who also happens to be on the payroll of the exiled Kuwaiti government. In fact, according to the Wall Street Journal, he is a registered agent of the Kuwaiti government.

The co-chairmen of the committee are all longtime associates of Kennedy involved in his various past failed enterprises. They are: Scott Stanley, Jr., former managing editor of American Opinion magazine, a John Birch Society publication, who went on to edit Conservative Digest when it was purchased from mailing list whiz Richard Viguerie by Kennedy; Sam H. Zakhem, the US ambassador to Bahrain from 1986-1989; and Lewis Tambs, the US ambassador to Costa Rica and Colombia during the Reagan administration. The stated purpose of the group, according to Zakhem, the most prominent spokesman, is to generate "grass roots support for President Bush. With this new ad campaign, we are expecting thousands more Americans to join our Coalition. Only by showing a broad consensus for our present policy in the Gulf, can we thwart the isolationist sentiment of a few individuals who have captured the media's attentions, and liberate both Americans held hostage and Kuwait." Zakhem is obviously referring to the growing movement among the so-called paleo-conservatives—old-line, traditional America firsters who oppose interventionism—best characterized by columnist Pat Buchanan's high-profile statements against the war. Vice President Dan Quayle refers to the anti-war movement as the Buchanan-McCarthy axis, since both the conservative columnist and the liberal former Sen. Eugene McCarthy find themselves on the same side of this issue. All three of these co-chairmen worked with Kennedy by serving as speakers at his so-called Monetary War Colleges. These were sponsored by Kennedy's Western Monetary Consultants (WMC), his bankrupt precious metals investment firm. At these events, high-rollers were invited to attend "seminars" on geopolitical strategy, given by a host of conservative luminaries and past and present lower-ranking Reagan administration officials, supposedly to help sophisticated investors make wise financial decisions. Circulating among the guests, however, were high pressure salesmen getting down to the real business at hand, the sale of silver through WMC. Conservative Digest (CD) and WMC were inextricably linked. Potential attendees for the "war colleges" were solicited from the subscriber list, and the seminars were heavily promoted in the pages of CD. WMC filed for bankruptcy in 1988, at which time Kennedy was pouring $20000 a month into the operating deficit of the magazine. According to a lawsuit filed against CD, Kennedy and other officials of the company by Richard and Vaudois Douglas of Sacramento (investors who were left high and dry after WMC's bankruptcy), Kennedy, his employees, relatives, friends and attorneys.

Also, Conservative Digest, Inc. was used as a front for Kennedy's Western Monetary enterprises, as 'journalists' for Conservative Digest served as 'boiler room' sales people." The Douglass lost $158000 dollars to Kennedy. CAR is yet another moribund conservative organization revitalized by Kennedy. It had been founded in 1985 to drum up public support for the Nicaraguan contra's, but ceased to operate in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal. Kennedy had many ties to conservatives close to then President Reagan, and some sources have indicated that Zakhem's appointment as ambassador to Bahrain was due at least in part to his association with Kennedy.

And this is where the Middle East connection began. As WMC was struggling to keep afloat in 1988, Kennedy traveled to Bahrain in March of 1988 and met with Zakhem, who proceeded to introduce him to wealthy individuals in that country who might be interested in investing in WMC, sponsoring war colleges or even in buying CD. Is CAR just an effort by Kennedy and associates to ingratiate themselves with the cash-rich Iraqis?
cow Kuwaitis? The ads he has placed certainly cite no pressing American interests at stake in the region, but rely heavily on emotional appeals that seem geared more to arousing Kuwaitis, rather than American, indignation. "To remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the Desert Shield needs a sword," reads one headline. The copy reads: "The Kuwaiti morgues are filled with the bodies of murdered Kuwaitis in heaps, as at Auschwitz. Countless Kuwaiti women have been raped and brutalized by grinning Iraqi troops in uniform. Saddam Hussein has friends right here in America that want to help him bring America to her knees. This is not merely a 'crisis in the Gulf' but a HOLOCAUST. Why, then, are we not hearing the whole truth? Why are so many dancing around the issue?" Kennedy refuses to reveal the sources of his funding. He told the Wall Street Journal, "You don't tell the enemy what your resources are." "What the CAR ads don't say is that Kennedy is a registered Kuwaiti agent trying to profit by managing Kuwaiti flight capital," says the Wall Street Journal. [=]

24011. --------- "Government Building Bombed in Baghdad, Killing One Man", in Seattle Times, October 19, 1994, p. A16. A bomb exploded at a mosque at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, killing one man and seriously wounding five people (including three women). There was no claim of responsibility, by the Iraqi police blamed 'agents hired by the enemies of Iraq, which could be a reference to Kurdish or Shiite rebels. The last such attack was a car bombing of the state-run Al-Joumhuriya newspaper offices: there have been a string of bombings over the last two years. Separately, the military forces Iran cross the Iraqi border at Ashraf to attack the main base of the Mujahideen-i-Khalq. [TXT]

24012. --------- "Gulf War Syndrome Research Boosted", in Science News, October 15, 1994, p. 252. Some $8.4 million has been allocated in defense appropriations for Gulf War Syndrome research ($5 million), and for the 'antibacterial treatment method' of Edward Hyman at Touro Infirmary in New Orleans. The legislation would also require the VA to examine the health impact on spouses and children, which has not been done to date. In 7/1994, the VA allocated $1.5 million to study possible health effects of environmental contaminants during the war. [TXT]

24013. --------- "Gulf War Syndrome Research Boosted", in Science News, October 15, 1994, p. 252. Some $8.4 million has been allocated in defense appropriations for Gulf War Syndrome research ($5 million), and for the 'antibacterial treatment method' of Edward Hyman at Touro Infirmary in New Orleans. The legislation would also require the VA to examine the health impact on spouses and children, which has not been done to date. In 7/1994, the VA allocated $1.5 million to study possible health effects of environmental contaminants during the war. [TXT]

24014. --------- "Gulf War Syndrome: The Cold Cover-Up: Tampering with Medical Records", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 1, 1996, pp. 9, 14. As the RW reported last year (number 820, 8/27/1995), the military has tried to destroy or alter soldiers' medical records as part of the GWS coverup. A Marine Corps order dated 8/1991 indicates that tampering with health records was a matter of policy. Several sources have suggested that the documentation of exposure to smoke within the geographical boundaries of Kuwait should be placed in members' health records," the order said. "Placing such information could wrongly imply possible health problems in the future, while all the information to date suggests no health hazard exists. Unless there are current health complaints, there is no reason to make health record entries." The Army Times (4/25/1994), which covers news of the US armed forces, reported accusations by Navy personnel that the Navy removed files from the medical records of afflicted sailors in 11/1991. The sailors say these records prove they were exposed to biological or chemical agents in the Gulf. Navy Reserve captain Julia Dyckman, a 27-year veteran of the military, was a supervisor in a 500-bed field hospital in Saudi Arabia during the war. She believes that she was exposed to chemical or biological warfare agents. The 46-year-old nurse has tried unsuccessfully to get her own records from the Navy so she can get treatment for over a half dozen disabling medical conditions. She says the problem is not just with her records. "We kept statistical records and data that we sent to the Navy Research Center in San Diego, but they said they never received them. We sent medical encounter sheets to the 10000 we saw over the period we were in Saudi Arabia, and they claim it never arrived. Convenient, isn't it?" Dyckman said that the field hospital treated many people, but none for chemical illnesses. "If somebody came in with like what I had - open sores, which I think was from a blister agent - we were told that there were no chemicals, so we didn't treat them for that." Dyckman was told that the blisters and open sores were from "desert sand." After the war, Dyckman served on a committee to interview soldiers returning from the Gulf. "When I started interviewing people, they were complaining of the same illnesses that were plaguing me, so I started documenting the complaints. When I started reporting, the Navy got even with me and took my pay away and stuff. I got a lot of harassment." [=]

24015. --------- "Iraq Claims Sanctions Killed 400000 [one-third of dead were under five, Health Ministry reports; in addition 42000 under five are malnourished, 2 million had illness related to malnourishment]", in Arizona Daily Star, January 9, 1994, p. A17. [TXT]

24016. --------- "Iraqi Trade Unions Federation Founding Congress: Congress Ended Its Sessions on the 11th Instant", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to ithdad Al-Shaab, July 23, 1959, p. 12. The number of unions represented in the Congress was 51, which is the total number of trade unions existing in Iraq embracing 275000 members. These unions were represented by 258 delegates, among them five women. In addition there were 64 observers, representing all Executive Bureaus of the Federation. After reading and discussing the political and economic reports and other affairs of the Federation, the Congress took a number of resolutions, among which were:

1. A resolution to join the National United Front.
2. A resolution about joining the World Federation of Trade Unions. The resolution explained the honorable rule played by the WFTU in defending the cause of the colonial and suppressed peoples, its support to the World Peace Movement, its fine stand on the questions of Arab Liberation and its great efforts to unite the struggle of the toilers of the world.
3. A resolution about People’s China: The resolution expressed condemnation of the stand of the reactionary states in the UN, and of the occupation of the Chinese seat by Chiang Chai-shek. The resolution demanded the restoration, to the Chinese people and their popular government, of their lawful place in the UN.

A resolution about strikes: "Our assessment of the political situation leads us to consider negotiations between the workers (through their unions) and the owners of factories, as the best means of settling disputes without compromising the basic demands of the workers." The resolution requested the owners to respond to the spirit of the revolution and dispense the workers of the need to resort to strikes.

5. A condemnation of the arrest of Iraqi workers in the UAR. The congress asked the Foreign Ministry to take the measures necessary for their release. The Congress also sent greetings to the Leader Abdul Karim Qassim on the occasion of the First Anniversary of the great 7/14/1958 Revolution and greetings to the Cuban workers struggling for the consolidation of the independence of their country. The congress sent an appeal to the conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva to concentrate their effort for the peaceful solution of international problems. The Congress expressed appreciation of the honest economic aid offered to us without strings by the countries of the friendly Socialist Camp. Finally the Congress condemned the criminal attack on the Lawyer of the Federation, Said al-Khafaji and demanded the punishment of those responsible for the killing of our martyrs. [=]

24017. --------- "Is Japan's Responsibility of War Over? (11): Chapter 4: 4-2. Who Will Try Them? - The Issue of Establishing Tribal, Part 1", in The People’s Korea, June 5, 1993, p. 5. (Continued from the previous issue) Many suggestions have been put forth in regard to establishing an
international criminal tribunal to make it possible to try war crimes and crimes against humanity on the basis of international community [Kuhn, “International Criminal Jurisdiction,” American Journal of International Law Vol. 41, 1947, and Vespasian V. Pella, “Towards an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law Vol. 44, 1950.]. The UN General Assembly on 12/9/48, adopted a resolution stating that “in the course of development of the international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law,” and therefore “inviting the International Law Commission to study the desirability of establishing such a judicial organ, in particular as a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice” [See the Report of the sixth Committee of the General Assembly prepared by the Rapporteur Mr. J. Spiriopoulos in UN Doc. A/760, 12/5/48.]. However, attempts to establish the international criminal court have not been fruitful. [–]

24018. -------. “Is Japan’s Responsibility of War Over? (11): Chapter 4: 4-2. Who Will Try Them? - The Issue of Establishing Tribunal, Part 2”, in The People’s Korea, June 5, 1993. p. 5. Despite the absence of such a court with general jurisdiction, there is still a possibility to establish a court with limited jurisdiction. Mr. Van Boven, the special rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights has already submitted a report arguing that “the establishment of courts of human rights, or criminal courts, regionally or internationally, could help in the process of making those responsible for gross violations of human rights accountable for their acts, as could legislation authorizing universal jurisdiction over such violations” [UN Doc. E/C.4/Sub.2/1992/6, 7/25/92, P. 24.]. Even though he did not mention such specific subjects as the jurisdiction, composition of the judicial body, procedure, and enforcement of the decision, we can imagine several kinds of tribunals. It is unimaginable for the United Nations to succeed in setting up an international tribunal with which all nations concerned are forced to comply. Japan is also not likely to succumb to the tribunal, because there has not existed any similar international tribunal since the Nuremberg Tribunal and IMTFE. On the other hand, it is highly suggestive to see the example of the United Compensation Commission (UNCC), even though it had not criminal jurisdiction, which was founded under the supervision of UN for the purpose of compensation to victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental rights resulting from the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq [The UNCC was established pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in order to administer funds to pay compensation for the victims in Kuwait. The claim was mainly allowed to be submitted on the governmental basis, but compensation was aimed to be calculated on the individual basis. (See UN Doc. S/RES/682/1991, S/AC.26/1991/1, S/AC.26/1991/3, S/AC.26/1991/17/Rev.1 and S/RES/687/1991)]. With the agreement of Japan, the problem will be settled easily. (cont. [–]


24020. -------. “Is Japan’s Responsibility of War Over? (11): Chapter 4: 4-2. Who Will Try Them? - The Issue of Establishing Tribunal, Part 4”, in The People’s Korea, June 5, 1993. p. 5. Furthermore, the principle of universal jurisdiction which grants a state the right to punish a crime regardless of the place of the crime or the nationality of the criminal, has undergone considerable development [This principle of universal jurisdiction was also applied to the Ichmann case. The defense council denied the jurisdiction of Israel over Ichmann, criticizing the law 5710 on the ground that it was contradictory to international law because it allows for the trial of acts which were perpetrated even before the creation of Israel, outside of its present borders and the victims of which were persons who were not citizens of Israel. However, Israel court dismisses the opinion saying that the right of Israel to punish the genocide of the Jews proceeds directly from the universal nature of this crime and since an international tribunal does not exist for the moment, international law invests the legislative and judicial organs of each state with the power to punish them. (Pep Dapatdos, The Eichmann Trial, Stevens & Sons, London, 1964, p. 42, p. 44.) Universal principle as established by the municipal law of several states for certain crimes has recently been recognized for a whole category of war crimes [Ibid, p. 45]. It has also been introduced into international treaty law by the Conventions of Geneva of 8/12/49, which impose on the authors of the crimes. After World War II, the field of application of universal jurisdiction was further enlarged to include crimes against humanity and the great majority of scholars on legal theory agreed to submit crimes against humanity in general to universal jurisdiction [Ibid, p. 46]. The court established under the principle has been explained that “these courts, although national in form, are essentially international in character by reason of the functions they perform. They are in fact, called upon to impose punishment for international offenses on behalf not only of their own states but also of all other states, on behalf of the international community as a whole. They thus act as judicial organs of the international legal order, which is institutionally deficient” [UN Doc. E/C.4/906, p. 116. It has similar logical background which is shared in Eichmann case]. Therefore, there can be no doubt about the jurisdiction of Korea over the war crimes or crimes against humanity committed by the Japanese army. [–]

24021. -------. “Is Japan’s Responsibility of War Over? (11): Chapter 4: 4-3. How Can the Criminals Be Brought to Court? - The Problems of Deportation and Extradition: (1) Inevitability of Extradition of War Criminals and Criminals against Humanity”, in The People’s Korea, June 5, 1993. p. 5. If the Japanese government has concerns about prosecuting the war criminals and criminals against humanity within its territory and under its jurisdiction, the procedure for punishment is simple. What other countries can do is only to cooperate with the Japanese government in the trial, including investigation and obtaining witnesses. However, judging from the attitude and mentality exhibited by Japanese government, it is unimaginable that it will consider the issue of prosecution sincerely. The next possibility is that the Japanese war criminals appear voluntarily in front of the authorities. In the past, there
was the striking scene where a few conscientious war criminals appeared before the public and confessed the crimes they committed during World War II or during the occupation of Korea [Mr. Yoshida Seiji was a former chief of Yamaguchi district responsible for draft and hunting for “comfort women” and forced laborers to come to Korea to give witness on 1/16/92. He confessed shockingly that he himself had hunted no less than 1000 Korean women to send to the military camp as “comfort women.” He had already published his Confessions titled “My Confessions on War Crimes” in 1983 and was determined to act as witness wherever he was wanted. (The Han-Kuk libo, 1/17/92)]. When we are reminded of the fact that they can be punished through the criminal procedure, it is unimaginable for the criminals to cast voluntarily their destiny on the altar of foreign judiciary. The last remaining way of bringing the war criminals to the country concerned is to extradite them by Japan or other countries in which Japanese war criminals retain their nationality or residence. Without efficient means of obtaining the criminals, any discussion about punishment will become useless and futile. Fortunately, the principle of extradition of those who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity has been established as an international customary law. Extradition and deportation constitute a legal process by which a country removes individuals involuntarily. Extradition means to request a country to surrender an individual whom the requesting state wants to prosecute. A formal mutual extradition treaty is needed to extradite. On the other hand, deportation is a unilateral measure by which a country expels an alien. Almost all of war crimes cases have been regarded as deportation, because war criminals removed without mutual extradition treaty between the countries concerned [Gregory J. Getschman, “The Uncertain Role of Innocence in United States Efforts to Deport Nazi War Criminals,” Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 21, 1988, p. 289]. [=]


24023. ------. “Mideast Destabilization Seen From Breakup of Iraq Embargo, Part 2”, in The Spotlight, February 21, 1994, pp. 18-19. Kuwaitis feel the whole affair was mishandled and overly costly both in terms of money and social upheaval and are demanding an accounting. Add to this the faux pas by the Kuwaiti government in jailing a British citizen of Kuwaiti extraction, Suleiman al-Adasani, who was said to have been involved in the anti-Iraqi resistance, only to be picked up off the street when Operation Desert Storm returned the Sabahs to power and -- allegedly -- tortured. The Kuwaiti government charges al-Adasani with producing and distributing pornographic films featuring members of the royal family. The films are said to depict known members of the ruling house engaged in both heterosexual and homosexual orgies. Whether the charge is true or not, the local populace tends to believe the stories about the orgies and feels their rulers have offended Allah. Now Kuwait faces an angry populace and an equally angry international community. Only gobs of cash can keep things under control. And if oil prices drop, there goes the ball game. The situation is much the same -- if less violent on the surface -- in Saudi Arabia, where the royal family considers all assets of the country to be their personal property. For years the ruling family has been taking cash out of the country and investing it -- or spending it. But the result is that the Saudis need the cash flow from oil profits to keep the country going. Add to this the unrest among the foreign workers, who owe no allegiance to the royal house, and you have a government that’s ready to topple. Perhaps with this in mind, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, in late December 1993 (12/93), inaugurated the kingdom’s first Majlis-e-Shura (consultative council). The council has 60 members appointed by the king from the general public not belonging to the ruling al-Saud family. They took their oaths of office on 12/28/93. Prominent Moslems welcomed “this historic step”.

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King Fahd said: "Saudi Arabia was founded on the principle of consultation and is determined to continue along the Islamic path." It should be noted that the kingdom has no general elections. And, it is no secret that the banks -- bulging with oil money -- are smacking their lips in anticipation of the downfall of any or all of the governments of the oil-producing states. That will give the banks the chance to freeze the funds of the ousted rulers and keep them forever. [–]

24024. ------. "New US War Threats Against Iraq", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), October 16, 1994. p. 2. As we go to press - 10/8/94, the Pentagon has announced large movements of troops, combat planes and warships to threaten the country of Iraq. The US imperialists already have warships and thousands of troops permanently stationed within striking distance of the Gulf oil fields. Now more warships carrying jets and cruise missiles. 4000 US Army troops and two anti-missile batteries are being rushed to the Persian Gulf. Floating warehouses full of tanks and other invasion weapons are moving from the Indian Ocean into the Gulf itself. The decision for even more troop deployment is waiting for the heads of the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Perry and Gen. Shalikashvili, to return from US-occupied Haiti. US threats in the Persian Gulf have nothing to do with preventing aggression. The US troops are ship movements are new acts of aggression by US imperialism in a region it considers strategically vital. With these war threats, the US ruling class shows again that it demands the right to control other countries throughout the world, especially in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. In 1991 the US government did not hesitate to kill more than a hundred thousand Iraqi people to enforce this domination. The excuse for this new round of US threats is full of hypocrisy: The US government accuses the Iraqi military of massing troops in a threatening way near Kuwait's northern border. However, it is the US (not Iraq) that has just invaded and occupied a neighboring country, Haiti! The US militarily threatens and isolates other countries constantly. In just the last few months the US has bullied North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, and now Iraq again. Iraq's people are suffering terribly from an embargo imposed on them by the US and the United Nations - an embargo energetically reinforced by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq has been prevented from selling oil internationally, and from buying many necessary goods on the world market - including machinery and supplies to restore sanitation, electricity, bridges, highways and other key structures destroyed by the US military almost four years ago during the 1990 Gulf war. Many reports document the suffering caused by this embargo, including heightened death rates among Iraqi children. In recent weeks, Iraq was forced to even further cut the food rations of the people. The US government and military have no right to bully other countries. It has no right to dictate and dominate in the Persian Gulf. US hands off Iraq! US troops out of the Persian Gulf! [–]


24027. ------. "Save the Life of Faraj Allah Al-Hilu", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab, July 23, 1959. p. 11. More than three weeks have passed since Faraj Allah Al-Hilu, the leading Lebanese patriot was arrested in Damascus, by Nasser's gestapo; ever since his arrest he had been subjected to the most horrible torture in the Maze Prison. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From there he has been transferred to an unknown place. From then on it is known. These telegrams and petitions came from all kinds of honest people: men and women, young and old, peasants, workers, professionals, students, etc,... belonging to various organizations, classes, sects and beliefs. Messages of protest from 20000 Lebanese have been sent; there was a telegram from 61 children in Lebanon, friends of the hero's daughters, requesting the return of Faraj to his country and home. Another letter of protest came from the Arab Students in Prague; also one from the Peasants; Associations in Mosul.

A letter from Syria to the Lebanese "Nida," paper, said that the Syrian people, who have known Faraj as a great fighter against French imperialism and for Lebanese and Syrian independence, demand, an immediate end to the torture of Faraj, his release and publication of the truth about his fate. The letter ended with the following words: "Our People raise their voices, together with all the freedom loving peoples of the world to demand the release of Faraj Allah al-Hilu."

World progressive public opinion strongly denounced the kidnapping of Faraj; among the petitions and messages of protest coming from various parts of the world, there were letters from the Communist Parties of Italy, Morocco and Tunis; these demanded the authorities in Cairo and Damascus to save Faraj's life.

The Lebanese National Congress also demanded the UAR authorities in the name of freedom of thought and human rights to clarify the mystery that seems to surround the destiny of Faraj.

The latest development in the "Save Faraj" campaign is the Lebanese Government decision to send an official delegation to Damascus in order to investigate the matter. Prime Minister Rashid Karami, stated that the government is deeply concerned about the safe return of this great patriot to his homeland. [–]

24028. ------. "Setting the Record Straight", in Multinational Monitor, February/March 1985. p. 13. In many countries, government officials and doctors rely almost exclusively on pharmaceutical companies or their representatives to provide information on drug's efficacy. In Upjohn's cover memo, reference is made to Stephen Minkin, former nutrition director with the United Nations in Baghdad, who has written several articles exposing problems with Depo-Provera and deficiencies in safety testing of the drug. Note our rebuttal to Upjohn's "Key Response Statements." [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.]

24029. ------. "Setting the Record Straight: Cover Memo", in Multinational Monitor, February/March 1985. p. 13. 5/25/83 TO: Group and Division Vice Presidents, Subsidiary and Branch General Managers, Medical Directors, Regional Marketing Managers, Health Regulatory Affairs Managers, MSL Managers, and Worldwide Public Relations Agencies

Subject: Depo Provera
Dear Colleagues, Attached are important new materials to assist you in responding to negative publicity about Depo-Provera. As you know, false and inaccurate stories about Depo-Provera have been repeated in the media until they are accepted as truth. While there is no completely effective method to stop such reports, we believe one of the best ways to counter false and adverse publicity is to quickly and factually respond to all major negative news stories that appear in your
country. To assist you I have attached: A completely revised Depo-Provera Information Kit, intended to replace your present kit which contains outdated materials; A form letter to media editors responding to attacks against Depo-Provera which can be translated and adapted to specific charges by using: Key response statements rebutting specific, but common charges leveled at Depo-Provera, which can be inserted into the form letter above: A review of Depo-Provera response procedures. Depo-Provera Information Kit. This new kit reflects the shift in focus of the major issues surrounding Depo-Provera following the recent US and U.K. hearings regarding its registration for long-term contraceptive use. Both hearings centered on scientific evidence rather than on unsubstantiated allegations by activists such as Stephen Minkin. We regard this as a positive development: consumerist attacks often forced us into a defensive stance; the scientific focus allows us to use a wide range of supportive materials. This new Information Kit reflects this shift: the Minkin material has been removed and a number of recent third party scientific reports and endorsements have been added. Since issuing the original D-P Information Kit, we have also sent out a number of supplemental materials. I suggest you review these materials, keeping only the most up-to-date items having specific relevance to local Depo-Provera issues in your country. Form Response Letter: A number of our subsidiaries have asked for a basic form letter to use to responding to negative stories. This sample letter, prepared by B. K. Berger, can be translated and adapted to a variety of situations by incorporating selected key response statements discussed below. Key Response Statements: These 12 statements provide replies to some of the most frequent charges against Depo-Provera. They can be inserted into the Form Response Letter as necessary. Review of Response Procedures: To assist you in responding quickly to media attacks on Depo-Provera, I have attached a step-by-step guide. These procedures merely formalize what is established practice with our subsidiaries affected by negative Depo-Provera publicity. In the coming months, we can expect increased media activity as the results from the US and U.K. hearings are announced. We will keep you informed as events progress, and will supply supportive materials whenever possible. Please contact us if you have any questions. Sincerely, Leigh M. Bailey, Public Relations Associate, International Human Health LMB/ems Attachments cc: JAllen, RAssenzo, MGBeck, BKBerger, PCCarra, ELClark, GWDuncan, JGoossens, RBHeaps, JHTheywood, KKnort, OAKreuzer, CTMan, TMansager, WACO'Connell, TGSchlaik, PCSchwallie, ESShepherd, JCSucki, WESykes, SSVescovi, DWDitcher. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. [1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted with permission.] [==]

24030. -------. "Setting the Record Straight: Form Letter for Response”, in Multinational Monitor, February/March 1985, p. 14. Dear Editor: On (date) you published/aired a story entitled, (title). This story concerned our product, Depo-Provera; unfortunately, it contained a number of false and inaccurate statements and I want to correct these inaccuracies for you and your readers/viewers. I think you will agree that health care products are of vital concern to consumers. We believe that the accurate reporting to consumers of information about health care products is just as important. First, Depo-Provera is an injectable product containing the drug medroxyprogesterone acetate. The product is injected intramuscularly and its contraceptive effect comes from suppression of pituitary hormones that cause release of a mature egg. The drug is also approved for use in many countries for treatment of endometrial, breast and kidney cancer. Now, include ideas from key paragraphs to respond to specific inaccuracies. This may be one or several paragraphs in length. Finally, worldwide experience with Depo-Provera shows that it is a highly effective contraceptive option for women, and it is probably the safest hormonal contraceptive available. We believe that those who know the information about the drug do a serious disservice not only to reputed worldwide scientists and doctors who support Depo-Provera, but also to patients themselves. Again, I hope that you will share this information with your readers/viewers. I’ve also attached a copy of the “Information Kit on Depo-Provera,” which contains additional evidence about the drug. Please feel free to contact me if you wish to discuss further this product. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. [1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.] [==]
no significant differences were observed in comparison with IUD or oral contraceptive users. 10. Depo-Provera is "used" on women without their knowledge or consent . . . : The Upjohn Company has always supported the concept of fully informed and free choice of contraceptive methods in all countries. Adequate patient information is a necessary part of any contraceptive or family planning program, and Upjohn has through the years provided a number of written and visual materials for this purpose. Also, in 1983, Upjohn prepared a comprehensive 17-page patient booklet that fully informs potential users of all known side effects and contraindications. Finally, millions of women-years' experience with Depo-Provera prove that it is not a dangerous contraceptive given to unsuspecting women. 11. Upjohn makes large sales and profits from Depo-Provera and will make even more when the drug is approved in the US and the U.K. . . .: This is simply not true. Sales of Depo-Provera for contraception account for less than 1% of total corporate sales in any given year. Further, US approval is not going to open up numerous new markets since the drug is already approved in more than 80 countries. Finally, the patent on Depo-Provera in the US expires in 1986. Thus, the company will not obtain substantial commercial value from approval in the US before the patent expires. 12. Then why is Upjohn pursuing registration?: We have continued to support Depo-Provera for long-term contraceptive use on principle because we believe it is a safe and efficacious product. We feel that it supplies an important need worldwide and, in particular, to the 2 million women who presently rely on Depo-Provera. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.] [x]

24032. --------. "Setting the Record Straight: Rebuttals to Key Response Statements", in Multinational Monitor, February/March 1985. p. 14-15. 1. and 4. In many countries, drug "registration" simply involves registering the drug with customs. Even "approval" by a foreign health minister is often based only on information supplied by the drug company itself. The Swedish government, recognizing Depo-Provera's dangers unless it is administered with close monitoring, prohibits its international development agency from promoting the drug abroad. 2. The FDA Board of Inquiry recommended in 10/84 that approval of contraceptive use of Depo-Provera continue to be denied. In 1978 the FDA itself gave four reasons for its denial of approval: three of them were scientific, and a fourth was that no significant patient population needing the drug had been demonstrated. 3. The FDA Board of Inquiry found that there is no proof that Depo-Provera does not cause cancer. Cancer did result in required tests of the drug conducted on beagle dogs and monkeys; Depo-Provera was only the contraceptive that caused cancer in both of these animal tests. 4. There have been no studies conducted of the drug's children through puberty, when reproductive abnormalities would most likely become evident. One study of infants exposed to Depo-Provera through breast milk showed that Depo-exposed infants were more vulnerable to common infections than other children. A number of studies showing no difference in Depo-exposed and other children were reviewed by the FDA Board of Inquiry and found to be inadequate. 6. The FDA Board of Inquiry criticized the scientific studies of Depo-Provera as being "haphazard" and "uncoordinated." 7. Judith Weisz, chair of the FDA Board of Inquiry, has said of the OB-GYN advisory committee's recommendation of approval of Depo-Provera, "Theirs was a free-wheeling discussion, not serious analysis. It's a shame that it wasn't, since they now get cited as the authorities." One of the advisory committee's own members commented that the more you know about physiology, the less you want to take this drug. 8. As the FDA Board of Inquiry stated, "The lack of adequate long-term follow-up of subjects cannot be obscured or overcome by pooling of data from women who have used the drug for different periods of time and presenting these data in forms of 'women years' or months of use. . . . While it takes nine months to produce a baby, nine women, each one contributing one month, cannot produce a baby." 9. This is an especially important area where there hasn't been adequate study with long-term follow-up. 10. It's been a major concern of women's groups and experts like the Medical Committee in England that the targeted population for this drug, often uneducated or underprivileged women, have the least ability to give informed consent. Griff Ross, the member of the FDA Board of Inquiry recommended to the panel by Upjohn, recommended that the drug be approved for use in the US by drug abusers and the mentally retarded, two of the very groups unlikely to be able to give such consent. One of the major criticisms in the 1978 FDA audit of the Grady study in Atlanta was that many of the women seemed to be aware of the drug's experimental status. 11. and 12. Governments around the world are concerned when a drug is not approved for use in its country of origin. Even though Depo-Provera is currently registered or approved in 80 countries, those decisions are not irreversible. Continued FDA denial of approval will fuel opposition to the drug, and undermine Upjohn's reputation around the world. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.] [x]

24033. --------. "Soviet Exhibition Opens in Baghdad", in Iraqi Review-Western English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab, April 30, 1960. pp. 5-6. Sunday, 4/10/1960, was impatiently awaited by thousands of men and women. Young and old poured into the street (the widest in Baghdad) where the Soviet Industrial Exhibition was to be opened at 5:00 p.m. Hours ahead at the scheduled opening massive groups were gathering along the street, at first standing orderly on the pavements, but soon getting too much for the space and gradually, yet still orderly, spilling into the whole street. The cars bringing the guests to the opening of the exhibitions had to force their way through the human ocean!

The thousands of peace-loving men and women that filled the streetand the surrounding area, were in fact themselves the host of Baghdad's great guest, Comrade Mikoyan. Echoing through Baghdad West was the enthusiastically repeated slogan of "Mikoyan Welcome! Iraqi People Greet You." For hours on end the people voiced their feelings towards the Soviet Union, friend of the peoples, and their warm support for Iraq-Soviet Friendship.

At five o'clock sharp, Comrade Anastas Mikoyan, the First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, opened the exhibition by delivering a speech to the invited guests of more than 2000. Mikoyan's speech was many times interrupted by warm applause from thousands of pairs of hands and greatly touched the hearts of the audience.

The mention that by the end of the Seven Year Plan all workers and employees would enjoy the six or seven hours work day, was met with loud applause. More so was the cause with the mention of Mikoyan that there is not a single political prisoner in the Soviet Union.

The peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union and the prospects of development of communist construction in the USSR, besides its sincere will to strengthen and consolidate friendship and cooperation with peoples the world over, including the Iraqi people - all this was received with prolonged and stormy applause.

On inviting the guests to see the exhibition, the Premier Abdul Karim Qassim spoke, stressing Soviet-Iraqi friendship. In parts of the Premier's speech, he quoted from the speech of Mikoyan his mention that the Soviet Union was proud of their being able to expel the invaders. Premier Qassim admired the courage of the Soviet people and added that the Iraqi people have likewise destroyed the imperialist base into which their country had ben, and particularly they destroyed British imperialism in Iraq.

Throughout the speeches, which lasted for some hour and a half, the masses outside the exhibition kept raising slogans of Soviet Iraqi friendship and of the friendly nature of the Soviet Union.

This was among the masses in the street. High up above were the two flags of the Iraqi Republic and of the USSR. As if taking their cue from the enthusiastic crowds below, they were proudly waving in harmony with the feelings of peace and friendship voiced by the two leaders, Premier Qassim and Comrade Mikoyan, and by the many thousands of guests and bystanders alike.

The exhibition entrance was lit by a huge sign bearing the slogan: "The Peaceful Economic Program of the Soviet Union Opens from 1959-
1965 for the Further Development of Soviet Foreign Trade."

A statue of the founder of the world's first workers and peasants state Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, welcomes you as enter the exhibition of Soviet products...a showroom of 1000 square meters, with many pavilions showing examples of the successes scored in the Soviet Union in all spheres of life.

Full-scale model of the three sputniks, exhibition. When the tour of the exhibition began, all machines started to work, a sign of greeting to the guests.

Premier Qassim showed interest in a large Saloon car, and even mounted a "heli-copter" amidst the cameras of pressmen and T.V. to mark this happy and friendly occasion.

In the agricultural section, the Premier enquired about the Soviet seeds and their suitability for Iraqi soil. Comrade Mikoyan's reply was: "Try them, they might be useful.

In the "Atom for Peace" section, there was a cannon, of which the manager of the section said: "This cannon is not for killing, it is for curing people.

The Automatic "hands" raised laughter and admiration amongst the guests, for their skill in handling materials.

Comrade Mikoyan then invited Premier Qassim to attend a concert and variety show held in the large hall established on the exhibition grounds. Baghdad considers this exhibition a manifestation of the friendship. Long live Iraqi Soviet Friendship! May it flourish still more!

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24034. ------. "Special Report: Muslim Women Show the Way Forward at World Conference", in Crescent International, April 16-30, 1997. p. 6. Among the many highlights at the "Crescent International conference in Pretoria, held in memory of Doctor Kalim Siddiqi, was a full day dedicated to Muslim women. It was an instant success. The most frequently heard comment was that this is something they were looking for all along. At hand were a number of sisters who had long experience in motivating and mobilizing sisters for the Global Islamic Movement. Overseas guests included Sister Merve Safa Kavakci, head of international relations and women's affairs for the Refah Party in Turkey, Sister Suraiya Siddiqui, widow of the late Doctor Kalim Siddiqui, their daughter Lubna, and Sister Faiza Siddiqi—the last two members of the executive committee of the Muslim women's Institute in London. There was no shortage of local talent either. The Women's Day idea had come from Sisters Waheeda Kassim and Fajriya Fakier, "Crescent International's" representatives in South Africa. They had the support of such other women activists as Sister Ayesha Khan, Sister Rabia Kaila, among others. Once the sisters had been motivated to take up the challenge, then there was no stopping them. Throughout the day, the sisters held their sessions and workshops. The excitement was electrifying. As what usually happens on such occasions, they wanted to move quickly to achieve something tangible right away. It was clear that they had missed a lot of time in the past; they did not want to waste any more time. The issues they wanted to discuss were not about cooking or sewing, important as these are (an army marches on its stomach, goes an old saying!). Their concerns were much more profound: the mobilization of Muslim women for the Global Islamic Movement, addressing the drug menace, providing the proper environment for their children to grow up in, and refuting the challenges of western feminists who insistently pronounce that Muslim women are oppressed because they wear the hijab. Had western feminists been there, they would have found more than a match in these sisters. A number of sisters addressed the issue of why Islam held such attraction for middleclass, otherwise worldly successful western women. What was lacking in their lives to attract them to Islam after they had achieved almost everything that the Muslim Women's Day will be included in the forthcoming issues of the "Crescent International," insha'Allah. [=]

24035. ------. "Study Concerning Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (18): Final Report Submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur: V. Compensation to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Resulting from the Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq", in Peoples Korea, September 3, 1994. p. 8. 93. In resolution 687 (1991) adopted by the Security Council on 4/3/91 the Council reaffirmed that Iraq "...is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" (paragraph 16). In this connection the Council decided to create a fund to pay claims that fall within paragraph 16 quoted above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund. It should be noted that the Council's wording in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991) by and large restated paragraph 8 of the Council resolution 674 (1990), which reminded Iraq that "...under international law, it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." 94. For the purpose of the present study three issues will be discussed: (a) the legal basis for Iraq's duty to pay compensation; (b) loss, damage or injury suffered in connection with gross violations of human rights; (c) Governments and individuals as subjects submitting claims. [See also Larisa Gabriell, "Victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms arising from the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq," Report of the Maastricht Seminar, pp. 29-39; Frank C. Newman, Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Resulting from the Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, in Peoples Korea, September 3, 1994. p. 8. 93. In resolution 687 (1991) adopted by the Security Council on 4/3/91 the Council reaffirmed that Iraq "...is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" (paragraph 16). In this connection the Council decided to create a fund to pay claims that fall within paragraph 16 quoted above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund. 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Newman, Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Resulting from the Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, in Peoples Korea, September 3, 1994. p. 8. 93.
to answer the call of their people and leader to defend the cause of the people, for the sake of all these we beseech you to order the release of these dutiful patriots and let justice be done to them in order to enable them to return to their mothers. [–]

24041. ------. "US Embargo Kills Half Million Iraqi Children: Big Increases in Disease and Hunger", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 17, 1995, p. 8. The study appeared in The Lancet, the journal of the British Medical Association. It was co-authored by Mary Smith Fawzi, a researcher at the Harvard University School of Public Health, and Sarah Zaidi, science director of the Center for Social and Economic Rights. The study was based on a survey conducted in 8/1995 of 2120 children under 10 years old in 25 neighborhoods in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. The survey found that: - Mortality rates for children in Iraq is now five times greater than before the Gulf War. - Iraq's water and sanitation systems were devastated by the bombing during the Gulf War. As a result, deaths related to diarrheal diseases have tripled compared to before the war. - 28% of children were stunted in growth because of food shortages and bad health conditions, compared to 12% in 1991. - The percentage of children affected by "wasting" - emaciation requiring urgent medical attention - rose from 3% in 1991 to 12% in 1995. Malnutrition is widespread, and the rate of underweight children now compares with those of the poorest Third World countries like Mali or Ghana. The Lancet article says: "These findings illustrate a strong association between economic sanctions and increase in child mortality and malnutrition rates." The article in Lancet is an isolated study. A series of studies by various organizations - from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) to the Harvard Medical School of Public Health - have documented the catastrophic effects of the US bombings and the economic embargo on the 20 million people of Iraq. A 9/1995 study by UNIFEC reported: "The situation in the health sector regarding children and women has remained critical over the past five years... According to [Iraq's] Ministry of Health (MOH) statistics, the number of mortality cases among children under five has been on the rise over the past five years. MOH figures indicated that the monthly average of mortality cases among children of the same age group due to acute respiratory infections, water-borne diseases and malnutrition stood at 4409 for 1994 against 742 cases in 1990..."

24039. ------. "US Embargo Kills Half Million Iraqi Children", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 17, 1995, p. 8. For five years, the US and its big-power allies have carried out an economic embargo against Iraq, preventing that country from selling its main export - oil - and importing vital necessities like food and medicine. What has been the human cost of these sanctions? A study just published in a leading British medical journal reports that as many as 576000 Iraqi children may have died since the end of the 1990-1991 Gulf War because of the economic sanctions. The US accuses the Iraqi government of continuing to produce "weapons of mass destruction," and uses this accusation as justification for the embargo. But it is the US which has used economic sanctions as a "weapon of mass destruction" against Iraq. [–]

24040. ------. "US Embargo Kills Half Million Iraqi Children: Behind the Sanctions: US Imperialist Interests", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 17, 1995, p. 8. The massive US-led bombings and the land invasion of Iraq during the Gulf War left more than 100000 Iraqi people dead. But the US policymakers were not satisfied with the military defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. For the US rulers, keeping a dominant position in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East overall is crucial to their status as the top imperialist superpower. The US itself gets a relatively small percentage of its oil from the Gulf, but the area is a lifeline for Europe and Japan. Saddam Hussein has remained in power despite the devastation of the Gulf War, and the US imperialists are afraid he has become a symbol of the limitations of their global power. So they want to force Saddam Hussein himself out and replace him with a new set of rulers that the US can more easily control. The US has used the economic embargo - backed by military threats - to try to achieve this result. The anti-Iraq sanctions are being carried out under the banner of the UN, but they are basically enforced by the US and British military. Some of the other powers - like France and Russia - have pushed for easing the sanctions, hoping to strike profitable capitalist deals with the Iraqi regime. But the US has vetoed any suggestions to lower the embargo wall that has been built up around Iraq. Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN, bluntly declared last year, "We recognize this area [the Persian Gulf] as vital to US national interests, and we will behave with others multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must." This is the cold-blooded imperialist logic behind the sanctions against Iraq and the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. [–]
sections of the people in Iraq. But the situation is getting desperate for the great majority of Iraqi people. Eric Rouleau, a former French diplomat, wrote in Foreign Affairs (1-2/1995): "The slow asphyxiation of the economy since the Persian Gulf War has brought about the collapse of the dinar and a cumulative inflation rate estimated at 5000% over four years. Salaries, meanwhile, have remained virtually frozen. An entire month’s salary of a middle-level governmental employee, for example, is needed to buy a kilo of bread for a pair of shoes for a pair of children. This makes the middle of Baghdad survive. Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, children have been selling petty things at traffic lights, but today many more have turned to beggary.... Child labor is also visible in the streets where small children are seen selling a variety of items, even drinking water. This situation is unlikely to witness immediate improvement even if the economic and trade sanctions are lifted or eased. [–]

24043. ———. "US Embargo Kills Half Million Iraqi Children: Cutting Off Food", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 17, 1995. p. 8. Iraq, which has the world’s second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, is a country oppressed by imperialism. But before the Gulf War, the revenues from the sale of oil was the basis for a general living standard and levels of literacy, health, and nutrition that were far higher than other Third World countries. The massive air bombings during the Gulf War destroyed a lot of Iraq’s infrastructure, such as factories, water and sanitation plants, electric lines, roads and bridges, and so forth. And the sanctions have cut off the foreign sale of Iraqi oil, eliminating what used to be Iraq’s main source of income. The sanctions have also prevented Iraq from purchasing essential goods - such as machinery and parts to repair conference of non-governmental organizations held in Baghdad in 1992, the import of necessary food and medicine is still supposedly allowed under the sanctions, the ban of the sale of oil means that Iraq has no way to pay for such key imports. The study “Hidden Casualties II, the Environmental, Health and Political Consequences of the Persian Gulf War” (copublished by Arms Control Research Center and North Atlantic Environmental, Health and Political Consequences of the Persian Gulf War) reported in 1993: “Before the war, Iraq imported 70% of its food. Even though food is exempt from the UN sanctions, delivery is slow and restrictions on Iraq’s cash supplies have helped to prevent bulk buying. UNICEF reports that food prices had increased 20 to 40 times over pre-Gulf War prices by 1/1992. Dr. Eric Hoskins, a Canadian physician, who has been monitoring the effects of the Gulf crisis on Iraqi women and children, reports that from 8/1990 to 4/1993 food price index had increased 50 times and that most prices increased by an additional 50% or more during the first three months of 1993 alone. Government food rations contain 1500 calories, not the 2700 calories daily adult recommendation.”

"As a result, malnutrition has been and continues to be a major problem in Iraq. According to Dr. Hoskins, pregnant women are subject to anemia because their diets are deficient in iron and folic acid, leading to abnormal rates of miscarriages, premature labors, and low birth weights of newborn infants.... Adding to these problems is a continuing lack of infant formula, with protein and micronutrient deficiency the cause of growth retardation, anemia, goiter, rickets and other illnesses related to the health of infants. Malnutrition, touching all groups of the society, has especially affected children one to three years of age. Government attempts to supplement food supplies ran into trouble when the 1992-1993 cereal harvest fell far short of expectations. Damaged crops were a result of the lack of pesticides and spare parts for irrigation pumps and other agricultural machinery, another consequence of UN sanctions.” The Iraqi government provides a subsidized “food basket” of five basic items to all the people. But this food ration covers only about 40% of minimum nutrition requirements. And the price of food items not rationed by the government is sky high due to inflation, putting it out of touch of the vast majority. According to UNICEF, the shortage of food is putting at risk some 3.5 million people in Iraq, including 1.58 million children under the age of 5. The International Committee for the Red Cross estimated that 220000 children were underweight due to the lack of food, and an additional 300000 were malnourished. Even more critical is the health of children below the age of one. There is evidence that many children will be born mentally handicapped. The US News & World Report wrote in 10/1994: “A UN survey in a poor section of Baghdad found nearly 1 in 10 infants suffering clinical marasmus; the Saddam Central Teaching Hospital for Children sees nearly 100 cases a month of children suffering marasmus and kwashiorkor - Third World nutritional diseases in a country that recently aspired to join the oil rich.” In 10/1994, an article in the New York Times revealed the sickening contrast between the hunger facing the Iraqi people with the situation in Kuwait - the reactionary oil kingdom that the US claimed to be protecting through the Gulf War: “To the north, in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, food rations have been cut in half and there are lines for bread and cooking oil. Inflation is rendering the Iraqi dinar worthless, and many on fixed incomes have trouble buying enough food for their families. Food has become a daily concern. But Kuwait, whose oil wealth and small population give it one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, has no such worries. Obesity has been steadily on the rise since the end of the Persian Gulf war, and Health Ministry officials say that at least half of the population is overweight.” [–]

24044. ———. "US Embargo Kills Half Million Iraqi Children: Direct Impact on Health", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 17, 1995. p. 8-9. Aside from increase of malnutrition, the economic embargo has a direct effect on the health of the Iraqi people and the medical care they receive. Iraq used to import $400 million each year in drugs and medical supplies - now it gets only one-tenth of that. There are serious shortages of medicines, vaccines, syringes, anesthetics, surgical materials, laboratory and diagnostic equipment. The UN has put anesthetics on the "red list," because of the supposed "military value" of its nitrate content. Newborn babies in intensive care must share incubators, and hypodermic needles are being used over and over again. During a 1991 survey in a poor section of Baghdad found nearly 1 in 10 infants suffering marasmus, all of which could be prevented. The surgeon needs special tools to do his work sterile. The result is wound infection, gangrene, osteomyelitis, sepsis, all of which could be prevented. The surgeon needs special tools for operations. The simple things were missing: sterile disposable scalpels. Because of this, the doctors were forced to use them as often as possible and only throw them away when they did not cut anymore. There was no gauze, bandages, surgical yarn, and even now the available amount is not according to the standard Iraq was accustomed to before the embargo. Normally operations are done under total anesthesia. How can you do it if the drugs are not available, the narcotic gas is missing. This is why the reason why many patients including children had limbs amputated without anesthetic as well as painful wound dressing without painkillers. Because of the breakdown of the sanitation system due to the damage from the Gulf War and the continuing sanctions, there has been a huge increase in diseases caused by contaminated water. "Hidden Casualties II" reported that in 1/1993 the northern Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyyah saw a 500% increase in the number of typhoid cases from the previous year. And there have been serious outbreaks of other illnesses, including: malaria, cholera, gastroenteritis, intestinal parasites, diarrhea and dehydration, infection hepatitis and respiratory tract infections. [–]

24045. ———. "US Sends More Troops to the Gulf", in Socialist Worker
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The anti-China campaign, which most bourgeois forces in the US have joined, is being waged because they can't forgive the workers and peasants of China for seizing their country for themselves in the 1949 revolution. In doing so they removed close to one quarter of the world's population from the dictates of capital. Today the Chinese government is taking on a greater political, economic, and military role in Asia and the Pacific, out of the control of Washington, London, Tokyo, and other imperialist powers. And, for all their investment, the imperialists are finding they can't reimpose capitalism in China just by opening a stock market in Shanghai. Fighters for women's rights from around the world will be looking for each other at this conference, trying to find ways forward. Neither Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright, leading the official US delegation, nor the right-wing forces campaigning against the conference speak for the vast majority of women. Our future will be forged in uncompromising fights for women's equality, and is intertwined with the worldwide struggle for socialism. [↩]

24049.  ....... "Youth Movement in Iraq", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to Itilhad Al-Shaab, June 11, 1959. pp. 7-8. (6/11/1959 is the opening of the First Congress of Iraqi Youth. Our Correspondent visited the headquarters of the Iraqi Democratic Youth Federation (IDYF), on the Karkh bank of Baghdad and in an interview with Mr. N. A. Rasaq, Secretary General of the IDYF, collected the information, on which this article is based.)

The youth, on whose shoulders rest the pillars of the new society, were very much oppressed in old Iraq that is the pre-7/14/1958 Iraq. They did not have the right to legal organizations of their own.

The Youth organization, under the same it holds now, IDYF, was first formed in 8/1951. Being illegal it was unable to bring in all the youth it would have done in normal life. Yet the obstacles placed in its way, did not limit the scope of its work. Branches outside Baghdad were active and its organ “The Youth,” distributed illegally some 7000 copies all over the country. The federation spared no efforts to defend the gains of the republic and its social interests and fought with great courage and resolution for the defense of freedom and the independence of the country against the imperialist forces.

The youth, organized in this federation, were conscious of their responsibility towards the progress of their society and the freedom of their people. They realized that their destiny was part and parcel of that of their fellow citizens. To improve their own conditions, they were confronted with the task of improving that of the people in general. Thus they came face to face with the imperialist domination of our economy and social affairs. Imperialism and the imperialist lackeys running the country’s affairs had to be exposed as being the direct enemy of our people and youth alike. This fact explains the whole character and history of the youth movement in Iraq. It explains likewise why it was attacked by the successive governments of the old regime.

The Iraqi youth struggled alongside the people, and their patriotism during national uprisings is particularly remembered. During the uprisings of 11/1952, the youth were in the forefront of the demonstrations, and many of them were the first victims of the fascist rule of the government. During the Tri-partite aggression on Egypt, Iraqi youth played a similarly active part in the campaign of solidarity with the Egyptian people.

Through the anti-imperialist struggle was the dominant feature of the IDYF then, it did not limit its activities to this end only. The difficulties it continued to face, reaching a climax with the signing of the Baghdad Pact, failed to isolate the Iraqi youth from the youth of the rest of the world. The youth participated in all the youth festivals held successively in Berlin, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow. Iraq youth are now getting ready for the forthcoming festival in Vienna. The youth delegations to these festivals were organized by the IDYF, thus contributing to the strengthening of the relations between students, workers, artists and other sections of the youth of Iraq with their colleagues in the various parts of the world.

Mass international youth congresses and conferences were similarly attended by the IDYF. The Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held in Berlin in 1951, the Third International Youth Congress in 1953 and the Peasant Youth Congress in 1954, were all but examples of the international contribution of the IDYF.

At home, one great achievement was the participation of the IDYF in the Higher Committee of the National United Front. This was a direct recognition of the role the youth federation was playing in general. On Nuri as-Sa'id's comeback to office, in 1954, all democratic measures forced on the previous government by the struggle of the people, were revoked and similarly all democratic organizations, first and foremost the IDYF, were crushed.

The activities of the federation decreased to a minimum till freedom dawned on Iraq, on 7/14/1958. The IDYF was reformed and reorganized on a totally new basis. Its aims changed according to the demands of the new era. The support of the people's movement for democracy and the defense of our independent Republic, are the chief aims of the IDYF now. All other activities originate from these two aims.

The IDYF now includes a number of organizations as well as individuals. Its membership grew by leaps and bounds since the very first day of the Republic.

What is the IDYF today? It is a social organization embracing youth of all walks of life, irrespective of political affiliations, race, religion or nationality. It is a non-party mass organization. Social activities, including cultural, artistic and sports, are the main type of activities.

The Preparatory Committee was legalized by the end of 3/1959. An ever increasing number of youth registered as members in the IDYF. In fact in the short period of four months, the figure reached 100000. The target of the federation is a quarter of a million members during the coming year. In fulfillment of its responsibility towards the republic, the federation spared no efforts to defend the gains of the republic and its democratic system, the youth nobly carried out their duties and many of them actively guarded the country, as members of the People's Resistance Forces.

During the Shawaf conspiracy (planned not by one aggressive force but by ruling circles in UAR, Britain and the US) the youth entered the battle for freedom on the side of the people. By the joint efforts of the honest army men and the people including the massive number of youth, it was impossible to smash the putsch.

The federation called on its members also to help in the nationwide campaign for combating illiteracy. Many schools were opened in the villages and rural areas and are run by the youth. Since the IDYF counts as members all the main companies of music theater and arts in general, it urged these members to take an active part in the people's preparations on the various national occasions. Army day on 1/6/1959, 6 months of the Revolution on 1/14/1959, Woman's Day on 3/8/1959, the Peace Festival on 4/16/1959 and May Day. The Musicians' Society and Modern Theater Company are the most active in this field. The IDYF since 7/14/1958 has participated in an even greater number of international meetings than before, the most important being the Ninth Congress of the Dimitrov Youth in Bulgaria, held in 11/1958, the Afro-Asian Youth Conference, end of 11/1958, the meetings of the Executive Committee of the WFDY meeting in Colombo and recently the Congress of The Free German Youth (FDY) of the German Democratic Republic.

The Federation's attention is now being directed mainly (apart from the congress of course) to the coming Youth Festival in Vienna. The delegation of the IDYF will be around 600 young men and women. There will be members representing all the arts, culture and sports of the Iraqi people: The Modern Theater Company, the Music Society, the Folk Song groups, literary and scientific personalities besides the various sport clubs and unions. The branches of the IDYF all over the country are now
competing in the different fields to be represented, and the best of each will be the luckiest of all! Other organizations were given a chance to send their representatives to the Festival. The students' Union was given a greater share than others. The Trade Unions, the League for the Defense of Women's Rights, the General Union of Peasants' Societies and others are represented on the Preparatory Committee of the Youth Festival, formed by the IDY.

Yet all this is but a start. Four months are short in the history of an organization. The first Congress of Iraqi Youth, to be held on 6/11/1959 (today), will mark the opening of a new era for the IDY and open fresh fields for its activities, so that the youth, the hope of the future, will live a happier and better life in a world of peace and progress. [=]

(2) Sectarian segregation: The Iranian authorities have enforced and exploited the segregation of the POW's according to their denominations and religions. Thus Sunni, Shiites and Christians were segregated from one another. Then the Iranian authorities recruited religious scholars from every sect to try converting the religious beliefs of the POW's to their own creed. Their aim was to lecture every POW in accordance with his beliefs. As far as Christian POW's were concerned, they were subjected to intolerable pressures to convert them to Moslem Shiites and they were forced to perform the rituals of the Islamic religion.

(3) Daily coercive means: The measures pursued by the Iranian authorities include the coercion of POW's to attend prolonged religious sermons filled with hatred and odio expressions against Iraq and its leadership. The POW's are forced to carry pictures of Khomeini and to shout hostile slogans against the political system of Iraq. They are forced to engage in collective prayers. This kind of measure aims at making the POW's accustomed to this kind of behaviour. Through repetition, this may lead to habitation and a state of being inured or the psychological condition of being rendered insensible to reaction to it. Once this takes root, one does not feel guilty as a result of association with hostile slogans or with carrying Khomeini's picture or with other acts of such a kind.

(4) Concealment of prisoners: The Iranian authorities have concealed a great number of Iraqi POW's from the International Red Cross. This measure leads to increasing pressure of worry on the POW's due to the lack of news and correspondence of their families. Moreover, in these circumstances, the fears of POW's for their unknown fate will be mounting, until they have the feeling that they are on the verge of death at any moment. They find themselves forced to obey their Iranian captors in order to escape death and as a means to get to know their families' news.

(5) Camp transfers: The Iranian authorities resort to this kind of measure by transferring POW's collectively or individually from one place to another continually. This in itself leaves POW's in a constant state of fear as they are deprived of the chance to adapt themselves to their environment or to make close friends with their fellow POW's. This usually leads to the weakening of POW's psychological resistance. As a result, their Iranian captors achieve their end when POW's turn to accept anything in return for some kind of stability. Subsequently, POW's are turned to become docile and more receptive to ideological concepts, at least as a presence in order to be left alone.

(6) Individual isolation: The Iranian authorities disperse Iraqi POW's in such a way as to facilitate the treatment of the prisoner in accordance with the authorities' ends. They isolate officers from soldiers and try to break up any collective unity by dispersing friends and colleagues. They implement as well individual isolation measures against the individuals who enjoy a good standing among POW's or against those who oppose the Iranian practices and designs. This procedure aims at erecting barriers against the psychological unity of the POW's which may arise through gathering in one place. It serves as a punishment against opponents in order to stop others from following suit.

(7) Infiltrating agents among POW's: This is done through agents from the Dawa Party who try to find out the political views and loyalties of the POW's. These agents are selected from various areas in Iraq. They should eventually be able to provide thorough reports on POW's affiliations and loyalties. The reports are dealt with by the POW Administration, and in the light of their contents, POW's are selected for various measures of torture or murder.

(8) The intimidation of airmen: Due to the effective role of air power in the war, the Iranian authorities have resorted to threatening and intimidating them by warning them that they will be tried as war criminals when the war comes to an end. This makes POW's extremely worried about their future fate. It could lead to the same consequences as have been mentioned previously.

(9) Visits to the war zone: The Iranian authorities take some of the officer POW's to the areas that were bombarded by Iraqi forces, such as Abadan, Dezful, Andimishk and alMuhammara (Khorramshahr) in order to make POW's feel guilty and sympathetic with Iran about it. Their captors think that Iraqi POW's will pass to their fellows the picture of the damage they have been led to see by their captors.

(10) Food poisoning: Poisonous substances and laxatives are administered to the POW's food. These cause pernicious pains among the whole group of prisoners, and the Iranian authorities then deliberately allow excrement to foul the body in order to humiliate the POW's and weaken them psychologically prior to the stage when they have to obey what is imposed on them for safety.

(11) Sex abuse: The Iranian Administration of POW's encourage their agents and collaborators to commit indecent acts against prisoners who do not cooperate with them, especially the young. This offensive activity weakens the moral deterrent of the prisoner and makes him more readily manipulable in the hands of the enemy and the enemy's agents.

(12) Night raids: This is another measure pursued by the Iranian authorities. The POW's guards shout vociferously at various intervals in the night in order to call POW's for assembly. Individual and collective tortures are carried out including the murder of ZO POW's and inflicting injuries on 70 others, not for any reason apart from the fact that these POW's expressed their dissatisfaction with the offensive treatment they received at the hands of Iranian guards. Other groups of POW's were made to witness similar executions in Karaj, Mashad, Semnan, Brandik, Tazileh, Tawandah, and Anzali. The aim of using this means of threat and torture was to shake violently the emotional balance and sensitivity of the POW's by bringing them to deduce that a horrible fate will befall them if they still try not to respond to the Iranian orders and directions.

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example, and the POW's are exposed to many other kinds of humiliating and injurious acts. [=]


Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a conspiracy to enslave and oppress certain segments of our society. Plaintiff contends she is a cyborg, and that she received most of the information which forms the basis for her complaint through ‘Proteus’, which I read to be some silent, telepathic form of communication.

Presently before the court is an Order to Show Cause why the Court should not enjoin the trial in the World Trade Center bombing case. Plaintiff alleges that President Clinton ordered the bombing of the World Trade Center in order to justify war with Iraq. In support of her application, plaintiff describes certain ‘proteus’ communications she has had with other individuals. Plaintiff contends that the United States invaded Panama and arrested General Noriega because Noriega objected to United States soldiers raiding Indian tribes in Central America for child sex slaves to torture in American cocaine-filled thrill-killing rackets. Plaintiff contends she wrote to Noriega asking him to join in her lawsuit but that United States soldiers holding Noriega beat him when he asked for his mail.

Plaintiff asserts that in 1988 Rajiv Gandhi spoke to her through ‘Proteus’ and informed her that he was being held prisoner and sexually abused by a man whom he had caught stealing from the funds generated by the Bhopal disaster settlement. According to plaintiff, Yasser Arafat tried to confirm Gandhi’s tale of abuse on behalf of the plaintiff, to no avail.

Plaintiff additionally contends that the Gulf War was undertaken so that America could restock its sexual slavery camps, which had been depleted. According to the plaintiff, 40,000 Iraqi soldiers captured by the United States and selected for their physical attractiveness had been brought to this country, ‘beaten, forced to run gauntlets, and homosexually gang-raped by American soldiers’. Plaintiff claims to have confronted former Secretary of Defense Cheney with evidence of this allegation. Cheney, through ‘proteus’, purportedly told the plaintiff, “Well, we were so sick and tired of killing Black girls. We just had to put some variety back into our death-hunting industry. And they (Persians) are incredibly beautiful. The beauty of the face heightens the pleasure of the kill. I know of no higher pleasure than the gang-rape of exceedingly beautiful people”.

Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the Soviet government, the Nazi ‘Bund’, the Bank of Commerce & Credit International (BCCI), and IBM are also involved in the conspiracy. Representatives of both IBM and BCCI made an appearance and successfully moved to have the claims against them dismissed.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss the complaint as to all defendants. The Clerk is directed to refund to plaintiff her filing fee. Plaintiff’s motion to Order to Show Cause to enjoin the World Trade Center bombing trial is denied.

It is so ordered. [=]


FY 1994 estimate: $100 million.
FY 1995 request: $100 million.

Purpose: UNICEF encourages and assists the long-term humanitarian development and welfare of children in developing countries. UNICEF does so through education and information programs which make governments, communities, and private groups aware of the plight of children and the possibilities for improving their situation. UNICEF also provides goods and services to help meet basic needs in maternal and child health, sanitation, clean water, nutrition, primary education and social services in support of self-help efforts. UNICEF provides incentives, both technical and financial, to start important programs, but the Governments or NGOs implement them. UNICEF also provides emergency assistance in the event of disasters.

Background: The United Nations General Assembly created UNICEF in 1946 to aid impoverished children left in the wake of World War II. Initially an emergency aid program, UNICEF, by 1953, had evolved into a long-term, voluntary development fund aimed at improving conditions for the poorest children of the developing world. UNICEF currently cooperates in programs in 130 countries. In its work, UNICEF cooperates closely with governments, private groups and local communities in developing nations, as well as with UN and aid donors to protect children and enable them to develop their full mental and physical potential. Individual governments establish their priorities as a result of studies of major needs, and UNICEF assists in implementing mutually agreed-upon programs. In 1993 UNICEF will inaugurate new country programs in eight Central Europe and New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. UNICEF’s assistance is allocated on a sliding scale according to such factors as the number of children, the wealth of the country, and, especially, the infant and child mortality rate. Allocations are scaled so that the larger countries do not monopolize most of the assistance and so that the per-child allocation among countries of similar size favors the poorest countries which receive approximately five and a half times as much per child as do the middle-income developing countries. UNICEF has a small emergency unit that continues to play a key role in many international relief efforts. Because it is careful to maintain an apolitical approach to its work, UNICEF frequently finds acceptance in countries seriously destabilized by civil strife and in 1992 provided emergency assistance in 56 countries.

In 1989, UNICEF coordinated Phase I of “Operation Lifeline Sudan,” the UN’s emergency relief effort in the Sudan. In 1990, UNICEF was called upon to assist the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe in assessing the needs of their children and in 1992 this request was echoed by the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. UNICEF was also among the first of UN agencies to assist victims of the Gulf conflict, by providing emergency and basic health services for women and children. Such assistance served to meet the urgent needs of vulnerable populations in Iraq and Kuwait at a time when bilateral aid was not possible. UNICEF has assumed primary responsibility for assistance projects in the particularly vulnerable Kurdish area of northern Iraq. Likewise, UNICEF is working to alleviate conflict-induced conditions in the Horn of Africa and in the former Yugoslavia. It is now working in close coordination with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs on humanitarian assistance in new emergencies. UNICEF reports expenditures of over $167 million on emergency efforts during 1992 -- a 50% increase over emergency expenditures in 1991 and more than 340% over those in 1990. This figure represents 22% of total 1992 expenditures -- a level unprecedented since UNICEF’s founding in 1946 as the “UN Children’s Emergency Fund.” Four staff members lost their lives in emergency situations in 1992. UNICEF inspired and provided the secretariat for the 9/1990 World Summit for Children which was attended by 71 heads of state. The Declaration issued at the Summit endorsed a mutually agreed-upon program. There is a close and continuous dialogue between the United States and UNICEF on technical matters of assistance priorities and programs. There is a close and continuous dialogue between the United States and UNICEF on technical matters of assistance priorities and programs.

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In fulfillment of the Plan of Action, UNICEF is supporting developing countries in the preparation and implementation of national programs of action in pursuit of Summit goals. UNICEF cosponsored or helped plan seven regional conferences on summit follow-up issues in 1992-93. UNICEF also reports regularly to the Secretary General on Summit follow-up activities and in 1993, began publishing an annual publication -- the Progress of Nations -- to report on progress achieved each year, based on a set of core indicators. US Interests: UNICEF’s approaches have generally been consistent with US humanitarian development assistance priorities and programs. There is a close and continuous dialogue between the United States and UNICEF on technical matters of common interest and strong cooperation in field activities. All UNICEF programs are directly related to the welfare of children and mothers. Some programs -- such as clean water and sanitation -- also benefit other members of the community. Programs are designed to involve local communities as much as possible and to use equipment and

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work of UNICEF which complements our own bilateral assistance controlled by the government; thus giving the government more control in being of the neediest, most vulnerable population groups. A contribution of strengthen government control. The first was mandatory registration of incidence of low birth weight (2.5 kilograms or less) to less than 10%. between Sunni schools of law, in general, and Shi'i schools of law in moderate malnutrition among under-5 children by half; (d) Universal
Reduction of maternal mortality rate by half; (c) Reduction of severe and reinterpret them in order to create the necessary changes in family law.
these goals are: (a) Reduction of infant and under-5 child mortality rates formed of Muslim scholars to draft the reform, a committee instructed to reform family law followed certain steps to insure the success of the
2000 of goals delineated in the World Summit Plan of Action. Among reform and to minimize adverse criticism to it. It created a committee instructed to follow the basic precepts present in all traditional legal books and to accomplish because of public resistance to change and fear of manipulation of the traditional laws as interpreted by the early scholars. The problems were compounded by tradition and custom which imposed
pledged $100 million, or approximately 28% of the $361 million in total amount. Muslim
The United States has always been a strong supporter of UNICEF and is supported UNICEF generously through private donations over the years. population then he could perhaps arrange to send them food across the border. Actions by Kuwait to increase the strangehold on the wretched population are difficult to reconcile with the expressed sentiment. [M. Al-Chalabi, petroleum consultant] =
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materials which can be locally obtained and maintained.
Such projects are frequently linked to resources from other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, e.g., the UN Capital Development Fund and the bilateral US Agency for International Development (USAID) program, including child survival activities. UNICEF emergency assistance efforts are also coordinated with those of other agencies and governments, under the leadership of the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). UNICEF, traditionally is given the formal responsibility in major emergencies for essential medical supplies, child needs and water/sanitation work. The United States has urged continued collaboration between UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) in several areas of mutual interest, including: the development of the Children’s Vaccine Initiative and the promotion of breast-feeding and nutrition. In addition, during the 1992 governing body meetings of WHO, UNDP and UNICEF, the United States sponsored resolutions requesting increased interagency collaboration, particularly at the field level, in the fight against AIDS. At the urging of the United States and other donors, UNICEF is increasing the attention it gives to assure that the programs it supports can be maintained and sustained by local resources over the longer term. UNICEF has also reviewed its external relations activities and, with the encouragement of its membership, is taking steps to assure these activities (which include advocacy, fund-raising, information and education) are more effectively integrated into its operations, and achieve their intended objectives without diverting resources from those operations. A 1993 State Department informal survey of UNICEF programs due for renewal or approval in 44 countries reflected an increased focus on monitoring and evaluation at the field level. External evaluations of UNICEF programs include a recent United Kingdom review of the “Bamako Initiative” and an overall evaluation by a multi-donor group presented in 1993. Official US support for UNICEF conforms with the humanitarian ideals of the American people, who have supported UNICEF generously through private donations over the years. US participation enables the United States to serve humanitarian aims in some nations where direct bilateral assistance is not politically feasible or desirable. The position of UNICEF Executive Director (currently James P. Grant) has always been held by a US citizen. Other Donors: The United States has always been a strong supporter of UNICEF and is one of its largest contributors. For calendar year 1993, the United States pledged $100 million, or approximately 28% of the $361 million in total governmental contributions to UNICEF’s general resources budget. Other major contributions included: $44.2 million from Sweden, $35.0 million from Norway, $25.9 million from Japan, $25.5 million from Italy, $25.4 million from Denmark, and $20.1 million from the Netherlands.
FY 1995 Program: According to UNICEF publications, approximately 35000 child deaths occur each day from ordinary malnutrition and disease. A total of 150 million children live with ill health and poor growth. A total of 100 million 6 to 11-year-olds are not in school. As the acknowledged leader in the field of child survival and development, UNICEF has made major contributions to reducing infant and child mortality rates in developing nations. Perhaps best-known are UNICEF’s emphases on childhood immunization and oral rehydration therapy (ORT). Through its Universal Child Immunization program, UNICEF helped countries achieve the seemingly impossible goal of 80% coverage (by WHO and UNICEF estimates) in 12/1990. (Funds came from many sources but UNICEF provided the impetus). UNICEF hopes this success will be replicated and improved by attainment by the year 2000 of goals delineated in the World Summit Plan of Action. Among these goals are: (a) Reduction of infant and under-5 child mortality rates by one-third (or to 70 per 1000 live births -- whichever is less); (b) Reduction of maternal mortality rate by half; (c) Reduction of severe and moderate malnutrition among under-5 children by half; (d) Universal access to basic education and completion of primary education by at least 80% of primary school-age children; and (e) A reduction in the incidence of low birth weight (2.5 kilograms or less) to less than 10% in five countries. UNICEF’s programs have a widespread, positive impact on the well-being of the neediest, most vulnerable population groups. A contribution of $100 million will reinforce the continued US support for the development work of UNICEF which complements our own bilateral assistance efforts through USAID’s Child Survival Fund and other bilateral programs. The contribution will also demonstrate US commitment to the pursuit of the World Summit goals in developing countries and in newly independent countries that are in a critical transitional stage. Furthermore, it will demonstrate our interest in improving the overall UN emergency relief response to which UNICEF has become a key contributor. [=] 24053. Adler, T. “Illness of Gulf War Vets Stump Experts”, in Science News, May 7, 1994. p. 294. After failures of physicians to characterize the cluster of symptoms known as Gulf War Syndrome, the NIH has established a 12-man panel to develop a working definition of the disease. A preliminary report finds leishmaniasis (a parasite), pesticides, fine sands and petroleum fumes as causes, while ruling out exposure to depleted uranium in US radiological weapons or vaccines as causes. The syndrome appears to be transmissible to wives of affected veterans and their children. 24054. Al-Chalabi, M. Letter: “Iraq’s Starvation Will Not Bring Peace or Democracy ?”, in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 24, 1994, p. 2. The letter from the ambassador of Kuwait (letter, 7/17/1994) sadly echoes three years of political rhetoric. I will take up one issue as an example: the $1.6 billion worth of oil that Iraq is supposed to be able to sell. What the Iraqi people actually get is not $1.6 billion but only about half of that, or just over $40 per head. The oil is sold by UN officials, not marketing specialists. If and when this oil is sold, the Iraqi people still cannot access the funds. They need to submit a request to the UN escrow account making a case for why and how much of the $40 should be released and which the UN may or may not consider to be valid. It is all very well to demand maintaining sanctions when the dying children are not one’s own. If his excellency was so concerned about the Iraqi population then he could perhaps arrange to send them food across the border. Actions by Kuwait to increase the strangehold on the wretched population are difficult to reconcile with the expressed sentiment. [M. Al-Chalabi, petroleum consultant] =
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In recent years, women are coming to expect a greater degree of equality in the relationship with their husband. Yet the normal expectations of Iraqi women about marriage, and the traditional manner in which most partners are selected, strongly argue against companionship and friendship being the major part of a marriage. Many women noted how difficult it was to engage their husband's in conversation on other than matters of household or the children: husbands are viewed as outsiders and women normally have stronger ties to their brothers than to their husbands. Iraqi women rarely engage in the normal leisure activities of women in the West: reading and painting [sic?]; women are mainly occupied with housework, which is largely performed by women in Iraq. While all manner of household appliances are widespread in the affluent Iraqi society (so widespread that it is hard to determine whether a family is middle class just by its possessions, since such appliances are also common in the working class), domestic servants are very rare now. While economic development has pushed many women into the workplace, many women feel that fulltime housewives have higher status than women who work outside the home. Women do not perceive independence to be an option since it ends any likelihood of future marriage. Few women thought Western style "women's liberation" was genuine liberation since it entailed, they argued, little more than sexual freedom for which there are very high trade-offs; some noted that even the activities of the General Federation of Iraqi Women were sometimes seen as rather bold. "In Iraq, women's oppression within the family is fairly universal", and neither widespread access to education or a strong presence in the workplace has made any difference in this "universal oppression".

24057. Al-Radi, Selma. "Iraqi Sanctions: A Postwar Crime: Punishing the People; The Embargo Will Be Lifted When Business Wants It Lifted", in Nation, March 27, 1995, p. 405. Life is becoming increasingly intolerable in Iraq, after four years of embargo. The struggle for food is everywhere. Baghdad is gradually running down, with air pollution intensified as petroleum product additives are banned. The systematic explosion of Iraqi chemical weapons, many just outside Iraq, have also created an ominous pollution problem throughout Iraq. The levels of air pollution have damaged agricultural production, possibly causing the disastrous harvest of 1994 (dates down 50%, citrus down 33%). No new cars, parts or equipment have entered the country in four years. General poor health and malnutrition is widespread. While medical care has declined in Iraq, many Yemenic states come to Baghdad for medical care (which was among the best in the Middle East) bringing their own medical supplies with them for their treatment. Prices have exploded, education is seen as a luxury as children are forced to work: If the embargo is not stopped soon, the next generation of Iraqis will be illiterate, ignorant, amoral and fanatically anti-Western, replacing a society that is secular, educated and largely pro-Western. While Iraqis have little history of emigration, now 2 million of the population of 18 million have fled. "Perhaps when the embargo is finally lifted, the Iraqi people can bring the countries of the Security Council before some tribunal for taking away their livelihood, their health, their education and their physical safety. In short, for violating their human rights."

24058. Amnesty International. Press Release: Kuwait: Wave Of Abuses In Wake Of War. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [June 1991?] In April, Amnesty International publicly appealed to the Emir of Kuwait to end the wave of arbitrary arrests, torture and killings in the country since the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The appeal followed a two-week Amnesty International fact-finding visit to Kuwait. The team reported that scores of victims had been killed and hundreds more had been arbitrarily arrested since February 26. Many had been brutally tortured by Kuwaiti armed forces and members of "resistance" groups since February 26. Most of the victims were Palestinians, among them Jordanian passport holders. They also included Iraqi and Sudanese nationals and members of the "Bidun" community (stateless persons in Kuwait, denied basic civil and political rights). Victims have been shot in public or tortured and killed in secret. Hundreds were taken from their homes or arrested at checkpoints, many to be tortured in police stations, schools and other

the rural areas of the country. The second gave the judge more control over matters dealing with family law. Both decrees served to weaken tribal control over women and to decentralize tribal power. The dissertation discusses the history of reform to family law in Iraq, the role and objectives of the Iraqi government in the drafting of reform, presents the traditional family laws as well as the new amendments. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [\textcopyright ]

24056. Al-Khayyat, Sana. Honor and Shame: Women in Modern Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 1990. This study of Iraqi women is written by and Iraqi women who has training as a sociologist, allowing both insider and outsider perspectives to be taken; the study is based on in-depth interviews with Iraq women (interviewing Muslim Arabs, Muslim Kurds and Muslim Turkomans, and Christian Arabs; while the attitudes and lives of all the Muslims were very similar, the Christians were much more conservative). (By contrast, she notes the observation of a well-educated Iraqi man who states: "Why are you wasting time with those stupid women? What can they tell you?... If you insist on adopting this method, select a few educated men and interview them; they would tell you all you need to know about women"). Iraq is a patriarchal society reinforced by Bedouin tribal values that became normative during the four centuries of Ottoman rule up to WWI; the society uses both bedouin social values and Islamic ideology to control women. In Iraq today education is compulsory for both sexes at the primary level (11-12 years), and in urban areas most girls go on to secondary education and many to universities. Many traditionally male areas such as engineering are open to women. Most jobs are open to women from bus and truck drivers to doctors, university professors and executive positions in Ministries; such opportunities broadened during the labor shortages of the Iran-Iraq War; there are few women in top decision-making positions however. The compulsory national literacy program includes fines for any adult that does not learn to read.

The conduct of women in Iraqi society is governed by the concept Arab concept of honor, and of shame; the sexual conduct of a woman can bring shame on all her kin (because her male kin have responsibility for her conduct); immorality can bring shame on kin as well. Gossip may bring shame on a woman wrongfully, so many women suffer from guilt without necessarily having committed any shameful act. The predominantly agarian nature of Iraqi society, where the inability of girls to work in the fields as well as boys, has "fuel[ed] the historical hatred of women"; while girls are seen as weak, boys are seen as strong (a common rebuke for a boy is "do not act like a girl"). The birth of daughter is traditionally seen as an inadequacy, and the burden of preserving the honor of the girl (and her virginity) is an additional burden. For some of the women, their childhood was scarred by domestic violence, their father's beat their mothers; this was usually associated with alcoholism by the women, which added the sense that the behavior was un-Islamic (and thus reinforcing rather that subverting Islamic norms). The more general education of Iraqi women has not dramatically changed the manner in which they raise their children.

Marriage is almost universal in Iraq; people want children and grandchildren. Marriage is seen as the joining of two families rather than of two people: traditional marriages are arranged and the couple meets on the wedding day. Modern marriages in which both partners select the other are becoming more common. In Iraqi society it is very common for cousins to marry, with favored cousins being father's brothers children. Love is still seen by many Iraqis as an impediment to happy marriage: until the 1940s, if a man was known to love a woman this would preclude an arranged marriage. Many women do not believe marriages for love can be successful; modern affairs by victims had been killed and hundreds more had been arbitrarily arrested since February 26. Many had been brutally tortured by Kuwaiti armed forces and members of "resistance" groups since February 26. Most of the victims were Palestinians, among them Jordanian passport holders. They also included Iraqi and Sudanese nationals and members of the "Bidun" community (stateless persons in Kuwait, denied basic civil and political rights). Victims have been shot in public or tortured and killed in secret. Hundreds were taken from their homes or arrested at checkpoints, many to be tortured in police stations, schools and other

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Victims were still being killed and tortured during Amnesty International’s visit from March 28 to April 9. The team also updated information in Amnesty International’s 1990 report on violations by Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Amnesty International was able to confirm that its report had given an accurate overall picture of the range and intensity of the violations inflicted on the population during the occupation, although it could not confirm the precise number of killings by Iraqi forces during the occupation. However, on the highly publicized issue in the December report of the baby deaths, Amnesty International’s team was shown alleged mass graves but found no reliable evidence that Iraqi forces had caused their deaths. In response to Amnesty International’s appeal, the Kuwaiti government admitted on April 19, that human rights violations had been committed immediately after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces but insisted that such abuses are no longer taking place. [=]

24059. Amnesty International. Press Release: Kuwait: Wave Of Abuses In Wake Of War. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [June 1991?] In April, Amnesty International publicly appealed to the Emir of Kuwait to end the wave of arbitrary arrests, torture and killings in the country since the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The appeal followed a two-week Amnesty International fact-finding visit to Kuwait. The team reported that scores of victims had been killed and hundreds more had been arbitrarily arrested since February 26. Many had been brutally tortured by Kuwaiti armed forces and members of “resistance” groups since February 26. Most of the victims were Palestinians, among them Jordanian passport holders. They also included Iraqi and Sudanese nationals and members of the “Bidun” community (stateless persons in Kuwait, denied basic civil and political rights). Victims have been shot in public or tortured and killed in secret. Hundreds were taken from their homes or arrested at checkpoints, many to be tortured in police stations, schools and other makeshift detention centers. Savage beatings with sticks, hose pipes and rifle butts and whippings with electric cables were the most common methods. Amnesty International’s team also catalogued more than a dozen forms of torture, including electric shocks, burning with cigarettes, candles and acid, cutting with knives, biting, threats of execution and of sexual assault. Teams of torturers reportedly worked in relays, maintaining the torture for hours. Daily torture of captives appeared to have been common. Most of the abuses immediately after the Iraqi withdrawal were said to have been carried out by “resistance” squads, but armed forces personnel were increasingly cited in later cases. Victims were still being killed and tortured during Amnesty International’s visit from March 28 to April 9. The team also updated information in Amnesty International’s 1990 report on violations by Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Amnesty International was able to confirm that its report had given an accurate overall picture of the range and intensity of the violations inflicted on the population during the occupation, although it could not confirm the precise number of killings by Iraqi forces during the occupation. However, on the highly publicized issue in the December report of the baby deaths, Amnesty International’s team was shown alleged mass graves but found no reliable evidence that Iraqi forces had caused their deaths. In response to Amnesty International’s appeal, the Kuwaiti government admitted on April 19, that human rights violations had been committed immediately after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces but insisted that such abuses are no longer taking place. [=]

24060. Amnesty International. Press Release: Kuwait: Widespread Abuse Follows Invasion. London: Amnesty International, December 1990. Since the 8/2/1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi forces have tortured and killed hundreds of victims, arrested thousands and left more than 300 babies to die after looting incubators from at least three of Kuwait city’s main hospitals. The abuses perpetrated by Iraqi forces are detailed in an Amnesty international report on human rights violations in Kuwait, published December. The human rights that Amnesty International seeks to protect are the same in times of peace and war. It takes no position on the conflict in the gulf, but is concerned about human rights violations inflicted on civilians. While the organization mandated in international law to protect victims of armed conflict and prisoners of war is the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International remains concerned that captives of the armed conflict may be at risk from human rights abuses such as torture and execution. It will monitor any allegations that prisoners of war are being subjected to human rights violations. Most of the abuses outlined in the 82-page Amnesty International report occurred in the first three months after the invasion. The severity of the early suppression appears to have crushed much of the opposition. Amnesty International interviewed several medical
personnel who worked in the hospitals where the babies died. All had seen the dead bodies and one doctor had even helped to bury 72 of them in a cemetery near a hospital. In some hospitals, unofficial records were kept of the number of people who had been killed, including the babies. Amnesty International's report contained numerous testimonies from former detainees, who said they were held incommunicado without charge or trial and tortured throughout their detention. Thirty eight percent of the interviewed juvenile offenders reported suffering from mental illness or brain damage. Curtis Harris himself was one of nine children brought up in extreme poverty. No evidence was presented at either the trial or the sentencing hearing regarding his background or the fact that he had an IQ of only 77.

Later psychiatric evaluations found evidence of brain damage resulting from severe head injuries he had sustained from beatings during childhood. Amnesty International found it particularly disturbing that Curtis Harris and other offenders should face execution when the law under which they were sentenced to death has been radically changed. Texas has had a new capital sentencing statute since 9/1991 which allows the jury to consider any mitigating factor in deciding whether to impose life imprisonment or the death sentence. However, this new law does not apply retroactively to offenders who were convicted before this date. There were many mitigating factors in Curtis Harris' case which the jury had no opportunity to consider under the old law and this alone should have been grounds for commuting the death sentence. Although Texas has the most juvenile offenders under sentence of death (at least 12 as of 4/1993), it is not alone. 24 other US states allow the execution of offenders under 18 at the time of their crime. Frederick Lashley, a black teenage offender convicted of murdering his foster mother when he was aged 17, is due to be executed in Missouri on 28 July. If it goes ahead this would be the first such execution in the state for over 60 years. Amnesty International has called on the Clinton Administration to stop the state killing of juvenile offenders. It has urged the United States Government to withdraw its reservation to Article 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one of a series of international treaties and standards which bar the execution of people under 18 at the time of the crime. These standards were developed in recognition of the fact that the death penalty, which denies any possibility of rehabilitation or reform, is wholly inappropriate in the case of young offenders. [=]
Thank you for the invitation. I am delighted to be here. I will come right to the point. Building a vibrant and productive partnership between the United States and the United Nations is one of the critical tasks of our time. And I can tell you after some months as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations that—if you like roller coasters—it is also one of the most exhilarating tasks of our time. It is also a task in which the UNA/USA has long played a dynamic leadership role. For that and for all our good work, I salute you. I suspect many of you saw the cover story in the Sunday Times magazine this past week featuring a battered blue helmet and a discussion of the trials and tribulations of UN peacekeeping. That article—and the facts on which it is based—underlined again the importance of the US/UN relationship. It reminded us that the UN remains dependent upon the will and the resources of national governments, which in turn depend on collaboration through the UN to do things none of them can do alone. It told the story of an able and distinguished Secretary-General doing a hard, and, at times, thankless job. And it should compel us to respond to the advent of a new and promising historical age, not by settling for what seems possible today, but by setting our sights on what may be possible tomorrow. Let me start with two pragmatic policy propositions: First, the United States should maintain a robust military and diplomatic capacity to act unilaterally. This is necessary because the world remains dangerous, and because we want to influence events in directions that reflect our interests and values. Second, we need workable alternatives for those occasions when unilateral action is unnecessary, insufficient, or impossible. That is why we are preserving vigorous alliances with our fellow democracies and long-time friends, and why we must put fresh energy into our commitment to the United Nations. These basic propositions frame our approach in what pundits persist in calling the "post-Cold War era." I note from your program that the UNA has a more useful label: "the global era." The distinction is by no means semantic, for as the President recently pointed out, post-Cold War tells us "where we have been, not where we are going." The Cold War prism also tells us little about the underlying forces of history which helped end the old era and are plainly shaping the new. These are indeed global forces. Only if we build policies and institutions that take them into account can we expect to succeed. What are some of these forces?

Economic interdependence is one. Labor, capital, production, and markets have all been globalized. The information revolution—faxes, VCRs, satellites, CNN—have made people around the globe more aware, more demanding, and more able to act independent of governing structures. Not only are money and ideas overrunning political borders, so too are refugees, immigrants, pollution, narcotics, armaments, and disease. As a result, terms like national interest and national security are losing clarity. And national governments are less able, on their own, to satisfy popular expectations.

At the same time, more and more non-state actors are moving onto the world stage. These include multinational corporations, environmental and human rights organizations, criminal cartels, ethnic minorities, and individuals of broad public influence. These and other forces are the essence of the post-Cold War world, and they are changing the international order beyond anything the statesmen and statecraft of the old state system ever contemplated. Long-stable institutions have been profoundly altered; some—including the United Nations—are acquiring new relevance; others—like NATO—are being redefined; still others are fading from view. It would not surprise us, then, that Americans' own vision of global affairs is in flux. Clearly, economic and social problems—legacies, in part, of Cold War costs—occupy our attention here at home. A recent Los Angeles Times poll concluded from this that the general public: "... is inclined toward a new but unique kind of isolationism.... They want a foreign policy that serves the domestic agenda of the United States, and they would treat each global issue according to its impact on that agenda." According to the pollster, the top foreign policy priorities of the American people are to stop drug trafficking, strengthen our economy, halt the flow of illegal aliens, and protect the global environment. To me, these priorities are not isolationist at all. On the contrary, they contain the seeds from which a...
new and revitalized consensus about our role in the world may grow. People are seeing that global forces do have a real impact on their lives and believe, not unreasonably, that a central purpose of a successful foreign policy should optimize these impacts. The Clinton Administration's focus on global economic growth is part of an emerging domestic/foreign policy synthesis. By enlisting the circle of market democracies and reducing barriers to trade, we create good jobs at home and more opportunities for people in developing countries to improve their lives. NAFTA, APEC, and GATT don't exactly roll off the tongue—and not everyone agrees about them, to be sure—but they reflect precisely the kind of domestically grounded multilateral initiatives that will serve our citizens well in a global era. Against this background of a transformed and transforming world, we need to ask ourselves anew: What should we expect from the United Nations and other international institutions? Where do they fit in? What can we do to limber them up? How can we develop robust options for collective action and burden-sharing, when those alternatives appear to offer the best solution? Clearly, the potential for international organizations to play an influential role on the world stage is greater today than in previous decades. If we are to fulfill that potential, we must forge international arrangements that complement, not compete with, the efforts of national governments. This is not a zero sum situation in which existing authority is simply reapportioned among national and international actors. All must make the strongest contributions they can. For purposes of tonight's discussion, I will divide the Clinton Administration's strategy for developing the kind of multilateral institutions we need into three general components. First, we are taking a new and more constructive approach to reforming UN institutions. As our superb Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, has pointed out: "... the bills of the [United Nations] are not paid by governments; they are paid by hard-working, tax-paying citizens—the largest portion by citizens of the United States". Those citizens have a right to know that their dollars are being used wisely, efficiently, and for purposes they understand and support. We who are responsible for the UN cannot afford the luxury of bureaucratic bloat. There are too many important jobs to perform and, in key areas such as peacekeeping and emergency relief, far too few resources. We must now do what governments, businesses, universities, hospitals, and other institutions are being asked to do: improve services while controlling costs. In the recent past, the United States has pursued UN reform through micromanagement and interference in its innermost workings. The result was little reform and even less accountability. The current Administration has charted a different approach. Instead of trying to micromanage in quest of micro-gratifications, we are trying to shift the focus to good governance—to setting broad objectives, to holding UN managers responsible, and to evaluating results. The global era is also a competitive era. As a contender for scarce public resources, the UN can neither be insulated from that competition, nor should it fear it. The UN brings to the table enormous assets of global legitimacy, a record of past accomplishments, and a system of shared financing that multiplies each dollar contributed several times over. Unfortunately, as former Ambassador Donald McHenry has said: "The whole UN civil service got hijacked by the Cold War and decolonization. Everybody, us included, started insisting on certain jobs within the UN and using them for defeated politicians.... Once you took on such an individual, you had to take on three other people who could actually do the job." The United States is now trying to set an example by embarking on a higher road. We're working to identify outstanding individuals not only from our own country, but from around the world, to recommend for high-level UN posts. We're advocating a personnel system in which UN employees are hired, fired, and promoted according to merit, rather than political pull. And we're pressing for reforms that will give agencies and programs a real chance to perform, with the understanding that we will back fully those that achieve results, and do our best to pull the plug entirely on those that do not. The second element in our strategy at the UN is to take full advantage of the opportunity to break free from the east-west, north-south divisions that have traditionally hindered the institution's work. Here, with a massive assist from history, we are making dramatic progress. For example, this past fall, the General Assembly voted to establish a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This is something Americans have been pushing for, with greater or lesser degrees of energy, since the days of Eleanor Roosevelt. It is a true landmark in the life of the UN. It could not have been achieved during the Cold War, but this year, every former Soviet Republic supported it, and regimes that abuse human rights were reduced to delaying tactics and weakening amendments that failed. The High Commissioner is no home to unique human rights problems, but he or she can become a highly visible and influential champion for a cause that embodies both UN principles and our core values. Arms control is another arena in which the Cold War chilled cooperation. But this past fall, at the General Assembly, Russia opposed the US on only one of 3 arms control and security-related resolutions. The UN endorsed a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel land mines. Meanwhile, the IAEA, with support from all major powers, is playing a key role combating nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iraq. These actions, too, accord with the fundamental purpose of the UN as a peace-preserving institution, and with the interests of our own citizens in a more stable world. There is also a new attitude at the UN on what has historically been the most contentious of issues—the Middle East. September's Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles breached deep and bitter divisions. For the first time, an Israeli was elected to a position at the General Assembly. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was toned down and action on some particularly divisive resolutions was deferred. Most importantly, the peace process was endorsed by a nearly unanimous vote, and there was broad support for economic and social projects in Gaza and the West Bank. Let me cite briefly some other areas where US leadership and a changed UN hold the promise of benefits for us and for others:

We are determined to make the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia a meaningful instrument for establishing the truth about the atrocious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Balkans.

We are welcoming and participating in the UN's entry into the business of democracy-building and election monitoring in places as diverse as El Salvador, Cambodia, South Africa, and Mozambique.

We are working to follow up on the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio by making the concept of sustainable development a reality in people's lives, in our own country and overseas.

We have embarked on a joint effort with Japan to improve the coordination of the UN's response to complex emergencies.

And the President himself has called attention to the heroic efforts of UNICEF and WHO to save children's lives. By using low-tech, low-cost, high-impact techniques, these agencies have raised immunization rates in cities like Lagos, Calcutta, and Mexico City above those even in the United States. As a result, more than 3 million children who would otherwise die each year are now getting a chance at life. This is doubly important because we know that birth rates decline when mothers are confident that the children they do bear will survive. The key fact here is that without a general spirit of cooperation—to which the US is contributing—these initiatives and experiments at the UN would not be possible; and without experimentation, forward movement would not be possible. Today, the habit of cooperation has led the UN to the threshold of a new age of discovery. Like the European monarchs of 500 years ago, those of us responsible for international organizations are sending vessels to sea in search of the unknown. Like them, we can expect some of those vessels to turn back, some to sink, and some to find new worlds wholly beyond our prediction. The important thing is not that there are setbacks, but that we continue to sail outward toward the horizon, rather than allow our resources to rust inexorably and uselessly in port. The third element in our UN strategy is international peace-keeping. Why? Because if we do not wish to assume responsibility for containing overseas conflicts ourselves, we must look to the UN and regional organizations to do so, or accept a future ruled not by the law of nations, but by no law at all. Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now among the principal threats to international peace. Although many of these conflicts do not now impinge directly on our security, the
cumulative effects of continuing conflict include economic dislocation, humanitarian disaster, terrorism, regional political instability, and the rise of leaders and societies that do not share our values. We are working with Congress to forge a strong bipartisan consensus on our approach to international peacekeeping. Such a consensus must be guided by realism about what the UN can and cannot be expected to do, especially in the short term. It must be durable and disciplined enough to withstand the vicissitudes of this morning’s headlines and tonight’s network news. And fourth, under no circumstances will American servicemen or -women be sent into combat in the absence of competent command and control, nor will the ultimate command authority of the President over US armed forces ever be compromised. A consensus on peace-keeping must also draw the right lessons from past successes and disappointments. The difficulties of peace operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti demonstrate that traditional approaches are not adequate where government or civil society have broken down or where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict. Major operations must be planned not only with “best-case,” but with “bad-case” and “worst-case” scenarios in mind. A clear understanding must exist not only of how an operation might begin, but also of how it can be brought to a conclusion within a reasonable period of time and at an acceptable cost.

Finally, the complexity of modern peace-keeping missions underlines the importance of being very clear about what the mission is and how the mission is to be accomplished. Certainly, the experience in Somalia underlines the importance of defining a mission clearly and of understanding the limits of what outsiders can do in the absence of an internal commitment to peace. At the same time, we should not forget that because of American and UN efforts, hundreds of thousands of Somali children are alive, crops are being planted, and prospects for political reconciliation are real. No one can guarantee what Somalia will look like a year or two from now. But it would be patronizing to assume that Somali leaders have not learned from past tragedies, or that chaos will inevitably ensue as the international presence is drawn down. Nor should we find it troubling that the fate of Somalia will be shaped primarily by Somali hands. UN peace-keeping is not the only tool, but it remains a vital one, for responding to threats to international peace and security. Certainly, such threats will continue to arise. The world will continue to look to America for leadership. It will continue to be in our interest to provide that leadership, but we cannot and should not bear the full burden alone. We, and all those who share our stake in a relatively peaceful and stable world, will benefit if the UN becomes more capable of preventing, containing, and ending international conflict. Although it is true that the UN has moved to center stage of world affairs in recent years, the reviews to date are mixed and the prospects are unclear. The UN’s commitment to genuine reform remains suspect.

Because of financial shortfalls occasioned, in part, by the United States, the UN’s logo seems sometimes less the dove of peace than the tin cup. The durability of major power cooperation at the UN cannot be taken for granted. There are inevitable limits on what an organization dependent for its mandate on the full diversity of world opinion is going to be able to do. But we would fail in our responsibility if we were to take too narrow and pricked a view of the opportunities that are now at hand. We Americans, living in an open democracy and a global economy, have a deep interest in a world where acceptable “rules of the game” are observed. For decades, we argued the merits of free markets, free elections, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and human rights. During the depth of the Cold War, these issues were raised even when hopes for immediate progress were not realistic.

Today, as the global era dawns, we have the chance to see real movement toward higher standards of international behavior, not overnight, but over time. International organizations, and especially the UN, can be central to this effort. A couple of weeks ago, the Secretary-General met in Japan with the family of Atsuhito Nakata, a young UN volunteer who was shot to death in Cambodia last April. There was no bitterness. On the contrary, the young man’s mother spoke of her son’s kindness, his concern for the UN. The father, who has quit his job to help raise his orphaned son, said that it is his dream that the UN volunteer himself, told the Secretary-General that “although my son’s flesh has vanished, his spirit of service has survived.” Thanks in no small measure to you—the UNA/USA—this same spirit of service is alive and well in America. It is no accident that 71% of Americans said in a recent poll that the US should cooperate fully with the United Nations. Because of your efforts, most Americans understand that the UN family is characterized less by the renowned slothful bureaucrat than by the health technician whose vaccines are saving small children; the election monitor aiding the cause of freedom; the convoy driver struggling to help the innocent survive; and the peacekeepers like Atsuhito Nakata and our own servicemen and -women who have given so many victims a chance for what President Clinton has called “the quiet miracle of a normal life.” Forty-eight years ago, another President, Harry Truman, pledged to the first General Assembly that America would: “... support the United Nation with all the resources we possess ... not as a temporary expedient, but a permanent partnership.” After decades of ups and downs, this partnership between the US and the UN continues to contribute mightily to a global system more acceptable than anything either we or it could achieve alone. The financial cost is relatively small. The entire UN system, including peace-keeping, gets 0.7% of the $285 billion the US spends annually on international security. That translates into a price per capita for us, for everything from blue helmets for peacekeepers to polio vaccines for babies, of less than $7 a year—or the price of a ticket to see “The Pelican Brief.” Those who expect the UN to solve all the world’s problems are unrealistic; those who suggest it has ever had such broad pretensions are wrong. The UN was created by men and women who had just survived the second of two devastating world wars. These were not naive people. They understood, perhaps better than we, the frailties of humankind, and the yawning gap between how we would like the world to be and how it is; between promised benefit and reality. But they also understood the perils of missed opportunities and failed responsibility.

During Senate debate on the UN Charter, Senator Arthur Vandenberg replied to those who thought the goals of the Charter unrealistic by saying that: You may tell me that I have but to scan the present world with realistic eyes in order to see these fine phrases . . . reduced to a contemporary shambles.... I reply that the nearer right you come to the eye of the storm, the greater is the need for the lesser qualities that had made it necessary. Today, under the leadership of President Clinton, America is exploring the possibilities and perils of a new world. We are developing a new framework of policy and power that will protect our territory, defend our citizens, safeguard our interests, promote our values, and project our influence. In that effort, we will embrace opportunities for multilateral collaboration without forfeiting the prerogatives of leadership. We will strive to make international institutions serve the times, rather than spend our time serving institutions. In so doing, we will seek to build a world driven not by events we deplore, but by hopes we cherish; a world not without conflict, but in which conflict is effectively contained; a world not without repression, but in which the sway of freedom is enlarged. That is our mandate as we enter this new global era. And that is the future that—with your continued help—we can bequeath with pride to our children and to theirs. [↩]

24068. Bracey, Derek; Williams, Maurice. “In Brief: Hussein Remains President”, in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), November 6, 1995, p. 2. Saddam Hussein remained head of state of Iraq after a referendum on his presidency in mid-10/1995. The overwhelming “yes” vote for Hussein reported by the government is widely seen as a reflection of Iraqis’ anger
at UN-imposed sanctions on their country. "We have 11,000 children dying of malnutrition here every year. Nothing can justify this genocide," a pharmacist told the New York Times. At least 15,000 Iraqis were killed during the US-led slaughter in 1990-91. [ ]

24069. Brittain, Victoria. "Iraqi Children Suffer Drugs Shortages", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 24, 1994, p. 4. The health of children in Iraq continues to deteriorate as supplies of drugs continue to decline. Kwashiorrhkhor, rickets and malnutrition are common now; leukaemia is increasing rapidly; and cancer among children is soaring. Hospitals have no antiseptics, incubators, anesthetics, needles, antibiotics and drugs of all kinds, reports Medical Aid for Iraq. Medical aid is supposed to be exempt from the UN embargo but in practice enforcement of the embargo has closed off out-country supplies of drugs and medical supplies. Five of six hospitals in Baghdad have shortages of drugs to treat children for diabetes, asthma and epileptics. Children with cancer are receiving half doses of drugs. Sick children are often treated with tea.

24070. Brooks, Geraldine. "Albright's Role As Tough Face On Foreign Policy May Be Ticket To Become Next Secretary of State", in Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1994, p. A12. Madelaine Albright relishes her role as US enforcer in the UN, telling the Iraqi ambassador that the US was staging rocket attacks on Baghdad in response to the Iraqi role in an attempted assassination of George Bush [the US now admits that the charge was false] and in new threats of massive attacks if Iraqis cross the Kuwaiti border. She has been a consistent advocate of force in Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq and North Korea. Her harsh brand of foreign policy has made her the favored candidate for replacing Warren Christopher as Secretary of State. She also provides fierce sound-bites and has become one of the main spokesmen for the Clinton Administration, often making two-three TV appearances a day during crises. She also claims to be a feminist. She married newspaper heir Joe Albright, obtained a PhD in Russian Studies and became a professor at Georgetown University; she was in the NSC and worked with Edmund Muskie. [Albright is also closely associated with Zionist lobbying organizations, including the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an AIPAC affiliate.]

24071. Brooks, Geraldine. "Albright's Role As Tough Face On Foreign Policy May Be Ticket To Become Next Secretary of State", in Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1994, p. A12. Madelaine Albright relishes her role as US enforcer in the UN, telling the Iraqi ambassador that the US was staging rocket attacks on Baghdad in response to the Iraqi role in an attempted assassination of George Bush [the US now admits that the charge was false] and in new threats of massive attacks if Iraqis cross the Kuwaiti border. She has been a consistent advocate of force in Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq and North Korea. Her harsh brand of foreign policy has made her the favored candidate for replacing Warren Christopher as Secretary of State. She also provides fierce sound-bites and has become one of the main spokesmen for the Clinton Administration, often making two-three TV appearances a day during crises. She also claims to be a feminist. She married newspaper heir Joe Albright, obtained a PhD in Russian Studies and became a professor at Georgetown University; she was in the NSC and worked with Edmund Muskie. [Albright is also closely associated with Zionist lobbying organizations, including the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an AIPAC affiliate.]

24072. Carnegie, M.D. "Between East and West; There Is a Growing Feeling In Ankara That Turkey's Inflexible Pro-Western Stance Harms The Nation's Pocketbook As Much As Its Pride", in American Spectator, May 1996, pp. 36-43. Turkey has a modern sector that overlays the brutal poverty of growing numbers of drug addicted homeless children. Turkey now has 60 million people and the seventeenth largest economy in the world, but with an inflation rate above 100% per year. Turks are becoming more impoverished by the minute. Yet trade is booming: for example, while official two-way trade with Moldova is $1 million per year, unofficial estimates are $56 million. As much as two thirds of the entire economy is underground and missed in the GNP. The triumph of the Refah (Welfare) Party in national, Istanbul and Ankara elections is an example of the paradox that lies at the heart of modern Turkey. The upset stunned everyone who accepted Turkey's pro-Western, secular orientation as a given. The rise of Refah is a direct challenge to Turkey's relationship with the West. In one campaign speech, Necmettin Erbakan called for an end to 'interest, imitation, IMF slavery, Western slavery'. However, Refah has been unable to implement its agenda due to the uneasy coalition of the Ciller's True Path Party and Mesut's Motherland Party. However, Ciller's rule, predicted on being progressive because she was a woman and because she espoused privatization, failed. In particular, privatization was a complete failure. However, even as Ciller's economic policies have eroded the assets of the Turkish middle class, she built vast foreign holdings, reportedly including strip malls in New England, a mansion in Oregon, and farmland in the Midwest. The obvious corruption of the secular leaders led to the rise of the Refah, whose reputation is one of exceptional honesty. In Istanbul and Ankara, Refah has cut the municipal work forces by thousands while improving services. In Istanbul, even opponents of Refah admit that at least the garbage is collected, and the ban on burning coal has reduced the city's notorious air pollution. Refah has used computers in coordinating its electoral strategies, and has effectively mobilized women as local leaders and party spokeswomen (Refah Womens Commission).

At the same time, the business class is concluding that Turkey's excessively pro-Western stand has been a disaster; the embargo on Iraq has cost Turkey and estimated $25 billion. Turkish leaders have contempt for the policies of the Clinton Administration, although they dare not use their names fearing retaliation by the US, for example: (1) about US policy in general: "Warren Christopher is a perfect fool and everyone knows it. He commands no respect amongst his peers", (2) about US Russian policy: "Strobe Talbott is in the Moscow orbit. His world view is so focused upon them that I don't understand how you Americans could support him, or the administration he works for"; (3) about Syria: "It is really a very simple matter of diplomacy. You claim to be opposed to terrorism, yet there is Clinton pleading with Damascus. You claim to be our friends, yet you don't come speak to us. At some point, we get the idea that we are not your important allies. And then we think, maybe we shouldn't be".

Yet Turkey will probably never be acceptable as a member of Europe, since "Europeans have a difficult time seeing a Muslim nation as their equal", and the recent killing of one Jewish businessman by an 'Islamic Jihad group' makes Turkey unfit to join the 'civilized' world.

24073. Cary-Webb, Aimee. "Arts And Culture: Arab Impressions", in BBC, Jerusalem Times, November 17, 1995, p. 13. Janet Venn-Brown is a lovely woman with white hair and clear eye. She sees everything with an artist's eye, she devours light and texture, her ambrosia. Venn-Brown began her career as an artist in her native Australia where she moved from abstract and took a day to paint landscapes, as she had in New England, a mansion in Oregon, and farmland in the Midwest. The New England, a mansion in Oregon, and farmland in the Midwest. The New England, a mansion in Oregon, and farmland in the Midwest. The
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she wants to sell as much of her work as possible. She wants Arabs to buy it as a reminder of their heritage. A heritage that is slipping away. She said, "I don't believe in making political statements, it must be more subtle than that. I only want Arabs, Palestinians in particular, to appreciate their heritage." Venn-Brown does not set herself up as the chronicler of the Arab world, but says that her paintings will some day be precious reminders of what was. Her work is an important document of disappearing architecture and landscapes, some already gone. She said of Jerusalem, "Architecturally, Jerusalem is the most beautiful city, and I am enjoying every moment in this marvelous, beautiful city." Before she left she said, "I don't mean to preach, but a heritage is being lost in the present. We know the past, but the present is disappearing, it must be preserved." [–]

24074. Casals, Rodolfo. “Baghdad Ready to Begin a New Chapter in US-Iraq Relations; No Response From Washington On Request For Talks; Iraq Not Too Optimistic About New Administration; Delegation of Iraqi Legislators Visits Cuba To Show Solidarity and Condemn the Tightening of the US Blockade”, in Granma International (Havana), February 14, 1993, p. 14. Iraqi officials do not believe that the election of Pres. Clinton will result in any change of policy. Abdel el-Hadithy, chairman of Iraqi National Assembly's Petroleum & Energy Commission noted. Hadithy led a delegation of Iraqi legislators to Cuba. Iraqi officials expressed their appreciation of the Cuban support at the UN for the end of the embargo against Iraq. Hadithy noted: 'We have invited the new administration to negotiate an agreement that will do no diminish Iraqi sovereignty and will put an end to intervention in its domestic affairs'. Hadithy noted recent US cruise missile attacks, including those on the Rashid Hotel, were foreign correspondents stay in Iraq, had eroded the coalition against Iraq. He noted that the massive and indiscriminate destruction of Iraq by the Bush Administration had merely left the US with resistance to reconstruction in Iraq, rather than any impetus towards peace. Hadithy stated that Iraq will never agree to the terms of the UN Sanction Committee (created in 8/1990 in Security Council Resolution 661 and opposed only by Cuba and Yemen). Hadithy observed: 'When we were on the brink of reaching an agreement that would have been satisfactory to the Iraqi people, pressures exerted on the commission by the United States and other Western powers thwarted its approval. This demonstrates that our differences are not with the UN but with those countries which exert pressure on the organization and manipulate its resolutions'. He noted that the no-fly zones were created for Shiites and Kurds in order to de facto partition the country. Hadithy reported that the embargo had plunged Iraq into a terrible time of privation. People have been able to survive only due to a national system of ration distribution. However, public health conditions continue to deteriorate, with the most serious health problems among infants and children. Diseases long since banished from Iraq are reappearing, including cholera and malnutrition.

The delegation also included Jaber al-Rawi, member of the National Assembly's Foreign Relations Commission, and Mohamed Ezzat, head of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Relations's Latin America Department. [TXT]

24075. Chomsy, Noam. “Chapter 13: The Burdens of Responsibility”, in Letters from Lexington: Reflections on Propaganda [letters to Lies of Our Times (LOOT)]. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1993. pp. 93-100. [B/12/1991] Truth is what is said by those with power, while facts may be insignificant, especially if they contradict Truth; example: the US government is attempting to curb arms sales to the Middle East at the same time it is working to increase arms sales to the Middle East; example: from a New York times article by Patrick Tyler: Though Mr. Bush has made it plain that he will not tolerate needless suffering among Iraq's women and children, widespread disease and malnutrition have been documented in the country, but have not been addressed' (Truth is the US is trying to decrease suffering in Iraq, the fact is its policies are causing the suffering (a 5/1991 Harvard study predicted 170000 child deaths by the end of 1991)). The Bush Administration has never supported the democratic opposition in Iraq, hoping instead that another officer will overthrow Hussein so that stability will be maintained. The treatment of the Kurds in the region reflects their role as a pawn in the strategic game.

24076. Chomsy, Noam. Enter a World That Is Truly Surreal. President Clinton's Sudden Use of International Violence. Special Broadway: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series. Westfield, Mass.: Open Media, 1993. At the end of the 1982 Israeli/American attack on Lebanon, Pres. Bush stated that what was at stake was the New World Order. This war was the product of the Saddam Hussein having 'committed the first crime that mattered, disobeying orders'. On 6/26/1993, Clinton attacked Baghdad with 23 cruise missiles: 7 missiles hit residential areas, and one killed Layla al-Nora Boustany, a well known Arab artist: Defense Secretary Les Aspin noted that such civilian deaths were acceptable since the missiles do not put US pilots at risk, Clinton and Congressional supporters including Barney Frank and Joseph Moakley applauded the attack as an appropriate response to terrorism. The attack was made in response to positive proof that Iraq had tried to assassinate George Bush in Kuwait; later it was quietly admitted that there was no proof at all. While Amb. Madeleine Albright, the New York Times and the Washington Post agreed that this attack met the definition of Article 51 of the UN charter that allowed for attacks in self-defense, they justification was absurd even if the charges of Iraqi involvement in the assassination attempt were true, which they were not. The Boston Globe and Christian Science Monitor even noted that the attack was actually proof of US respect for international law. However, by any normal standard of international law the attack on Baghdad was criminal act that should be punished. The attack did raise Clinton's standing in the polls; as TV correspondent Charles Glass noted, Clinton has long used violent acts to bolster his political standing: Layla al-Attar in 1993, and mentally retarded Black man Rickey Ray Rector, whose execution in 1992 boosted Clinton's presidential bid. Clinton's advisors have gauged the deep disillusionment of the US electorate and decided that since addressing the genuine sources of their alienation is not a priority (since such moves would offend key constituencies: 'it does not matter much if public education and health deteriorate, the useless population rots in slums and prisons and the basis for a livable society erodes for the public at large'), that the principle purpose of state power is to divert and frighten potential domestic opposition. Cold War propaganda about imminent threats to America served this purpose for a while. Now, the political advantages of good photo-ops dictate which interventions will be made: Somalia is selected after the peak of the famine because no meaningful resistance is possible, while Bosnia is ignored since there might be real fighting. So US troops can use massive force in Bosnia where there is no real opposition, but rules of engagement in Bosnia are carefully drawn so as to not bother the Serbs as they exterminate the Muslims. 'Terrible atrocities' in haiti are simply irrelevant. The principle new enemy is 'Islamic fundamentalism', which is seen replacing the Soviet Menace as a tool with which to manipulate the American people. Oddly, the Saudi Arabia is the most extreme Islamic fundamentalist state, and the US ally Gulbuddin Hekmayt in Afghanistan (who received $3.5 billion in US aid), are the most extreme Islamic fundamentalists in the world. Accordingly, the open goal of the US-backed 1982 invasion of Lebanon was to destroy the PLO, which is the most progressive voice of Arab secularism; predictably, the most far reaching impact of that invasion was the emergence of the fundamentalist Hezbollah. Israel even supported fundamentalist Hamas in the Occupied Territories in its struggle against the PLO, dropping support only when Hamas emerged as a threat to Israeli security. As is normal in the American press, the discussion of the attack on Baghdad (in New York Times, Washington Post, and by William Safire) sees in the US attack 'an act of war' by Iraq, when in fact the US attack was unprovoked; Safire also argues that the US would have had a basis for attacking Cuba if it were proved that Cuba assassinated Kennedy, when in fact the Kennedy Administration repeatedly tried to assassinate Castro. Similarly, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times would argue that the US raid on Libya under Reagan, an assassination attempt in which Qaddafi's baby daughter was killed, was good precedent for attacks on Iraq; Friedman simply ignores that the US justification for the attack (an alleged Libyan
role in obliterating of a discotheque in Berlin) was simply a lie. Such corruption of the intellectual community is of course necessary if the unprecedented series of assassinations of foreign leaders by the US in this century is to be ignored by the press.

US policy is to use the Kurds of northern Iraq to weaken the Baghdad government, and often publicizes the brutality of the Iraqi government against the Kurds, but has included Kurds of Iraq in the illegal embargo against Iraq as a whole and provides only a fraction of the aid needed to assist the Kurds who have become impoverished in their new role of a buffer zone against Baghdad. This is one instance of the US use of economic warfare worldwide (which has included Cuba, Nicaragua and Vietnam): as in Iraq, it leaves the central government intact while savaging the population (in Iraq, killing 46,000 children in 1-8-1991). Clinton's 'first triumphant display of his manhood and character' was the random butchering of unarmed civilians in Baghdad. Clinton operates in a political climate in which international law is a fraud and there is an 'intellectual culture that recognizes few limits in its services to power'.

'The New World Order is 'new' only in that it adapts traditional policies of domination and exploitation to somewhat changed contingencies; it is much admired by the West because it is recognized to be nothing more than yet another device 'to enslave the countries and people of the world'...’ [TXT]

24077. Churchill, Ward; Means, Russell. "Circumcized Nazis: Israeli Aggression in the Middle East", in Rebel, February 27, 1984. The special relationship between the US and Israel has created a myth that Israel has some 'unique moral character' and a 'purity' of military force. So the US government and its media market Israeli war as 'peace', Israeli terrorism as 'justice', and the mass dispossession and forced relocation of the Palestinian people as 'a just settlement of the Middle East crisis'. Zionist leadership has long been interested in vast expansion beyond the territory of Palestine now held as Israel: open proclamations of the goal to annex southern Lebanon, parts of Syria, Gaza and all of Jordan have been frequent. David Ben-Gurion has stated: 'The acceptance of partition does not commit us to renounce Transjordan...We shall accept a state with fixed boundaries toady, but the boundaries of Zionist aspirations are the concern of the Jewish people and no external factor can limit them'. In 1948, Menachem Begin proclaimed: 'The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature of institutions or individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Eretz Israel [the land of Israel] will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And forever.' In 5/1948, Ben0Gurion noted: ‘...we should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria...The weak point of the Arab coalition is Lebanon [for] the Muslim regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be established, with its southern border along the Litani River. We will make an alliance with it.' This systematic policy of military expansion has led Israel to reject peace will all Arab states around it: Israel has territorial ambitions against each of them. Israelis continue to believe that they are fighting a genocidal holy war, with a Gush Emunim rabbi stating: ‘...It is a mitzvah [religious duty] to destroy Amalek [non-Jews], including women and children’. As Rafael Eitan, Chief of Staff of the IDF stated: 'What must be destroyed--we will destroy. Whoever must be imprisoned--we will imprison'. Mainstream Rabbi menachem Barash observes: ‘There is no place in this land of the People of Israel and other nations alongside it. The practical meaning of [this commandment to] possess the land is the expulsion of the people who live in it...[ours] is a holy war, commanded in the Bible...You shall destroy them, you shall enter into no covenant with them, you shall not pity them, you shall not intermarry with them...’

This call for genocidal warfare against non-Jews is stated clearly by Yedida Segal, in the Israeli Journal Nekuda: 'Those among us who call for a humanistic attitude towards our neighbors are reading the Halacha [religious law] selectively and avoiding the specific commandments...in a divinely commanded war [milhemet mitzvah] one must destroy, kill and eliminate men, women and children...The ethical principles do not change...there is no place for 'humanistic' considerations:' This unity of clergy, military and political leadership has sustained an intense race hatred for the Palestinians: as David Ben-Gurion (in his Independence War Diary) notes: 'The question is only time and place. Blowing up a house is not enough. What is necessary is cruel and strong reactions. We need precision in time, place and casualties...[We must] strike mercilessly, women and children included. Otherwise the reaction is insufficient. At the place of action, there is no need to distinguish between guilty and innocent.' So, the 1967 war was an aggressive war fought by Israel to break out of the possibility of a peace agreement with Egypt. Sadat had offered Israel peace and secure borders in return for an end to Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and for human rights guarantees for Palestinians: this offer, first made in 1971, was rejected by Israel. Similarly, the PLO offer in 1975-1976 of recognition of Israel in return for Israeli recognition of Palestinians was rejected by Israel. By 1979, even Iraq and Libya made clear their willingness to make peace with Israel: but Israel rejected their peace initiatives. The refusal of Israel to accept peace talks is a product merely of Israeli desires for territorial expansion.

The systematic nature of Zionist terrorism has also been long ignored. The Irgun in the 1930s conducted a systematic campaign of bombing Arab marketplaces, and in 1938 killed 52 Palestinians in 'retaliation' for the arrest of one Jew. While supporters of Israel term the Deir Yassin massacre an aberration, in Israel the massacre was celebrated, with a mass celebration at the site of the mass graves one year later by happy Israelis. Israelis staged the first airliner hijacking in 1954 (to gain hostages to exchange for Israeli POWs), and staged the 1967 attack on the USS Liberty. Similarly, the Israelis directed the massacre of 200 Muslim hostages on 12/6/1975 in Lebanon by the Phalange; assisted with Israeli bulldozers the razing of the Muslim Karantina slum in 1975; and directed the massacre at the Tel al-Zaatar Refugee Camp in 1975. Israeli long secretly equipped and financed the Phalange forces of Bashir Gemayel and George Haddad: only Israeli military aid enabled this fascist group to emerge as a power in Lebanon. So, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a transparent attempt to impose an Israeli-controlled puppet government on Lebanon. The character of the invasion was made clear when the US vetoed a UN ceasefire resolution for Lebanon on the grounds that the resolution was 'a transparent effort to preserve the PLO as a viable political force' just as Israeli forces were trying to exterminate Palestinian resistance.

Such allusions to Nazi Germany are not a rhetorical device, but are rather a precise nature of the Israeli regime. Nazism and Zionism are mirror images: each embracing military expansion of the master race, expanding by extermination of indigenous peoples. Zionists refer to non-Jews as 'dogs' exactly as Rosenberg termed non-Aryans 'swine'; and the director general of the Israel Broadcasting Authority openly notes the 'genetic racial inferiority' of South African Blacks. The Zionist argument that the Holocaust gives them special rights is belied by the establishment of Israel. However, it is reasonable to expect that the US will continue to support Zionist genocide against Palestinians in the same manner that the US practiced genocide against the indigenous peoples of North America (some call the American Indians the 'Palestinians of America'). Nevertheless, 'the Nazis—whether they be Jewish, German or American—have had their day, their time, Today, one way or another, that time is running out.' [Ward Churchill is a Creek-Indian artist who teaches at the University of Colorado (Boulder); Russell Means is an Oglala Lakota (Sioux) and a leader of the American Indian movement. He is also a contributing editor of The Rebel.]


Dear Ambassador:

The fourth anniversary of the unleashing of 110,000 aerial sorties which assailed Iraq with 88,000 tons of explosives by US aircraft alone, and the first Security Council review of sanctions during 1995 will occur in the next week. The combined effect of the military assault of the sanctions constitutes the deadliest and cruellest violation of human rights in the name of the United Nations since its creation. It is a crime against humanity.

UNICEF estimated in 12/1994 that 500,000 children under five years of age have died in Iraq since sanctions were imposed by the Security Council in 8/1990. It warned that an additional 1.5 million children "could die if sanctions continue." An article from New York Newsday for 12/18/1994, reports the story. Several million children bear permanent personal injuries as a result of the sanctions. The elderly, chronically ill and emergency medical cases have suffered higher increases in death rates and the general population feels the impact of sanctions physically and psychologically every day, all day.

Conditions in Iraq are worsening with consequent increases in death and permanent injury rates. The British Red Cross last month described conditions in Iraq as horrific and rapidly deteriorating, adding, "We cannot be silent in the face of such a tragedy."

A German study group has graphically demonstrated the staggering increases in deaths in Iraq. Using only selected major causes of death, they report the average death rates between 1989 and 1994 of children under five increased over 6.5 times, and death rates for persons over five years of age increased over 3.5 times.

Water and sanitation conditions in Iraq were described by a UNICEF report Children, War and Sanctions, in 4/1993 as being in a "crisis condition." By late 1994 Kalinda Seneviratne of the University of Technology in Sidney, Australia reported: "UNICEF spent some US$70 million last year in assisting Iraq to overcome the effects of the embargo on its child population. According to UNICEF's resident representative in Baghdad, Thomas Ekvall, one of the problems which is never heard about from either the media or the government, is the situation with drinking water."

I'm just back from Basrah (southern Iraq) where health authorities have taken 400 water samples for analysis and they have found 90% of it to be contaminated, Ekvall says. "This situation could have catastrophic effect on the well-being of the population."

Ekvall says that though there was some damage caused to the water system by US bombing, the major problem now is with spare parts and special chemicals needed to operate the plants, which are very sophisticated ones imported and installed in the 1970s and 1980s. UNICEF has been importing spare parts and chemicals for these plants, but Ekvall admits that the UN embargo causes problems because every import has to be approved by the UN sanctions committee."

Secretary General Boutros Ghali has called sanctions a "blunt instrument" stating, "They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects."

The Secretary General is too diplomatic. Sanctions which kill infants, children, the elderly and the chronically ill are a crime against humanity. They are weapons for the destruction of the masses. Those at the UN who sponsor, condone, or perpetuate such sanctions are guilty of complicity.

The Security Council must end the sanctions against Iraq immediately.

Sincerely, Ramsey Clark.


Women of the International Forum of Arab Women for Peace in Tunisia was an occasion for feminists in the Maghreb (Arab North Africa), and others as well, to find themselves, to search for an identity beyond the one represented by the banner of Saddam Hussein.

When a group of journalists from the Maghreb convened in Tunisia last 9/1990 to discuss the state of the Arab women's press, what came out of the meeting was apparent: from Morocco to Mauritania, to Algeria, Tunisia, and over all of the Maghreb, the end of the 1980s coincided with the closing of many experiments in "women's journalism" born in the 1970s: magazines, journals, black and white "zines," written in Arabic only or bilingual (in Francophone North Africa), which spanned the full range of Arab feminism to represent all points of view.

"What a waste," commented Dorra Bouzid, former director of the Tunisian magazine Faiza, listing those magazines now extinct: Faiza, perhaps the pioneer among Arab and Maghreb women's magazines, closed early in the 1970s; then Nissa, a monthly from the Tunisian feminist collective, Tahar Haddad, was suspended in 1985; then the Moroccan Kalima, March 8 (magazine in Arabic from the Democratic Women's Movement) and Nissa El Maghrib (bilingual monthly from the Democratic Women's Association) were both suspended between 1988 and 1989.

"What a waste," repeated Dorra, lightly unfolding the pages of the final issue of Faiza. Thousands of copies previously had passed through all the important Arab and Afro-Arab cities. As she points out the hottest issues covered in the magazine (virginity, relations between the sexes, marriage, love, friendship, prostitution), I can identify in the yellowed photographs time different from the feminist world that currently surrounds me. We are presently in Tunisia, in the hall of the Congressional Palace where the International Forum of Arab Women for Peace, organized by the Tunisian Women's Union and the Collective of organizations in the Arab Women's Union is unfolding with the theme "Peace with Dignity."

The conference is being held during the Gulf War: 2/17-18/1991. Inside the Congressional Palace, along the walls of the auditorium, the work of the Women's Forum is unfurled, little doves made of blue paper fluttering among manifestos, children's drawings of peace and video images of Iraq that cause murmurs and discussion: bodies mangled by the force of the bombing, mutilated children, the weeping and swearing of women.

In the room Arab feminists have assembled in Tunisia for the first time, women from official positions and independent feminists, young and old, mothers, children, in chador, in stiletto heels and nicely made-up, Algerians, Tunisians, Libanese, Iraqis, Yemenis, Egyptians, while the Mauritanians are recognizable by light and colorful veils and the Palestinians by their national scarves about the neck. I observe the continuous movement typical of any convention, searching for the common denominator in the mosaic of differences. In weaving together these "calling cards" I form a first image: "lay" feminism in the Maghreb (articulated in groups, small circles and individually, equally distributed along all political fronts), Two names: Fatima Alau, president of the Maghreb Development Forum and Meziha Nefoud, president of the Tunisian Women's Union (40000 members); Egyptian, Iraqi or Palestinian feminism which is both part of and articulated through the politics of their respective states, "authenticist" feminism that, especially in the Maghreb, expressed a need for a cultural identity and finds; "at the end of the tunnel, the breeze of Islam as it was in the beginning." War and peace, neutrality or intervention cut across the differences. Among the blue doves of peace and images of death, also the consensus and dissent that accompany the speeches from the floor are part of the complex mosaic; who is it that applauds, who instead mutters with that thready sound usually reserved for births, marriages and funerals. The speeches occur with a concise rhythm ("we are for life," shouts the representative..."
of the Women of the Earth Association, a Maghreb collective living in France; “In the name of Lebanese women, enough destruction of the Arab world. We have seen too many ruins,” says the representative of Lebanese women, in turn, while the Algerians toss out names of the Arab Nation, “the only one that matters.” A showcase of humor and emotion, the Forum swings like a pendulum, sometimes all too eager, then permitting space and visibility. “This war has united us,” explains Samaja, 54, a law and an independent feminist, “but it makes me more aware of the conditions for speaking subject to old prejudices and the eternal inferiority complex of the Arab world. So, women’s attentions are sidetracked defending cultural identity, enclosed in the North/South opposition, participating in the popular emotion of the Arab nation and leaving in the background what is relevant to feminine identity and liberation. When the war ends, we will have to account for all of this.” Tamara Accroui, speaking of liberty and solidarity from the Iraqi women’s podium, received an ovation from the congress. Liberty, magic word. But what is liberty, I ask shortly afterwards, under an Iraqi dictator? Tamara said shortly, “Saddam Hussein is our president. Already in 1977, Iraqi women had achieved salaries comparable to those of men. Today, 38% of the working population is made up of women in every sector, guaranteed by legislation.”

“Take a look at the emirates,” concurs Delonda Jaziri from Tunis, “those absolute monarchies that the West considers champions of good faith and even good government. I assure you that within the Arab world they are medieval; there the daily life of women is like a blindfold covering their eyes: one long dark night.”

Delonda is 35, a teacher and has three children. While she accompanies me past the stands set up by women at the Forum, her voice is frantic and tired at the same time. She speaks of national liberation, citing Garibaldi and our war of independence, developing parallels with astonishing knowledge. “After all,” she says, “the emancipation of women is tied to social accomplishment. The Tunisian woman in her 50s is more liberated than one in her 20s because she has breathed the enthusiasm of the end of colonialism and the birth of a new society. The young’ are without a point of reference, overwhelmed by the present, closed to the traditions that give a sense of certainty in membership. In the large. Tunisian cities, many young people are turning to the chador and raising it up as a banner of progress in the streets and at work. This gives them a sense of the future because it answers their need for an identity.”

Delonda is a cyclone of references, but I linger over the key word, progress. What is progress for Arab women, in the Arab world? Wasisila Tampali is an Algerian lawyer. Her speech to the Forum called for unity among women in order to express the real power of women, “But,” she told me shortly afterwards, “the heart of our problem is contained in the word ‘modernization’, which should not be confused with economic development. Arab society does not identify modernity with technological development. Added to this is Islam, to which few in the West assign democratic values because the West has made the ideal of social justice its own property since the French Revolution; another thing is authenticism. It finds roots in the rejection of irritating technology and it nurtures the same social anxieties that provoked the failure of so many modernization policies in the Arab states since the colonial period. While authenticism is not a return to the old obscurantism, it is a modern phenomenon within Islam. Women live within it and they go beyond it, as happens with every historical conflict. But we have a chain on our feet in comparison with those in the West: you fought within an idea of legality that has the foundation of your state ethics for almost 200 years, we are setting out still deprived of all of that. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30] [c]

24080. DS. "Iran: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the DS, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Credible reports indicate that security forces continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Common methods include suspension for long periods in cable or bars, cigarettes, and more severe torture. The Special Rapporteur noted that he had witnessed guards torture children in the presence of their parents. In September the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a report on unresolved humanitarian issues from the Iran-Iraq war. The ICRC noted that the Government violated the Third Geneva Convention by failing to identify combatants killed in action and exchange information on those killed or missing. According to the report, the fate of almost 19000 Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs) in Iran "remained unknown." The report criticized the government for obstructing ICRC efforts to register and repatriate POWs. [1]
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iraq is a party. The UN General Assembly likewise condemned what it termed mutilations in a December resolution. Certain prisons are notorious for routinemistreatment of prisoners. Al-Rashidiya Prison, on the Tigris River north of Taji reportedly contains torture chambers in its basement. The Al-Shamma’iya Prison, located in east Baghdad, holds the mentally ill and is reportedly the site of both torture and disappearances. The Al-Rawaniyah Prison, located near Baghdad and reportedly the site of torture and arbitrary killings, including mass execution by firing squad. This prison was the principal detention center for persons arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991. Many people taken into custody in connection with the uprisings have not been seen since. Middle East Watch estimated in 1994 that the Al-Rawaniyah Prison holds between 6000-10 000 detainees. The Special Rapporteur, Middle East Watch, and Al cited the Al-Rawaniyah Prison and the Abu Ghraib Prison, located in Baghdad, as principal sites where torture and disappearances continue to occur. According to opposition reports, in late 1994 authorities at the Abu Ghraib Prison amputated the hands of persons convicted of theft. The security forces allegedly raped captured civilians during the Anfal Campaign and the occupation of Kuwait and the Gulf War. The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report that he had interviewed numerous women who continue to suffer severe depression after they were raped in official custody. The Government has never acknowledged or taken any action to investigate reports of rape by its officials. Kurdistan authorities in northern Iraq also employed torture. Al reported in 1994 that these authorities and Kurdish opposition groups used torture on political opponents and criminal suspects in 1993. [6]

24083. DS. “Iraq: Respect for Human Rights; Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial”, In Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5208(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There are two parallel judicial systems: the regular courts, which try common criminal offenses; and special security courts, which try cases involving national security. However, the security courts try many criminal cases. The President may override any court decision. There are no checks on his power. The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report that the executive interferes regularly in all aspects of normal judicial competence in matters ranging from property and commercial law, to family law and criminal law.” The procedural rules applicable in the regular courts theoretically provide many basic protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts cases which, on their merits, would appear to fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are public, and defendants are entitled to counsel government expense in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury system, panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation, the highest Court. The Special Rapporteur reported that the regular courts often assign penalties that are “disproportionate” to the offense (see Section 1.c.). Decree 13 of 1992 imposes the death penalty for automobile theft. In 1994 the Government announced the death penalty would be invoked for automobile smuggling, various categories of theft, and solicitation for the purposes of prostitution. As of late 1994, the penalty for possession of stolen goods was life in prison. Similarly, the Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged crimes. A 1992 decree grants immunity from prosecution to members of the Ba’ath Party and the security forces who may cause death while in the pursuit of army deserters. A 1990 decree grants immunity to men who kill their mothers, daughters and other female family members who have committed “immoral deeds”. There are no Shari’a, or Islamic law, courts as such. Regular courts are empowered to administer Islamic law in cases involving personal status, such as divorce and inheritance. In 1994 the regime introduced Shari’a punishments for some lapses of criminal offenses and for military desertion (see Section I.b.). Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special Rapporteur military officers or civil servants with no legal training head these tribunals which hear cases in secret. Authorities often refuse to allow defendants in incommunicado detention and do not permit them to have contact with their lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by torture which often serve as the basis for conviction. Although defendants may appeal their sentences to Saddam Hussein, many cases appear to end in summary execution shortly after trial. Because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or imprisonments, it is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners. Many of the tens of thousands of persons who have disappeared or been killed in recent years were originally held as political prisoners. [6]
Security forces reportedly detained 15 youths and transported them from the area. Simultaneously, the military caused destruction and arrested inhabitants in Al-Haaahiya, Al-Wasidiya, and Al-Malha. In September opposition sources reported that military forces used incendiary bombs and launched an armored attack against the area of Al-Seigel in the Amarah marshes. The army later set fire to the entire area. In 1994 military operations caused an unconfirmed number of civilian casualties in the region. More than 1000 refugees from the marshes fled to Iran where they joined between 50000-60000 who had fled in previous years. In January the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution characterizinthe marsh Arabs as a persecuted minority whose very survival is threatened by the Iraqi Government. The EP resolution described the Government’s treatment of the Marsh inhabitants as "genocide." According to Middle East Watch and US. Government researchers, government files captured by Kurdish rebels in 1991 contain a military plan for the destruction of the marshes and the people living there. The plan appears to have been approved at the highest levels of the Government. It is being implemented by Minister of Defense Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the military leader who supervised the Anfal Campaign.

The Special Rapporteur continues to note the similarity between the Government's "genocide-type operations" against the Kurds and its operations in southern Iraq. He stated in his February report that the extent of violations against the marsh inhabitants places the survival of this indigenous population in jeopardy. In August the Special Rapporteur dispatched two of his assistants to the Iran-Iraq border to interview refugees fleeing the marshes. He reported in October that the refugees are generally in poor physical and psychological condition, having suffered severe deprivation of food and medicine. He reiterated his concern over the survival of the marsh inhabitants "as a community." Regarding the Kurds, the Special Rapporteur reported in February that he also holds the Government responsible for "serious breaches" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. He observed that these breaches may demonstrate the Government liable under the 1948 Genocide Convention. According to the Special Rapporteur, the activities of the Government during the Anfal Campaign left virtually no Iraqi Kurd untouched. He concluded that "serious violations of human rights committed against the civilian population of Iraq both in times of peace and war involve crimes against humanity committed under and pursuant to the commands of Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan Al-Majid." The Special Rapporteur reported that he continued to receive accounts of mass graves in southern Iraq. Observers believe these graves contain the remains of persons killed following the civil uprising of March 1991. As the Government does not permit international visitors into these areas, forensic experts have not yet investigated the grave sites. However, forensic experts continued to developinformationobtained from mass grave sites in northern Iraq. These graves contain the remains of hundreds of persons presumed killed in the Anfal Campaign. According to opposition sources, a new mass grave, containing up to 250 bodies, was found in April near the Al-Sharqat district of Mosul. Sources said that the graves were discovered when heavy rains washed away the covering soil. Based on forensic evidence and government documents seized by the Kurds in 1991, Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human Rights estimate that between 70000-100000 Kurds were killed, and up to 4000 villages destroyed, during the Anfal Campaign. The evidence suggests that government efforts to eliminate Kurdish communities were widespread, systematically planned, and ruthlessly implemented.

The most flagrant example of current discrimination against the Kurds is the Government's ongoing internal embargo on the north, which includes necessities such as food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. Since 8/1993, the embargo also has included massive electric power cut-offs in specific areas cause the spoilage of medicines, breakdowns in local water-purification systems and the loss of certain hospital services. A disaster was averted only by the prompt action of the United Nations and donor governments, who imported and installed temporary generators to alleviate the crisis. Additional electricity cut-offs were imposed in 8/1994. The embargo of the north has impacted not only Kurds but various other minorities such as Turcomans, who also live in the area. Operation Provide Comfort—the joint US., British, French, and Turkish command—continued in 1994 to inhibit government aerial attacks in the northern "no fly zone." However, the military forces continued intermittent, sometimes heavy shelling of northern villages by long-range artillery. On October 26, opposition media reported that shelling of villages in the Shawan region had resulted in several civilian casualties in that same region. The military maneuver continued throughout 1994. Two persons were killed in an execution-style shooting (see Section 1 a.). Several other international workers involved in the relief effort, including six United Nations guards, were injured in bombing and shooting attacks in March and April. On March 27, Iraqi security forces permitted a crowd in Mosul to attack and damage a UN helicopter attempting to airdrop wounded guards to safety. Two Swedish journalists were injured in Aqrah on March 14 when a bomb exploded under their automobile.

Some terrorist incidents pointed to government involvement, but there was insufficient information to determine the responsibility for other attack. Innocent civilians were the victims of fighting between the guerrilla forces of the two main Kurdish political parties—the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Heavy fighting between the two parties broke out in May, in August, and again in December, producing several hundred civilian casualties. In 1994 civilians near the Turkish border were caught in raids by Turkish military forces on suspected hideouts of the extremist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On August 8, Turkish planes bombed a camp near Zakho containing 10000 Kurdish refugees from Turkey. Although the refugees suffered no casualties, 10 Iraqi guards were reported killed and 7 wounded. The Turkish Government claimed that PKK terrorists were hiding in the camps. On August 23, Turkish planes attacking a PKK camp in Zele bombed the nearby village of Bidewan village, wounding 7 Iraqi Kurdish civilians. On September 8 Turkish planes again bombed the large concentration of Turkish refugees near Zakho. No injuries were reported, but several tents were destroyed. Kurdish villages along the Iranian border were subjected to shelling by the Iranian military, as well as sporadic Iranian military incursions into Iraqi territory. Opposition media reported that Iranian artillery shelled civilian areas in As Sujeymaniyah province the night of April 17-18. Iranian forces were also reportedly involved in fighting between the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties in August and December. The Iranian military conducted attacks on Iranian opposition camps based in Iraq. On November 6, it launched a SCUD missile attack on a Mojahedin E-Khalq base located some 30 miles north of Baghdad. On November 9, Iranian jets bombed an Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party base in the town of Koi-Sarauq in northern Iraq. Land mines in northern Iraq continued to kill or maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid during the Iraq-Iraq War, but the army has failed to clear them. The mines appear to have been haphazardly planted in civilian areas. The Special Rapporteur as repeatedly reminded the Government of its obligations under the Land Mines Protocol, to which Iraq is a party, to protect civilians from the effects of mines. Based on interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, the US Government has concluded that the Iraqi regime engaged in war crimes—willful killing, torture, rape pillage, hostage-taking, unlawful deportation, and related acts—directly related to the Gulf War. The US. Government urged the UN Security Council to create an international commission to study evidence of a broader range of war crimes, a well as crimes against humanity and possible genocide. At the end of 1994, Middle East Watch was preparing a charge of genocide that it hopes governments will bring against the Government of Iraq before the International court of Justice in the Hague. Middle East Watch reported that its case was based on a thorough review of evidence obtained from mass graves, government documents, and interviews with eyewitnesses. [=]
International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government controls movement within the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to arrest (see Section I.d.). Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways. The Government requires citizens who obtain expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may not make more than two trips abroad annually. The Government reportedly prohibits some citizens from all international travel. Before traveling abroad, citizens are required to post collateral with the Government which is refundable only upon their return to Iraq. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside Iraq alone; male relatives must escort them. The Government continued to pursue its discriminatory retributive policies, including demolition of villages and forced relocations of Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorities. Middle East Watch reported that the Government was continuing to force Kurdish residents of Mosul to move to Kurdish controlled areas in the north. However, the Government directed most of its resettlement efforts in 1994 at residents of the southern marshes. According to the Special Rapporteur, security forces relocate marsh inhabitants obtained during the course of military operations to the main southern cities. They were later transferred to detention centers and prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad. Opposition sources reported in September that the Government had relocated more than 300 families from the marshes to a detention area in Diwaniya province. The authorities reportedly returned other families who had taken refuge in Baghdad to the province of Amara. Large numbers of Shi’a refugees from southern Iraq fled to Iran, particularly after the escalation in military activity in March. It was difficult to estimate the number of persons displaced by these operations, due to the lack of international monitors in the area. However, in late 1994 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that more than 10000 refugees from the marshes were in camps in Iran. Amal Appeal, a charitable organization operating several of the camps, placed the number at more than 35000. US. Government analysts estimated in September that more than 200000 of the 250000 former inhabitants of the marshes had been driven from the area since 1991 (see also Section 1.a.).

In 1994, the Special Rapporteur noted that the Government in 1993 had expelled several Faili, or Shi’a, Kurdish families. Faili Kurds, who have traditionally lived in the mountainous region bordering Iran, were the victims of mass deportations in the 1970'8 and 1980'. The Special Rapporteur reported that in recent years the Government may have expelled a total of more than 1 million persons suspected of being “Persian sympathizers.” According to the Special Rapporteur, about 500000 of these displaced persons are believed to live in Iran. According to the UNHCR, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remained abroad—mainly in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. Apart from those suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government’s suppression of the civil uprising of 1991: others are Kurds who fled the Anfal Campaign of 1988. The UNHCR assists many refugees, notably in Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled following the 1991 uprising, the great majority, particularly Kurds, have repatriated themselves to northern Iraq in areas where the allies have prohibited overflights by Iraqi aircraft. Several hundred thousand Kurds remain unsettled in northern Iraq because political circumstances do not permit them to return to their former homes in Government-controlled territory. Moreover northern Iraq is host to about 10000 recently arrived Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in southeastern Turkey (see the report on Turkey), in response to the Turkish government’s counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK. The UNHCR is treating these displaced persons as refugees unless they reach an official determination on their status. In late 1994, the UNHCR relocated the Turkish Kurd to protect them from periodic raids by Turkish military aircraft (see Section dents abroad who refuse to return are required to reimburse any expenses paid by the Government. Each student wishing to travel abroad must provide a guarantor. The guarantor and the student's parents may be liable if the student fails to return. Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in Iraq for 5 years are required to apply for nationality. The requirement is 1 year of residence for the spouses of Iraqi citizens employed in government offices. Many foreigners thus have been obliged to accept citizenship and are subject to official travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance include 1088 of job, a substantial financial penalty, and repayment for any governmental educational expenses. The Government prevents many citizens who also hold citizenship in another country—especially the children of Iraqi fathers and foreign-born mothers from visiting the country of their other nationality. [=]

24085. DS. “Iraq: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. No information is available on whether the Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups have collected a substantial body of evidence pointing to the Government's continuing disregard for the rights and welfare of children. The Government failure to comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions. As a result, general economic and health conditions throughout Iraq have deteriorated dramatically. Children have been particularly susceptible to the decline in the standard of living, increases in child mortality and disease rates have been reported. The Special Rapporteur has observed that, under these circumstances, the Government has special obligations to ensure that the most vulnerable groups in the population have adequate food and health care. The Special Rapporteur stated in his February report that Iraq's refusal to implement UN. Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which would permit a one-time sale of oil in order to finance the import of humanitarian goods, has had an adverse effect on vulnerable populations including children. In October the Special Rapporteur reported that “the obvious imbalance between military expenditure and resources allocated to the fields of health care and education clearly illustrates the priorities of the Government.” The Special Rapporteur has repeatedly observed that the ongoing bombardment of civilian settlement in the southern marshes has resulted in the deaths of many innocent persons, including women, children, and the elderly. [=]

24086. DS. “Iraq: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government claims that it is committed to equality for women, who make up about 20% of the work force. It has enacted laws to protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual harassment: to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and police forces, to require education for female children; and to equalize women's rights in divorce law ownership, taxation surcharge, and election to the National Assembly. It is difficult to determine to what extent these protections are afforded in practice. Reports indicate, however that the application of these laws has declined as Iraq’s political and economic crisis persists. Familial violence against women, such as wife beating and rape is known to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such abuse is customarily addressed within the tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the subject and the Government issues no statistics. Spousal violence constitutes grounds
for divorce and criminal charges, but suits brought on these charges are believed to be rare. The Special Rapporteur has commented on the high incidence of rape committed by the armed forces and security services (see Section 1.b.). He noted that an unusually high percentage of the northern population is female, due to the disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men in the Anfal Campaign. The Special Rapporteur has reported that the widows, daughters, and mothers of Anfal victims are typically dependent on their relatives because they may not inherit the property or assets of their missing family members. Other report suggests that economic destitution has forced many women into prostitution. Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign of 1988 indicates that the Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing squads and in chemical attacks. [\*]

24087. DS. "Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The judicial system is composed of the regular courts, which try criminal and civil cases, the State Security Court, which tries cases of a security nature, and the Court of Cassation, which is the highest level of judicial appeal. During periods of martial law, the Amir may authorize military courts to try civilian defendants. There have been no martial-law trials since 1991. Sunni and Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective denominations for family-law cases. The Constitution states that judges shall not be subject to any authority. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Justice controls the judiciary's administrative and financial matters. The Amir appoints all judges on recommendations from the Minister of Justice. Judges who are citizens have lifetime appointments but the Government also employs many non-citizens as judges. They work under 1-year, renewable contracts, which undermine their independence. The Ministry of Justice may remove judges for cause but rarely does so. Foreign residents involved in commercial disputes with citizens frequently complain that courts show a pro-Kuwaiti bias. Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and to have a lawyer of their choosing. Defendants and prosecutors may appeal verdicts of the State Security Court to the Court of Cassation, but the appellate court may only determine whether the law was properly applied with respect to the sentence, it does not rule on guilt or innocence. In criminal cases not involving state security, appeal is to the High Court of Appeal, which may rule on all aspects of the lower courts decision. In the secular courts there are no groups, including women, who are barred from testifying or whose testimony is given lesser weight. The Islamic courts, which have jurisdiction over all aspects of family law, follow Islamic law, which states that the testimony of one man equals that of two women. Most trials are public, as was the 1994 trial of 14 persons accused in the foiled assassination plot against former President Bush. In June the State Security Court convicted 13 defendants and acquitted 1. It sentenced six defendants to death and seven to prison terms ranging from 6 months to 12 years. Like other trials, this one did not meet internationally accepted standards regarding an independent judiciary and the evidence required for proving abuse. There are no reported political prisoners, but the Government continues to hold persons accused of collaboration with Iraq during the occupation. By law such collaboration is a felony. Most of the people convicted in martial-law courts (including a majority of collaborators) did not receive a fair trial. [\*]

24088. DS. "Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (b) Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The judicial system is composed of the regular courts, which try criminal and civil cases, the State Security Court, which tries cases of a security nature, and the Court of Cassation, which is the highest level of judicial appeal. During periods of martial law, the Amir may authorize military courts to try civilian defendants. There have been no martial-law trials since 1991. Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective denominations for family-law cases. The Constitution states that judges shall not be subject to any authority. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Justice controls the judiciary's administrative and financial matters. The Amir appoints all judges on recommendations from the Minister of Justice. Judges who are citizens have lifetime appointments but the Government also employs many non-citizens as judges. They work under 1-year, renewable contracts, which undermine their independence. The Ministry of Justice may remove judges for cause but rarely does so. Foreign residents involved in commercial disputes with citizens frequently complain that courts show a pro-Kuwaiti bias. Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and to have a lawyer of their choosing. Defendants and prosecutors may appeal verdicts of the State Security Court to the Court of Cassation, but the appellate court may only determine whether the law was properly applied with respect to the sentence, it does not rule on guilt or innocence. In criminal cases not involving state security, appeal is to the High Court of Appeal, which may rule on all aspects of the lower courts decision. In the secular courts there are no groups, including women, who are barred from testifying or whose testimony is given lesser weight. The Islamic courts, which have jurisdiction over all aspects of family law, follow Islamic law, which states that the testimony of one man equals that of two women. Most trials are public, as was the 1994 trial of 14 persons accused in the foiled assassination plot against former President Bush. In June the State Security Court convicted 13 defendants and acquitted 1. It sentenced six defendants to death and seven to prison terms ranging from 6 months to 12 years. Like other trials, this one did not meet internationally accepted standards regarding an independent judiciary and the evidence required for proving abuse. There are no reported political prisoners, but the Government continues to hold persons accused of collaboration with Iraq during the occupation. By law such collaboration is a felony. Most of the people convicted in martial-law courts (including a majority of collaborators) did not receive a fair trial. [\*]
at international conferences abroad. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return. A serious problem exists in the case of the bidoon, who are stateless persons usually of Iraqi or Iranian descent, who resided in Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion. The Government argues that many of the bidoon (the term means "without") are actually the citizens of other countries, who claim they are stateless in order to remain in Kuwait, become citizens, and enjoy the generous government benefits provided to citizens. However, the Government has insisted that the number of bidoon resident in Kuwait was reduced by more than 50% in the postwar period, from about 220,000 in 1990 to about 117,000 in 1994. Others immigrated to Kuwait during the oil boom years. At the end of 1994, there were about 117,000 stateless people in Kuwait, down from the prewar level of about 220,000. The Government does not wish to see the return of the bidoon who departed Kuwait during the Gulf war. It frequently delays or denies issuing them entry visas. This policy imposes serious hardships and family separations. In 1994 the Government continued its postwar policy of reducing the number of Iraqis, bidoon, Palestinians, and other foreign residents. However, the Government permits the ICRC to verify if the deportees object to returning to their country of origin. The Government holds those deportees who have objections at the main deportation center. In 1993 the Government discontinued its postwar practice of arresting and deporting Gazan Palestinians for violating residency laws. The Government issued 1-year renewable residency permits to 5000 of the 8000 Gazans remaining in Kuwait, but did not seek to deport those without residency permits. Nonetheless, the Government and social pressure prodded many Gazans to depart Kuwait. There is no legislation governing refugees. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of political refugees. The Ministry of Interior issues residency permits to persons granted political asylum. The Government does not deport anyone who claims a fear of persecution at home but it will often maintain such persons in detention rather than grant them permission to live and work in Kuwait. [\[\]

24090. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Iraq: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government claims that it is committed to equality for women, who necessary to support their families. The law stipulates that employees include women in protection from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and police forces; to require education for female children; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land ownership, taxation, suffrage, and election to the National Assembly. It is difficult to determine to what extent these protections are afforded in practice. Casual violence against women, such as wife beating and rape, is known to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such abuse is customarily addressed within the tightly knit Iraqi family structure. There is no public discussion of the subject, and there are no official statistics. Excessive violence against women is grounds for divorce and criminal charges, but suits brought on these charges are believed to be rare. Continuing analysis of documents and testimony concerning the Anfal campaign of 1988 indicate that many women and children, including infants, were killed by firing squad and in chemical attacks during that operation and that many more remain unaccounted for. [\[\]

24091. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Iraq: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. No information is available on whether the Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of children. However, the UN Special Rapporteur and various human rights organization have collected a substantial body of evidence pointing to the Iraqi Government's continuing disregard for the rights and welfare of children. The Government of Iraq's failure to comply with the terms of UN resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions against Iraq. As a result, general economic and health conditions throughout Iraq have deteriorated seriously. Children have been particularly susceptible to the decline in food and health care, increased in child mortality and disease rates have been reported. Under these circumstances, the Special Rapporteur observes, the Government of Iraq has special obligations to "take steps to the maximum of its resources" to ensure that the most vulnerable groups in the population have adequate food and health care. The Special Rapporteur stated in his November report that Iraq's ongoing refusal to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 (which would permit a one-time sale of oil in order to finance the import of humanitarian foods), has had an adverse effect on vulnerable populations, including children. The Special Rapporteur noted: "The Government's failure to act (regarding 706 and 712) bears heavily upon those in need and no doubt accounts for a significant portion of the large increases in mortality rates." The Special Rapporteur further reported that the Government's policy of diverting humanitarian aid to its own supporters has deprived vulnerable groups, including children, of essential food and medicines. Finally, the Special Rapporteur observed in his November report that the ongoing bombardment of civilian settlements in the southern marshes has resulted in the "deaths of large numbers of innocent persons including women, children, and the elderly." The Special Rapporteur stated that he had interviewed numerous orphans who had survived military attacks which had killed their parents. [\[\]


24093. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 01: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Kuwait's rulers (Amirs) drawn from the Al-Sabah family, have governed the country in consultation with prominent commercial families and other community leaders for over 200 years. The 1962 Constitution provides for an elected National Assembly and details the powers of the Government and the rights of citizens. Although the Constitution permits the Amir to suspend its articles only during a period of martial law, the Amir has twice (from 1976-1981 and from 1986-1992)suspended constitutional provisions by decree and ruled extra-constitutionally. The 10/1992 Assembly elections and the subsequent convening of the Assembly marked a return to parliamentary life. During 1993 the Assembly assumed an active role, enacting legislation, including the national budget. (See below for further details on the role of the Assembly The Ministry of Interior supervises Kuwait's security apparatus, including the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Kuwait State Security (KSS), two agencies that investigate internal security-related offenses. Kuwait's security forces continued to commit human rights abuses, particularly in their treatment of those Peoples whose leaders were associated with support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Iraqis, Jordanians, Palestinians, Yemenis, and Sudanese). Endowed with rich oil resources, Kuwait's market economy made
substantial progress in recovering from the destruction caused by the Iraq occupation. By 1993 Kuwait had an estimated per capita income of approximately $17234. Reconstruction was largely complete, however, heavy costs accompanied the recovery. Over the past 3 fiscal years, Kuwait incurred a cumulative fiscal deficit of approximately $63 billion, a deficit that it covered by drawing down its foreign assets by half and increasing its public debt. Despite the emphasis the Government places on exports, its economy is not diversified and many businesses are subject to restrictive labor laws. In addition, the Government has ownership interests in most of the major banks and in many businesses, chiefly in the oil industry. Although Kuwait showed some progress in human rights in 1993, its overall human rights record was mixed. The Government relaxed its residency restrictions on Gazans, made it easier for foreign workers to sponsor their family members, agreed to begin investigating the cases of long-term detainees, and closed illegal recruitment agencies for domestic servants. The Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly and the press publicized important human rights issues, raising awareness of such issues at both the official and popular level. Nevertheless, serious human rights problems remained. There were continuing reports of torture and of arbitrary arrest, as well as limitations on the freedoms of assembly and association and women's rights. Political parties remain banned, and citizens do not enjoy the right to change the head of state and government. The Government banned all unlicensed nongovernmental organizations in August, thereby eliminating some organizations that had been engaged in human rights work. The Government continued to refuse to readmit stateless, Iraqi, and Palestinian individuals who had strong family ties to Kuwait, and Kuwaiti labor laws continued to exclude domestic servants from their protective provisions. [1]

24094. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 03: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (b) Disappearance", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There were no reported cases of permanent disappearances but there were credible reports of foreigners (particularly those peoples whose leaders were associated with support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) being taken from their homes by unidentified Kuwaitis, held for a few hours, and then released as a tactic of harassment. Numerous disappearances followed Kuwait's liberation in 1991 as elements of the military and vigilante groups sought retribution against persons, particularly foreigners, whom they suspected of being pro-Iraqi. While there is no reliable estimate of the total number of disappearances, over 100 cases remained unresolved in 1993. In additional cases where persons are known to be dead, law enforcement officials have failed to identify or indict suspects. According to the latest and most accurate figures provided to Iraq by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 699 Kuwaitis and residents of Kuwait including 9 women, were taken prisoner by Iraqi authorities during the occupation and are still missing or detained in Iraq. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which provides for the detainees' release. Iraq denies that it holds Kuwaiti detainees and refuses to account for missing Kuwaitis taken into Iraqi custody during the occupation. [1]

24095. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government restricts the travel of Saudi and non-Saudi women. Women must obtain written permission from their closest male relatives before the authorities will allow them to board public transportation between different parts of the country or travel within the country. The Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their employment or chane their workplace without their sponsor's permission. Foreign residents who travel in the Kingdom are often asked by the authorities to show they possess letters of permission from their employers. Foreign workers must also obtain permission from their sponsors to travel abroad. Sponsors generally retain possession of the workers' passports. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved. Some sponsors use this pressure tactic to resolve disputes in their favor—or to have foreign employees deported The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and witnesses in criminal cases, and suspends the issuance of exit visas to them, until the case is tried . As a result, some foreign nationals are forced to remain in the Kingdom for lengthy periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the passports of suspected subversives. The Government prevents Shi's Muslims believed to have pro-Iranian sympathies from traveling abroad. Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship. There are no provisions for long-term foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an influential patron. In April the Government revoked the citizenship of Osama Bin Laden, a wealthy citizen known to support Islamic terrorist groups, for refusing to return from abroad to answer charges concerning his activities. The Interior Ministry issued a statement that Bin Laden 'contradicted the Kingdom's interest and harmed its relations with sisterly countries'. After his citizenship was revoked, Bin Laden was prohibited from entering the Kingdom. Article 42 of the 1992 Basic law provides that 'the State will grant political asylum if the public interest mitigates' in favor of it. The language does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general, the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other foreign workers: they must have sponsors for employment or risk expulsion at the border. After the Gulf War, the Government granted refuge to 36000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war. At year's end, 16,000 have been resettled in third countries or were voluntarily repatriated to Iraq. Most of the remaining 18400 refugees are restricted to the Rafha Refugee Camp. In 1993 Human Rights Watch reported that refugees were forcibly repatriated to Iraq after staging a riot at the Rafha camp. However, the UNHCR has monitored over 2450 refugees voluntarily returning to Iraq since 1991 and found no evidence of forcible repatriation in 1993 or 1994. The Government has temporarily allowed some foreigners to remain in Saudi Arabia in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they were deported to their home countries. The authorities also worked with the UNHCR to repatriate several hundred southern Yemeni refugees after the end of the Yemen civil war. [1]


Gulf of Ignorance: One of the big problems when we begin to talk about things is that we don't know our own history. And if you look at the whole question of how effectively the Gulf War was managed in this country, it was because people didn't even know where Iraq was. They were totally dependent on ITN news to put a map of the world up there and say that's Iraq and that little bit there, that's Kuwait and you see that dirty great big rocket country there, that marched into that tiny country there and everybody watching News at ten goes 'aah that's not fair!' Then they throw in a few phrases like 'democracy' and 'defending democracy in Kuwait'!! Almost everybody in this country gets at least the benefit of
education until they’re sixteen years old and almost nobody challenged the notion of defending democracy in Kuwait during the Gulf War. You couldn’t have found it with a magnifying glass; it didn’t exist. Nobody knew anything about Kuwait until that issue came up. Nobody knew anything about Iraq. In this country when people hear of Palestine they think of when they were at school and learnt stories in the Bible. That’s what Palestine is. It belongs in the Bible. It’s not real. We don’t even challenge the authority of our own people. We’ve got to learn what we’re doing; we’ve got to learn the history of world struggles. And I don’t mean that we all take six weeks off and do nothing until we have read all the books.

But we’ve got to understand the factual history. People in this country have got to understand the central role that was played by Britain in creating all these problems. That doesn’t mean then, that you start running around like the Americans used to do, with a fit of the communal guilt, with heads held in a brown paper bag saying: ‘Don’t let anyone see me because I’m white, British and I’m not being oppressed other than as a woman’. I’m not saying that, but I’m saying that if we’re going to work together again we’ve got to know and respect not only what we share in common, but also the differences between us.

No Patronage Please, Sisters: Our culture, my language, her language, is not necessarily better than yours, it’s as good. If I choose because of the history of my own culture to behave in a certain way, don’t tell me you know a better way of doing it. I am capable of learning for myself and I am capable of choosing for myself. If I want to dress in the manner of my culture or yours, that is my decision. And while you’re at it don’t make an issue about whether my war, or my position is right or wrong. My development may not be totally even. We people in Ireland, we’ve all got our own internal difficulties. People in Ireland may not be as well-informed, as well-educated or as broad-thinking on a whole lot of issues like family reproduction rights, like the role of a woman in the family. We may not within the narrow confines of understanding the oppression of our sex, be in the forefront, though some of us might be. But don’t use that as a stick with which to beat my people in this war. Don’t use that, by saying the way forward in Ireland is to educate women on these issues. It is being said about women whose houses are being raided whose children are being dragged off to prison: ‘we’ll have to consider critical support here because the real problem is that these women are very bad on the question of gay rights, on the question of abortion information, so let’s actually do the revolution right here and let’s all head off to Ireland and make sure they get the question of reproductive rights right. Then when they have that right, we’ll be sisters and we can help them’. All of that has got to go out the window.

Irish Land in Irish Hands: We are women in struggle for the survival not only of our sex, not only for women and women’s rights! We are a group of women in our countries fighting for the survival of what we love, our children, our mothers, our partners, our sons. We are fighting for the survival of our culture, our race and our land.

And the parallels in all struggles just continue until they are frightening. I know what’s happening to the people of Kurdistan; I see them. Unlike the Palestinians and in many ways, to some extent, still like ourselves, they still actually have ground to hang on to. The Palestinians have no homeland; no state. And in the Brooke talks in Ireland, they are trying to make Palestinians of us. They are trying to say to the Northern nationalists: ‘Look, you have got it all wrong. The problem in Ireland is that there is this imperialist country called the Republic of Ireland which lays claim to the territory of the North and the way forward for peace is to change the Irish constitution and accept that the North of Ireland is not part of the nation of Ireland’.

People in the south of Ireland and people in Britain and liberal people, peace-loving people are saying to us: ‘That sounds like a good idea.’ Well let me tell you, you’re not doing that with me. Just before it comes up on the agenda, first I want to assert—which I’ve done at every conference I’ve been speaking at—you are not doing that to me, Mr. Brook or Mr. Collins or Anglo-Irish Agreement. You are not taking the land out from under my feet. You are not going to make me live in the same position as the Palestinians. Sitting in County Tyrone, where my people have lived for hundreds upon thousands of years and telling me suddenly, that as from some date next year, it is not Ireland. What is it? I get angry thinking of it–what will it be?

If Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution are taken away and Tyrone is not part of the nation of Ireland, what will it be and what will I be? I am not a British citizen. Till the day I die I will never be anything other than an Irish citizen. If I have no land, if I can’t say County Tyrone is in Ireland—i was born there–I’m an Irish citizen but the place I was born in, which is in Ireland, is no longer Ireland because some piece of paper took it away, what will I be?

Or we might be beaten into South Armagh and up the Falls Road and to the top-of the mountains of Tyrone and then we will be in a position that the Kurdish people are in. Then people ask me if we can make links within these struggles. We don’t have to. They are beating us in the face. They are one and the same struggle and yet we are always told we are wrong.

Let’s Discuss Our Resistance: I think that the question that we as women have to discuss here today is not war; we don’t have to discuss war, it’s a real situation, it’s there. What we have to critically discuss is the resistance and how we women in the countries of oppression can look to you sisters here in the belly of the beast for added strength. What are you, our sisters, going to do to bring this struggle forward and to give us—not simply within the narrow confines of a separatist position on women–support? What are you our sisters in the belly of the beast, going to do for the rest of us? How can you help? How can we work together to beat off the oppressor, and in beating him off, educate ourselves and our brothers so that we can reconstruct in place of war; reconstruct in the face of oppression, free and equitable societies?

I think there are lots of things we can learn from each other on the question of resistance. One of the things that women by tradition are better at than anybody else is education. It’s because that has traditionally been our role. We bring children into this world, we educate them. We are the social organizers, we keep the family going, we keep the community going, we work within ourselves and we seem to have a longer history of sharing resources and sharing information. But we still have to learn.

We do not want to build societies where, having fought and won the war, our brothers say, “Thanks very much. Bernadette, you can go home now and, make the dinner.” But that’s the least of my problems at this time—whether or not Gerry Adams is going to send me home after the war to make the dinner. Don’t you worry about that, sisters, I can deal with Gerry Adams: it is the British army that is my problem. We have gained civil and political rights in Central and Eastern Europe have gained civil and political rights in the former Communist states; at the same time the introduction of the market economy often starts with the loss of women’s maternity and daycare benefits, and often their jobs as well. However, the emphasis on the public sphere in Communist societies over the private sphere led to a failure to address the fundamental contradictions between women’s productive and reproductive roles, and of gender relations within the family. Women’s independence was seen as a logical product of the broader socialist revolution, rather than as an explicit goal of such revolution. Just as socialist states emancipated women as worker-mothers, the new nationalisms of the region see the “cult of motherhood” as the basis of the renewed nationalisms. While it is agreed that gender inequalities within the family in Capitalist societies...
are the basis of inequality, the dual role of women in socialist societies as worker-mothers helped to perpetuate gender inequalities in the Communist states. Even as the shortages of housing and consumer goods, coupled with long hours made women's dual role more difficult, Communist governments (especially Hungary) or the men of Communist societies (such as Poland) held very traditional views on the legitimate role of women. Notably, on his 1991 visit to Poland, Pope John Paul II denounced individualism as unsuitable for Poland, and posed the true values of the traditional family with the false collectivism of socialism. Women's reproductive rights, based in the absolute right of women to determine their own reproductive goals, even as women must never be forced to bear the full costs of their decisions, has been subordinated to both the needs of the Communists (such as the 1936 ban on abortion in the USSR) or the re-imposition of traditional religions: both ideological systems presuppose heterosexuality norms. At the same time, sex education in the Communist countries was rudimentary, and birth control uncommon (in the USSR only 18% of women used birth control, in Georgia only 3%). Abortion was a major means of birth control, but was discouraged by terrible quality of abortion services (a Georgian doctor relates stories of dark hospital wards shaken by screams of patients), while in post-Communist Poland the Church seeks to ban abortion, while Croatia associates aborted fetus with concentration camp dead in anti-abortion posters, and in Bosnia Serbs consciously used mass rape as a tool of genocide. Ironically, the end of Communism also began the rapid eclipse of the political role of women: whether in government or in emergent democratic opposition movements, the value women held as dissidents vanished at the same time that women who had risen in the Communist governments were marginalized. Significantly, feminism as an ideology was discredited by the co-option of feminism by the Communists (at least in name), while the renewed nationalisms of the region reject any new formulations of feminism under whatever name as an alien ideology. Nevertheless, the small feminist groups that have emerged have been very vocal: the small groups have often, as in Poland, coupled demonstrations for abortion rights with peace movement work (in 1991, condemning the Persian Gulf War as "patriarchal").

Q: Of course, getting into it means getting your hands dirty. Over all there was the problem of bringing the hostages home and for that, as we well knew, it would be necessary to advance into dirty terrain. I was clean enough last year to organize the demonstration in Jerusalem: it was the best of both worlds. This time, no. To go to Baghdad with Capucci, who wanted to choose the PLO as one of the two subjects of mediation (in fact we met Arafat in Baghdad). We knew already that inside the PLO there was a conflict and we thought that it would be useful to get all the sides into a dialogue, as Capucci, as Arafat, as Nemer Hammad. It shook them up. For them to be able to intercede for the hostages it was, it seemed to me, a way of helping the moderates in the PLO restore moderation. It was important for the world to know that the Palestinians were concerned with the hostages and for the Palestinians to be able to understand that this was the only way they might be able to maintain relationships with the West. I am convinced that at that phase there was a margin of negotiation, that the West burned that bridge by the intimidation of the ultimatum. It was seen as an insult to Arab pride. We, however, during these encounters around the hostages, we had many occasions to toss out a denunciation of the invasion of Kuwait (contrary to Formigoni who, interviewing the Iraqi Parliament, never mentioned it). The fact that we were able to express our opinions without its causing a big scandal demonstrated that there was room for negotiation. Then they all got radicalized.

Q: Without a doubt there is a one-sided image of Israel among young pacifists, seeing it only as the oppressor of the Palestinians but not also as a state under siege. Why?

A: It's true: the young people are very Ignorant about Israel and the Middle East; on the other hand, I can remember, 20 years ago, looking for Vietnam on a map. For three years they have seen the children of the Intifada, seen the repression to which they are subjected, why are you surprised that they identify with their contemporaries? The peace movement has, of course, worked on this a lot. We women, for example, two years ago, we had not been able to get Israeli pacifists to meet with Palestinians; last year, after a lot of hard work, it is finally possible. To make this possible, to know the other face of Israel, it is essential to break the sectarianism of the younger ones.

I recognise that at this moment it is difficult to reach an understanding with the Israeli pacifists: I think that the horror at their backs should not impede confronting the problems at hand and I believe, thus, that Israel, in order to change its image, ought to make a gesture, right now, towards the Palestinians.

I appreciate very much that Israel hasn't, until now, intervened in the war, but I consider it tragic that "Peace Now" has declared that peace...
now wants to say war now. This collapse is terrible, it is a troubling return to the syndrome of encirclement: also among pacifists we find a terrible obstinacy, a big closing down at any notion of negotiation. In the end, refusing our solidarity because we are against this war. But I do not renounce dialogue with them and continue to deny myself being touched too much by my Israeli friends or my Palestinian friends in the territories. But you can imagine saying about this war, who is imprisoned by the occupation of the parties. And thus the question, there is a real danger that democracy has come to a complete standstill. We see it in the bias of the courts, we see it in the poverty and the despair of our communities, we see it in the empty voting booths that millions of Americans no longer bother to enter.

In the conclusion to his 12 page dissent, Judge Mikva wrote: "...whatever its proper role in correcting imbalances and imperfections in the status quo, government certainly must not abandon its posture of nonpartisanship. The government of any democracy, let alone one shaped by the values of our Constitution's First Amendment, must avoid tilting the electoral playing field, lest the democracy itself becomes tarnished...." If democracy is to be expanded and the electoral process opened up in the way that Judge Mikva has advocated, we need to take his ruling out to the grassroots. That's what my 1992 Presidential campaign is all about. I'm urging everyone who cares about fairness and justice to vote for Lenora Fulani and Abner Mikva in 1992! He lost the fight for democracy in the courts, so we need to win it in the communities. We need a sizable vote just because we can't win in the courts. They've been seized by the right wing— Clarence Thomas is just the icing on the oreo cookie! We already have strong evidence to show that if the electoral process is opened up—even with all its limitations—voting patterns alter considerably. For example, whenever independent candidates of national stature—such as John Anderson or George Wallace—have run for office, even in one-shot campaigns, large numbers of people turned out to vote for them. Just imagine what it would be like if the "electoral playing field" were tilted in favor of democracy and inclusion. Imagine what it would mean if the debates included four or five or six different candidates, each of them representing different political viewpoints, different social values, different solutions to the problems that confront our society. Imagine the media covering those viewpoints, examining those values and solutions. It would mean that the concerns of millions of ordinary Americans would be addressed and discussed; more than that, it would mean that our opinions, needs, and desires would be heard, heard and understood. In the end, pulling these candidates from the political vacuum at the grassroots. That's what my 1992 Presidential

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Iraq

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Q: Women and peace, "Women in Black", mother right. Are you also convinced that women are rightfully the vanguard of the peace movement?

A: Listen, I don't want to theorize too much about it. I take issue also with the opinion polls that say that women are more against war than men. The essence of that position cannot be so unequivocal. Too many things are mixed up together: mother love, the sense of limits, feminism, suspicions about power. Personally, I feel this is very extravagant. I don't look to grasp the fascination of the influence of the army, I perceive instead that it attracts men more than women, even those who are politically against the war. I believe then in leaving him experience of the old politics, that women have to have a decisive role in the building of the movement for peace because they are capable of not being dazzled by the political mediation, by its conspicuous pretensions. With the entrance of women as part of the movement, things get complicated—and that is good: questions such as "how is it that if I am against cutting the navy and you are in favor, we can both demonstrate against the war?" can be asked. Also, with feminists the relationships were not very simple: the experience of Women in Black was a break from the feminist tradition of emphasizing discussion. In fact we said, first we act, first we live these things, and later we'll talk.

From concrete experiences we could draw our culture together, we chose the body and not the mind as the primary vehicle for our message. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, CA 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] ==

24099. Fulani, Leonora. Press Release: Do We Need More Democracy? You Be The Judge. New York: Leonora Fulani For President [200 West 72nd Street, Suite 30, New York, NY 10023; Tel: 212-799-2100], N.D. [1992]. Recently a three judge panel ruled that I had no right ("standing") to challenge the tax-exempt status of the Commission on Presidential debates for failing to include me in the 1988 Presidential debates—despite the fact that, no less than Michael Dukakis and George Bush, I was on the ballot in every state and had received federal primary matching funds. The amazing thing is that the decision is not that two out of three federal judges ruled against me, but that one of them, Chief Judge Abner Mikva, had the guts to side with me—and with democracy. The Commission on Presidential Debates was established in 1987 by the national Democratic and Republican parties for the explicit purpose of taking over sponsorship—control —of the debates from the League of Women Voters. My lawyers have argued that the Commission is not entitled to enjoy tax-exempt status because it is not non-partisan, as the law requires, but bi-partisan—that is, it excludes everyone who isn't a Republican or a Democrat. The Commission on Presidential Debates said I wasn't eligible to be included in the debates because I wasn't a "legitimate" candidate. That's a Catch-22 situation, because minor party candidates can never be "legitimate" as long as the system says that the only legitimate candidates are major party candidates! By ruling in favor of the CPD, the court perpetuated a dangerous and unconstitutional political myth—which is that bi-partisan means the same thing as non-partisan. But it doesn't. Since the Constitution doesn't even mention political parties at all, in giving special privileges to two nongovernmental agencies—namely the Republican and the Democratic parties—the US government and its institutions are in violation of the Constitution. A ruling in our favor would have meant the unraveling of American electoral politics as we know it. It's clear that the powers that be are willing to do whatever they have to do—even if that means issuing criminally biased and partisan judicial decisions—to hold on to their to party political monopoly. Even if it means destroying democracy itself. From Gramm-Rudman (the so-called "balanced budget" legislation that turned Reaganomics into law, enacted with bipartisan support) to the war in the Persian Gulf, the history of the last ten years has been the capitulation of the Democratic Party to the Republicans' right wing agenda. As Judge Mikva pointed out in his 12 page dissent, there is a real danger that democracy has come to a complete standstill. We see it in the bias of the courts, we see it in the poverty and the despair of our communities, we see it in the empty voting booths that millions of Americans no longer bother to enter.
our approval: new constitution, ‘reformation’ of political parties, elections, ‘restoration’ of the parliament, and ‘all of these things’. The US has not given support to the Iraqi National Congress because they did not deserve such US support, inasmuch as they ‘didn’t get its act together’. The vindictive redrawing of the Iraqi-Kuwait border was done to punish Iraq and will be counterproductive, since Iraq will exist forever: even a democratic Iraq will want the return of those territories and it unnecessarily creates a ‘time bomb’. While Iraq’s only card in the region is Hezbollah, the PLO-Israeli agreement will end the Palestinian issue as a focal point for radicals in the region: ‘Arab-Israeli peace will be the single most powerful blow to the radical, ideological, despotic states in the Middle East’. [Fuller is a senior analyst at RAND Corp., and was interviewed 10/11/1993 by Thomas Mathar.]

24101. Garza, Laura; Trowe, Maggie. "China Meeting Highlights Women’s Rights", in Militant (SWP), September 25, 1995. p. 8. Beijing - More than 26000 women from throughout the world successfully held the largest forum ever of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss women’s rights near this city. The forum in Huairou, China, included more than 5000 workshops, and ended as the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing with official government delegations was still under way. The NGO gathering, which drew many women’s rights activist, was testimony to the fact that the fight for equal rights for women is a part of discussions and struggles occurring throughout the world. Most of the governments at the official conference have felt compelled to portray themselves as trying to advance women’s status. What came through in the myriad informal discussions and formal presentations was the fight women are forced to wage in country after country for equal legal rights, decent pay, and against exploitive working conditions. These struggles are spurred on by the greater integration of women into the workforce worldwide. “In Japan women earn 52% of the wages men earn,” said Michiko Hiroki. "There are many cases now of women using big companies for discrimination. The three big national union confederations, for the most part, have not fought for these women. 40% of working women are in part-time, temporary, or sub-contracted jobs. Immigrant women come from Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Iran, Bangladesh, and Iraq. Many are illegal and work the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs.” Hiroki works with the Asian Women Workers Center in Tokyo, part of a network of groups in the Community for Asian Women. The association is headquartered in Hong Kong and includes affiliates in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal. [=]

24102. Garza, Laura; Trowe, Maggie. "China Meeting Highlights Women’s Rights: Burden of Foreign Debt", in Militant (SWP), September 25, 1995. p. 8. Many speakers from Asia and the Caribbean mentioned problems of the debt and social spending cuts imposed by international lending agencies as conditions for loans, but few joined in calling for cancelling the debt. Billie Miller, a Deputy Prime Minister from Barbados, stated a more common position: “Barbados has not been immune to the adverse effects of economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs.” Miller stated. “Despite Barbados’s ranking in social development performance, it still needs new and additional resources to maintain its record of gender performance.” Representatives of countries from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also painted a picture of a worsening economic situation. The representativeof Belarus, Uladzimir Rusakevic, said changes in that country had resulted in "a rise in women's unemployment,” and "increased infant and maternal mortality.” The transition from a centrally planned economy in Armenia has meant acute unemployment for women, who account for 64% of the unemployed, and who hold the lowest paying jobs when they do work, said Hranush Kakobian of the National Assembly of Armenia. Three-quarters of the World Health Organization’s European budget is devoted to Eastern Europe where once non-existent diseases such as cholera, diphtheria, and typhoid are on the rise along with maternal mortality rates. The budget for that region for the WHO is to be cut by 20%. Dr. Assia Brandrup-Lukanow from the WHO said, “The health of women, men and children is under threat.” The proposals from many third world countries for new and additional resources have been flatly rejected by representatives of the US and the European Union at the conference, whose stance is that governments should work on reallocating existing resources to achieve the goals of the conference. A number of right-wing forces, in most cases under the guise of defending religious rights, have attacked the draft platform of action for failing to condemn abortion, describe women’s central role as that of family, give greater weight to the family as a solution to women’s and society’s ills. Groups such as Real Women from Canada and Right to Life from the US have been joined by representatives from the Vatican, and countries including Iran and Guatemala, in repeating these themes.

They have not succeeded, however, in pushing back the discussion on reproductive rights, or in a wholesale attack on the conference. They have had to attend, participate, and couch their attacks on women’s rights in a way that portrays them as defending equality for women, while maintaining that women should have different roles than men in carrying out their responsibilities. During the exchange of views at the plenary session, Rosalyn Hazelle, of St. Kitts and Nevis, argued, "Women must have autonomy over their sexual and reproductive rights if they are to protect themselves from unwanted and unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.” Cuba’s delegation is headed by Vilma Espin Guillois, president of the Federation of Cuban Women. Speaking at the event she stated Cuba’s stand in favor of a woman’s right to control her body, noting abortion is safe and legal in Cuba. She continued, “The independence and sovereignty we conquered is something the US tries to punish us for with the illegal and aggressive policies, imposed 33 years ago, of the harsh economic, financial, and commercial blockade.” Bassam S. Kuba, of Iraq, called for an end to the sanctions imposed against that country by the UN at the urging of Washington. “Owing to inflation,” she said, “wages earned by women are not enough to pay the costs for transportation.” The high prices, and lack of food and medicine have taken a harsh toll on the civilian population, she stated. [=]
As the official UN Fourth World Conference on Women got under way there were 17000 people in attendance, including some 4000 NGO delegates who went into Beijing to join in discussions and express their opinions about the issues - from abortions rights to marriage and divorce laws - that are being debated as the conference drafts a platform of action. Most of them encountered a very different atmosphere than in Huairou, as the discussion shifted from one of activists involved in fighting the blacklists, to the more muted and formal scene of government representatives discussing how to administer programs that affect women. The picture that has emerged here too, though, reflects the economic crisis facing the world capitalist economy and the toll being taken on workers and farmers, with the heaviest burden being borne by women. Speaking at a plenary session, Diakite Fatoumata N'Diaye, Minister and Commissioner for the Promotion of Women of Mali, noted that ten years after the last such conference on women in Nairobi, Kenya, “the situation of women is still characterized by low literacy rates. The situation of women cannot be separated from the situation of the country as a whole. Our economy is burdened by debt. In these conditions there can be no prospect for the increased well-being of women. The actual structural cause of poverty is the cycle of indebtedness which holds African countries in poverty. This problem has not been addressed by refinancing the debt or any other so-called remedy. The only solution is a radical one - cancelling the debt.”


In 9/83, the disastrous war between Iran and Iraq entered into its fourth year, a war that has cost 400000 lives, left half a million disabled and two to three million refugees in Iran alone. The economic losses of this war are equal to its human casualties. Iran has spent billions of dollars to keep the war machine going. As a result, poverty, the loss of husbands and sons, and unemployment have deeply affected family life and brought about terrible consequences for women. In order to visualize the situation, a brief economic analysis is needed.

Iran’s economy prior to Khomeini suffered from chronic production deficiencies on the one hand and enormous expenditures—mainly for the military—on the other. But, as difficult as this may have been, it doesn’t approach the tragic situation of today. The social and economic disorders beginning in 2/79, when Khomeini took power, were accepted as part of the price that had to be paid for revolution. But the subsequent and prolonged incapability of the Mullahs [religious leaders] to run Iran have turned the situation into a disaster. From 2/79 to 9/80, industrial production fell to its lowest level ever, producing, some say, at only 10% of its capacity.

The agricultural sector suffered as well; the failure of the new regime to provide support for the farmers further damaged the already fragile level of productivity in the countryside, resulting in massive food shortages and unemployment in the cities and peasant migration.

War “Saves” The Day: Prior to the war, Khomeini was deeply entangled both politically and economically in the domestic turmoil. His revolution had caused. Many of the leading Mullahs, including Khomeini, could not hide their fears of imminent political breakdown. With the advent of war, however, Peoples' attention was diverted away from domestic problems, and Iranians from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum were suddenly united against the foreign invader. Indeed, according to many political observers, the Iran/Iraq war was an important factor in the survival of Khomeini’s regime.

However, if war boosts the economy of the industrial nations that own the war supplies, it smashes the economy of the nations that consume them. Since Iran does not produce but rather buys its military hardware, it has not enjoyed the economic boom that often goes with war. Instead, it is the US, which had outfitted the Iranian army, that has emerged the real winner.

In the face of increasing military commitments to the war and declining economic possibilities, the jobless lower classes and particularly the peasantry were recruited for the army—a movement that further aggravated the crisis in the agricultural sector. Today, despite the fact that Iran is a massive importer, taking in 50 times more than it exports, shortages continue to proliferate. Inflation is unbearable for people from almost all walks of life. The price of rice for example has increased from about $7.00 a kilo on the black market, available yes, but who can afford it? For an average middle class family it means a month of work for a few days worth of food. In the midst of such chaos, the lives of women are literally a question of survival.

Women and War: When we talk about the effects of war on the Iranian women, not only do we mean those already poor or of the lower classes, but also the recently impoverished middle classes and even upper middle classes. In a general categorization, we can say that Iranian women fall into two major groups: urban women and rural women (which include village and tribal women). The latter form the majority of the female population and are an important element in the rural economy, but they are at the same time still far more under-privileged than their urban sisters. Socially and economically they are completely dependent on the man in the family, be he husband or son. They work on the farm and in rural factories producing foodstuffs and hand-made goods, but earn nothing for themselves in exchange for their labor. Their income is invisible and goes or adds to the property of the family which ultimately belongs to the husband or children. If a woman is divorced, she receives nothing. If her husband dies, she receives one-eighth of the cash and household—if there is any at that economic level. She has no right to the land or farm. As for the house, the price of the land must be deducted, and she receives one-eighth of the building price, which, in the rural context, means a pile of kah-gel (mud mixed with straw used as building material). And she is illiterate.

Although illiteracy is a structural phenomenon in rural Iran, it is far more widespread among women than among men. According to the last available statistics gathered in 1975, 91% of rural women are illiterate. By now, since there has been no effort made to change this situation, the figures must be close to 100%.

As a sub-effect of her illiteracy, a woman remains virtually unskilled apart from the nontransferable, unrecognizable hard work she does on the farm. All of this aggravates her extreme vulnerability to the slightest economic change within the family. The high number of deaths, injuries and unemployment caused by the war, particularly considering that one man’s responsibility may extend to his mother and sisters as well as his wife and daughters, causes hardships to an immense number of women. Moreover, it is an unfortunate fact that Iran lacks any kind of economic crisis facing the world capitalist economy and the toll being taken on workers and farmers, with the heaviest burden being borne by women. Speaking at a plenary session, Diakite Fatoumata N’Diaye, Minister and Commissioner for the Promotion of Women of Mali, noted that ten years after the last such conference on women in Nairobi, Kenya, “the situation of women is still characterized by low literacy rates. The situation of women cannot be separated from the situation of the country as a whole. Our economy is burdened by debt. In these conditions there can be no prospect for the increased well-being of women. The actual structural cause of poverty is the cycle of indebtedness which holds African countries in poverty. This problem has not been addressed by refinancing the debt or any other so-called remedy. The only solution is a radical one - cancelling the debt.”

Women’s Options: In order to survive, a woman has few options. If she is very fortunate she can remarry. For most though, polygamy, prostitution, servitude, or beggary are the most common solutions.

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Women's Options: In order to survive, a woman has few options. If she is very fortunate she can remarry. For most though, polygamy, prostitution, servitude, or beggary are the most common solutions.

Polygamy was outlawed in Iran in 1967 by the Family Code. But a few months after Khomeini took power, the Family Code was abolished, and polygamy is now officially recognized and even forcefully recommended by the regime. "Polygamy is beneficial to women," said Khomeini the day he repealed the Code. The grave nature of women's situation because of the war is used by the regime to propagate the idea of polygamy. Committees have been organized to manage these marriages, and monetary incentives are offered to men to encourage them to marry war widows.

Prostitution is another phenomenon that has increased as a reflection of the war time economic situation. The regime claims that prostitution was eradicated as it was anti-Islamic behavior. But the fact is that even though the brothels have been closed and prostitution is prohibited in its conventional sense, a different kind of prostitution, which might be called the Mullah's religious prostitution, is taking place.
Sanctioned by the regime and thus in many ways more forcible, this version of prostitution is named "temporary marriage." It is a verbal or written contract between a man and a woman before sexual intercourse based on two factors: the woman's price and the duration of the so-called marriage. The period can be anywhere from one hour to several years during which time the woman has no economic or moral claims on the man whatsoever. There is no need for formal divorce in this marriage since it expires automatically when the term of agreement has elapsed. Finally, the number of "temporary wives" a man can have is not limited, and since it is categorized as "marriage," it must be both respected and accepted by Iranian women.

Today, it isn't only war widows who are victimized by polygamy and prostitution, but also their young daughters who find themselves faced with the same struggle for survival. In the Muslim's opinion, girls can be married as soon as they reach maturity which, in their view, is from age nine or the first menstruation. Moreover, the increasing shortage of young men along with the deepening poverty of the peasantry has revitalized. It's not uncommon to find a 70 or 80 year old man with a wife that could be his youngest granddaughter.

The Keys to Heaven: Finally, amidst economic ruin and the hopelessness of having almost nowhere to turn for help, there is the final horrifying blow to mothers of having their adolescent sons "recruited" to clean minefields. The survival rate for this particular military job is very low and it has already claimed the lives of 50000 youngsters between the ages of 12 and 18.

When confronted by outraged international opinion, Khomeini denies everything calling the allegations of "suicide missions" imperialist slander against the Islamic government. In Iran, however, his rhetoric is, "The blood of our children washes the sins from our land." To the boys ready to leave for the war, his message is that their lives in the material world are pointless, that they are being given the opportunity to go to heaven, and that being killed in the war is the direct way to heaven. They are even given an actual key to wear around their neck so that they'll be able to open heaven's door. Their brainwashing is so thorough that if captured, the boys don't want to go home. Having promised to die for Khomeini, they are ashamed to be alive.

Since most of these children come from peasant and lower class families that have very likely already lost one or more males to the war, the mother may be desperate and ignorant enough to believe that she shares heaven with her sons and husband if she encourages and supports the recruitment of her family. Indeed, she has no other choice; after all, the war is for Islam and God, and resistance means execution.

The war between Iran and Iraq has had a disastrous impact on the Iranian society as a whole but for women in particular, it has been especially catastrophic. For an illiterate, unemployed, and already impoverished woman whose life and welfare are delicately balanced between the fragile security of absolute dependence on her men folk on one hand and complete ruin or even death on the other, any fluctuation damaged it. The challenges facing the Israeli peace movement make the obstacles before Israeli-Palestinian understanding are much greater than they were just months ago. At the same time, the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue has deep roots which give room to hope that, in spite of the blows dealt to it recently, it can survive. The Palestinian policy of seeking understanding and dialogue with the Islamic government is part of a wider strategy for enlisting world support, as other national liberation movements have sought to do. On the other hand, the Israeli left would lose its raison d'etre if it abandoned its struggle against occupation and for Palestinian rights. The accumulated network of mutual contacts and experience cannot be swept away, even if the current crisis has severely damaged it. The challenges facing the Israeli peace movement make possible a reassessment of the weight of each of its components. Cooperation with the more radical elements in the peace movement, small as they may be, should be resumed in light of the consistent commitment they have shown to the Palestinian cause. Past experience indicates that they played a key role in vitalizing the peace movement at the outbreak of the Lebanon war, when the Zionist left was still confused. Special attention should be paid to the moderate wing of the Zionist left. The moderates call for the continuation of the dialogue despite the conflicts which have arisen, and continue to view the PLO as the representative Palestinian body and to seek a political settlement with it. This camp includes various groups such as Women in Black and Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), whose activists continue to perform acts of solidarity with the intifada despite internal conflicts over the larger international view. Explanations of the truth about the Palestinian position will find eager listeners among these elements, and will safeguard one of the intifada's most important gains.[-]
The largest US epidemiological study of Depo-Provera was conducted at the Grady Memorial Family Clinics in Atlanta, Georgia. Between 1967-1978, it is estimated that 11,000-14,000 women received at least one Depo-Provera injection at the Grady clinic. Both because of the study’s size and because the FDA weighs US data more heavily than foreign data in deciding on drug approval, the Grady study is an often cited addition to the human clinical literature on Depo-Provera. The Grady hospital and family planning clinics are located in a low-income section of downtown Atlanta. The hospital is built in the shape of an “H”; it was originally designed to accommodate segregated facilities, including two sets of reception areas, operating rooms, and entrances. Although it was desegregated in 1976, it soon served an over 90% black clientele, and is one of the largest charity hospitals in the country. The family planning clinic, run by Dr. Robert Hatcher, occupies the annex next door. At the clinic, pamphlets with titles like “The Joy of Birth Control” line magazine racks. Depo-Provera is one of the birth control methods described in the pamphlets, with no mention of the drug’s unapproved status. This oversight is consistent with the findings of an FDA audit conducted in 1978, involving interviews of clinic patients who had received Depo-Provera treatment in the clinic’s testing of the drug. As one of the FDA auditors, Dr. Alan Lisook, wrote—referring to both patients and clinic staff—“There was no common feeling that an investigation of an unproven drug was in fact taking place.” From 1967 to 1971, the Grady study was financed by Upjohn; in 1971 the FDA told Upjohn to terminate the tests. There are conflicting accounts as to why the testing was halted. Upjohn claims that the FDA told the company that it had submitted enough studies for approval. By 1974 testimony at Senate Health Subcommittee hearings on pharmaceutical companies revealed that FDA drug evaluation reports in 1971 had urged that all human testing of Depo-Provera be stopped within two weeks because animal studies indicated that the drug was too dangerous for continued human experimentation. In 1973, the FDA apparently changed its mind, and gave Hatcher and another Grady doctor approval to start a second test of the drug. “This was not any sort of scientific investigation,” admitted an FDA medical officer. “We really had a population of patients receiving treatment... approval of the study was really to allow them to continue receiving treatment.” But not all the patients continued. A new informed consent form was used, which explained that the drug could cause breast cancer and that it shouldn’t be used if the women wanted additional children. Of the 1200 women who were taking the drug, 500 dropped out of the study. Grady clinic did not submit any of the requisite annual reports on its study. Yet it took the FDA five years before it finally audited the study and revealed an array of abuses. After seeing the FDA’s written report of the audit, Rep. Ted Weiss (Democrat-New York), chair of the House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, wrote to the FDA about some of the more flagrant abuses and virtual disregard of the law witnessed upon testing protocol: “It has come to my attention that FDA conducted an extensive on-site audit of the Grady study in 12/78,” Weiss wrote. “The FDA audit team cited serious deficiencies in the design and conduct of this study. These include:

1) On average the study lost 50 and gained 50 subjects per month, resulting in an overall turnover rate of 75%. Despite the large number of drop-outs, no provision was made for patient follow-up, including ‘longterm follow-up with regard to cancer.’

2) Although a 1973 protocol called for a total of 1100 subjects, FDA personnel estimated that 4400 women took the drug between 1973 and 1978.

3) Required reports to the FDA of deaths and adverse reactions to subject were not made. In addition, mandatory annual reports to FDA were not submitted.

4) Significant adverse reactions were not evaluated by the Grady clinical investigators.

5) The three-month interval between injections specified in the protocol was not followed. One woman, for example, received Depo-Provera injections on two consecutive days.

6) Women did not receive adequate protection as experimental test subjects: (a) The clinical investigation was carried out despite the unwillingness of the Emory University Institutional Review Board to approve it as ethically acceptable. In addition, the Emory Board never received required submissions, including safety reports, from the Grady clinical investigators. (b) Although it is thought to cause infertility, the drug was administered to teenagers, women without children, and women wanting more children in the future. (c) One woman was permitted to participate in the study even though she had a biopsy-proven carcinoma-in-situ of the cervix, a condition associated with Depo-Provera among women taking the drug in clinical trials. (d) Patients were kept on the drug despite the development of serious conditions. A woman was continued in the study despite terminal ductal hyperplasia, inflammation and stromal fibrosis as revealed by a breast biopsy. Another woman with hypertension and possible seizures was also continued in the Depo-Provera trials [experiments]. (e) Women received injections as much as one year before signing the required investigational drug trial consent forms. Perhaps not surprising, women interviewed by FDA personnel often did not realize they had been subjects in an investigation of an unapproved use of Depo-Provera.

According to FDA’s inspection report, both the study’s sponsor and the director of the Grady clinic agreed with all observations made by the (FDA) inspecional team.” When questioned about these problems during the Public Board of Inquiry hearings in 1983, Grady’s Dr. Hatcher commented, “To be very honest with you, we are not a research unit.” He admitted that he had not ever seen the protocol the clinic was supposed to be following until 1978, when the FDA audit team showed it to him. As for a protocol for long-term follow-up of patients who dropped out of the study, Hatcher explained, “We did not have a protocol, period, for our contacting them.” Despite the Grady study’s serious defects, the finding appeared in the 6/83 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association with this conclusion: “[T]his study indicates that there is not likely to be a strong association between medroxyprogesterone injections and cancer of the breast, uterine corpus, or ovary.” Rep. Weiss ended his letter to the FDA commissioner with the following questions: “...has FDA communicated with the Journal of the American Medical Association to request that it alert the medical community to serious deficiencies in data admitted by the agency?... Does FDA have an established policy for otherwise notifying the medical community of such information?” Other than terminate the Grady IND [Investigative New Drug status], did FDA take any other significant regulatory action in connection with several apparent violations of its investigational drug regulations?” The FDA’s answers to Weiss’ questions were all negative. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. [1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411, Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTIMON] and is reprinted by permission.] [= [24107. Greenberg, Eric J. “Bronfman Denounces Farrakhan After Dining With Black Leader”, in Jewish Transcript (Seattle), November 22, 1996. p. A25. Alcohol and pornography magnate Edgar Bronfman broke with other Jewish leaders who have long refused to meet with Louis Farrakhan by meeting him over dinner; the dinner was arranged by Bronfman Denounces Farrakhan After Dining With Black Leader”, in Jewish Transcript (Seattle), November 22, 1996. p. A25. Alcohol and pornography magnate Edgar Bronfman broke with other Jewish leaders who have long refused to meet with Louis Farrakhan by meeting him over dinner; the dinner was arranged by Bronfman Denounces Farrakhan After Dining With Black Leader”, in Jewish Transcript (Seattle), November 22, 1996. p. A25. Alcohol and pornography magnate Edgar Bronfman broke with other Jewish leaders who have long refused to meet with Louis Farrakhan by meeting him over dinner; the dinner was arranged by Bronfman Denounces Farrakhan After Dining With Black Leader”, in Jewish Transcript (Seattle), November 22, 1996. p. A25. 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references to the Holocaust were totally unacceptable to the Jewish community—indeed we called such usage inflammatory. I was hoping, as were you, that Minister Farrakhan had been serious when he discussed with you, after you had taped your interview with him, creating a new era in relations between the black Muslims and the Jews. We now know that he cannot find it in his heart to renounce his own anti-semitism. That is rather sad. Two things have become totally clear. One is that what Farrakhan and his gang are after is money. Number two, leopards don't change their spots, and this man is evil personified.*

In a letter to Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League, Bronfman wrote: "Looking back, your position has been reinforced. No self-respecting person, let alone a Jew, should have anything to do with him". Elian Steinberg, executive director of the World Jewish Congress notes: "It is not the first time that Edgar has taken a risk for the Jewish people, he put Farrakhan to the test and Farrakhan failed." [TXT]

Q: What is religious prostitution? Women are raised to accept their unfortunate destiny and believe that as a religious obligation. A: Under mullahism, it is called sigheh. Sigheh is a contract through which a woman rents her body for a certain period of time and for a certain amount of money. It could be for one night or many years and for any amount of money. Any ambiguity about these two conditions makes the contract invalid. The intercourse makes the contract effective and no divorce exists. The contract either dissolves when the duration is finished or the man doesn't want to continue. The woman has no right to dissolve the contract.

To make the contract, the woman only needs to say to the man in Arabic [as opposed to Farsi, the national language] that she sighehs herself to him, for how long and how much. Then the man says, "I accept." That's all! There are no witnesses and no registration. Is there any real fundamental difference between the way to sigheh a woman and to pick up a prostitute?

Yet the religious instructions and rules that a sigheh woman is subject to are extraordinarily oppressive for these women. A sigheh loses her freedom as soon as she goes through her contract and gets no long lasting benefit in return. She is treated and viewed as a slave. She has to give much more than the money she receives is worth.

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Q: Has the institution of prostitution changed in Iran since the money, but because of the position that she is in, she has to take what she can get. According to item 2515, Khomeini states that a sigheh woman is not allowed to have another contract for two months after her last contract has dissolved. At the same time, she receives no money during this period either.

The worst is another item (item 2426) which says that even if the woman, prior to the contract, doesn't know that she doesn't have these rights, her status won't change. She must continue the contract regardless. In these ways, as soon as she becomes a sigheh woman, she gains what is like a slave status, a status which adds to her oppression.

Q: How do the mullahs justify this practice?

A: Through a distortion of some Koranic verses, mullahs claim that there are two categories of marriages in Islam—permanent and temporary. A man can have four permanent wives and as many temporary ones as he can afford financially and handle physically. In this way, they say sigheh is marriage. But no matter what they call it, the nature speaks for itself.

Q: Do women who were prostitutes prior to Khomeini continue working under this new system?

A: Yes, they probably have not found other work. Now the work is the same except that they have to learn an Arabic sentence. But the root of the problem has worsened. Prostitution is the outcome of other fundamental social, economic, cultural and educational problems, which have reached their lowest point ever.

Q: What kind of payment do they earn?

A: These women who make sigheh contracts are from the lower class and are barely surviving. The sigheh woman receives very little money, but because of the position that she is in, she has to take what she can get. All of the humiliation in these religious instructions arise from the mullah's class attitude and sexual beliefs. The result is that a poor woman is viewed as an object for sexual satisfaction.

Q: If no one witnesses the sigheh contract except the man and the woman, who is to find out that a woman does in fact have sexual relations with another man before her two months is up?

A: If the woman was a prostitute before Khomeini, I don't believe that she would follow these religious instructions. But the problem remains for the women who had never been prostitutes. These women adopt the fanatical religious values, which in a man-woman relationship are almost always in favor of the man and repressive for the woman. Women are raised to accept their unfortunate destiny and believe that as
women, particularly as poor women, this is the most they deserve. They fulfill the instructions voluntarily because they fear God.

Q: What would the status of a sigheh's child be?
A: This is one of the points that mullahs are very proud of and use to glorify sigheh and distinguish it from prostitution. They claim that in sigheh the status of the child is legal and the child benefits from the privilege of knowing the father. He or she is also an heir to the father. However, according to the mullahs' own instructions, a sigheh child and a child from a permanent marriage are treated differently even before being born. As I mentioned earlier, the father is not responsible for supporting his baby during pregnancy.

In social practice, in Iran, a child born of a sigheh marriage does not have the same dignity and respect that sisters and brothers from the permanent marriage have. Even if the sigheh wife lives with her husband, the child's life style differs greatly from that of the brothers and sisters. The simple fact is that sigheh women along with their children constitute a lower class, and the child suffers more than the mother from this status. I believe that a child would rather not know or inherit from the father than suffer lifetime humiliation.

Q: Do you think that religious sigheh women consider themselves more dignified than other prostitutes?
A: If the women are religious themselves, it seems that they would feel more dignity than other prostitutes who wouldn’t care for such laws. The prostitutes use the contract just to be able to work and live. But they are a small group. The majority of women who make sigheh contracts, because they are religious, do not consider themselves prostitutes. This is a very subtle point. Yes, they are religious, but their beliefs are being used against them. Their problem is that they are illiterate, unskilled, unemployed and poor. The war has crucially increased their numbers: hundreds of thousands of war widows and wives of war-disabled men are added to this section of the population. Furthermore, the economy is worsening daily. More than four million people are unemployed. As a result, today, the number of women in need is astronomical.

What I ask is why shouldn't these women enjoy a better life? I look at the matter in another way. I say that the regime is responsible for raising the standard of living of these women instead of dragging them into sigheh and leaving them as a slave-prostitute.

Q: How was prostitution under the Shah?
A: During the time of the Shah, prostitutes were segregated and lived in special quarters of the cities. Of course, there were some who worked on the streets. In Tehran, the quarter was called Qaleh, which was a kind of non-military fortress. Qaleh had high walls and was cordoned off by the police. The police kept the area from spreading and enforced some measures of cleanliness. There was little welfare for the prostitutes, except some measure of health control, literacy classes and school for their children.

A: What did Khomeini do with Qaleh when he took over?
A: When Khomeini took over, he started his so-called Islamic anti-prostitution campaign. His people attacked Qaleh and burned the brothels. Qaleh was closed and some prostitutes were taken to a house in the northern part of Tehran. Mullahs gave them religious and military instruction. They now use these women as sigheh women for themselves and the revolutionary guards. Militarily they are used to suppress women's opposition at demonstrations.

Mullahs also executed prostitutes. In Kerman, a major city in Iran, the method of execution was very brutal. They dug holes in the ground and buried the prostitutes up to their neck and then stoned them to death.

Q: What is the current situation of sighehs?
A: A letter, which was sent from Iran a few months ago by an Iranian women's resistance group to inform the world of the regime's anti-women campaign, explains that special centers have been established for the widowed women of the war. These women wait at the centers all day for a man to sigheh them. The letter mentions that this official market of religious prostitution has provided an opportunity for the influential men of the regime to select and possess "the best" for themselves. In addition, mullahs have made an effort to stress the "privileges" of sigheh contracts through the mass media which is totally in their hands.

Further Reading: "In God's Name," Connexions n. 11, Winter 1984. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712. Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] =


As thousands of American troops are being rushed to guard Kuwait, Kuwaitis are living their plush lifestyle in the expensive restaurants that fill the emirate. Many are socializing in the most visible symbols of the US liberation of Kuwait from Iraq, the fast food franchises: McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Fuddruckers, and Baskin-Robbins. While Iraqis starve, the major social concern in Kuwait has become obesity: the Ministry of Health reports that half of all Kuwaitis are overweight. Most Kuwaitis are tended by foreign servants, and spend the evening channel surfing through satellite TV channels. A Danish study attributes the obesity to post traumatic stress; now many Kuwaiti women are trying to loose weight with diet pills prescribed by indulgent physicians. [TEXT]


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The widespread appearance in Iraqi children of a number of inexplicable new symptoms, including leukemia and childhood cancers, has been traced by UN and Iraqi medical workers to US radiological munitions. Massive amounts of such materials are scattered throughout Iraq. A report by the UK Atomic...
Energy Authority finds that at least 40 tons of depleted uranium munitions were used in the war, in both Iraq and Kuwait. Many of these uranium pellets are now being used as toys by Iraqi children. Iraqi public health officials fear that depleted uranium also contaminated soil and drinking water sources. This would create a contaminated environment that would expose Iraqis to excessive radiation for generations. Although the US claims that there is no significant radiation for such uranium, when the director of Switzerland's Institute for Nuclear Technology arrived in Berlin with an improvised radiometric equipment, he was immediately arrested for having dangerous radioactives: the pellet was immediately sealed in a lead lined case by the German government. Foreign doctors have seen children playing with the depleted uranium pellets. Notably, the depleteduranium is made available to munitions producers by nuclear weaponproduction facilities, thus allowing a path for disposal of radioactive wastes in the Third World as a byproduct of aggressive wars there. [Hospins is an MD who is working in Iraq; this report was originally published by the Communist Party of India in India.] [TXT]

24113. Hussein, Saddam. Excerpts of Remarks Exchanged between Saddam Hussein and Some British Families Detained by Iraq at Vital Iraqi Installations on August 23, 1990. Hussein: Good morning. We've come to see how you are doing. You are British? Of all of you? [Answer] Yes. We are a British family. [Hussein] When did you come here? [Answer] For myself, four days. [Hussein] Are all your needs, whatever you require available? Are you getting your milk, Stewart? [Answer] With corn flakes, too. [Hussein] I do not think all the Iraqi kids can get corn flakes now. Do you have any younger one? [Answer] I have a brother, fourteen. [Hussein] Do you have enough place for exercise? [Answer] Volleyball? .... [Hussein] And the ladies, how are you passing time? I am sure you prefer to be in Britain now. I am an Iraqi and I realize that if I were in your shoes I would rather be in Iraq, my country. But sometimes one is forced to face situations which are not of one's own choice. Your presence here and in other places is meant to prevent the scourge of war, to avoid the war. In Arabic, we say preventing danger. There is a semantic problem in the English language here. We, in our communique, used the dar' in Arabic, which means "to put away or to prevent or to avoid" the scourge of war or the danger of war. We use the word dar', which means in Arabic "to prevent." But when we used this word, the Western media used a different word. The pronunciation of the word dar' was changed into dar' [including the sound of the Arabic letter 'ayn ], which means "shield." And they thought that we were using people as a shield rather than as a dar', which we meant, which means "to prevent" war. So there was perhaps deliberate misinterpretation or inadvertent misinterpretation of our wording of the communiqué. [Hussein] Stewart, will, I am sure, be happy to have as part of life or his personal history that he played a role in maintaining peace. So when he, along with his friends and along with those present, here have played a role in preventing war, then they will be heroes of peace. I am sure that you all have your own journals, your own diaries, perhaps, and will jot down whatever you have as feelings or as recollections or as impressions of the day. And in any case your presence now and in this sort of atmosphere is not a source of pleasure to us. It does not make us happy. What would make us happy would be to see you back in your countries or to see you roaming the streets of Baghdad in the normal way, as you used to do. So please forgive us because we, like you, have our own children, like Stewart, and like Tan. And we also have our own women like you and have our own families. And we would know how you feel, but we are trying to prevent a war from happening. And we hope that your presence as guests here is not going to be for too long. Now I am prepared to listen to whatever you would want to say and to receive whatever questions you may have. And would like you see you as comfortable as you wish to be in a democratic atmosphere, because we in fact here are more democratic than some quarters which claim for themselves to be, because in the past few days I have come across articles published in Western newspapers, so-called democratic newspapers, in which the writers urge the President to actually strike at Iraq and actually use force against Iraq and Baghdad despite the fact of your presence here. And this, in fact is a sign of the falsehood of this so-called democracy and their so-called concern for human life. Because they talk about human life and humanitarian issues and yet they urge President Bush to strike despite your presence. We are truly concerned about your welfare and well-being here. We would want you to be safe and to return to your country. And this is not meant to be propaganda. I am not speaking for propaganda purposes, but it is truly a humanitarian concern that we want you to be safe. It is our religion, it is our duty, as both Iraqis, as Arabs, and as human beings that we would want you to be safe. We would like you to go back to your country, but I might say not because we are finding your-hospitality, or your presence as guests here, heavy on us. On the contrary, we only want you to have your freedom and go back to your country.

[Unidentified speaker] We appreciate that you have come in person, since nobody else had been able to answer questions. [Hussein] I am here to answer all your questions. [Unidentified speaker] You have school-going children here, right here. Who will begin, in about in a week's time, on the first of September. [Hussein] As for schoolchildren, we hope that your presence here is not going to be long. But despite that, if by the time school begins and you are still here in Iraq, we are going to exert unusual efforts to make sure that the children are not deprived of their school years. And we will send to you experts from our Ministry of Education to see the curricula and the levels of schooling so that everything that we can prepare so that the children will not lose the opportunity. All religions urge us to learn more and more, and to continue our learning. And in our religion, the first time God Almighty addressed the prophet Muhammad--blessings be upon his soul--through Gabriel, God said to Muhammad: "Read," and that was the first instruction. So, reading and learning is the fundamental thing in the life of a person, and we know what it means. One would have wished that the kind of circumstances could have been reversed. We would like to have the opportunity to see you in a different kind of situation. But it has happened, and we are faced with the outcome of actions, some of which have come by chance or coincidence, and some of which have come actually by deliberate scheme. But we, for our part, we shall try to treat you in the same way as we treat Iraqis, the people of Iraq, because you are not hostages. We want nothing from Britain or the United States. We want nothing from them. They owe us nothing. We owe them nothing. The question should be addressed to them: What had Iraq taken away from you which has made you bring your forces threatening Iraq and the land and territory of God and the Muslims? What has Iraq done to deserve so? We have taken nothing from London or from any other English cities. We have taken nothing away from the United States. We have our viewpoint, in any case the Arab nation is one nation, a single nation. British colonialism cut away the Third World as a byproduct of aggressive wars there. [Unidentified speaker] We appreciate that you have come in person, since nobody else had been able to answer questions. [Hussein] I am here to answer all your questions. [Unidentified speaker] You have school-going children here, right here. Who will begin, in about in a week's time, on the first of September. [Hussein] As for schoolchildren, we hope that your presence here is not going to be long. But despite that, if by the time school begins and you are still here in Iraq, we are going to exert unusual efforts to make sure that the children are not deprived of their school years. And we will send to you experts from our Ministry of Education to see the curricula and the levels of schooling so that everything that we can prepare so that the children will not lose the opportunity. All religions urge us to learn more and more, and to continue our learning. And in our religion, the first time God Almighty addressed the prophet Muhammad--blessings be upon his soul--through Gabriel, God said to Muhammad: "Read," and that was the first instruction. So, reading and learning is the fundamental thing in the life of a person, and we know what it means. One would have wished that the kind of circumstances could have been reversed. We would like to have the opportunity to see you in a different kind of situation. But it has happened, and we are faced with the outcome of actions, some of which have come by chance or coincidence, and some of which have come actually by deliberate scheme. But we, for our part, we shall try to treat you in the same way as we treat Iraqis, the people of Iraq, because you are not hostages. We want nothing from Britain or the United States. We want nothing from them. They owe us nothing. We owe them nothing. The question should be addressed to them: What had Iraq taken away from you which has made you bring your forces threatening Iraq and the land and territory of God and the Muslims? What has Iraq done to deserve so? We have taken nothing from London or from any other English cities. We have taken nothing away from the United States. We have our viewpoint, in any case the Arab nation is one nation, a single nation. British colonialism cut away the Third World as a byproduct of aggressive wars there. [Hospins is an MD who is working in Iraq; this report was originally published by the Communist Party of India in India.] [TXT]
would be in a position to destroy this force in defense of your honor, national honor and sense of your own future. Same thing, same feelings, same situation is here now. We do not want war to come about despite the fact that we know that we can smash and crush any attack that may take place. So the question that has to be posed by all of us to Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Bush is: What has Iraq taken away from them which has made them bring their armed forces to the region threatening the people of the area, threatening Iraq with an attack and destruction? What has Iraq done against them? Had Iraq taken anything from them and Iraq does not know it, let them tell us what we have taken away from them so that we may be able to return it to them. In my opinion they will fail to find anything. I am sure they will fail, and they will find that world public opinion will turn against them, even inside England and inside the United States. I am sure you would be able to see Arab public opinion, which direction it takes. Arab public opinion is against foreign presence, or the presence of foreign forces on Arab territory. And if time drags on, with the presence of foreign forces still on our territory, you will find that the agents and regimes under foreign tutelage will fail one by one. But in any case, I hope and I pray that your presence here in this kind of situation will not be long, and that you will go back to your country, and perhaps we will become friends. Any more questions?

[Question] We realize your determination. Our families know we know of your determination, but we would like them to know that we are well and in good health?

[Hussein] Yes, we shall make sure that your messages will reach your families in England. So, as of now, you can write your letters, and if you want to send photographs...

[Hussein] I must say, I must be exact and accurate in saying to you now that, regrettably, nobody has conducted any negotiations or any dialogue as yet. Our foreign minister went to Amman and there he announced that Iraq would be prepared to get into negotiations. And the response came immediately after the foreign minister issued this statement--it was immediate, it was so quick--in this manner the US Administration has responded to all our initiatives. They said immediately that they were not prepared to conduct any dialogue with Iraq before Iraq has withdrawn or left Kuwait, as if Kuwait were Washington. Our response is that neither the Iraqis, nor the Arabs in general, would be prepared to accept dialogue under blackmail. You will notice in this situation that there is accusation of being un-democratic, that the Iraqis are now asking for dialogue when the so-called democratic West are refusing dialogue. But in any case, the situation will clear up.... We have so far issued two initiatives.... In any case, President Bush and others may learn a great deal from Iraq on the humanitarian level and even on the level of more accurate stands. And before all this, and more important than all of this, is the fact that the Iraqi people and the Arab nation will again teach them how to be civilized. I am happy to have met you and to know you, even though I would have preferred to have met you well and in good health?

[Hussein] Yes, we shall make sure that your messages will reach your families in England. So, as of now, you can write your letters, and if you want to send photographs...

[Hussein] I must say, I must be exact and accurate in saying to you now that, regrettably, nobody has conducted any negotiations or any dialogue as yet. Our foreign minister went to Amman and there he announced that Iraq would be prepared to get into negotiations. And the response came immediately after the foreign minister issued this statement--it was immediate, it was so quick--in this manner the US Administration has responded to all our initiatives. They said immediately that they were not prepared to conduct any dialogue with Iraq before Iraq has withdrawn or left Kuwait, as if Kuwait were Washington. Our response is that neither the Iraqis, nor the Arabs in general, would be prepared to accept dialogue under blackmail. You will notice in this situation that there is accusation of being un-democratic, that the Iraqis are now asking for dialogue when the so-called democratic West are refusing dialogue. But in any case, the situation will clear up.... We have so far issued two initiatives.... In any case, President Bush and others may learn a great deal from Iraq on the humanitarian level and even on the level of more accurate stands. And before all this, and more important than all of this, is the fact that the Iraqi people and the Arab nation will again teach them how to be civilized. I am happy to have met you and to know you, even though I would have preferred to have met you well and in good health?
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24114. Hussein, Saddam. Message on "Iraqi Child Day" from Saddam Hussein on October 12, 1990. In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: Our message today goes out to the children, even if on this occasion we are also addressing ourselves to adult minds. As we celebrate the day of the Iraqi child, we also observe the day of the children of the Arabism and the children of the world, and not only the children of dear Palestine—the heroes of the stones, every one of whom is acting like a hero of our nation taking on injustice and Satan in the same camp as their fathers and their patient mujahidin brothers. When, on this day, we ponder the great significance of this particular day being named as day of the child, we must recall all the humanitarian principles, without which we do not believe man can become free or happiness prevail in human society. In this year, the invocation of the means to bring about the happiness of children will be fraught with all the dangers inherent in the economic blockade and the threat of military force by imperialism and invader armies. It is significant in the uniqueness of these circumstances and their implications. A few days ago, specifically on 10/3/1990, the whole world observed the international day of the child. The observance was attended, and speeches were made by anyone who could be there. Some of them proposed partial solutions to childhood conditions, just as they used to propose partial solutions to issues bearing on key issues of human society. Typical of those responsible for human tragedies when they distance themselves from universality, and thus distance themselves from the right thinking and the right remedy, they sought to divorce the question of childhood from the subject of life. For us, however, it is inconceivable that a happy childhood can be attained without happy lives for their adult fathers, mothers, and relatives. In that international gathering, some speakers argued that to eliminate starvation of children in the world, they would need several billion dollars. It is natural that the rich and those responsible for the travails of humanity should find it virtually impossible to admit that this human goal is achievable and that this sum can be made available for that noble objective. We see clearly that there is an inseparable link between children's happiness and the communities in which they live. We submit that there can be no freedom for the children without pure milk and pure clothing of a chaste mother. Such conditions are impossible to obtain in circumstances of hunger and want, or where the alleviations of affluence in a community sated in all its wants cause the envy of a community yearning for all that it wants and needs. We find that true happiness cannot be divorced from a sense of dignity, and that decent bread is only possible when it is mixed in dignity. A child will only be free in a free community. A child cannot be born free in a family enslaved by shackles of others, for in time, it is bound to become similarly enslaved. Children of the world become free and healthy when all the adults of the world become free and possess what it takes to be healthy. The children of the world can have no secure future except under circumstances of equality. The children of any society cannot be free except when their societies have equal opportunities with other societies and enjoy their freedom equally. In a world dominated by the rich whose humanity is eaten up by greed, the wealth of these rich can only spawn destitution causing hunger and disease.

A child whose parents are enslaved by denial of equal opportunities and livelihood, and whose mother's milk is soiled with vice, cannot be enslaved itself. And its sense of enslavement will haunt it, even if in adulthood, he manages to free himself of the shackles of material slavery. The big difference in the level of scientific and technological progress and economic development among societies will always effect the type of outlook and conduct that will give rise to a feeling of superiority in these fields and a kind of superior outlook and conduct on the part of the society of tyrants over societies that are less developed. All this will produce suffering afflicting the present and future of children, after having afflicted their parents, and causing them to lose their ability to deal properly with life. Wherever there is a difference in the opportunity to choose, a difference in freedom and liberation will result. Consequently, the difference in freedom at the expense of others will distance those who enjoy freedom without limit from God and from those who are deprived of freedom and its requirements without having any imminent hope. For, possessing absolute freedom of action over the destiny of other humans will keep those who practice this approach at a distance from God, just as those who are able to achieve all their wishes and whims are distanced from God. This applies to those who possess wealth that is not limited by law or morality in an impoverished society. It also applies to those who are capable and who use their capabilities negatively in weak societies.

We view national society as one society; the pan-Arab society as one; and the world as one human society. There is no room for discrimination, which creates differences in human dealings on any religious, ethnic or other basis, to prevail in these societies. It is on the grounds of misunderstanding of the above which is detailed in all religions, primarily the true Islamic religion—that the children in Africa and in other places have remained hungry and enslaved and died because of hunger. This is not because food and medicine are not provided by human organizations the way they should be, or because they have not provided them at all, but because the proper living conditions have not been made available to their fathers and mothers as they should be. And, if the adults are not provided with the proper living conditions, a living cannot be provided for the children. Consequently, if anyone wants to help children there, they should help adults as well, in terms of job opportunities and sound living. The decisions adopted by human societies should be replaced, or, other decisions issued by political leaders should be concomitant with the former. Moreover, the required funds should be spent on development projects, and not just on projects to provide food and medicine for children. This is because, if poverty remains, it will produce a continuing lack in children's milk and medicine. Happiness will never be achieved if poverty continues. Some of those who attended the celebration of the international day of the child and who delivered high-sounding speeches, including Bush, have spent more than $20 billion on the armies of invasion and other armies that came to the land of Najid and Hejaz [Saudi Arabia] and the Arabian Gulf. Specialized human organizations and societies have not been able to provide this sum for children who are dying of hunger or of disease because medicine is either scarce or not available at all. Those who are shedding crocodile tears, on the international day of the child, over the future of children that are dying in the world are the same ones, they and their regimes, who are responsible for those tragedies, and we hold them responsible today for the tragedy of any Iraqi child that dies because of a shortage of food or medicine caused by their unjust blockade. They and their regimes are responsible for all this. Also, they are responsible for all the tragedies of wars and civil wars in the world, be it directly or because of their intrigues and conspiracies. Therefore, they alone are responsible not only for the tragedy of the Palestinian people and the Zionists' oppression of them in general, but also for the persecution and crimes against the children of Palestine in particular. Those who believe that everything in the lives of others can be bought are true to their nature because they themselves put up everything in their lives for sale. This had been their feelings and behavior in their relations with Iraq before 2 August. Therefore, the Croesus of Kuwait and his henchmen were dragged into their schemes after their vision and hearts were blinded by the wealth that had been stolen from the great Iraqi people. They believed, curse them, that they were able, through their usurpation and wealth, to tamper with the values of the Iraqis and with the sacred virtues in which they believed. They thought they could not only enslave and corrupt the lives of adults but also enslave children in pursuit of their despicable aims. The duty toward God and the national and noble pan-Arab and human duty compelled us to carry out what overcame the Croesuses on 2 August, the victorious day of the call. Thus, not only were Iraqi men and women able to remain free, but a great opportunity was made for a freedom whose waves are expanding, God willing, across the Arab homeland and the entire world. My beloved children of Iraq, I am aware that you love sweets, despite the harm they cause to your beautiful teeth. Many of you, especially the very young, live on imported milk, and the quantity of this milk available in Iraq has been reduced because of the blockade that Bush has imposed. He is abetted in his crime by Zionism and its creation, Israel, which usurped the Palestinian land. I and your...
comrades in the leadership feel with you, and we are living through what some of you are suffering. We will do what determined and valiant men should do whose conscience is filled with responsibility. Our aim is to alleviate your suffering to the best of our ability, as God wishes us to do. However, the shortage or unavailability of sweets is less harmful compared to what Bush wants. Bush wants to enslave you after enslaving your fathers and mothers. Shame on him and shame on those who stand behind him with bowed heads and shameless faces. Bush wants to take control of your present and that of your families so that he can dominate your future in order to satisfy Zionism, evil Israel, and imperialist ambitions. Therefore, your fathers have proudly rejected Bush's wishes and preferred what God wants for every free people, so that you might remain proud, O beloved ones. Abundance, sweets along with pride, a decent present, and a bright future are all coming with the steadfastness of your fathers and mothers. Honor will remain protected and safe, God willing. Children are the beloved of God. They are our beloved from all nationalities, races, and religions, be they in Iraq, Palestine, and the Arab homeland, or all over the face of the globe. God is great. Ignorosity to those who kill childhood and life and alienate themselves from God, the One and Only One. [signed] Saddam Hussein, 10/12/1990. [Reprinted from Fred Moore (compiler). Iraq Speaks: Documents On The Gulf Crisis. Palo Alto, Calif., N.D.]

24115. Hussein, Saddam. Remarks by President Saddam Hussein During his Visit with Some Families on August 28, 1990. I have been told that we have a birthday today. Happy birthday Rachel. Sometimes even unpleasant coincidences open chances for friendship and pleasant results. I appreciate, under the circumstance, as I earlier told your comrades, your feelings of annoyance at not being allowed to travel because, if I were in your place, or if my family were in your place, then I would have the same feeling. However, politicians are forced sometimes to look at things in such a manner that is beyond what can be directly seen. For example, if it were to do with my human feelings toward you as individuals, I would have immediately said that you should leave. However, when we view matters through a wider perspective involving a much greater number of people and their destiny, be they foreigners or Iraqis. If a military conflagration takes place, God forbid, between Iraq and the armies brought by the United States and its allies, if we visualize the losses that will result from such a conflagration, if it were to happen and if we view your presence here as guests of Iraq at a certain time as something that may prevent such a conflagration, or that this presence may contribute toward preventing such a conflagration, then we would find ourselves in predicament in which are compelled to take decision we have taken. This means that a number of foreigners have been kept to prevent the death of many more foreigners. Of course, if war were to erupt, many Iraqis will also die, or, the way we look at it, will fall as martyrs, if the war were to take place, because they would be defending their homeland, their own existence, and their holy places. As you know, the economic and scientific installations in Iraq operate round the clock and workers are accommodated within the same scientific and economic installations. If war erupts, these installations will be the target of this war, as clearly stated by some Western officials and by Western media. Therefore, we expect that a large number of pretty Iraqi children, just like yours, would perish if these installations were to be attacked. Among the most important things that we should take into consideration is the inhuman act that the President of the United States has committed. It is he and his administration that should be asked why they have come to this area. Initially, they said they were coming to the area to defend Saudi Arabia. Once the weakness of this pretext had been discovered, they began saying that they came to defend oil. I think that each and every one of you know--and you have lived in the region--that the people of the region do not intend to keep the oil in their pockets; they want to sell it to the United States, Japan, and Europe. The revenues from oil would be used in development, and Western and Japanese companies in general are the ones that help carry out development projects, whether in Iraq or other places. So the oil would be sold to the West, and the revenues from oil will be used in projects in the region executed by Western companies. The claim of defending oil, therefore, is groundless. The question should be posed to the US Administration: Why do you want to embroil the world and yourselves--the American people--in a war that, by all standards and by the simplest scenarios, will not be an easy war. You know, and I think that the politicians in your country know that we do not beg the sympathy of anybody. We respect the views of people. When we go out of our way and open a dialogue with you--and you are ordinary citizens--it is not because we want to beg sympathy from your learning. We want to preserve the respect for the human being. God almighty and his Holy Koran taught us that there is no difference between whites and blacks, Westerners and Easterners, Arabs and non-Arabs except in the manner in which they worship God. The most difficult thing is to punish someone for doing something he did not know was prohibited. The war, if it erupts, will be a kind of severe punishment to people. As the Iraqis and the Arabs will lose sons, women, and children, the aggressive parties will also lose men, children and women. By this I mean the attackers and their allies.

If the United States attacks installations and the installations have children, women, and civilians accommodated inside them, these persons would be killed. The weaponry owned by Iraq might not be capable of reaching the United States, but it can reach its allies. When Iraq attacks installations and factories in cities, it is expected that children, women, men, and civilians inside the installations will also die, in addition to the soldiers who will die on the front in Iraq. This is of course in addition to the destruction in all aspects of life. When we face such a possibility--not an easy possibility--it would not be wrong to enter into dialogue with peoples concerned about the outcome of such action, especially after we have found that doors are shut or half-shut by the concerned administrations as regards starting a dialogue and holding direct talks to find solutions which would rule out the scourge of war. When I conduct such a dialogue with you and before you--we coincidentally found at a place we visited that all those present were British--I do so, first because we respect the human being, and second, because we depend on dialogue to convey to the people the actual facts as they are and not as the deeply-involved parties wish to portray them to their people. After the last meeting, we read the criticisms directed at us by some British politicians. They were very upset at the meeting. I do not see why they are so upset. It seems they were upset because they do not want the British people to learn facts from sources other than the British channels, which have become involved in faulty estimates. They even played a role in involving the US Administration, in addition to the roles played by some of those called the allies of the United States in the region. Their estimates were extremely dangerous and mistaken. Consequently, they have pushed events to the point they have now reached. Some Western politicians say that Iraq's measures are inhuman. I would agree with them that these measures are inhuman, had we had other options with which we could prevent the scourge of war. I also agree that it would be inhuman if the objective is inhuman. If it is merely revenge or aimed at causing harm it is inhuman. But this is hosting under difficult circumstances--and I know it is under difficult circumstances--this is one of the factors to prevent war. Therefore, it should have another description. For the sake of comparison even in this narrow field, in the wake of our measure, some Western states held Iraqis in order to keep them. Just because a number of their nationals were held, or hosted, a number of Iraqis were held. What will the situation be if what is taking place against Iraq is an attempt to invade Iraq, and not just holding a number of Iraqi citizens? What if the situation is reversed? If Iraq wanted to invade Paris, Washington, or London can we imagine the measures that would be taken by these states? They forgot all that they have been saying about democracy and freedom when they learned that some of their nationals are not allowed to travel outside Iraq; they held the Iraqi nationals who are in their states. Despite these details, some of which might be wrong, the question should be addressed to the people who brought their fleets, air bases, and armies: Why have you come to invade Iraq? Why have you excluded the opportunity of an Arab solution and holding a dialogue to reach a political solution that will achieve tranquility in the region away from war? Now, I will try to answer your questions and anything related to your situation. We may think of dispatching some of you to carry a message of peace to your Western governments in which you address the direct question: Why have you
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come to the region as invaders although your legitimate interests are
guaranteed in accordance with all criteria—present and past? Those of
you who will undertake this mission will be heroes of peace contrary to
those who seek heroism through reckless adventure from which they will
only harvest disappointment and loss. The lecture is heavy, particularly
on the children who do not understand politics. I am ready to answer your
questions, suggestions, and needs.

[Question from an unidentified person] How can you leaders use children in an issue children cannot understand?

[Hussein] The question is legitimate and expected from a respectable lady the one who put this question. I ask myself the same question, but in another way. My answer is: As far as I am concerned, being in charge here, the question is: Is it acceptable to kill people without a legitimate objective? Except in self-defense, is it acceptable to kill people? Even in the case of self defense, would it not be better if there was another means other than to kill in self-defense? All of us have seen films about wars and know that if warplanes attack cities, they will kill beautiful Iraqi children just like the children sitting in front of me, and who have mothers too. Women will also be killed. This military buildup in the holy land came to strike at Iraq, to kill women, children, old men, as well as soldiers, who have neither attacked the United States nor Britain. My answer to the lady's question is that it is not acceptable to harm a human being outside the framework of self defense. Even a case such as that is a forced situation to which we have no alternative. So for my part, as being in authority in Iraq, I am ready for a direct, immediate dialogue with Mr. Bush and Mrs. Thatcher. If they wish, so that the public opinion can learn the logic of the concerned parties so as to be able to pass fair judgments, let the debate between them and me be televised in front of world public opinion as a whole. Therefore, Iraq, for its part, is neither responsible for detaining anybody, nor responsible for the intentional death of anybody, but Iraq found itself in a forced situation. Iraq believes that among the ways to prevent war is not allowing you to travel abroad until further notice.

[Comment by a man who is on a honeymoon with his wife] It would be better for us to be in our country rather than here, and that the best peace message is to be in touch with our families. We would like to be allowed to go to France to spend our honeymoon there where we can meet with fellow Frenchmen who are beginning to understand the situation and we can explain it.

[Hussein] I agree with what the questioner, who seems to be from France, has said. I said that from the humanitarian point of view, I am hurt as much as you are. Or let me say, to be accurate, some of you may be more hurt. I say I empathize as a human being due to the circumstances that led you to this situation. At any rate, I understand the humanitarian implications you are talking about, as being people who found themselves in a situation against their will. I am confident, or hope, that your stay here as forced guests will not be long.

[Question from an unidentified person] Is it possible to propose an initiative which could lead to a peaceful solution, and would such an initiative allow children and women to leave?

[Hussein] In the first place, anyone is expected to make such a proposal, which has been put forward by the US gentleman who posed the question. However, I wish you to know that some states did not appreciate our decision to allow some citizens to leave. In other words, some states did not consider this a gesture of goodwill that could lead to an in-depth dialogue to ward off the scourge of war from the region. Despite this, the proposal by the speaker is expected to come from anyone or any man because men always try to keep any harm from children and women. Despite this, the circumstances are difficult and people such as the Iraqis cannot make all the humanitarian choices they would like to make if the circumstances were different. Some of you might know the Iraqis and their character and can give them descriptions different from the descriptions given them by some governments. You might not have known that some of your governments have decided to deprive Iraq of food, children's milk, and medicine. Such a measure has never been taken before in the world. Ladies and gentlemen: Do you not know that when children are deprived of milk their health becomes weak, they will not be able to resist disease, and hundreds, if not thousands, will die? Do you know how many men, women, and children will die if they have no medicine? Do you not know that a person will die if he is deprived of food? If Iraq had not taken precautions for such a possibility, people would die, and if the land of the Euphrates is not generous with the Iraqis, people will die. While you are here in our country you are aware that we have neither deprived you of food or medicines, nor deprived your children of milk. If there is any shortage, please let me know directly because the instructions are clear and firm: the children of our foreign guests should have milk, medicine, and food. Therefore, the cutting off food and medicine is overt, not covert. It is not to talk to a journalist; it is the current blockade. This is illegal. We asked Mr. Waldheim when he visited Iraq: Is there anything in the UN Charter that deprives people of food, medicine, and children's milk? He said that nothing in the UN Charter allows this in any situation. However, this is the outcome of the American implementation of the idea of boycott and embargo. The British Government is cooperating with it. Regrettably, the European and Japanese administrations have not said that this is unacceptable in human terms. How do you expect the situation would be if such a blockade were imposed on you in Britain or France? Would you not be angry against whoever imposed such a blockade on you to kill you, your children, and your sick people because of the lack of medicine? Despite this, I believe that you have noticed through your contact with the people that our people do not harbor any rancor against anyone; they hate the decisions and acts, but not the people. Those who make such decisions do not have sufficient knowledge about the Arab mentality or Iraqi mentality. The Iraqis are ready to eat dirt and to not bow their heads to the aggressive invaders. I think they want to be the object of your respect and that of the world when they prove to the tyrants that they are people who can live without accepting humiliation and disgrace. The next months and years will prove--if the blockade lasts for years-- that all estimations made on the basis that the blockade can subjugate the Iraqis are incorrect and baseless. The president: I thank the French lady for her flattery. For, after all, I am only a human being who needs the ordinary people to tell him what is right and what is wrong concerning his conduct, because God Almighty has taught us such principles, when He said in His Holy Book, the Qutan: "If ye are grateful, I will add more favors unto you." This address is from God to man. You, as believers, know that God does only what is right; nevertheless, He asks man, who is his own creation, to do what He asks. God Almighty uses dialogue to convince his servant, the human being. So, we, the servants of God, no matter how intelligent anyone of us is, still need the help of each other to attain the image that we are supposed to attain, in human terms. I thank the lady for this flattery and I say to her: Yes, all French politicians are our friends. We had expected them, before doing anything, to talk with us and ask us about right and wrong, so that we could answer them. Regrettably, however, they have not done so.

Proceeding from this, therefore, and depending on other evidence that we found through our links with other countries, it became clear to us that the United States has reached a degree of arrogance and brute force - here, I mean the US Administration, not the US citizen--to the extent that there is no longer anyone who can simply say no, when this no is addressed to the United States. It seems that the economy and its repercussions in Europe have reached a point that is sometimes--unless the Europeans take notice of this--at the expense of their humanity. For what can the United States use to pressure the Soviet Union, France, or Italy? It can use the economy to apply this pressure. It seems that some political leaders of these countries are no longer capable of withstanding such pressure. Therefore, they have begun to appease the United States to the degree that this appeasement is a danger not only to the whole of humanity, but to Europe itself. It is obvious, therefore, that although Iraq is a friend of France--and we suppose that France can initiate a dialogue with do not have sufficient knowledge about the Arab mentality or Iraqi mentality. The Iraqis are ready to eat dirt and to not bow their heads to the aggressive invaders. I think they want to be the object of your respect and that of the world when they prove to the tyrants that they are people who can live without accepting humiliation and disgrace. The next months and years will prove--if the blockade lasts for years-- that all estimations made on the basis that the blockade can subjugate the Iraqis are incorrect and baseless. The president: I thank the French lady for her flattery. For, after all, I am only a human being who needs the ordinary people to tell him what is right and what is wrong concerning his conduct, because God Almighty has taught us such principles, when He said in His Holy Book, the Qutan: "If ye are grateful, I will add more favors unto you." This address is from God to man. You, as believers, know that God does only what is right; nevertheless, He asks man, who is his own creation, to do what He asks. God Almighty uses dialogue to convince his servant, the human being. So, we, the servants of God, no matter how intelligent anyone of us is, still need the help of each other to attain the image that we are supposed to attain, in human terms. I thank the lady for this flattery and I say to her: Yes, all French politicians are our friends. We had expected them, before doing anything, to talk with us and ask us about right and wrong, so that we could answer them. Regrettably, however, they have not done so.

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addressed to anyone who lives within the oil regions, he would say that it is not in Europe’s interest or Japan’s that America should take hold of Middle East oil, to the extent of allotting their quotas. Regardless of this debate, all Europeans and Japanese know that if war breaks out, not only might the oil fields in Iraq be set on fire, but also in other areas. They also know that if this happens, a good deal of the amount allotted to them will be cut off, because when the oil is ablaze it cannot flow to France, England, or Japan. At any rate, America will be in a better position to acquire its quota than Europe or Japan. It is certain, nevertheless, that even the United States itself will be affected. It is not in anyone’s interest, therefore, to see a war in the region. Why are they, then, pushing things toward the verge of the abyss? I think it weakness. The French need to invoke de Gaulle’s spirit of the independent decision. While saying this, I do not intend to instigate Europe against the United States. We want peace; we do not want conflict. I want to say, however, through this quick human survey of what we have said, in addition to the miserable condition of humanity in Third World countries, that the United States should not dominate humanity or it will become tyrannical; because if it becomes tyrannical, it will lose its humanity and others will lose their humanity. This is because when someone becomes tyrannical, he cannot see the basic conditions for others to enjoy their humanity. It is clear, therefore, that the United States does not have to win the military battle in order to confirm the humanity of the American citizen. On the contrary, if the United States wins the military battle against us, the American will lose his humanity and many will lose their humanity as well, while we, the Arabs and the Iraqis, should not be defeated by aggression. Our humanity dictates that we should not be defeated. In fact, the humanity of the entire world dictates that Iraq and the Arabs should not be defeated by aggression so that we can avoid disasters. Only God Almighty can be just when He dominates humanity. God, as you know, is already dominating humanity, because He is the One and Only One.

[Comment from an unidentified person.] As far as I know, not all the members of the same families are here. I would like to say to those who see this film that not all the families are here, but that all of our families are in good health. It goes without saying that we have come to this place without anyone telling us what to say, what questions we can and cannot ask, and how to answer this or that question. The world does not know this.

[Question from an unidentified person.] We have been in contact with our embassies for the past 11 days. We were unable to contact our families, and we neither received, nor sent letters to them. We hope that something will be done in this respect.

[Hussein] Things will improve in the future. We have given orders that you will always be allowed to exchange letters with your families.

[Question from an unidentified person.] I have two questions of a political nature. How do you intend to secure peace in this region and when will this be? And what are your conditions for peace?

[Hussein] We have no conditions and do not want to take anything from anybody. However, we refuse to give in to illegitimate demands from others. For example, we do not want to attack anybody, but we will confront any attack against us. If some people want to secure the continued flow of oil, we would like to tell them that we produce oil to sell it to them. Kuwait is part of Iraq and not the 52nd US state. Those who say that we want to attack Saudi Arabia, are saying inaccurate and untrue things. What we want is to live in dignity in our country and let others live in dignity in their country. If the foreigners cannot understand our problems, let them leave us as Arabs to solve our problems ourselves. We are more capable of solving them, as we have no other choice.

[Question from an unidentified person.] Thank you. Another question: We are living near Baghdad: Is there a shelter in this place in case something happens?

[Hussein] You will be the first to enter the shelter. First, the children, then the women, and then men, and finally the Iraqis.

[Request from an unidentified person.] Thanks. Is it possible to arrange for visits by a Japanese physician, because we have sick people? Regrettably, we do not speak any other language. As for Japanese, nobody speaks it here. If this is possible.

[Hussein] I think we have an Army physician who knows Japanese. We will send you an Iraqi physician who knows Japanese, address your government in this regard, or send a translator to translate into Japanese to work with an Iraqi physician.

[Comment from an unidentified person.] The Japanese Embassy in Baghdad has a Japanese physician.

[Hussein] Despite this, we will secure for you a physician who speaks Japanese, or supply the physician with a translator who knows Japanese.

[Unidentified person] Thank you, sir.

[Request from an unidentified person.] My question, Mr. President, concerns the same question addressed by the one to my right regarding letters. In addition to the usual letters, we know that there are letters that can be also addressed through telephone or telex. Our embassies in Iraq can get us telex messages. Would it be possible to install a device in our places to ensure that we continue to receive such messages?

[Hussein] I asked the secretary, to maintain continuous contact with your embassies through the Foreign Ministry so that the letters that reach your embassies can be received and given to you. We might consider a post office box that you can use for your mail. Thus, your correspondence would be collected daily and sent to you and from you to your relatives.

[Unidentified person] I have another request. You know that all those present in this session were separated from their wives last night for the sake of this meeting.

[Hussein] You will return to your wives. As for the wives, they will return to their husbands. We just wanted to see some of you.

[Unidentified woman] I would like to say that we are receiving very good treatment where we are living right now. Our needs are being met in dignity in their country. If the foreigners cannot understand our things. What we want is to live in dignity in our country and let others live widespread ownership of appliances, even in villages, had ended the era of a well-rooted country and in 750 the Abbasid Caliphate moved its capital to Baghdad. Baghdad has a Japanese physician.
capital to the new city of Baghdad. The city took four years to build and required 100,000 workers, and was first known as Medina al-Salaam (City of Peace). The Abbasid led an advanced society with a rich tradition in art and literature; many educated women became prominent. There was an opportunity for women to study medicine, law and theology in Abbasid Baghdad. In 1258, Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongols. In 1534, after a succession of ephemeral states, Iraq was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. In 1918, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British established a puppet monarchy. In 1920, there was a major uprising, in which women played a major role; at a cost of 2000 British deaths, the rebellion was suppressed. Formal independence of Iraq was declared in 1932, and Iraq joined the League of nations, but Britain retained control of Iraq. The monarchy was overthrown in 1958. After several years of coups, in 1968 the Baath Party took power. In 1979, VP Saddam Hussein became president.

24118. Ingrams, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 03: Minorities. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 31-40. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] Kurds are an ancient people with their own language and living in northern Iraq, and in Iran, Syria and Turkey. The Baath Party made a commitment in 1968 to solve what had become known as the "Kurdish Problem" by granting limited autonomy. In 1970 the government recognized the Kurdish nationality by guaranteeing the Kurdish language, with representation of Kurds in the administration, armed services, a Kurdish university at Sulaimaniyah, and the formation of students', women's and teacher's organizations. In 1974, the Kurdistan Region was given autonomy, with its own Legislative Council and an Executive Council. The General Federation of Iraqi Women has a special secretariat for Kurds (the secretariat has nine committees for culture, health, social activities, rural women, illiteracy, training, organization, legal affairs, and sports).

Turkmen are found in the NE of Iraq, with some in Mosul and Tell Afar. Most are town dwellers or tribal. They number 1.5-2.5% of the population; two-thirds are Sunni, one-third are Shiites.

Yezidis (they call themselves Dasnayi) are a Kurdish-speaking minority of about 30,000 in the Sanjar district. They are considered to be devil-worshippers. Their chief shrine is the tomb of Sheikh Adi on Jebel Sanjar, 70 miles west of Mosul. Some Yezidis attend Baghdad University.

Christians are 4.8% of the population and many occupy prominent positions in Iraqi society. There has been significant rural-urban migration among Christians, with the Christian population in Baghdad rising from 75,000 to 110,000 in 1963-1966. Christians are divided into Nestorians (Armenians), Gregorians and Jacobites. Chaldeans, numbering 200,000 are the largest Christian community.

Armenians number 4000-15,000 and they came to Iraq fleeing the massacres in Anatolia in 1915. As refugees, they collected in Basra, but have generally moved to cities throughout Iraq. Smaller communities include Mandeans (or Sabeans or Chists of St. John), Syrian speaking Christians, a few Jews, and some Lurs and Iranians. Iranians number 2.5-3.0% of the population, and most live in the Shiite Holy Cities of Najaf and Kerbala. [TXT]

24119. Ingrams, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 04: Islam and Women. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 41-54. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] In the Jahaliya, the pre-Islamic period, the status of Arab women was determined by tribal practice, but even in that society women had considerable freedom. The rise of women increased the rights or women and improved their status: "misconceptions about Islam among non-Muslims are widespread, and particularly as regards Islam and women". Polygamy is often a focus of critics of Islam, yet Islam reformed the universal practice of Islam and laid the basis (the issue of suitable treatment of wives) that has in more modern times led to the near disappearance of polygamy. Veiling was never universal among Arabs, being largely an urban practice. Sharia, Islamic Law, gives women specific rights, including requirement that a woman consent to marriage, her right to the dowry, and the right to divorce with cause. While the Sharia gives women lesser rights in divorce and child custody, it gives women more right in property and inheritance. Many women have traditionally been learned in religion, and are known as Mullayas (especially in Basra).

24120. Ingrams, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 05: The Girl. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 55-66. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] There are persistent misunderstandings in the West about the status of women in Islamic countries; so to there are misconceptions about the importance of daughters. Muslims love their children, whether sons or daughters. Traditional beliefs in the Evil Eye, which tended to emphasize the value of boys are falling aside as the general educational level of women advances: women do, after all, may the major role in the upbringing of children. Female circumcision is not practices in Iraq. Education is free from primary through higher education (with passage of examinations). Alternatives to universities include vocational training and professional schools. Veiling of girls was once traditional at age 12 but now is not done. Most marriages remain arranged.

24121. Ingrams, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 06: The Woman. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 67-78. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] The aspect of Muslim society that has caused the greatest misunderstanding in the West is the status of women, yet the status of women in Islam has always been better that believed in the West. Most problematic is condemnation of Western commentators of features of Arab society that remain true as well in the West. Women participate fully in Iraqi society, and modern Western dress is normal, except in religious institutions. Women do housework and increasingly also hold jobs outside the home. The high cost of living has forced women to work in many families. There is no wage discrimination between men and women having comparable employment. Industrialization has played a major role in modernizing the status of women in Iraqi society: literacy programs throughout the country, including among Kurds and Bedouin, were set up to accelerate the employability of women. The status of women is not advanced in villages, as opposed to cities, but is advancing even there.

24122. Ingrams, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 07: Pioneers. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 79-98. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] Arab women started organizing for more rights in the mid-nineteenth century, about the same time that British suffragettes started to organize. The first school for girls was opened in 1859, with the approval of the Ottoman government. By 1914 there were only 6 or 7 schools for girls in Iraq; however at the time education for boys in most areas was little more than Quran memorization. The first teachers' training college was opened in 1923. The King encouraged sports training for women and organized girls' sports teams at the palace under the direction of his daughter; he also opened a school for female nurses. The education of women received some support from Muslim religious leaders, such as the Shite elder Mirza Hussein al-Na'in. By the 1930s, it was becoming a normal expectation of urban classes that their daughters would be educated. One of the first women's rights organizations established was the Women's Renaissance or Awakenings Club, founded by Asma Zahawi in 1923. Although this group soon closed down, many other such groups were established in the 1930s: Red Crescent in 1933; Biyut al-Umma (Nation's Institutes) in 1935; as well as the Muslim Sisters Society, Child Welfare Society, Society for the Welfare of the Poor, a society for assistance to homeless women and children and YWCA. In 1944, the Club for Sisters of Freedom and the Anti-Nazi & Fascist Society were established; in 1951 the Society of the Muslim Sisterhood as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established. Iraqi women began their participation in international conferences in the 1930s. In 1952, the Women's Union began a drive to implement the political rights that women were guaranteed by law, but which had not been
implemented in fact.

24123. Ingmar, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 08: The Iraqi Government and Women. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 99-108. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] The Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) forms the present government of Iraq. The ABSP has long endorsed women as full partners in Iraqi society. When VP, Saddam Hussein speaking at a conference of the General Federation of Iraqi Women noted: “During the 1920 revolution in which our people gave their response to the British colonial occupation and during mass uprisings against the imperialist pacts and alliances... women took part and played a role which gave an example of courage and initiative and inspired bravery and enthusiasm in the hearts of the struggling... The complete emancipation of women from the ties which held them back in the past, during the days of despotism and ignorance, is a basic aim of the party and the Revolution. Women make up one half of our society. Our society will remain backward and in chains unless its women are liberated, enlightened and educated.” As president, Hussein would state: “Strengthening the economic status of women through both legal rights and social conventions is part of the liberation process. Strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy is also part of that process. The same can be said about limiting divorce with additional restrictions and wider and stricter conditions... Anti-feminist acts and ideas should be extensively condemned by men as well as by women in every section of our people. Unjustified divorce ought to be condemned everywhere. Polygamy ought to be condemned in every corner of our society.” Milestones in women’s rights in Baath Iraq include: Labour Act of 1970, giving women and men equal pay and conditions, prohibits nightwork by women, and established free daycare in Iraqi industry; the Act of Judicial Institution of 1976 allowing women to become Public Notaries; and the Agrarian Reform Act of 1970, which “ended feudalism” in rural society. In 1980, a resolution of the government approved a national program of rehabilitation of the handicapped, with 20 rehabilitation centers being set up.

24124. Ingmar, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 09: The General Federation of Iraqi Women. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 109-116. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] During the monarchy an Iraqi Women’s Federation was setup. After the 1958 revolution the Women of the Republic Association was setup, it was disbanded but re-emerged in 1963, and in 1968 the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) emerged from it. The GFIW had its first conference in 1969, and now has a national organization represented by 250 deputies. Secretariats of the GFIW include: Information and Culture, Foreign Relations, Family Affairs, Social Mobilization, Organization of Secretariats, Finance and Administration, Bureau for Nurseries, Literacy and Adult Education. One project of the GFIW was to establish an all woman agricultural research center to provide productive work for impoverished rural women.

24125. Ingmar, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 10: Women in the Professions. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 117-128. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] Iraqi governments in this century have all promoted the education of women, with opportunities expanding from the early acceptability of women in medical and teaching professions. The first attempt to employ women in a professional sector was in 1923 through the establishment of the Teachers Training College. In 1947, Sabihah al-Sheikh Da’oud became the first woman attorney in Iraq. Women have now become judges and prosecutors. Nursing has long been a profession of marginal respectability, but professionalization beginning in 1933 through Ministry of Health training courses. Initially, many nurses were women from Christian families, who accepted nursing as a career for the reasons that their daughters somewhat earlier than Muslim families. Other professions in which women are well-represented include photography, engineering, architecture and archeology. In the 1950s Iraq women started entering the diplomatic service, however, just as in the British diplomatic service, few women have reached top ranks.

24126. Ingmar, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 11: Women in Art and Literature. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 129-154 [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] Women played a significant role in arts and literature in the Abbasid Caliphate during the 2-3 centuries of the Abbasid Golden Age. When VP, Saddam Hussein speaking at a conference of the General Federation of Iraqi Women noted: “During the 1920 revolution in which our people gave their response to the British colonial occupation and during mass uprisings against the imperialist pacts and alliances... women took part and played a role which gave an example of courage and initiative and inspired bravery and enthusiasm in the hearts of the struggling... The complete emancipation of women from the ties which held them back in the past, during the days of despotism and ignorance, is a basic aim of the party and the Revolution. Women make up one half of our society. Our society will remain backward and in chains unless its women are liberated, enlightened and educated.” As president, Hussein would state: “Strengthening the economic status of women through both legal rights and social conventions is part of the liberation process. Strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy is also part of that process. The same can be said about limiting divorce with additional restrictions and wider and stricter conditions... Anti-feminist acts and ideas should be extensively condemned by men as well as by women in every section of our people. Unjustified divorce ought to be condemned everywhere. Polygamy ought to be condemned in every corner of our society.” Milestones in women’s rights in Baath Iraq include: Labour Act of 1970, giving women and men equal pay and conditions, prohibits nightwork by women, and established free daycare in Iraqi industry; the Act of Judicial Institution of 1976 allowing women to become Public Notaries; and the Agrarian Reform Act of 1970, which “ended feudalism” in rural society. In 1980, a resolution of the government approved a national program of rehabilitation of the handicapped, with 20 rehabilitation centers being set up.

24127. Ingmar, Doreen. The Awakened: Women in Iraq: Part 10: Women in the Professions. London: Third World Centre for Research & Publishing, 1983. pp. 99-108. [Book dedicated to the General Federation of Iraqi Women.] The Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) forms the present government of Iraq. The ABSP has long endorsed women as full partners in Iraqi society. When VP, Saddam Hussein speaking at a conference of the General Federation of Iraqi Women noted: “During the 1920 revolution in which our people gave their response to the British colonial occupation and during mass uprisings against the imperialist pacts and alliances... women took part and played a role which gave an example of courage and initiative and inspired bravery and enthusiasm in the hearts of the struggling... The complete emancipation of women from the ties which held them back in the past, during the days of despotism and ignorance, is a basic aim of the party and the Revolution. Women make up one half of our society. Our society will remain backward and in chains unless its women are liberated, enlightened and educated.” As president, Hussein would state: “Strengthening the economic status of women through both legal rights and social conventions is part of the liberation process. Strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy is also part of that process. The same can be said about limiting divorce with additional restrictions and wider and stricter conditions... Anti-feminist acts and ideas should be extensively condemned by men as well as by women in every section of our people. Unjustified divorce ought to be condemned everywhere. Polygamy ought to be condemned in every corner of our society.” Milestones in women’s rights in Baath Iraq include: Labour Act of 1970, giving women and men equal pay and conditions, prohibits nightwork by women, and established free daycare in Iraqi industry; the Act of Judicial Institution of 1976 allowing women to become Public Notaries; and the Agrarian Reform Act of 1970, which “ended feudalism” in rural society. In 1980, a resolution of the government approved a national program of rehabilitation of the handicapped, with 20 rehabilitation centers being set up.

24127. Iraqi Communist Party. “A Word on the Peasants’ Demonstration Which Was Exclusively Called by a Patriotic Quarter”, in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Itithad Al-Shaab), December 23, 1959. p. 19. [Published on 12/16/1959] Local newspapers reported yesterday the permission of a procession of rejoicing in the safety of Premier Kassim to be made by the “peasants associations.” We have contacted the headquarters of the General Federation of Peasants Associations asking for clarification on the issue, and an official in the General Federation stated to us that the Federation did not apply any request for the official authorities and that it did not call the peasants associations to take part in the procession which was said will be held on Friday next (12/18/1959), and that the Federation will not take part in it. It is obvious from this statement that those who called for the demonstration on 12/18/1959 must be from those who worked in the name of the peasants associations outside the sphere of the General Federation. Since this issue has been associated by various rumors, therefore it aroused a number of enquiries in the peasantry and patriotic quarters and among some citizens. The rejoicing in the safety of the leader Abdul Karim Kassim embraced all the sincere citizens of various patriotic tendencies. Naturally then this group and others have the right to express their patriotic sentiments through the legal democratic means, especially that the mentioned group has obtained an official permission for organizing this demonstration. Yet the sons of the people have the right to enquire: Is it true that the purpose of organizing this demonstration is confined to expressing the sentiments of rejoicing only and that there are no political motives and parochial purposes? When the citizens make these enquiries they remember the grand peoples procession of rejoicing which was held on the day that followed the release of the Premier from the hospital and which truly embraced the representatives of all the sectors of the people: “the peasants,” the workers, the merchants, the students, the intelligentsia, men and women and from various patriotic organizations and tendencies and varied nationalities. The citizens rightly enquire about the motive which drove the organizers of the new demonstration to isolate themselves from that grand procession without any reasonable justification and the reason why they did not join any of its contingents, such as the contingents of the journalists, the lawyers and others? Does not this private demonstration of them help, without their knowledge, the trumpets of hostile propaganda which described the previous grand procession, that it was the procession of a certain patriotic trend and not the procession of the people with their various classes, nationalities and religious communities? The citizens also enquire whether this quarter does not aim from this demonstration to parade its special forces and exploit that for purposes which have no relations with rejoicing - such as to render a support for the non-democratic biased measures which were pursued recently in connection with the licensing of the peasants associations in some provinces of Iraq? These aims may be legitimate from the point of view of democracy, but there are no less complicated ways for this purpose. In order to explain what we mean by the complication we enquire about the
opinion of these brothers themselves in case others also resort to organize a similar peasantry procession, will this method of “display of forces” be useful from the point of view of the necessity of making the best efforts for the unity of the peasants and the unity of national ranks? And would it be useful from the point of view of the fruitful political activity for the backing of the Republic and its patriotic government?

In spite of all that, and since the brothers have decided to express their reverence of safety and the patriotic purpose by holding this demonstration, and since the patriotic government has licensed this demonstration, then we hope that these brothers will show the organizational and instructive ability necessary for steering the demonstration in a positive and constructive spirit which should be refrained from provocations, following the trails of the grand peoples procession which was held on the day which followed the release of Premier Kassim from the hospital which slapped the faces of the slanderers with its magnificence, powerful organization, and the soundness of its patriotic orientation. That procession was a victory for the Iraqi Republic and a reinforcement to the leadership of the government and a strength for all the patriotic quarters without exception. We stress on that point in view of our belief that the soundness of guiding this new demonstration assumes at the current circumstance a special significance in view of what we have experienced in the evil cliques who try to exploit every occasion to do something that harms the unity of national ranks and to spread the confusion and feed the slanderers and abuses against our dear republic. We have great confidence that the conscious masses of our people who have already performed their duty in their past grand national procession will refuse anything that can be exploited for spreading rumors to harm the prestige of our Republic. [x]

24128. Iraqi Communist Party. "Let the Banner of the Republic Continue Waving on the Skies of Our Flowering Fatherland", in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab), December 23, 1959, p. 12. [This article appeared on 12/4/1959.] Today flowery Baghdad receives the masses of the great people organized in their great procession carrying banners and slogans that express the insistence of this people to forge ahead in the path of defending everything good and noble in the fatherland. Today, the masses of the people, their democratic organizations and patriotic bodies meet in the great procession of rejoicing, celebrating the safety of the leader of the Revolution, Premier Abdul Karim Kassim, and his escape from the bullets of imperialist reactionary plotting. They are reaffirming their solidarity with the patriotic authority under his leadership, to preserve the course of the revolution which is reinforced by a democratic anti-imperialist and anti-reaction course of action. Together with the rejoicings of the people which are displayed by all the honest citizens from various nationalities, classes, political inclinations and social posts. Together with these rejoicings which express the adherence of the entirety of the people to their gains and victories, there appears very clearly the legitimate anger of the people and the sacred national hatred to the enemies of the republic and of its patriotic leadership, the imperialists, the covetous and all categories of agents. This process of the people is taking place at a time when the recent statements of Premier Kassim has revealed the identity of the enemies of the republic thereby dispelling the illusions which were constructed by the enemies of the people to complete their concealment. The imperialist reactionary grouping was proved, as was confirmed by life, to be a plotting terrorist grouping aimed to subvert the structure of the mighty republic and to enable the imperialists to stage a comeback to our holy land. All the branches of this imperialist reactionary grouping were proved by the premier to be, regardless of their “nationalist,” “religious” and “students” facades as organs of plotting and treason which deceive the naive citizens and drive them to the slippery paths and dangers. This procession of the people is taking place simultaneously with the official condemnation of these groupings and their rings whether in Mosul and the imperialist reactionary putsch there, or in Kirkuk where a massacre was staged by the imperialists and their agents, or the troubles which flared in the republic other than those of Mosul and Kirkuk.

This procession of the people is taking place at time when life and its realities have approved of and confirmed the significance of the democratic organizations which embraced the broadest masses of the people, workers, peasants, students, women and intelligentsia and at a time when these organizations emerged triumphant after surmounting the ordeals of the imperialist reactionary schemes. They have been patient and endurant and revealed in their patience their broad popularity and their solid foundations proving that they enjoy the confidence, support and loyalty of the loyal sons of the people. The great procession of the people is taking place at a time when the reactionary plotting forces went back to their hiding holes and rings, defeated, evading the anger of the people, and concentrating their efforts to find new guise and new methods to disrupt the ranks, organize new schemes and create anarchy, and exercise the means of subversion and destruction against the erect structure of the republic. The forces of the people, associated in solidarity, find themselves today facing an extremely noble task of standing in one rank and linked by the link of defending the republic and supporting its patriotic leadership in its initiatives and measures to liquidate the rings of treason and plotting so as to ensure the prevalence of stability and tranquility on the basis of the victory of the democratic course. On this day, the characters of this people will once again manifest themselves. The procession will clearly demonstrate organization, discipline and the compliance with what deprives the enemies of the chance to turn our celebrations and festivities into occasions of hostility to the republic and its course. There is no doubt that the broadest masses will reject the deceptive slogans and the extremist shouts which do not serve the unity of national ranks and which will only disguise the enemies of the republic. Let the process of today, then, be an expression to the unity of the people. Let the procession of today brilliantly reveal the solidarity of the people and he army. Let the procession of today be a demonstration for the backing of the patriotic authority which is impersonified in our patriotic government under the leadership of Premier Kassim. Let the procession of today be an expression to the legitimate anger of the people at the enemies of the republic, the imperialists, the covetous, the reactionaries and local agents both the disguised and the public ones.

Let us all meet in solidarity in the front of defending the republic. Let us all - communists, patriots, democrats, nationalists - stand in one rank to defend our republic with a barrier that smashes all the conspiracies and criminal endeavors. [x]

24129. Iraqi Communist Party. Editorial: “Editorials from the Arabic Edition: The Educational Policy in the National Charter of the Iraqi Communist Party (2/3/1960)”, in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab), February 24, 1960, p. 16. Article Fifteen of the National Charter of our Iraqi Communist Party was devoted to the education of the people and the sacred national hatred to the enemies of the republic and a reinforcement to the leadership of the patriotic government and a strength for all the patriotic quarters without exception. The bitter experiences of the imperialist reactionary forces” be useful from the point of view of the necessity of making the time when these organizations emerged triumphant after surmounting the ordeals of the imperialist reactionary schemes. They have been patient and endurant and revealed in their patience their broad popularity and their solid foundations proving that they enjoy the confidence, support and loyalty of the loyal sons of the people. The great procession of the people is taking place at a time when the reactionary plotting forces went back to their hiding holes and rings, defeated, evading the anger of the people, and concentrating their efforts to find new guise and new methods to disrupt the ranks, organize new schemes and create anarchy, and exercise the means of subversion and destruction against the erect structure of the republic. The forces of the people, associated in solidarity, find themselves today facing an extremely noble task of standing in one rank and linked by the link of defending the republic and supporting its patriotic leadership in its initiatives and measures to liquidate the rings of treason and plotting so as to ensure the prevalence of stability and tranquility on the basis of the victory of the democratic course. On this day, the characters of this people will once again manifest themselves. The procession will clearly demonstrate organization, discipline and the compliance with what deprives the enemies of the chance to turn our celebrations and festivities into occasions of hostility to the republic and its course. There is no doubt that the broadest masses will reject the deceptive slogans and the extremist shouts which do not serve the unity of national ranks and which will only disguise the enemies of the republic. Let the process of today, then, be an expression to the unity of the people. Let the procession of today brilliantly reveal the solidarity of the people and he army. Let the procession of today be a demonstration for the backing of the patriotic authority which is impersonified in our patriotic government under the leadership of Premier Kassim. Let the procession of today be an expression to the legitimate anger of the people at the enemies of the republic, the imperialists, the covetous, the reactionaries and local agents both the disguised and the public ones.

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advance in this field, these schools have not yet assimilated all the children who are of school age. On the other hand, the illiterate people who are above school age, and who are vast in number, cannot at all be assimilated by these schools. This dictates that centers for combating illiteracy must be opened everywhere in the cities and the countryside to shoulder this patriotic duty in addition to the necessity of generalizing compulsory primary education. This great duty is placed in the first place on the shoulders of the Ministry of Education. Close cooperation be established between the peoples organizations particularly the Teachers Association and the Students Union and others. In face a serious fight against illiteracy cannot be accomplished without such cooperation. The elementary experiences in this field proved the possibility and importance of this cooperation and its success. They have also proved the great enthusiasm which drove tens of thousands of members of those organizations to take part in this combat action and the amazing enrollment of the people, to be educated in spite of the difficulties, among which were the arbitrary actions of some officials. This article of our National Charter stated that culture and education are among the natural rights of our people. We add here that education and cultivation of the people is one of the basic duties of the State. It is not enough to recognize this natural right. The Government should take all the necessary measures to enable the people to win this right.

The Charter dealt with other important issues including the “integration of education with practical life and with the economic, social and political development of our country.” This issue necessitates a radical upturn in the educational field. The governments of the old regime devoted all their efforts in the educational field to one single aim, namely to prepare the necessary personnel to satisfy the needs of the governmental machinery and the imperialist machinery and establishments which dominated the country. As for elevating the cultural standards of the sons of the people and the spreading of science and knowledge, they were never among the aims of the imperialists and their underlings. The people used to wrest them by force after making generous sacrifices. As for now, after the Revolution, the schools, institutes, colleges, their curricula and laboratories must all be subjected to the aims of the Revolution itself and to achieve a development in all the economic, political and social fields. Here, too, cooperation must be established between the government and the democratic organizations because some of these organizations have devoted their congresses to laying down a patriotic and democratic policy for culture and education. The Ministry of Education on her part took some steps in this respect. Therefore it is necessary to unite the efforts of the Ministry of Education and those of the social organization concerned to realize the best results in the field of culture and education. It is also necessary that the other governmental and popular organizations should work, each in her own field, for the promotion of the popular culture and for the revival of the progressive ideological heritage and for publicizing science, technology, art and human literature among the masses of the people. Full attention must be paid to the vocational schools and the institutes of specialization and scholarships for abroad for the skilled workers. The question of scholarships abroad is still important and urgent. The patriotic government had taken great steps in this respect, but we still demand more of them and demand assurance for the sons of the Kurdish people and the other national minorities to provide the necessary number of personnel as to lead into a speedy development of the culture of all the fraternal nationalities in this fatherland. This point should win attention with regard to the admission to the University and with regard to the opening of new colleges in the North, especially a college for Teachers Training.

The application of the National Charter of our Communist Party in the University and the assurance of its independence would provide the normal academic atmosphere, as well as supplying it with the necessary tutorial staff, scientific laboratories and experimental farms, care of the students and housing, books and all necessities, all that is something necessary because we are ambitious and long to see Baghdad - as it was in the past - a focus for scientists and men of letters from various parts of the globe. We have to compete with time to keep pace with the forward march of mankind. The aims which the National Charter of our Communist Party puts forward in the fields of culture and education are national and democratic aims and they require cooperation on the national scale with all the patriotic parties and all the people, party and non-party members, as well as the patriotic government for their realization in order to promote the standard of culture and education in the Republic. [...]

24130. Iraqi Communist Party. Editorial: "Editorials of the Week: The Iraqi People Who Proved the Originality of Their Consciousness Are Worthy of Exercising All Their Democratic Liberties (12/23/1959)”, in Iraqi Review (Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab), December 30, 1959. p. 9. Only few days remained from the transitional period. All citizens were looking forwards towards the new period, the period of commencing the declaration of the democratic legislations that ensure the rise of the conditions for the new period. Naturally, if the permanent constitution and the other legislations ensured the democratic rights of the people and laid down the new foundations upon which the Republic will embark under its new conditions, that will help in providing the guarantees for stability and tranquility and the creation of the best relations of solidarity with the patriotic authority. It is also natural that the new period will start with the declaration of the freedom for political organization on the basis of the foundation of political parties after the people had exercised some of their organizational freedoms in other fields and after it has been clearly manifested what role can the democratic liberties play in mobilizing the people and their patriotic forces in the joint action for the consolidation of the pillars of the Republic and the safeguarding of its gains. The political freedom is not alien to the people or their awareness. The people have employed various means of struggle in order to realize their democratic liberties. The peoples' insistence to exercise these liberties was a feature which characterized the people with vitality, valiance and boldness. Under the old regime, the people offered sacrifices in order to win freedom and to score victory over the enemies of democracy until they developed a special sensitivity that developed and grew amidst the flames of the revolutionary struggle against the rulers of the extinct regime, the enemies of democracy. During the periods which the people imposed their enjoyment to their political liberties, they proved their worthiness for that and gave brilliant examples that amazed the enemies. On the morrow of the victory of the 7/7/1958 Revolution, the people set a brilliant example in responding with the patriotic authority and in devoting their efforts to accomplish the conditions of stability so as to enable the patriotic government to consolidate the victory.

When the people exercised some of their democratic liberties in the fields of democratic mass activity, they set the same examples. Demonstrations, public meetings and vast processions were organized without anything taking place which does not confirm the peoples realization to their tasks. Elections for the numerous democratic organizations were held such as the trade unions, the students unions, the Youth Federation, the League for the Defense of Women's rights, the Teachers’ Association and the rest of the professional and social organizations - all of which have furnished evidence to the vitality of the people and the originality of their democratic consciousness. Relations of respect and cooperation between the official patriotic authority and the democratic organizations were established. The problems between the trade unions and the businessmen were solved in the spirit of negotiations and understanding despite the intricacies of these relations. The conduct of solidarity became evident among the students themselves and among every sector of these organizations. The peasants associations took the initiative to solve many of the problems and disputes in the spirit of cooperation and harmony and overcame many of the difficulties that existed for many years and were able to spread the spirit of cooperation in various fields for the achievement of the accomplishment necessitated by the Agrarian Reform. All that have impelled the enemies of the Republic to stand against the democratic liberties of the people and to fan the suspicion and alertness from those liberties. When they failed in that they resorted to various means of deliberate subversion, but they once again failed in preventing the people from exercising those liberties. Hence they resorted to extremely base
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means for instigating against democratic organizations by slandering their reputations and stands hoping to influence some quarters to abandon the democratic organizations. They raised the slogan of disbanding the democratic organizations or the interference in their electoral and internal affairs. But Premier Kassim gave them a strong slap in his speech to the conference of the Journalists Association, in which he said that he will not dissolve any organization and he leaves it to the members of the organization to decide by their own vote to disband or continue with the path they pursued. The Premier Kassim and the Premier Government have announced that this transitional period will be ended on 1/6/1960, had a strong impact on the imperialists, the covetous and their reactionary agents. If threatened with the collapse their propaganda and falsehoods before Iraqi Arab and world public opinion. We shall reveal no secret to state that those circles and quarters are working now feverishly and through all means of intrigues, slanders and threats and the artificial creation of political crises both at home or in relations with neighboring countries in a desperate attempt to maintain the present transitional period and to sabotage the efforts exerted by the patriotic government and the patriotic forces and the broad masses of the people to lay down the foundations of public life on healthy basis that enable the entirety of the people to exercise their democratic, social and human rights and liberties. In our opinion, it is the duty of all the patriotic forces and elements who are sincere to the republic and keen to reinforce its democratic course to exert the maximum efforts they can with a spirit of cooperation and solidarity among themselves and with the patriotic authority to provide for the authority the best means and most secured ones for the transition towards the new era and to foil the endeavors of enemies which attempt to prevent this transition. There is no doubt that the patriotic forces and elements are responsible before the people and before history in the stands which they take and the activities they make in serving or not serving this great target.

On our part, we have struggled since 7/14/1958 and are still fighting to safeguard the Republic, to safeguard this ripe fruit which our people won after bitter struggle and heavy sacrifices. We have put and are still putting ourselves and all our abilities to serve this sacred duty in cooperation with all the patriotic forces and the patriotic authority. We on our part have contributed, together with all the patriotic forces loyal to the republic, in the education of the masses with the spirit of solidarity with the patriotic authority and the spirit of patriotic cooperation and fraternity among the nationalities and the handling of all problems that arise after the very liberal revolution which releases the forces of the people and their aspirations and which explode their hatred to imperialism, feudalism, treason and oppression. The past period of our Republic, testifies to the good results of the stands of the working class towards her national duties and towards the expected problems and disputes with the businessmen. Many of the problems and disputes were solved through the friendly and constructive means thereby depriving on many occasions the saboteurs and infiltrators of the chance to drag the workers into strikes. This period also witnessed comparatively good results for the peasants who live and work under more difficult and complicated circumstances in view of the violent resistance made by the feudal elements and the quarters who are affected by the feudal influence and in view of the fact that the peasants are divided into many categories, the poor peasants, the middle and rich peasants and the small and middle landowners. All these factors render the settlement of the disputes in the countryside among these strata and their mobilization and the unification of their efforts for the task of safeguarding the Republic and backing the patriotic authority for the accomplishment of the Agrarian reform and the increase of production an intricate task. The loyal sons of the people, the students, youth and women and others displayed high vigilance towards the plotting activity. They have backed the patriotic authority in checking the dangers which menace our republic and in defending the gains of the Revolution.

In our opinion, the stubborn and triumphant struggle which was waged by our people against the enemies of the Republic was and still is imposing a common duty on all the patriotic forces and elements which they should perform through solidarity, each in his own field and according to his own way. It is well known, for example, that one of the means of imperialism in fighting the recently liberated countries is the pressure and subversion in the economic sphere: in the fields of industry,
trade and finance. We have witnessed on the morrow of the Revolution the subversive role which was played by the foreign banks and companies as well as the big capitalists who ceased their activity and smuggled their money abroad or froze them, and who spread rumors about the chaos in the Iraqi economy which had a negative effect among several quarters of merchants and businessmen. Such thing also took place in the sphere of construction works and in the agriculture. Naturally the imperialists, the covetous and those who are enraged at the accomplishments of our revolution and its reforms that affected their selfish interests do not cease from placing the consequences of their subversive actions in economy on the responsibility of the Revolution, its new legislations and laws and on the popular masses. Here, some of the patriotic forces who can exercise their political and moral influence in the economic sphere can contribute their share in this sphere by establishing confidence and optimism in the future and by establishing the resolution to overcome the difficulties that usually arise after every revolution. The raising of the slogan of stability and insisting on it will continue to be of no use unless the patriotic forces take the initiative to struggle, in solidarity with each other and each in its private sphere of influence to accomplish the conditions for stability by creating the basis where the legitimate interests of all national classes meet, and correspond with the line of the revolution. The road towards stability, is the road of providing the conditions and circumstances that facilitate the task of the patriotic authority in the transition towards the new life. It requires from all the loyal patriotic forces and elements inside the patriotic government and outside it to fight patiently and persistently each in his sphere, abilities and special means with close solidarity with the patriotic government in order to establish the favorable ground for ensuring the stability. These tasks impose themselves urgently in this period in particular when the people are receiving with great hope the beginning of the new life which they expect will achieve for them their political and human rights. [=]

24132. Jasim, Latif. Interview with Latif Jasim, Culture and Information Minister by Unidentified Reporter for Der Spiegel published on October 8, 1990: Part 1. [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Minister, will there be a war? [Jasim] War may break out at any time. However, this depends on the United States. [DER SPIEGEL] Why? [Jasim] Because it is increasingly massing troops in the region. Soldiers are being deployed here under the pretext that we want to attack Saudi Arabia. This is a dirty lie. We have a non-aggression pact with the Saudis. We do not have the slightest reason for attacking Saudi Arabia. After the crisis in Kuwait, King Fahd asked us to participate in a summit meeting of five Arab states. We immediately agreed to this. [DER SPIEGEL] Why did this meeting not come about? [Jasim] Because suddenly the Saudis no longer wanted it and called the Americans instead. [DER SPIEGEL] Do you have an idea what made the Saudis change their mind? [Jasim] As we now know, the whole thing was a perfidious plot which began long before things happened in Kuwait. It was initiated by the Zionists. Israel realized that it was no longer able to launch a big attack against Iraq on its own. As a result, it ganged up with the scoundrels in Kuwait and other shaikhs in order to start a plot against Iraq. So, we were forced to eliminate the shaikh of Kuwait. However, the plot is still going on and may lead to a war any time, as I just stressed. [DER SPIEGEL] Let me point out one thing before you continue with your plot theory: There had been no conflict without your attack on Kuwait, and the Americans would not have come to Saudi Arabia either. [Jasim] This was only a cheap excuse and has nothing to do with the villainy that is going on now. A long time before we invaded Iraq, the United States began an economic siege of Iraq. The entire dirty campaign that was unleashed against us in the United States and Western Europe--with London playing a particularly outstanding role--was already part of the plot. In no time the Americans arrived with their tanks, guns, and other heavy weapons. This proves that everything was carefully prepared a long time in advance. Why are they threatening with a war now, despite the fact that we suggested an Arab solution and are willing to agree to such a solution? [DER SPIEGEL] But why should the Saudis, without any need, place themselves in such a difficult situation? They are now seen as dubious guardians of the holy sites by the whole Islamic world, who called infidels to help them against their fellow believers. Do you think they would have risked this stigma if they had not felt threatened by Iraq? [Jasim] The Saudis know quite well that we never threatened them. This is an infamous lie. Why should we threaten or even attack Saudi Arabia? [DER SPIEGEL] Well, maybe because you wanted more oil. [Jasim] We do not need more oil. We have enough. [DER SPIEGEL] Now that you can no longer sell it, you have more than enough. Why should the Saudis maneuver themselves voluntarily into such a tricky situation? [Jasim] We, too, asked ourselves this question and prepared a detailed analysis. According to our 100% correct information, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, Bandar, played a key role. It was Bandar who, together with the Americans, initiated the whole thing. He also persuaded his uncle, King Fahd, to join the plot, thus exposing him to a great danger. The background to this intrigue is a conflict within the ruling clan. Fahd then dropped his proposition for a summit conference, which was to have provided an Arab solution to the problem of Kuwait. Thus, he would also be responsible for a possible war, which would destroy him as well. [DER SPIEGEL] Are you prepared for such a war? [Jasim] We are prepared. Our people’s morale is excellent, and we have the best weapons. We have a regular army comprising over 1 million men who have gathered experience in eight years of war. In addition, we have 5.5 million volunteers. If the United States really starts a war here, it will suffer one of its worst defeats in the desert. [DER SPIEGEL] What makes you so sure of that? After all, the United States is a world power, also in military terms. [Jasim] Because such a war will quickly develop into a world war. This is an extraordinarily explosive region; a lot of things can bum here. We have the means to set everything on fire or to blow everything up. [DER SPIEGEL] This may be true. But why a world war? First of all, the United Nations, and thus almost the entire world, is against you. [Jasim] Once a war breaks out, nobody can say when and how it will end. Oil prices will explode first, to $200-300 a barrel. How can the world endure this? Who can pay that? Already at this point, when we have not yet fired a single shot, the oil price stands a $40, which is nearly three times as much as a few months ago. [DER SPIEGEL] Many countries which do not even think of war are responsible for this. [Jasim] You may be right. However, can you imagine what will happen when a war starts? [Reprinted from Fred Moore (compiler), Iraq Speaks: Documents On The Gulf Crisis. Palo Alto, Calif., N.D.] [=]

24133. Jasim, Latif. Interview with Latif Jasim, Culture and Information Minister by Unidentified Reporter for Der Spiegel published on October 8, 1990: Part 2. [DER SPIEGEL] Even your Soviet friends have abandoned you. Were you not completely taken by surprise by the strong international reaction to your invasion of Kuwait? [Jasim] I would like to point out once more that the whole thing was and still is an incredible plot. Imperialism, Zionism, and the whoremonger Kuwait and its helpers conspired against Iraq. The Kuwaitis pushed down our currency to one-fifth the value of their dinar. We had to defend ourselves against this step. At the same time, an opportunity presented itself for correcting history and for finally incorporating Kuwait into our country. [DER SPIEGEL] At the price of international isolation? [Jasim] We are by far not as isolated as you think. Those who are against us wanted to suppress us economically before that. However, we can rely on the support of the Islamic masses whose anger against the United States is growing day by day. They are ready to fight with us in a jihad, a holy war. For the first time in Arab history, nationalism and Islam have forged an alliance. You should not deceive yourselves. We are by no means alone.
[DER SPIEGEL] However, most of the Arab states are against you. Many even send troops because they do not like the idea that one Arab state was simply swallowed by its neighbor.

[Jasim] We only implemented our chartered right of 1913. Kuwait always belonged to us. Now we have incorporated it in our country. In addition, we struggle for the unity of all Arabs. You Germans, whom we wholeheartedly congratulate on your unification, should show particular understanding for this.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, Kuwait apparently did not want to be united with you. Do you see no possibility of a compromise, that you withdraw from Kuwait, for example, and keep only the disputed islands and the border region of Rumaylah with its oil fields?

[Jasim] No, never! Never! You can forget about that.

[DER SPIEGEL] We do not want to forget that you are still keeping thousands of foreigners as hostages who have nothing to do with the events. When will you release them?

[Jasim] They are not hostages but guests of the Iraqi people, as our president stated. Unfortunately—but for a noble reason—we were forced to keep them here. They help to prevent the outbreak of a war. We hope that it will soon be possible for them to be reunited with their families in their home countries. We only want the United States to provide a written guarantee that it will not attack Iraq. Then our guests can immediately go home.

[DER SPIEGEL] You always hold others responsible. How do you want to get out of this mess?

[Jasim] We did not start the whole thing. It was the conspirators who want to destroy us.

[DER SPIEGEL] You must live with the consequences resulting from your invasion of Kuwait. A worldwide embargo has been adopted against you. Nobody buys your oil anymore, and nobody supplies goods to you. How long can you endure this?

[Jasim] Of course we are suffering under this embargo. Pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs are becoming scare. Our children have no milk. This hurts. Nobody denies this. However, we are a big country with two big rivers. We have mobilized our agriculture to make up for the losses.

[DER SPIEGEL] This takes time.

[Jasim] Of course this will take time. We will not be able to harvest tomorrow what we sowed today. However, the embargo will not kill us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Abu al-'Abbas and other radical Palestinian leaders conferred with your government. Do you want them to open fronts all over the world in the event of war?

[Jasim] All Arab forces, no matter of what orientation, have their place in Iraq. We do not tell them what they have to do. We do not use terrorist methods. Also, we will not unleash terrorist activities against countries that do not terrorize us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Israel has now started to distribute masks among its population. Must Israel be afraid of Iraqi terrorism?

[Jasim] We will only attack those who attack us. If Israel makes preparations now, this indicates that it wants to attack us. If Israel launches the first strike, we will strike back. We are prepared for it.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you consider it conceivable that your Arab brothers who supported Iraq in its war against Iran suddenly conspire with Israel and the United States against Iraq? Why should they do that?

[Jasim] Everybody knows that. Nobody wants to or can accept that an Arab country in this clearly divided world should become as powerful as Iraq is now. Everybody hoped that we would be completely destroyed after he war against Iran—economically, socially, politically, and militarily. The opposite was the case. We are stronger today than ever before. However, this is not allowed. No Arab country in this region must be stronger an Israel. Israel must remain the undisputed dominating power. We, who have always claimed that we want to berate Jerusalem, must be kept weak because they want it this way.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are things as simple as that?

[Jasim] Yes, they are. However, there is also another reason: oil. The United States wants to be in control here. During the Carter era the United States always tried to get access to the oil resources. Only those who control the most important oil resources can rule the world. In this way, Europe and Japan can easily be blackmailed any time. However, this is not possible as long as there is a powerful Iraq. Thus, they started a plot against Iraq. When Israel no longer succeeded in keeping us small because we had already become too strong, Kuwait assumed the role of the Zionists and pushed the oil price down by overproduction so that we lost billions, which endangered our economy. In this way, the scoundrel Israel wanted to force us on our knees and starve us. The emirates cooperated with Israel.

[DER SPIEGEL] You seem to be obsessed with the idea of the alleged front between the shaikhs, Israel, and the United States. It seems fantastic to us.

[Jasim] Well, this is the truth. The Kuwaitis acted in a particularly stupid way so we decided to kill two flies at the same time: To destroy the plot and to fulfill our historic duty, to incorporate Kuwait in our country.

[DER SPIEGEL] In this way you take the risk that the whole region might explode?

[Jasim] Let me explain the whole bitter truth: If this fire breaks out with an immense force now, the flames will reach the sky and sparks will fly in all directions. Heaps of corpses will be seen in the desert. But this will not be everything. Nobody—nobody, I would like to repeat this—can imagine what explosives will be released, and what will happen in the Islamic world. Will the Americans really be ready to sacrifice their lives if a war should break out? Will the French die for Kuwait? One billion Muslims will fight on our side, and US interests in the Islamic world will be destroyed all of a sudden.

[DER SPIEGEL] We will also be destroyed in such a fire.

[Jasim] In any case, we have the power to cause the destruction of the entire Gulf region in an inferno. You do not have the slightest idea of what we intend to do and what we can blow up virtually everything. We will not do this because we are vandals but because we will defend ourselves with all possible means if we are attacked. We possess means that you do not even dream of. We will not simply be slaughtered.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you want as many people as possible to die with you?

[Jasim] We will not die. The others will die. [Reprinted from Fred Moore (compiler), Iraq Speaks: Documents On The Gulf Crisis. Palo Alto, Calif., N.D.] [-]

24134. Karadaghi, Pary; Kurdish Human Rights Watch Inc.; Kurdish Women Delegation; Working Group on Kurdish Women. Press Release: Kurdish Women Delegation to the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, China. Caucus Statement by the Working Group on Kurdish Women, September 6, 1995. This statement is the voice of Kurdish Women, September 6, 1995. This statement is the voice of Kurdish Women. The women who participated in the dialogue "Challenge to Peace, Freedom, Human Rights, socio-economic equity, Meeting the needs of Kurdish women." Human rights abuses against Kurdish women living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have seriously blocked the road to peace and stability. This dialogue was held in conjunction with the NGO Forum on women in Beijing, China. This consensus document clarifies certain areas of concern with respect to the Platform for Action and strategies to address them regarding indigenous people, refugee and internally displaced women's protection, human rights, repatriation, and socio-economic development.

We Kurdish Women Delegation in the NGO Forum are deeply concerned about the fate of our Kurdish sisters in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria and elsewhere. Escalating violence, wars, internal conflicts, and vast human rights abuses have caused deep distress and sufferance. We demand equality in the following areas:

- Refugee women and the internally displaced are not sufficiently protected by UNHCR, or other UN agencies in the region. The internal economic embargo imposed by Sadam Hussein has led life unbearable for the Kurdish population and more specifically for women. Added to that the UN embargo on the whole of Iraq. We demand the immediate separation of the north of Iraq from the rest of Iraq and the UN sanctions.

- Education, Iraqi Kurdish women and girls are deprived of education and many Kurdish women are removed from schools, higher education.
institutions and universities only because of their ethnic identity, that is being Kurdish. Prohibition against participation of Kurdish scientists and specialists at high-level cultural projects and important scientific research work. This is the case of our Kurdish sisters in Syria, Iran, and Turkey. The economic embargo imposed by the Iraqi government and the UN sanctions have their toll on Kurdish women living in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Employment, the working possibilities and layoffs are increasingly practised against the Kurdish people because of their ethnic identity. Prohibition of working at government positions because of their ethnic identity. This has increased the unemployment rate to more than 75% in Syria and 90% in Iraq. As a consequence this has led to a lower socio-economic situation more specifically for women.

Health, lack of health services, immunization and medical supplies to cover the needs of women.

Violence against Women, increased practices of rape, intimidation and violence as a weapon of war practised against Kurdish women.

Armed Conflict, eleven years of war in Turkey led to the loss of lives rendering thousands of victims specially women and children.

Economic Participation, the inequity of the economic participation and development in Kurdish inhabited areas has led to the non-participation of Kurdish women in the economic development of their respective countries.

Right to Citizenship and equal rights as other women in Countries of origin. The example of 150000 Kurdish women in Syria. In Syria, Kurdish men and women are looked upon as "second class citizens and immigrants" in their own ancestral land.

Freedom of Speech of journalists and writers, in the last four years 400 journalists have been arrested in Turkey for expressing their opinions on the situation of Kurds in the South-eastern region of Turkey.

Mine explosives and its danger on women and children. The Iraqi government has left thousands of mine explosives in 5000 villages. Every day the "mine fields of Sadam Hussein".

We demand the internal conflicts inside northern Iraq comes to a halt. A separate letter will be addressed from the Kurdish Women Delegation to the Kurdish leadership.

Press Release Prepared by Dr. Pary Karadaghi, Executive Director of Kurdish Human Rights Watch Inc. (KHRW) 10560 Main Street, Suite 205, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 USA Phone: 703-385-3806, Fax: 703-385-3643. [2]

24135. Khorasani, Rajaie. Lebanon: The Victim of Zionist Airraids, Aggressions, Crimes and Atrocities: A Speech Given To The UN Security Council on the Subject of Lebanon By Dr. Rajaie Khorasani, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN. On March 7, 1985. I would like to congratulate you for presiding over the Security Council and particularly for the masterly manner in which you have been conducting the affairs of the Council. I should also congratulate Ambassador Krishnan of India, who during the month of February, carried out the heavy responsibilities of the Council with great efficiency and diplomatic skill. Back to Lebanon, which has been the victim of Zionist air-raids, aggressions, crimes and atrocities even long before its occupation by the Zionist army. Lebanon is now the holy land of struggle and resistance. Muslim people of Lebanon have kept Beirut-based foreign journalists out of the area and have closed the smaller roads between the villages hindering local communications.

The scope of Zionist crimes increasingly widened, according to Mr. Rilmer's article. "The Red Cross said today that the Israeli forces had put 112 new prisoners into the Ansar prison camp in Southern Lebanon since the middle of this month, raising the number held there to 1602. Under normal practices, however, prisoners are often held and interrogated for days before being transferred to Ansar. The Shiite Imam, or religious leader, of the village of Burj al Shemali, who was seen being carried off by Israeli soldiers during a raid last week, was found today by a shepherd in a field near Beirut. The Israeli military authorities are using a West Bank prison as an "intimidation center" where prisoners are sometimes beaten and tortured, lawyers have alleged." As the Zionist atrocities increasingly continue, the scene of the crimes shows further uncontrolled madness of the Zionist crimes. Another article in the Christian Science Monitor by Jim Muir on 1/25/1985 reports: "Any house where arms or suspects are found is bulldozed. Several dozen villagers are usually taken for questioning. None has yet returned. They came in with tanks and troops shooting everywhere, one said. All the men between 14-60 were taken to the village school for interrogation. They took police dogs into the houses where the women were." The same article reports "When the village sheik tried to explain to the Israelis that they were turning the whole house against them, they shouted at him to get back in line... The Israelis were weighed down with arms, but they were more frightened of us than we were of them. We laughed at them." In his article in the New York Times of 2/25/1985 John Kilmer, reported-'Israeli soldiers besieged at least nine Shiite Moslem villages in Southern Lebanon today; continuing their crackdown on the underground resistance. He says Israel initiated the conflict with its Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, called an iron fist policy,... To show its iron fist,"columns of Israelis backed by armored personnel carriers and tank carriers and tanks have surrounded and entered a string of Shiite villages just east of Tyre that have been centers of rebellion. They rounded up all the men of the villages for questioning, carried off suspected Shiite guerrillas and bulldozed or blew up houses." "Details of the Israeli action are coming out slowly because the Israelis have kept Beirut-based foreign journalists out of the area and have closed the smaller roads between the villages hindering local communications." The scope of Zionist crimes increasingly widened, according to Mr. Rilmer's article. "The Red Cross said today that the Israeli forces had put 112 new prisoners into the Ansar prison camp in Southern Lebanon since the middle of this month, raising the number held there to 1602. Under normal practices, however, prisoners are often held and interrogated for days before being transferred to Ansar. The Shiite Imam, or religious leader, of the village of Burj al Shemali, who was seen being carried off by Israeli soldiers during a raid last week, was found today by a shepherd in a field near Beirut. The Israeli military authorities are using a West Bank prison as an "intimidation center" where prisoners are sometimes beaten and tortured, lawyers have alleged."
and redundant. It is particularly so because some conscientious member states of the Security Council know pretty well that their hands too are in the blood of the Lebanese Muslims deep up to their elbows. The basic question in front of the Council is not why the Council has been watching all these terrorist, criminal acts in cold blood.

The answer to this question considering the presence of Zionist supporters in the Council is quite clear. The basic and enlightening question that all the Arab and Muslim countries altogether are electricing, and the Zionists, forces, anything happened to the international peace and security or not? Was the sleeping conscience of the guardians of international peace and security bothered? Is it not the case that each one of us has been sleeping fairly well on the blatant and continued violation of international peace and security? Is it not that in all these two painfully slow moving years every hour of which for the people of Lebanon has lasted longer than a year for the Security Council, only the brave Muslims of Lebanon have been sacrificing to the last drop of their blood in defence of international peace and security? Do you not agree Mr. President, that ever since the enemies of mankind installed this dirty boil of Zionist base in the bottom of Palestine, international peace and security has perished from our region and that therefore, those who have come together here to defend the safety of expanding borders of Israel have been continuously betraying the cause of peace and violating the Charter? Do you therefore not agree that they are bloody liars who have sent their Zionist agents to our region in order to devastate, occupy and plunder?

Among the millions of Arabs and hundreds of millions of Muslims, the people of Lebanon, with all their genuine commitment to the liberating faith of Islam, have taken upon themselves to demonstrate a historic record of resistance, determination and struggle. For the first time they have defeated the champion of the 1967 Six Day War. The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt who is now attending the Council and remembers the size of the Arab army of 1967 war can well appreciate how great the achievement of the Muslim people of Lebanon is. Of all national and international entities, which have been some how pertinent to the Arab-Israel conflict and who have wished to be known as adversaries of the Zionist invaders, only the Muslim people of Lebanon have proved victorious under the banner of Islam. The international body and the Security Council are deeply indebted to the people of Lebanon. It is they who have been fighting against aggression and for the cause of peace and independence. They are the real defenders of international peace and security, not those who produce rhetorics in this chamber.

With an Islamic determination, they have punished the Zionist aggressor, and those behind them. They are thus paying the heavy price of that lawful punishment that they have brought, and shall by the grace of God continue to bring, to the Zionist enemy. And at the peak of this struggle of crime and punishment we, all of a sudden, observe a desperate oppressed can rely and which the Istickbary powers fear. They rather displacing the blame on the Islamic Republic of Iran, they do not in end to make it evident that the entire struggle in the Middle East is a confrontation between Islam and Kufr? Mr. President, The record of the Security Council and its governing principles show that those who can maintain their interest outside the Security Council in the real world can also maintain their interest in this chamber and those who are blindly fascinated by the material glamour of the satanic worldly powers, and has therefore adopted servility to them outside the United Nations, remain surrogate and tributary to those powers inside this chamber too. And therefore, until and unless the Muslim nations do bring together all their potential in a united Islamic front, they are bound to be scared of Islam as the enemies of Islam are and will not be able to contribute to the human society all the good and happiness that Islam requires of them to contribute. When Muslims identify themselves with anything other than Islam, then their new artificial, insecure identity fearfully departs from Islam and anything Islamic. It is this fear of Islam and the Islamic revolution, as today's article by Karen Elliot says in Washington Post, that encouraged certain Arab nations including Iraq to harken to Egypt's call for a broader Arab-Israeli peace. My first proposal is to our Arab brothers in the region who have mistaken the problem for the solution. Islam, I do not need to assure them, is the solution and the problem.

And a broader Arab-Israeli peace is only the problem and surely not the solution. To the Security Council, if it really wants to play “Security Council”, my proposal is a strong and straight forward resolution which condemns the Zionist aggressor for its recent crimes as well as for its illegal and over-due occupation of the Lebanese territory and which requires the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Zionist forces from all the occupied territories. We also hope that professional vetoers will this time try to take side with the Arabs who have both plenty of cheap oil and a lucrative market: and not with the Zionist base, which up to now, in addition to a very heavy load of military and financial bills, has brought nothing to the United States other than deep animosity and hatred by the people of the Middle East. Finally the Islamic regime in Iran, due to its Islamic quality, is always blamed for all Islamic developments in the region and particularly in the Lebanon. In putting the blame on the Islamic Republic of Iran, they do not in end to make propaganda for Iran as a powerful Islamic state on which the oppressed can rely and which the Istickbary powers fear. They rather want to discredit the Muslim people of Lebanon, as if others besides Iran are neither entitled to nor committed to Islam. Let me assure those concerned, that first of all Islam is no body's monopoly. All people including our brothers in the Lebanon are equally entitled to Islam. Secondly, as soon as a nation like Lebanon refreshes its commitment to Islam, it will continue its constructive liberating role independently of the Islamic Republic of Iran and immediately on the basis of Islam and accordingly to it. Those who think otherwise are ignorant of Islam. What you are observing in Lebanon is simply the light of Islam which has happily enlightened a portion of the tiny population of Lebanon, who have resolutely decided to powerfully cleanse their Islamic homeland from the darkness of Zionism and imperialism. Nothing can stop them. The more you try to extinguish this light the more you force it up. The best advice to the enemy is to leave the area peacefully, though it is not easy to carry out this advice. I am told that the Israeli currency used to be equal to one dollar but nowadays more than, 9000 of it hardly make a dollar. Airline tickets in Israel are to be paid for in dollars. This means if the Ashkenazi Jews sell all their property and real estate, they can hardly get a return ticket to Brooklyn. This means even for those return tickets the poor American farmer has to pay. Second, to my Arab brothers, I wish to reiterate that the Zionist base is a balloon beast full of air. Don't fear it. It is nothing. An American Professor of Politics who once came to see me commented that the United States could never understand how weak and...
defeatable this petty satan was. I therefore hope that American officials will no longer spend on a Zionist real non-entity. They have to live with Muslims; with independent and powerful Muslims. They would better start to learn to do it seen and with less casualties on both sides. To the Arab brothers I have to reiterate that the enemy is already defeated. You don't need to fear it. Let us join together and liberate Palestine. Believe me the beautiful flag of Palestine shall soon be hoisting in the entire occupied land. The sooner we establish our United Islaami Board, the sooner the liberation of Palestine and the rest of the oppressed people will come about. Since the victories of the Islamic forces in the Lebanon are usually taken as the fruit of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, then we can clearly understand why in spite of the 12 June agreement and the presence of the United Nations team in the two capitals, we have to be the target of huge devastating missiles in Desful, Abadan, Ahwaz, Sari-pole-Zhab and other places. Thank you. [=]

24136. LCOME. “POSTAL WORKERS FOR PEACE: Statement on the Persian Gulf Crisis”, in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1991. (Among the resolutions and statements on the Persian Gulf crisis the following from the Miami-based Postal Workers for Peace raised a number of the key issues the labor movement must confront in the coming months - EDITOR) The holiday season is a time to celebrate peace on earth, yet once again our government prepares a monstrous war in a far away land. Over a half million troops, mostly Americans, are assembled in Saudi Arabia for what has been predicted to be one of the largest and costliest battles in world history. While President Bush has solicited support from other governments, it is clear that American troops will do most of the fighting, and the American people will be expected to make the sacrifices and bear the brunt of this war. Already, 53000 body bags are in place to ship our dead soldiers back home. In a few short months, on the pretext of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush has brought us to the brink of a terrible war, possibly involving chemical, biological and/or nuclear weapons and over a million civilian and military casualties. The entire globe will feel the impact of this war. Drastic increases in the price of oil will precipitate economic collapse throughout the third world, resulting in increased misery and starvation for millions. As unemployment grows, the governments of Europe, Japan and the US will use repressive to beat down the labor movement and lower the standard of living of workers. Few would disagree that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a brutal act in violation of the right to national sovereignty. Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait. Yet no one should believe that that is why US troops are now massed in the desert. The war in Vietnam, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, and over a decade of military intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua show that the US government has no principles when it comes to national sovereignty. In the Middle East, the US armed and financed Israel's murderous invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and continues to give massive aid to Israel in spite of its violations of Kuwait was a brutal act in violation of the right to national sovereignty. Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait. Yet no one should believe that that is why US troops are now massed in the desert. The war in Vietnam, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, and over a decade of military intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua show that the US government has no principles when it comes to national sovereignty. In the Middle East, the US armed and financed Israel's murderous invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and continues to give massive aid to Israel in spite of its continued military occupation of land internationally recognized as belonging to Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians. No, the US government is not interested in upholding any principle of territorial integrity. Neither are US troops there to defend democracy. The "legitimate" government of Kuwait is just like the Shah's regime in Iran or the ruling rich in Central America - families of reactionary billionaires which do Washington's bidding while crushing all dissent. Democratic rights for women and unions are slim to nonexistent in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. We are always told that war is necessary to defend "democracy" from "aggression", and we are getting tired of it. Many see this correctly as a war for oil. The troops are there to ensure that world oil production continues to be dominated by a handful of mostly US multinational oil companies. This is a war to maintain the unchallenged US domination of the production, pricing and distribution of world petroleum supplies. Workers are always the losers in war. It is we who suffer and die and kill our fellow workers in strange lands while at home the rich reap the profits and attack our unions and break our strikes in the name of "national defense." Congress no longer even mentions the so-called peace dividend or increased social services through hoped-for cuts in defense spending. In the inner cities, joblessness, run-down housing, homelessness, drug addiction, and a failed system of education and health care are pushing conditions to the breaking point. Yet this war will bring even deeper cuts in social services. Laying down their lives for the oil companies appears more and more to be the only job available to African-American and Latino youth. We see the effect of this lowering of social services in the post office, where budget cuts have led to the 30 cent stamp, casuals delivering mail, lower delivery standards, the contracting out of jobs, shorter window hours, an overall decline in the quality of service. The total breakdown of collective bargaining. Now we also see assignments and routes left vacant as postal workers in the reserves are sent off war. All of the major provisions in our contract now go to an arbitrator, as management seeks to gut our benefits and job security. The stage is set not only for war with Iraq, but also for war against the workers here at home. It is time for us to fight back - and our fight is here.

Postal Workers for Peace is proud to join the growing movement against this war. We know that the labor movement will not be able to move forward if we don't stop this war. As we struggle for a fair contract and workers' rights, we must also demand: "US Troops out of the Middle East!" "No War for Oil!" "Money for Jobs, Not for War!" Postal Workers for Peace rejects this war drive and calls for the immediate withdrawal of all US forces in the Persian Gulf, so that the countries in the region can be free to achieve a peace settlement respecting the national rights of all peoples in the region. We will work to support the massive united actions needed to stop this war. [Postal Workers for Peace, P. O. Box 37-0135 Miami, Florida.] [=]

24137. LCOME: Javidi, Ali. "From the Shah to Khomeni The Emergence of the Iranian Working Class", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Spring 1990. THE EMERGENCE OF THE modern Iranian working class had its origin in the Shah's land reforms of 1963-1968. The land reform program nationalized some of the land owned by big land-owners and "distributed" it among peasants. The small peasants who were financially incapable of using the land had no option but to sell their portion to the giant agricultural corporations and leave for the cities to find jobs as workers in the industrial zone. By 1974 thousands of factories were set up, most of which were initiated or subsidized by the government. The Shah's government made most of its revenue from oil explorations and sales, pouring into the country vast amounts of foreign capital. This meant that while the formal investment of foreign companies amounted to a mere 10% of the total annual investment, the Shah's government pumped the other 90% from oil revenues into the economy. Crash industrialization or what the Shah called rapid modernization of the society marked the beginning of the contemporary history of Iran.

INDUSTRIALIZATION: Industrialization on the one hand brought huge profits to foreign companies and created a set of very rich, affluent Iranian factory owners, a middle class and technocrats; on the other hand it created millions of young Iranian workers, deprived of minimum standards of living and basic labor rights including the right to strike and the formation of their own organizations and unions. The sharp rise in oil prices in the mid 70's brought a short "boom" period. The astronomical revenues at this time enabled the government to revise its development plans, accelerating the pace of industrialization. But the "boom" was shortlived and with the drop in oil revenues in 1977, the crash industrialization program went awry. The government then attempted to counter its huge budget deficit and adapted an austerity program to finance its development projects. Foreign companies began to see darkness rather than light at the end of the tunnel and began withdrawing their formal, directly invested capital from the country. Unemployment shot up to unprecedented levels and inflation grew to such an extent that even the Shah's legislation and propaganda campaigns to counter price rises ended in failure. A crisis had hit Iran and its latent effects embraced the country all at once and so deeply, that in addition to the working class, the middle class also observed a drop in the general level of subsistence. It was in such circumstances that members of the clergy which had been run to the fringes of the land reform and the cultural and social values that ran parallel with the industrialization, raised their voices against the Shah's modernization plans. Their hostility towards the Shah grew mainly from the land reforms that had taken most of the population to the industrial zones and had broken the clergy's traditional endowments. As
the economic crisis deepened further and increasing numbers of Iranians turned against the Shah and his despotic rule, the revolution gathered momentum. From the second half of 1978 the workers' muscle proved the decisive force in toppling the regime. Khomeni, leading the clergy, exploited the workers' and peoples' discontent with the Shah while cunningly avoiding the specifics of his program. Despite his attempts and that of his pre-set government to accept a quiet transfer of power, the February revolution took place and swept away the monarchy. From the very beginning the new regime attacked the gains of the revolution (such as the 40-hour work week, the right to organize and participate in political activity) and its thugs attacked the demonstrations of unemployed workers; women demanding equal rights with men, etc. During the revolution, workers, on their own initiative, had formed councils in many factories. These workers' councils were the most advanced form of mass organization in which the workers participated in their struggles and was one of the highlights of the labor movement in Iran. Under the new regime these councils were attacked and replaced with the official Islamic councils.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR: The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war has been one million dead, many thousands permanently disabled, millions of refugees from war-torn areas, and hunger. The war-economy resulted in mass redundancy and unemployment in all branches of non-military industries. This had a major effect on the workers' living standards. During the eight years of war and the reign of terror, Iranian workers never submitted to the regime. Hundreds of strikes were organized and there were bloody confrontations. In many factories workers fought bare-handed against the gunfire of the regime's armed forces. They opposed the regime in every way possible to gain their right to jobs, improved working conditions, higher wages, the right to form independent organizations such as workers' councils and unions, and hold regular mass meetings to discuss and unify their actions. With the growth of anti-war struggles, the Islamic republic, sensing its weakness, accepted a ceasefire and began a new wave of repression, marked with torture and mass executions. The regime is now trying to impose the repression experienced in war-time in a time of "peace," driving workers to more poverty and higher unemployment. It is in such circumstances that Iranian workers are struggling. At the same time, international support is being sought to create external pressures for change and bring encouragement to the Iran labor movement. [Ali Javid is a member of AFT Local 1475 and the Iranian-American Labor Solidarity Committee. For information write IALSC, POB 25A72, Los Angeles, Ca. 90025.][=] 24138. LCOME; Webb, Carol; Traugott, Al. "North California Labor Councils Lead Nation In Opposing Bush's Preparation for War", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1991. IN THE MONTHS prior to the outbreak of the war the labor councils of Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara and San Benito Counties passed resolutions in October and November calling for withdrawal of all military forces from the Gulf region and all but San Francisco called for an international peace conference "at which the complex political and economic problems of the Middle East, including the invasion of Kuwait" could be resolved through diplomacy. Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not mentioned by name, its inclusion in such a conference was implied. The resolutions, which were generally similar, detailed reasons why organized labor has a stake in the conflict: children of working people make up the bulk of all military forces; it means the end of the "peace dividend" when funds are desperately needed for domestic programs; and focus on this crisis diverts attention from the Bush administration's failure to deal with the growing recession and the S & L scandal. Simply stated, the labor councils' sentiments were that working people do not want to pay for or die in another war so far from home to protect the interests of large oil corporations. These resolutions emerged from a growing understanding of the US involvement. Bush did not commit more than 40,000 troops to the Middle East to "draw a line in the sand" beyond which Iraq must not pass. The most powerful country in the world can draw such a line with a few thousand troops.

BUSH SUPPORTED PREVIOUS INVASIONS: Nor could Bush be offended by the naked aggression of Saddam Hussein, for he supported Iraq's invasion of Iran, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and, of course, the US invasions of Grenada and Panama. Neither does it seem likely that the goal is to restore the "legitimate rights" of the Kuwaitis or the "preservation of our way of life," which in this case seems to mean access to cheap oil. An attempt by Secretary of State James Baker to convince US workers that the intervention in the gulf was to "preserve" their jobs never got off the ground. Baker previously had announced the US intention of remaining in the Middle East in the future. That is what this foray is all about—the domination and control of the area and its resources. Recent pronouncements by government officials have made the point that if the US is to continue to dominate the international economy, we will have to depend increasingly on the military's capacity to make Third World markets secure and to guarantee access to raw materials. Since the November election, the Administration has made it clear that an invasion of Kuwait and the aerial destruction of Iraq's military capacity is what is intended. So what does this mean for labor? It means, first of all, the death of thousands of children of US and Middle Eastern workers—not the sons of sheiks or the sons and daughters of oil magnates. It is estimated that an invasion of Iraq, 20,000-30,000 US troops will be killed and hundreds of thousands of Arab soldiers and civilians will die. Of course, workers will continue to pay a disproportionately large share of the cost in four ways: through increased taxes, through the diversion of tax money, from much-needed social services to the military, by more wage and benefit concessions to guarantee high profit margins, and with our lives. In addition, military spending is inflationary and results in less employment then similar expenditures on housing or education or road construction. Spending on weapons pumps money into the economy while satisfying no consumer need or demands. The result is increased demand, higher prices and a further reduction in the real earnings of workers. One can see what is happening to the price of housing during the military buildup of the 1980s. The US, in its attempts to guarantee access to markets and to oil or other raw materials, must necessarily make deals with the most backward and oppressive elements in the countries it controls. Those are the ones who deny workers the right to organize, who kill those who struggle to achieve the most basic rights and even minimal standards of living. This has been the case in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, as well as the Middle East. Such policies must inevitably undermine the labor movement in the United States. When General Motors can get away with paying subsistence wages in Mexico, it becomes more difficult for US workers to maintain, let alone increase, wage levels here. Our well-being as workers, as union members, surely lies in our support for a country's right to self-determination and workers' right to organize in every part of the world. The war that seems about to begin in the Middle East is not being fought for democracy, for human rights, for self-determination, or for any of the principles that we cherish for ourselves and our country. It is critical that we in the labor movement speak out against US intervention in the Middle East in every way that we can, for in this country, we are the ones who will pay. [Al Traugott is a long-time activist and Carol Webb is formerly secretary of the Santa Clara and San Benito Co. Central Labor Council. This article is updated from one in Labor Notes in Dec.][==] 24139. Lancaster, Pat. "Mosaic Of Fantasy and Legends: An Exhibition of the Paintings of Suad al-Attar Opens In London This Month; Being a Woman, A Painter, and Iraqi, All Of These Are Important", in Middle East Labor Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1991. IN THE MONTHS prior to the outbreak of the war the labor councils of Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara and San Benito Counties passed resolutions in October and November calling for withdrawal of all military forces from the Gulf region and all but San Francisco called for an international peace conference "at which the complex political and economic problems of the Middle East, including the invasion of Kuwait" could be resolved through diplomacy. Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not mentioned by name, its inclusion in such a conference was implied. The resolutions, which were generally similar, detailed reasons why organized labor has a stake in the conflict: children of working people make up the bulk of all military forces; it means the end of the "peace dividend" when funds are desperately needed for domestic programs; and focus on this crisis diverts attention from the Bush administration's failure to deal with the growing recession and the S & L scandal. Simply stated, the labor councils' sentiments were that working people do not want to pay for or die in another war so far from home to protect the interests of large oil corporations. These resolutions emerged from a growing understanding of the US involvement. Bush did not commit more than 40,000 troops to the Middle East to "draw a line in the sand" beyond which Iraq must not pass. The most powerful country in the world can draw such a line with a few thousand troops.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) published in late 1995 a study in which it attributes to the US/UN sanctions against Iraq the responsibility for the death of over 500000 children. This genocide continues the line of manifold war crimes for which the US administration should be made accountable.

The sanctions are maintained by Washington because of strategical and politico-economical reasons and attempts--by holding the Iraqi people hostage--to uphold its superclass interests in the Gulf.

The main reasons for the maintenance of the embargo seem to me the following:

1. The sanctions should suggest that Iraq still constitutes a danger [to world peace]. Thus the fears of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of Iraq are continually fuelled. The regimes of both Gulf states believe that they cannot be without the 'protection' of US troops. The permission to permanently station its troops in the Gulf--long-sought by Washington--with the aim to directly exert military and economic control of the oil fields, has now been granted by the regimes. The costs of stationing US troops is borne by these countries. In this connection one should point to the significant arms trade by the US with these countries, which does not increase their security but permits the flow of billions of petro-dollars back into the deficit-plagued US budget.

2. The lifting of the sanctions would lead to massive oil sales by Iraq. This would rapidly result in oil price reductions in the international market. This cannot be neither in the interest of Saudi Arabia nor of Kuwait. Both countries depend--as a result of the high costs of stationing US troops and of costly arms purchases--on a stable oil price. Such a situation would not be welcome by the US either. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would not be able to honour their debts or reduce dramatically their expenditures, which would primarily affect their trade with the USA. An additional argument is that a declining oil price might negatively affect the standing of the dollar.

3. The current so-called peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours would provide another reason for the maintenance of the sanctions. Here we are faced with two unequal parties: On the one hand militarily weak Arab countries, divided by intercne conflicts; on the other a state (Israel), possessing atomic, biological and chemical weapons of mass annihilation and backed by the main superpower. The aim of this superpower (the US) is to impose an order in the region which would ensure the long-range interests of its protege, Israel, and increase its own influence. If Iraq were permitted to regain its strength destruction was desirable (a report through the uncensored Irish radio).

Iraq's current so-called peace negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait are not in a position to influence the interests which underpin the sanctions. The interests affecting the continuation of the sanctions lie outside the reach of Iraq. It is thus irrelevant whether Iraq fulfills the US-imposed UN resolutions or not. These resolutions serve rather to hide the true motives of the Gulf war and the sanctions. They serve however very well to justify--for public opinion--the continuing genocide against the Iraqi population. Western media--serving Washington's agenda--have hitherto failed, alas, to question the compatibility between these resolutions and international law. It seems to me also urgent to discuss the legitimacy of resolutions made by a non-democratically legitimized Security Council.

In our regular visits to Iraq we were not only witness to continuously worsening conditions of existence for the majority of the population, but also to the extent of the destruction caused by disproportionate means of warfare (in relation to the war's declared intent). If the aim was to free Kuwait, it was not necessary to destroy human habitat, hospitals, schools, kindergartens as well as the civil infrastructure such as water and electricity supplies. Unless of course the aim of the war was different from what was publicly claimed. Those who demand compensations for the victims of Iraqi deeds in Kuwait, should also demand reparations for the Iraqi people who have been subjected to unmeasurable sufferings by allied bombings and the sanctions. [=]
the Middle Eastern course from his Daily Record and Sunday Mail". Of course, such anti-Arab racism is routine in the US mass media, as in Stephen Spielberg's "Back to the Future" with its purely gratuitous characterization of Arabs as ‘mindless terrorists’. Press briefings by the military during the war were conducted with an air of unreality: briefers would not use the word ‘Iraq’, rather they talked about attacks on ‘Saddam’ in the new ‘language-bombardment of demarcation’. This tactic enabled Westerners to ignore the fact a nation was being destroyed. So, in an example of the kind of blackwhite statements that characterized the media onslaught that was part of the war, Pres. Bush could characterize the massacre of Iraq as ‘a victory for the human race’; “it seemed at one point as if the designer of the cruise missile would be in line for this year’s Nobel Prize for Peace”. At the same time, the very large opposition to the war in Parliament was completely silent in the mass media. Predictably, any such public opposition in Parliament would be greeted with cries of treason, as in the Falklands War. The Scottish Nationalist Party, with Scotland having 70% of its people opposing the war, has remained silent on the war, other than a few wimpsers about how a disproportionate number of the frontline soldiers were Scots.

Normality in reporting from the Gulf war remains total censorship. Typical is a recent BBC report of fighting between Iraqi forces and Kurds, with mention of refugees fleeing to Iran with napalm burns (falsely implying that the napalm burns were inflicted by Iraqi forces, when the napalmizing was actually conducted by US forces). There is still no reporting on the damage done by the air raids in Kuwait, and no report on the burning of the oilfields (such reports have been suppressed by the Army since any reports on the number of burning oil wells would be a ‘propaganda coup for the enemy’). Any TV reports of environmental damage are characterized as having been the product of Saddam Hussein’s barbarism, without a single word about the air raids being the direct cause of the suffering. “The deliberate destruction of a country, of its means of communications and of its population’s means of maintaining life and health; the deliberate refusal to consider peace terms until as many as possible of a conscript army has been exterminating using weapons against which they have no means of defending themselves: this to me is an act of genocide”, but Leonard notes that calling it an act of genocide would be denounced by Holocaustists, who believe that only Jews are sufficiently human to suffer. Leonard concludes “One would have thought that it might have at least occurred to people that there will be Iraqi survivors, or their descendants, who will feel that there will be Iraqi survivors, or their descendants, who will feel that if there is any justice in the world, the cities of Britain and America will one day get at least a little of what their citizens were apparently so indifferent to inflicting on the towns and cities of Iraq.” Leonard’s Shorter Catechism includes a set of questions and answers such as: (1) Who said ‘Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth’? This was once said by Jesus Christ on the Mount of Olives. He was quoting in anticipation of George Bush, who used the words in his address to the American people after ordering the mass bombing of Iraq. (2) What did you used to call someone who should feel guilty about their country’s past policy of genocide? A German. (3) What do you call a quarter of million Germans marching in 1991 against genocide? Anti-semitic. (4) What does UN Resolution 242 state? Shhh. [TXT]

24142. Leopold, Evelyn. "UN Plans Six More Months of Iraqi Oil For Food Deal", in Seattle Times, June 3, 1997, p. A13. The Security Council has extended the oil-for-food deal which will allow some food to enter Iraq. In Kurdish areas, 19.3% of children under 5 are malnourished, of which 26% are chronically undernourished and 5% acutely malnourished. UNICEF reports $13.5 million is desperately needed for vaccines for children. [TXT]

24143. Madrid, Ronaldo. "Book Review: How Bush Used Television to Manipulate America for the Persian Gulf War", in Crescent International, June 16-30, 1996, p. 9. The Persian Gulf TV War, by Douglas Kellner. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, US. 1992. pp. 402. Paperback: $19.95. The Bush administration had demanded that by 1/15/1991, the Iraqi army “pull out” of Kuwait which was considered an innocent victim of Iraqi aggression. The end result of this “line drawn in the sand” was war. The Persian Gulf Oil War, like other wars the US fought, is now of history books. But as with everything else that the majority wants to put behind, there are always a few who will continue to analyze and critique the war. In The Persian Gulf TV War, Kellner takes a close look at how America, democracy, and television itself on indifference to ignore the fact a nation was being destroyed. So, in an example of the kind of blackwhite statements that characterized the media onslaught that was part of the war, Pres. Bush could characterize the massacre of Iraq as ‘a victory for the human race’; “it seemed at one point as if the designer of the cruise missile would be in line for this year’s Nobel Prize for Peace”. At the same time, the very large opposition to the war in Parliament was completely silent in the mass media. Predictably, any such public opposition in Parliament would be greeted with cries of treason, as in the Falklands War. The Scottish Nationalist Party, with Scotland having 70% of its people opposing the war, has remained silent on the war, other than a few wimpsers about how a disproportionate number of the frontline soldiers were Scots.

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Any TV reports of environmental damage are characterized as having been the product of Saddam Hussein’s barbarism, without a single word about the air raids being the direct cause of the suffering. “The deliberate destruction of a country, of its means of communications and of its population’s means of maintaining life and health; the deliberate refusal to consider peace terms until as many as possible of a conscript army has been exterminating using weapons against which they have no means of defending themselves: this to me is an act of genocide”, but Leonard notes that calling it an act of genocide would be denounced by Holocaustists, who believe that only Jews are sufficiently human to suffer. Leonard concludes “One would have thought that it might have at least occurred to people that there will be Iraqi survivors, or their descendants, who will feel that if there is any justice in the world, the cities of Britain and America will one day get at least a little of what their citizens were apparently so indifferent to inflicting on the towns and cities of Iraq.” Leonard’s Shorter Catechism includes a set of questions and answers such as: (1) Who said ‘Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth’? This was once said by Jesus Christ on the Mount of Olives. He was quoting in anticipation of George Bush, who used the words in his address to the American people after ordering the mass bombing of Iraq. (2) What did you used to call someone who should feel guilty about their country’s past policy of genocide? A German. (3) What do you call a quarter of million Germans marching in 1991 against genocide? Anti-semitic. (4) What does UN Resolution 242 state? Shhh. Relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, which coached the young girl in what stories he was reporting on the first night of the attack on Iraq. He also said that had started the war. This shallow excuse of blaming Saddam (only) was pounded into the American psyche on a daily basis. Kellner reminds us that during the Iraq/Iran war when Saddam was a US ally the media “invariably referred to Baghdad and Iraq as the agents in the war, but during the Gulf crisis and war the dominant mode of reference was to Saddam Hussein thus collapsing Iraq into Hussein” (p. 64). Another tactic used by the Bush administration, and later by the media, was their choice of rhetoric. In every major speech concerning the war, speakers resorted to the use of sexual words. For example, the invasion of Kuwait was often referred to as “rape” or “penetration.” They also spoke of Iraq referring to “pull-out” of Kuwait. Finally, general Colin Powell summed up this insidious language by stating that the US, in dealing with Iraq, had to “cut it off and kill it” (p. 65). Kellner states that by using sexual words, the US was justifying its future use of violence. He says that “throughout US history, vengeance for rape - especially the rape of white women by men of color - has been used to legitimize US imperialist adventures and military action” (p. 66). The demonization of Saddam was not confined to words. During the Gulf crisis, the US media constantly reminded the public about Saddam’s past brutal actions. This was highly hypocritical because when Saddam was a US ally, none of these reports ever surfaced. There were other dimensions of the demonization process. Kellner states: “Although the Iraqis were portrayed as brutal bullies, Bush and the US were presented as strong and honorable defenders of international law” (p. 65). Bush was praised as decisive and brilliant. Saddam on the other hand, was being molded as the new Hitler. According to the Gannett Foundation, there were 1170 references in the media linking Saddam to Hitler. If this were not enough to poison the public mind, the baby-incubator campaign surely was. It involved a young Kuwaiti girl who testified to congress that she saw firsthand 15 babies from incubators thrown to the floor and left to die, by Iraqi soldiers. The public and congress were outraged. America, the golden warrior, would have to uphold the moral decency of the world by killing the “savage” Iraqi people. After the war, it was revealed that the whole story was a lie. It had been made up by the American Public Relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, which coached the young girl in what to say. The girl, Naiyera, turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington DC!

Throughout the book Kellner expresses how the public fell victim to biased reporting. His harshest criticism is reserved for Wolf Blitzer of the CNN. He says that Blitzer did not even wait to confirm any of the stories he was reporting on the first night of the attack on Iraq. He basically became the mouthpiece for propaganda campaigns which wanted to put a positive spin on the initial attacks on Iraq. Kellner states that Blitzer “claimed that US officials were claiming that scud missile sites were knocked out, that the Republican Guard was decimated, and that the Iraqi Air Force was destroyed, all totally specious claims” (p. 143). What reporting like this accomplished was to relay disinformation to an eager audience which began to feel that the war was going to be quick and decisive, without any American deaths. Blitzer accomplished
another objective of the pentagon as well. By not questioning the veracity of any of the reports and spewing them through CNN, the most-watched news channel in the world, Blitzer actually helped ally fears in the public which facilitated keeping oil prices down. This was one of the objectives of the Bush administration. Kellner states that the “disinformation” campaign was “to convince oil markets, world stock exchanges, Israel and western opinion of the success of the attack” (p. 128). One of the most intriguing critiques Kellner has about the Persian Gulf War is that it helped for the first time America (or any other country for that matter) emerged in what has now become known as the “Technowar.” This means the use of science and technology to control the battlefield and decimate the enemy. What it tries to convey is that war is bloodless and nobody dies, only buildings get destroyed by “smart bombs.” It is an outlandish idea, something which is impossible to convey, but the impossible did happen. If a person who watched CNN or any other channel were asked whether they saw any dead bodies or chopped limbs, the overwhelming response would be “no.” The networks sold “Technowar” and the public bought it at the expense of reality.

The images of war were of missiles always hitting their targets. Blood and death were rarely shown on TV. This illusion gave Americans the feeling that their morality (pure and good) was winning out over barbarous enemies, even though in reality the US airforce were singing songs like, “If you kill for fun, you’re a sadist. If you kill for money, you’re a mercenary. If you kill for both, you’re a paraatrooper” (p. 248). So much for the good wholesome morals which Americans pride themselves on. Kellner concludes his critique by stating that “Iraq was the victim, therefore, of a neo-imperialist attempt to control its destiny. Iraq refused to submit to the will of the western neo-imperialist superpower and its allies” (p. 386). Kellner’s book is excellent. He brings to life the power which television has on society. He also exposes the dark side of the US which prides itself on being “pure and civilized.” Kellner is very methodical and meticulous in his arguments. He is also well-versed in his subject. Readers will no doubt be alerted not to digest everything from the US media. Kellner's book helps in creating the understanding that not everything in the media should be believed. He exposes the dangerous track the Americans are on, and will help more and more people to become educated about the effects of television before it is too late. [s]

24144. Makiya, Kanan; Al-Khalil, Samir. Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993. [Kanan Makiya, under the name Samir Al-Khalil was the author of Republic of Fear (1986), a critique of the human rights abuses of the Saddam Hussein regime.] Makiya begins with the proposition that the Persian Gulf War was; at bottom an Arab moral failure of historic proportions, and that Saddam Hussein is merely a manifestation of the deep and pervasive sickness of all Arabs. Makiya argues that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was not a human act but was rather ‘a kind of malignancy … a kind of foul smelling plague … [that] came seeping out of pun-filled sores…’, noting that the nationalist argument made by Saddam Hussein (in condemning the pre-war prostitution trade that serviced Kuwaiti tourists), that, “To the Kuwaiti, the glorious Iraqi woman goes for a nickel!” He notes that the pervasive stench of the Iraqi occupation reflects the traditional Muslim distain of filth (noting that the nazzacheen Christian caste of Iraq that work as ‘cleaners of sweres’) was manifested by the Iraqi acts that made Iraq unclean. However, Arabs had little sympathy with the Kuwaitis suffering from occupation, for example, Moncef Mazrouki of the Tunisian Human Rights League who attributed pro-Iraqi demonstrations in the Maghrib to the ‘90% of Arabs’ who hate [the] dictatorial and archaic regime that have squandered Arab resources and honor’. [pp. 42-43] This is an accurate characterization of the pointlessness of Arab ‘mindless permanent anger’. [p. 46]. Arab poetry itself, long an emblem of Arab chauvinism, has been reduced to mere ‘namecalling, stereotyping and bigotry’.

Makiya tells of the Kuwait ‘Khalif’ whose life was saved several times by Palestinians during the occupation, whose childish belief that Palestinians had been victimized by Zionism was purified by his reconceptualization of the ‘Palestinian-as-collaborator’ [p. 55] and the ‘tenfold multiplication’ of his sex drive through the process of resistance to the Iraqi occupation [sic? p. 52]. Makiya tells of ‘Abu Haydar’, who is hypothetically supposed to have survived the war (after leaving an apology to Khalil in his home) and is then hypothesized as a participant in the anti-Saddam ‘intifadah’ in Basra. Makiya notes his account is a recitation of unverified rumors, until he reaches the account of an officer (who he merges into ‘Abu Haydar’) who first fought to banish Republican Guard forces from Najaf (rebels who cache themselves for months from the Baathist forces, for the prepositioned against possible American parachute troop attacks) and Kufa, and the who fought the Republican Guard as they fought to return to the Shiite city of Najaf. This Abu Haydar notes that he lost belief in the Baath Party when it ceased to be a real party and became an instrument of Saddam, and that he opposed the invasion of Kuwait because, “the world was imposing something on us and I accepted what it was imposing”. Abu Haydar participated in mass exclamations of supporters of Saddam Hussein in Najaf (such as the Baath revolutionary poet Falah Askar, who composed crueious verses such as “The whole people is a bouquet of flowers and the smell is Baath”, as well as other Baathite poets like Ridha al-Falahm and Hasan Amara). Nevertheless, the progressive, 2000 Wester stance of Shiite leaders like Abu Haydar was soon displaced by militia forces mobilized by the Supreme Islamic Assembly, that proclaimed an Islamic Republic based in Basra. The Republican Guard (reinforced by soldiers from the Yazidis (who have a traditional antipathy to Shites), and the towns of Hit, Mosul, Shirkat and Beiji) reasserted its power in Basra using napalm, cluster bombs, and at least 35 SCUD missiles; refugee columns advised to leave Basra were attacked by helicopter gunships. Shites were targeted for murder, rape and lotting; the Dar al-Hikma Library established by Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the public library of the Hakim family were burned; was the Dar-al-Ilm library of Ayatollah Khoie.

In Baghdad, the account of a man tortured for composing a song about the loss of Fao to Iranians (a city recaptured in the Iran-Iraq War only after 53000 Iraqis died in the fighting) is related (the man recalls the line: ‘Fao has gone, Out of my asshole it will come back’). Meanwhile, in the north, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, reinforced by dejecting Kurdish soldiers from the Iraqi army, rose spontaneously in the north. The only serious opposition they confronted initially was the Peoples Mujahideen, an anti-Khomeini force led by Masoud Rajavi and armed by Saddam Hussein. Significantly, many Kurds who had fought for Saddam, and who switched to fight the central government, would later switch sides against to fight for Saddam Hussein, despite the memory of the use of chemical weapons on Kurdish villages, and despite the Anfal campaign (estimated by Kurds to have killed 180000, and by official records to have killed 100000; and including demolished villages, transfer points, poison gas, firing squads, mass graves [p. 152], and the sale of Kurdish women as sex slaves to buyers in the Gulf states [p. 158]). In 1988, Anfal entailed the destruction of 1276 villages, which is so much more serious that the Israeli elimination of a mere 369 Palestinian villages. [pp. 166-167].

The real criminals in this horror are Arab intellectuals: for even criticizing such crimes of the Arabs intellectuals, the author asserts he would be “no.” The networks sold “Technowar” and the public bought it at the expense of reality.

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Elias Khoury liberates a Kuwait as occupied as Palestine by the great powers and their puppet monarchs, (4) the idea that Saddam's military power was somehow a general reflection of 'Arab' strength in the 'struggle' against Zionism [Makiya notes that any Arab struggle against Israel is inherently anti-democratic [pp. 264-265]]; (5) that linkage between ending the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and ending the occupation by Israel was meaningful [Makiya notes that the support of the Iraqi regime for linkage was proof of Iraqi hypocrisy on the issue of linkage, and that support by Arab intellectuals for such linkage was proof that Arab intellectuals have no moral basis for criticizing the Israeli occupation [pp. 266-267]]; (6) the 'Arab Solution, the idea that there can be a meaningful role for Arab diplomacy in the Middle East; (7) the false belief by Arabs that oil played any role in the conflict (which has the corollary that the Arab oil economies are anything less than free agents in the world system [p. 275]); (8) that there is anything real to the idea of Western cultural imperialism (Makiya observes that 'Western culture today is immeasurably more tolerant of cultural, religious, and ethnic differences than Arab culture' and so the gifts of Western culture are rejected by Arabs only because of their racism against the West [p. 280]).

Makiya goes on to argue that the passivity of Arabs to repression, which he illustrates by noting that in 1982 the Syrian government killed 10000-40000 opponents to the regime in Hama and no Arab protested [sic: 10000-40000 opponents is surely not zero opponents, and protested over the Hama massacre were widespread]. Makiya goes on to argue that the normative nature of such violence is illustrated by the employment of Iraqis to rape women: 'violation of women's honor' [sic: it actually appears to be a criminal record, rather than a job description]; Makiya then builds upon this apparent confusion to argue that the Iraqi regime's depravity is thus revealed as a regime that is uniquely built on violation of what even the thugs of the regime believe is 'honor'. Makiya then argues that such official mass rape is unknown outside the Islamic world (noting that [Serbian] mass rape is merely the unofficial acts of 'some paramilitary organizations'), and cites a report in an Israeli newspaper (translated by Israel Shahak), of an honor murder by a man of his sister, whose body was left outside a Kibbutz so Jews would be blamed [generally, pp. 287-300; Kibbutz incident pp. 290-291]: Makiya goes on to argue that it is characteristic of Arab intellectual dishonesty to support Saddam's brutality while falsely accusing the Jews of being the real victims, when in fact, Jews are the real victims (Makiya notes that many of the many reported cases of rape of female Palestinian political prisoners by Israelis proves that conditions are so much worse in Arab countries (mentioning Jordan and Saudi Arabia), since Israeli society is democratic and open [p. 295]). He notes that rape has become a normal women; many have siblings or other close relatives who are Kuwaiti prisoners by Israelis proves that conditions are so much worse in Arab countries (mentioning Jordan and Saudi Arabia), since Israeli society is democratic and open [p. 295]). He notes that rape has become a normal women; many have siblings or other close relatives who are Kuwaiti

Makiya concludes with an attack on all Arab intellectuals and all their work in recent decades, concentrating on Edward Said: he attacks Said for asserting 'the morally wrong idea that the West is to be blamed in the here-and-now for its long and nefarious history of association with the Middle East', since the real problem cannot be any minor phenomenon like imperialism, but rather is Arab cruelty. [pp. 317-318] If there is to be a new Arab intellectualism, in the wake of the final death of Pan-Arabism [p. 327] it must find inspiration in the works of men like Salman Rushdie. [p. 324]. [TXT]

24145. Marcus, Aliza. "Turkey's Kurds Fight On Alone; The US Backed Government Claims Turkey Has No Kurdish Problem, Only a Terrorism Problem", in Nation, January 3, 1994, pp. 8-10. The war between Kurds and the Turkish Army continues in SE Turkey. Turkish troops, despairing in their ability to suppress the rebellion, have turned to ethnic cleansing: one-third of the village of Caglayan was burned down, and 600 villagers forced to leave at gunpoint. The Turkish Human Rights Association reports that at least 729 villages have been destroyed, in the same manner that Saddam Hussein destroyed 4000 Kurdish villages in northern Iraq in 1975-1991. In the last two years, 530 dissidents were executed by death squads, including three human rights activists. The US GRAF (German Rights Association for Kurds) has condemned the war for nine years and its military force has risen to 10000. This guerrilla army faces 18000 Turkish troops, with $400 million in annual US military aid. In addition, Turkey is a heavy buyer of US armaments: in 12/1992, Turkey paid $1.1 billion for 95 Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters. Turkey still refuses to admit that the Kurds, who are 26% of the population and who number 12 million, even exist. PM Tansu Ciller, Turkey's first women PM, has intensified the rhetoric that there is no Kurdish problem (since there are no Kurds), but rather there is only a terrorism problem. Ciller has outlawed the Peoples Labor Party, the hitherto legal Kurdish party (although it resurfaced as the Democracy Party), a deputy investigating murders of Kurdish leaders was himself murdered, the pro-Kurdish paper Ozgur Gundem was shut down for four weeks; and now the prosecutor in Ankara is seeking to lift the immunity of Kurdish MPs (which would allow their trials for treason). Kurdish activists hoped President Clinton would have done something to advance the human rights of the Kurds during Ciller's state visit in 10/1993, but Clinton remained silent on the question. Clinton in fact promised support for the Turkish war on terrorism (i.e.-Kurds). [TXT]

24146. Middle East Watch-Middle East. The Bedoons of Kuwait. New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1995. [Ann Lesch, member of Advisory Committee, Kenneth Roth, executive director.] The 'bedoon' is from the Arabic 'bedoon jinsiyya', meaning 'without nationality' or 'without citizenship'.

Kuwait practices institutionalized discrimination against long-term residents known as Bedoons, who have been denied Kuwaiti citizenship (sometimes for generations) and who are now being made stateless. The Kuwait government had promised citizenship to some of theses people for decades, but after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the government reversed its position declared them illegal aliens.

There are some 300000 Bedoon, one-third of the entire population of Kuwait: about half are now in exile, mainly because Kuwait blocked their return to Kuwait after the end of the war. Most bedoon were born in Kuwait and lived there all their lives; 30000 are spouses of Kuwaiti women; many have siblings or other close relatives who are Kuwaiti citizens. Since 1985, Kuwait policies have displaced Bedoon from government positions (excepting a few thousand reinstated in the military and police). Bedoons are no longer issues civil ID cards, driver's licenses or travel documents; they are not permitted foreign travel (including travel for pilgrimage or medical emergencies) unless they are willing to never return. These policies were instituted in 1985 by then Minister of Interior Shiakh Salem al-Sabah to drive the Bedoon from Kuwait, although the policy still remains secret. In 1986, Bedoon were banned from attending universities, and were ordered expelled from the Kuwait Medical Association and Kuwait Lawyers Association.

After the end of Iraqi occupation, and despite the fact that most Bedoon backed the resistance, the government used the occasion to pursue more draconian measures against the Bedoon. Martial law trials failed to substantiate government allegations that Bedoons as a group were collaborators (the government tried to scapegoat the Bedoon for the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait). Hundreds of Bedoon are now held in the Talha Deportation Center (some remaining in the makeshift camp for years). Bedoons are subject to harassment and exploitation. Most Bedoon, impoverished by lack of employment (the percentage of Bedoon/tribesmen in the military has declined from 80% in 1985 to 25% in 1995; ultimately 'Kuwaitization' will eliminate all bedoon in the army), face eviction from their homes, mainly in slums. Kuwait law prevents judicial review of citizenship decisions, making such decisions not subject to judicial review; Courts have tried to intervene Bedoon from deportation but the government has ignored these rulings are issued

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expulsion orders for 24000 Bedoon since the end of the war. Most Bedoon have documentation that would have allowed them to become citizens if the process had been conducted fairly; many bedoon were denied citizenship simply because the government has failed to act on applications for citizenship.

Denial of citizenship to bedoon violates international law, violates international law on gender-based discrimination (for Bedoon husbands of Kuwaiti women), violates international law on the unconquered human rights of children and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; violates the universal right to due process; and violates Bedoons to their vested rights to citizenship and permanent residence.

Recommendations to the Kuwaiti Government: (1) for all Bedoon in the country (150000-180000): Kuwait should all the right to reside in Kuwait, release those held without charge, rescind deportation orders (afflicting 24000), and permit Bedoons to petition courts for redress; (2) for Bedoons outside the country (130000-160000): Kuwait should permit return all with Bedoon status before 8/2/1990 (many still remain in desert refugee camps, mainly in Iraq, with smaller numbers in Iran, and even smaller numbers outside the region), prioritize family reunification, and be allowed to collect back wages and retirement benefits from the Kuwaiti government; and (3) for Bedoon classified as such in 1985: allow travel within and outside the country, lift the ban on Bedoon driving cars, and end discrimination in education and health care. [=]

24147. Mirkarimi, Ross B. "Ecovoice: Life Struggles In Iraq: Is The War Over? 18-Month Old Baby In Karbala General Hospital Dies Dying From Malnutrition", in Buzzworm-The Environmental Journal. November-December 1992. p. 16. [Mirkarimi of the San Francisco-based Arms Control Research Center traveled to Iraq with the International Study Team; its report "Hidden Casualties" is available at (415)-397-1452.] Karbala General Hospital is filled with starving children and infants. Famine and childhood diseases are killing the children of Iraq in prodigious numbers as physicians can do nothing to assist them. The International Study Team notes: "Prior to the Gulf Crisis, Iraqis enjoyed a modern civilian infrastructure with sophisticated health care, water and sewage treatment, and electrical power systems. These systems have collapsed due to economic sanctions, Iraq is now one of the most impoverished countries in the world, and life is a daily struggle for most of its 18 million people." Baghdad appears to be recovering the fastest of the cities from the war (both the Iraq government and the United States prefer that the appearance of human misery be muted, at least in the capital), but outside the capital conditions continue to deteriorate. The Study Team notes, "women feel overwhelmed by their daily struggle to provide their children with even basic needs like food and water". South of Baghdad, at the Dijlah river, women interview had lost their husbands in the war, people drank from river water contaminated by untreated sewage and industrial wastes (locally a still-operating textile plant is discharging untreated wastes), and river fisheries (which before the war provide ample protein) had completely collapsed. UNICEF reports that outside Baghdad waterborne disease are ubiquitous: in Basrah much of the city remains flooded with sewage contaminated waters. The Study Team documented the death of 7000 children under age five in 1991, with infant mortality 300% that of pre-war levels; the main causes of such deaths are malnutrition and dehydration. The UN embargo has produced anger in Iraq that is directed at the United States. One Iraqi doctor notes: "Except for the Kurds and Shiites, Saddam is becoming the only "friend" that the Iraqi people have. Not by choice, but for survival". The paranoia of many Islamic fundamentalists who see in the West basically the devil himself is not totally removed from reality. However it cannot be treated as equivalent to the delusion of the Nazis, who saw the Jews as the embodiment of all evil. Iraqis are not the Germans of 1939-45, or vice versa. German history, culture, religion and socialization cannot be compared with the historical development of the Arab people. As a psychoanalyst not only do I find such a historical argument about the unconquered human death instinct incorrect, I consider it dangerous. This concept ignores reality and alleviates everyone's guilt. A "Third World War," which we know would be our last, would be preprogrammed and unavoidable under such philosophy.

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Margarete Mitscherlich, psychoanalyst, published the book The Inability to Grieve in 1967 in collaboration with her husband. Twenty-four years later, she came to this conclusion: The Germans can grieve. The need to praise peace is very easy, but ineffective. "What we do need is active participation in the fight against war and everything that leads to war," Albert Einstein wrote in a 1953 letter to the Jewish Peace Fellowship. So, what shall we do?

There is no doubt that thinking in terms of friend/enemy categories presupposes a readiness for war. Once war has begun, it is whole nations and peoples who engage in worshipping themselves as "Good" while neglecting conflicts and grievances in their own countries by focusing on the "bad enemy." Constructing images of the enemy always seems to divert attention from one's own aggression and problems. We know very well that this tendency to fall back into these primitive psychological mechanisms exists everywhere. Still, it is frightening to be confronted with it once more in our Western civilized world, which as we hoped, would be more enlightened by now.

It is a precondition for peace that we liberate ourselves from a pattern of black and white thinking and resolve our conflicts through politics and diplomacy. This is exactly what Enzensberger finds foolish, especially when you are dealing with an opponent who is just plainly the "enemy of humankind." [Margarete Mitscherlich is referring to an article by Hans Magnus Enzensberger in Der Spiegel No. 6, 1991. Enzensberger sees Saddam Hussein as a second Hitler, whose motive is the death instinct, and the modus of whose rule is annihilation. According to Enzensberger, a "Hitter" or "Saddam" can only happen when a whole nation wishes for their occurrence. The "enemy of humankind" taps into the death energy of a whole nation.] Enzensberger, for whom Saddam Hussein is a "second Hitler", concludes: "Every thinkable political solution has no impact on such human beings. The death instinct of an "enemy of humankind" connects fatally with the resettlement of whole nations."

And according to Enzensberger: "Nations that feel like constant losers, as do the Germans and the Arab nations, are predestined to fall for the paranoid thinking of those leaders. They do not look for solutions, they are looking for redemption." Enzensberger feels that it is the never-ending love of and willingness to sacrifice for their leaders that made the Germans and Iraqis keen on killing, but even more willing to be killed themselves. To find a simultaneous ending with their leader is to be redeemed.

Such thinking in anthropological constants, however, would mean that we are the helpless victims of these "enemies of humankind." There would be no way to prevent a war with such an enemy and his sadomasochistic followers.

Is this indeed so? Do these human catastrophes for which we have no remedy which are supposedly unchangeable, exist? Is there no history, no economy, no socialization process, no religion, no psychology that contributes to those circumstances or could prevent them?

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ourselves from prejudice, false ideals and gender-fixed role models. The fight against war, societal violence, and injustice in general is a pointless endeavor for people who think like him.

Not only that, by doing this little trick of equating Saddam with Hitler, war becomes a moral obligation. We then have our “justified” war. A man like Enzensberger must know that by using the idea of the “enemy of human kind” he is tapping into the ever ready human psychological need to think in terms of “Good” and “Bad.” I guess Enzensberger uses it simply to cover up a presumably “morality-free” interests of power.

The peace movement opposes such hypocritical and fatalistic thinking in every way and with all its energies. The peace movement in Germany, its fight against war and worldwide self destruction is often misunderstood abroad...What is the matter with Germany? We hear from all sides. Barely reunited, an economic giant, now a world political actor, it refuses to send its soldiers to the Gulf. The Germans are bad allies, cowards and want their own special way.

“While there are supposedly 110000 Muslims waiting in Pakistan for Iran to open its borders so they can join Saddam's troops, in Germany more and more young men refuse military service. Before, the conscientious objectors objected on the grounds that they could not kill for reasons of conscience. Since the beginning of the Gulf war, more and more of them refuse military service because they do not want to die.

It is our constitution, after all, which says no war shall be fought away from German soil. Wasn't that exactly what our former enemies wanted from us? Doesn't anyone remember that the victors, at the end of WWII, seriously thought of putting Germany back into an agrarian state?

This was expressly so that we would never have the power or means to murder other people or oppress them again.

Just a few months ago, the media in those same countries that accuse Germany now of cowardice and disloyalty voiced their fear of a superpower Germany, and a “Fourth Reich.”

Now that so many young Germans do not want to fight anymore, now that they protest against senseless destruction, Germans are accused of weakness and hypocrisy instead of being hard and barbarous. Such contradictions only motivate our young generation even more to protest for peace and against war.

This generation shows responsibility. It shows responsibility by refusing to be part of a catastrophic game that despises humanity.

Other criticism is all too justified. The German economy with the permission of politicians did supply Iraq with poison gas, the gas which now threatens Israel. Germany helped build the leader's bunker, in which he sits safely while his people die under the hail of bombs. But trade in ABC weapons does not seem to contradict the general world economic morality.

There are, however, unavoidable and terrible historical associations, because the German economy also developed the gas for Auschwitz.

Considering our past it seems self-evident that we ought to protect Israel from the criminal deeds of our German industry. But I cannot help thinking that German soldiers would probably not be welcome in Israel, neither could they help the dilemma between Israelis and Palestine. One Israeli women wrote to Zeit, “Everyone who is demonstrating against the war in the Gulf, is demonstrating for the Hitler of the end of this century.”

This women neither considers the differences between then and now, nor does she consider the existing potential of total destruction of nature and humankind--she neglects to see that it is impossible to equate the historical, social and religious factors of that time and this one.

Certainly, it would be an illusion to think that there is no longer anti-Semitism in Germany. Especially in times of war a process goes on that reinforces the psychological mechanisms which establish images of the enemy in order to create a sense of belonging and unity. Enzensberger tries to do so, as do all the Western nations engaging in the Gulf war. But Germany is no longer the country of the hard, disciplined, militaristic men who love war. Here a people are evolving who do not want to be killed, who fight for peace and rationality.

The ideology of the German “Herrenvolk” (master race) has been put to rest, and with it the submissive identification with “powerful leaders.” This should be a relief for all nations. To turn it around and suggest that the the peace movement, its desire for peace, is really hiding a desire to help Hitler-Saddam to victory and destroy Israel, becomes rather absurd and very sad.

The Germans, indeed, have learned from their history. Never before have we talked so much so openly about our past as we do now. Never before have we talked so much about the terrible wars Germany initiated, about Auschwitz, the symbol of insane destruction and contempt for humanity.

Until recently I have had the impression that repressing the past had been successful; that we were unable to grieve, to look back, and confront our historical guilt. This is changing. The past is with us more then ever before. During the cold war our uncritical identification with the victors of WWII served to ward off our guilt and grief. This is over.

Precisely because of our past we do think differently from our western allies, detest war even more then they do, and believe we have to oppose war at all costs. Even the youngest participants in demonstrations have learned these lessons, despite the rumors that they have been instigated by their teachers. These young people have internalized the burden we carry as Germans and they are particularly sensitive to the unholliness of “holy wars” and “holy nations.”

The past has always weighed heavily on this country and this used to produce more defensiveness than insight. The past stayed dark and as such created fear. We whistled it away, as a kid whistles away the fear of the dark. The Gulf war has confronted us very immediately with the horrors of the past and its terrible ideals.

Now that the hard German men, the victorious soldier and war comrades are no longer our ideals, now that men fear death and admit their fear of killing, haven't we become more straight forward and much less "German" in the traditional sense? "Values" are questioned as to their origin and content. "Manliness" no longer seems to be an ideal. This gives me hope that death will not be again "an officer from Germany"--even though we might not escape a world catastrophe.

German youth, more consciously than ever before, fights against the thinking in terms of friend/enemy: which does not allow perception of the realities. These young people try to liberate themselves from the notions of their parents and grandparents, such as self-idealization hypocrisy, and distortion.

The delusion and celebration of manhood in the Nazi era permitted violence and contempt for certain people to thrive while idealizing the "holy fatherland" and personal ego. As this kind of male conflict resolution has become more and more apparent people refuse it.

The younger generation of the peace movement does not take sides unconditionally, or hope for "victory," they resist the division of"Good" and "Bad" while looking for a conflict solution, that is most appropriate for a complex and complicated situation. Germans are, after all, the survivors and descendents of Hitler's delusions. So indirectly we have been involved in a million-fold murder.

Confronted again with the issue of war, more and more of our contemporaries must deal with the consequences of the last war. We cannot refuse a critical reevaluation of our previous value system, even if it temporarily questions our own sense of self-worth, if we want to escape the vicious circle of destructive interaction. A solid sense of self-worth does not come from denial, idealization and considering things evil.

It is our ability to discover, to learn from the past, to be critical of ourselves and others which establishes a solid sense of self-worth.

Whether we do have personal guilt as Germans or not, we as Germans carry a heritage of guilt. In many ways, it is our responsibility to make sure that Auschwitz which is synonymous with total human cruelty, never happens again. To forget and deny does not liberate our younger generation. The only thing that can liberate us and change us, is the laborious effort to openly meet our past and learn from it.
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Iraq

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President: Saddam Hussein; Vice-President: Taha Muhieddin Maruf.

Revolution Command Council: Chair: Saddam Hussein; Vice-Chair: Izzat Ibrahim; Secretary-General: Khaled Abu al-Moneim Rashid; Members: Taha Yassin Ramadan, Sa`adoun Shaker Mahmoud, Tariq Mihayl` Aziz, Hassan Ali Nassar al-Amiri, Dr. Sa`adoun Hammadi, Taha Muhieddin Maruf.

Council of Ministers: President and Prime Minister: Saddam Hussein; First Deputy Prime Minister: Taha Yassin Ramadon; Deputy Prime Minister: Dr. Sa`adoun Hammadi; Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tariq `Aziz; Minister of Defense: Saadi Tuma Abbas Juburi; Minister of Transport and Communications: [blank]; Head of Presidential Cabinet: Ahmad Husseind as-Samarrai; Minister of the Interior: Samir Muhammad Abu al-Wahab Hash-Shaykhali; Minister of Education: Abu al-Qadir Izudin Hammid; Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research: Dr. Mundhir Ibrahim; Minister of Youth Affairs: Abu al-Fattah Mahmod Amin; Minister of Justice: Akram Abu al-Qadir Ali; Minister of Housing and Construction: Taher Muhammad Hassoun al-Marzouk; Minister of Planning: Salam Majid Faraj; Minister of Health: Raya al-Jazairy; Minister of Oil: Hussein Kamel Hassan; Minister of Trade and Finance: Muhammad Mahdi Salih; Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation: [blank]; Minister of Culture and Information: Latif Nasil al-Jasim; Minister of Labor and Social Affairs: Umeed Madhat Mubarak; Minister of Religious Endowments/Religious Affairs: Abdulla Fadel `Abbas; Minister of Local Government: Ali Hassan al-Hajid; Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization: Hussein Kamel Majid; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Sa`eed al-Salhahh; Minister of State for Military Affairs: [blank]; Minister of State at the President's Office: Hashim Aqrawi Subhi; Minister of Internal Security: Sa`adoun Shaker; Ministers of State: [blank]; Advisers to the President: Subhi Yasin Khudair, Abu al-Ghani Abu al-Ghafur, Samir Muhammad Abu al-Wahhab, Abu al-Hasan Rabi` Fir`aww, Sa`adi Mahdi Salih, Mzabian Kadhri Hadi, Khaled Abu al-Moneim Chief of Staff: General Hussein Rashid; Commander of the elite Republican Guard: General Iyad Khalil; Rawi Air Force Advisor: General Hassan Shabban; Air Defense Commander: General Muzahim Saab Hassan; Arab Ba`th Socialist Party Intelligence Service Chief: Sabawi.

Legislature: National Assembly: 250 elected members (including 33 women); Speaker of the National Assembly: Saadi Mahdi Salih; Kurdish Legislative Council with 57 elected members: Chairman: Ahmad Abu al-Qadir an-Naqshabandi; Political Organizations: Arab Ba`th Socialist Party, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdistan Revolutionary Party.

Governor of the 19th Governorate (Kuwait): `Aziz Salih al-Numan.

Iraqi Ambassador to the US: Mohamed Sadiq al-Mashat; Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN New York: Abdul Amir al-Anbari; Iraqi Representative to UN in Geneva: Barzan Tikriti; US Ambassador to Iraq (before 8/1990): April Catherine Glaspie; US Acting Ambassador to Iraq at present (former Charge d'Affairs): Joseph C. Wilson IV. [=]

24150. Nash, Douglas E. "Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town: Part 1", in Special Warfare, October 1994. During the Gulf War, US Army Civil Affairs units performed a variety of tasks, including liaison duties with the host-nation government, humanitarian-relief activities, planning for noncombatant evacuation operations and educating US units about Saudi Arabian culture. These are missions for which all CA units train regularly. A task that is rarely practiced, however, is the administration of an occupied town or city in enemy territory. The Army gained considerable experience in this task during World War II and the Korean War, but it had little opportunity to engage in it since. During Operation Desert Storm, Company B of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion had the mission of administering the town of As Salman after its seizure by the French 6th Light Armored Division.

Employment: Company B's mission during Operation Desert Storm was to support the XVIII Airborne Corps and its reserve-component units with Civil Affairs teams. From the beginning of Desert Shield in August 1990 until reserve-component CA units were activated and deployed in December 1990, Co. B was the only CA unit supporting the entire corps. Its first teams arrived in Saudi Arabia with the lead elements of the 82nd Airborne and 24th Infantry divisions. During this five-month period, Co. B located water wells and negotiated contracts for their use, assisted in use, assessed and evaluated potential sources of labor, produced bilingual instruction cards for guard personnel, established liaison with local officials to minimize the impact of incidents between US forces and the Saudi populace, and provided assistance to the corps staff judge advocate and Saudi officials on claims against the US government. The company also developed and coordinated plans for the evacuation of civilians in the eastern province, and developed and coordinated a noncombatant-evacuation-operation-plan for US and third-country nationals. Authorized 36 personnel, Co. B had only 22 personnel present for duty when Desert Shield began. Soldiers from other companies of the 96th CA Battalion were attached to the company, giving it a peak strength of 54 personnel in November 1990. Attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the company assigned teams to each of the corps' major subordinate commands--the 1st Cavalry, the 24th Mechanized Infantry, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airmobile divisions. The XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, the 1st Corps Support Command, the 16th MP Brigade, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Teams varied in size from two to four personnel. Their equipment was limited to trucks, radio sets and individual weapons, and they were completely dependent upon the units to which they were attached for support.

Support to French forces: Early in 1991, the company was notified by the XVIII Airborne Corps G-5 that it would be attached to the French 6th Light Armored Division for the liberation of Kuwait. Co. B began movement on Jan. 17 to the 6th LAD's tactical area assembly area north of the village of Rafha. En route, some of the company's teams also supported the convoy movement of the corps. By Jan. 29, these teams had rejoined the company, which was then busily engaged in supporting the French forces in the Rafha area, providing much the same operational and planning support as it had for the XVIII Airborne Corps units. Company B was somewhat of an oddity to the French, who had no Civil Affairs capability in their force structure. After an initial adjustment period, curious French soldiers who wanted to meet "les Americans" and trade for highly prized souvenirs sought out members of the company. Other French soldiers were more curious about what a Civil Affairs unit could do for them. The XVIII Airborne Corps had requested that the company be attached to the 6th LAD because the division would have the task of seizing and administering the only sizable Iraqi town in the area--As Salman. Although other Civil Affairs units were available, they had only recently deployed into the theater. Company B had the most experienced and best-trained CA assets, and a number of its officers and NCOs spoke French. Before the ground-attack phase of Desert Storm began, Co. B became acquainted with its new division and the area around Rafha. The company conducted area surveys and assessments and established working relationships with the emir of Rafha and other local authorities. These relationships proved invaluable to the 6th LAD and the XVIII Airborne Corps in dealing with the inevitable conflict involved in massing thousands of soldiers and vehicles in a civilian community.

Mission: While the air war continued, the company received an updated mission statement from the French division commander, General Michel Roquejoffre. The mission directed that Co. B conduct civil-military operations to reduce civilian interference with military operations, identify and acquire local resources, fulfill legal obligations and moral considerations in accordance with international law and
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agreements, and terminate hostilities with conditions favorable to the long-term national interest of the allied coalition. Implicit in this mission was that the company would assume responsibility for the administration of the town of As Salman. As conditions permitted, it would receive administrative and logistics support from the French to carry out its mission. Since the 6th LAD had no staff position equivalent to a G-5, the Co. B commander wrote the Civil Affairs annex to the 6th LAD operations plan. The company's two French linguists translated the document, and it was published as part of the division's plan. The concept of operations for Co. B was that during preparation for the ground campaign, the unit would update area studies, refine CA plans, identify stockpiles of humanitarian-relief supplies and pre-position them as far forward as possible. During the ground campaign itself, the company would concentrate on population control to minimize civilian interference with military operations. Unit personnel would also conduct early assessments of the attitudes and basic needs of Iraqi civilians. Once As Salman was seized, tasks would be prioritized as follows: (1) Coordinate and execute a civil-information program to create a favorable image with the Iraqi civilian population; (2) Locate local resources and assist in their acquisition for use by allied forces and the civilian population; (3) Conduct displaced-civilian operations; (4) Alleviate human suffering among civilians in accordance with Article 56 of the Geneva Convention; (5) Assist French commanders in fulfilling their obligations under international law; (6) Conduct civil administration of occupied areas, including the re-establishment of essential services; (7) Plan for the transfer of civil-military operations functions to follow-on elements of the 360th CA Brigade.

To accomplish these tasks, the unit developed an approach best described as civil affairs triage. Similar to categorizing wounded personnel, the process enabled the company's teams to decide what could be fixed quickly and placed back into operation, what could be fixed in the long-term, and what could not be fixed. To carry out its mission, the company reorganized along functional lines and established five teams. The public-works team would locate and assess Iraqi government facilities: the public-services team would assess the civilian population's requirements for survival; the law-and-order team would handle population control and enforcement of directives targeted at the Iraqi populace; the civil-information team would coordinate psychological operations targeted toward the Iraqi populace; and the public-health team would determine health and medical requirements and the condition of civilian housing. Each team consisted of an officer, an NCO, an operations specialist (usually a military policeman), and a volunteer Kuwaiti translator. The volunteers, militiamen from a training camp north of Dhaarten, added a much-needed Arabic language capability. [Typical Team Organization: (1) PERSONNEL: 1 RAM LEADER=E-7/SPC; 1 TEAM NCOIC=E-7/SPC; 1 OPNS SPECIALIST=E-4/SPC; 1 TRANSLATOR--KUWAITI. (2) EQUIPMENT: 1 M-I 009 3/4 TON TRUCK; 1 AN/VRC-46; 1 BULLHORN.]

Objective: As Salman: One of the most difficult tasks the unit had before the ground war started was to acquire reliable information about As Salman. Unit members made acquaintances with local merchants, police, Bedouins and administrators and, through these sources, gathered enough information to generate a detailed picture of As Salman and the entire French sector. Using its area study and the application of 14 political-military analytical factors taught in the Regional Studies Course at Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the company developed a plan to administer As Salman once it had been seized by the French. Founded approximately 1800 years ago, As Salman was home to 4500 people, many of whom were nomadic Bedouins who lived there only during the winter. Located about 70 miles north of the Saudi Arabian-Iraqi border, the town had served as a watering hole for caravans along the "Darb al Hadji," the historic pilgrimage route from Baghdad to Mecca. This route, recently paved, had been renamed major supply route 'Texas' by the XVIII Airborne Corps. It became one of the major avenues of approach to the Euphrates valley. With the coming of the Iraqi Baath regime, As-Salman became a major governmental/corporate town. In addition to housing a border police battalion in a fortress two miles east of the town, As-Salman aslo housed a military garrison, a military school and a local Baath party headquarters. It boasted a modern health clinic, running water, several schools, a weather station and many other amenities not common to Iraqi towns in the region. Once the air war began, large numbers of the town's residents fled north to avoid the bombing. An Iraqi reserve division, the 45th (composed mostly of Kurds), was moved to As-Salman and ordered to defend the Iraqi far right flank while it continued to incorporate large platoons of reservists into the structure. So B would not enter As Salman until it had been secured by the French division's 3rd Colonial Marine Infantry Regiment, the 3rd RIMA. On the morning of Feb. 26, the company commander was told to link up immediately with the 3rd RIMA for the attack on As Salman. Fortunately, the unit had planned for this contingency, and its teams were prepared. After a hasty conference, one CA team was attached to each of the four French infantry companies to deal with civilians and EPWs encountered during the attack. One remaining team would move with the French battalion trains to receive displaced civilians and EPWs from the forward teams and hold them at a collection point for interrogation by French military-intelligence personnel. When the armored vehicles of the 3rd RIMA reached the edge of As Salman, the troops dismounted and began clearing the town house by house. The Iraqis did not defend As Salman, and all that allied troops had to show for their efforts were 17 Iraqi prisoners and 13 civilians. The EPWs were shipped to Rafha, but the civilians were allowed to remain. After interrogation by the unit's Kuwaiti interpreters, each civilian was escorted back to his home by a CA team and told not to leave the dwelling. [-]
town, the team discovered that the secular mayor, who held an Iraqi civil-service position, had fled, as had all members of the Ba'ath party political structure. However, the traditional tribal leader of the town, the muhktar, had remained. The company commander decided that the allies should formally recognize the muhktar as the sole legitimate civilian leader of As Salman, and the French garrison commander concurred. The civil-information team was given the mission of enhancing the muhktar's authority, establishing his legitimacy, and introducing the town's new "administrators" to its inhabitants. Since the muhktarate was being used by the French, Co. B's commander set up the muhktar's new office in an unused room in the boys' school, near the company command post. The civil-information team also arranged daily town-council meetings with the muhktar and various tribal and family heads, in which details of the administration of the town were worked out. The muhktar was also briefed on directives issued by the French area commander that would affect the town's population. Important information, such as the need to boil drinking water and the dangers posed by unexploded munitions, was regularly disseminated during the meetings. The meetings were also a forum for grievances. The fact that there were no instances of rebellion or outbreaks of hostility during the town's administration is indicative of the success of the meetings. Every evening, team leaders met with the company commander to share information and to update the As Salman area assessment. To keep both the 6th LAD and the Corps G-5 informed of its activities, the company submitted daily situation reports that detailed its activities and provided estimates of supplies required for the town's population. The French, for their part, did not intrude into this process. They remained satisfied with the company's performance as long as the town did not demand too much in terms of security or logistics support and did not interfere with military operations. However, the French commander stipulated that only prewar residents of As Salman would be allowed to return. All others were to be turned away.

Population returns: By 3/5/1991, the teams had completed their inventories. All foodstuffs had been moved to a storage site in the company's compound. Military equipment had been removed from most of the residential areas of the town. Tons of gear, ammunition and weapons had been collected by French Foreign Legion sappers and destroyed north of the town. Several wells had been placed back into operation, and the town clinic had been cleaned in preparation for the daily sick call that would begin when the population returned. Company B's mechanic had repaired a garbage truck and two water trucks, making them operational. All these services would be badly needed when the estimated 2500 townspeople returned. An estimated 500 townspeople were camping in the desert. Although they were notified by the muhktar that it was safe to return to their homes, they did not trust the Americans at first—Iraqi propaganda had painted the allies as barbarians. The villagers sent representatives to As Salman to see for themselves. If the Americans were telling the truth, the villagers would return. Word was also passed along by Bedouins to those townspeople who had fled north that it was safe to return home. These groups also sent representatives to see what the Americans and the French were up to. By Mar. 9, the trickle of returnees had become a flood. To establish control of the returning townspeople, the law-and-order team set up a checkpoint at the northern entrance to the town. All other routes into the town were sealed off by the French. At the checkpoint, all returning traffic was stopped and vehicles and personnel were searched for weapons and other contraband. Because of Islamic customs regarding the treatment of women, the unit's sole female soldier was joined by three other female soldiers from the Corps G-5 and the CA Brigade to assist with searches of women. The law-and-order team quickly discovered that most Iraqis had no identity documents. Many had had their identity cards confiscated by the Iraqi secret police; others had thrown them away to hide their identity. The lack of identity cards made screening the legitimate inhabitants of the town difficult, but the Kuwaiti translators were adept at ferreting out the required information. For example, they could tell by an Iraqi's dialect whether he was a local Bedouin or a resident of Baghdad. Questionable cases were checked against the captured police files. Iraqis who were not returnees were turned away. Many were found to be Iraqi Army deserters, and when their numbers began to pose a threat to security at the checkpoint, they were taken to the EPW cage in Rafha. Returnees who had been screened were in-processed and issued an American-made identity card and four days' rations. All returnees were briefed by the muhktar on the allied administration and its rules. They were also told that they would have to go through the muhktar with questions or complaints—they were not allowed to deal directly with the allies. This helped to establish the muhktar as the legitimate Iraqi authority over the town.

Challenge of 'military government': By Mar. 24, the company had processed 2768 returnees, most of whom chose to return to their homes. Others, mostly Bedouins, returned to their pastures in the surrounding area. Most of the unit's personnel were heavily involved in the day-to-day duties required to administer a town of more than 2000 inhabitants; only the law-and-order team remained at the checkpoint north of town, where it continued to screen and in-process the few remaining returnees. Realizing that the unit was not large enough to adequately administer the town, the company commander decided to transfer as many duties as possible to the muhktar once he was able to handle them. For example, the civil-service team had initially staffed the food distribution point and had managed the issuing of rations. The muhktar was directed to pick a staff to run the food-issue point. One of the company's operations specialists would supervise the operation. Soldiers from Co. B had initially driven the water trucks and the garbage truck, but an Egyptian national later volunteered to perform this duty. He "hired" several local assistants, who were usually paid with extra rations of food. By the end of Co. B's stay, water distribution and trash hauling were civilian responsibilities. As food stocks were exhausted, the French Army provided military rations for issue to the townspeople. Although the allies could have flooded the town with food, the company commander believed that it would not be in the Iraqis' best interests to raise their standard of living higher than it had been before the war. They received what was adequate to sustain their day-to-day needs, and local merchants slowly began to fill in the gaps. The public-health team administered sick call at the town clinic. Since all Iraqi public-health personnel had fled north, the French Army medical personnel performed this vital service, often seeing more than 100 patients each day. Care provided at the clinic played a major role in developing favorable attitudes toward the allies in general and the Americans in particular. As a result, the Iraqis cooperated with their American administrators, even going so far as to compel their neighbors to follow the allies' rules and regulations. By Mar. 20, the town was virtually self-sustaining except for food and medical supplies. On Mar. 23, the company moved from the boy's school to an abandoned border-police fortress on the northern edge of town. This move was necessary because the town council had decided to reopen the schools, probably the most conclusive evidence that normalcy had returned to As Salman and that the unit's mission had been successful. That same day, the company commander met with the commander of the 354th CA Command from VII Corps to discuss the hand-off of responsibility for As Salman. The following day, the company was relieved by VII Corps units and began its redeployment to COUS.

Conclusion: During Operation Desert Storm, Co. B was able to execute a classic Civil Affairs mission—the administration of an occupied town in enemy territory. With little prior experience in performing such a task, a small unit was able to complete its mission with a minimum diversion of allied resources. A combination of factors contributed to the unit's success: planning, experience, service support, training, initiative, PSYOP, and cultural and language training. Planning was crucial to the success of the mission. Not only was it a solid operations plan important, but also constant rehearsals, updated area studies, and coordination with supported and supporting units. The operations plan was adjusted constantly during the administration of As Salman, ensuring that the company was flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. Area assessments were important because they were used as tools to teach company members about the village they would soon be administering. Soldiers knew each street, each building, and the ethnic makeup of the town before they ever saw it. Experience was another crucial factor. Although all the members of Co. B had received some formal Civil Affairs training, six months in the theater—working with the inhabitants

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and dealing with real problems--gave the unit experience in locating local resources, dealing with local officials and operating in a desert environment. The unit's success could not have been achieved without administrative and logistics support from the XVIII Airborne Corps G-5 and the 6th LAD. The company learned to live without support from ARCEN or CENTCOM: these organizations were too remote. Although As Salman was administered in an austere logistical environment, the company's needs were largely met by energizing the considerable assets of the corps. Fortunately, the rapid cessation of hostilities enabled the 6th LAD to divert a larger amount of resources for the Iraqi populace than it ordinarily would have. Company B trained throughout the air campaign to conduct its mission. Team members were fully aware of their individual roles and of the general concept of the operation. Teams conducted rehearsals of their assigned missions, and when the ground war began, each soldier was ready. The importance of collective and individual initiative was also reinforced. All things do not come to those who wait. Unit members must often aggressively seek information and gather resources without waiting for help. This is especially important on the modern battlefield, where Civil Affairs units compete with other services for the same limited assets. Another lesson learned was the need for Civil Affairs and PSYOP to work closely together. Each must have a working knowledge of the other's job. Because both specialties are in short supply on the battlefield, CA and PSYOP soldiers may have to fill in for each other. This was the case in As Salman. Because PSYOP support was unavailable, Co. B improvised loudspeakers, leaflets and other media. All indications showed that these attempts, although crude, were successful, in part because several of the unit's members had attended formal blocks of instruction on PSYOP or had worked closely enough with PSYOP units to gain an understanding of the fundamentals. Finally, cultural and language expertise proved to be the company's most crucial advantage. The knowledge of Arabic culture gained after six months of dealing with indigenous peoples on a daily basis enabled the unit to approach its mission with the required degree of sensitivity. The Americans showed respect for Islamic culture and gained the trust of the local leadership, and the people of As Salman were receptive to American administration. Cultural sensitivity is the most difficult skill to learn and the most perishable, but it is one of the crucial factors that make SOF an effective combat multiplier. As the Army and other services prepare for a future characterized by operations other than war, episodes such as the administration of As Salman may become commonplace. Commanders may find themselves responsible for the safety and well-being of thousands of enemy citizens within their area of operations. While in many respects As Salman was an ideal laboratory for revalidating CA concepts and principles, all units can benefit from the lessons learned by Co. B's operations.

Lesson learned: PSYOP should be incorporated into all aspects of planning for humanitarian missions; Language and intercultural skills are crucial to success; CA units cannot provide security for towns--that is an MP mission; US forces should be prepared to work with allied and international forces; Political-military factors taught in the Regional Studies Course are excellent analytical tools for Civil Affairs and PSYOP units; Infantry skills are necessary in preparing for combat operations. CA units may have to accompany the ground-assault force; Flexibility and ingenuity are crucial--don't wait for detailed guidance or try to fit the doctrinal template to real-world situations; METT-T applies to the planning process for CA and PSYOP units too; JRTC must continue to emphasize the administration of occupied population centers during its exercise play; CA units should view an administrative mission as a temporary one. If they become indispensable, they may remain indispensable. Reactivate the indigenous leadership as soon as possible; Use local resources as much as possible--don't be a distractor for the maneuver commander; All members of CA units are workers--the only way to get an administration mission moving is to practice hands-on leadership. [Maj. Douglas E. Nash is currently attending the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. His most recent assignment was commander of the Regional Studies Detachment, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. His other assignments include service as commander of Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, where he served during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Guantanamo. A graduate of the Civil Affairs Course and the Regional Studies Course, he holds a bachelor's degree from the US Military Academy and a master's degree from Troy State University.] [=]

24152. National Wildlife Federation; Great Lakes Natural Resource Center. EPA's First 'Great Waters' Report to Congress: Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great Waters: Comments of National Wildlife Federation: Part 05: Air Toxics Are Causing Serious and Widespread Adverse Effects: Mercury. District of Columbia: National Wildlife Federation, Great Lakes Natural Resource Center, May 1994. (Questions or comments may be directed to: National Wildlife Federation, Great Lakes Natural Resource Center, 506 E. Liberty St., Ann Arbor, MI 48104; tel: 313/769-3351; fax 313/769-1449,) The case against mercury is clear. Due to ubiquitous, high mercury levels in fish, sport fish consumption advisories are in place in virtually all waters of many states and in the province of Ontario. The Great Lakes states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana recently called on EPA in a joint letter to propose steps for mercury as part of the upcoming medical waste incinerator regulations. The states concluded: "Even when fully diluted, there is too much mercury in the environment." The serious human health risks from mercury exposure, particularly to neonates, are well-known. Mercury exposure can cause developmental toxicity, reproductive toxicity, acute toxicity (death through exposure to lungs, mouth, or skin), chronic toxicity, neurotoxicity, and environmental toxicity (harm to wildlife through water, soil or consumption of contaminated fish). Mercury can bioaccumulate (is not easily expelled from living plants and animals thus concentrates over time and repeated exposure) and persist (does not disintegrate). Although widespread adverse public health effects have not been documented at this time, immediate preventive actions to eliminate mercury emissions are imperative: "Mercury levels in the blood of Michigan adults who do not consume large amounts of fish may be only ten-fold lower than those calculated to have possibly produced adverse effects in children born to methylmercury exposed women in Iraq... The margin of safety for mercury appears relatively low compared to those for many human-derived (anthropogenic) environmental pollutants." [=]

24153. New American View. "News Notes: Preparing For The Future", in New American View-News and Informed Commentary on US Relations With Israel and the Middle East, Vol. 6(1), January 1, 1991. Shoshana Cardin, 64, former chairwoman of the National Conference of Jewish Women, was unanimously elected last month to serve as chairwoman of the powerful Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. She succeeds Seymour Reich, president of B'nai B'rith International. During the past two years, according to Reich, there has been a surge of official US criticism of Israel and rising antisemitism in America. Cardin said, "The priorities [for the future] almost identify themselves." She predicted the conference will spend much of the new year in assuring that the US government makes no linkage between Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and Israel's "administration" of the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, she said, "There is a relation between the exciting, massive aliyah [the Soviet Jewish exodus to Israel] and the ability of Israel to maintain a secure [military] position at the same time [it is] welcoming incredible numbers of olim [Jews from abroad]." (Jewish Telegraphic Agency.) (Translation: The conference will concentrate on squeezing still more money from the American taxpayer to help Israel absorb its new Jews.) [=]

24154. New American View. "News Notes: War of the Womb", in New American View-News and Informed Commentary on US Relations With Israel and the Middle East, Vol. 5(18), September 15, 1990. Israeli efforts to raise the number of Jews in the Zionist state depend exclusively on the mass immigration of Soviet Jews. So far this year, 80,000 Soviet Jews have come to Israel. Still, the number of Jews in Israel remains at slightly more than 80%, 3.7 million out of a total population of 4.6 million. The remaining 20% are mostly Palestinians. The continuing low Jewish
birthrate, as well as the high level of emigration (largely to the US), is barely keeping the Jews ahead of the Palestinians inside Israel. Meanwhile, the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza, now estimated to be as high as 2 million, continues to climb. At the same time, many of the 350,000 refugee Palestinian workers from Kuwait are seeking to return to their homeland, as are some of the 2.5 million Palestinians now living in Jordan. Counting those living in Israel, the occupied territories and Jordan, there are now more than 5 million Palestinians living in the Middle East. (JTA and Palestine News Agency.) [\textit{\bibitem{[24155. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. Table: "Major Sources and Locations of Refugees, 1980: Country of Origin: Middle East", in Connexions, Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 2, October 1, 1981. p. 3. Iraq: 30,000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: Jordan, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria. [Source: Worldwatch Paper 43.][Reprinted with permission of the publisher.]]}

This decision indicates a dismantling of the Arab ranks and a deterioration in Arab unity. Not only that, but it also signals that they are giving up on the question of Palestine and Jerusalem. The Gulf countries which severed all relations with the Palestinians during the Gulf War, even cutting off-aid, hurried to make peace with Israel immediately after the Madrid Talks. Many also welcomed Israeli delegations to their countries and making yet another move toward the normalization of relations with Israel, despite, the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians in the occupied territories, the Judaization of Jerusalem, forgetting the Islamic character of the city.

This move is due to US pressure, on the Arab countries, even Warren Christopher declared that this decision is a victory for the Clinton administration in its efforts to get rid of the discrimination against US companies that deal with Israel. Christopher asked the Gulf states to lift the direct boycott on Israel, and these countries complied to US pressure. The Secretary of State also declared that during his meetings with Prince Hassan of Jordan and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Shara, he will ask them to do the same as the Gulf states did, and open their markets to Israeli goods, at a time when Israeli still has a grip on the occupied territories, confiscating more land, building more settlements, controlling more water and giving a larger section of the Ibrahimi Mosque to the Israelis.

This Gulf decision is a breach of the Arab League ruling that was taken 47 years ago to boycott Israel, and no one has the right to change this ruling except for the League.

The Gulf decision also comes after the tightening of the Iraqi embargo, despite the fact that many countries have asked that this embargo be lifted since Iraq has complied with UN requirements. Many children and infants are dying in Iraq due to lack of milk and medicine, but the embargo continues.

It was natural that the decision was welcomed by the Israelis, with Peres calling it another step toward demolishing the wall of hatred and forming a new Middle East. And this is considered one of the biggest successes for the Israelis ever since their Jewish state was formed, when they started marketing the notion of the Palestinians as refugees and asked the rich countries to find them shelter in their own countries, rather than admit the fact that the Palestinians were deprived from their own homes and land. And many countries accepted this idea, either consciously or unconsciously, and now many of these countries are falling into yet another trap set by the Israelis, and this one is the new "Middle East" of development and economic growth, where joint economic ventures will be set, tourism will flourish, there will be normalization of relations psychological barriers will be destroyed and "Islamic terrorist fundamentalism" will be fought.

The Gulf decision means economic development for the Israelis, since many companies will now set up plants in Israel, a thing that will encourage more immigrants into Israel, which means more land confiscation, more settlement building and more stealing of waters from the occupied West Bank, occupied Golan Heights and Sough Lebanon.

What is strange is the fact that this decision comes at a time when there is pressure on the Arab countries from Israel, the US and other countries not to submit the issue of the Palestinians to the UN General Assembly including the right to return, the withdrawal from the occupied territories and Jerusalem, dismantling settlements, and the issue of the Israeli nuclear weapons. The gulf decision comes at a very bad time, and doesn't serve the arab negotiator as Syria's Foreign Minister Shara's said when he commented on the decision. The decision proves that many Arab states consider the Palestinian question a burden, and found a chance to rid themselves of it when the PLO and Israel signed the peace agreement. [\textit{\bibitem{[24158. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. "Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf, Part 1", in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 3. As we go to press, the United States is continuing the war threats against Iraq by deploying 30,000 ground troops and 500 aircraft to the Persian Gulf - even though all reports indicate that Iraq's elite Republican Guard divisions have been pulled well back from the border with Kuwait. The US government says it will order military strikes against Iraq - with or without a UN stamp of approval - if it decides Iraq is "misbehaving."
Clinton administration officials are discussing plans to greatly increase permanent US military presence in the region and to set up a "no-go zone" inside Iraq's territory where Israeli ground forces will not be allowed to enter. The US justification for these huge military moves is that they are in response to "Iraqi aggression." The US ruling class and their media portray Saddam Hussein as "crazy" for challenging the US once again or say he "made a
big miscalculation.” This is a twisted logic that turns reality upside down. It is the US that is sending a huge military contingent thousands of miles away. The US has been the big power aggressor in the Persian Gulf - a region that the US imperialist ruling class feels they must dominate at all costs because it is strategically vital to their worldwide empire. In 1991 the US government launched a war against the Hussein regime and killed more than 100000 Iraqis to enforce this domination. For over four years, the US and its allies have maintained a cruel war of sanctions against Iraq - causing many deaths and deep suffering for the Iraqi people. The US has refused to ease the deadly sanctions, even after the Iraq government agreed to a humiliating “weapons inspection program” that put UN spies and cameras in important Iraqi factories. And now the US has geared up its bloody war machine again. At the end of the Gulf War, many people who had remained silent or were sucked into supporting the war felt a deep sense of shame. They saw the immense death and destruction caused by the US military - to protect reactionary pro-West kingdoms like Kuwait and US control over the oil-rich Gulf. The US rulers are once again trying to get the people to back their bullying moves in the Gulf. [=]

24159. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. “Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf, Part 2”, in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 3. It is not in the interests of the great majority of people in this country to side with these international criminals and their dirty wars. The US imperialists have no right to dominate and push around other countries. Our interests lie in standing with our brothers and sisters - the masses of oppressed people in the Middle East - and against the US aggression in the Gulf. [=]

24160. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. “Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf: Mass Murder Through Sanctions, Part 1”, in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 3 & 10. A recent article in the New York Times contrasted the hunger facing the 18 million people in Iraq with the situation in Kuwait, the US-protected oil kingdom: “To the north, in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, food rations have been cut in half and there are lines for bread and cooking oil. Inflation is rendering the Iraqi dinar worthless and many on fixed incomes have trouble buying enough food for their families. Food has become a daily concern. “But Kuwait, whose oil wealth and small population give it one of the highest per-capita income in the world, has no such worries. Obesity has been steadily on the rise since the end of the Persian Gulf war, and Health Ministry officials say that at least half of the population is overweight.” The anti-Iraq economic embargo is being carried out under the UN banner - but they are basically enforced by the US and British military. Iraq has the world’s second largest oil reserve after Saudi Arabia. But the sanctions have prevented the foreign sale of Iraqi oil, eliminating what used to be Iraq’s main source of income. The sanctions have cut off purchases of key goods on the world market - food, medicine, machinery and parts to repair and maintain sanitary systems and many other necessities. The Iraqi government recently announced a 50% cut in rations of basic food. According to a just-released report from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), more than 2.5 million Iraqi children, pregnant women and mothers of infants are at risk of malnutrition. The US embargo has created a horror story for Iraqi people’s health. The president of Jordan’s Red Crescent Society reported that there was a ten to twenty-fold increase in deaths among children and a three-fold increase in adult deaths in 1994 compared to statistics from before 8/90, when the sanctions first began. Medicine and medical equipment are in such short supply that newborn babies in intensive care must share incubators and hypodermic needles are being used over and over again. Iraq used to import $400 million each year in drugs and medical supplies - now it gets only one-tenth of that. Diseases that used to be under control - such as polio, cholera and tuberculosis - are coming back. And many people, especially children, are dying of diarrhea and intestinal diseases because the sanctions have prevented the repair of sanitation and water cleaning systems. [=]

24161. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. “Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf: Mass Murder Through Sanctions, Part 2”, in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 10. For four years, the US has been committing mass murder of Iraqi people through economic sanctions. The US cold-bloodedly refuses to take responsibility for this suffering and instead blames the Iraq government. US officials claim that Saddam Hussein has been given a “humanitarian offer” to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil, which the Iraq government has refused because the money from the oil sale would be completely under the control of the UN, which would have the power to decide how to spend it. In other words, this so-called “humanitarian offer” that the US talks about is nothing but a deed that the Iraqi government turn over control of oil sales - the lifeline of this country’s economy - to outside forces. [=]

24162. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. “Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf: US Provocations Against Iraq, Part 1”, in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 10. In 1993, just as Clinton was taking over the presidency from Bush, the US government ordered a new fly-by-bombing of Iraq. The US claimed that the bombing was in retaliation for a “pattern of provocations” by Saddam Hussein. What actually happened was that the US had stolen a large part of the skies over Iraq by setting up “no-fly zones” patrolled by US jet fighters in the northern and southern parts of the country. When Iraq moved some defensive missiles into the southern zone, the US denounced this as a “provocation” - even though the missiles posed no threat to the US planes. In fact, it is the US that is guilty of carrying out a “pattern of provocation” against Iraq. At the end of the Gulf War, the UN said that the economic sanctions against Iraq would be lifted after the Hussein regime complies with several demands - the key one being that Iraq agree to destruction of large missiles and a strict monitoring of its industry to prevent manufacture of more heavy weapons. After repeated US bombings and military threats, the Iraqi regime agreed to the stationing of a large contingent of UN “weapons observers” and the installation of a sophisticated “industrial monitoring system” in many of the factories. The system includes TV cameras, sensors, radars and hundreds of miles of wiring. An American engineer with the monitoring team said, “This is the most sophisticated and intrusive industrial monitoring system ever devised.” The Iraqi government expected that the agreement on weapons monitoring would lead to the easing of sanctions. And they began negotiations with foreign businesses in anticipation that oil exports could start up again soon. France’s two major oil companies signed agreements this summer to develop oil fields in Iraq once sanctions end. Russia, Japan and other countries have also been eager to make economic deals with Iraq and to get repayments of billions of dollars in loans to the Hussein regime. But the US and Britain made it clear that they oppose the lifting of sanctions - until Saddam Hussein is removed from power and replaced by another ruler more obedient to US demands. Even the New York Times had to admit, “The US and Britain are refusing to acknowledge Saddam Hussein’s compliance with the UN’s stated terms for lifting sanctions. . . . In fact, Britain and the US are changing the rules.”[=]

24163. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. “Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullies: At It Again in the Gulf: US Provocations Against Iraq, Part 2”, in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994. p. 10. In short, the US has forced Iraq to accept outright violations of its national sovereignty; at the same time, the US is refusing to loosen the sanctions noose. It is unclear what Saddam Hussein’s intentions were in moving the elite Republican Guard divisions into southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti border during the past few weeks. Some bourgeois analysts say that it was meant as a pressure tactic to show that Iraq had the potential to make military trouble if the sanctions were not lifted. In any case, it is shameless hypocrisy for the US to try to drive the Hussein regime into the corner through a series of provocations, bullying and war threats - and then accuse Iraq of “aggression” for moving troops within its own territory! This situation is reminiscent of what happened leading up to the Gulf War. In the early 1980s, the US and other big powers pushed Saddam Hussein to make war with Iran. After the Iran-
Iraq war. Hussein argued that Iraq's huge debts to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other oil kingdoms should be cancelled. But the Gulf monarchs, with US backing, pushed for repayment. Kuwait put more pressure on Iraq by raising oil production and driving down world oil prices, and Kuwait even siphoned off oil from the Rumailah field that runs between the two countries. It was after these repeated provocations that Iraq took military action against Kuwait in the fall of 1990. This was seized on by the US as a justification for a massive power play in the Gulf. [ =] 24164. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. "Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullyes: At It Again in the Gulf: US Imperialist Calculations in the Gulf, Part 1", in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994, p. 10. Why is the US so intent on attacking Saddam Hussein? Why is the US still sending a huge military force to the Gulf, even after the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein's troops from southern Iraq? This is not a matter of a US "vendetta" against Hussein. These moves are based on cold-blooded calculations of the US empire. The US rulers are compelled by the needs and drives of their system to carry out big-power aggression in the Persian Gulf. Here are the key factors behind the recent US moves in the Gulf: (1) The US needs to get rid of Saddam Hussein, as part of asserting control over the whole Persian Gulf. For the US rulers, keeping a dominant position in the Gulf and the Middle East overall is crucial to their status as the top imperialist superpower. The US itself gets a relatively small percentage of its oil from the Gulf, but the area is a lifeline for Europe and Japan. Saddam Hussein remains in power despite the devastation of the Gulf War, and the US imperialists are afraid he has become a symbol of the limitations of their power. And they do not want to look like they are being forced to respond militarily by the maneuverings of Saddam Hussein - or anybody else. So they want to replace Hussein with a new set of rulers that they can more easily control. (2) Even as they attack Saddam Hussein, the US wants to prevent Iraq from sinking into chaos and giving an opening to Iran. Although the US rulers want Saddam Hussein replaced, they do not want various sections of oppressed people in Iraq to rise up in rebellion, possibly leading to the break-up of Iraq as a country. The US wants to see Hussein replaced by another repressive government that will keep the oppressed people down and Iraq open to domination by imperialism. This is why the US is requiring Hussein to only pull back the 200,000 Republican Guard troops that recently moved near the Kuwaiti border, not the 50,000 regular Iraqi Army troops who were already there. The New York Times put it this way: "The Iraqi leader would be allowed to keep in place the regular Army divisions that he has used over the last year to repress the Shiite residents, many of whom have been vocal in their opposition to the government in Baghdad." The US aim is to keep both Iraq and Iran in check - in order to keep the Gulf under firm US control. In the Pentagon, they call this the policy of "dual containment." (3) The US wants to increase permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf. As the Iraqi military withdrew from the area near the border with Kuwait, US Defense Secretary Perry unveiled a plan to keep a large amount of planes, tanks and armor on bases in the Gulf kingdoms. Even after the 1991 Gulf war, Saudi Arabia and other kingdoms were reluctant to agree on a large permanent US military presence, fearing it would make them targets of anti-US sentiments among Arab masses. The US is pointing to what they call the "continuing threat from Saddam Hussein" to push for a division worth of military equipment to be stored in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This will allow the US to quickly fly in 15,000 troops to "match up" with the equipment - as well as conduct regular "training exercises." (4) The US is countering moves by other major powers to horn in on "their turf" in the Gulf. In the last few months, differences between the US (and Britain) and other powers on policy toward Iraq have come more to the surface. While the US refuses to even consider easing the anti-Iraq sanctions, France, Russia, Turkey and some other countries have been holding discussions with Iraqi officials and planning economic ventures. As the US poured troops into the Gulf last week, the Soviet foreign minister travelled to Baghdad, met with Saddam Hussein and announced they had come up with an agreement in which Iraq made some concessions in return for a promise that sanctions will be lifted soon. And the French foreign minister criticized the US military buildup, implying that Clinton was only trying to build up his domestic popularity. These are all signs that there is an intensifying contentiortbetween the various imperialist vultures over the Gulf. By making a big show of force, the US wants to make clear that it is still the "world cop" - the leading power in the "new world order," the only imperialist country capable of deploying such a huge military force thousands of miles from its "home base." 24165. Revolutionary Communist Party; RCP. "Iraq: The War of Sanctions and the Threat of War: US Bullyes: At It Again in the Gulf: Hands off Iraq", in Revolutionary Worker, October 23, 1994, p. 10. During the 1991 Gulf War, many people became confused by the US ruling class tirades against Saddam Hussein. Today, once again, the oppressors are using the same tactic to fool people into getting behind them. They are threatening more attacks and more killings if Saddam Hussein does not "behavior." But the people must not be played for fools by the oppressors. The oppressed people, and everyone who is against US crimes around the world, have to be clear on what's really going down. The main problem for the people in Iraq is imperialism. Imperialist domination has meant reactionary wars, oppressive regimes backed by foreign powers, a distorted economy, big debts to the Western powers and suffering for the people. From the standpoint of the international proletariat, the real problem with Saddam Hussein is that he is very much tied in with this imperialist domination of Iraq. What justice can there be in a big power like the US beating up on a Third World country already devastated by war and economic sanctions? What right does the US have to punish the oppressed people of Iraq by denying them food and medicine, stomping on their country and threatening to bring cruise missiles down on their heads? The US and other imperialists have never helped the people of Iraq and the whole Middle East. The Arab people are not our enemy - they are our sisters and brothers. The masses of people in the US have a common cause and common enemy with the people of Iraq - US imperialism. And we have a responsibility in standing with them to oppose the latest US war moves in the Gulf. US hands off Iraq! US troops out of the Persian Gulf! [ =] 24166. Rowley, Storer H. "Deal Struck On Abortion Language; Compromise In Population Plan", in Seattle Times, September 5, 1994. p. A3. The Clinton Administration has promised the Vatican that it will not promote abortion as a means of birth control in the draft document to be produced at the UN Population Conference. Clinton has condemned the Roman Catholic Church and some Muslim groups 'as out of step with the rest of world'. As a Roman Catholic Bishop warned that the Clinton stance on abortion at the UN conference could become a domestic political issue, Gore stated that the US position had never been to assert abortion as a method of birth control, Gore also (oddly) never mentioned contraception other than abortion as important. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Sudan have boycotted the meeting. Many Third World countries complain that the conference which claims to address both development and population has ignored economic development for the world's poorest peoples. 24167. Ruane, Michael E. "Parents of Air Force Pilot Killed Over Iraq Qant Justice", in Seattle Times, November 18, 1994. p. A11. Parents of an Air Force officer (Lt. Laura Piper) killed in the mistaken shoot down of two US helicopters in Kurdistan by US Air Force jets are enraged that only one of the officers involved remains accused. On 11/16/1994, a judge dismissed five of the six officers accused. 24168. Salih, Sadi Mahdi. Letter to American People from Sadi Mahdi Salih, Speaker of the National Assembly, on 8/24/1990. In the name of God. We send you greetings of civilization, freedom, and democracy, wishing you and all peoples of the world well being, happiness, and peace. We have decided to address this message to you because we believe you will better understand and interact with us than President George Bush's administration does, because people better understand other people. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bush administration seeks to distort the image you have of the Iraqis and to depict them as terrorists
and as harsh men who love war, as well as barbarians who have no consideration at all for international laws, the interests of other nations, and human values. However, we the Iraqis are not like that. We are not what the Bush administration is describing us to be. We are an ancient people of successive human civilizations, the most ancient of which dates back to about 6000 years ago. We are the nation of the Mesopotamia, the inheritors of Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Ashor. Our people wrote the first written language and the first to promulgate laws and specify rights 4500 years ago as detailed by the Hammurabi law. We were the first to establish schools, compose verses and epics, and formulate the most ancient mathematical and astrological theories. And when the sun of Islam rose on the land of the Arabs, Iraq was the first to receive it and open its heart and mind to its light. Iraq strove for it and carried its banner to the world, and with Islam Iraq became a center of world civilization and its capital Baghdad the capital of peace when Europe itself was still plunged in the darkness of the Middle Ages. This means, ladies and gentlemen, that civilization, the love of justice, and respect for law, and belief in God, have been handed down to the Iraqis and so became a built-in part of their psychological and spiritual fabric in contrast to Bush's contention and what he has been spreading abroad. The Iraqis are at the same time as self-respecting a people as are the American people, and they will not have their dignity compromised nor their rights taken away from them or any one pointing guns at them. The Iraqi people are also a resilient, militant, and courageous people, as past history has shown them to be. In short, the Iraqis are not what they are perceived to be by Mr. George Bush and painted by US and other Western propaganda. We the Iraqis are today, unjustifiably and under false pretexts, on the receiving end of a conspiracy led by and built up by the Bush administration. Just because we retrieved part of our country which British colonialism had built into a grand hotel called the State of Kuwait and installed there backward, subservient rulers, the Bush administration began making charges that now we want to invade Saudi Arabia, and now we threaten Western interests, including American interests. All this is sheer slander. Like Iraq, Saudi Arabia is an Arab country and the two are bound by a non-aggression pact signed in 1989. We honor the agreement and abide by its letter and spirit. We have emphasized as much to Saudi Arabia and to the Bush administration and the international community, and we have stated our readiness to give sufficient guarantees bilaterally, or in an Arab or international context, that we do not want to threaten any interests of the United States or the West, or any other nation for that matter, since we have a vested interest in regional peace and in a smooth flow of oil to the world and the United States itself in an atmosphere of security and stability. You must know that before the present crisis erupted we sold one third of our oil to the United States. Perhaps you do not know we are now importing up to 20% of the world's oil needs. Is it in our and the United States' interest that the entire region with its oil go up in flames? Contrary to the Bush administration's perception of us, we respect others' legitimate interests and appreciate their circumstances and requirements and want to see oil sold at moderate prices; our policies within OPEC bear witness to that. And more than anything else, we respect international law and are mindful of our responsibilities toward the world and appreciate the importance of the region in which we live and its impact on world politics. Only, we do not like anyone interfering in our domestic affairs, nor do we want for ourselves to become puppets manipulated by others. Neither will we have our dignity and freedom compromised or anyone dictate to us. All we want is for the Iraqi and Arab individual to enjoy the same rights as the Americans in their country.

These ambitions, we believe, are legitimate if others view them from a neutral perspective. However, it is obvious that Mr. Bush's administration has not understood this--or maybe it does not want to understand it. The Bush administration wants to decide for us what we should or should not do. It has not accepted the idea that the southern part of Iraq, Kuwait, should unite with its north, the way the south of the United States united with its north. The Bush administration wants us to be like those submissive puppets it can manipulate with strings in certain parts of this world, including our region; this would be doing injustice to us, our history and future. Therefore, the Bush administration aroused the feelings of hostility held by some toward us, urged those who went along with it to impose an economic blockade on us, and started to prevent everything from reaching us, including food, medicine, and milk for the infants. It has also recruited fleets, squadrons of planes, and soldiers to commit aggression on us--an act of war and a violation of the UN Charter, whose clauses it interprets anyway it wants--and used all that is available to it from among the methods of persuasion, pressure, and encouragement so that other countries would follow suit. It seems, however, that the Bush administration has not considered in the least the results of what it has planned or put into action. Neither has it remembered the tragedy of Vietnam and the effects on the American people which they are suffering still today. Therefore, it found it easy to push American soldiers into the desolate desert quicksand. It has not taken notice that Iraq is not like Vietnam and that its weapons are not like those of Vietnam. It has not heeded what this aggression would cause for us--feelings of hostility and enmity toward the American people along with the millions of Arabs and Muslims who have begun to volunteer to join us. Mr. Bush's administration has made itself believe that the Arabs are siding with it. It has not realized that Arabs are not like some of their rulers; they are the masses of the people who are seething with anger against it, and who are preparing to strike at US interests should aggression start against us. Moreover, the Arabs are those nationalist honorable rulers who are clearly siding with us. Ladies and gentlemen: It is easy for Mr. Bush to fan the flames of war, but it would be very difficult for us and you to bear its tragic consequences. Therefore, and to avoid together this outcome, we call on every American citizen who advocates right, justice, freedom, and peace to raise his voice in protest against the policies of Mr. Bush's administration toward us. We call them to ask Mr. Bush's administration to lift its illegitimate, inhuman blockade, and to stop the conspiracy to starve our people, kill our children, and inhibit our progress. We call them to ask Mr. Bush's administration to withdraw US armies from Arab land and waters, and to stop humiliating our nation and Islamic sanctuaries. We call Mr. Bush, through you, by virtue of his being an American citizen, to reconsider his hostility toward Iraq before deliberating with his advisers, and to join the protesters, because this protest will render a service to the American and Iraqi people and to all the Arabs and humanity at large, because Mr. Bush is threatening to set a fire whose victims will undoubtedly be thousands of Americans and Arabs. May God keep you and us away from the evil and atrocities of war, and away from the evil of hatred and craving for revenge. Peace be upon him who thinks, contemplates, and follows the voice of reason and the call of conscience[Signed] Sa'di Mahdi Salih, speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly. [Reprinted from Fred Moore (compiler), Iraq Speaks: Documents On The Gulf Crisis. Palo Alto, Calif., N.D.]  

24169. Scigliano, Eric. “Rough Sailing At Greenpeace; Environmentalism; Just As The Worldwide Action Group Struggles With Declining Funds and Midlife Crisis, Its Seattle Office Is Riven By PC Feuds and Charges of Harassment, Discrimination and Mismanagement; The Pot-Smoking Field Managers, Very Popular With the Seattle Workers, Were Reprmanded, Demoted and Fired”. In Seattle Weekly, November 27, 1996, pp. 9-15, 17. Greenpeace is struggling against a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment, and sex and race discrimination. A former canvasser leader charges she was driven out because she is female, African-American and Lesbian, and that the very successful Seattle office is a veritable Animal House of harassment, vandalism, nepotism, drug use and mishandling of donated money. Another former canvassing manager agrees with the charges and noted he was discriminated against as a middle-aged white male. Greenpeace refuses comment. However, whatever the truth of the matter, the question illustrates the problems faced by environmental organizations seeking to make common cause with other progressive movements.

The woman suing for harassment (given the name Samantha in the article) came to the Seattle office after working as a canvasser in Austin, Texas, in 1992 (not only was Austin hostile to a Black canvasser, the Austin Greenpeace office had a Confederate flag hanging in it): a period when Greenpeace started a financial decline that continues to the present. (While Greenpeace paid canvassers only a percentage of their
nightly take, the fact they were frequently moved around the country made in briefly attractive to many young people who wanted to see the country. Samantha was a prize for the Seattle Greenpeace since it, like many environmental organizations, wanted a more diverse workforce (e.g., Sierra Club created a special gay and lesbian group). Greenpeace management has traditionally been uneasy with minorities, being reluctant to canvass in Black areas, and only gradually ending its confrontations with Canadian and Alaskan natives over subsistence hunting of seals and whales. Yet when Samantha started working in Seattle, she was greeted by fellow workers with hostility, since they believed she had been promoted over thus to affirmative action (actually her transfer from Austin was a lateral transfer). She also came into conflict with the local corporate culture due to her concern with professionalism, which focused on alcohol and drugs, and included week-long closures of the office when the Grateful Dead came to town so the staff could party-their-brains-out. She also objected to the loose handling of funds, with some officers routinely skimming sums off the revenues, or borrowing money to buy drugs or bail out someone who had been arrested for drugs (and then losing the IOUs). While an ally of Samantha in the office, Stephen Schafer, a middle-aged White male, confirms most of her charges (although states he was unaware of money problems), he notes that the pervasive anti-White male attitudes made it difficult to implement any kind of managerial controls: he had come into Greenpeace to revamp its canvassing system. Schafer observes: “Political correctness is the source of tyranny. It makes for arbitrary decisions about everything”. His efforts to modernize the canvassing system earned him the nickname “Hitler”.

Samantha noted that after Greenpeace hired and then decided not to retain a diversity consultant, the fatal problem for her was the continuing problem of drugs and money. Samantha may exaggerate the scale of drug use in Greenpeace Seattle (seeing sales of small amounts between staffers as drug dealing) but drug use was pervasive. The incident that led to a serious confrontation was her report that canvassers on a trip to Montana had smoked marijuana in a Greenpeace-owned van during its risk: its classification: it led to the reprimanding, demotion and firing of the field managers. This led to months of insults and harassment by the canvassers under her, and the refusal of her managers to address the problem. Samantha and Schafer received bad performance reviews; she found a hangman’s noose on her desk, and the verbal harassment accelerated.

Canvassing is the core of the Greenpeace mission: the individual canvasser is often the personal embodiment of Greenpeace for most people. Canvassing is the entry path into the movement for most of the people who later become managers and leaders in Greenpeace, and is also the source of researchers, demonstrators and action campaigners (on chlorine, toxic wastes, overfishing and other high profile issues). Fueled by outrage over the French secret service bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 in New Zealand, the canvassing operation of Greenpeace grew rapidly, and provided an annual budget approaching $200 million at its peak. Beginning in Vancouver, British Columbia, in 1971, as it grew its center moved from Vancouver, to San Francisco, to Washington DC, to London and to Amsterdam; even Canadian operations moved to Toronto.

However, for Greenpeace, the drive to generate revenues remains a constant. Paul Watson, a Greenpeace co-founder expounded because of his desire to use aggressive methods to confront sealers and whalers, scorns the canvassers as “the Fuller Brush men of the environmental movement”. Samantha and others note that the pressure to produce revenue gradually creates jaded hard-sell artists, who become progressively obsessed with generating ever more revenue. However, Greenpeace USA revenues in the 1990s started a continuing decline: from $42 million, to $26.6 million in 1994, and $23.4 million in 1995; membership has declined from 1.6 million to 700,000; and the Seattle canvassing staff has fallen from 40 to 12.

Many Greenpeacers blame the decline on the Persian Gulf War: Greenpeace took a conspicuously stand against the war. The Seattle office was very active in the local anti-war movement. However, other factors may be more important: (1) the decline in the number of publicity to its activist efforts (some have been dubious or ill-informed); as budgets became tighter activists were cut from the budget, rather than marketing campaigns. At the same time, environmental issues confronting Greenpeace now are more complex that the early days when it could just say no to nuclear testing or whaling: questions of pulp mill effluent levels have a much smaller constituency that earlier issues. Two-thirds of Greenpeace canvassing offices have closed (returns were modest in the first days of the war, $200 million at its peak. Beginning in Vancouver, British Columbia, in 1971, as it grew its center moved from Vancouver, to San Francisco, to "adultery" by hearing snatches of songs broadcast in between the news. In the first days of the war, the Haredim moved to Toronto. rather venial. It means that they sinned each time they heard women music. Usually, the strictly observant religious Jews - the so-called Haredim - refrain from listening to the radio while being prohibited to watch TV. During the crisis, when the missile alarms, the all-clear signals and other security-related instructions were broadcast by radio, the Haredi rabbis enjoined their flocks to listen to the radio for life and the instructions of army authorities. This immediately created problems, because Jewish signals and other security-related instructions were broadcast by radio, the Haredi rabbis enjoined their flocks to listen to the radio for life and the instructions of army authorities. This immediately created problems, because Jewish music. Usually, the strictly observant religious Jews - the so-called Haredim - refrain from listening to the radio while being prohibited to watch TV. During the crisis, when the missile alarms, the all-clear signals and other security-related instructions were broadcast by radio, the Haredi rabbis enjoined their flocks to listen to the radio for life and the instructions of army authorities. This immediately created problems, because Jewish women in the Middle East and North Africa Iraq www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
and the seculars. The first issue was over whether the war will break out; the second, over the real reasons for its outbreak and for the damage inflicted by the missiles; and the third, over what to do to terminate the war by a speedy American victory. The overwhelming majority of prominent Haredi rabbis were of the opinion that either the war cannot break out, or, if it nevertheless does, "no Israeli Jew will be in any way hurt by it." (The Lubavitcher Rabbi’s words pronounced from the safe distance of New York). have been written on iron spits. Third, the rite should have been performed in a cave rather than in a Synagogue. And fourth, the 10 performing rabbis must have never before committed any covert sin. Nothing much could have been done to rectify the last "error," much as many Haredim suspected that it was decisive in turning the ritual into a fiasco. But the first three "errors" were duly rectified in a repeated ceremony, held already in a cave on the midnight of 2/2-3/1991, which was again described by the press at length. Since the second ceremony has proven no more effectual than the first, the discoveries of errors in its performance can be expected. There were some attempts at performing magic in public. Some rabbinical authorities proclaimed that the right way of making Saddam Hussein die would be to announce his funeral in print, in a form closely conforming to the usual pattern of such announcements. This was indeed done, and distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies, which can now be seen in all public places conceivable. Other rabbis suggested that Saddam Hussein will surely die if all the Jews of Israel pronounce the death curse on him at exactly the same moment. But, since so many infidels live in the Jewish State, and the believers clash over the content of their beliefs, not all the methods suggested can be put to a test. One effect of described practices is certain. They motivate the secular Jews to acquire knowledge of the living Judaism in order to resist it. But an assessment of consequences of this fact must be left for the future. [=]

24171. Simpson, Alan. Letter: "Some Questions About Kuwait", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 7, 1993. Before we even begin to discuss the latest approach from Kuwait to send British troops in, we must go back to Kuwait and ask some very important questions. We must ask the emir of Kuwait what he has done to extend the democratic franchise in the country since it was handed back to the royal family at the end of the Gulf war. We must ask for an explanation of why over 200,000 of the 400,000 permanently settled Palestinians have fled or been deported from Kuwait since its 'liberation'. We must ask why the remaining Palestinians are denied access to schools for their children or the right to health care and why the systematic harassment of Palestinians has gone unchallenged in Kuwait. Finally we must ask ourselves where in the UN mandate was anyone given the authority to annex sovereign Iraqi territory and give it to Kuwait? Why have western forces chosen to do this rather than to address the territorial dispute which had already been lodged with the UN by Iraq over the territory in the region? The Government’s actions so far demonstrate only a la,mentable willingness to use military power to conceal a political vacuum. There is no strategy for the development of peace, stability, democracy and social justice in the region—has to be the starting point of a discussion that begins and ends with Arab states in the region, not the bombing schedules of a departing US president.[Alan Simpson, MP, Notts South, House of Commons.] [=]

24172. Smith, Sharon. “Slaughter in Bosnia Can Be Stopped by United Workers Movement: Don’t Give a Feminist Cover for Intervention by US/UN”, in Socialist Worker (International Socialist Organization), March 1993, p. 2. Over the last several months, many feminists in the US have begun calling for a United Nations (UN) response to the mass rapes of Bosnian women in the ex-Yugoslavia. The National Organization for Women held a demonstration in Washington, D.C. and the Women’s Action Coalition (WAC) has begun a nationwide campaign calling for greater UN intervention in the former Yugoslavia. A campaign letter by Chicago WAC states, “The raping of Muslim and Croatian women in Bosnia-Hercegovina seems unprecedented in the history of war crimes. “Women and girls are raped by Serbian soldiers in an organized and systematic way in what seems to be a planned agenda to destroy, both
physically and psychologically, the Muslim culture." Among its other demands, WAC has called for increasing the number of UN peacekeeping troops and that the UN establish a "United Nations War Crimes Tribunal" to try soldiers accused of raping Bosnian women. The raping of women in the former Yugoslavia is deplorable. But these recent feminist campaigns are ill-informed and seek demands - in particular, greater UN intervention - which will only worsen the the war in the former Yugoslavia and strengthen then US imperialism. It is now widely accepted among feminists that Serbian soldiers are the main culprits in the rape of women in Bosnia. In a recent issue of The Nation, Slavenka Drakulic argued that the rapes by Serbian soldiers are qualitatively different than rapes in other wars: "What seems to be unprecedented about the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia (and, to a lesser extent, the Croat women too) is that there is a clear political purpose behind the practice...a systematic attempt to cleanse (to move, resettle, exile) the Muslim population from certain territories Serbs want to conquer in order to establish a greater Serbia." [=]  

24173. Smith, Sharon. "Slaughter in Bosnia Can Be Stopped by United Workers Movement: Don't Give a Feminist Cover for Intervention by US/UN: Had Committed Rapes", in Socialist Worker (International Socialist Organization), March 1993. p. 2. The War Resisters League has also compiled claims by observers that some UN troops had committed rape in Bosnia as well. A senior European Community (EC) official explained recently, "The Red Cross, the UN and we know that some mass rapes have been committed by non-Serbs. The information has come from similar sources: the victims. That didn't stop the EC's 12/92 summit, also pitted against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, from finding that the mass rapes in Bosnia had been committed by Serbs "in the context of expansionist strategy," or ethnic cleansing. By taking the claims of the US government or its allies in the Balkans at face value, feminists have simply joined the anti-Serbian chorus clamoring or ministers had changed the policy and decided to export weapon-making materials to Iraq. She also said the change to the policy was hardly an appropriate response to rape. More UN ground troops in the former Yugoslavia will only intensify the war there, and increase the chances that innocent women and others will be victimized by the barbaric actions of soldiers on all sides. Even a UN war crimes tribunal is a step in that direction. But most importantly, a UN war crimes tribunal would place the US once again in the position of passing judgment on the war crimes of others, when US imperialism has a record of slaughter and barbarism surpassed by no other country in this century. Only two years ago, the US slaughtered 250000 Iraqis in the Gulf War, most of them civilians and 47000 of them children under the age of five. [=]  

24174. Smith, Sharon. "Slaughter in Bosnia Can Be Stopped by United Workers Movement: Don't Give a Feminist Cover for Intervention by US/UN: Pulled Out of Vietnam", in Socialist Worker (International Socialist Organization), March 1993. p. 2. And just two decades ago, the US finally pulled out of Vietnam, bringing to an end the war in Southeast Asia, that killed between 3-4 million people. Rape and other atrocities against civilians are a tragic by-product of capitalist wars, particularly by conquering armies. US soldiers in Vietnam were no exception. Although no statistics exist about the frequency of rape in the Vietnam War, it was commonplace. As journalist Peter Arnett described, "It was so easy to rape on a squad level. Soldiers would enter a village without an interpreter. Nobody spoke Vietnamese. It was an anonymous situation. "Any American could grab any woman as a suspect and there was little or no recourse to the law by the people." But no UN war crimes tribunal was set up to try US soldiers for raping Vietnamese women. Between 1/1/65 and 1/31/73, only 50 US soldiers were convicted of rape or sexual assault in Vietnam. WAC's claim that the rapes in Bosnia are "unprecedented" in the history of war crimes is therefore patently untrue. Such a claim only heightens the anti-Serbian hysteria, which will bring the US closer to armed intervention in the former Yugoslavia - and which will ultimately benefit only Western imperialism. [=]  

24175. Smith, Sharon. "Slaughter in Bosnia Can Be Stopped by United Workers Movement: Don't Give a Feminist Cover for Intervention by US/UN: Qualitatively Different", in Socialist Worker (International Socialist Organization), March 1993. p. 2. Estimates of the number of women raped vary wildly - ranging from 20000-50000. And, as Aryeh Neier argued in the same issue of The Nation, "the numbers being bandied about appear to have little basis in careful, independent fact-finding." Most estimates rely either on the claims of the Bosnian or the US governments, both of which seek to portray the rapes as primarily carried out by Serb soldiers in order to bolster their own war drives against Serbia. Just over two years ago, the US made similar claims that Iraqi soldiers had committed mass rapes against Kuwaiti women as part of its campaign against Iraq, which culminated in the US's six-week war against Iraq in early 1991. There is plenty of evidence from first-hand observers in Bosnia that mass rapes have been committed by all sides in the conflict. Croatian and Muslim soldiers have also taken part in raping Bosnian women. As Amnesty International wrote in 1/93, the rapes are "systematic...with the deliberate detention of women for the purpose of rape and sexual abuse." Amnesty went on to conclude that "forces from all sides in the conflict have been rapists, and women from all backgrounds have been victims, although Muslim women have been chief victims, at the hands of Serbian armed forces." [=]  

24176. Stevenson, Richard W. "Thatcher Denies That She Knew About Iraqi Sale: British Panel Examines Military Deal of 1988", in New York Times, December 9, 1993. p. A3. London: On 12/8/93 High Court Lord Justice Scott formally questioned Margaret Thatcher about her former government's activities concerning arms manufacturing equipment and technology sales to Iraq in 1988. In 1989, former prime minister Thatcher reported to the House of Commons that the policy of no-weapons-sales to Iraq had not been changed since its formulation in 1984. Thatcher claimed she had no idea, and was never informed, that in 1988 her junior ministers had changed the policy and decided to export weapon-making materials to Iraq. She also said the change to the policy was not fundamental and did not require her approval. [TXT]  

24177. Sundin, Olof. Letter to "Papal Visit: Look At Our Own Behavior Before Using Cuba Cliches", in Seattle Times, November 23, 1996. p. A13. "Castro Gets Religion" proclaims a 11/20 Times editorial on the Pope's visit to Cuba. Castro, continues the editorial, "will get exactly what the Polish general (Wojciech Jaruzelski) received: a public flogging on human rights". Why are we incapable of looking beyond cliches? Is not the US-led embargo that leaves hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children dead and dying, a human rights (and life) violation that leave the excesses of the small Caribbean dictatorship a most distant second? Why do we chase Castro and not our own business? Now, what about 'getting religious'? Could possibly the Cuban nation with its pre-Castro history of corruption, abject poverty of the masses, exploitation and US manipulation, that in a few short decades created one of the finest public health care and education systems in the world, be closer to the communities of the early Christian followers than to our proclaimed One Nation Under God? The infant mortality in God's Own Country is higher than among those Godless Communist Hispanics. And the Pope himself, is he not clad more finely and living and working in Vatican palaces that make both the villas and dress of the powerful in Cuba--both pre- and post-Batista--pale in comparison?  

Are editorialists such as the one in the Times not more about our own confusion, cold hearts, fear and anger than about the true state of affairs in today's Cuba? What are we truly afraid of? In a few years Castro will be gone and Cuba will have reentered the Realm of Capitalism. Will some of us, then, begin to grasp what hope and promise the Cuban Experiment (in all its frailty and imperfection) briefly held for humanity? [=]  

24178. TDN Parliament Bureau. "Opposition Blasts Motherpath Program", in Turkish Daily News. Turkish Embassy in the USA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 11, 1996. [DSP leader Ecevit says despite indirect support for government they will not be held responsible
for its actions) ANKARA- The minority government formed by the Motherland Party (ANAP) and True Path Party (DYP) under the leadership of ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz faced its first trial by fire in Parliament on Sunday when it came under direct attack from opposition parties.

Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), told the Turkish legislature his party would not be responsible for the government's actions.

Ecevit, whose DSP has promised to help the government's chances of getting a vote of confidence by abstaining in the vote, added that they would continue to act as an opposition party despite their indirect support for the ANAP-DYP coalition.

The debate in Parliament on the government program, which was read out by Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz last Thursday, proved that the new cabinet's work will by no means be an easy task.

The vote of confidence in the new coalition government is due to be held on Tuesday.

The accusations levelled on Sunday by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) -- which came first in the elections but failed not only to get the necessary majority to govern but also to find a coalition partner -- showed that this party will test the coalition very severely.

Meanwhile, remarks by Ecevit to the effect that his party would be indirectly supporting the new government in order to prevent the prospect of the RP forming a government received an angry reaction from Welfare benches.

Ecevit for his part responded by indicating that the reason for his party's suspension about the RP stemmed from the latter's apparent lack of commitment to a secular republic.

He said that the fact that the RP had not produced even a single female candidate for Parliament proved that they were fully justified in this concern.

"Even in Egypt, which (RP leader) Erbakan has described as an exemplary country, produced 178 women as candidates for deputy.

Hoping not to see in government a party which treats women as second-class citizens is our right," Ecevit said.

Ecevit continued by indicating that he had not promised any support for the government's actions or program.

"As a party we have no outstanding debt to or dependence on the government," Ecevit said.

He said that they would support government projects to the extent that they saw these to be in keeping with the principles governing the DSP.

Ecevit also expressed satisfaction that the government had decided to take out of its program plans to dismantle state social security institutions and hand these over to the private sector.

The DSP leader went on to indicate that the lifespan of the present government could not be predicted at this stage, and added that it would be the government itself which in the end would determine how long it lasted.

Because of this uncertainty, Ecevit said, there was the need for Turkey to be constantly ready for the prospect of early elections.

Pointing out that DYP leader Tansu Ciller had taken on many functions of government, Ecevit said the time had now come for the prime ministry to return to its traditional function of securing coordination between the various branches of government.

Ecevit also expressed satisfaction over the fact that one of the first things done by Mesut Yilmaz on assuming the prime ministry was to get rid of the prime ministry emblem put up in an irregular fashion by Ciller when she came to power.

Adding that they would be closely following the implementation of the government's self-avowed commitment to fighting corruption, the DSP leader said one proof of sincerity in this respect would be whether the government makes the Prime Ministry Inspection Board totally independent.

On the subject of Provide Comfort, the allied military force deployed in eastern Anatolia to protect northern Iraqi Kurds, Ecevit said this force should stay in Turkey for just a short while longer. "During this period Turkey should develop its own policy on Iraq independently of countries that are not part of the region," he said.

Ecevit declared that the DSP would fulfill its role as an opposition party in a constructive, not destructive, manner.

He vowed however that they would struggle to the end against corruption and "those who rob the people." Speaking on behalf of the RP after Ecevit, Aydin Menderes, said his party objected to the DSP leader's remarks about the Welfare Party.

Menderes' remarks were enthusiastically applauded by his fellow RP deputies and protested angrily by DSP deputies.

Referring to the RP-ANAP coalition that was almost formed but which fell through at the last minute when Yilmaz said there were deep differences between the two parties, Menderes said this government had been prevented by "rentiers." He accused the present government of representing these rentiers and said that both ANAP and the DYP, when they were previously in government, had implemented an economic policy geared towards rolling the public through high interest rates.

Menderes also accused DSP leader Ecevit and said that in the 1970s he had promised to change the system whereas now he had become the guard of the system.

Referring to speculation that the military did not want to see his party in government, Menderes characterized this as a "fabrication."

"The military is dedicated to democracy, and has sworn to uphold democracy. This army is not the army of rentiers but of the people," Menderes said.

He add that remarks by President Demirel, the chief of the General Staff, and the speaker of Parliament had clarified speculation about the military and the RP, and had proved these rumors to be nothing by lies.

Menderes also responded to public questions as to whether the RP was part of the current system or not.

"It is being asked if we are in the system or outside of it. The RP is within the limits of the system drawn up by the Constitution and it is the only party that is so," Menderes said.

Menderes also claimed that the customs union accord Turkey has concluded with the European Union meant in effect that the rights and privileges of the Turkish Parliament had been transferred to Brussels.

He said this would become another of the crucial issues that would be brought on to this Parliament's agenda.

Following that the Motherpath government was formed in order to protect Tansu Ciller and said this would become apparent when his party submitted certain files to the legislature.

Reading passages from the government program relating to religious rights, Menderes asked Prime Minister Yilmaz if "the oppression directed against Friday prayers, headscarves and the hides of sacrificial lambs" would continue.

The last reference was to an annual debate as to whether religious groups and orders have the right to collect sheep hides after the animals have been slaughtered during the Feast of the Sacrifice holiday.

Menderes also asked whether increasing primary education to 8 years was aimed at blocking the secondary levels of schools that give religious education. [-]

24179. Thompson, Jennifer. "Sanctions Bring Iraq To The Brink", in Greenleft News, October 19, 1994. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein appears to have lost a desperate gamble. Despite the sickening hypocrisy which portrays Iraqi troops in Iraq as a "threat" and US troops half way around the world as "peacekeepers", the movement of Iraqi troops near the Kuwait border has allowed US President Bill Clinton to conduct a new military build-up without arousing widespread domestic opposition. Hussein's gamble can be seen as an attempt to disrupt the virtually automatic continuation of the murderous US/UN sanctions against Iraq. These sanctions have been regularly renewed by the Security Council despite the fact that perhaps a majority of the permanent members would prefer that they be dropped or phased out. The March meeting of the council could not agree on a formal statement announcing the continuation of the sanctions. France, Russia and China, in addition to some non-permanent members, were insisting on the inclusion of a commendation of Iraq for moving towards meeting UN terms on
disarmament: this was opposed by the US. At the July meeting the US again refused to endorse a statement appreciating Iraq's cooperation with UN Special Commission on Iraq. The US and Russia issued their own separate statements. The Russian UN ambassador said that September should be the starting point for a new period of cooperation and a deadline set beyond which the council should consider lifting the oil embargo. Britain and the US, in contrast, insisted on including human rights peremptorily. The UN sanctions commission, already recognized by more than 50 nations, including several other countries' businesses and even semi-official delegations are frequently seen in Baghdad... There are many who now question whether the US insistence that sanctions remain is part motivated more by economic than political factors. "A European Commission official Went so far as to say: 'We suspect that the US may put a heavy price on the lifting of sanctions, a price that may include exclusive trade terms.' He compared this to the situation in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. when US companies got nearly all the big contracts." The continuing low price for oil which followed a sharp drop in oil prices in late 1993, has been a concern for the oil-producing Gulf allies of the US. While oil exporters have been concerned more to increase production to boost oil export income, the re-entry of Iraq into the world market might further depress the price of oil. The US/UN policy is designed to bring Iraq to its knees, by inflicting massive suffering on the people and damaging its economy so that it will remain under the burden of war reparations, reconstruction costs and debt repayment for years, ending any potential to challenge US hegemony in the region.

Campaign against sanctions: An International Appeal to End Sanctions against the Iraqi People is being coordinated by former US attorney general Ramsey Clarke and others in the International Action Centre in New York. The campaign takes the form of letters addressed to members of the UN Security Council demanding an end to the sanctions. The centre is calling for human rights groups, unions, women's, religious, youth and other organisations to add their voices to the demand for an end to sanctions. To obtain a copy of a standard letter and a mailing list of countries presently on the UN Security Council, contact the Committee to Save the Children of Iraq, PO Box 146, Petersham NSW 2049. [=]

24180. Tinnon, Damon. "Turkish Government Launches Assault on Kurds", in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), April 10, 1995. p. 3. The Turkish government unleashed the largest military assault in the Middle East since the Gulf war on 3/20/1995, pouring 35000 troops into the predominately Kurd-populated region of northern Iraq. The invasion force included warplanes and commando, mechanized, and armored units. The aim of this offensive is to deal a crushing blow to the struggle of the Kurdish people for national self-determination. Some 20 million Kurds live in the region where the borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey converge. Turkish prime minister Tansu Ciller has vowed to wipe out all Kurds, in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), April 10, 1995. p. 3. The PKK, and establish a "buffer zone" at the border. Turkish officials justify this offensive by pointing to the PKK's recent ambush of a Turkish military convoy, which resulted in the deaths of 18 soldiers. The PKK, which took up arms in 1984, is one of several organizations fighting for an independent Kurdistan. More than 15000 have been killed in the conflict - most of them by the Turkish army - since 1984. In 1992, some 20000 troops swept the border and then withdrew, allowing Kurdish fighters to regain their positions. Ciller has vowed not to allow that this time.

With Iraq and the race to get in on lucrative reconstruction contracts, the continuing depressed state of the world oil market and other longer term aims of the US in consolidating its hegemony in the region. According to Mariam Shahin, writing in the September 9 Middle East International, "US companies are competing with their European counterparts for preferential terms of trade, particularly in the areas of reconstruction and oil. French, German, Turkish, Russian, Italian, Polish, Romanian, Japanese, and even Indonesian European companies are also reported to be involved. A call for trade with Iraq despite UN approval for the sale of such items. A common practice by many governments has been to delay the approval for food and medicine until the expiration dates have passed. Competing for spoils The differences in the Security Council are related to competition associated with the reopening of trade
homes under the pretext of suspected membership or involvement in the PKK. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, based in northern Iraq, flatly stated that, “The Turks know that these were not PKK villages. The targeted area has no PKK bases and it is strictly populated by Iraqi Kurds.” A villager from Hizaw, a town along the Turkey-Iraq border, reported beatings of his neighbors by Turkish troops. A teacher in the same town said that school books not meeting with Turkish government approval were confiscated. Some 3.5 million Kurds live in the invaded region. Iraqi Kurds are mounting protests against the bombing of civilians. Ciller claims that the “utmost effort is being made not to harm civilians.” The military campaign brought the sharply divergent interests of the main imperialist powers to the surface. The governments of Germany and France are calling for a withdrawal. Germany, which has a large Turkish population, has already begun to feel the political backlash, as Turkish mosques, travel agencies, and cultural centers were fire-bombed. Although no group has taken responsibility for the attacks, German authorities are blaming the PKK, which is outlawed in Germany. Paris has made the sharpest criticism of the Turkish military assault. French foreign minister Alain Juppe said that the attack violated Iraq’s territorial integrity. The French government has pressed for an end to the UN embargo imposed on Iraq, since French capitalists stand to profit from expanded trade with Baghdad. [suggest]

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24182. Tinnon, Damon. “Turkish Government Launches Assault on Kurds: Washington Seesaws”, in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), April 10, 1995. p. 3. The administration of US President Bill Clinton initially gave strong support to the Turkish offensive. The State Department approved Ankara’s use of force as “necessary and appropriate to defend itself.” The Pentagon suspended flights providing “humanitarian” aid to Kurds in the region so as not to interfere in Turkish bombing runs. The affected area of northern Iraq is currently under Washington’s military control in the guise of a UN mandate. The administration, however, began to backtrack after press reports shed light on the conduct of the offensive. Claiming Washington’s interest was in “human rights,” Secretary of State Warren said on 3/28/1995, “We told them that we thought support of the US and the international community would be forthcoming only if troops were promptly withdrawn.” The Wall Street Journal editors defended the invasion in a 3/24/1995 editorial, stating it was necessary “to get the job done.” The big-business newspaper added, “Turkey, all agree, remains an important adjunct of Europe and a key member of the Atlantic Alliance. It is a friend in a troubled region and it deserves our support.” The New York Times editors said, however, Washington should oppose the invasion, warning that “harshly repressive army tactics in Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey have created a million and a half internal Kurdish refugees,” and driven millions more to other parts of Turkey. The Iraqi regime, which has a long history of attempting to drown the Kurdish struggle in blood, remained virtually silent. There are 12 million Kurds living in Turkey. The Turkish government perpetuates a host of discriminatory measures against them. It is illegal for the Kurdish language to be spoken in schools or used in the media. It is also illegal to discuss the political situation of Kurds in Turkey. In fact, eight Kurdish members of Parliament who spoke out against the oppression of Kurds were recently thrown in jail. The pro-Kurdish daily Ozgur Ulke has been closed, and many artists, intellectuals, and Kurdish independence fighters remain behind bars. Ciller has “promised” reforms of repressive laws aimed at Kurds - once Kurdish rebels in the border region have been crushed. [suggest]

24184. Tyler, Patrick E. “China Villagers Recall Gorm Attack; Chinese Villages Were Attacked With Plague in the 1940s; Techniques With the Japanese Army Dissected Live Victims of Biological Warfare”, in New York Times, February 4, 1997. pp. A1, A6. In 8/1942 Japanese aircraft staged a biological weapons attack on the village of Congshan, China, exposing the village to bubonic plague. Some 392 out of 1200 villagers died in the next two months. In 11/1942, Japanese troops appeared and burned the village down. Now, after 50 years of recriminations, Japan has agreed to assist China in the destruction of abandoned biological and chemical warfare depots left in China. Old Japanese depots in Manchuria hold an estimated 0.7-2.0 million chemical bombs, most loaded with mustard gas, and many badly eroded. Congshan and several other Chinese villages are the only confirmed targets of biological weapons in modern history. The home of Wu Xiaonai has been made a shrine, since she was lured to a nearby Japanese monastery with claims that they had medical treatment: she was dissected alive without anesthesia.

Leonard Cole at Rutgers University argues that allowing Iraq to get away with the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War led many to conclude that such weapons could be effective, such as Aum Shinri Kyo.

24185. Viorst, Milton. “Crushed Between Two Worlds: An Iraqi Artist Killed By a Rocket”, in New York Times, July 10, 1993. p. 15. The US cruise missile attack on Baghdad on 6/26/1993 killed Leyla al-Attar, a ‘celebrated Iraqi artist’ and her husband. Their previous home had been destroyed in American airraids, and they were now living in temporary housing. Neither she nor her husband ever joined the Baath Party; she did head the Saddam Art Center in Baghdad, where her work was presented, includingnudes. She noted that her themes were not Islamic. Artists were cultivated in Iraq, but, Viorst concludes: “…the thug in [Saddam Hussein] prevailed, crushing what Leyla al-Attar represented to Iraq's
future. A stray American rocket did the rest'. [TXT]

24186. Weiner, Tim. "Citing Security, US Jails Iraqis It Used in Plot; Are They Refugees Persecuted By Saddam Hussein or Potential Terrorists?", in New York Times, May 10, 1997. pp. 1, 6. A group of Iraqis used by the CIA in a failed $20 million coup against Saddam Hussein and offered refuge in the United States, are now in jail and facing deportation to Iraq. Thirteen of the refugees are termed by the INS as being "a danger to the security of the United States". The charges come from suspicions of the FBI that the men may be Iraqi spies. Many of the men's attempts to be falsely accused by inflight in the resistance groups backed by the CIA (including the Iraqi National Accord and the Iraq National Congress) and would face death if their plea for political asylum is refused and they are deported. They could be deported to Turkey, which has refused to take them, or to Iraq. Civil Rights lawyers Susan Campos notes: "Some of the men are depressed and nearly suicidal. They have questioned whether being in a US jail is any better than being subjected to the tyranny of Saddam Hussein". [TXT]

24187. Whiston, Gaetan. "Protests Against Bombing of Iraq Continue: Protest in Minneapolis", in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), September 23, 1996. p. 8. Chanting "US Hands Off Iraq!" and "No Blood for Oil!" 60 people gathered in front of the Federal Building here on 9/4/1996 to protest the US bombing of Iraq. Some of the protesters were activists from the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, Women Against Military Madness, Veterans for Peace, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Young Socialists. They distributed leaflets to passersby, denouncing both the latest war moves and the five-year economic embargo against Iraq. Immediately after the third bombing was announced, organizers of the first action called another demonstration at the Federal Building for 9/13/1996. [=]

24188. Wilcox, Clyde; Hewitt, Lara; Allsop, Dee. "The Gender Gap in Attitudes Toward the Gulf War: A Cross-National Perspective", in Journal of Peace Research, February 1996. pp. 67-82. A number of recent studies have found that women are consistently less supportive of war than are men, but most studies are based on polls undertaken in the United States. The Persian Gulf War was a popular North-South conflict that was intensively supported by the mass media. Research on US attitudes found a wide gender gap before the war, which narrowed during the war, and widened again after the war. Two [rather absurd] testable theses are the feminist thesis (which would argue for a larger gap since feminists educate women to 'seek peaceful solutions', as in a large gender gap in Europe) and the maternalist thesis (which would argue that women care for their babies, and would be demonstrated by the absence of a gender gap in Israel and Turkey since 'they saw a weaker Iraq as less threatening' to their babies). Strong opposition to the war was voiced by women in Mexico City and Tokyo; there was no significant gender gap in Ankara or Lagos. The data conforms to no proposed model, and the authors cannot 'offer a definitive explanation' for the results.

24189. Williams, E. Faye. "About the Author", in The Peace Terrorists; A Personal Story On The Middle East Crisis; Day By Dat 12/3/1990-1/16/1991. WashingtonDC: EFW Publishers [1245 Fourth Street SW Suite E102, Washington DC 20024], September 1991. pp. [i-ii]. E. Faye Williams is a lawyer, teacher and human rights activist. She was 19 when a congressional staffer for Rep. Mervyn Dymally of California. She is a member of Delta Sigma Theta, National Political Congress of Black Women, Congressional Black Associates, NAACP and other organizations. As a candidate for Congress from Louisiana's 8th Congressional District, Williams came under intense attacks from the Jewish lobby: "of the numerous vicious right wing attacks against Williams during her campaign for the Congress was a last minute attack by the pro-Israel lobby, because her platform called for a balanced Middle East policy, and because her campaign manager was Samuel Burgan, an Arab-American friend whom she met in law school. After confirming her campaign manager's ethnic origin, which she had made no attempt to hide, the pro-Israel lobby sent a telegram to all elected leaders and the news media which said 'withdraw your support from Williams. She is a PLO sympathizer'. This served as just one more incident in a series of negative campaign tactics used to chip away at Williams' strong support. She lost the election by a mere 0.7% after this racist attack by the lobby, after a suspicious computer breakdown, and among other things, a bizarre incident in which the helicopter in which she was riding on the eve of the election was ordered to land in the midst of an Air Force Base. Upon landing, Williams was ordered out of the helicopter, surrounded by a full show of military readiness and held at gunpoint until the last evening news before the election was over. On the morning of the election, with no opportunity to respond, the news carried an incredible, uncertified and extremely damaging story that Williams was 'rude, abusive and threatening' to the military, despite the fact that the Air Force, not Williams, had the guns and battle equipment. It was obvious that all these dirty tricks, and more, were designed to steal and election..." Williams has since written a book, 'Be Angry: Be Constructively Angry'. [TXT]

24190. Williams, Maurice. "Washington Steps Up Threats Against Iraq; US Embargo Increases Misery in Iraq", in Militant (SWP), September 11, 1995. p. 3. Washington's campaign to isolate the regime in Baghdad is seen "as throwing its weight around the Middle East to the detriment of Arab interests," according to the New York Times. The UN Children's Fund reported last year that, as a result of the embargo, 3.3 million Iraqis were at risk of malnutrition and disease, including 625000 infants and children under five. US diplomats have pressured the regime in Jordan to stop buying Iraqi oil, which provides Baghdad with hard currency. Some 75000 barrels of oil a day are shipped to Jordan at reduced prices in repayment for debts, an arrangement authorized by UN officials. Jordanian merchants are owed almost $1 billion in unpaid bills from Baghdad. Reacting to these pressures, King Hussein asserted that he would not consider closing the country's borders with Iraq, saying it would cut off essential supplies of food and medicine to the Iraqi people. "As far as closing the borders with Iraq, this is unthinkable," he declared in a nationally televised speech on 8/23/1995. The rulers in Saudi Arabia have also expressed their hesitation about moves to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. At the same time they are not anxious for the anti-Iraq embargo to be lifted. Saudi oil barons are raking in handsome profits from Iraq's share of the world oil market, raising their output to 8 million barrels a day. The Iraqi regime exported 3 million barrels of crude oil a day before 1991. "Nobody is interested right now in any serious change in Iraq," a senior Saudi official told the Times. "It means we will have to sell less oil or sell it at lower prices." [=]

24191. Willson, Ruth; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Women in Exile At Home and Abroad: A Nation Severed by Borders- Kurdistan", in Connexions. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 26, June 1, 1988. pp. 16-18. The Kurds are the 4th most numerous people in the Middle East, but there is no independent state known as Kurdistan. It is rather "geographical expression," an area lying within 5 different independent states: mainly in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, with enclaves in Syria and the USSR. The area Kurdish groups claim as their Kurdistan stretches from the Taurus mountains in the west to the Iranian plateau in the east, and from Mount Ararat in the north to the plains of Mesopotamia in the south, and it spills into Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Kurdish nationalist movements within each state have mostly functioned independently of each other, because most of the kurd population live in inaccessible mountain areas and are subject to the malice of repressive governments. Moreover the Kurds do not gain any long-term benefit from the animosity between the states of the region. For example, long before war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Iran was giving material and moral support to the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, attempting to weaken that country to gain territorial advantages. Iran doesn't believe in autonomy for Iraqi Kurds any more than for Iranian Kurds. Without any actual agreement, states with Kurdish minorities have been practicing collective repression against this people. [Reprinted from an article written by Ruth Willson, Outwrite, British womens newspaper, issue 54, 1/1987.]

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Kurdistan is a rugged, mountainous territory covering the border areas of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The Kurds have a long history, going back over 3000 years, but their land has always been claimed by larger powers. Today their rights are severely curtailed, and they suffer violent government repression. About 85% of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but there are also Jews, Christians, and other religious groups. The Kurdish language is spoken throughout Kurdistan, though with some marked regional differences. In political, cultural, and geographical terms, Kurdistan is a crucial part of the identity of millions of Kurds. By the 13th century, the Kurds had gradually moved into the plains and mountains which they occupy today. The area is always being isolated and inaccessible, and Kurdish leaders have tried to balance paying allegiance to the dominant power with retaining as much autonomy as they could. From the 16th century until the outbreak of WWI, a large part of Kurdistan came under the Ottoman Empire. It was divided into fiefdoms run by local Kurdish leaders in the 19th century. Private ownership of land became prevalent; a land-owning class emerged among the chiefs, while the majority of Kurds, who had no land, became impoverished laborers.

Political Background: In the 19th century, the Ottomans began to feel threatened by European imperialism. After losing the Balkans, they promptly crushed all signs of Kurdish autonomy. In WWI, the Kurds had to fight for the Ottoman Empire against Europe and Russia, yet at the same time the Ottomans killed thousands of Kurds and deported thousands more because they thought the Kurds might defect to Russia. The end of WWI, the Ottoman Empire was defeated and Britain occupied most of what is now Iraq. The allied forces took charge of dividing the territory; oil interest was a determining factor. In the process of establishing clearly defined national boundaries, Kurdish claims for autonomy were completely ignored.

In the 70s and 80s, Kurds, along with other opponents of the Turkish government, continue to be arrested, tortured and executed. The Kurds have collaborated with the Turkish left, but frequent neglect of Kurdish issues has caused widespread disillusionment. There are a number of Kurdish parties, at least one of which is armed and fighting, but there are also divisions between traditional groups and radical left-wing parties.

In recent years, the eastern and southern provinces of Turkey have become military zones, with US and NATO military bases. The aim is to ensure a strong Western presence on the Afghan-Iran-Iraq-US SSR border, but the build-up of troops also enables the Turkish government to suppress Kurdish political movements. Since the incursion of the Iraq-Iran war, Turkey has also massacred troops along the Iraqi border, where Iraq's vital oil pipeline lies.

The Kurds also suffer continuing oppression in Iran; Kurdish identity is scarcely recognized. For a brief period during WWII, some of the Kurds established the independent republic of Mahabad. This happened in 1946 when British troops occupied southern Iran, and the Russians were in the north. The republic was outside the Russian area, but depended on it for trading links. When the Russians withdrew, the Iranian troops regained control.

In 1979, most Iranian Kurds supported the overthrow of the Shah, and began to petition for greater self-determination, but the negotiations didn't get very far. In 1980, the Iran-Iraq war brought another government clamp-down on the Kurds in Iran. Since then, two political groups have come to the forefront both of which are engaged in armed struggle: the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which aims for Kurdish autonomy within Iran's frontiers and Komala, a communist organisation with a strong Kurdish identity. There are many women activists and fighters in Komala, which upholds the equality of men and women. The guerrillas control areas of the countryside near Iran's north-western border with Iraq.

Iraq was granted independence by the British in 1932. The Kurdish opposition to the Iraqi regime has at times been a major force controlling wide areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The government has continually tried to crush the Kurdish resistance, which is periodically supported by the Iraqi government. The Iraqi war has had a huge impact on the Kurds in Iraq. In addition to bringing greater suffering, it has provided the Kurds with greater opportunity to attack the beleaguered Iraqi government. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have more than 20000 fighters and control extensive liberated zones. In recent months, they have attacked the vital oil fields in Iraq's Kurdish territories and have severely damaged two power stations. With sophisticated weapons from Iran, they appear to be launching sustained attacks, despite the ruthless attacks and reprisals of Iraqi troops.

In Syria, many Kurds are denied citizenship, and the government has an "Arabization" policy. In the Soviet Union Kurdish language and culture were preserved, but men and women are increasingly part of the service sector and work in the service sector as women didn't get very far. In 1980, the Iran-Iraq war brought another government clamp-down on the Kurds in Iran. Since then, two political groups have paid work force. In particular, they work in the service sector as cleaners, teachers, nurses, and doctors. The government is encouraging this as part of "the war effort." How ever, women remain responsible for home and family, and government provision of childcare facilities is severely damaged two power stations. With sophisticated weapons from Iran, they appear to be launching sustained attacks, despite the ruthless attacks and reprisals of Iraqi troops.

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Iraq: The Embargo Holocaust

24192. Dialogue For a Just Peace. Press Release: Children of the Sanctions. Poulsbo, Wash.: Dialogue For a Just Peace. c/o Ground Zero [16159 Clear Creek Road NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370], June 1997. Lealey Stahl: We have heard that a half million children have died as a result of sanctions against Iraq. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima... Is the price worth it?

Madeleine Albright (then US Ambassador to the United nations): "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it." [*Sixty Minutes* - 5/12/1996.]

For Noora Taibbi, a young girl at Al-Mansur Pediatrics Hospital in Baghdad, the price is emphatically not worth it. Noora is in her third relapse with acute lymphoblastic leukemia, and there is no treatment available for her. In this most modern of Iraqi hospitals, 90% of required therapeutic agents are not available. Doctors classify the rise in childhood leukemia as an epidemic and blame it on the tons of radioactive debris left by the nearly one million depleted uranium tipped shells fired by the US during the war. Mortality for children is up five to six times what it was before the Gulf War. There are many relapses due to lack of medicine. Many children die from severe infections because there are no antibiotics. Parents have sold their homes to buy treatment for their sick children, only to discover no treatment is available. The streets en route to Al-Qadisiyya General Hospital in Saddam City, a densely populated suburb of Baghdad, are filled with raw sewage. Goats graze on huge mounds of garbage. The city's fleet of trucks for garbage collection is incapacitated due to lack of spare parts (not allowed in because of the sanctions). In Basrah, conditions are even worse. Children walk barefooted through the streets overflowing with raw sewage. It is a cesspool of disease and potential epidemic. The sewage pumping station remains broken now for four years. The US media continues to portray UN Resolution 986, the celebrated oil-for-food agreement approved last December as the potential savior of Iraq. This Resolution in truth does not begin to meet the overwhelming needs of the civilian population and does nothing to repair the infrastructure of the country or reopen the intellectual and academic lifelines many Iraqi professionals cry for. Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote last June in a letter to Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, "No failure to comply with any United Nations condition can possibly justify the collective punishment of the entire nation and the direct deaths of infants, children, the elderly population and the handicapped."

If these infants, children, elderly, handicapped were members of our families would we agree, "...the price is worth it." Can we be silent and let these deaths continue? The United Nations will again vote to extend the sanctions during the week of 6/8/1997. Please contact President Clinton today urging a vote to end these immoral sanctions. [The information in this leaflet was taken from articles written by Brad Simpson, a graduate student in history at Northwestern Univ. and Chuck Quilty of Voices in the Wilderness of Chicago, IL. Chuck has traveled several times to Iraq carrying medical supplies, risking arrest and fines for violating the sanctions. For more information on the current situation in Iraq contact: Voices in the Wilderness, 1460 W. Carmen Ave, Chicago, IL 60640; (773) 784-8065; fax (773) 784-8837; mmail: kkelly@olgc.apc.org.][461]
United Campaign in Support of the People of Iran; Womens Strike for Peace; International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions; Iraq Action Coalition; Bridge to Baghdad; International Athens Conference Against the Embargo on Iraq; Spanish Campaign for Lifting the Sanctions on Iraq; Voices in the Wilderness; Organization in Solidarity with the People of Africa Asia & Latin America; OSPAAAL; Kerbala Hospital Fund; Peoples Rights Fund. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq, reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 01: Sanctions Violate International Law. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. [International Action Center, 39 West 14th Street, Suite 206, New York, NY 10011 (or F.O. Box 1819, Madison Square Sta., NY, NY 10159); Phone (212) 633-6646; fax (212) 633-2889; E-mail: npc(a)pipeline.com; and, International Relief Association, 24522 Harper Avenue, St. Clair Shores, MI 48080; Phone (800) 827-3543; fax (810) 772-3159.]

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions—1977: Part IV, Section 1, Chapter 111, Article 54:
(1) Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
(2) It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

International Conference on Nutrition, World Declaration on Nutrition, FAO/WHO, 1992:

We recognize that access to nutritionally adequate and safe food is a right of each individual. We affirm that food must not be used as a tool for political pressure.

UN General Assembly Resolution 44/215 (Dec. 22, 1989.)
Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries:

Calls upon the developed countries to refrain from exercising political coercion through the application of economic instruments with the purpose of inducing changes in the economic or social systems, as well as in the domestic or foreign policies, of other countries;

Reaffirms that developed countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade and financial restrictions, blockades, Embargoes, Famine, and other economic sanctions, incompatible with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted bilaterally and bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion that affects their political, economic, and social development.

Constitution of the World Health Organization, 1946:
The enjoyment of the highest standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic, or social condition.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. [–]

24194. International Action Center; et. al.; Flounders, Sara. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 02: Acknowledgements. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Hundreds of people made possible the many meetings around the world that, on the fifth anniversary of the Gulf War, cried out for an end to sanctions on Iraq. It is impossible to acknowledge them all, but we hope that this book, by providing a permanent record of those events, serves as a memorial to their dedicated labors. Many people also contributed the necessary funds to make this book possible. Most are listed as signers of the International Appeal. We would especially like to thank the International Relief Association for its assistance. The distinguished Voices of Opposition cited within, and the authors of the FAO Report, need no further acknowledgment here. We would like to thank individually, however, those who have made this book possible by putting in long hours assembling, writing, editing, typing, proofreading, and organizing its many components into a coherent volume. Sara Flounders and Deirdre Griswold Stapp edited the material in collaboration with the production team of Frank Alexander, John Catalinotto, Hilile Cohen, Paddy Colligan, Stephanie Hedgecocke, Lyn Neeley, and Lal Roohik. Additional assistance was provided by Kaduri Al-Kaysi, Committee in Support of Iraq People; Ali Azad, United Campaign in Support of the People of Iran; Pete Dovidack; Gregory Dunkel; Lenora Foerstel, Women for Mutual Security; Jack Gabryelecki; Betsy Gimbel; Marie Jay; Joyce Kanowitz; Saul Kanowitz; Gloria La Riva; Henri Nereaux; Sonia Ostrom, MetroPeace Action; Cleo Silvers; Johnnie Stevens; Edith Villastrigo, Women's Strike For Peace; and WBAI Radio. [–]

24195. International Action Center; et. al.; Flounders, Sara. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 03: Introduction: Break the Silence. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Sanctions are war. They are the most brutal form of war because they punish an entire population, targeting children, the future, most of all. Sanctions are a weapon of mass destruction. Since sanctions were imposed on Iraq, half a million children under the age of five have died of malnutrition and preventable diseases. Sanctions impose artificial famine. A third of Iraq's surviving children today have stunted growth and nutritional deficiencies that will deform their shortened lives. Gathering and sifting through the material included in this book revived the turmoil of my own impressions of Iraq when, in 2/1994, I saw the damage wrought by war and sanctions. Three years earlier, bombs with a 15 kiloton explosive power equal to seven Hiroshima nuclear blasts had crumpled the sewage lines, water pipes and electrical grid. I saw how a modern industrializing society is built on a fragile, vulnerable network. Vast modern housing developments with wide boulevards, built so proudly on the outskirts of Baghdad, had become fetid swamps, lacking pumps or sewage lines for drainage. Chlorine to purify water and pesticides for the swarms of mosquitoes and flies are both banned under UN sanctions. These sights all came back to me as I went over the contributions to this book from doctors, journalists, photographers, and film makers. They have recorded vivid personal impressions of a policy that invades every crevice of Iraqi society. The book uses many different resources to explain the catastrophe in Iraq today. Cold, hard statistics about crop output, caloric intake, water purification, and infant mortality prove the crime. Photos make the victims' faces unforgettable. Impassioned letters and testimony to the United Nations Security Council show the anger against the criminals. Documents and resolutions of international conferences show how opposition is mounting.

This book reflects a growing world movement that speaks in many languages. Political campaigns expose the crime. Groups try to send medical supplies through international relief agencies. Others organize, resistance, zeroing in on the laws and resolutions imposing sanctions. A few shed light on the horrors of the military use of depleted uranium. A growing number of world leaders and internationally prominent human rights activists have added their voices to the opposition. We need to break the silence and expose the crime. A generation ago in Vietnam, the Pentagon had other weapons to terrorize the civilian population. They were called napalm, white phosphorous, Agent Orange defoliants, fragmentation bombs, and other "anti-personnel" weapons. The early movement against the Vietnam war was small, but was able to put a human face on the suffering caused by the Pentagon. The images of Vietnam burned into the minds of a whole generation, especially the youth, who mobilized into a powerful force that helped end that war. That is what we have to do today. We have to reveal
the human face of those targeted by the new weapon of sanctions. We have to get this book, with the reports from the United Nations' own Food and Agriculture Organization and others into every library, onto every campus, into community centers, churches, mosques, synagogues, and union offices to ensure that no public figure can say, "We didn't know." Anyone who wants to end human suffering must know what causes it. This book is a tool for that fight. The official report from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, written by a team of doctors and nutritionists who measured this catastrophe firsthand, is a powerful indictment of the UN Security Council's policy by an agency of the world body itself. In the period following World War II, the United Nations General Assembly and various international bodies passed a number of conventions and resolutions on the conduct of hostilities to protect non-combatants—especially children. The US government signed such conventions, resolutions, and lofty statements as the UN Charter the Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg Convention. The hard facts, the photos, and the eyewitness accounts herein make an irrefutable case that the UN Security Council, at the insistence of the United States, imposed sanctions in violation of international law. Every two months for five years, former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark has defined the political implications of the criminal sanctions policy. Clark has sent letters to every member of the UN Security Council before its bimonthly vote to continue sanctions against Iraq. Some of his correspondence is included in this book. His letters have gained a wide circulation internationally as a voice of conscience.

Iraq is home to one of the world's oldest civilizations. Ancient Mesopotamia, the land between two rivers, flourished for 6000 years because of its water resources and irrigated agriculture. During the Gulf War, irrigation canals, bridges, and food-processing plants were systematically targeted for destruction. Now fertilizers and preservatives, along with parts for tractors, are a memory of another age, of ancient history, before 1991. Despite the heroic efforts of doctors and other medical personnel, Iraq's new, modern hospitals are now wards of belligerent policy. Many people who feel outrage over the war and the years of blockade are overwhelmed by the enormity of the injustice. Is it hopeless? Is there nothing we can do? The facts show we are far from helpless. When Washington politicians debate the reasons why they stopped the war after forty-two days, and why the Pentagon didn't occupy Baghdad with thousands of troops it becomes clear that the war ended when it did because the politicians and generals here were afraid. They feared that a foreign occupying army would awaken resistance throughout the Middle East. They feared that any US casualties would awaken mass opposition at home. They feared the Pentagon's allies would collapse in the face of an outraged mass movement, that the criminal coalition would come apart. Sometimes we forget that what we do enters their calculations. The authorities fear opposition—from the poor and working people here at home. They fear exposure of the magnitude of their crimes. We have the evidence of the crime. And we can do something about it. We need to act with determination. Let the children live. [=]

24196. International Action Center; et. al.; Clark, Ramsey. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 04: Text of Ramsey Clark's Report on the Civilian Impact of UN Sanctions to Members of the UN Security Council, 3/1/1996. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. One issue between Iraq and the United Nations exceeds all others in importance. That issue is the Security Council sanctions imposed against Iraq at the insistence of the United States. The whole world knows, and history will permanently record, the fact that those savage sanctions have cruelly killed more than one million people in Iraq these last five years, injured millions more, and damaged the population and society for generations to come. Is this the legacy the United Nations wishes to support by failing to completely end the sanctions now? While February statistics are not yet available, more than 6000 children under age five and 6000 persons five years or older died in 1/1996 as a direct result of the sanctions. More than
20000 human beings have died since the Security Council reviewed the sanctions this January. Added injuries affected millions and four million remain at risk of death from malnutrition. A continuation of sanctions for another sixty days will cost as much in life, justice, and respect for Security Council members that continue the sanctions.

During last week, which I spent in Iraq, my fifth annual inspection since the sanctions were imposed, I visited ten hospitals in four governorates which have nearly 15% of all rationed items are usually made by midmonth. At the end of February, we found warehouses stocking up for March, but, with few exceptions, retail stores empty of all rationed goods and with few food items for sale.

If the present agreement pursuant to Resolution 986 is finalized in March, it will be months before this ration can increase and by the most optimistic estimates it will be far short of basic needs, providing Iraq with only a lower level of malnutrition. If the entire allocation of Resolution 986 oil-sale income available for health was spent on medicine and medical supplies, there would still be severe shortages causing deaths and protracted illness. Billions of dollars will be required over and above funds available under Resolution 986 for adequate levels of food and medicine, to replace and repair machinery and parts, rehabilitate medical facilities produce fertilizers and insecticides, to increase food production; build and repair food storage, processing, distribution facilities and transportation equipment; to rebuild water systems, water treatment facilities, pipe lines; to rebuild sewer systems, treatment and disposal plants; to repair schools, provide desks, benches, chairs, books, supplies; and to provide an acceptable standard of nutrition, health care, and education for the people of Iraq. The quality of life will continue to deteriorate even with the implementation of Resolution 986. The Security Council, which tragically bears the responsibility for so much death and destruction in Iraq, must act now to completely end the sanctions, to help meet the emergency needs of the Iraqi people, and to help Iraq rebuild its society. The lawlessness and cruelty of such death-dealing sanctions, which are a crime against humanity and genocide, must be recognized. Their use against whole populations, killing first infants, children, elderly, and chronically ill, must be prohibited. Until then no poor people on the planet are safe from the UN, or the superpower whose will it enforces. [a]
cold afford to feed his people.” But only a fool would offer or believe such propaganda. If Iraq is spending billions on the militia, then the sanctions are obviously not working. Malnutrition didn’t exist in Iraq before the sanctions. If Saddam Hussein is building palaces, he intends to stay. Meanwhile, an entire nation is suffering. Hundreds are dying daily and millions are threatened in Iraq, because of US-compelled impoverishment. If the United Nations participates in such genocidal sanctions launched against the threat of military attack, it consents to the murder of the people of the world fail to prevent such conduct, the violence, terror, and human misery of the new millennium will exceed anything we have known. I am enclosing a copy of the summary to the FAO report. ou must vote against these genocidal sanctions. Your nation should not share responsibility for the deaths of more than 10000 Iraqis who will die before the Security Council review in March if sanctions are not lifted in January. [The preceding two letters are only the most recent sent by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to all members of the Security Council before its scheduled votes on UN sanctions on Iraq. Since 8/1990, this vote has come up every two months. Clark’s letters have been widely circulated to the media and on the Internet. They hal e become a voice of conscience against sanctions, citing ethical and legal standards widely agreed to by all nations but consistently disregarded. (At the back of this book is a list of the names, addresses, phone, and fax numbers of the current members of the UN Security Council].) [=]

24198. International Action Center; et al.; Zaidi, Sarah. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 64: Letter to the Editor, The Lancet, Vol. 346, 8988, p. 1485, December 2, 1995. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Sir, Under the auspices of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) we conducted a community survey of the nutritional status of and mortality among children under the age of 5 in Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 23-28, 1995). A random sample of 25 clusters representative of neighbourhoods in Baghdad was selected from clusters included in a nationwide survey conducted by the International Study Team in 8/1991. [Ascherio A, Chase R, Cote T, et al. Effect of the G-IIlf war on infant and child mortality in Iraq. NEnglJMed 1992; 327: 931-36.] The number of clusters for each city district within Baghdad was determined on the basis of the population size of each district according to the 1987 census. Within each cluster, contiguous households were screened until 24 were identified as eligible. Eligible households included women aged 15-49 who had a live birth after 1/1/1985. All eligible women within each household were included in the survey. Among eligible households, children under age 5 within the first 12 households were weighed and measured for assessment of nutritional status with UNICEF standards. From this sample, Z-scores based on the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) standardised distributions were calculated (EPI-INFO v6). 3 Malnutrition was defined as having a Z-score more than 2 SD below the median for the NCHS standardised distributions for height-for-age (stunting), weight-for-age (underweight), and weight-for-height (wasting). Children with extreme Z-scores [Centers for Disease Control. EPI-INFO, version 6. Atlanta: CDC, 1994.] and who were 60 or more months old were excluded from the analysis. Information was collected on 2120 children under 10 years of age; anthropometrical measurements were done in 594 children. Infant and child mortality rates before the beginning of sanctions were compared with mortality rates after sanctions. There was a two-fold increase in infant mortality and a five-fold increase in under-5 child mortality (Table 28).

These results correspond with an increasing prevalence of malnutrition—namely, a two-fold increase in stunting and a four-fold increase in wasting between 8/1991, [Smith M, Zaidi S. Malnutrition in Iraqi children following the Gulf war: results of a national survey. Nutr Rev 1993; 51: 71-78.] and 8/1995 (Table 26). These findings illustrate a strong association between economic sanctions and increase in child mortality and malnutrition rates. In the 1991 survey baseline mortality for the under-5 population rose from 43.2 to 128.5 per 1000, reflecting a three-fold increase in child mortality related to the Gulf war and the economic sanctions. In the present study, the under-5 mortality rate increased five-fold. When we looked at cause-specific mortality we found a three-fold increase in diarrhoeal-disease-related mortality among children under 5 (odds ratio 3.2 [95% CI .74-13.9]). This two-fold increase in infant mortality was observed subsequent to the Gulf war in 1991, while the economic sanctions were implemented. A three-fold increase in infant mortality has been sustained despite the fact that the war ended 4 years ago. Furthermore, in 8/1991, rates of malnutrition in Baghdad were similar to those observed in Kuwait. Current estimates of malnutrition in Baghdad (Table 26) are similar to levels seen in lesser developed countries—eg, underweight rates in Ghana and Mali are 29% and 31%, respectively; stunting rates are 28% in Sri Lanka and 27% in the Congo; and wasting levels are 12% in Madagascar and 11% in Myanmar. [Wardlaw T, Carlson B. A global, regional and country assessment of child malnutrition (staff working paper no 7). New York: UNICEF, 1990.] The data are consistent with the economic and social realities seen in Iraq. Food prices are high, purchasing power is low, water and sanitation systems have deteriorated, hospitals are functioning at 40% capacity, and the population is largely sustained by government rations which provide 1000 kcal (4.2 MJ) per person per day. The deadlock between the UN Security Council and Iraq over acceptance of various UN resolutions demonstrates a continued disregard for the deteriorating health of the Iraqi people, especially children. The UN’s humanitarian arm offers palliatives for the suffering while the Security Council is intent on continuing the sanctions. The moral, financial, and political standing of an international community intent on maintaining economic sanctions is challenged by the estimate that since 8/1990, 567000 children in Iraq have died as a consequence. [Sarah Zaidi, Mary C Smith Fawzi, Center for Economic and Social Rights, New York, NY 10010,USA; and Harvard School of Public Health, Boston.] [Note: Tables 26 and 28 can be found in the Table section of the FAO report.]=] 24199. International Action Center; et al.; Pellett, Peter L. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 65: A bankrupt policy: Letter to the Editor of the Guardian Weekly, England, by Dr. Peter L. Pellett responding to a Washington Post editorial reprinted in the 1/7/1996, issue of the GW. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Sir, While dismay in certain circles at the exposure of child deaths in Iraq as a consequence of the economic embargo is understandable, nevertheless the Washington Post Editorial (Guardian Weekly, 154 1: Jan 7) is breathtaking in its hypocrisy. The argument appears to be that sanctions are blameless—resisting them is the evil. To condemn Saddam Hussein for not giving in to the sanctions is as a Weapon on War: Part 65: A bankrupt policy: Letter to the Editor of
as baby milk (about 50% of needs) for infants, which is almost free of cost. Thus, this is also an enormous income subsidy in the face of hyperinflation and a 5000 fold increase in food prices. The prevention of absolute disaster is, however, at the cost of a colossal drain on currency reserves and the future collapse of such an unsustainable system cannot be ruled out. In nutritional and health terms, the five years of sanctions have moved Iraq from an almost 1st world status to that of sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, selling of additional oil for humanitarian purposes would alleviate the situation and in our report we urged the GOI and the Security Council to come to an agreement. Even were this to occur it could never be a complete solution. Painless sanctions are a contradiction in terms and child deaths especially in the poor and vulnerable are an inevitable consequence of economic pain. Having seen the effects of the embargo in Iraq both in 1993 and the summer of 1995 as well as comparing this and the prewar situation, malnutrition, beggars, crime, street children, a collapsed health care system, hyperinflation, and widespread suffering are the new realities. I cannot believe that continued sanctions are the answer. After five years the policy seems practically and ethically bankrupt. The question must be whether our humanitarian principles should support the continuation of these actions which literally are killing people. The incessant trumpeting of “human rights” at the same time as we continue to approve the sanctions seems to be blatant hypocrisy. Finally let me emphasize that this letter is written on a personal basis and is in no way officially endorsed by the UN Agency which supported the mission nor by the University of Massachusetts [Peter L. Pellett Professor of Nutrition University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 Team Leader, UN/FAO Mission to Iraq, 8/1995.] [=]

24200. International Action Center; et. al.; Harris, Sue. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on: constructed his own incubator made from a baby’s bed and plastic By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council to come to an agreement. Even were this to occur it could never be a complete solution. Painless sanctions are a contradiction in terms and child deaths especially in the poor and vulnerable are an inevitable consequence of economic pain. Having seen the effects of the embargo in Iraq both in 1993 and the summer of 1995 as well as comparing this and the prewar situation, malnutrition, beggars, crime, street children, a collapsed health care system, hyperinflation, and widespread suffering are the new realities. I cannot believe that continued sanctions are the answer. After five years the policy seems practically and ethically bankrupt. The question must be whether our humanitarian principles should support the continuation of these actions which literally are killing people. The incessant trumpeting of “human rights” at the same time as we continue to approve the sanctions seems to be blatant hypocrisy. Finally let me emphasize that this letter is written on a personal basis and is in no way officially endorsed by the UN Agency which supported the mission nor by the University of Massachusetts [Peter L. Pellett Professor of Nutrition University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 Team Leader, UN/FAO Mission to Iraq, 8/1995.] [=]

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24200. International Action Center; et. al.; Harris, Sue. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on: constructed his own incubator made from a baby’s bed and plastic By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council to come to an agreement. Even were this to occur it could never be a complete solution. Painless sanctions are a contradiction in terms and child deaths especially in the poor and vulnerable are an inevitable consequence of economic pain. Having seen the effects of the embargo in Iraq both in 1993 and the summer of 1995 as well as comparing this and the prewar situation, malnutrition, beggars, crime, street children, a collapsed health care system, hyperinflation, and widespread suffering are the new realities. I cannot believe that continued sanctions are the answer. After five years the policy seems practically and ethically bankrupt. The question must be whether our humanitarian principles should support the continuation of these actions which literally are killing people. The incessant trumpeting of “human rights” at the same time as we continue to approve the sanctions seems to be blatant hypocrisy. Finally let me emphasize that this letter is written on a personal basis and is in no way officially endorsed by the UN Agency which supported the mission nor by the University of Massachusetts [Peter L. Pellett Professor of Nutrition University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 Team Leader, UN/FAO Mission to Iraq, 8/1995.] [=]
choice by the United States and by the Security Council of the United Nations at the urging of the US and its allies, are weapons of mass destruction directed at a whole people. These blockades have been used only against poor countries, and while the entire people is punished by their economic impact, the greatest harm is overwhelmingly on the poorest and weakest—infants, children, the chronically ill, and the elderly. There is no crueler violation of fundamental human rights than this sanctions policy. The case of Iraq has demonstrated that the US and its allies do not stop short of the deliberate creation of a new zone of death and destitution, with thousands of deaths monthly, dehydration, organ failure, and pain without relief, permanent physical or mental disability, and generalized shortening of life. All humanitarian law from its inception has endeavored to limit violence to combatants, to prevent use of cruel and unfocused weapons, to protect civilians from the scourge of war, and to outlaw the principle of collective punishment. The sanctions policy is clearly a "Crime Against Humanity" as defined under the terms of the Nuremberg Principles. It also clearly violates the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Convention and other fundamental documents of contemporary international law. Ahmed Ben Bella, first President of Algeria, Daniel Ortega, former President of Nicaragua, Ciro Gómez Almeyda, former Deputy President of Chile, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, former Prime Minister of Malta, Romesh Chandra, President, World Peace Council, Roosevelt Douglas, Member of Parliament, Dominica, Ben Dupuy, former Ambassador at Large, Haiti, Sir Gaetan Duval, Former Deputy Head of Government of Mauritius, Sheikh Mohammed Rashid, former Deputy Head of Government of Pakistan Mror Ghaleb, former Foreign Minister of Egypt, Fr. Miguel D'Escoto, former Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, Tony Benn, Member of Parliament, Britain, Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States Margaretta Papandreou, former First Lady of Greece.

The above Appeal was drafted by Ramsey Clark and introduced by the International Commission on Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. It will be submitted to the next UN Security Council session that takes up the continuation Of sanctions. To make a contribution and have your name added please contact: International Action Center, 39 W. 14th St., Suite 206, New York NY, 10011, USA. Tel: (212) 633-6646; fax: (212) 633-2889. The IAC would like to give special thanks and acknowledgment to the signers of the Appeal listed below for their assistance in this project. Initiators: Kadouri A-Kayssi, Committee in Support of Iraqi People, Jaime Ballesteros, OSPAAAL, Madrid, Adel Barakat, President Arab American Chamber of Commerce & Professionals, Dr. Arthur W. Clark, Dr. Irna Parhad (Clark) In memoriam, Hillel Cohen, Bean & Alan Finneran, Marion Grevelle Kenucky Dominican Family, Center of Ecumenism & Reconciliation, Dr Khalil Jassem, International Relief Association, Phyllis J. Lucero Rania MaSi Founder and Coordinator, Iraq Action Coalition, Hugh Stephens International Coalition on Inquiry on Economic Sanctions, Britain. [Lists of Benefactors and Sponsors, Supporters, Endorsers, Signers omitted; [Affiliations listed for that time I didn't see a single hospital that wasn't damaged. I didn't see a
which means that we shot them! He didn’t mention the African American family who were told their son died a hero’s death, virtually in hand-to-hand combat with the Iraqis, when nobody got within 3000 meters of Iraqi ground troops. What really happened to their son? He was in a Bradley armored personnel carrier and his legs were cut off by a depleted-uranium rocket, a silver bullet as we call it. It came right through and cut his legs off. His family finally got a letter a month later describing how they tried to save him, how the tourniquet he couldn’t stand up, how they couldn’t get him over. What’s the matter? He doesn’t have any legs. He dies by an American rocket and they tell his family . . . well, they’re nauseated. We’ve lost a son, our hearts are broken, and our government lies to us about how it happened. It never mentions the tons of depleted uranium that will infect the lives and health of the Iraqi people with a radioactive half-life of 125000 years. Why didn’t they go to Baghdad? A general on the Rather show said they could have been there in a goddamn 36 hours, there was not one soldier to stand in the way, Republican Guards or anything else. But they needed a demon to bring the country down for five years, they didn’t want the Iraqi people mobilizing under new Iraqi leadership. Never forget Vietnam. Our war against the Vietnamese people was awful. But our twenty years of sanctions after the war were far crueler, far deadlier and never even recognized. That’s what brought them down to utter poverty, that’s what brought their living standard below that of Mozambique, that’s what forced them out into the sea m open boats mto settlements in Hong Kong and places like that. They were crushed. A people who during the bombing were so proud they could raise five tons of rice per hectare, working night and day, cut off from everything for twenty years, until finally there is nothing left except an agreement. And the next day Pepsi blimps flying over Ho Chi Minh City. Free at last, thank God almighty, free at last.

One crime against humanity exceeds all others in its magnitude, its cruelty in all the ways that humanity has discovered to be cruel to each other, and most significantly in what it means for the future: sanctions. The sanctions against Iraq are the most dramatic, crushing unbearable example. And let me tell you that in Cuba today, the food intake, caloric and otherwise, is still less than two-thirds what it ought to be. One of the great human beings of our time is there today with a million dollars worth of medicine for a people who are deprived of medicine. His name is Muhammed Ali. He’s got a lot of medicine for Parkinson’s disease. The United States alone imposes that embargo on Cuba, killing or ten million people in Cuba. Every man, woman, and child there. And it does it in defiance of all the nations of the world. Over one hundred nations have voted in the UN to condemn the United States for its unilateral blockade against Cuba. These sanctions are a killer beyond compare. They have killed five or ten people for every person who died from the typhus on Iraq. They have injured far more. You’ve got over 20% of the population under ten stunted in their physical and mental development from malnutrition in the early years of their lives, the number of underweight births is five times what it was before. If you are born under two kilos [4.5 pounds], you’re going to have a hard time, you eliminated. [From speech to London meeting against sanctions, 1/20/1996, New York.][4]

24203. International Action Center; et. al.; Ben Bella, Ahmed. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 69: ‘A disease of the world system’ Ahmed Ben Bella First President of Algeria. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The question of the blockades can only be properly understood when seen in a wider context. We live under a world system in which 35 million people die of starvation every year, in which a quarter of the world’s population suffers from tropical diseases, and in which the countries of the South have seen no development in their position during the last thirty years. We live in a world where the goal of development held out by the US, the IMF, and the World Bank cannot possibly be supported by the planet we live on. Three quarters of the world’s population live in the countries of the South, and there will quite simply never be the possibility that all these people could consume energy and other resources at the rate the US does; we should need ten or fifteen more such planets to provide the necessary resources! The countries of the South owe $2000 billion in debt; they cannot even pay interest on this amount, let alone ever pay it back. In short, the whole of the South is blockaded. The blockades of Iraq, Cuba, Libya, People’s Korea are, in fact, merely the most extreme examples of the use of this policy. The constitutions of many countries now ban racism. What we must struggle for is that blockades should also be banned in the same way. These blockades are a disease of the world system; we want these blockades to be eliminated from the face of the earth, just as smallpox has been.

[From speech to London meeting against sanctions, 1/17/1996.]

Iraq is a symbol of struggle against a barbaric system, like north Korea, north Vietnam, Libya, and Iraq. Cuba is a human revolution. That’s why the US has had sanctions on Cuba for over thirty years. There are millions of poor in the US Many are Blacks and Mexicans. The US cannot accept the extraordinary example of thriving Black and Latin women and children in Cuba. Sanctions have moved to the center of attention in this conference. The sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, and Libya are an act of warfare without war. They affect every country and the stability of the world. The imposed legality of the embargo is a UN takeover by Washington. The powers can force their own concept of legality. Economic sanctions are a declaration of war. They intend to force change, to destroy Iraq. That’s oppression. It’s worse than the effect of the Hiroshima bomb. The US treats the world like a teacher in a classroom. There are always certain students who are in trouble, like Koreajo Cuba, Iraq. That’s liberal [laissez-faire] capitalism. Either you apply rules they want or you are destroyed. They offer the paradise of liberalism but one has only to look at those who are out of work. The conflict, the struggle is against imperialism, against its system, against
the men who are the symbols of this barbaric system. We must continue to fight. The US controls everything in the United Nations Security Council. It has been transformed into a council of war. What did they do with Iraq in a month? They made a declaration of war there without informing the General Assembly. It's the Security Council of the United States alone. We have to organize in the United States more than in London because we have to talk with the American public. I am convinced that there are progressive Americans. There are brothers and sisters from South America. There are African Americans. American society is very diversified. There are possibilities of a good outcome. We have to reform. After fifty years of the UN, I do not understand why five countries have the right to vote against the rest. Is this democracy? We have to reform the Security Council because it has direct contact with the money of the US. We have to reform that. It's a catastrophe. The way the Security Council acts is with blind force against the public. We have to transform the United Nations in the direction of more democracy and less military force. It is time to do this. The unions can play a very important part because they are organizations that have experience. They represent the working class, the poor, those who most want things to change. The unions have to play a central role. [From speech to International Commission of Inquiry of Economic Sanctions, London, 8/1995.] [n]

24204. International Action Center; et. al.; d'Escoto, Miguel. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 70: 'We have a moral imperative' Father Miguel d'Escoto, Former Foreign Minister of Nicaragua. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The people we have here are the converted, that is to say, people who understand the gravity of the problem and are committed to doing something about it. What I should say to you is, keep up the good fight. But not only keep it up—double, triple your efforts. We have a moral and, for many of us, a religious imperative to call things by their rightful names. Sanctions in the case of Iraq are certainly the continuation of that awful war. It never stopped. But it's more than war, because even in war, you have certain laws regulating wars. Sanctions, especially as being applied in the case of our brothers and sisters in Iraq, is not only war. It's murder. It's international terrorism, it's genocide. Once when we in Nicaragua were in the middle of our own sufferings—which continue, which never stopped, just like the war in Iraq never stopped—at one juncture I called upon people to accompany me on what I called a fast for life. It was a kind of religious thing. Thousands and thousands of people in Nicaragua joined, but many also came from abroad. At one point, when I was close to thirty days into the total fast, I received a delegation from the United States. There were something like twenty-five people, and a young woman led the group in song. I really appreciated the song and said, Will the young lady care to lead the group in another song? And she says, oh, Father, thank you for calling me a young lady, I am the mother of five. I said to her, What are you doing here? She being young, the five had to be very young. She said, you know, my husband and I in Boston have been praying and reflecting and talking about what our government in the United States is doing to the people of Nicaragua. And when our children grow up and they learn about what went on during the eighties, they are going to ask us, what did you, our father and mother, do when this was being perpetrated against the people in the name of the United States? It was this kind of reflection that said we must go and express our solidarity. They decided that the mother should go and the father should stay home minding the children. She went down and was kidnapped, along with other Americans. The kidnapping took place on the San Juan River on the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, by the Contras, with the help of the American Embassy in Costa Rica. This is the most difficult country to work in on behalf of causes, not because the people are not wonderful. The people are wonderful. But this is the most systematically deceived, lied-to people on Earth. Noam Chomsky, a very wonderful man and dear friend, has written a book called Manufacturing Consent, where the whole methodology for the robotization of the American citizenry is put forth and explained. This is a nation of robots. It isn't that they don't care, they don't even know. And they are led to believe that it's not even good manners to inquire into certain things. We are the ones who suffer the consequences. We in Nicaragua, our brothers and sisters in Cuba for so long, and our dear brothers and sisters in Iraq and in Libya and in so many places. People ask me all the time in Nicaragua, Father, you know the nature of the beast that you are facing, going to the States and appearing on "Nightline" or whatever television programs. We can't help but notice that you have a certain optimism, you have hope. How can you have hope? How do you keep the torch alive? I believe that no matter how powerful those bent on crime and lies and greed might be, God is more mighty. It isn't that God is on our side. We are on His side when we're struggling for brotherhood and sisterhood, for peace and for a better world. Those who are more committed to fighting for a better world will get one. Our people in Nicaragua, they dare to dream, and for that, they continue to suffer. The enemy would like people to say: We won't try to dream any more. What's the use? It's too difficult, and you will pay the consequences for a long time. Why don't we just accept that things must be this way? The world we all want will be the result of courage and not of cowardice, and the degree of courage and heroism that is necessary is quite large, but it will be forthcoming if we stick to our guns—our moral guns. God bless you. [From speech to New York anti-sanctions forum, 1/20/1996.] [n]
Let me thank the International Action Center on behalf of the United States government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 72: Hypocrisy and sanctions on Haiti. Ben Dupuy, Former Ambassador-at-Large, Haiti. Co-Director Haiti Progress. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. It is a very difficult job in this country to fight the big media machine that manufactures pretty soft budget cuts. One of the logic of Zbigiew Brzezinski of the Trilateral Commission, one of the famous think tanks in the United States, is that “for democracy to work there has to be a sensible amount of apathy.” He said that during the Vietnam War. Obviously, the ruling circles in this country were quite afraid of the danger of a new consciousness among the people who would represent for their form of democracy. Not too long ago Fidel Castro was around here. Mayor Giuliani did not want to receive him at Gracie Mansion. So he had no choice but to go and see his old friends in Harlem. During his speech he compared the blockade of Cuba to a silent nuclear bomb, because this embargo has been killing thousands of innocent people. This is exactly what is happening in Iraq today. Maybe by talking about another form of embargo we can see better the hypocrisy of the policy makers in the United States. The embargoes they impose on Cuba and Iraq are real. But what about Haiti? After the CIA engineered a coup in Haiti against Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, whom they did not like because he was too close to the people, they adopted a policy with two faces. Officially, they were supporting the legitimate government of Haiti, which had just been toppled by a military coup. Secretary of State James Baker, at an OAS meeting three days after the coup, said that the military were thugs and would have no friends. Yet they lasted three years. There was supposed to be an embargo against the Haitian military leaders. But, in fact, that embargo was not directed against these military leaders, it was directed against the people of Haiti. At the same time the United States was reinforcing the military dictatorship. The Navy, stationed around Haiti to supposedly enforce the embargo, was, in fact, taking the boat people, the refugees fleeing the military dictatorship, and returning them to Haiti. But this Navy could not detect the tankers bringing fuel and all sorts of other supplies to reinforce the military dictatorship? They organized and financed a terrorist organization known as F.R.A.P.H. The United States could then come back and say, “We are coming to deliver you, to help you.” This is the kind of hypocrisy that must be understood. Haiti has a long experience with embargoes and blockades. Let us discuss a little history. Haiti became independent in the beginning of the 19th century, in 1804, after the slaves overthrew their masters and declared the country independent. Haiti was the first country in Latin America to become independent. This was really unacceptable, especially for the United States. We have to remember that the power in the United States was in the hands of the slaveholders. They were afraid that if the slaves could become free and independent in Haiti, then maybe in the whole Caribbean and the southern part of the United States the slaves would revolt. And that would be an end to their domination. So Haiti was put under an embargo. The United States, in cahoots with Great Britain and France, isolated the country for 60 years. Nothing would go out and nothing would come in. Today you can hear constantly over the media that Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. They want to prove that if a black country becomes free and independent, they are still unable to govern themselves. They are still unable to succeed. Today they consider Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and other countries to be trash in a basket. Whoever is trying to climb up is kicked Tottenham Three. A number of Irish militants were jailed in Britain for ten years, but they were allowed to return to Ireland; they cannot offer their citizens to Britain or the United States. Whoever is trying to climb up is kicked Tottenham Three. A number of Irish militants were jailed in Britain for ten years, but they were allowed to return to Ireland. Today you can hear constantly the talk of sanctions against the Hussein government. Without even waiting to ask what the conditions were in our country, he donated $1 million with no strings attached to help in our reconstruction. This is the kind of assistance and solidarity that the people and government of Iraq have been giving to people who have been struggling. Whether you go to southern Africa or Palestine—wherever you go, whatever negative criticism has been made of the Iraqi government—you get the same word from people who are fighting. That the Iraqi government was always willing to assist people struggling for their national liberation. For that reason I visited Iraq in 12/1990. In fact, I left Baghdad two days before the war really began, on probably the last flight out. They had first imposed sanctions in 8/1990. So even at that time, children were already dying because of a lack of medicines. I visited hospitals and saw it. And that was six months into the sanctions and before the war actually began. So you can imagine how after five years, with a tightening of those sanctions, the children of Iraq are suffering. All children have a right to a decent life, all children have a right to benefit from the fruits and resources of their country. What is good for the children of America is also good for the children of Iraq, Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, China, all over the world. Our country got political independence in 1978 after 400 years of colonial rule—Spanish, French, then British. And in that period from the beginning of slavery until 1978, they trained just four doctors. But between 1978 and today, although we have had governments hostile to the Cuban government, Cuba has trained over thirty doctors for Dominica. And Cuba itself has been under sanctions. That is the kind of anti-imperialist solidarity, that is the kind of reaching out and touching people’s lives, that we need in this world. Because the very same budgets that they’re cutting back on the poor people of America, they’re doing the same thing to us in the Third World. So we have a common enemy and a common struggle, and if we do unite, they will pick us off one by one. We have to put our heads together, put our resources together, put our commitment and our lives on the line to ensure that this planet, which we all inherit, will survive the vicissitudes of imperialism and move to be a real democracy with real human solidarity. Because without that we are all doomed. Brothers and sisters, I have had the opportunity to work also in Libya. It is another country under the weight of sanctions because there are two people in Libya the imperialists want for the Lockerbie bombing. The international media have investigated and found that Libya is completely innocent, but the Libyans have still offered to allow these two people to be tried in the International Court of Justice—not in Cuba, not in Iraq, under Sadaam Hussein, but in the Hague. And they refuse. They insist the two must be tried in Britain. Look at the history of justice in Britain. A number of people were killed—the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Tottenham Three. A number of Irish militants were jailed in Britain for ten to fifteen years only to be told afterwards that in fact they were innocent. The Libyan people cannot offer their citizens to Britain or the United States to be tried in their courts because there is no justice in those courts. And that is why the sanctions against Libya are unconscionable, are immoral, and have to be lifted. When you had what was called the oil windfall, the United States was saying that countries should give 1% of their profits to the poor. But Libya, the country that has given 1% of its gross domestic product to foreign aid. Yet there was a time when Libya gave 27% of its gross domestic product to foreign assistance, to countries fighting for liberation. And it is the only country inside Africa today where you can see what was done with that oil money. At a cost of $25 billion, Qaddafi was able to bring water from...
under the Sahara desert to the Mediterranean coast to irrigate land, to conquer the damages of the Sahara, to move towards industry, public health, and a number of projects. The money has gone towards the development of the Libyan economy, and at the same time they gave so much assistance and solidarity to South Africa, to Namibia, to Palestine, to Zimbabwe—you name it. Libya gave assistance. Standing up against sanctions is a struggle that is just, a struggle that is necessary. We came from the battle last weekend, and even with all the problems from the UN, over 15000 foreign students on scholarships studying in Cuba. The will to survive is in the Cuban Revolution, is in Libya, is in Iraq. They’re afraid of those countries because of their stand against imperialism. And brothers and sisters, comrades all, it is not an easy struggle now because of the unbalanced situation in the world, the dominant military power of the United States. But I can tell you that will to survive under conditions of sanctions is burning inside the hearts and minds and souls of the Iraqi people, of the Libyan people, of the Cuban people, and those of us who believe that the Third World is going to continue to struggle. We ask you to stretch out your hands to us so that we can work together as one team. As Maurice Bishop often said, in the Grenadian Revolution, “Forward ever, backward never.” [From speech to New York anti-sanctions forum, 1/20/1996] [a]

24208. International Action Center; et. al.; Benn, Tony. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 74: ‘The rich threaten the poor’ Tony Benn, Member of Parliament, Britain. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The sanctions question has been on the margins of the world political agenda for some years now, but this conference moves it to the center. The way sanctions are being used now is really an act of political and economic warfare without war. But it has the effect of imposing the most terrible suffering, contrary to the Charter of the UN. They have become a threat to the stability of the world political and commercial system. They symbolize the way the UN has frankly been taken over by Washington. I strongly urge your government to take action at the [Security Council] meeting to redress this shameful situation. [From a letter sent to the London embassies of UN Security Council countries, 10/11/1995.] [a]

24209. International Action Center; et. al.; Bonnici, Karmenu Mitsud. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 75: ‘Silence and inaction are complicity’ Karmenu Mitsud Bonnici, Former Prime Minister of Malta. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. It is inconceivable that the United Nations Organization, which is set up to promote the well-being and development of peoples; should itself, through its sanctions, be the cause of the widespread misery and death of so many people, and bring about the economic destruction of countries, the foremost being Iraq. It is morally unbearable that the United Nations Organization, which raises and spends millions of dollars to combat malnutrition, hunger, and disease, should cause hunger, malnutrition, and disease to so many people, the foremost being the Iraqi people. It is ethically unacceptable that the United Nations Organization, which in its Charter professes to express the will of “We, the peoples of the world,” should arrogantly flout our feelings of abhorrence and opposition to the adoption of measures which run counter to and suppress the fundamental human rights of so many people, the foremost being Iraqi children, mothers, and the aged. Our silence and inaction would amount to complicity in the perpetration of the crimes against humanity which the United Nations Organization is committing through its sanctions. If our governments are willing to be accomplices to such crimes against humanity, we, today, through these activities organized on the fifth anniversary of the UN aggression against Iraq, want to be counted as fierce defenders of human rights and moral values, and pledge ourselves to strive to bring about an end to such crimes. [From message to New York anti-sanctions forum, 1/20/1996.] [a]
established during the Gulf War by a group of Americans originally from Iraq. It was very clear to us from day one that this war was going to drag on through fighting or sanctions for an indeterminate period of time. But even we were unprepared for the unspeakable violation of human rights, especially towards children. So we decided to establish a nonprofit charitable organization. Little by little we grew to be a major relief organization in the United States supporting the innocent people of Iraq, with the cooperation of the religious or political-affiliated independents, not a favor we do for anyone. I want to paint a picture from inside Iraq, not as a visitor or as someone who comes and goes, but from somebody who has had the chance to really know both societies. My dear friends, what is going on inside Iraq is beyond description. The human degradation, humiliation and feeling have been pushed to the limit. They cannot be documented. A couple of stories have been brought to my attention—not through Peter Jennings or Dan Rather's broadcasts, but by those who were eyewitnesses. They are stories of a people who only a few years ago were the richest nation in the Middle East. Zahraa, a fourteen-year-old girl, was asked by her teacher to stand up to write something on the blackboard. When she reached the board and turned around to face the class, she collapsed. The teacher put some water on her face and she woke up. Asked what was wrong, she said, "It's not my turn to eat today. We are six, we only eat food on alternate days. It's not my turn today." That is one example of how the children of Iraq live. Yesterday I was contacted by a person twenty-five years old who had to sell one of his kidneys for 200000 Iraqi dinars, equivalent to less than seventy-five US dollars. Iraq today is the place to buy body parts. I am from a relatively well-off family, but I've seen my own nephew almost die because he needed asthma medicine. I lost my sister-in-law for the same reason. Every Iraqi has lost loved ones to the ongoing sanctions. These stories go beyond what anyone could really say. If they don't move us to do something, what will? The Iraqis have no way of expressing themselves to the outside world, to explain their point of view, because it's not only sanctions on food and the basic necessities of life, it's a total mass media blockade. It's silent starvation, killing, and murder, but in the middle of the day where all the world is watching silently. What we are doing, basically, is collecting donations for food and medicine to help the most needy and vulnerable. We ask good people all over the United States, especially the Muslim communities, to donate generously to this cause. Thanks to Allah (God), we have had some success. Last year we sent two big shipments of medicine to the north, and one to the south and central regions. We're also distributing basic food, mainly rice and flour, especially during the season of the holy month of Ramadan. We are trying to help them stand on their feet. And we are trying to get the outside world to see that what's happening is simply wrong and violates everything the United States and United Nations stand for. From the few thousand of dollars we were able to collect a few years ago, we have raised more than one million dollars to send medicine and food to those inside Iraq. We have an office in Michigan—our East Coast representative and the board members are here with me—and we are working in Canada, the UK, and Turkey. But what we are doing is but a drop in the bucket compared to the actual need of the people. We are lagging behind in reaching out to the American public at large. We need every bit of help to reach your mosque, church, community center, universities, and everywhere. Americans in general are one of the most generous people, especially when there is an appeal for medicine and food. Many people among you say, keep going, we will support you. We need your help and action to alleviate these inhuman conditions imposed on the innocent children. I hope that with time the American people will become more aware of this tragedy, and realize that every bit of support, no matter how tiny, will make a difference in someone's life. I think we already have made a difference. My heartfelt thanks to the International Action Center. They are performing a beautiful job in helping us. Thank you and may Allah bless you. [From speech to New York anti-sanctions forum, 1/20/1996.] [c]

24211. International Action Center; et. al.; Safwat, Safia. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War; Part 77: 'Iraq complied with UN resolutions' Dr. Safia Safwat, Member of the Permanent Bureau of the Union of Arab Jurists. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. For more than two years, Iraq has been subject to severe sanctions and blockade. The people of Iraq have faced the most intensive and vicious air war campaign in which hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed and the country's telecommunications network. An essential basis for this complex and extensive infrastructure was trade. For example, most of the machinery, as well as the spare parts to keep it running, was obtained from outside the country. Approximately 70% of the food needs of the country were met through imports from abroad. What primarily paid for this level of imports was revenue from the sale of oil. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on 8/2/1990, the situation started to change abruptly. From August 6, the Security Council imposed a comprehensive package of financial and economic sanctions (Resolution 661). The war in 1/2/1991 brought about massive destruction in many elements of physical and service infrastructure. Further major damage was created by the civil conflicts that ensued. A final factor was the economic and financial sanctions imposed on Iraq, including the freezing of its foreign assets and a ban on the international sale of its oil. Numerous reports of international missions have indicated the size of destruction caused to Iraq as a result of the war and the imposition of economic blockade and sanctions. These reports have also explained the suffering and hardship they caused to the population. Despite the unjust and arbitrary nature of the United Nations resolutions on sanctions and other resolutions, Iraq has met the obligations imposed, namely, those which relate to the economic embargo. However, although all this has been done, the state of the iniquitous embargo imposed on Iraq remains unchanged. Among the important early reports on the effect of sanctions are: (1) the call by the UN Secretary General for an urgent humanitarian plan in 4/1991; (2) Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari's report in 5/1991; (3) the report of the Harvard Medical Team in 5/1991; (4) Sadruddin Aga Khan's report in 7/1991; (5) the report by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 10/1991; and (6) the report by the General Federation of Iraqi Women in 11/1992. All these reports have pointed out severe shortages in clean drinking water, destruction and stoppage of the sewage systems due to the total collapse of electricity power supply, which resulted in spread of disease causing dire consequences among the population and in particular among the infants, sick, and old people.

During the Gulf crisis the Security Council issued twenty-four resolutions in one case, an unprecedented matter even in far more serious circumstances. The said resolutions were passed with a great deal of haste, one after the other without giving any time to see the results of each resolution. For instance, Resolution 660 demanding Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and hold immediate negotiations with Kuwait was passed on the evening of 8/2/1990, and was followed on August 6 by Resolution 661 determining that, as Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 660, it thereby imposed a total blockade on Iraq. At this stage the issue of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait has been completely forgotten. The swiftness with which the Security Council's resolutions were drafted and passed gave the impression that such resolutions had been prepared in advance—especially as the United States carried out the task of drafting them and even announced them before the Security Council.
Council did. Further, the resolutions have deliberately opted to employ the severest provisions available. The said resolutions as measures designed for restoration of international peace and security in the area failed to observe the conditions of reasonableness and proportionality required by the UN Charter. Moreover, the parties involved in their adoption and implementation did not enjoy impartiality. Resolution 678 included violations of the UN Charter inasmuch as it authorized member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660. In spite of these violations, let us assume for the moment that these resolutions were fully within the Security Council's legal capacity and in exercise of its powers according to the United Nations Charter. Going back to Resolution 661 passed on 8/6/1990, we find that it had relied on one reason: the noncompliance of Iraq with Resolution 660 demanding it withdraw from Kuwait. The Council relied on the same reason to pass its subsequent Resolutions 665 on August 25 and 678 on November 29. It is clear therefore that the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq was designed to achieve the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and Iraq's compliance with the resolution in this respect. Such a measure should therefore have ended with the end of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Further, in spite of this striking paradox and grave injustice inflicted upon it, Iraq has complied with its obligations under the resolution despite its arbitrary nature. In addition, Iraq has complied with Resolution 687 demands that it reaffirm its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other treaties restricting the production of chemical and other mass destruction weapons, yet the sanctions have remained in place. It is evident that no matter what Iraq does in fulfillment of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions, the unjust sentence passed by the Council to starve the people of Iraq and deny them the right to life continues, simply because this is the will of certain influential governments in the Council; the very same will that was behind the drafting and adoption of the Council's resolutions, the will that was and continues to be behind the unjust manner in which Iraq has been treated in both intentions and deeds. The post-war attack on central Baghdad by cruise missiles on 1/15/1993, which resulted in deaths of innocent civilians, is yet another proof not only that sanctions are designed to continue but also of the constant threat of aggression against Iraq and its people. [From speech before the British Commission of Inquiry of the IWCT, House of Commons, London, 2/10/1993.] 

24212. International Action Center; et. al.; Stephens, Hugh. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As A Weapon on War; Part 7B: A wave of Security Council blockades" Hugh Stephens, Coordinator of the International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Following the Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991, we in Britain worked to support the call issued by Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General, to indict the US government and its allies for war crimes in provoking this war, in waging it in a criminal manner, and in extending it through the use of the blockade on Iraq. This work took the form of an International War Crimes Tribunal on US and Allied War Crimes in the Gulf, and in the course of our work in this country, we held public hearings in London, Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham and Bradford. These proceedings were submitted to an International Hearing in New York. Since then I have worked with a number of public figures and other concerned people to carry forward its work in the form of the International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. This project is now gaining recognition, and next month we shall hold a major international event here in London. In the fifty years since the inception of the United Nations there have been ten instances of economic sanctions imposed by its Security Council. Eight have been during the 1990s. The fact that this new wave of blockades has been a feature of only the past five years has led to a situation where it is only slowly and belatedly that the enormity of their violation of all legal, humanitarian and other norms of international behavior is becoming exposed. To help remedy this situation is a central task of our Commission. These sanctions have transgressed the recognized human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and subsequently reiterated and confirmed by numerous international and regional agreements up to and including the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (1993). These sanctions in addition violate international humanitarian norms as expounded in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other conventions which outlaw collective punishment and reprisals affecting innocent civilians, as well as the principle of proportionality in international law, which demands that the damage incurred by civilians is proportionate to the damage incurred in the area of military operation. The principle also intertwines with internal affairs, freedom of navigation, freedom of international trade, sovereignty over natural resources, and international norms relating to migrant workers, etc. The embargoes not only violate in this way the system of international law and norms which has been so earnestly fought for, but also violate the standards of behavior set by the relevant international organizations such as the WHO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR. These organizations, like the United Nations itself, have at various times and in various ways been fought for and utilized by the Non-Aligned Movement and other forces which manifest the independence struggle of the developing countries. To raise the question of these violations of international law and standards by the Security Council of the United Nations is not to campaign against the United Nations or indeed to call for a revision of its Charter. On the contrary, it is to rally to the defense of the United Nations and help rescue it from disrepute and disintegration. These sanctions bring to bear on the credibility of the United Nations and indeed also on the credibility of regional organizations such as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, etc. All have, like the United Nations, played a role in the defense of the state sovereignty of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and all have seen their standing and effectiveness corroded by the existence of these blockades. The current embargoes have involved the arbitrary use by the Security Council of the United Nations of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is designed to be used only in emergencies with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The fact that four years had elapsed before Chapter VII was invoked against Libya over the Lockerbie incident illustrates the degree to which not only the spirit but even the letter of the United Nations Charter is violated in these cases. In contrast, there is a conspicuous lack of use of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter which would have brought to the fore the use of pacific means of dispute settlement—procedures such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. Even the most general principles of law are violated in the case of these sanctions. For example, despite the fact that the universal principle of "innocent until proved guilty" is recognized in the systems of law of the various individual states as well as in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and other competent international tribunals, the Security Council has blatantly violated this principle in its repeated demands made on Libya to make reparations to the US, UK, and France for alleged terrorist actions without any legal proceedings having taken place whatsoever. We hear much, of course, of the exceptions or exemptions supposedly existing in the application of the sanctions, namely medical and other humanitarian goods. In fact, of course, if a country's entire supply system is totally disrupted—its market, its foreign trade and its communications and transport—then to claim that humanitarian supplies are exempted is to add insult to injury. It is clear, in short, that these sanctions have increasingly become an instrument for the imposition of the foreign policy goals of a small number of big powers rather than an instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In this respect sanctions represent a continuation of the policy of unilateral sanctions imposed by the US, notably its embargo on Cuba which has continued for over 30 years and the undeclared embargo to which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (north Korea) has, in effect, been subjected by the US since 1953. Their goals at various times have included isolating China and preventing the expansion of the socialist camp, securing control of the oil resources of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean waterways, and now, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, gaining control of the roads, waterways, and communications in general in that strategic part of Europe. We should in addition call for the United
Nations to establish a mechanism for paying compensation for the damage inflicted in contravention of its own charter and of international law generally damage which has taken years to repair. Lost revenue, however calculated, is only one rather simple criterion, which clearly provides only the crudest reflection of the material damage to a country which has seen the total disruption of the economic and cultural development of a whole generation. We may nevertheless recall that Iraq could have benefited from its $25 billion in foreign reserves. After these 4 million barrels of oil a day were cut, the value of which would now be around $131 billion. I urge those present never to assume that the principles of international law and other norms of international behavior are wellknown and propagated and that somehow, some other body somewhere will heed them. This is far from our experience. Indeed, the actions of the Security Council of the United Nations rely precisely on vagueness and indeterminacy. It remains up to us, to popular pressure groups and campaigns, to demand that these principles be upheld—principles which were achieved by the weak and poor countries of the world in their struggle to establish independence from the big powers, and which are thus part of the legacy of all who work for peace and justice in the world. I propose that this meeting has the status of a Preliminary Public Hearing of the British Commission of Inquiry, and that its proceedings be submitted to the Presidency of our Commission. [From speech to a meeting of Third World Solidarity and the Non-Adjusted Students & Youth Organization, London, 7/20/1995.][=]

24213. International Action Center; et. al.; Aziz, Barbara Nimri. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 79: ‘In 1994, economy ground to a halt’ Barbara Nimri Aziz, Writer, Broadcast Journalist. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. As the United Nations trade embargo against Iraq enters its fourth year, the country’s economy is slowly grinding to a halt. “This is as bad as the bombing; it is a slow death,” laments a once comfortable woman in Baghdad, who is now unemployed. Food and medicine, despite being exempt from the embargo, are in dangerously short supply, Iraqi doctors say. Industry and agriculture are limping along with broken or jerry-rigged machinery desperately in need of raw materials and spare parts—tractors need tires and farmers need pesticides. “Lack of spare parts cripples all industry: health, agriculture, or transport,” says a medical doctor, who, like almost all Iraqis, requested anonymity. The impact of sanctions, which were imposed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, has been exacerbated by the country’s heavy dependence on oil revenues and food imports before the Gulf War. Three years ago, Iraq had a modern economy built on oil sales, which accounted for 90% of its hard currency revenues. The Baath government did not permit dissent, but provided its 18 million people with national health care, school meals, overseas training, housing, and electricity. After the war, Iraq astonished many observers with its aggressive reconstruction campaign. Within months of the cease-fire, the government had restored electricity and 50% of water supplies. It rebuilt bridges and roads; repaired damaged hospitals; reopened schools; and started a nationwide food-rationing program. But many state-run programs were shelved as the embargo began to bite. And imports such as medicine could not be replaced. “Our doctors and modern hospitals cannot function without medicines, and those, Iraq cannot supply,” says Deputy Health Minister Showki Marcus. He notes that “although the UN embargo does not apply to the purchase of medicines, foreign drug companies are unwilling or forbidden by their individual governments to sell to Iraq, even where we paid in advance.” Dr. Marcus dismisses present, emergency medical aid. “It amounts to barely 5% of our needs,” he says. In the past, Iraq imported $500 million annually in pharmaceuticals. Food is also scarce in part because of a prewar dependence on imports. During the 1980s, the country used its oil revenues to buy food imports at the expense of developing its agricultural policy—by necessity. Farmers, for example, are offered bonuses to expand arable land and grow cash crops. At the same time, however, Iraqi officials charge that the UN has sabotaged food programs by preventing farmers from spraying crops by plane and blocking the import of animal vaccines. Last winter’s abundant wheat crop in the Mosul region brought temporary relief. “It may stave off famine—this year,” says a householder, echoing the widespread belief that only lifting the embargo can save the country. A 1993 UNICEF report, which the United Nations funded but has since disclaimed because it faults the direct link drawn between health statistics and sanctions in Iraq, found that hunger is growing and disease increasing. The unpublished report cites multifaceted increases in low-weight births as country imported food items into the country. Government officials admitted that during the previous years, the value of which would now be around $131 billion. I urge those present never to assume that the principles of international law and other norms of international behavior are wellknown and propagated and that somehow, some other body somewhere will heed them. This is far from our experience. Indeed, the actions of the Security Council of the United Nations rely precisely on vagueness and indeterminacy. It remains up to us, to popular pressure groups and campaigns, to demand that these principles be upheld—principles which were achieved by the weak and poor countries of the world in their struggle to establish independence from the big powers, and which are thus part of the legacy of all who work for peace and justice in the world. I propose that this meeting has the status of a Preliminary Public Hearing of the British Commission of Inquiry, and that its proceedings be submitted to the Presidency of our Commission. [From speech to a meeting of Third World Solidarity and the Non-Adjusted Students & Youth Organization, London, 7/20/1995.][=]

24214. International Action Center; et. al.; Becker, Richard. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 80: ‘Sanctions are collective punishment’ Richard Becker, Co-Coordinator. International Action Center, San Francisco, New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. A modest article in the 1/8/1996, edition of the San Francisco Examiner revealed a very startling fact: On 6/27/1980, a joint NATO squadron of US and French jets shot down a civilian Italian airliner over the Mediterranean. All eighty-one people aboard were killed. The US and French jets were trying to ambush a plane carrying President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. This was six years before the US/NATO bombing of Libya, allegedly in retaliation for an explosion in a nightclub in West Germany, which itself was later blamed on someone else. This 1980 shoot-down was covered up by the Italian, US, and French governments. The downing of the plane was attributed to a “terrorist bomb.” And it was a terrorist attack—a state terrorist act by the US and France. Shouldn’t the French and US governments be subject to sanctions for this act? As well as for the 1986 bombing of Libya in violation of all international law? But today Libya is under severe sanctions. It is barred from all international air traffic. No planes can fly into or out of Libya, allegedly because the government won’t turn over to Britain and the US two accused suspects in the Lockerbie, Scotland, downing of a airliner. Shouldn’t air traffic in and out of the US and France now be halted, until those responsible for the downing down of the Italian airliner are brought to justice? But France and the US are permanent members of the UN Security Council. That’s not who sanctions were designed for. No such resolution will be brought before the Council—no allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace. Yet all of these were committed, not only against Libya, but of course far more extensively in Iraq. The InternationalAppeals to End Sanctions says: “Economic sanctions and blockades are a weapon of mass destruction directed at a whole people. These blockades have been used only against poor countries.” A blockade, attempting to shut off another country’s trade, has always been understood as an act of war. Iraq today is suffering from probably the most total isolation of any country in modern history, under the polite term “sanctions.” Before the war, Iraq sold highgrade oil on the world market, using a large part of the earnings for development that benefitted the people (unlike the oil-rich USpuppet emirates). It purchased 70% of its food and 65% of its medicine on the world market. Iraq developed widely respected health care, education, and social welfare systems based on oil exports. Today Iraq can export nothing and so can no longer buy the raw materials, food, medicine, and other products needed to sustain economic life. Relief efforts, no matter how vigorous, can supply at most 5% of the country’s needs, according to the relief agencies themselves. So, Iraq is starving, the people of Iraq are starving. Maybe Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher and Bill Clinton aren’t aware
of what their insistence on the continuation of sanctions means? But, of course, they are more than aware. Because this is not a new tactic. In 1919, then President Woodrow Wilson said in Versailles: "The one who chooses this economic, peaceful, quiet, lethal remedy will not have to resort to force. It is not such a painful remedy. It doesn't take a single human life outside the country exposed to boycott, but instead subjects that country to a pressure that, in my view, no modern nations can withstand." Of course, we have seen US embargoes and blockades imposed on China, Korea, Cuba, Chile, Libya, Vietnam, Iran in 1953 and again in 1979, Nicaragua, and other countries that dared to rebel to end the domination of the US. Particularly for the smaller countries, great devastation was done to their attempts to develop and provide for the needs of their people. Nixon and Kissinger vowed to make Chile scream. Reagan swore he would make the Sandinistas say "uncle." The US-sponsored Contra war killed 75000 Nicaraguans outright and impoverished this nation of only 4 million people. In both cases, economic destruction paved the way for overthrowing their governments. It is sometimes said, citing South Africa, that sanctions can be used in a progressive way. But the divestment campaign called for by the mass organizations was very different. The apartheid regime was never subject to a blockade.

In the last few years, the use of this weapon of economic warfare has accelerated. What is new about the use of sanctions in this post-Cold War period? Until recently, blockaded countries like Cuba could turn to the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. Western blockades hurt, but they could survive. That option no longer exists for the developing countries. It was removed with the destruction of the Soviet Union—which was also accomplished to a very large degree by economic warfare plus a trillion-dollar arms race. In this new period, the US corporate/Pentagon establishment is moving very quickly to establish and reinforce its domination in key regions of the world. For the developing countries this often takes the form of an offer they can't refuse. Accept the dictates of Washington or face the starvation and slow death of your people, especially the very young, the elderly, the sick. And/or military attack. They've always gone hand in hand. The blockade against Iraq is enforced today by naval, ground and air forces, twenty-four hours a day. Those who have not fully accepted the new world order, joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the North American Free Trade Association, allowed US bases if requested, accepted the International Monetary Fund/World Bank plans to cut food subsidies, privatize, and turn their economies into subsidiaries of USA, Inc., are subjected to a familiar formula. First their leaders are vilified and demonized in the mass media. They are a "new Hitler," or "drug runners," or "violators of human rights," or "war criminals." Of course, this is never applied to the leaders of Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, or Guatemala. It is never, never applied to the leaders of the US, who killed millions in Vietnam, or the French who killed over a million in Algeria, or the British on whose empire the sun never set. All this is done in the name of defending human rights. But how can those who kill millions with sanctions be defenders of human rights? Human rights were also used as the justification for securing and extending US domination in the part of the world that they consider most vital: the Middle East with two-thirds of the world's petroleum reserves. In the past year when we have been fighting the Contract on America, which means to deprive millions of poor people of food, housing, and health care, people have often asked, "How can these politicians do this?" The answer is that they've had a lot of practice on people around the world, and they and the corporate interests they represent don't have any more regard for people here than there. It is of critical importance for the anti-war and progressive movement to make an analysis of the current strategy of imperialism. During the Gulf War, there was a division in the anti-war movement. One side said, "Let the sanctions work." Well, we have seen just how they do work. Three or four times as many Iraqis have died from sanctions as from the bombing. Sanctions are an instrument of war and often an instrument of genocide. They must be opposed as a collective punishment of a whole people, a crime against humanity, not just in Iraq or Cuba, but anywhere. The focus of this meeting is, as it should be, on ending the blockade against Iraq.

That is the greatest human rights violation in the world carried out in the name of sanctions. At the same time, we as a movement need to be prepared for new situations. When we see this government and the corporate media raising the need for sanctions against Azerbaijan, or China, or Nigeria, or Yugoslavia, whatever the justification given, we will say NO! End the sanctions! [From speech to San Francisco anti-sanctions forum, 1/21/1996.]
big problem, since most water systems were destroyed or made dysfunctional during the war. The water of Baghdad is reported to be 10% contaminated and potable water is available to less than half the rural population of the country, whereas before the war 95% was potable. The social structure of Iraqi society is disintegrating. The people are destitute. This was not the case before the sanctions. The strong middle class of the seventies and eighties is being wiped out. Poverty and desperation are increasing. In order to survive the trip from Jordan, Babil, Baghdad, and the blockade doesn't extend to medical equipment and supplies, but, in fact, few of those items actually get through. The sanctions have closed air and sea routes, so all imports must make the 500-mile trip through the desert from Amman, usually strapped to a dusty roof or stashed in the trunk of a dilapidated taxi or bus alongside a leaky, makeshift spare fuel tank. Under the best circumstances, the sixteen-hour trip can be fatal to sensitive vaccines or antibiotics that need refrigeration. Even if Iraq succeeds in obtaining their permission from the United Nations to transport them within the country, a procedure that can take months and is sometimes denied, depending on the substance. Several years ago Iraq asked for permission to import from Britain about $150000 worth of Angised tablets, a common medication containing glyceryl trinitrate that's used to reduce the risk of heart attack in angina patients. Prior to the war, Iraq bought about three times that amount of Angised each year. After months had passed with no response, a company official finally wrote the Iraqi health ministry saying that the British government had refused to issue the necessary export license. The official said he had tried to explain that glyceryl trinitrates are not banned under UN sanctions. But he said the government informed him that their rejection of the export license was London's decision and not that of the UN Sanctions Committee. Eventually, Iraq was told that the refusal was based on the fact that glyceryl trinitrate could be used in the manufacture of explosives—the same reason given for prohibiting radionuclides used to scan for cancer; the same reason that's given for banning pencils. Before the Gulf War, Iraq spent $500 million a year to import medicine.

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Iraq

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24216. International Action Center; et. al.: Casa, Kathryn. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 82: 'A timelbomb depleted uranium' Kathryn Casa, Journalist. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Five years after the Gulf War, we've heard a lot of debate about who won. The British are unhappy because the conflict didn't spark sales of British military equipment as it did for US weapons. Americans—when they think of the war at all—are unsure what to make of it. Was it the resounding allied military victory we were told it was? Did it put that bad taste of Vietnam definitively behind us? The Gulf War did turn a decisive corner. It was the conflict that pioneered and guaranteed a place for a dangerous radioactive poison now commonplace in so-called conventional weapons around the world. It was the war that resulted in UN agencies created to protect human life abandoning or selectively carrying out their mandates. It was a war that killed children, women, the elderly—and that killing has not stopped. Last spring during a trip to Iraq, I visited a children's hospital in Baghdad. The doctors there work twelve-hour shifts seven days a week. They have been unable to read current medical journals or books for five years. But those are among the least of their worries. About 150 new patients a day are admitted to this hospital, virtually each one showing signs of rickets. It's the result of a simple vitamin D deficiency in an infant's diet that leads to inadequate bone growth in children. Most of the new patients have diarrhea and vomiting and need intravenous fluid, but with just five IV lines on the ward, only the most serious cases can be treated. The others must be treated orally. Often they can't tolerate it, and they vomit more. If a needle is inserted in the vein, the mother must keep her hand over it and not let the baby move until it's finished. There is a critical shortage of nurses—I didn't see one on the entire ward—so mothers usually must leave other children at home to stay with the one who is hospitalized. They sleep and eat on the floor next to their children, who are often housed two to a bed, with up to eight beds in a room. The shortages in Iraq extend to all types of medicine and equipment. At the hospital I visited, all the oxygen tents are ripped. But that's beside the point, since the three oxygen tanks on the pediatrics ward had broken two years before. Windows are missing from most of the incubators, and mothers stand near the ones with broken thermometers, making sure the devices don't overheat with their infants inside them. With jaundice on the rise, the hospital doesn't have the blood transfusers necessary to treat severe cases. Left unchecked, the ailment can lead to epilepsy and brain damage. In one room was a young woman standing over her child who lay listlessly on a dirty sheet, too weak to do much more than whimper, his abdomen swollen to the size of a large melon. This incredibly tiny, four-month-old baby boy dressed in an old yellow cotton slip, with no diaper on, with an IV in his head, and flies crawling in and out of his eyes and mouth—this little Iraqi, whose country sits atop some of the largest known oil reserves in the world—was starving to death.

The malnutrition among Iraqi children is exacerbated by a lack of vaccines, antibiotics, and clean drinking water, since chlorine is banned under the sanctions. According to UNICEF's own, admittedly outdated, statistics, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of deaths of Iraqi children under five. Birth weights have dropped significantly and there have been sharp increases over the past five years in typhoid fever, diabetes, giardiasis, scabies, cholera, and viral hepatitis. In theory, the
under the age of five. Magnesium occurs naturally in the human body. Added to DU to make it burn faster, it allows the stuff to move freely throughout the body, crossing organs, including the placenta. This could explain the increase in reported miscarriages and birth defects among the children of those exposed. As time goes by, the depleted uranium is expected to become even more apparent with the increased likelihood of cancer as the oxide particles lodge themselves in the lungs. Those who managed to avoid ingestion of DU during the actual battles are still not safe. A child who collects a spent DU shell weighing, for example, two thirds of a pound, and holds the shell close to the body for one hour, would receive the equivalent of fifty chest X-rays. Last May, Iraq complained to the United Nations that the widespread use of DU was causing serious illness and death among Iraqi civilians and that "balling pathological cases have appeared." The US Army itself carried out a major review of the health and environmental effects of used depleted-uranium weapons after the British Atomic Energy Agency warned of dangerous contamination of battlefields and after Washington determined that Army personnel had been inadequately trained to handle DU weapons. Yet at the same time, proliferation of these weapons continues. DU weapons are right now being deployed in Bosnia. Besides the United States and Britain, countries known to have developed or to be in the process of developing weapons containing DU include Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, France, and Israel. Washington has sold these weapons to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, among others. Meanwhile, on the front lines of this five-year-old war are the children, their parents, and the doctors I met, who are armed with little but the ability to stand by and watch as children die. Like many people, I don't know who won the Gulf War. But I have met those who lost it, and their eyes reflected back at me the other losers—all of us who allow this war to continue. [From speech to San Francisco anti-sanctions forum, 12/1/1996] [ ]

24217. FAO; International Action Center; et al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 06: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Executive Summary: New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. [ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS: CARE: an NGO operating in Iraq; EMOP: Emergency Operations Programmes (World Food Programme); GOI: Government of Iraq; ID: Iraqi dinar; IMR: infant mortality rate; ITI: Impact Teams International; MOH: Ministry of Health; NGO: non-governmental organization; NRC: Nutrition Rehabilitation Centre; PDK: Democratic Party of Kurdistan; PKK: Kurdish Workers' Party; PUC: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; SD: social deviation; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF: United Nations Childrens Fund; UNIRCU: United Nations Iraq Coordination Unit; WFP: World Food Programme; WHO: World Health Organization.] An FAO Mission visited Iraq from 7/25-9/1/1995 with the task of investigating the nutritional status of the population and assessing the crop and food availability situation which prevailed after the imposition of an embargo in 1990. The Mission received full cooperation from the staff of UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, WHO) based in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country and from the government agencies and NGOs involved in food and nutrition activities. The Mission travelled extensively in various parts of the country including the Northern Governorates, visited health, agricultural and food distribution facilities, interviewed farmers and concerned professionals and carried out independent market surveys for a cross sectional assessment of food availability and market prices. With the cooperation of the Nutrition Research Institute of the Ministry of Health, the Mission conducted a survey in Baghdad to assess the nutritional status and mortality of children under-five years of age. The Mission also reviewed existing and available data on foodproduction, food consumption, food availability and nutrition and health status obtained from a wide range of governmental, UN and NGO sources. The estimated total population of Iraq is 20.7 million with 42% being aged less than 14 years. The population is mainly urban (71%) and has an annual growth rate of 2.7%.

Adult literacy is high (95%) and there are 22 Universities and Institutes of Higher Education. Until 1990 there were very significant advances in the provision of health care and major construction projects gave the country a first class range of medical facilities both in large towns and through a series of clinics in rural areas. As a result of these improvements infant mortality rate (IMR) had declined to a value of about 40 per 1000 live births by the late 1980s. The Iraqi economy was dominated by the oil sector from the early 1950s until the major cessation of exports in 1990. During this period there was improving prosperity for the vast majority of the population. With the embargo on oil exports (except for limited sales to Jordan) economic decline has proceeded rapidly over the last several years and is reflected by the exchange rate of the US$ which currently (8/1995) is in the order of 1 US$ = 2000 Iraqi dinars (ID). This decline has precipitated severe problems throughout the whole country which were described by earlier missions in 1993 as demonstrating pre-famine conditions. The agricultural sector has been given high priority by the government to ensure food security through greater self-sufficiency. However, there continues to be a high dependence on imported foods which is increasing. Following the Gulf war, the country is now divided into two regions: the Government of Iraq (GOI) consisting of 15 governorates and the North composed of the Governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Suleimanya. [ =] 24218. FAO; International Action Center; et al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 07: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Executive Summary: Crop Production and Food Availability. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Cereal production for 1994/95 has been estimated at 2.5 million tons, about 10% lower than last year and about 16% lower than the average harvest of the previous 5 years. Moreover, the consumable output of wheat, which accounts for about half of the cereal output, is further reduced by the presence of high levels of non-grain impurities. To reflect this the conversion ratio of wheat into flour has been reduced to 80%. It was earlier forecast that the cereal output in 1994/95 would increase relative to the previous year; but, in spite of good performance of the rainfall and efforts of the government and international organizations, severe constraints relating to agricultural machinery, particularly nonavailability of essential replacements and spare parts, good seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides has resulted in a decline in output. Livestock, poultry and fish subsectors also suffer from severe setbacks because of shortages of machinery, equipment, spare parts and essential drugs. The shortages of basic foods are enormous. Rough calculations show that an amount of US$ 2.7 billion would be necessary to import basic foods to meet the shortages anticipated for 1995/96. In view of such food shortages, there is a renewed emphasis on the production of vegetables and fruits to supplement other food items. The production of vegetables, however, remains rather limited. The output of dates is about the same as last year but better than the average of the last few years. Very little is now exported and dates are widely used as asupplementary food. Prices of basic foodstuffs have risen phenomenally. For example, the price of wheat flour in 8/1995 is 11667 times higher than in 7/1990 and 33 times higher than in 6/1993. The increases are in the order of 4000-5000 times in the case of several other items compared to 7/1990 and 30-60 times compared to 6/1993. On the other hand, household incomes have virtually collapsed for a large majority of the people (about 70%). The average civil service emoluments are ID 5000/month and unskilled in various parts of the country including the Northern Govemorates, 5000 times in the case of several other items compared to 7/1990 and involved in food and nutrition activities. The Mission travelled extensively 33 times higher  than in 6/1993. The increases are in the order of 4000-
vulnerable groups, both in terms of quantities supplied and the number of people served. Only if donors adequately respond can WFP provide food assistance to the targeted groups. Due to lack of supplies, WFP could not provide any food assistance in south and central Iraq during 6/8-1995 and in the north during August. People in institutions and hospitals are given priority and now being served the allocated amount. The situation of famine has been prevented largely by an efficient public rationing system which provides a minimum food basket to all with the Basrah area (1 million population) being the most serious. The basic reason is the lack of spare parts for a variety of equipment throughout the system which cannot be purchased without foreign exchange. In addition specific Sanctions Committee approval is also required for most of the items. Overall the situation concerning sewage disposal in Basrah has deteriorated even further since 1993. Given these difficulties, the whole system is unsustainable and its collapse will have disastrous consequences for a significant majority of Iraqi people.

24219. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As A Weapon on War: Part 08: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Executive Summary: Nutrition and Health: New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. As noted above, catastrophe in the Republic of Iraq has been avoided by the widespread availability of the Government food ration. This, however, provides only about one-third of the food energy and protein availability when compared to 1987/89. The ration, moreover, is deficient in a number of minerals and vitamins especially iron and vitamins A and C. Animal protein is also lacking, and hence such a cereal based diet is deficient in lysine. All additional nutritional needs must be provided at market prices which are beyond the means of most families. For children less than 1 year of age the monthly ration (1800 g baby milk) provides about one-half of needs for food energy and protein and a somewhat higher proportion of minerals and vitamins because of the fortification present in such products. Since 1993 the situation has become much worse for the majority of the population, with malnutrition, including undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, commonly seen both in hospitals and in the general population. Both marasmus and kwashiorkor were widely observed in paediatric wards throughout the country and presented many of the classically recognized signs such as pedal oedema for kwashiorkor and severe wasting, especially visible in the ribs and limbs together with "old man faces" for marasmus. The monthly average number of cases of kwashiorkor and marasmus has increased 50 fold since 1989 while the monthly average number of deaths (denominators unspecified) for children under five years has increased nearly 8 fold. These data were provided by Iraq and were unable to be confirmed by the Mission. In view, however, of the malnutrition observed, the health hazards in the water supply, the degree of inflation throughout the period and hence the inability of many to purchase food together with the decline in the overall health care system, these data are plausible. Vitamin A deficiency showing Bitot's spots and xerophthalmia was reported from a number of centres. The frequency of observation remains low but any evidence of clinical vitamin A deficiency must be taken seriously. An increasing prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia was observed in both children and pregnant women. Increased availability of iron supplementation programs is recommended. In the present circumstances flour fortification with iron as well as other micronutrients such as calcium, thiamine, niacin and lysine, while desirable is impractical given the limited resources and deteriorating infrastructure. Distribution of anthelmintic drugs would potentially reduce the burden of anaemia in the population. While food is readily available in markets the purchasing power of the average Iraqi has declined, especially for the salaried civil servants and pensioners. The Ministry of Health estimates that 109720 persons have died annually between 1990-3/1994 as a direct result of sanctions. The Mission had no way of confirming this figure. Famine has been avoided by the widespread availability of the Government food ration. This Government ration is not available in the northern region and all food there must be purchased on the open market. For this and for a number of additional reasons which include factional fighting, the decline in external assistance, high prices and many previous government employees not receiving salaries, child malnutrition is also widespread in the North. The water and sanitation system remains critical throughout the country and presented many of the classically recognized signs such as pedal oedema for kwashiorkor and severe wasting, especially visible in the ribs and limbs together with "old man faces" for marasmus. The parallel problems of waterlogging and salinity of agricultural land with consequent reduction in water supply and sewage system is a significant factor associated with both malnutrition and excess infant mortality. The parallel problems of waterlogging and salinity of agricultural land with consequent reduction in the area available for food production should be noted. The interaction between nutrition and sanitation is such that poor water quality and sanitation are contributory causes to both growth failure and acute malnutrition requiring hospitalization in children. The lack of capital for repair and updating of the water supply and sewage system is a significant factor associated with both malnutrition and excess infant mortality. The parallel problems of waterlogging and salinity of agricultural land with consequent reduction in the area available for food production should be noted. The causes relating to lack of spare parts for pumps and equipment are identical. The food industry was returned to the private sector in 1990 but despite this, total production is only a fraction of the earlier level. This is due to a variety of causes including nonavailability of both raw and packaging materials as well as restrictions on the use of sugar in manufacturing. It has generally been more profitable to import products from the cheapest of these areas were grossly unhygienic and much of the city smelled badly as a result of these overflows. This of course produces severe hazards to health which can seriously influence nutritional status in children. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that there were many cases of infectious diseases including typhoid fever and infective hepatitis in the hospitals as well as widespread gastroenteritis in the hot summer months and in consequence many cases of nutritional marasmus. What remains surprising, however, is that the city has been able to avoid major epidemics in the presence of these very bad sanitary conditions.

In contrast to the general deterioration in sewage disposal, water availability may have marginally improved with the very large number of strategically sited water tanks throughout the city where drinking water is sold. Despite the slight increase in availability of potable water, the quality for the piped water supply remains poor with 65% of samples failing either microbiological or mineral purity tests. While these descriptions are for Basrah, similar problems exist in many towns and cities throughout the country including Baghdad. The hazards of water supply and sewage disposal are thus nationwide and the effects on health are serious. As an example government statistical office figures show 1819 cases of typhoid fever in 1989; this had risen to 24436 cases in 1994. Similarly there were no reported cases of cholera in 1989 but 1345 cases were recorded in 1994. The interaction between nutrition and sanitation is such that poor water quality and sanitation are contributory causes to both growth failure and acute malnutrition requiring hospitalization in children. The lack of capital for repair and updating of the water supply and sewage system is a significant factor associated with both malnutrition and excess infant mortality. The parallel problems of waterlogging and salinity of agricultural land with consequent reduction in the area available for food production should be noted. The causes relating to lack of spare parts for pumps and equipment are identical. The food industry was returned to the private sector in 1990 but despite this, total production is only a fraction of the earlier level. This is due to a variety of causes including nonavailability of both raw and packaging materials as well as restrictions on the use of sugar in manufacturing. It has generally been more profitable to import products from the cheapest sources which are often past their expiration dates or declared unfit for human consumption. One of the few growth areas in production is date syrup which, because of the nonavailability of sugar for sweets, is sold widely as a substitute for jams and preserves. Additional problems for food production from small manufacturers in the private sector lie in poor quality control and the use of non-food grade materials for food use. The latter can include emulsifiers, thickeners, dyes, and other chemicals. Regulations are unable to be enforced and very real food safety hazards exist. Adequate mechanisms for food safety need to be reestablished although it is recognised that these will have low priority in relation to the paramount needs of supplying food energy to the population. The 1995 Baghdad nutrition and mortality survey of children under-five years of age, conducted between August 23 to 28, was a collaborative effort between the FAO Mission and the Nutrition Research Institute (NRI), part of the Ministry of Health. Six hundred and ninety-three households were visited and 768 mothers were interviewed. Information was collected on 2,120 children under 10 years of age, and a total of 594
children under-five years of age were measured for anthropometry. Percentiles and Z-scores for height-for-age, weight-for-age and weight-for-height were calculated using EPI-info, version 6. Malnutrition was defined as the percentage of children less than -2 standard deviations (SD) below the median values for the NCHS (United States National Centre for Health Statistics) standardized distributions for the indicators: stunted (height-for-age), underweight (weight-for-age) and wasted (weight-for-height). The percentage of children below -2 SD in urban Baghdad was 28% for stunting, 29% for underweight and 12% for wasting. Severe malnutrition, defined as the percentage of children below -3 SD, was noted among children: 10% for stunting, 7% for underweight and 3% for wasting. Mild malnutrition, defined as the percentage of children below -1 SD, was: 56% for height-for-age, 65% for weight-for-age and 39% for weight-for-height. The level of wasting was highest among children 1-3 years of age with a second peak occurring at age 4-5 years. In addition, a high prevalence of wasting was noted among children with illiterate mothers (16%) as well as those with secondary (14%) and post-secondary level of education (13%).

The deteriorating nutritional status of children is reflective of events which are occurring in Iraqi society—loss of purchasing power and high prices for basic food items, poor water and sanitation quality, and high burden of infectious and parasitic diseases. Since 1991, shortly after the inception of the sanctions, the nutritional status of children in Baghdad has significantly deteriorated. Compared with 1991 estimates, the current survey demonstrates a 4-fold increase in wasting for the city of Baghdad. Prevalence estimates for stunting and underweight have also risen dramatically. The deterioration in nutritional status of children is reflected in the significant increase of child mortality which has risen nearly fivefold since 1990. For Baghdad, a highly advanced urban society, the prevalence of underweight children (29%) has increased to a level comparable with children from Ghana (27%) and Mali (31%). For stunting, prevalence rates are similar to estimates from Sri Lanka (28%) and the Congo (27%). Furthermore, the prevalence of wasting in Baghdad is comparable with estimates from Madagascar (12%) and Myanmar (11%). The prevalence of severe wasting is comparable to data from northern Sudan (2.3%). In contrast, 1991 estimates of malnutrition from Baghdad were comparable with estimates from Kuwait (12% for stunting, 6% for underweight, and 3% for wasting). The current nutritional situation among children in Baghdad is more similar to less developed countries with a larger percentage of the population residing in rural settings which may be a reflection of the inability to maintain systems for sanitation and clean water under sanctions. Due to the increasing problem of food insecurity and the inability to repair the infrastructure for provision of sanitation and potable water, the nutritional status of children in Baghdad will continue to deteriorate unless the economic embargo is lifted and high burden of infectious and parasitic diseases. Since 1991, shortly after the inception of the sanctions, the nutritional status of children in Baghdad has significantly deteriorated. Compared with 1991 estimates, the current survey demonstrates a 4-fold increase in wasting for the city of Baghdad. Prevalence estimates for stunting and underweight have also risen dramatically. The deterioration in nutritional status of children is reflected in the significant increase of child mortality which has risen nearly fivefold since 1990. For Baghdad, a highly advanced urban society, the prevalence of underweight children (29%) has increased to a level comparable with children from Ghana (27%) and Mali (31%). 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improving prosperity for the vast majority of the population. With the embargo on oil exports (except for limited sales to Jordan) economic decline has proceeded rapidly over the last several years and is reflected by the exchange rate of the US$ which currently (8/1995) is in the order of 1 US$ = 2000 ID. This decline has precipitated severe problems throughout the whole country which were described by earlier missions in 1993 as demonstrating pre famine conditions. In Iraq the agricultural sector has been given high priority in attempts to ensure self-sufficiency through greater self-sufficiency. Despite this a high dependence on imported food remains. Since 1993 the situation has become much worse for the majority of the population, beggars and street children are seen widely, crime has increased and infantile malnutrition can be observed in both hospitals and the general population. In Iraq, catastrophe has been avoided by the widespread availability of the Government food ration. This Government ration is not available in the autonomous region of the North and all food must be purchased on the open market. For this and for a number of additional reasons which include factional fighting, the decline in external assistance, high prices and many previous government employees not receiving salaries, child undernutrition and malnutrition is also widespread in the north, especially for the poor. [=]

24222. FAO; International Action Center; et al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 11: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq; Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Production in 1994-1995: Cereals. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. An earlier forecast by FAO Representation in Iraq that the 1994/95 cereal output would be larger than last year's based on good performance of rainfall and increased efforts by the government and international organizations, has not materialized. The total cereal production in 1994/95 is estimated at 2.5 million tons, about 10% lower than last year's production and about 16% lower than the average harvest during the past five years. Compared to 1989/90, the last year before the embargo, the cereal production in 1994/95 is down by about 27% (Table 2). Moreover, the consumable cereal output in 1994/95 is further reduced because of much larger than usual presence of non-grain impurities such as dust, straw, weed seeds and remains of insects/pests. By examining samples of wheat and barley from stores, seed processing units and silos, the Mission found nongrain impurities of up to 20% in certain cases while, in the case of the mechanically harvested crops in Iraq, about 5% would be an acceptable level. Both the total cropped area and the per hectare yield in 1994/95 are lower compared to 1993/94 (Tables I and 3). Although per hectare yields of both wheat and barley, the two main food crops of Iraq respectively accounting for about half and about one-third of the total cereal output, were somewhat higher compared to last year, a steep reduction in the acreage under both outweighed the gain in yields, causing a reduction of about 8% in the output of each. In the case of rice and maize, which together account for 15-20% of the total cereal output, the opposite has occurred, i.e. an increase in acreage and a proportionally larger decrease in yield, with the result that the output of each has declined. South and central Iraq accounts for 78.7% of the total 1994/95 cereal output, while the autonomous northern region (governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimania) for 21.3%. Per hectare yield is somewhat higher in the northern region compared to south and central Iraq for both wheat and barley but not very significantly so (Tables 4 and 5). The main problems faced are virtually the same in all the regions. Prior to the embargo the Iraqi population were accustomed to highly subsidized imported foods with only about 30% of its cereal consumption being from domestic production. The government has been unable to continue with this practice and government policy is now to increase domestic food production to feed the population. Government efforts to encourage and facilitate agricultural production includes the raising of purchase prices which rose very sharply in 5/1995 to provide incentives to the farmers (Table 6). Farmers must, according to regulations, sell all their wheat, barley, rice, maize and sunflower to the government at the prices fixed by Council of Ministers. Farmers interviewed have indicated that they are reasonably satisfied with the prices currently being paid. However, under increasingly adverse input supply conditions, their costs of production are increasing. International organizations, mainly FAO, have extended some help toward raising agricultural production in Iraq. For example, about 276000 dunums (69000 hectare) in Nineveh governorate, which produces about half the country's total cereal output of mainly under rainfed agriculture, were given significant assistance through greater self-sufficiency. Despite this a high dependence on imported food remains. Since 1993 the situation has become much worse for the majority of the population, beggars and street children are seen widely, crime has increased and infantile malnutrition can be observed in both hospitals and the general population. In Iraq, catastrophe has been avoided by the widespread availability of the Government food ration. This Government ration is not available in the autonomous region of the North and all food must be purchased on the open market. For this and for a number of additional reasons which include factional fighting, the decline in external assistance, high prices and many previous government employees not receiving salaries, child undernutrition and malnutrition is also widespread in the north, especially for the poor. [=]
Meal and Dubas. This is adversely affecting the production of dates. 1995/96 are: food grains 66%, pulses 58%, vegetable oil 61%, poultry infesting the date palm fields and are harbouring insects/pests such as is grossly inadequate to meet national requirements—the shortfalls for and spare parts, insecticides and herbicides. An abundance of weeds is New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Domestic production of basic foods about 18 million. Under conditions of food shortage due to the embargo, of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Production in 1994-1995: Livestock, Poultry and Fish. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The animal population in Iraq has declined steeply since 1990 (Table 9) under the post-embargo conditions. Between 1 990 and 1 995, the number of cows declined by 34%, the number of buffaloes by 46%, the number of sheep by 42%, and the number of goats by 81%. Traditionally, Iraqi people have depended heavily on meat and other livestock based products in their regular diet. The embargo has reduced the availability of red meat, poultry meat, milk, eggs and fish to very low levels, as shown in Table 10. Critical shortage of animal products have caused their prices to increase steeply and beyond the purchasing capacity of the majority of the Iraqi people. Most Iraqis are unable to eat meat or poultry meat even once a week. The main factors limiting livestock and poultry production are critical shortages of feed, veterinary services and drugs, and machinery and equipment and their spare parts. Moreover, a further constraint is gaining in importance and that is the diversion of pastures into grain production. The production of milk and milk products have virtually collapsed due to poor health of milking cows and lack of equipment. Before the Gulf war (1990), 2.5 million tons of feed stuffs (corn, protein concentrates, soybeans, wheat bran and barley) were available, but now none can be imported or spared from the local harvest under the existing food shortages. Livestock farmers have, however, been advised to try to save the animals using whatever other alternative feed they can find. The central meat supply system has collapsed. The animals are now slaughtered on road sides openly and indiscriminately, creating health hazards. Reportedly cattle are being smuggled out to neighbouring countries because of the weak Iraqi dinar and the attractive profits that can be made from smuggling. In poultry production, there were 8353 small and 25 big chicken projects during the pre-Gulf war period, which provided estimated 1688 million eggs, 106 million hatching eggs, and 250000 tons of chicken meat. However, many of these projects are now just empty compounds with some remains of equipment and machinery scattered around. Fish production has also been seriously affected. The only central facility for rearing and supplying fish fingerlings to fish farmers and to rivers, ponds, lakes and dams to renew and maintain the fish population in the country is now functioning only at half its capacity. The seasonal capacity of this fish hatchery was 50 million but the deterioration of its machinery, equipment including laboratory chemicals and feed and hormone supplies, its performance has drastically declined. [1] 24223. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 13: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Production in 1994-1995: Livestock, Poultry and Fish. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The animal population in Iraq has declined steeply since 1990 (Table 9) under the post-embargo conditions. Between 1 990 and 1 995, the number of cows declined by 34%, the number of buffaloes by 46%, the number of sheep by 42%, and the number of goats by 81%. Traditionally, Iraqi people have depended heavily on meat and other livestock based products in their regular diet. The embargo has reduced the availability of red meat, poultry meat, milk, eggs and fish to very low levels, as shown in Table 10. Critical shortage of animal products have caused their prices to increase steeply and beyond the purchasing capacity of the majority of the Iraqi people. Most Iraqis are unable to eat meat or poultry meat even once a week. The main factors limiting livestock and poultry production are critical shortages of feed, veterinary services and drugs, and machinery and equipment and their spare parts. Moreover, a further constraint is gaining in importance and that is the diversion of pastures into grain production. The production of milk and milk products have virtually collapsed due to poor health of milking cows and lack of equipment. 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The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 14: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Production in 1994-1995: Livestock, Poultry and Fish. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The animal population in Iraq has declined steeply since 1990 (Table 9) under the post-embargo conditions. Between 1 990 and 1 995, the number of cows declined by 34%, the number of buffaloes by 46%, the number of sheep by 42%, and the number of goats by 81%. Traditionally, Iraqi people have depended heavily on meat and other livestock based products in their regular diet. 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result of the embargo, the country’s ability to import food stuffs has declined drastically despite some flexibility being allowed for food imports. With a view to ensuring a minimum of food availability to the population as a whole, the government of Iraq introduced a public food rationing system with effect from 9/1/1990, i.e. within less than one month following the imposition of the embargo on 8/2/1990. It provides basic foods to the population at 1990 prices which means they are now virtually free. This system was introduced in such a way that it supported the original lower levels to the 1993 level shown in Table 12, that provided 53% of the 1987-89 average per capita food energy availability. The basket for adults was sharply reduced on 9/24/1994, presumably due to increasing difficulties in ensuring adequate supplies. Vegetable oil was however increased by 25%. This reduced basket has been supplied until the present and provides only some 34% of the average 1987-89 per capita food energy availability. Not only does the ration basket provide only about one-third of food energy needs, but being carbohydrate-based it is deficient in essential micronutrients and animal proteins. Hence, while the rationing system has forestalled the occurrence of any massive famine under conditions of critical food shortages and high food prices since the embargo, it has not checked increasing malnutrition and morbidity in a large section of the population which is too poor to adequately supplement the rations with other essential food items. About 3.5 million people, comprising all civil servants in active service, military, police and security and other elite forces, civil servant pensioners, military pensioners, social welfare beneficiaries, and war veterans with a 60% or greater disability also have been receiving a monthly allowance of ID 2000 (equivalent to one US$ at the current free market exchange rate) since 10/1/1994. This allowance, however small, is certainly a welcome relief for those who receive it. However, 17.2 million people are not covered by this programme, with many of these being in extremely difficult economic conditions. Of these, some 3.6 million people of the northern region are not receiving any, or only negligible, food supplies through the public rationing system.

However, the northern farmers are not required to sell their foodgrains to the central government. The food basket supplied through the rationing system is a life-saving nutritional benefit which also represents a very substantial income subsidy to Iraqi households. The monthly subsidy to a household of 5 adults is ID 42895 and for one of 6 members, $482, with ID 58,912, with ID 6000 being paid at average prices of ID 10000, ID 6000, ID 135000 and ID 70000 per ton for wheat, barley, paddy and maize respectively and another ID 5000 for vegetable oil and 0.9 kg sugar to the two core commodities of 5 kg wheat flour and 0.5 kg pulses. This reflects a reduction in the daily food energy value from about 1800 kcal/day to some 650 kcal/day. In centre and south, the number of beneficiaries has been reduced to 250000 (from 750000) in the north and the food basket/On (kg/person/month) reduced from the four commodities of 12 kg wheat flour, 0.9 kg pulses, 0.9 kg vegetable oil and 0.3 kg sugar to the two core commodities of 5 kg wheat flour and 0.5 kg pulses. This reflects a reduction in the daily food energy value from about 1800 kcal/day to some 650 kcal/day. The rationing system is a life-saving nutritional benefit which also represents a very substantial income subsidy to Iraqi households. The monthly subsidy to a household of 5 adults is ID 42895 and for one of 6 members, $482, with ID 58,912, with ID 6000 being paid at average prices of ID 10000, ID 6000, ID 135000 and ID 70000 per ton for wheat, barley, paddy and maize respectively and another ID 5000 for vegetable oil and 0.9 kg sugar to the two core commodities of 5 kg wheat flour and 0.5 kg pulses. This reflects a reduction in the daily food energy value from about 1800 kcal/day to some 650 kcal/day. The rationing system is a life-saving nutritional benefit which also represents a very substantial income subsidy to Iraqi households. The monthly subsidy to a household of 5 adults is ID 42895 and for one of 6 members, $482, with ID 58,912, with ID 6000 being paid at average prices of ID 10000, ID 6000, ID 135000 and ID 70000 per ton for wheat, barley, paddy and maize respectively and another ID 5000 for vegetable oil and 0.9 kg sugar to the two core commodities of 5 kg wheat flour and 0.5 kg pulses. This reflects a reduction in the daily food energy value from about 1800 kcal/day to some 650 kcal/day.
a potentially rich country, to import foods to meet its entire requirements. [-]

24227. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 16: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Supply Position and Access of Population to Food: Assess to Food-Prices and Income. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The rations are grossly inadequate both quantitatively and qualitatively. People must therefore supplement their food intake by purchases from the open market. Prices of basic food stuffs have increased phenomenally—in all parts of the country. The Mission carried out independent market surveys in Baghdad and several governorates in the central and south Iraq and also in the north. The prices are not only very high, but also extremely volatile. Some prices have gone up by 15-30% over a two week period, as indicated by spot surveys conducted in Baghdad on 8/14-27/1995. Prices of basic food stuffs as of end 8/1995 are reported and compared with prices in 6/1993 and 7/1990 in Table 15. It is mind boggling that the price of the most basic food item, wheat flour, has risen by 11667 times compared with 7/1990 and by 33 times compared with 6/1993. Prices of rice, vegetable oil, milk powder, and sugar have risen by 4375-5500 times compared with 7/1990 and by 37-58 times compared with June 1993. Prices of poultry meat, eggs, tea, potatoes, and lentils have risen by about 1000-2000 times compared with 7/1990 and by 37-62 times compared with 6/1993. Red meat and fish prices have risen the least—respectively 193-240 times compared with 7/1993 and 17-21% compared with 6/1993. The Mission during its visits to markets in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Ahvaz, Nasiriya, Najaf, Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniya saw reasonable supplies of food stuffs in shops, except in Erbil where some shortages were noticed. Apparently, the private sector is active in procuring and displaying supplies. But the prices everywhere are out of the reach of the common people. The Mission noticed very little purchases being made in the various markets. If there were adequate purchasing power in the hands of the people, the available supplies might not last very long—of course, in that case, more supplies will be brought in by the traders. That the national and family economies are in crisis can be easily gauged from the fact that the Iraqi Dinar has experienced a free fall in the unofficial exchange market. Currently at 2000 Dinars to the US dollar, the unofficial exchange rate is 6400 times the official exchange rate. A large part of the recent steep increases in the market prices of food stuffs and other commodities, which are mostly imported by traders who have to mobilize their own foreign exchange resources for imports, can be attributed to the collapse of the ID. There has been a simultaneous collapse of the personal incomes in terms of purchasing power. In central and south Iraq, the monthly emoluments (salary + allowances) of lower level government employees are ID 500-600. The average monthly emoluments of all civil servants are about ID 5000 (US$ 2.50 at the unofficial exchange rate). There is very little work in the private sector. Unskilled workers can earn about ID 500 a day provided they find work. Interviews with groups of unskilled prospective employers, in Baghdad and other places have revealed that it is not often that they find work for more than one day a week. In the northern region, the situation is equally bad if not worse. Civil servants in Erbil and Sulaimaniya have not been paid salaries over the past several months. In Dohuk, however, civil servants have been receiving their salaries, but these are too low in relation to the prices of food stuffs and other necessary products. Jobs in the private sector are very hard to find and it should be remembered that the basic government food ration is not available to the people in the north. Also WFP assistance for most of the vulnerable people has been substantially cut back on account of supply shortages caused by inadequate donor responses. The economic problems of the region has been further compounded by the recent fighting and continued antagonism between the two Kurdish factions PUK and PDK, as well as the cross-border actions of Turkey in pursuit of the PKK.

There is a prevailing view and it has been confirmed through investigations conducted by the Mission that, in general, rural people, particularly farmers are doing better than the urban population. Farmers can, for example, grow vegetables, raise chicken or cattle towards augmenting their food availability and incomes from crop production. On the other hand, in urban areas such opportunities rarely exist. The urban population accounts for about 71% of the total population of Iraq, of the total population, rural farmers constitute about three-quarters. That is, about 21% of the total population are farmers. The other 8% or so living in rural areas are in bad shape in the absence of income earning opportunities. Of the urban population, about 10-12% or about 7-9% of the total population may be doing very well through trade and access to other attractive means of making money. Hence, when the farmers (21%) and the rich (7-9%) are excluded, about 70% of the total population is in precarious conditions. Many have been surviving by selling household goods and personal effects; but this option is also closing for most of them because either they have run out of things to sell or buyers are becoming hard to find. It was observed in a collective village in the north that people were literally selling their houses, i.e. bricks and other materials of their houses, with more than one family then congregating in a single remaining room. It has been shown earlier that the ration basket for an adult that provides 34% of the normal food energy intake by an Iraqi costs ID 8588 at current market prices. If the shortfall of 66% were to be made up by a family of 5 adults from the same food items, i.e. without considering the quality of the foods, it would need ID 83354 to purchase the necessary supplies from the market and the amount would be larger if a more balanced diet were to be secured. If the family has a baby under one year for whom the ration (baby-milk powder) provides about 50% of the need, it would need another ID 16020 for procuring the additional food for the baby. These sorts of financial resources are clearly beyond the command of the majority of the Iraqi population. The solution lies in adequate food supplies in the country, restoring the viability of the ID, and creating conditions for the people to acquire adequate purchasing power. But, these conditions can be fulfilled only if the economy can be put back in proper shape enabling it to draw on its own resources, and that clearly cannot occur as long as the embargo remains in force. [-]

24228. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 17: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Food Availability: Food Supply Position and Access of Population to Food: Basic Food Import Requirement. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Prior to the Gulf crisis, Iraq produced about one-third of its basic food needs and spent about US$2 billion to import the balance of the requirements. Since then, despite emphasis on increasing food production, the situation has deteriorated due to many problems relating to agricultural inputs as has been explained earlier. It is estimated that Iraq will need US$2.7 billion to import basic foods to meet the shortages in 1995/96 (Table 16). Short of lifting the embargo, the only other source of such a huge amount of foreign exchange for Iraq is its frozen assets, the use of which is strongly encouraged by the Mission to enable Iraq to import the essential basic food stuffs to feed its population. [-]

Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Iraq

The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An and 43% of total protein, other nutrients, in particular vitamin A and
24230. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: needs. While the food energy of the ration supplies 38% of adult needs
faced with the far more basic task of providing a daily ration of food to as a convenient yardstick for comparing nutritional availabilities. These
problems, while real, can only have low priority when the Government is of course, not fully appropriate for the Iraqi population but they do serve
in re-establishing adequate mechanisms for food safety. These The United States recommended daily allowances for an adult male are,
thickeners, dyes and other chemicals. Regulations are unable to be (1988-90 average) was also calculated using appropriate food
private sector lie in poor quality control and the increasing use of non-contaminated with a mixture of weed seeds and non-food material. The
sugar for sweets, is sold widely as a substitute for jams and preserves. with wheat flour reflecting the nominal composition of 60% wheat and
in production is for date syrup which, because of the nonavailability of the most appropriate values for food composition of the items concerned
locally by humans and by animals as feed. One of the few growth areas in production is for date syrup which, because of the nonavailability of sugar for sweets, is sold widely as a substitute for jams and preserves. Additional problems for food production from small manufacturers in the private sector lie in poor quality control and the increasing use of non-food grade materials for food use. The latter can include emulsifiers, thickeners, dyes and other chemicals. Regulations are unable to be enforced and major food safety hazards exist. FAO help may be needed in re-establishing adequate mechanisms for food safety. These problems, while real, can only have low priority when the Government is faced with the far more basic task of providing a daily ration of food to meet food energy needs. [=]
cereal based diets and improving the bioavailability of vitamin A. There is no recommended daily allowance for fat but in order to supply 30% of the food energy as fat at 2.900 kcal/day some 97 g/day would be needed; the 22 g/day in the ration thus falls short of this value. The ration supplies a very important part of daily dietary needs, especially for food energy and protein and has prevented catastrophe for the Iraqi people over the five years of the embargo. It is, however, far from being nutritionally balanced. In view of daily needs, about 26% of the caloric intake was available in 1988-1990. The foods needed to bridge the gap between the ration and daily needs are mainly fruits, vegetables, oil, dairy products, legumes and animal protein, all of which are expensive in the market place and, as a consequence of the reduced purchasing power for the majority of the population, are unable to be obtained in adequate quantities. [-]

24231. FAO; International Action Center; et al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 20: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq; Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: General Health and Nutrition Background. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The accomplishments in health and nutritional status of the Iraqi population achieved over the last two decades in part due to the oil wealth are rapidly deteriorating due to prolonged sanctions. While food is readily available in markets the purchasing power of the average Iraqi has declined, especially for the salaried civil servants, pensioners and destitutes. The Ministry of Health estimates that 109720 persons have died annually between 8/1990-3/1994 as a result of the delayed effects of sanctions. The Mission was unable to confirm these numbers. According to the Ministry of Health, the health and nutritional status of children has been seriously affected. Moderate to severe malnutrition using the criteria of less than 80% weight-for-age was 29% for children under-five, the percentage of low birth weight babies (<2.5 kg) is estimated at 21.1% and infant mortality and under-five mortality are reported at 92 per thousand live births and 128 per thousand live births. In comparison, the infant mortality rate in 1989 was about 40 per thousand live births. As a result of 5 years of sanctions, most of the Iraqi population is suffering from reduced food intake. Although basic food items are available in the market, prices are prohibitively expensive for most wage earners, pensioners and those that rely on monetary assistance from the Government. Thus the nutritional status of much of the population, especially the most vulnerable groups including children under-five, is in decline. The Ministry of Health has reported a significant increase in cases of malnutrition, such as kwashiorkor and marasmus and other micronutrient deficiencies. Monthly average numbers for kwashiorkor, marasmus and for other cases of malnutrition are shown in Table 19. The very large increases in all categories are obvious. Doctors in paediatric hospitals observed that before 1990 kwashiorkor was a rare phenomenon but is now common. The number of marasmus cases has also increased significantly and reflects the role of infections especially gastroenteritis in the summer months and respiratory infections in the winter. Total number of deaths and monthly averages for deaths of children under five years of age between 1989-7/1995 are shown in Table 20. Average numbers of deaths can be seen to have increased dramatically over this period. These data were provided by the Government’s health statistics department and are unable to be confirmed by the Mission. In view, however, of the malnutrition observed, the health hazards in the water supply, the degree of inflation throughout the period and hence the inability of many to purchase food together with the decline in the overall health care system, these data are plausible. Several surveys which were carried out immediately after the war revealed high levels of malnutrition in hospitals and health clinics (Harvard Study Team, 1991). One drawback of these surveys was that they were based on hospital visits, and thus not representative of the nutritional situation of the overall Iraqi population. In 8-9/1991, the International Study Team conducted a nationwide survey of the nutritional situation among children under five years. Their results showed a considerable degree of stunting among children under the age of 5 years (21.8% of children under 5 years were below -2 SD from NCHS Ht/ Age median values). However, the percentage of children with weight for height below 2 SD (wasting) was 3.47 similar to the NCHS standard. The most vulnerable age group for all nutritional indices was between 12-23 months. Studies conducted between 1991-1993 showed deteriorating nutritional status of children in Baghdad with 51% of Kindergarten children in 19 schools in Baghdad serving different socioeconomic classes showed that those from low socioeconomic classes had the highest percentage of stunting (14.6%) (Naoush and Obeid, 1992). The authors noted a negative correlation between wasting and socioeconomic status. The Z-score distribution for all three nutritional indicators (height for age, weight for age, weight for height) shifted to the left of the NCHS reference but did not suggest significant malnourishment. UNICEF assessed the nutritional status of children in the Wasit governorate south of Baghdad and noted that the percentage of wasting was higher in urban areas (4.6o) compared with rural areas (0.8%). Nutritional assessment of children in Al-Muthana governorate (adjacent to Wasit) showed that the percentage of wasting was 10.3% and infants under 6 months were seen to be most affected.

A survey was conducted in 1993 by the FAO mission in collaboration with the Nutrition Research Institute. This was in a less privileged area of Baghdad and covered part of the same areas in Saddam City that were examined by the 1991 International Team Survey. One hundred and twenty-one households were visited and a total of 506 subjects were measured: 194 were children under 5 years of age, 136 were between 5-15 years and 172 were above the age of 15 years. The results showed that for those under 5 years and using the criteria of Z-score of less than -2 SD as signifying malnutrition, 30% were stunted (h/age), 35% were underweight (wt/age) and 16% were wasted (w/h). For those between 5-15 years the corresponding values were 33%, 31% and 11%. It was concluded by the 1993 mission that there had been a significant increase in both stunting and wasting among children since 1991 and that there was evidence of both chronic and acute malnutrition in children below 15 years of age. In 3/1994, the Ministry of Health conducted its first nutritional assessment covering 50% of all children under five enrolling in kindergarten—25% of the sample was from Baghdad and the rest from other governorates excluding the 3 northern governorates (30089 children). The average height for 4-year-olds was 92 cm and weight was 17.4 kg. Indicating a state of chronic malnutrition. Since the sample represents those who attend school, the degree of stunting would be expected to be more severe in children who are not at school. As a further indication of economic decline and hence probable malnutrition in the community, the Mission noted a greater presence of street children selling cigarettes or other items polishing shoes and begging in comparison to that observed in 1993.

According to Obeid (1994), the rate of stunting in the age groups 6 months and 7-12 months had increased compared with 1993. The rate of underweight in the age group 7-12 months was also higher than in 1993. However, there was no major change in the rate of wasting for these age groups. The Mission noted a few cases of marasmus in Mosul, Saddam Hospital. The hospital does not keep statistics on malnutrition, but according to the Head of the Paediatric Department the hospital has seen an increase in the number of cases that were referred as failure to thrive complicated with diarrhoea (Table 21). It was also noted that the hospital was seeing more cases of gastroenteritis in the 0-3 years age group. No cases of vitamin A deficiency were reported by this hospital. The Paediatric Departments of the Saddam Hospitals were also visited in Amarah, Kerbala, Basrah and Nasiriya. Many cases of both marasmus and kwashiorkor were observed in the wards along with cases of infectious disease such as typhoid fever and infective hepatitis which were associated with the generally poor state of sanitation. Some 30% of all admissions since mid-1993 have been for diagnosed malnutrition. Both marasmus and kwashiorkor presented many of the classically recognized signs. For kwashiorkor oedema especially of the face, legs and feet, thin and wispy hair and skin changes were all observed. Skin
changes were, however, minimal compared to the severe flaky paint dermatosis with ulceration often seen in children from Africa. Severe wasting, especially visible in the ribs and limbs together with old man faces was seen in the marasmic children. Here weight-for-age was invariably below 60% (Gomez III) and when height/length was determined w/h was below 80% of the international median. Generally cases of kwashiorkor were older than 1 year while those diagnosed as marasmic were younger. All three hospitals were unable to operate at full capacity because of lack of facilities and medicines and were admitting the most severe cases. In addition, cases were discharged as rapidly as possible so as to free beds. Baby incubators were also suffering from lack of spare parts with only 8 from 36 being functional in the Basrah hospital. The situation in Amarah hospital had improved slightly since 1993 since 4 incubators were now functional. Vitamin A deficiency was reported as being on the increase in Basrah with both Bitot's spots and xerophthalmia having been observed. In both Basrah and Nasiriya, hospitals, CARE was providing daily food supplements for mothers and children. This consisted of 50g sweet biscuits (Marie), 25g milk powder and 30g processed cheese. While the value of the supplements was highly appreciated, it created problems for the staff since the timing of programmes was intermittent and no long-term continuity could be planned for. It is an interesting reflection on the overall severity of the food shortage in the country that this supplement was also available to the doctors involved in treating the children. General shortages also affect the working of hospitals such as nonfunctioning air-conditioners, absence of light bulbs and fluorescent tubes as well as the no longer functioning piped oxygen. In Basrah and Nasiriya, sewage disposal was difficult because the tanker trucks needed spare parts and in Basrah, in common with much of the city, sewage back-ups were occurring. The hospital in Kerbala noted an increasing problem of rodents, flies and mosquitoes. Few insecticides or pesticides are available and those available are often potentially harmful. In response to the worsening nutritional situation, UNICEF, WFP and MOH have proposed to establish Nutritional Rehabilitation Centres (NRC) in paediatric hospitals and primary health care centres. The following activities are to be undertaken: clinical examination and course of treatment (estimated for 20 days on average) and nutritional education for the mothers. Each child is expected to receive 50 gm/day of therapeutic diet, 50 gm/day of weaning food, and 100 gm/day of skimmed milk powder. The accompanying mother will also receive food which is regularly provided by WFP to hospitals. The Ministry of Health will provide the appropriate staff, monitor the programme and arrange for warehousing of WFP food supplies and distribution of weaning food and milk powder. Some of these centres were functional in the autonomous North with NGO assistance, but they were not yet established in Central and South Iraq. [-]

24232. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 21: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: Vitamin A Deficiency. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Vitamin A deficiency has been of great concern to both the MOH and UNICEF, since the observation of even relatively few cases can be a reflection of a very serious underlying nutritional situation. No information had, however, been collected or documented the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency in 1993 but several physicians had reported occasional cases of children observed with Bitot's spot as well as two cases of keratomalacia in Al-Mansour Children's Hospital. In 1994, the Nutrition Research Institute conducted a survey covering 8575 underfive children (4436 boys and 4139 girls) in 3 governorates of Nineveh, Baghdad and Basrah. The prevalence of night blindness was reported for boys and girls at 1.2% in Nineveh for both sexes, 1.7% for boys and 2% for girls in Baghdad, and 1.3% for boys and 1.2% for girls in Basrah. The WHO definition for a vitamin A deficient population is 1% prevalence amongst children. Moreover, Bitot's spots were reported at a level of 0.3% for boys and O.1% for girls in Baghdad. For Basrah, Bitot's spots were reported in 0.1% of boys only. No cases of Bitot's spots were reported for Nineveh. Vitamin A deficiency results from severe curtailment of intakes of both preformed vitamin A and of the various carotenoids especially beta carotene. This is often due to the high prices of food containing these nutrients. In 1993, the mission was informed that UNICEF, in agreement with the MOH, has agreed to distribute Vitamin A capsules: 100000 IU at birth and 20000 IU at 12 months of age when children are vaccinated for DPT at 18 months of age with the DPT booster vaccine. However, this programme has not yet been implemented in the field. The current Mission recommends that necessary steps should be taken immediately throughout the country to give Vitamin A to children to protect their health. [-]

24233. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 22: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: Iodine Deficiency and Goitre. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Goitre had been an endemic problem in Iraq, yet by 1979 goitre had been virtually eliminated in the country. A 1992 survey conducted in Mosul with the assistance of UNICEF revealed a prevalence of 40.7% among females. In 1993, a study of patients referred to Aloshah hospital in Baghdad revealed that about 56% of patients had several types of thyroid disease. Prevalence was highest among 15-44 years old. The government is planning to provide iodized salt. Nevertheless, his Excellency, the Minister of Health, while recognizing the importance of this and other fortification schemes indicated that his priorities must remain in ensuring that basic food energy needs are met. [-]

24234. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 23: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: Low Birth Weight (less than 2.5 kg) and Anaemia Amongst Pregnant Women. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The Ministry of Health has reported a categorical increase in the occurrence of low birth weight infants: 4% in 8/1990; 19.2% in 8/1993; and 21.1% in 7/1995. The Nutrition Research Institute collected birth weights in 1-2/1993 from 4 hospitals in Baghdad, and reported a low birth weight incidence of 19.45%. However, statistics that were made available to the Mission from the Ministry of Health, Nutrition Research Institute and several hospitals, did not include denominators necessary to calculate incidence rates. The 1993 mission had visited the Basrah governorate and obtained raw data collected from 60 health centres which included birth weights and total number of births by month for 1993. The incidence of low birth weight (based on 33971 births, 2-9/1993) was 3.86%. The Basrah maternity hospital reported to the Mission that 4.8% of births (based on 13089 births) were below 2.5 kg in 1994-1995. Similarly, the Mosul Saddam Hospital reported an incidence of low birth weight of 3.7% (Table 22), ranging from 1.0-4.2%. A large percentage of births takes place at home, and thus there could be a low birth weight problem which is not visible. In the Mission's household surveys, pregnant women were often noted to be suffering from anaemia. Iron fortification or iron supplementation would normally be recommended in these circumstances. In the present situation, in relation to the other priorities of ensuring access to food, it is unlikely that any action can be taken with regard to fortification greater availability of medication for iron supplementation could alleviate the problem to some degree. [-]
Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations; End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 24: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: Other Problems in the Health Sector. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Major surgical interventions have been reduced to 30% of pre-sanctions levels. In 1996 it was told that a surgical operation per week. From the monthly average of 15125 major surgical operations per month in 1989, the average reported by the Ministry of Health for 1-7/1995 was 4640. There is a general lack of anaesthesics and disposable equipment such as gloves, syringes and catheters. Laboratory tests have also been affected by the severe shortage of reagents. Moreover, hospitals and pharmacies continue to suffer from the lack of life-sustaining drugs for treatment of cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and other metabolic and endocrine diseases. No member of the Mission was medically qualified but, nevertheless, the situation can be recognized as serious. It is recommended that a Mission under the auspices of an appropriate agency, should be charged with examining the overall problems and deficiencies in the health care delivery system in Iraq. [ ]

24236. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations; End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 25: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: The Health and Nutrition Situation in the North. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The nutrition situation in the northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimaniya is still reported to be critical by UNICEF, various NGOs and regional authorities. The recent fighting between the two main political factions has disrupted the flow of resources and has also affected access to health care and food. Basic food items are available but expensive. Various groups including those classified as internally displaced due to the 1991 civilian conflict, refugees returning from Turkey and Iran, recent exiles from Kirkuk, residents of collective villages and civil servants are experiencing difficulties in meeting their nutritional needs. Because the government in Erbil has no current source of revenue, consequent to the factional fighting between the PUK and PDK, civil servants, including doctors and teachers, had received no pay for more than six months. Doctors were still working in the hospital without pay but were surviving on the incomes generated from their private clinics. Persons living in collectivized villages are unable to produce their own food or other displaced persons and poor urban dwellers are also entirely dependent on WFP food assistance. The Government of Iraq does not provide food rations on a regular basis to these governorates, and what is provided meets less than 0.1% of the needs. In the North, all food must be purchased from the free market. Lack of fuel for heating is another major concern of the regional government and will become more acute as winter approaches. In Dohuk, Suleimaniya and Erbil governorates malnutrition amongst children appears to have plateaued at around 20% using weight-for-height less than 90% of the NCHS median. This is according to two UNICEF 30 cluster surveys conducted in 1993 and 1994. In the 1994 survey, stunting was found to be more prevalent in the 3-5 year age group (43.5%), while wasting was more prevalent among those 0-3 years old (31.5% for under 1 and 50.4% for 1-3 years). No significant differences were found between male and female children, and rural areas reported higher prevalence rates than urban areas. This may be due to diminishing humanitarian assistance to the rural sector and the adverse effect of political instability, in particular the internal conflict between PUK and PDK. Using the criteria of weight for height less than 90% median, values for malnutrition in the three governorates were 21.8% for Dohuk, 20.2% for Suleimaniya and 20.1% for Erbil. The Mission visited the main paediatric hospital in each of the three governorates. The Mission noted the presence of severely malnourished children in all three locations, many were marasmic and some were suffering from kwashiorkor. Statistics from the paediatric hospital are reported in Tables 23 and 24. There is a considerable degree of seasonal variability with winter months being the most severe. Dr. Robin Mills and Dr. Najmuddin Ahmed from UNICEF reported that paediatric admissions for malnutrition had substantially increased from the previous year in the nutrition rehabilitation centres. In 1994, there were 90-110 admissions per month per centre while in 1995 the number increased to 150-200 per month. Of the cases were kwashiorkor and 70% marasmus, most were less than 3 years old. In the centres, malnourished children are given K-MixII and vegetable oil. However, nothing is given on discharge and thus the same child often returns to the centres.

Impact Teams International (ITI) is an international NGO operating in Erbil. Working closely with the paediatric hospital, they administer a supplementary feeding programme and nutritional rehabilitation centre. Data for 1994 collected by ITI showed 6.8% severe malnutrition (children less than 70% weight-for-height) and 2.6% amongst children under five in the in-patient therapeutic feeding programme in Erbil’s paediatric hospitals (Table 24). In addition, the total case load of malnourished children (less than 90% weight-for-height) in six health centres in Erbil ranged between a minimum of 1214 to a maximum of 1765. The prevalence of gastroenteritis was estimated at 46% and the case-fatality rate due to gastroenteritis was 32.9 (Table 25) per 100 child deaths. Malaria cases have also increased in the past year. In 1/1995, 928 cases were reported for Northern Iraq and by 6/1995 there were 4124 cases. The spraying campaign of the WHO malaria vector control programme in the Northern region had been completed in 7/1995. Sporadic cases of xerophthalmia are also appearing in hospitals in the North. However, UNICEF is administering vitamin A at the same time as measles vaccination. Vaccination coverage is satisfactory for individual vaccinations (BCG = 74.5%, DPT3 = 47.2%; measles = 60 1%), but rates were low for a complete set and were estimated at around 22% by UNICEF staff. There are no reliable data on breastfeeding but according to Zerfas (UNICEF consultant) about 50% of infants were bottle fed. Many of the pregnant women are reported to be anemic. However, no data are available to validate this claim. A household survey conducted by Ward and Rimmer (9/1994) found that 11.6% of non-pregnant women had a body mass index below 18.5 in the population. This compares with around 3-5% in developed countries, and 5-15% in many developing countries. Moreover, a body mass index below 18.5 is associated with low birth weight babies and is also indicative of chronic energy deficiency. These data were compatible with expenditure data collected during the same period, and parallels the general decline in the purchasing power of the population. Not all groups are affected equally and only a minority (although a substantial one) has been sufficiently affected to result in adult malnutrition. In 8/1995 the pockets of vulnerable groups had increased with the internal fighting increased market prices and reduction in WFP food assistance. [ ]
administrators, Dr. Ahmad arranged visits and the team were able to discuss the problems and limitations of the system in the head office for Basrah, visit pumping stations and see many local sites where huge areas of sewage water, often green with algae and sometimes showing visible faecal material, produced small lakes in streets and in common and domestic areas. These areas were grossly unhygienic and much of the city smelled badly as a result of these overflows. Overall it is our assessment that the situation concerning sewage disposal in Basrah has deteriorated even further since it was last seen and described as serious in 1993. This of course produces hazards to health which can seriously influence nutritional status in children. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that there were many cases of infectious diseases including typhoid fever and infective hepatitis in the hospitals as well as widespread gastroenteritis in the hot summer months and in consequence much nutritional marasmus. What remains surprising, however, is that the city has been able to avoid major epidemics in the presence of these atrocious sanitary conditions. The team was informed that before 1990 the costs of imports solely related to water and sanitation equipment and spare parts for repair and replacement exceeded US$ 100 million/year for the whole country. In contrast, the total of aid for the same purposes during the last five years from international agencies has totalled less than US$ 10 million. Oh viously in these circumstances, with both the need for permission and with little foreign exchange available for purchases, water and sewage systems are both in continuous decline. Contracts for various stages of the sewage renewal project for the Basrah area were agreed before 8/1990 but delivery could not be completed because of the embargo. Although pipes may have been laid in earlier stages, many were never connected to the pumping system. Since they were believed to be functional many private connections were made to these pipes often leading to small sewage rivers in the middle of many streets and frequent backing-up of the liquid sewage into houses because of the high water table and the inability for natural drainage to occur. Of more importance is the fact that under flat land conditions all sewage is required to be pumped. The team was informed that of the 65 pumping stations in the Basrah area none were able to operate at full capacity because of nonavailability of spare parts for essential components such as the electric motors. A typical situation at a pumping station would show one functional pump from the four required to meet operational needs. Old motors are used extensively with parts being cannibalized in order to keep other motors functional. This procedure has its limits and a common sight throughout all Iraq, in almost all sectors, are massive piles of machinery, equipment, engines and motors which are providing spare parts to keep an ever decreasing number in service.

In the sewage and waste water disposal system street drainage and sewerage lines eventually meet; with functional pumps this is no hazard but without pumps in very flat areas such as for Basrah such sewage backs up into houses and street drains producing foul smelling areas and very large health risks. The Governor cited families living on roofs as well as those using concrete blocks and planks in their houses so that they can live above the level of the backflow sewage. Other areas of the town were described where the sewage accumulation was so extensive and prolonged that vehicles could partially sink. Even the hospitals are not immune since lack of spare parts for tanker trucks can prevent the special disposal of waste from these areas. Further environmental contamination is caused by the illegal use of private tankers that discharge raw sewage into waterways. The observations in the area made by the Mission confirm those made by previous groups, including various Needs Assessment Missions that the water and sanitation situation in Basrah continues to remain critical. Governmental and international agency activities attempting to alleviate the situation are extensive but are nowhere near enough to repair and replace systems that are so extensively devastated. The health risks are serious and continue to cause excessive and preventable mortality especially since intravenous fluid supplies are often problematic both in quality and quantity. Oral rehydration salt mixtures as provided by UNICEF were, however, generally reported as being sufficient. In contrast to the general deterioration in sewage disposal, water availability may have marginally improved with the very large number of strategically sited water tanks throughout the city where drinking water is sold. Despite the slight increase in availability, water quality remains poor with 65% of samples failing either microbiological or mineral purity tests. Drinking water for Basrah city is from the Shatt al Arab which also receives discharged sewage. Because of the 2000 ton/yr deficit in chlorine supply only drinking water is chlorinated often at a lower than desirable level.

In Basrah there are 256 pumping stations for a city of some 4 million. The water treatment from 2.5 mg/l to 1.5 mg/l for sewage disposal, in Baghdad there are 1819 cases of typhoid fever in 1989; this had risen to 24436 cases in 1994. Similarly there were no reported cases of cholera in 1989 but 1345 cases were recorded in 1994. The interaction between nutrition and infection is such that poor water quality and sanitation are contributory causes to both growth failure and acute malnutrition requiring hospitalization in children. The lack of capital for repair and updating of the water supply and sewage system is a significant factor associated with both malnutrition and excess infant mortality. The parallel problems of waterlogging and salinity of agricultural land with consequent reduction in the area available for food production should be noted. The causes relating to the inability of purchasing lack of spare parts for pumps and equipment are identical. [=]
years of age, conducted between August 23-29, was a collaborative effort between the FAO Mission and the Nutrition Research Institute (NRI), part of the Ministry of Health. Mission members were responsible for the methodology, including the selection of the sample. In the field, interviews were conducted by NRI staff supervised by FAO Mission members, a UNICEF member and physicians from the NRI. Data were inputted in Ep-Info primarily by NRI staff with assistance from Mission members. Once completed, the data were reviewed by FAO Mission members and duplicate records were removed. A total of 693 households were visited and 768 mothers interviewed. Information was collected on 2120 children under 10 years of age. A total of 594 children under-five years of age were measured for anthropometry, with measurements on 184 children from the eight clusters in Saddam City that had been surveyed in 1995 by the previous FAO Mission. [+]  

24239. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War; Part 28: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq; Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: The Baghdad Child Nutrition and Mortality Survey: Methods. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Selection of clusters for the 1995 Baghdad survey was based upon a random cluster sampling design taken from the nationwide survey of infant and child mortality and nutritional status conducted in 1991. In that survey the number of clusters for each governorate was determined by the population size of the governorate according to the 1987 census. Seventy-three clusters were selected for Baghdad for the 1991 survey. The distribution of clusters within Baghdad was determined by the population size of each district using the 1987 census, representative of the city. Within each district the clusters for the 1995 survey were selected randomly from the 1991 clusters using a random number generator (EPIINFO, version 6). The minimum number of clusters required for the 1995 survey was determined to be 25, making the conservative assumption that for 24 contiguous households selected from each cluster between 1-2 children under the age of 10 would be living in each household on average. The assumptions for the sample size for nutritionalanthropometry (n = 420) were as follows: a baseline prevalence of wasting of 3.1% (from 1991 estimates from Baghdad); a 2.5-fold increase in wasting observed in 1995; power of 80%; and an alpha level of 0.05. The weight of children between ages 1 and 5 years was ascertained using a calibrated hanging scale to the nearest 0.1 kg. Height was measured to the nearest 0.1 cm, using either a length board (for children under age two) or a height board. Infants under the age of one were measured using an infant scale. Children were measured wearing loose clothing and without shoes. Age was determined primarily through registration cards. Surveyors were from the Nutritional Research Institute (NRI). Percentiles and Z-scores for height-for-age (stunted), weight-for-age (underweight) and weight-for-height (wasted) were calculated using EPI-Info, version 6. Malnutrition was defined as the percentage of children less than -2 standard deviations (SD) below the median values for the NCHS (United States National Centre for Health Statistics) standardized distributions for the indicators: stunted, underweight and wasted. The criteria for exclusion of observations were:

1. Extreme outlier, defined as values of Z-scores:
   - less than -4 SD or greater than 6 SD for weight-for-height;
   - less than -6 SD or greater than 6 SD for weight-for-age and height-for-age;

2. Age equal to or greater than 60 months.

Anthropometric indicators (stunted, underweight and wasted) are presented for Baghdad and for the 8 clusters in Saddam City examined in 1993. In addition, anthropometric indicators were stratified for the overall sample by the following characteristics: child age (1 year intervals), maternal education, pointprevalence of diarrhoea (defined as 3 loose stools within 24 hours during the past 2 days) and gender. Infant and child mortality estimates are reported comparing pre and post economic sanctions. Effect modification by maternal education in relation to infant and child mortality is also examined. [+]  

24240. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War; Part 29: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq; Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: The Baghdad Child Nutrition and Mortality Survey: Results. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The percentage of children below -2 SD in the 8 clusters of Saddam City was 25% for stunting, 22% for underweight and 7% for wasting in the overall sample (25 clusters) for Baghdad, 28% of children were stunted, 29% were underweight and 12% were wasted (Table 26). Severe malnutrition, defined as the percentage of children below -3 SD was noted among children: 10% for stunted, 7% for underweight and 3% for wasted. Mild malnutrition, the percentage of children below -1 SD, was: 56% for height-for-age, 65% for weight-for-age, and 39% for weight-for-height. A comparison of the prevalence measures for malnutrition by child age, maternal education and diarrhoeal disease. No significant gender differences were noted in this population. However certain districts within Baghdad demonstrated higher prevalence estimates of underweight in central part of the city, in neighbourhoods of Rasafah, Karada and New Baghdad. For wasting higher prevalences were noted in Karakh and New Baghdad. Table 29 reports results from the mortality analysis. Infant and child mortality prior to the institution of economic sanctions (8/1990) was compared to the mortality rates for the year prior to the interview (9/1994 -8/1995). Infant mortality had increased approximately two fold compared with the year prior to the intitiation of economic sanctions. Further analysis indicates a two fold increase in infant mortality during the first year of economic sanctions which included the Gulf War (8/1990-9/1991). This two fold increase in infant mortality has been sustained since 1990 until the present. Child mortality had increased nearly five fold, comparing the rate prior to the economic sanctions with the rate observed during the past five years. Table 29 stratifies infant and child mortality rates by maternal education. The effect of the sanctions on infant and child mortality is most pronounced among children of illiterate mothers. Infant mortality increased about 3.6 times and child mortality increased 8.5 times compared with pre-sanction estimates for this sub group. [+]  

24241. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War; Part 30: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq; Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Nutrition and Health: The Baghdad Child Nutrition and Mortality Survey: Discussion. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Nutritional status of Iraqi children before the Gulf war and sanctions was similar to children in Kuwait. Since 1991, shortly after the inception of the sanctions, the nutritional status of children in Baghdad has significantly deteriorated. Compared with 1991 estimates, the current survey demonstrates a 4-fold increase in wasting for the city of Baghdad. Prevalence estimates for stunting and underweight have also risen dramatically. For the Saddam City district of Baghdad, there appears to be a modest reduction in the prevalence of wasting compared with the FAO mission report from 1993 that reported a wasting prevalence of 16%. There are several reasons for observed changes in level of wasting which is acutely sensitive to external factors. Since the 1993 survey was conducted in November and the current study was conducted in August, secular variation may in part explain the observed reduction in prevalence. Differential child mortality may also explain the lower prevalence of wasting observed in Saddam City in 1995 if severely wasted children were more likely to die in 1995 than in 1993 due to deteriorating conditions. In addition, this population may be better able to...
cope with adversity since there are more economic options such as bagging or peddling goods which were not available in 1995. The Mission noticed that fewer male members were at home during the current survey as compared to the 1993 survey. For Baghdad overall, the prevalence of underweight children (29%) has increased to a level comparable with children from Ghana (27%) and Mali (31%). For stunting, prevalence rates are similar to estimates from Sri Lanka (28%) and Madagascar (28%). The prevalence of wasting in Baghdad is comparable with estimates from Madagascar (12%) and Burma (11%). The prevalence of severe wasting is comparable to data from northern Sudan (2.3%).

In contrast, 1991 estimates of malnutrition from Baghdad are comparable with estimates from Kuwait (12% for stunting, 6% for underweight, and 3% for wasting). The current nutritional situation among children in Baghdad is more similar to lesser developed countries with a larger percentage of the population residing in rural settings which may be a reflection of the inability to maintain systems for sanitation and clean water under sanctions. The observed increase in under five mortality may also be related to the sanitation/water problem in Baghdad, where the occurrence of diarrhoea-related deaths has increased nearly threefold compared to the time period prior to the sanctions. Due to the increasing problem of food insecurity and the inability to repair the infrastructure for provision of sanitation and potable water, the nutritional status of children in Baghdad will continue to deteriorate unless appropriate measures are taken to secure food and to provide a safe environment. The Mission recommends that a nation-wide nutritional surveillance system be put in place immediately in light of the poor nutritional status of children in Baghdad in order prevent the further deterioration of the nutritional status and mortality of children under five years of age in Iraq. Moreover, it should be noted that the nutritional status of children in southern Iraq and North is likely to be even worse than reported in Baghdad. [=]

24242. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 31: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Conclusions and Recommendations: (A) Food Production and Access. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. (1) The only viable long-term solution is for Iraq, a potentially rich country, to use its own resources for earning foreign exchange and hence be able again to feed itself and provide for the sick and vulnerable. The GOI and the Security Council are urged to come to an agreement on the sales of oil so that these needs can be met.

(2) Recognizing that Iraq faces enormous shortages of basic foods in 1995/96, the Mission urges that the country be enabled through appropriate and agreeable mechanisms to import necessary foods to feed its population. The estimated foreign exchange required for the purpose is US$ 2.7 billion.

(3) Recognizing that rehabilitation and promotion of the agricultural sector has a crucial role towards ensuring food security in the country, the Mission recommends that suitable arrangements be made urgently to enable Iraq to import on a priority basis agricultural machinery including those used in drainage/irrigation—replacements and spare parts—and necessary seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides for the rehabilitation of agriculture.

(4) Taking into account the linkages between nutritional status, health, and the quality of water and sanitation the Mission also recommends the importing of spare parts and equipment to ensure adequate access to potable water and the safe disposal of sewage material.

(5) Recognizing the deterioration in the whole health care system including hospitals, clinics and primary health care facilities, the procurement of needed medical supplies, equipment and diagnostic material including essential drugs is urgently required.

(6) Such suitable arrangements could entail the authorization by the Security Council of the release of additional funds, in particular from Iraq's frozen assets, for the import of the essential items mentioned above through a mechanism that both GOI and the Security Council would recognise and accept. FAO can play a significant role in facilitating these actions, particularly in the case of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and spare parts and providing institutional support.

(7) Recognizing that the most vulnerable people need food assistance for survival, the Mission urges that the WFP food assistance be restored to previous levels and provided regularly for the targeted beneficiaries in the country on the basis of need (in both the North as well as in South and Central Iraq). [=]

the vast majority of the population and nutritional status continues to go from bad to worse. If no additional funds or resources are provided the Mission recommends that the following steps should be taken:

(8) In the light of the reduced public food ration the GOI should as far as possible ensure the ration is nutritionally balanced, in particular with regard to good quality protein, oil and micronutrients.

(9) It is recommended that WFP give consideration to increasing the amount of rice, pulses and oil, essential items in the Iraqi diet, in the food aid they provide, particularly for consumption in social institutions and hospitals.

(10) In order to improve the nutritional status of school children as well as those not attending school, the Mission recommends that: (a) food aid be provided to children through school feeding programmes and (b) new programmes should be developed to address the needs of the increasing population of street children in the large cities.

(11) Recognizing the need for households to supplement the ration with nutritious and least expensive foods, the continuation and expansion of current mass media campaigns in nutrition education is encouraged. How best to utilize the food available at the household level how to prepare appropriate weaning foods and the benefits of breastfeeding are examples of important nutrition messages. Breast-feeding is particularly important given that the effects of malnutrition on mortality is much greater in the absence of breast-feeding.

(12) The Mission endorses the various actions taken by the Government and UN agencies to improve nutritional status such as salt iodization, vitamin A supplementation with EPI and the establishment of nutritional rehabilitation centres and calls for their continuation and expansion.

(13) The Mission views with concern the increasing prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia in both children and pregnant women and recommends the expansion of iron supplementation programmes. The distribution of anti-helmintic drugs would also be of value here. The Mission believes that the fortification of flour with iron as well as other micronutrients such as calcium, thiamine, niacin and lysine, while desirable is unrealistic in the present circumstances.

(14) It is recommended that an appropriate Agency be charged with examining the overall problems and deficiencies in the health system in Iraq with the view to provide advice on the most cost-effective ways to utilize limited resources for delivering promotive and preventive health care.

(15) The Mission calls for the continuation and expansion of public health campaigns. Simple messages such as promoting the boiling of drinking water and safe sanitary practises are effective in reducing the occurrence of infection, especially among children under the age of 5 years.

(16) In order to improve the efficiency of corrective actions and to establish priorities in the allocation of the existing resources, including targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable groups, it is recommended a nationwide nutrition surveillance system be set up in Iraq with special emphasis on urban and periurban areas. An outline of a proposal for monitoring the food and nutrition situation is presented in Annex 2.

(17) Given the critical health and social problems confronted by the population, the Mission recommends that academic and governmental institutions should be encouraged to perform relevant applied research and interventional programmes in nutrition and public health.

(18) The Nutrition Research Institute and appropriate Governmental agencies should strengthen their efforts to reduce the number of products on the market which contain non-food grade components and do not meet minimum standards of food safety. FAO can provide assistance to the Government in this area if requested. [\]


Barley: area 1.25 million ha; production 790000 tons; yield 632 kg/ha.
Paddy: area 175000 ha; production 315000 tons; yield 1800 kg/ha.
Maize: area 75000 ha; production 90000 tons; yield 1200 kg/ha.
Total: area 2.5 million ha; production 1.993 million tons; yield 773 kg/ha.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

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kg/ha. [-]


24255. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 44: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Table 11: Domestic Food Shortages in Iraq, 1995/1996. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Wheat flour: estimated production 989000 tons; total requirements 3.209 million tons; shortage or import requirement 2.22 million tons; shortage 69% or total requirement. Rice: estimated production 221000 tons; total requirements 994000 tons; shortage or import requirement 773000 tons; shortage 78% or total requirement. Barley: estimated production 892000 tons; total requirements 1.217 million tons; shortage or import requirement 327000 tons; shortage 27% or total requirement. Maize: estimated production 90000 tons; total requirements 213000 tons; shortage or import requirement 123000 tons; shortage 58%
or total requirement.

- Pulses: estimated production 50000 tons; total requirements 120000 tons; shortage or import requirement 700000 tons; shortage 58% or total requirement.
- Vegetable oil: estimated production 100000 tons; total requirements 298000 tons; shortage or import requirement 198000 tons; shortage 66% or total requirement.
- Red Meat: estimated production 94000 tons; total requirements 227000 tons; shortage or import requirement 133000 tons; shortage 58% or total requirement.
- Fish: estimated production 50000 tons; total requirements 62000 tons; shortage or import requirement 57000 tons; shortage 92% or total requirement.
- Eggs (million): estimated production 150 million; total requirements 1966 million; shortage or import requirement 1816 million tons; shortage 92% or total requirement.
- Milk: estimated production unknown; total requirements 372000 tons; shortage or import requirement 223000 tons; shortage 93% or total requirement.
- Sugar: estimated production 80000 tons; total requirements 814000 tons; shortage or import requirement 734000 tons; shortage 90% or total requirement.
- Baby Milk: estimated production negligible; total requirements 43000 tons; shortage or import requirement 43000 tons; shortage 100% or total requirement.

[Notes: (a) Estimated production is government and mission estimates. Conversion ratio of wheat into flour is 80%, reflecting the high rate of non-grain impurities in the 1995 wheat output; the recovery rate in the case of paddy into rice is 70%. (b) Total requirements are calculated using standard per person annual requirement of each item in Iraq. (c) If maize for feed for poultry and livestock is included, the shortage quantity will be much larger. (d) Pulses include peas, green grain, lentil, broad beans, beans. (e) Milk production in the country has declined sharply. It has been generously assumed that some 40% of the requirement will be met through domestic production of fresh milk or that many poor people may not consume milk. (f) Total population 1995/1996: 20.7 million.]


- Vegetable Oil: (1993) 0.50; (1995) 0.625.
- Sugar: (1993) 1.50; (1995) 0.50.
- Tea: (1993) 0.075; (1995) 0.10.


[Note: Baby milk is provided for infants 0-1 years (four tons weighing 450 grams each for each infant). The estimated number of infants in Iraq is one million, of whom 0.826 million in Central and South Iraq. The quantity provided meets about 50% of the baby's need.]

24257. FAO; International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a
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**Iraq**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Daily Supply</th>
<th>Daily Supply Percentage Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $224 per ton</td>
<td>$497 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry meat</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $950 per ton</td>
<td>$197 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $18 per box of 360 eggs</td>
<td>$91 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $3000 per ton; $2200 per ton; $1500 per ton</td>
<td>$93 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $2200 per ton; $1500 per ton</td>
<td>$93 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $1500 per ton; $93 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk powder</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $3000 per ton; $2200 per ton; $1500 per ton</td>
<td>$93 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry meat</td>
<td>(CIF Baghdad) $950 per ton</td>
<td>$197 million import cost.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$93 million import cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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[Note: Recovery rate used for wheat is 85% and for paddy 70%. Total Iraqi population 20.7 million minus one million children under one year; southern and central Iraqi population 17.1 million minus 0.826 million children under one year.] [=]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrient</th>
<th>FBS 1988-1990</th>
<th>Adult RDA</th>
<th>Daily Ration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thiamine (mg)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riboflavin (mg)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folate (microgram)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin B6 (mg)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lysine (mg/g)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Note: RDA values (NAS-NRC 1989): adult male 25-50 years. Lysine mg/g protein is indicative of protein quality. This is not an RDA but is the value recommended by FAO/WHO 1991.]
1995 (January): total patients, 505; number of diarrhoeal cases, 211, 41.8% of total cases; total deaths, 12; deaths due to diarrhoea, 1.
1995 (February): total patients, 530; number of diarrhoeal cases, 208, 39.2% of total cases; total deaths, 35; deaths due to diarrhoea, 0.
1995 (March): total patients, 546; number of diarrhoeal cases, 125, 22.9% of total cases; total deaths, 29; deaths due to diarrhoea, 3.
1995 (April): total patients, 490; number of diarrhoeal cases, 109, 20.2% of total cases; total deaths, 18; deaths due to diarrhoea, 3.
1995 (May): total patients, 557; number of diarrhoeal cases, 435, 78.1% of total cases; total deaths, 34; deaths due to diarrhoea, 3.
1995 (June): total patients, 607; number of diarrhoeal cases, 554, 91.3% of total cases; total deaths, 27; deaths due to diarrhoea, 6.

[Source: Statistical Department, Mosul Saddam Hospital.] [=]

February: total births, 341; 3.8% EBW.
March: total births, 368; 3.8% EBW.
April: total births, 354; 2.5% EBW.
May: total births, 297; 3.4% EBW.
June: total births, 306; 1.0% EBW.
July: total births, 367; 2.7% EBW.
Aberage: total births, 363; 3.7% EBW.

[Source: Statistical Department, Mosul Saddam Hospital.] [=]

April: Ainkawa, 59; Datartoo, 201; Badawa, 142; M. Baiellan, 932; Beneselawa, 185; Terawa, 246; Totals, 1765.
May: Ainkawa, 79; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, 224; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 185; Terawa, 226; Totals, 1214.
June: Ainkawa, 79; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, 224; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 185; Terawa, 226; Totals, 1214.
July: Ainkawa, 79; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, 224; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 185; Terawa, 226; Totals, 1214.
August: Ainkawa, 106; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, 156; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 215; Terawa, 337; Totals, 1394.
September: Ainkawa, 201; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, 140; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 220; Terawa, 341; Totals, 1402.
October: Ainkawa, 209; Datartoo, not reported; Badawa, not reported; M. Baiellan, 500; Beneselawa, 220; Terawa, 34; Totals, 1270.

[Source: Miller, Cathy. Impact Teams International.] [=]

24268. FAO: International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 57: Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq: Terminal Statement Prepared For the Government of Iraq (Rome 1995): Table 24: Number of Under-Five Years of Age Admissions To Suleimaniya Paediatric Hospital for Malnutrition (January, June, July and December 1993-1995): x. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. 1/1993: total paediatric admissions, 1820; total malnutrition admissions, 78; malnutrition 4.3% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 16, 20.5% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 14, 18.0% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 30, 38.5% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 18; deaths, 3.
6/1993: total paediatric admissions, 3385; total malnutrition admissions, 65; malnutrition 1.9% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 17, 26.2% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 15, 20.0% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 25, 38.5% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 10; deaths, 0.
7/1993: total paediatric admissions, 4086; total malnutrition admissions, 122; malnutrition 3.0% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 30, 24.6% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 23, 18.9% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 52, 42.6% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 17; deaths, 0.
12/1993: total paediatric admissions, 1847; total malnutrition admissions, 138; malnutrition 7.5% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 33, 23.9% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 18, 13.0% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 50, 36.2% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 37, deaths, 0.
1/1994: total paediatric admissions, 2104; total malnutrition admissions, 108; malnutrition 5.1% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 35, 32.4% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 13, 12.0% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 47, 43.5% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 13; deaths, 0.
6/1994: total paediatric admissions, 3109; total malnutrition admissions, 326; malnutrition 10.5% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 94, 25.8% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 66, 20.2% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 149, 45.7% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 27; deaths, 18.
7/1994: total paediatric admissions, 3286; total malnutrition admissions, 606; malnutrition 18.4% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 195, 32.2% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 94, 15.5% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 290, 47.9% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 27; deaths, 10.
12/1994: total paediatric admissions, 1303; total malnutrition admissions, 234; malnutrition 17.9% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 78, 33.3% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 37, 15.8% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 106, 45.3% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 13; deaths, 4.
1/1995: total paediatric admissions, 1240; total malnutrition admissions, 362; malnutrition 29.2% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 97, 26.8% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 79, 26.8% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 170, 47.0% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 16; deaths, 2.
6/1995: total paediatric admissions, 2304; total malnutrition admissions, 592; malnutrition 20.4% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 188, 31.8% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 106, 17.9% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 293, 49.5% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 5; deaths, 6.
7/1995: total paediatric admissions, 2368; total malnutrition admissions, 502; malnutrition 21.2% of total admissions; marasmus-severe cases, 177, 35.5% of total malnutrition; marasmus-moderate cases, 75, 42.4% of total malnutrition; marasmus-mild cases, 298, 49.4% of total malnutrition; kwashiorkor cases, 2; deaths, 14.

[Source: Sulaymaniya Pediatric Hospital.] [=]
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February: children admitted, 757; children with GE, 128; prevalence rate, 16.9%; children who died, 76; number of children dying with GE, 12; case fatality rate, 15.7%.

March: children admitted, 512; children with GE, 91; prevalence rate, 17.8%; children who died, 45; number of children dying with GE, 7; case fatality rate, 15.5%.

April: children admitted, 649; children with GE, 184; prevalence rate, 28.4%; children who died, 46; number of children dying with GE, 11; case fatality rate, 23.9%.

May: children admitted, 654; children with GE, 294; prevalence rate, 45.0%; children who died, 49; number of children dying with GE, 16; case fatality rate, 32.7%.

June: children admitted, 1278; children with GE, 850; prevalence rate, 66.5%; children who died, 71; number of children dying with GE, 37; case fatality rate, 52.1%.

July: children admitted, 848; children with GE, 527; prevalence rate, 62.1%; children who died, 60; number of children dying with GE, 29; case fatality rate, 48.3%.

August: children admitted, 952; children with GE, 542; prevalence rate, 57.0%; children who died, 36; number of children dying with GE, 12; case fatality rate, 33.3%.

September: children admitted, 1040; children with GE, 578; prevalence rate, 55.6%; children who died, 43; number of children dying with GE, 11; case fatality rate, 25.6%.

October: children admitted, 918; children with GE, 506; prevalence rate, 55.1%; children who died, 52; number of children dying with GE, 24; case fatality rate, 48.1%.

November: children admitted, 852; children with GE, 410; prevalence rate, 48.1%; children who died, 61; number of children dying with GE, 27; case fatality rate, 44.3%.

December: children admitted, 792; children with GE, 351; prevalence rate, 44.9%; children who died, 57; number of children dying with GE, 24; case fatality rate, 42.1%.

Total: children admitted, 10165; children with GE, 4686; prevalence rate, 46.1%; children who died, 674; number of children dying with GE, 222; case fatality rate, 32.9%.

[Source: Cathy Miller, Impact Teams International.]


Height for Age (n=585):
- Age: 0-11 months, 23%; 12-23 months, 38%; 24-35 months, 26%; 36-47 months, 30%; 48-59 months, 24%.
- Maternal education (n=585): illiterate, 32%; primary, 35%; secondary, 21%; post-secondary, 16%.
- Diarrheal disease (n=576): yes, 26%; no, 29%.
- Weight for Age (n=593):
  - Age: 0-11 months, 25%; 12-23 months, 25%; 24-35 months, 35%; 36-47 months, 24%; 48-59 months, 25%.
  - Maternal education (n=593): illiterate, 36%; primary, 28%; secondary, 29%; post-secondary, 24%.
  - Diarrheal disease (n=584): yes, 31%; no, 29%.
- Weight for Height (n=588):
  - Age: 0-11 months, 13%; 12-23 months, 12%; 24-35 months, 13%.
  - 36-47 months, 5%; 48-59 months, 17%.
  - Maternal education (n=588): illiterate, 16%; primary, 9%; secondary, 14%; post-secondary, 13%.
- Diarrheal disease (n=579): yes, 16%; no, 11%.


- Number of deaths: reference period, 16; during economic sanctions, 36; relative mortality (95% confidence interval), 2.0.
- Number of live births: reference period, 199; during economic sanctions, 224; relative mortality (95% confidence interval), 1.15, 3.49.
- Risk of infant deaths: reference period, 0.0804; during economic sanctions, 0.1607.
- Child Mortality (less than five years of age):
  - Number of deaths: reference period, 33; during economic sanctions, 245; relative mortality (95% confidence interval), 4.88, 10.0.
  - Number of live births: reference period, 812; during economic sanctions, 1236; relative mortality (95% confidence interval), 3.43, 6.94.
  - Risk of infant deaths: reference period, 0.0406; during economic sanctions, 0.1982.

[Note: Reference period for infant mortality includes all children born between 8/1989-7/1990; reference period for child mortality includes all children born between 8/1985-7/1990. Index period during economic sanctions for infant mortality includes all children born in the year prior to the date of interview (9/1994-8/1995); Index period for calculation of child mortality includes all children born from 8/1990 to the date of interview (under the age of 5).]
to end racism, sexism, and poverty in the United States with opposition to US militarism and domination around the world. The IAC was the first organization in the US to expose the damages of US bombing of innocent Iraqi civilians and the massive destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure. This evidence was compiled and published in the book War Crimes. The Centercoordinated an International War Crimes Tribunal that held hearings in twenty countries and thirty US cities probing the Pentagon's systematic destruction of Iraq. Evidence presented at this War Crimes Tribunal, which implicated the United States in gross violations of international law, was published in Ramsey Clark's ground-breaking book The Fire This Time. For the last five years the IAC has been a leader of the movement to unconditionally end US/UN sanctions against Iraq. It has coordinated international meetings and teach-ins, held demonstrations, published news releases and fact sheets, and, in collaboration with the Peoples Video Network, produced several video documentaries on sanctions. The IAC has also mobilized opposition to the thirty-five-year US blockade of Cuba, and organized shipments of medical aid to the socialist island. The IAC continues to actively oppose US military involvement throughout the globe from Haiti to Somalia, from Panama to Bosnia, from the Philippines to Palestine. One of the main purposes of the International Action Center is to expose the intricate web of lies the Pentagon weaves before, during, and after each military intervention. The IAC shows that US intervention is dictated by big business's drive for profits, and that even as military funding continues to grow, schools, hospitals, and social programs are slashed in the hands of the US war machine. The International Action Center is a volunteer activist organization. In its campaigns opposing US intervention, the Center relies totally on the donations and assistance of supporters around the country. To be part of a growing network, or to make a donation, request a speaker, or volunteer your support, contact the IAC. [International Action Center: 39 West 14th St., Suite 206, New York, NY 10011, USA (212) 633-6646; fax (212) 633-2889 e-mail: ncpa@pipeline.com; 2489 Mission St., Room 28, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA (415) 821-6545; fax (415) 821-5782 e-mail: afreeman(at)igc.apc.org] [=]

24277. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations; End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 85: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: International Relief Association. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The International Relief Association (IRA) is a charitable, taxexempt public organization established in 1992 by a group of Iraqi Americans. Its main objective was to ease the suffering of the people of Iraq and to extend a hand to the poor, needy, and less fortunate people elsewhere. The IRA mission statement is summarized by a verse in the holy Quran: "If anyone saved a life, it would be equivalent to saving the entire humanity." Another part of the IRA mission is to help needy women and their families. The IRA was and is the most active nonprofit organization helping the people of Iraq. IRA resources are: direct contributions from mosques, Islamic centers, churches, and others; in-kind contributions, mainly medicine; mail campaigns; fund-raising; return on investments. The IRA fulfills its humanitarian obligations and commitments by: delivering food and medical supplies; preventive education; establishing medical clinics; sponsorship of orphans and poor families; providing work opportunities for women and heads of household. In the last four years the IRA has extended its operation to Canada, the United Kingdom and Turkey, and has joint projects with a wide spectrum of other relief organizations inside Iraq and in the United States and elsewhere. The IRA is one of the fastest-growing nonprofit organizations. Its annual income increased from less than $100,000 to more than $2 million in just four years. The budget of the medical program grew from zero to more than $500,000 and is expected to reach more than $1 million by the end of 1996. The operating expenses of the IRA are one of the lowest for this type of organization, being less than 10.1% throughout its entire operation. The entire system is built on volunteers plus a few employees. The
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Association has extended its help to the people of Bosnia, Somalia, Kashmir, Africa, and others. Its ambition is to establish field offices in northern Iraq and Africa and to build a network of partnership with others. Contact the International Relief Association to make a donation, request speakers, or volunteer your support. [International Relief Association: 24522 Harper Ave. St. Clair Shores, MI 48080, USA Phone: (800) 827-3543; fax: (810) 772-3159.]

24278. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations; End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 86: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions was established in London to coordinate international work against sanctions. The organization includes on its board former heads of state Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, former Premier of Malta Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, British Member of Parliament Tony Benn, former First Lady of Greece Margarita Papandreou and former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark. On 8/19-20/1995, this organization drew over 600 people to the London Conference of the International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions. The main meeting of 350 people heard international delegates from more than twenty countries present eyewitness testimony and help build the campaign for an International Convention to end the use of these sanctions and blockades. The findings of the Commission were as follows: Members of the International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions meeting in London on 8/19-20/1995, having heard testimony from lawyers, government officials, members of parliament, human rights activists, medical experts, religious leaders, journalists, youth, trade unionists, and others, from fifteen countries and twenty-five nationalities, hereby resolve that: (a) Sanctions have increasingly become the weapon of choice, a brutal instrument of foreign policy carried out by the big powers, particularly the United States and Britain. (b) In the recent period, the target of these sanctions has exclusively been the people of developing countries; those who suffer the most, and those who are the most vulnerable, the young, the old, the ill. (c) Sanctions are a new weapon of racism and colonial domination. (d) These criminal sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against Iraq, Libya, and other countries are a continuation of the policy of unilateral sanctions imposed by the US, most notably the blockade of Cuba, and on north Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, and Vietnam. (e) Sanctions as a form of collective punishment are a violation of all international laws, conventions and humanitarian norms. We therefore condemn all sanctions. Embargoes, Famine, and blockades as a continuing crime against humanity and urge public mass action to prevent new aggression. [International Commission of Inquiry on Economic Sanctions: Hugh Stephens, coordinator BM 2966, London WCIN 3XX, Britain Tel/fax: (0171) 436 4636 E-mail: justice(a)easynet.co.uk] [a]

24279. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations; End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 87: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Iraq Action Coalition-Internet. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The Iraq Action Coalition is a broad-based network dedicated to providing information on the devastating consequences of the blockade against Iraq and to providing assistance to the people of Iraq. The Iraq Action Coalition was formed in 1995 as a “grassroots” response to the blockade’s lethal destruction against Iraq and to providing assistance to the people of Iraq. The Iraq Action Coalition has set up a homepage on the Internet that presents detailed information on the effects of the deadly blockade, the illegitimacy of the blockade, the use of chemical and biological weapons in the military war against Iraq, and the associations and relief organizations working to lift the blockade. In addition, updated news and urgent appeals for needed action to stop the war against Iraq are continually added to the page. [Rania Masri, Founder and Coordinator Iraq Action Coalition home page: http://www4.ncsu.edu/rmasri/ww/iac/Tel/(919)848-4738 and (919) 846-8264; fax: (919) 846-7422 E-mail:rmasri(a)ncsu.edu Address: 7309 Haymarket Lane Raleigh, NC 27615, USA.] [a]

24280. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq; reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 88: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Bridge to Baghdad. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. A Bridge to Baghdad has sent delegations to Iraq to gather information and report back in Italy on the consequences of the blockade. It has also organized international conferences on this subject. This group, with the support of many other progressive and working-class organizations in Italy, coordinated protest actions in Rome, Milan, Naples, Reggio Emilia, and other areas of Italy on 1/16-17/1996, the fifth anniversary of the Gulf War. The following are excerpts from their call for those demonstrations: Never has such a complete embargo been imposed for so long on an entire population. In the same way, never since the Second World War has there been a bombardment as massive as the one on Iraq in 1-2/1991. At the same time the “new world order” that was supposed to be born in the Gulf War has revealed itself to be an order singularly founded upon the domination of the most industrialized nations over the rest of the world. The economic divergence between rich and poor countries has widened since that time, fed by the mechanism of indebtedness and by the policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Even the peace process in the Middle East risks being heavily determined by Western neocolonial control. The countries of the ex-Eastern bloc, abandoned to the “free market,” are experiencing an unprecedented economic and social crisis. In recent years there have been a hundred “local wars” that have produced millions of civilian victims. To these victims can be added those suffering under the embargoes of Libya and of Serbia as well as that against Iraq and of the thirty-year-long economic blockade by the US against Cuba. We demand: the immediate revocation of the embargoes against Iraq, Libya, and Cuba. [A Bridge to Baghdad—Campaign of Solidarity with the Civilian Victims of the Gulf War Via della Guglia 69/a, 00186 Roma, Italy; Tel: 00396/6780808; fax: 00396/65000650 E-mail: fa.alberti(a)agora.stm.it.] [a]

24281. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 89: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Call To Action from the Second International Athens Conference Against the Embargo on Iraq. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The Second International Athens Conference Against the Embargo on Iraq denounced embargos against any country as a new and terrible weapon of mass destruction that affects most severely women, children, the elderly, the sick. All international law is based on protecting the defenseless from the consequences of hostility, yet sanctions make them the first target. It is particularly shameful that sanctions have become a weapon in the hands of the rich and powerful countries, which they use against developing nations. We hold those responsible for the continuation of the sanctions on Iraq to be fully liable, legally and morally, for the consequences of their actions. The conference, which was attended by 400 participants from more than 20 countries, was appalled to hear of the catastrophic consequences of the embargo, which worsen day by day. We therefore call on all human rights, peace, labour, women’s, religious, youth and other organizations to take urgent action to ensure that this crime against humanity is terminated immediately. (a) Present letters and petitions to the Secretary General of the UN and to the governments of the member states of the UN Security Council, focusing particularly on the US Congress and the British Parliament, demanding the lifting of the sanctions. Conduct publicity activities around these actions. (b) Hold demonstrations or present petitions at the UN of fices located in various countries, for
24282. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 90: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Spanish Campaign for Lifting the Sanctions on Iraq. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The Spanish Campaign for Lifting the Sanctions on Iraq organized an International Conference Against the Embargo on Iraq in Madrid on 9/30-10/1/1995. This conference evaluated the effects of the sanctions on Iraq and took steps to improve solidarity with the Iraqi people, including sending delegations to Iraq and bringing Iraqi children to Spain for medical treatment. The group also organized protest meetings throughout Spain in 1/1996 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Gulf War. The following is part of a statement issued at the demonstration outside the US Embassy in Madrid: The embargo is a weapon of mass destruction that must be banned from international relations. It is a weapon of intervention more pernicious than war, managed by the Security Council and which in the case of Iraq particularly serves the interests of the United States in the Middle East: defense of Israel, military control of Arab petroleum reserves, and the neocolonial restructuring of the entire region. We condemn the use of economic sanctions and of all types of embargoes or blockades. We condemn the continuation of the blockade of Cuba by the United States and the economic sanctions imposed on Libya. We want to reiterate here today, in front of the US Embassy, our solidarity with the Iraqi people and our condemnation of the continuation of the sanctions against that country, a true genocide developed by the Security Council under the domination of the US and which has to be considered a crime against humanity. [Spanish Campaign for Lifting the Sanctions on Iraq: de Correos 14, 180, 28080 Madrid, Spain Fax: (1) 531 75 99.]

24283. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 91: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Organization in Solidarity with the People of Africa Asia & Latin America (OSPAAAL). New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. OSPAAAL Madrid has organized international conferences opposing blockades and sanctions. It has also circulated the following appeal which, like the International Appeal, has gotten support from prominent personalities.

Against Blockades and Economic Embargoes: Resolution 44/215 of the United Nations General Assembly of 12/22/1989 condemned "blockades embargoes, and other economic sanctions," qualifying them as "incompatible with the foundations of the UN charter," and proclaiming that "developed countries must stop threatening and applying financial and economic restrictions, blockades, Embargoes, Famine, and other economic sanctions, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion that affects their political, economic, and social development." In spite of this resolution of the General Assembly, the Security Council as well as the United States and other countries keep using this cruel instrument in their dealings with countries whose governments or regimes they do not approve of. This is the case of the blockades and economic embargoes from which the people of Cuba, Iraq and Libya, among others, are suffering. We back the condemnation of blockades and economic embargoes expressed in Resolution 44/215 of the United Nations General Assembly. These economic sanctions applied to a whole nation are real crimes against humanity that, sometimes, cause more deaths and damage than war itself. They punish indiscriminately, against every juridical principle, entire nations, their victims being preferably the most vulnerable sectors of the population: babies, children, ill and old people, pregnant women, etc. Because of their cruelty and inhumanity, this type of indiscriminate economic sanctions, which are actually hunger weapons, should be banned from international relations. They are chemical and biological weapons. Therefore: (1) We demand that the Security Council fulfill Resolution 44/215 of the General Assembly of 12/22/1989. (2) In accordance with this resolution, we demand the immediate lifting of the blockades and economic embargoes inflicted on the peoples of Cuba, Iraq and Libya among others. [OSPAAAL—Jaime Ballesteros Valverde, 28-2804 Madrid, Spain Tel/fax: (01) 523 18 29.]

24284. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 92: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Voices in the Wilderness. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. Objectives: (a) We intend to deliberately violate the United States/United Nations' economic sanctions against the people of Iraq. (b) We demand that the government of the United States end these immoral and unjust sanctions or prosecute us to the full extent of the law. (c) We invite others to join us or to begin their own project to lift these sanctions. (d) We will personally and publicly declare our intention to the US Attorney General. (e) We will solicit medical relief supplies and continually campaign to lift the sanctions. The war of economic sanctions, which began in 8/1990, continues even now. (f) Members of our group will openly and publicly transport supplies through US Customs and UN checkpoints and into Iraq. There, they will be delivered to the people. We recognize that we could be stopped at any point for a variety of reasons. In that event, we will rely on nonviolent action to continue our effort.

Why are we doing this? In the five years since the Persian Gulf War, as many as 576000 children have died as a result of sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations Security Council, according to a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). If the blockade continues, UNICEF tells u.s., 1.5 million more children will eventually suffer malnutrition or a variety of unchecked illnesses because the sanctions make antibiotics and other standard medicines impossible to get. Yet the UN Security Council and the US government continue to defend a blockade whose highest casualty rate is among those under five years old. We can no longer remain party to this slaughter in the desert.

Who are we? We are teachers, social workers, parents, church workers, friends. Five years ago we opposed the Persian Gulf War in a variety of nonviolent ways. Some lived on the border between the opposing armies before and during part of the war; others traveled to Iraq immediately before and after the war. Still others filled the streets of the US to decry the war. Many have witnessed the consequences of sanctions firsthand and maintained contact with NGOs that continually attempt to deliver relief supplies to neediest groups and individuals in Iraq. We oppose the development, storage and use—in any country—of any weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical, biological or economic. We advocate active development of effective nonviolent methods of social struggle. What is the penalty for violating these sanctions? We understand that the maximum penalty for violating the Treasury Department law regarding shipments to Iraq is a $1 million fine, twelve years in prison and an administrative penalty of $2500000. If you would like to add your name or your support, travel with a future delegation to Iraq, send medical supplies or donations, organize a similar campaign in your area, or publicize this project, please contact us at the address below. [Voices in the Wilderness, 1460 W.st Carmen Ave., Chicago IL 60640, USA; (312) 784-8065; fax: (312) 784-8837; e-mail: kkelly@alics.apc.org]
By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 93: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Kerbala Hospital Fund. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The Kerbala Hospital Fund, Iraq, is a project initiated by Barbara Nimri Aziz. Its goal is to generate and funnel assistance to a specific hospital that was brought almost to a standstill by the five years of sanctions. Funds are sought to purchase food and basic medical supplies according to priorities set by the hospital’s doctors. Kerbala Hospital is no different than most hospitals across Iraq today. Wards are closing and surgery has come to a halt because of lack of supplies. Trained doctors cannot work because of the conditions. Medical journals have been available for over five years. The hospital has two ambulances where it once had thirty-six. It no longer functions as an emergency center for more than forty local clinics throughout the governorate. Dr. Kirim Naffi and Dr. Aziz Ali are dedicated senior staff at the hospital. With their advice and ongoing cooperation, Aziz established the Kerbala Hospital Fund to help reequip the hospital with some of its most basic equipment and supplies. The monies collected will be used to purchase supplies in Jordan for shipping to Iraq, the quickest and least expensive method. Iraqi officials have no objection to these supplies being designated for the Kerbala Hospital Center. They can be readily imported. The first shipment is expected in 4/1996. Funds are sought for basic supplies. $100 can purchase 40 kg of milk, or twenty sheets, or seven blankets, or sets of wires and discs for cardiovascular treatment and basic antibiotics. We are also seeking to accumulate several thousand dollars to obtain an oxygen machine to be used locally to manufacture oxygen to distribute to other hospitals to help them restore their surgical services. Please send $100, or more if you can. This is tax-deductible. Make check out to “Islamic Center of Long Island” and designate the “Kerbala Hospital Fund.” Send to: Dr. Barbara N. Aziz, 160 Sixth Ave., New York, NY 10013, USA. [=]

24286. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 94: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Peoples Rights Fund. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The People’s Rights Fund is a small foundation with limited resources that has channeled its support to projects often considered too controversial for more traditional funders. This has included the production of educational material opposing sanctions against defenseless populations, and combating racism and anti-Arab bigotry during the buildup to the Gulf War against Iraq. Its grants allowed the production of leaflets and other materials for the first US demonstrations against the Gulf War. It has also helped provide informational material for major rallies against the blockade of Cuba. A grant from the People’s Rights Fund initiated the work on this book, the children are dying. The People’s Rights Fund is a nonprofit, tax-exempt, educational organization. It depends on contributions from people who understand that grassroots activism can mobilize progressive public opinion into a powerful force. It has supported projects that use literature and/or video and have mobilized both small groups and great public assemblies to protect and advance the rights of the poor, the powerless, and the oppressed. For more information or to send a donation, write to: People’s Rights Fund 39 West 14th Street, 206 New York, NY 10011, USA. [=]

24287. International Action Center; et. al. The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: reports by FAO, Ramsey Clark: An Appeal By World Leaders To The United States Government and the Security Council of the United Nations: End the Use of Sanctions As a Weapon on War: Part 95: Organizing Opposition to Sanctions: Other Organizations. New York: World Forum Inc., 1996. The following organizations are among the many groups that are organizing against sanctions on Iraq: Women for Mutual Security, Coordinator: Margarita Papandreou 1, Romilias Str., GR. 14671 Kastri, Greece Tel: (01) 88 43 202; fax: (01) 80 12 850. Gesellschaft Kultur des Friedens, Am Lustnauer Tor 4, 72074 Tuebingen, Germany Tel: (07071) 52200; fax: (07071) 24905.
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26000. "Education and Health: Schoolbag; Suspension of Classes at Al-Umma College", in Biladi-Jerusalem Times, November 17, 1995, p. 12. Students at Al-Umma College in the Dahiyet Barid neighborhood of Jerusalem announced the suspension of classes for two lectures. During that time, students held a sit-in protest against the College Board of Trustees' decision to allocate the college for women only. The Students' Council called on the board to reconsider the decision showing them the results of a questionnaire which stated the majority of students support the idea of keeping the college co-ed. Twenty-three male students along with three hundred and twenty-three female students are studying at Al-Umma College. Sa'id Jamjoum, the college president, said he is hurt by this decision, but it is not the right time for students to call for a strike. The Board of Trustees Chairman, Hassan Qiq said the board has found it is more suitable to allocate the college for girls only for reasons of order. On the other hand, the partial strike announced by the teachers of Al-Umma college has entered its second week 11/15/1995. The teachers are determined to continue their strike protesting against the denial of the administration to pay their health and national insurance contributions, which have stopped after Jordan announced its severance of administrative ties with the West Bank. [=]

26001. "Foreign Visitors Honor Memory of Late President Kim II Sung", in People's Korea, October 8, 1994, p. 3. Many delegations and delegates from various countries, foreign diplomatic envoys and embassy officials in Pyongyang paid condolence visits to the statue of late President Kim II Sung on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang. Listed below are their names carried by the Korean Central News Agency in 9/94: Narto Erawan, department director of the Ministry of Information of Indonesia; Bhichai Rattakul, former leader of the Democratic Party of Thailand and Chairman of the Party Advisory Committee; Sawanit Kongsiri, Thai Ambassador to Korea; Pallab Sen Gupta, secretary general of the World Federation of Democratic Youth; Anthony Logulu Butele, minister of State of the Presidential Office of Uganda; Gouk Dure, secretary general of the International Liaison Committee for Reunification and Peace in Korea; Ogami Kenichi, secretary general of the International Institute of the Juche Idea; Aleksand Kaputo, former Soviet Ambassador to Korea; Marwan Sudah, secretary of Information and Foreign Affairs of the Arab Islamic Democratic Movement of Jordan; Candelaria Rodriguez, Cuban lawyer; Giancarlo Elia Valori, secretary general of the Italian Institute of International Relations; Fukuda Hajime, member of the Central Executive Committee and Director of the Organizational Department of the Social Democratic Party of Japan; Inoki Kenji, leader of the Sports Peace Party in Japan; Giancarlo Elia Valori, secretary general of the Italian Institute of International Relations; Ioan Lazar, Romanian Ambassador to Korea; Ramadan Muhamad El Labbi, acting secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau of Libya in Korea; Sarat Sinkaya, professor of the Institute of Buddhism of Japan; The delegation of the Foreign Ministry of Thailand led by Don Pramudwinai, minister of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Thailand; The delegation of the Forestry Science and Technology of the Academy of Forestry of Heilongjiang Province, China; The delegation of the Beijing Foreign Studies University headed by their President Wang Fuxiang; The family of Otto Grafewohle, former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic; The delegation of the Russian Research Center of Kimjongilism headed by its Chief Mikhail Konkin; The delegation of the researchers of the International Institute of the Juche Idea led by Takara Yusei; The Jilin City Friendship Delegation of China; The delegation of the Jilin Provincial Exports Exhibition; The delegation of Japanese Scholars led by Mushakoji Kinhide, professor of Meiji Gakuin University of Japan; The delegation of the Spanish Communist Party led by Antonio Joaquin Solera Lopez, general secretary of the Murcia Regional Committee of the Party; The delegation of the Center of Indian Trade Unions; and The friendship visiting group of the Italian Committee for Reunification and Peace in Korea. [=]

26002. "Girl, 12, Dies Before Operation [Heba Shaaban of Jordan died while waiting for an operation in Israel; her parents had sought operation in Israel to save her life; the Israeli government pledged $6000 toward the $40000 operation, but the girl died before the balance of the money could be raised; the Israeli offer of medical services was seen as a landmark in better relations between Israel and Jordan, but the price demanded was too high for the impoverished family, and the time to raise the money demanded by Hadassah Hospital too much]", in Olympian, November 13, 1994, p. A4. [TXT]

26003. "Hillary Rodham Clinton In Solidarity With Zionism, Shuns Muslims and Christians", in Prime News (CNN), October 27, 1994. While Bill Clinton has tried to give the appearance of impartially on his Mideast mission, Hillary Clinton, as first lady, has taken advantage of her time in Israel to visibly state her loyalty to the state of Israel. Hillary Clinton signalled her unmistakable commitment to Israel and Zionism by her worshipping of the Wailing Wall in annexed East Jerusalem, while she publicly rejected any visit to the Holy places of Muslims and Christians. Her public solidarity with Zionism presented a measured insult to Christians and Muslims, presenting in public what her husband Bill must dissimilate. [TXT]

26004. "News In Brief: "The Middle East", in Crescent International, June 1-15, 1996, p. 2. The New York-based Human Rights Middle East Watch, unable to condemn zionist brutalities outright, watered down its criticism of Israeli crimes in Lebanon by accusing the Hizbullah also of attacking civilian areas. The American group perhaps believes that fighting to liberate one's territory from foreign aggressors is a crime. The Hizbullah attacked Israeli occupation troops on May 19 inside the so-called zionist security zone in Southern Lebanon. The Hizbullah announced that two Israeli soldiers were killed while the zionists admitted to one being wounded. Israeli tanks then shelled a Lebanese village wounding one woman, in complete violation of the accord they had signed with US help at the end of April. Jordan's Medical Association condemned on May 15 the organizers of an Amman medical congress for inviting Israeli doctors to participate. Bassem Dajani, head of the 11000-strong JMA, said organizers in the Royal Medical Services, failed to tell local doctors that 20 Israeli doctors were taking part in the international meeting which had started a day earlier. Jordan's 80000 professionals --doctors, engineers and nurses-- are completely opposed to any dealings with the zionists. While professionals in Jordan were maintaining their boycott of the zionist invasion, a Jewish woman, Avital Harel, working at the zionist embassy, decided to have her baby in Amman on May 20. This was the first (official) Jewish birth in Jordan. Perhaps the zionists would now lay claim to this part of Jordan as well. [=]
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www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

26005. -------. "Peace Pact Comes Too Late To Save Sick Jordanian Girl", in Seattle Times, November 13, 1994. p. A12. [TXT] Heba Shaaban, a 12-year old Jordanian girl, died in an Israeli hospital, waiting for an operation her family could not afford. Rabin had publicly offered the operation as an emblem of the benefits of peace, but soon privately changed the offer to a 10% discount on the operation.

26006. -------. "Weekly Review: Qalqilya Calls for Waqf Representation", in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), February 22, 1993. p. 12-13. 2/14/93: Qalqilya's Chamber of Commerce called upon the secretary general of the Waqf (Islamic Trust) to establish and office in the city. They said that according to Jordanian law, Qalqilya is considered an independent unit, separate from Tulkarm.

Currently, Qalqilya residents are forced to travel to Tulkarm for everything from marriage certificates to inheritance hearings.

On the same note, the Chamber of Commerce asked the Waqf to persuade Saudi Arabian authorities to allow a greater number of pilgrims from Qalqilya access to Mecca this year.

Only 400 people were allowed to register. Among those, 100 are considered to be on the waiting list. [Al-Fajr] [=]

26007. -------. "Women Demand Empowerment", in Biladi-Jerusalem Times Palestinian Weekly (Occupied Territories), September 23, 1994. pp. 1, 14 A four-day conference on women, justice and law was officially inaugurated 9/15/94 in East Jerusalem, titled "Toward the Empowerment of Palestinian Women."

The conference was organized by a committee of Palestinian activists concerned with women's rights and affairs, and sponsored by Al-Haq, an affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists.

The conference was the culmination of a year long campaign throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip to raise awareness about the law can be used to secure better civil, political and economic rights for Palestinian women, particularly those living under the Israeli occupation.

The aim of the conference was to adopt a plan of action to improve the rights of Palestinian women through the law in six areas of concern: education; health; social welfare and work; civil and political life; protection against violence; family and personal status. Six working groups were formed to examine target areas and to draft a plan to be discussed and approved in the plenary.

"Between my family and my husband, I have lost my rights to education." This was the conclusion of one Palestinian woman participating in the conference, whose personal testimony was presented in a mock trial.

The court heard testimonies from four women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They exposed the complex pressures of living in a harsh and unforgiving, traditional patriarchal society. It also demonstrated that Israel's prolonged military occupation has only served to reinforce the archaic religious and traditional laws.

Islah Jad, a lecturer at Birzeit University, discussed the effect of law between the theory and practice, and confirmed that women must concentrate their efforts on abolishing all political discrimination against women. She emphasized that there must be equal work opportunities in Palestinian society.

Jad insisted that it is important to establish a women's department in the authority to promote a clear program, to supervise the commitment of the various ministries and departments to women's rights.

Lawyer Hanan Bakri, from the Women's Center for Social Legal Guidance, talked about the legal and social realities of women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. She clarified the existence of two different concepts: the economic and social equality for men and women, which has led to difficulties in dealing with the issue of women as a main and fundamental matter.

Bakri insisted that there should be awareness and an improvement in the literacy level of women in order to change society's negative concepts. "We have to legislate special laws in the interest of women rights."

During the second day of the conference, discussions were held on the women's experiences in legislating laws in the countries in the south hemisphere.

Hafiz Shuqeir, a representative of the Tunisian Democratic Women's Society, pointed out that in spite of the fact that women represent 40% of the population in Tunis, only 4% participate in political life. Furthermore, there is only one woman government minister.

Lawyer Asma Khader, head of the Jordanian Women's Union presented the topic of Jordanian women's experience in enacting laws. She pointed out to the other participants that the law is not absolute and can be changed. "The law is just when it is based on democracy."

She recommended that Palestinian women should benefit from the experience of Jordanian women and not repeat the same mistakes.

Rosaline Neiman, representative of the Legal Services Center at West Cape Town University in South Africa, talked about the transitional period in her country. She described the period as a transformation from a racist to democratic regime.

Other women participating in the conference discussed many important issues in the life of women in the West Bank and Gaza. They talked about arranged marriages in the context of the current family status law and the rigid social custom disenfranchise women legally and socially. They also discussed the fact that women have no rights to child custody and her status as a divorcee makes her a social liability to her own family.

According to one woman's testimony, the husband habitually exploited the weakness of his wife's position, beating her to the extent that she lost her second child, stealing her gold, and using her a a cover for his affairs with other women.

The participants argued that divorce in such cases, even for educated women, results in the woman losing her children. In addition, she faces enormous difficulties of social re-entry, and often education, work and social opportunities are barred to her.

In another case presented to the tribunal, the corruption of the Christian courts has allowed a husband to delay, for 10 years, divorce proceedings brought about his wife, as he bribes the clerks and officials to keep the case open, to prevent her re-marrying.

In another case, a physically handicapped woman faced intense hostility from her friend's family, even though he himself is physically handicapped.

The working group that examined the issues of social welfare and work, confirmed that the society should provide equality in wages. The group prepared a plan to protect the rights of women in case they are fired as a result of marriage or pregnancy.

As for the group that examined family and personal status law, it agreed on the importance of raising the legal age for marriage for women to 18. The group also agreed that no marriage should take place if either side disapproves. It also insisted that the subject of family and personal status be taught at schools and demanded to have an obligatory medical checkup for couples before marriage.

Regarding the group that examined the civil and political life, it gave high priority to equality and democracy, and called for the amendment or abolishment of all laws that lead to discrimination between the two sexes.

The group that discussed the protection of women against violence insisted on the importance of establishing special centers for the victims of violence. It agreed on the importance of commitment to human rights and that the PNA should fight against all kinds of violence in society.

The working group that examined the issue of education underscored the importance of making education obligatory but free until the age of 18. It also insisted on providing equal opportunities for work between the sexes, and called on the PNA to provide equal opportunities and raise educational standards for women.

As for health, the group confirmed that health services should be provided and that society must guarantee free medical care, including psychological care to all of the Palestinian citizens.

The four-day conference ended 9/19/1993 with the adoption of the accordes issued by the UN to eradicate all kinds of discrimination against women. It called on the Palestinian National Authority to enforce equality between women and men in Palestinian society.
In their final statement, the conference participants called on the PNA to consider the accords a reference for the constitution of the future Palestinian state. [-]

26008. AID. "Appendix B: Fact Sheet: AID's Women in Development Program: Highlights of the Agency's Women in Development Actions: Revolution and Pilot Activities: Part 2", in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger. United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 87-97. e) PPC/WID will continue the Gender Resource Awareness in National Development (GRAND) project, a micro-computer simulation model that demonstrates the economic impact that effective participation of women and girls can have in different economic sectors. Models for gender resource analysis have been developed for Pakistan and Jordan, and work is nearing completion in Lesotho and Senegal. The programs are tailored to each country situation incorporating such sectors as agriculture, small and micro enterprise, education, and water/sanitation/health. This microcomputer policy-dialogue project will assist Agency personnel and host-country policy and decision-makers in gaining a better understanding of the direct and indirect benefits of women's contributions to economic development. In the long term, the GRAND project objective is to institutionalize the process of gender-relevant analysis to maximize the efficiency of development planning.

f) PPC/WID also co-funded with USAID/Ecuador the compilation of conference papers presented at a PPC/WID co-funded seminar in Quito, Ecuador. The recently completed book, "The Informal Sector, Micro-Enterprise and Women's Work in Latin America," by ICRW, focuses on low-income women's access to credit and includes chapters on technical assistance and training, the role of lending institutions, case studies of selected micro-enterprise credit programs, and the impact of credit programs on the poor. A Spanish version will be published by the Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales in Ecuador in summer, 1988.

g) PPC/WID, through ICRW, has also completed analysis of several key development issues with regard to their impact on and importance for women. One such area of analysis is AID's trade development policy and support for the development of ties between private enterprises in developed and developing countries, including offshore production by US companies abroad. An analysis of "Women and Export Manufacturing: A Review of the Issues and AID Policy" shows that AID's emphasis on export promotion has more potential to contribute to women in development goals than previously realized. Moreover, the consideration of gender issues has implications for policies to improve the overall development impact of AID's export promotion activities. [-]


USAID's efforts to assist Chad in restarting its economy have focused on the Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) credit project. PPC/WID technical assistance has provided a study of gender-related problems experienced by the project. Specifically, USAID is concerned about the lack of credit applications from women. The scope of work (SOW) written by the technical assistance team will involve surveying women to determine the constraints to their applications for loans.

In 1988, PPC/WID developed a grant to the International Executive Service Corps (IESC) and Women's World Banking (WWB). These two organizations will team up in the Dominican Republic to select up to 8 women-owned or operated businesses in a pilot project to test a new credit model. IESC will provide technical assistance to the firms, and WWB will follow-up with loan guarantees. The objective is to assess if the combination of technical assistance, training, and credit can assist small, local women's businesses to expand in the domestic market as well as the international market.

The Bureau for Science and Technology's (S & T)'s Assistance to Resource Institutions for Enterprise Support (ARIES) project is designed to help increase the effectiveness of institutions that promote micro and small-scale enterprises. ARIES enhances USAID's capacities to implement women in development policies in the small-scale enterprise sector by integrating gender issues into strategies and programs, analyzing constraints faced by women entrepreneurs, and developing administrative capacity within the intermediary organizations charged with implementing income-generating activities for women. In Jordan, a technical assistance team from PPC/WID provided assistance to the Mission in the design of the Small Entrepreneur Project, which has as its objective the promotion of growth and employment within the micro and small-enterprise sector of the economy. In this ARIES sectoral study, PPC/WID technical assistance served to guide the team to focus on specific issues relating to women small-scale entrepreneurs.

The Office of WID plans to expand its capability to address small and micro-scale enterprises with a "buy-in" to a major AID contract by the Bureau for Private Enterprise. This buy-in will provide PPC/WID with access to a wide range of expertise to support Missions in market-based economic growth strategies, to provide technical and policy assistance to Missions, to consolidate and institutionalize private sector programs, and to promote policy dialogue with foreign governments in order that they make necessary public policy reforms and revisions to encourage investment and jobs-creation in the domestic economy. [-]
expanding the selection of contraceptives at pharmacies.

(3) Protecting the Environment: Improved Quality and Increased Quantity of Water Available for Use. Social progress and sustainable economic growth is critically linked to making good use of limited natural resources. USAID’s environmental strategy emphasizes water quality improvement and conservation to help reverse the critical degradation and accelerated depletion and improve the management of Jordan’s limited water resources. USAID is in the process of setting achievement targets and collecting baseline data for this component of its strategy.

(4) Building Democracy: More Efficient and Accountable Governance. Assistance to Jordan is provided under USAID’s regional strategic objective to achieve more efficient and accountable governance. No regional strategic objectives have been developed. Building on the successful 11/8/1993 multiparty parliamentary elections, Jordan will be receiving USAID support to carry out democracy-related pilot activities.

USAID MISSION RESULTS: USAID’s current strategy began in FY 1993. A report on performance of this strategy is planned for late in 1994 when data become available.

(1) Broad-Based Economic Growth: Increased Foreign Exchange Earnings. USAID assistance has helped the Jordanian Government change policies and regulations that inhibit foreign trade and investment. Jordan has enacted a harmonized system of tariff rates; import and export license requirements have been eliminated; tax incentives for exporters have been increased so that 70% of profits are exempted from taxes, up from a 40% exemption previously in effect; and Jordan has applied for membership in GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). USAID activities have led to the formation of two new export associations, which will help their members overcome the problems private firms face in financing, producing and marketing internationally competitive goods. Steps to improve resource management at cultural and environmental sites, such as Madaba, Mount Nebo and Petra, are underway and support the tourist industry as part of a broad-based attempt to enhance Jordan’s foreign exchange earning capacity.

(2) Stabilizing Population Growth: Reduced Fertility. USAID’s work at the national level has resulted in increased awareness among policy makers of the negative consequences of rapid population growth. A national birth spacing plan, developed by the National Population Commission with USAID funding, was approved recently by the Government. Family planning services will be integrated with ongoing health care services offered by government health centers and clinics. US assistance has reached down to the grass-roots level, helping 270 pharmacies provide family planning devices to couples in their neighborhoods. To ensure effective participation by indigenous agencies in USAID-supported birth spacing activities, capacity-building technical assistance is being provided for the National Population Commission and the Jordanian Association for Family Planning and Protection (JAFPP). The number of JAFPP clinics has increased from six to twelve and its annual intrauterine device (IUD) insertions have increased from 12000 in 1980 to 17000 in 1993. JAFPP now serves one-third of all IUD clients in the country.

(3) Protecting the Environment: Improved Quality and Increased Quantity of Water Available for Use. Social progress and sustainable economic growth is critically linked to making good use of limited natural resources. USAID’s environmental strategy emphasizes water quality improvement and conservation to help reverse the critical degradation and accelerated depletion and improve the management of Jordan’s limited water resources. USAID is in the process of setting achievement targets and collecting baseline data for this component of its strategy.

(4) Building Democracy: More Efficient and Accountable Governance. USAID has already provided support for a parliamentary needs assessment and, based on that assessment, is furnishing computer equipment and software to establish an information and document management system for the Parliament is being provided by USAID. The equipment will be installed in 3-4/1994. USAID supported a voter education campaign aimed at Jordanian women in the 11/1993 parliamentary elections. Its impact is being assessed, but indications are that women’s registration and voting increased as a result. Two electoral opinion polls also were supported.

OTHER FY 1995 USAID-MANAGED ACTIVITIES: None.

OTHER DONORS: In 1992, the United States was the third largest donor with about 16% of total donor funding. Other leading donors are Japan, the World Bank and Germany.

FY 1995 PROMOTING PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REQUEST: The Administration requests $8.75 million in Promoting Peace funds, which includes $1.55 million of regionally funded activities, and $7.495 million in Sustainable Development funds for: broad-based economic growth ($600000), stabilizing population growth ($6.75 million), protecting the environment ($640000) and building democracy ($45000). [USAID Mission Director: William T. Oliver.]

26011. Amnesty International. Press Release: Jordan Grants Amnesty International Groups Legal Recognition. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [1992] The Jordanian government granted legal registration to Amnesty International groups on Oct. 1 during a visit by an Amnesty International delegation. The 250 Jordanian members will now be able to undertake wide range of campaign activities. The government also reiterated its commitment to human rights protection. The Amnesty International delegation visited Amnesty International groups in Amman and Irbid and attended the opening session of “Amnesty International Week,” organized by members in Amman and opened by Queen Noor al-Hussein. Delegations of children from around the country performed songs and plays on human rights themes, then conducted a three-day seminar on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. A Public Security Department helicopter showered the surrounding areas with thousands of copies of the Convention. A.F’s Secretary General Ian Martin was received by King Hussein bin Talal and Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal and met with the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, as well as with members of parliament. The Amnesty International delegation discussed Jordan’s role in human rights promotion regionally and nationally and A.F’s membership development in the country. Amnesty International welcomed the lifting of the state of emergency but urged the authorities to strengthen safeguards for detainees: introduce the right of appeal before the State Security Court; and end all executions. Amnesty International also welcomed the government’s clearly expressed commitment to human rights education.

26012. Bishara, Ghassan. "Arab & Diaspora News: Christopher addresses ADC conference, Part 3," in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), May 3, 1993. p.7. By touching on Islam, Christopher was trying to draw a line between Islam and what are considered to be extremist groups which operate in the name of Islam and which seek to establish Islamic states. US officials have pointed to Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah, accusing them of sponsoring what the United States calls “acts of terrorism.”

President Aristide of Haiti, also a speaker at the convention, was received very warmly. He described ADC members as belonging to the global family of peace, and its purpose as being an honorable one. He appealed to the audience to help his country and people by writing letters to their Congressmen and women, to assist Haiti in reinstating democracy.

Deputy Bosnian Ambassador to the UN Soffet Cotovic, who substituted for Muhamed Sacibey, presented a very moving speech about the conditions in Bosnia. For more than year now, he said, Bosnia and its Muslim population has been facing what has been regularly described as the worst atrocities witnessed by Europe since World War II. Thousands of men, women, children and old people have been killed there at the hands of Serbs, and no less than 80,000 Bosnian Muslim women have been raped.

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Jerusalem. PM Yitzhak Rabin became interested in the case, announcing protests in Gaza and 17 had been injured by rubber bullets in the West and Jordan, her parents sent a fax to the Hadassah Hospital in reported that 18 Palestinians had suffered gunshot wounds during

Includes photograph of Heba Shaaban. Jordanian child Heba Shaaban. According to a report by the Associated Press, on 25 March four

Marrow Transplant In Israel”, in Seattle Times, November 8, 1994. p. A9. and the West Bank. One Palestinian was deported by Israeli troops to

needing a bone marrow transplant, may be going to an Israeli hospital for Palestinians were killed and 35 others were injured in some of the

26013. Bishara, Ghassan. “Culture: Washington Loses a Palestinian Landmark: Part 2”, in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), June 14, 1993. p. 11. Mama Aysha received some schooling in a Muslim school for girls in Jerusalem. And like most Arab girls of her generation, she married her first cousin. She divorced soon after. She married again, but this time her husband died. The third time, she married a businessman.

The political conflict of the late '40s in Palestine affected Mama Aysha like it did many other Palestinians, and forced here to look for other venues in which to continue her life.

According to Helen Thomas, longtime White House Correspondent for United Press International, who became Mama's best friend in town, the Palestinian woman came to America after "getting in trouble with the Jordanian government."

"As I remember, she had been cussing the king," Thomas explained. "One day, at the market, she said to the king, 'Abdullah, you can't rule us like this.' The king, of course, had heard what she said. He sent her husband to prison. So she left her husband and came to America."

In Washington, Mama Aysha began to work as a cook at the Syrian Embassy, where she met Thomas for the first time. The two became instant friends and kept in touch all through the years.

Mama's ambition pushed her in the direction of ventures of her own. She left the Syrian Embassy and, with a Syrian partner, opened a restaurant called the Desert Inn. Mama Aysha later opened another restaurant, The Caravan, with an Arab-American she had met. She and the American soon married. Finally, Mama opened the Calvert Cafe in 1960, and that's the one that flourished to become one of the best-known ethnic restaurants in the American capital.

Among her guests over the years were former US Secretary of state Henry Kissinger, prominent members of the Arab diplomatic corps in Washington, Middle East professors from and many universities here, and many others.

"Once she made a friend, she kept them for life," Thomas told the Washington Post.

Mama Aysha who could not live in the Middle East, kept much of that area's customs and generosity. Those who know here recall that, when she sensed that a customer didn't have enough money to pay for a meal, she'd let him/her eat on the house. Another tradition she kept from the Old Country was her inherent mistrust of banks. Al-Majal wrote that she kept her day's income in her pockets. When she had to pay for a delivery, she would pull out the cash and pay, instead of writing a check--which she could not do, because she couldn't read or write.

It is true that she was illiterate, "but she sure knew what the figures on the bottom line said," Thomas told the Post.

The woman will surely be missed in this city. [—]

26014. Boustany, Nora. "The Gift of Peace: Jordanian Child To Get Marrow Transplant In Israel", in Seattle Times, November 8, 1994. p. A9. Includes photograph of Heba Shaaban. Jordanian child Heba Shaaban needing a bone marrow transplant, may be going to an Israeli hospital for the operation. After the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, her parents sent a fax to the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem. PM Yitzhak Rabin became interested in the case, announcing to the Jordanian child: 'you shall receive the first gift of peace'. Israel has stated it would cover the full cost of the $65000 operation as a sign of goodwill toward Jordan. The girl noted: 'I am not afraid at all, but I pray every day to God to heal me. When I see Israelis, I can do nothing but thank them, thank peace and thank the governments of Jordan and Israel because they have made all these procedures so simple for us. When I get better, I will become a doctor and then I will treat all the children. I will cure Jordanians and Israelis'. [TXT]

26015. DPR. "Action Taken By The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People", in Division of Palestinian Rights, April 1989. In a letter dated 4/3/1989 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/44/209-S/20564), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew attention to an excerpt from the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988 issued by the United States Department of State, which contained information on the human rights situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. In view of the importance of this information, the Committee, at its 162nd meeting, held on 3/10/1989, decided to request that it be issued as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. The Chairman accordingly conveyed this request to the Secretary-General. A letter also dated 4/3/1989 (A/44/208-S/20563) conveyed the following information to the Secretary-General:

"In my capacity as Chairman of th Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to draw your urgent attention to the continuing policy of repression by Israel, the occupying Power, against Palestinians in the occupied territory. Several grave incidents have again taken place since my letter to you of 3/3/1989 (A/43/999-S/20505), as reported below. On 7 March, as reported by Reuters, Israeli troops stormed a United Nations medical clinic at Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza and, according to the medical staff, 15 Palestinians were wounded. A doctor said that the soldiers, who stormed the clinic after residents hurled stones at them from inside the building, broke everything, including windows and the laboratory equipment. Ha'aretz. The New York Times and Al-Fair reported, on 7 and 8 March, that Israeli troops had shot and killed a Palestinian in Nablus while "hunting for the killers" of a soldier who had died there 10 days earlier. The troops also arrested two Palestinians suspected of responsibility for the soldier's death, then blew up their houses. It was also reported that about 130 Palestinians were injured in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, 32 Palestinians were wounded by army gunfire in widespread protests against the deaths, on 6 March, of three Gaza residents, of whom two had been shot and one had died in a Gaza Strip gaol after allegedly having been beaten to death by Israeli interrogators. On 9, 10 and 12 March, Ma'ariv and Al-Fair reported the killing of four Palestinians, of whom three were shot by the army and one was electrocuted when soldiers ordered him to climb an electricity pole to remove a Palestinian flag. Over 20 Palestinians were injured in various incidents. According to Al-Fajr of 13 and 15 March, at least another 21 Palestinians were shot and wounded during those two days. The New Yor Times reported on 20 March that, the day before, four Palestinians had been killed and 18 had been wounded by the Israeli army. On 22 March, according to The Washington Post of 23 March, Israeli soldiers fired on protesters in Tulkarm refugee camp, killing an 11-year-old boy and injuring at least 30 others. The same source also reported that dozens of Jewish settlers from Ariel in the West Bank had driven to the Palestinian village of Bidya, smashed windows and burned trees and tires in a factory courtyard. Israeli sources said the raid had followed a firebomb attack on an Ariel vehicle and the stoning of a bus, neither of which had caused injuries. According to Aience France Presse, one Palestinian was killed and 12 others were shot and wounded on 23 March in various incidents in Gaza and the West Bank. One Palestinian was deported by Israeli troops to Jordan. According to a report by the Associated Press, on 25 March four Palestinians were killed and 35 others were injured in some of the bloodiest outbreaks of anti-Israeli protest in the occupied territory. It was reported that 18 Palestinians had suffered gunshot wounds during protests in Gaza and 17 had been injured by rubber bullets in the West Bank. The New York Times reported on 28 March that, a day earlier, a 4-year-old Palestinian boy had been shot to death during a demonstration

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in the West Bank village of Rur Rad. The paper also reported that a freelance Palestinian journalist, Hassan Jibril, had been beaten and shot by Israeli soldiers. Acence France Presse reported on the same date that eight other Palestinians had been injured, three of them gravely. On 30 March, according to Aaence FrancPresse, 18 Palestinians were shot and wounded in the area of Hbron. On the same date, The New York Times reported that the entire Gaza Strip and several towns and refugee camps in the West Bank were placed under curfew and that Palestinians from the occupied West Bank were being barred from entering Israel to prevent demonstrations in connection with the Land Day observance. According to the New York Times of 31 March and 2 April, five other Palestinians were shot to death in the occupied territory during the said observance. A result of the Israeli policy of armed repression, Palestinian fatalities since the beginning of the intifadah in 12/1987 have reached at least 545 by the end of March, based on figures published by the Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights. At the same time, the imposition of collective punishment on an increasingly large scale has resulted in massive destruction. According to information collected by the organization just mentioned, over 100000 trees were uprooted by the Israeli army in 1988. Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man) has estimated that at least 672 Palestinian homes have been bulldozed since the beginning of the intifadah. View of the persistent resort to armed force by Israel, the occupying Power, and the continuing suffering and devastation in the occupied territories, the Committee wishes once again to protest vigorously against these repressive policies and practices, and to reiterate its appeal to you to take all possible measures to ensure the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under occupation and to intensify your efforts towards the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/176 of 12/15/1988.

In a subsequent letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 14 April 1989 (GU/1005-S/2092), the Chairman of the Committee drew urgent attention to the extremely serious escalation of violent attacks by Israeli troops and settlers against Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories. The full text of the letter is as follows:

"In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to draw your urgent attention to the extremely serious escalation of violent attacks in the last few days by Israeli troops and settlers against Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory. On 9 April, as it was reported by the New York Times, a 12-year-old boy died in Gaza after he was shot through the heart with a plastic bullet. In the West Bank a 60-year-old Palestinian was shot and killed when troops clashed with demonstrators. On 10 April, also according to the New York Times, an unidentified gunman opened fire with a submachine-gun at an entrance to the Old City of Jerusalem, killing one Palestinian and wounding three others. Witnesses said the assailant, who fled, was wearing an Israeli army uniform. Later the Israeli radio reportedly said it had received an anonymous phone call from a man who claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of an underground Jewish organization, called the Sikarikim. On 13 and 14 April, Reuters and the New York Times reported that para-military Israeli border police accompanied by men in civilian clothes believed to be settlers, shot and killed five and possibly as many as seven Palestinians during a pre-dawn raid on the West Bank village of Nahalin, near Bethlehem. At least 25 other Palestinians were reported wounded, two of them critically, in what hospital officials who treated the victims called "a massacre". The shooting took place when the Israeli police encountered unexpected and strong resistance from the villagers, who were already up and about at the early hour because of the Ramadan observance. The reports indicated that this was one of the highest casualty tolls in a single incident since the beginning of the intifadah. The same sources also reported that another Palestinian shot during demonstrations in Bethlehem last week has died of his wounds. With these latest victims, the total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers since the beginning of the intifadah has now reached at least 553.

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to strongly protest the escalation of repression by Israel, the occupying Power, against Palestinians in the occupied territory, and particularly the growing involvement in such attacks by armed Israeli settlers. The Committee considers that the international community is duty bound to redouble its efforts to ensure protection of the Palestinians under occupation and the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian territory, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War of 8/12/1949, and United Nations resolutions. The Committee also considers that it is incumbent on all parties concerned to further intensify all efforts towards the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/176 of 12/15/1988, which provides the only comprehensive, practical and overwhelmingly accepted framework for peace. [–]
without a screening process. Palestinian males between the ages of 16 and 25 who cross the bridge into Jordan must remain outside the territories for 9 months. Expedited entry for Palestinian residents crossing into Gaza at Rafah, and into the West Bank from the Allenby Bridge, went into effect in November. Travel documents and identification card for the residents of Gaza and Jericho are issued by the Palestinian Authority; residents in the rest of the West Bank continue to be issued documents by Israeli authorities. Obstacles to emigration, the parliamentary elections held in 1993 were free and fair. Voters may elect municipal officials and the lower house of Parliament, but overall decisionmaking authority remains with the King. [–]

26018. DS. "Jordan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Citizens are free to travel abroad and within Jordan, except in and through military areas. The law requires that Jordanian women and foreign women married to Jordanians must obtain written permission from a male guardian to travel abroad or apply for a passport. This requirement is normally enforced only when a married woman plans to travel abroad with children. Legal authorities will enforce requests from fathers to prevent their children from departing the country, even when traveling with their mothers. Many Palestinian residents are Jordanian citizens—with all the rights of citizenship. The Government authorizes other Palestinians to carry Jordanian travel documents. Palestinians must obtain permits from the Ministry of Interior for travel between the East Bank and the Israeli-occupied territories and neighboring states. The permits are routinely granted. In May the Government eased travel restrictions on Palestinians, allowing residents of the Occupied Territories to enjoy unlimited residence and travel in Jordan. Over 1.2 million Palestinian refugees are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The Government cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in assisting refugees. There have been no reports that the Government has expelled anyone with a valid claim to refugee status. [–]

26017. DS. "Jordan: Introduction", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a monarchy. Its Constitution concentrates a high degree of executive and legislative authority in the King, who determines domestic and foreign policy. The Prime Minister and Cabinet manage the daily affairs of government. The Parliament, which consists of a 40-member Senate appointed by the King, and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies elected by the people, is relatively weak and not an effective check on executive authority. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) share responsibility for maintaining internal security and have broad authority to monitor the activities of persons believed to be security risks. They continue to be implicated in human rights abuses. The Government revoked martial law in 1991, but important aspects of martial law remain, such as broad police powers. Jordan has a mixed economy with significant government participation in industry, transportation, and communications. Jordan has few natural resources and is financially dependent on foreign assistance and remittances from Jordanian nationals working abroad. Because of the Government’s policies during the Gulf War, Arab countries in the Gulf discontinued financial aid. The economy has been buffeted by high unemployment and inflation, and a sharp reduction of exports to Iraq due to United Nations sanctions. Human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of detainees, prolonged detention without charge, lack of due process, official discrimination against adherents of the Baha’i faith, and restrictions on women’s rights. Citizens do not have the right to change their form of government, although in recent years the King has taken some steps to increase participation in the political system. In 1992 the Government legalized the establishment of political parties and has held five parliamentary elections to date. The parliamentary elections held in 1993 were free and fair. The King may propose specific legislation for consideration. The King may also grant or deny citizenship, and has broad parameters of public policy. Appointments made by the King to Government seats and those appointed by the King, and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies elected by the people, is relatively weak and not an effective check on executive authority. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) share responsibility for maintaining internal security and have broad authority to monitor the activities of persons believed to be security risks. They continue to be implicated in human rights abuses. The Government revoked martial law in 1991, but important aspects of martial law remain, such as broad police powers. Jordan has a mixed economy with significant government participation in industry, transportation, and communications. Jordan has few natural resources and is financially dependent on foreign assistance and remittances from Jordanian nationals working abroad. Because of the Government’s policies during the Gulf War, Arab countries in the Gulf discontinued financial aid. The economy has been buffeted by high unemployment and inflation, and a sharp reduction of exports to Iraq due to United Nations sanctions. Human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of detainees, prolonged detention without charge, lack of due process, official discrimination against adherents of the Baha’i faith, and restrictions on women’s rights. Citizens do not have the right to change their form of government, although in recent years the King has taken some steps to increase participation in the political system. In 1992 the Government legalized the establishment of political parties and has held five parliamentary elections to date. The parliamentary elections held in 1993 were free and fair. The King may propose specific legislation for consideration. The King may also grant or deny citizenship, and has broad parameters of public policy. Appointments made by the King to Government seats and
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during the next session. At year's end, 6 of 31 ministers and 11 of 80 parliamentarians were of Palestinian descent. This representation is in large part the result of an electoral system which gives greater representation to south Jordan, which has few inhabitants of Palestinian origin. Women have the right to vote. Three women ran for Parliament in the 1993 election; one was elected to a seat reserved for Circassians. Women's groups encouraged women to vote, and in the Amman area, nearly half of those who voted were women. [=]

26020. DS. "Jordan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives. By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Although the law prohibits children under the age of 16 from working, child street peddlers may be observed on the streets of Amman. The Ministry of Social Development has a committee to address the problem and in most cases removes the children from the streets, returns them to their families, and provides the families with a monthly stipend. Corporal punishment in schools is prohibited. Although social workers say there is a significant incidence of child abuse within families, the problem is difficult to quantify. [=]

26021. DS. "Jordan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives. By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of testimony in court (see Section I.e.). Under Islamic law, or Sharia, female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's inheritance, while the non-Muslim widows of Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who need assistance. Under Sharia's law, the testimony of two women is required to equal the testimony of one man. This technically applies only in religious courts but is sometimes imposed in civil courts as well irrespective of religion. Men are able to obtain divorce more easily than women under Islamic law. Marriage and divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by special courts for each denomination. The Government provides men with more generous social security benefits than those for women. The Government continues pension payments of a deceased male civil servant to his heirs, but it discontinues the pension payments of a deceased female civil servant. By law, a married woman requires her husband's permission to obtain a passport. Married women do not have the legal right to confer citizenship on their children. However, they may confer citizenship on their non-Jordanian husbands who then may obtain citizenship for the children. Civil law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice this law is sometimes ignored. Social pressure against women pursuing a career is strong. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many professions, including engineering, medicine, education, and law. Women's groups stress that the problem of discrimination is not only one of law but also of women's lack of awareness of their rights or unwillingness to assert those rights. The Jordanian chapter of the Business and Professional Women's Club gives seminars on women's rights and assists women in establishing small businesses. Medics experts acknowledge that spousal violence against women occurs. Cultural norms constrain victims from seeking medical or legal help and frustrate a scientific assessment of the extent of the abuse. Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against their spouses, but in practice, familial and societal pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Nongovernmental organizations provide assistance to victims of domestic violence. Wife beating is technically grounds for divorce, but the husband may seek to demonstrate in court that the beating occurred because the wife was irreligious or did not obey him. This defense stems from a Koranic injunction that an irreligious or disobedient wife, not to live with him, to show her the error of her ways. It is within the discretion of a Shari's Court judge to deny a divorce in such cases. The Criminal Code stipulates a sentence of 1 year for persons found guilty of committing a 'crime of honor', which is the murder of a female, usually by a male relative, for alleged sexual misconduct. Even if the defense cannot meet the stringent condition to plead a crime of honor defense—the defendant must have witnessed the female victim engaging in intercourse-offenders rarely spend more than six months to two years in prison. By contrast, the penalty for murder is life. Women may not invoke the crime of honor defense for murdering a male relative under the same circumstances. The law restricts a crime of honor to one who surprises his wife or any close female relative committing adultery." [=]
Government may dissolve Parliament, and is the ultimate arbiter of domestic and foreign policy. In practice, the King sets the broad parameters of foreign and domestic policy while the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers exercise management of daily affairs. The Parliament—consisting of a 40-member Senate where members are appointed by the King and an 80-member lower house whose members are elected—is subordinate to the executive branch. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) have broad responsibility for internal security and wide powers to monitor segments of the population thought to pose a threat to the security of the regime. Although the Government revoked martial law directives in 1991, important elements of martial law, such as the broad scope of police powers, remain operative. Jordan has a mixed economy, with government participation in key sectors, including industrial production, transportation, and communications. The country has few natural resources and one of the highest population growth rates in the world. Jordan's stance during the Gulf war caused Arab Gulf states to suspend flows of financial aid. Nevertheless, the economy continued to show surprising strength in 1993, growing by a projected 6-7%. Growth during this period is in part attributable to investment of repatriated savings by returnees from the Gulf. Jordan continues to remain highly dependent on foreign assistance and remittances from its nationals abroad. The Jordanian economy was adversely affected by a reduction of exports to Iraq, a major trading partner, as a result of United Nations' sanctions against Iraq. The unemployment rate was at least 14% for the year, while the inflation rate moderated to approximately 5%. Jordan continued to show process in liberalizing the country's political system. As a result of the legalization of political parties in 1992, 20 political parties, running the gamut of leftist, centrist, and Islamist conservative parties, were licensed in 1992-1993. The King ratified a change from the previous bloc-voting system to a "one person, one vote-system in August. On 11/8/1992, the Government of Prime Minister Abd Al-Salam Al-Ma'ali supervised the country's first multiparty parliamentary elections since 1956. While there were some minor irregularities on polling day, international and domestic observers agreed that the parliamentary elections were essentially free and fair. Nevertheless, citizens still do not have the right to change their government. Other continuing human rights problems included the broad scope of police powers, abuse of prisoners, prolonged detention without charge, lack of fair trial in some security cases, official discrimination against adherents of the Bahai faith, and restrictions on women's rights.

26024. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Jordan: Part 13: Respect For Human Rights: Section 4: Governmental Attitude Regarding International and NGO Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. February 1994. Women experience legal discrimination regarding pension and social security benefits, inheritance, and divorce. Under Shari'a law, which applies to all Jordanian citizens, inheritance matters, a female heir's inheritance is only half that of a male heir. In practice, non-Muslim women occasionally have been able to obtain rulings based upon their own religious laws. The divorce law allows men to obtain a divorce more easily than women, but men may have to pay considerable compensation based on the original marriage contract. A woman whose husband takes additional wives may seek and obtain a divorce under Shari'a law. The law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice the law is sometimes ignored, and women are paid less. Under Shari'a law, a woman's testimony in court carries only half the value of that of a man. Tradition also constrains women's freedoms, particularly their entry into professional and academic realms. Nevertheless, some women have successfully entered the fields of engineering, medicine, and law, and women's issues are receiving increasing attention in the media and at symposia. Women's groups stress that the problem is not only one of law but also of social constraints, including women's lack of awareness of their rights or unwillingness to assert these rights. The Jordanian chapter of the Business & Professional Women's Club gives seminars on women's rights and assists women in establishing small businesses. Club members traveled to communities throughout Jordan during the election campaign and succeeded in increasing female voter registration and raising women's consciousness about the election process and their rights. Despite progress in these areas, overall change in women's status has been minimal. The Koran allows a husband to discipline his wife, which some men apparently interpret as a license to discipline with force. Sources in the medical field say that, while they know wife beating occurs, family and cultural norms constrain victims from seeking medical or legal help and prevent any realistic quantification of the extent of abuse. Many Jordanians consider it culturally unacceptable to highlight what is considered a private, family matter. The issue also is considered a private one by the police and the judiciary, and public discourse rarely focuses on incidents of spouse or child abuse. Legal avenues to pursue redress in cases of spouse abuse do exist. If a woman is abused by her husband, she can visit a medical doctor obtain a report documenting her injuries, submit the report to the police, and file a complaint in court based on this evidence. The court will then charge and try the husband. Assistance to victims of domestic violence is provided by nongovernmental organizations (nearly all of which operate with a government license). Wife beating is technically grounds for divorce, but the husband may demonstrate in court that the beating occurred because the wife was irreligious or did not obey him. It is within the discretion of the judge to deny a divorce in such case.

Jordanian labor law prohibits children under the age of 16 from working. It is only in the past few years that employment of underage children, child street peddlers, and child beggars have appeared. The Ministry of Social Development has set up a committee to address the problem and in most cases removes the children from the streets, returns them to their families, and provides them a monthly stipend. A November report of a 12-year-old girl's engagement to her 11-year old cousin, who reportedly had dropped out of school to work, reportedly caused a public outcry. The Jordanian Women's Union called on government officials to take strict measures, and the Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Development concurred that the engagement was unjust and unacceptable. Children under the age of 18 are excluded from capital punishment. Children convicted of crimes are held in special reform centers where they receive vocational training and are not detained with adults. Corporal punishment at schools is prohibited. There have been problems regarding custody of children born to foreign female domestic servants. For example, if such a child has been fathered by a Jordanian man, that child is subject to Sharia law. Currently, the Jordanian government is considering a law that would make it difficult for single foreign mothers to obtain a residence permit for children with a foreign father not present in Jordan. [↩]

26027. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Jordan: Part 17: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (e) Religious Minorities", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government does not recognize the Baha'i faith as a religion and Baha'is have suffered various forms of official discrimination. Baha'i identity cards are blank where religion is indicated. In September the Ministry of Education issued regulations that made the previously mandatory study of Islam by Baha'i students optional. In December the Ministry of Interior agreed to accept Baha'i marriage certificates as proof of marriage for the issuance of passports and other official identity documents. However, the Baha'i community still does not have its own court to handle personal status and family matters. Instead, these matters are handled by Islamic Sharia courts. Baha'i community property cannot be registered in the name of the community but must be registered in the names of individual members. [↩]

26028. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Jordan: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The labor laws forbid children under age 16 from working except in the case of professional apprentices, who are allowed to leave the standard education track and begin part-time (6 hours per day, no night shift) training at age 13. Ministry of Labor inspection teams attempt to enforce these laws. In practice, some underage children work, primarily in family businesses. Despite compulsory education (education is compulsory up to the 10th grade or age 15), a small number of children in more remote areas are kept from school by their parents in order to work. [↩]

26029. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Jordan: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There is no national minimum wage, but the Government periodically prepares and adjusts a minimum wage schedule for various trades, based on recommendations of an advisory panel composed of representatives of workers, employers, and the Government. The absolute minimum wage rate is estimated at $140 per month, inclusive of all allowances. Unskilled workers earning the lowest scheduled wage face increasing difficulties earning enough to provide a family a decent living by local standards. Laws mandate maximum work hours and paid leave, but these protections are not supposed to be enforced properly. Premium wages are not paid for work more than 40 hours per week (54 hours for hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees), and may not work more than 16 hours in any continuous period or more than 60 hours overtime per month. Employees are entitled to 1 day off each week. Domestic servants in Jordan are not protected by Jordanian labor laws. Therefore, there is no legal forum to address their labor grievances. Large numbers of Sri Lankan and Filipino workers do not have the benefit of embassies in Jordan to lobby for their interests. The Labor Ministry maintains a group of full-time inspectors to oversee occupational health and safety standards. A parliamentary committee works with the Ministry to monitor conditions in the workplace. Jordanian law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for workers, including standards for bathrooms, drinking water, and safety and first aid equipment. The Government appears to administer and enforce its labor laws fairly, but the deployment of too few inspectors hinders its effectiveness. In addition, under the present Labor Code, inspectors lack the power to make, or have issued, orders having immediate force and no obligation is imposed with respect to notifying the Labor Inspectorate of Industrial Accidents & Occupational Diseases. Parliament declined to consider a draft labor law during its last session that would revise and update legislation dating from 1960. [↩]

26030. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 14: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Women in Kuwait suffer discrimination in both law and practice in many areas. Women are denied the right to vote and are traditionally restrained from freely choosing certain roles in society. There are no female judges or prosecutors, and only a few female Kuwaiti diplomatics are stationed outside of Kuwait. While spousal abuse exists in Kuwait, there are no shelters for women who have been abused by their husbands. Instead, cases are referred to the psychiatric department at the Ministry of Health. Police station and Ministry of Interior employees who handle complaints of spousal abuse are specifically instructed to try to reconcile the dispute within the family before opening a case. Each of the country's 50 police stations receives approximately one to two complaints of spousal abuse each week. Offending spouses are asked to sign a statement at the police station stating that they will not continue the abuse. Kuwaiti women who wear Western attire and foreign women are subjected to sexual harassment. The physical and sexual abuse of some expatriate Asian women (especially from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and other South Asian countries) who work as domestic servants received considerable attention in the press. Some observers believe that the problem worsened after liberation. On several occasions, the Philippine Embassy sheltered over 100 women at once. Although most of these women sought shelter due to contractual or financial problems with their employers, some cases involved physical and sexual abuse. Domestic servants may take legal recourse against their employers for abuse but generally do not because of a generally substantiated fear of reprisal and a sustained fear that the police and the judicial system will side with the Kuwaiti employer. In March the Court of Appeal reduced a 10-year sentence that had been imposed on a Jordanian couple who had been convicted of "unintentionally" killing their Philippine maid through starvation and beatings. In July, however, a Kuwaiti man and his Lebanese wife were sentenced to 7 years in jail for the "unintentional murder" of their Philippine maid. Although cited as an example of the
Court's willingness to sentence a Kuwaiti for a crime committed against a domestic servant, the conviction on the basis of unintentional murder appeared highly questionable in view of the maid's injuries, which included a broken pelvis, broken arms, and burns over all her body. The Government said it acted to punish abusers, but government action did not deal effectively with the problem. The Government established an office to investigate crimes and complaints involving domestics but has not yet acted on plans to establish a systematic investigation service. Under the interim measure, the authorities designated a central police station to handle maids' complaints and shelter a small number of maids. In addition to assisting foreign embassies with the repatriation of some of these women, the Government began to regulate recruitment agencies and close down unscrupulous ones. Kuwaiti courts have the authority to dissolve a marriage if a woman is in danger of being harmed by her husband; Kuwaiti judges have also found husbands guilty of spousal abuse, prostitution, although prohibited by Kuwaiti law, takes place. Some legal discrimination against women exists, particularly with respect to Kuwaiti women married to foreign men. Such women receive no government housing assistance and must pay residence fees for their husbands; residence is not guaranteed for their husbands unless the husband is working. In contrast, Kuwaiti men married to foreign women do not have to pay any fees for their spouses, whose right to residence is automatic. Females do not receive social security benefits. Under the Islamic laws of inheritance, male heirs receive twice as much as do female heirs. (These laws apply only to Muslims; a special judge handles cases for non-Muslims.) Women may own property and have the same property rights as men do. Women are restricted from working in "dangerous industries and trades harmful to the health." They are promised "remuneration equal to that of a man provided she does the same work. This promise is respected in practice. Kuwaiti women may drive and do not have to follow a dress code. They have full access to government-provided higher education, and an estimated 60% of women of working age are employed. Women work as doctors, engineers, lawyers, and professors. A few women have reached senior government positions. In July a woman was appointed to the Amiri Diwan (royal court) as Director of Political Affairs, a July Amiri decree named the first female president of Kuwait University. In September the woman Director of Political Affairs in the Amiri Diwan became Under Secretary in the Ministry of Higher Education. Kuwait named its first woman ambassador in 1993 and the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corp. (KPC), which runs Kuwait's oil industry, named a woman as its Managing Director for Administration and Economic Affairs one of KPC's four top positions. While a number of individual Kuwaiti women speak openly about the need to grant more rights to women, Kuwait lacks an organized women's rights movement. Before the invasion, the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF) had a Working Women Committee. The Committee has not yet resumed full activities since the Gulf war. Another group, the Women's Social-Cultural Society, has committees dealing with cultural affairs, social activities, alms, nurseries, cancer, the media, cooking, tailoring, literacy eradication, and the Kuwaitis presumed detained in Iraq. The Society also concerns itself with statistical studies on women, cases of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, legal and psychological counseling for women, and children's welfare. [26031. Division for Palestinian Rights. "Commissioner-General of the UNRWA Reports to The General Assembly", in Division for Palestinian Rights, October-November 1994. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA submitted his annual report to the General Assembly (A/49/13). A number of other reports relevant to the same item were submitted by the Secretary-General. The item was allocated to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the General Assembly. The reports were summarized as follows in a press release issued at Headquarters (GA/SPD/42): "The Commissioner-General states that the historic developments occurring during the year under review had a profound impact on the Agency's work and responsibilities. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and the anticipated extension of self-rule to the rest of the West Bank, UNRWA entered a new era in its relationship with the Palestinian people." In addition to maintaining the services it has provided for over 40 years, the Agency would soon begin a process of preparing for eventual hand-over of its installations, services and programmes to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the period under review, the vision of peace was expressed by the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on 13 September 1993, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed at Cairo on 5/4/1994, the report states. Following a 6/1994 decision of the Secretary-General, UNRWA began plans to move its headquarters to the Gaza Strip by the end of 1995, at an estimated cost of the some $22 million. That is in addition to costs involved in relocating certain Vienna-based operational units to Amman. The report states that a task force on development of the Gaza Strip and Jericho, of which UNRWA was a member, proposed that while the Agency should preserve and enhance its ongoing programmes and services, new investments should also be made in basic physical and social infrastructure, to improve public services and create jobs. The UNRWA has identified projects valued at some $138 million for immediate implementation. A letter of 9/15/1994 from UNRWA's Advisory Commission included in the report, cites a cash shortfall in the Agency's regular and emergency budget for 1994 of some $43 million, at a time when additional demands were being placed on the Agency. It also points out that the Agency ended 1993 with a deficit of $10 million, despite austerity measures of some $17 million. The Commission expresses appreciation for the Agency's programmes of assistance for more than 3 million Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, the remainder of the West Bank, and in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It welcomes the developments that have contributed towards transforming the region, including the Paris and Cairo accords signed by the two parties; the early empowerment agreement signed on 8/29/1994; the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area; the arrival of Chairman Arafat; and the setting up of the Palestinian Authority and related administrative structures. On 01/6/1993, the Agency launched its Peace Implementation Programme (PIP) to benefit refugees and other needy Palestinians, the report states. Public sector investment by the international community through PIP would contribute to stabilizing socio-economic conditions, especially in the Gaza Strip, where the situation was particularly volatile and critical. By 6/30/1994, $46 million in project proposals for the West Bank and $76 million for the Gaza Strip had been developed under PIP, the report states. That enabled the Agency to construct and upgrade schools and health centres; implement projects to improve sewerage systems, solid waste collection and water quality; undertake extensive shelter rehabilitation for poor refugees; build new women's centres; and expand the revolving loan fund and small business training programmes for the Palestinian private sector. On 10/18/1993, UNRWA, the European Commission and the Palestine Council of Health held a ground-breaking ceremony for the new Gaza General Hospital, whose completion was expected by the end of 1995, the report states. On 5/12/1994, the Agency and the PLO's Department of General Education signed a memorandum of understanding to further cooperation and coordination in improving the educational process and upgrading the skills of some 12000 public-sector teachers. The report states that in late 1994, concurrent with implementation of provisions of the Cairo Agreement, the Government of Israel proposed the establishment of a tripartite committee with representatives of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA, to arrive at new arrangements relating to UNRWA operations in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. With attention focused on developments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Agency has stressed the centrality to the peace process of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. By the end of June, contributions for PIP projects in those countries had totalled $10 million. Also in May, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator in the occupied territories, the report states. The Coordinator's functions include facilitating United Nations efforts in the West Bank and Gaza, representing the United Nations in various bodies and, when possible, leading its delegation to the multilateral working groups of the Middle East, North and South. In these negotiations, the Agency has supported the principle of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement with Israel on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Madrid Conference principles.
East peace process, and, as requested, supporting the implementation of the Declaration of Principles. Among other developments cited in the report is an 8/1993 agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on arrangements allowing the return to the West Bank and Gaza of more than 400 Palestinian refugees who had been deported to Lebanon in 1992. Addressing the ongoing conflicts in the occupied territories, the report states that between the signing of the Declaration of Principles and implementation of the Cairo Agreement, previously surmising that 'by 160 Palestinian and 40 Israelis lost their lives. With implementation of that Agreement, clashes virtually ceased in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, although clashes continued in the rest of the West Bank throughout the reporting period. On 2/25/1994, the Palestinian people experienced one of the worst episodes in their recent history when a lone Israeli settler opened fire with a machine-gun in the Mosque of Ibrahim in Hebron, West Bank, killing 29 worshippers and injuring many others. In the hours following the massacre, nine Palestinians were shot and killed in the West Bank and three in the Gaza Strip by Israeli security forces during protests and clashes. By mid-March, 15 more Palestinians from the West Bank and 11 from the Gaza Strip had also been killed in circumstances related to clashes with Israeli security forces. The Commissioner-General’s response on the Agency’s ‘excellent’ relationships with Jordan, which contains about 40% of the total number of refugees registered with UNRWA and the largest Palestine refugee population everywhere. The services provided by the Government to Palestine refugees there were of critical importance. UNRWA’s financial constraints had prevented it from expanding programmes to keep pace with population growth. In the areas of education and health, austerity measures had led to a hiring freeze, increasingly crowded classrooms and heavier patient loads for the Agency doctors. The Agency continued its efforts to meet changes called for by Jordan’s education reform policy of 1987, which required that teachers in basic education possess a four-year university-level degree. In 9/1993, UNRWA opened its first Educational Sciences Faculty in Amman, where a four-year teaching certificate programme for training new teachers replaced the Agency’s two-year programme. The UNRWA received $2.86 million under PIP for projects in Jordan. In Lebanon, the ongoing normalization of national life continued to enhance the security and safety of Palestine refugees, the report states. However, violence continued to erupt sporadically in Israeli-controlled south Lebanon and in the Beq’a region. The Government continued its policy of addressing the problem of persons displaced by the years of conflict, including facilitating the return to the lawful owners of property occupied by displaced persons. The UNRWA received $3.66 million under PIP for projects in Lebanon. In the Syrian Arab Republic, historically close contacts with the Government contributed to the smooth functioning of UNRWA programmes, the planning of new forms of assistance and the relative social and economic stability in refugees’ lives, the report states. The UNRWA received $3.1 million under PIP for projects in Syria. The Agency itself advanced funds to enable essential improvements to be made within the Damascus Training Centre, which had not been upgraded since its establishment in 1961. By 6/30/1994, more than 3 million Palestinian refugees were registered with UNRWA, entitling them to receive a range of education, health, and relief and social services. There were 398805 children enrolled at UNRWA’s 641 primary and preparatory schools and more than 4500 in its vocational training centres. Refugees had guaranteed access to primary health-care through the Agency’s 120 health centres and mother-and-child health-care clinics, 71 dental clinics, as well as 32 specialist clinics for pediatrics, obestics and gynaecology, cardiology and ophthalmology. In addition to clinics for treatment of ear, nose and throat and chest diseases, there were 210 special-care clinics treating diabetes mellitus and hypertension. The report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (document A/49/570) states that UNRWA failed to receive sufficient funding to deliver all parts of its planned programmes in 1993 and expected to be unable to do so again in 1994. The Group notes that the Agency was particularly concerned about the negative cumulative effect of austerity measures taken by the Agency, and carried over from year to year, to reduce its chronic budget deficits. The report cites the Commissioner-General as saying the Agency would need contributions of some $21 million to avoid running down its operational capital reserves, as well as $22 million to maintain its present standard of services in 1994. Thus, there was a total requirement of $43 million to fund its regular 1994 budget and its budget covering emergency measures in Lebanon and the occupied territories. The Group notes that efforts of the Commissioner-General and his staff to raise funds for PIP has succeeded in attracting financial support for UNRWA programmes and projects from some donor states and international bodies. The Group also notes the previous contact of Secretary-General expressed concern that, despite the Agency’s success in raising funds for new and special projects under PIP, there might be insufficient funds forthcoming to finance staffing and recurring costs of some with programmes being established under PIP. The Working Group supports the Commissioner-General’s strict policy of giving priority to operational programmes, the report states. It strongly urges all Governments to consider increasing their donations to UNRWA and to consider additional contributions in support of ongoing emergency-related and special programmes in Lebanon, as well as present and future phases of PIP, without decreasing or diverting funds from the contributions to the Agency’s regular programmes. It also urges them to consider making special additional contributions for construction projects, again without affecting their contributions to the regular programmes.

The Secretary-General’s report on offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestinian refugees (document A/491439), states that Japan and Switzerland offered scholarships to Palestine refugee students through UNRWA’s university scholarship programme. During the 1993-1994 academic year, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded 28 scholarships to Palestinian students under the regional project ‘Scholarship fund for higher education for students of Arab occupied territories’, 17 scholarships for its regular programme and budget, three scholarships under its Participation Programme, and two scholarships under the inter-university cooperation programme, PEACE, funded by UNESCO and the European Union. The Secretary-General’s report on Palestine refugees in the occupied territory (document A/49/440), states that Israeli authorities continued to demolish and seal refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip and West Bank on punitive grounds. The situation of 87 families categorized as living in hardship conditions remained the same. During the reporting period, no new plots of land in housing projects in the Gaza Strip were allocated by Israeli authorities for refugees living in camps. However, developments were underway for the movement of approximately 70 additional families to Tel Aviv and the Negev. According to information available to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Israeli authorities have up to the present allocated approximately 3914 plots of land in Gaza Strip for housing projects. A total of 2605 plots have been built on by 3714 refugee families comprising 22946 persons. Buildings on 236 plots are under construction, 936 plots are vacant and 137 have been built on by non-refugee families. In addition, 3034 refugee families, consisting of 18823 persons, have moved into 2666 completed housing units consisting of 5893 rooms. *The Secretary-General’s report on the return of populations displaced since 1967 (document A/49/441) states that the Agency is not involved in any arrangements for the return of refugees nor is it involved in any arrangements for the return of displaced persons who are not registered as refugees. It would not necessarily be aware of the return of any registered refugees who did not request the provision of services. However, the number of displaced registered refugees known by the Agency to have returned to the occupied territories since 6/1967 is about 13200 – and even those records may be incomplete.

The Secretary-General’s report on the protection of Palestine refugees (document A1491442) states that the Commissioner-General of UNRWA has continued his efforts, with the Secretary-General in support of the safety, security and legal and human rights of the Palestine refugees in the occupied territories. Its refugee affairs and legal officers continue to play an important role in helping defuse tensions in situations of potential and actual violence. It also provided help for refugees coping with day-to-day problems of their lives under occupation. The Commissioner-General has protested to Israeli authorities against
incidents of excessive use of force, collective punishments and other such measures, the report states. However, with the redeployment of the Israeli security forces away from large areas of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, there had been a consequent decline in violent incidents involving the Israeli security forces and Palestinians there. The ‘passive protection function’ which had been provided by the refugee affairs, officers there was discontinued. The Secretary-General’s report on the protection of Palestinian students and educational institutions, and safeguarding of UNRWA facilities in the occupied territories (document A/49/1433) states that, during the reporting period, there were 63 cases of unauthorized Israeli entry into West Bank facilities, and 113 cases at Gaza Strip facilities. There were also 63 cases of injury, though fatalities, among students and trainees at UNRWA educational institutions in the West Bank. The corresponding figures for the Gaza Strip were 1375 injuries and no fatalities. The three UNRWA training centres in the West Bank began the 1993/94 academic year in 10/1993 and ended in 6/1994, the report states. An average of 24% of academic time was lost owing to general strikes, curfews and closures of the occupied territory. Following the 25 February massacre at Al-Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron, the occupied territories were sealed off from Israel and East Jerusalem. The Agency required and obtained permits from the Israeli authorities for students from Gaza attending UNRWA training centres there. However, of 333 such students, 51 did not receive permits to study in the West Bank. A special schedule was arranged for Gaza students at the West Bank training centres to enable them to complete their course requirements. In the West Bank, a total of 9% of school time was lost between 9/1993-6/1994, owing primarily to military closures, general strikes and curfews, the report states. In the Gaza Strip, the corresponding amount of school time lost was 10%. The Agency provided students in the West Bank and Gaza with distance education and self-learning materials, but such measures could provide only partial compensation for lost classroom The Secretary-General’s report on revenues derived form Palestine refugee properties (document A/49/148) is issued in response to resolution 48/40 G, in which the Assembly requested that he provide information on his efforts for the protection and administration of Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel, and the establishment of a fund for the receipt of income derived therefrom, on behalf of the rightful owners. The report describes his communications to Israel and all other Member States, as well as the quotation from Israel’s note verbal of 27 July. It also cites a note verbal of 9/15/1994 from Norway which indicated that Norway was not in possession of any pertinent information relative to the item. The Secretary-General’s report on University of Jerusalem ‘Al-Quds’ for Palestine refugees (document A/49/505) concerns the Assembly’s request that he continue taking all necessary measures to establish such a university. In it, he states that such a task would require the completion of a functional feasibility study requested in earlier Assembly resolutions. He had, therefore, sought the assistance of the Rector of the United Nations University, who made available a highly qualified expert to assist in preparation of the study. The expert was to visit the area and meet with competent Israeli officials.

In a note verbal of 8/10/1994, the Secretary-General requested that the Government of Israel facilitate the visit of the expert, at a mutually convenient date, the report continues. In a response dated 23 August, the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that Israel had voted consistently against the resolution entitled ‘University of Jerusalem “Al-Quds’ for Palestine refugees’ and that its position remained unchanged. It is clear that the sponsors of this resolution seek to exploit the field of higher education for political purposes totally extraneous to genuine academic pursuits’, the Permanent Representative states. Accordingly, the proposed visit ‘would serve no useful purpose’. A note verbally dated 7/27/1994 form the Permanent Representative of Israel is quoted in the above-mentioned reports of the Secretary-General. In it, he states that the Assembly’s 1993 series of resolutions on UNRWA ignores the new political reality following the agreement between Israel and the PLO, as well as the bilateral and multilateral negotiations’. Major progress has been achieved in the framework of the peace process. Israel believes that UNRWA can play an important role in promoting the social and economic advancement foreseen in the agreements between Israel and the PLO, and accordingly looks forward to continuing the cooperation and good working relationship with UNRWA. The Permanent Representative also states that the Assembly’s resolutions on UNRWA should focus directly on issues relating to its humanitarian tasks. They should refrain from adopting resolutions relating to political issues irrelevant to its work and detached from the new reality. The Assembly’s resolutions on UNRWA should be considered into one resolution, an approach which would also be compatible with the need to rationalize the Assembly’s work. He says. The report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, contained in a note by the Secretary-General (document A/49/509), states that the Commission has nothing new to report since submission of its report of 10/7/1993 (document A/48/1474, annex). That report states that the Commission had been unable to find means of facilitating the work of an Assembly of Palestine refugees to be given the choice between peaceful repatriation and compensation. The circumstances that had limited its possibilities of action had remained essentially unchanged.‘[

26032. Earthstewards Network. Earthstewards Network Invites You To Co-Creat Our Global Future. Pamphlet. Bainbridge Island, Wash.: Earthstewards Network, N.D. [1996?] The Earthstewards Network began as a dream late in 1979. It started as a loose network of those who care for the earth and its inhabitants. Since then, the vision and depth of our work has expanded to include projects in people-to-people diplomacy, environmental service, global networking and conflict resolution—co-creating simple, effective models of grassroots leadership for innovative change. We get results. People’s lives change for the better. We have a global track record in clearly making a difference in our hearts, in our communities and around the world. On every continent, in all walks of life, we are finding ways to say YES to a more humane, sustainable future.

Global Community and Networking: Do you need ideas for your own project? Are you experiencing a lifestyle change and want to contact others who can relate? Are you looking for something important to commit your time, energy, and talent to? There is someone in this network who can help. Our underlying strength is our global community of caring members. When we connect with each other through our shared visions, we create opportunities for people to get and give support. You can participate in the quarterly newsletter, service directory, special interest circles, local focus groups, community projects, and international gatherings. Sponsor your own neighborhood citizen diplomacy trip or explore our extended travel host network. Whatever your desires, this is a place to make your dreams come true.

Essential Peacemaking. Women & Men: All over the world, women and men are waking up to the importance of creating new models of leadership. Our male/female gatherings, gender communication trainings, and co-leader accreditation programs are helping to heal the wounds of gender as they inspire in us healthy models of collaboration and co-leadership. Facilitators in over 25 countries are helping women and men to communicate clearly and work together to heal themselves and the planet.

Middle East Citizen Diplomacy Project: Since 1990, we have led ten citizen diplomacy delegations to the heart of one of the most protracted areas of conflict on the planet. Traveling to Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan, we’ve learned firsthand from our hosts about their lives, struggles, and perspectives. Living with host families and working side-by-side on a variety of service projects, we have forged lasting and unforgettable friendships. In addition, beginning in 1996, we will offer The Listening Project, an opportunity for Jews from around the world to collect oral histories from Palestinians. Through the gift of listening, each side will have the chance to connect heart to heart, and to see the human being behind the “enemy.”
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Jordan

www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

river bank in Costa Rica or reclaiming the desert in Southern India, participants learn communication and conflict resolution skills needed to create lasting trust. What's not so easy to convey is the spirit, the hope and the inspiration: Youth from Serbia, Croatia, Palestine, Germany, and Holland gather during the "Healing the Wounds of War" Conference in Berlin, Germany in 7/1995 how ranger district offices are "transformed" and their employees feel "reconnected with life again;" how an urban youth-at-risk stated, "It feels good to see a lot of people come together from all over the world to lend a helping hand... The earth is dying on us and this is the only planet we live on, so I think we should take care of it the right way." We have sponsored projects from Central America to South Africa, from Switzerland to Southern India, from inner cities to rain forests and deserts. Soon we will be planting, laughing, crying and trusting each other during projects in Berlin, Germany; Vietnam; the Himalayas; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Oakland, California. Wherever we go, PeaceTrees empowers our youth and encourages everyone to take a fresh look.

PeaceTable: This highly successful program utilizes the unique method of resolving conflict through the preparing and sharing of food. PeaceTable leads culinary diplomacy trips around the world. It has fed thousands in our PeaceTrees program, in addition to creating bountiful international suppers where participants share their recipes from home.

Grassroots Citizen Diplomacy: The Earthstewards Network has created precedents in people-to-people exchanges throughout the world. We have arranged for Soviet and American families to visit each others homes. We have lived in Northern Ireland homes, and hosted them in the US We have also traveled to Europe, Central America, the Middle East, India, Nepal and Tibet. [Project expenses in 1994-1995: PeaceTrees 46%, Gatherings 15%, Network Program 12%, Administration 11%, Essential Peacemaking Women and Men 9%, Middle East Citizen Diplomacy 6%, Workshops 1%. FY 10/1/1994-9/30/1995: total income $22,1201; total expenses: $21,1577] [=]


Kansas: Incumbent: Robert Dole (Republican) [PAC contribution]. Except for his important role in US-Israel Free Trade bill, Majority Leader Dole has not been among stronger supporters in recent years. Did not oppose Jordan arms sale or recent Saudi sale. Challengers: Dole's re-election in Kansas looks assured. With no real Democratic opposition expected, Dole, actively seeking GOP presidential nomination, will benefit from the big win he is sure to get. Kentucky: Incumbent: Wendell Ford (Democrat) [PAC contribution]. Good record of support, raising funds, looks safe. Challengers: Attorney Jackson Andrews is the GOP nominee - not a significant threat to Ford.

Louisiana: Incumbent: Russel Long (Democrat). Retiring after long and colorful Senate career, with support for Israel never one of his leading attributes.

Challengers: The race between Rep. John Breaux (Democrat) and Rep. Henson Moore (Republican) is tightening up - after Moore bids and is now almost even. Moore's financial advantage is considerable. Breaux's records on issues of concern has been more consistent than Moore's. PAC has contributed to Breaux. [=]

26034. Giacaman, Rita. "Health As a Social Construction: The Debate In The Occupied Territories: Enduring Intifadah Injuries", in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. p. 18. Ahlam, from the village of Yabud, was gassed by Israeli helicopters while in a demonstration in 2/1988. The tear gas ulcerated her skin in several patches on her body; she has suffered permanent central nervous system damage and impaired use of arm muscles. In the Amman Hospital in Jordan, doctors state that the serious medical damages suffered in skin and muscles is a result of tear gas inhalation.

26035. Haj Hussien, Jalal Mohd. The Impact Of Child's Gender, Level Of Mental Ability, And Sex Of Parent On Parents' Stress Levels In Jordan. The University Of Wisconsin-Madison. Dissertation. 168pp. AAC 9314982. [Advisor: Gardner, William I.] The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of the sex of parent, child's level of mental ability, child's gender, and interaction between child's level of mental ability and child's gender on mothers' and fathers' stress levels. Ninety mothers and 90 fathers of both boys and girls without disabilities, with mild mental retardation, and with severe mental retardation completed the Jordanian version of the Questionnaire on Resources and Stress-Short Form. Factorial analysis of variance, Least Significant Difference (LSD), Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Mann-Whitney test, and other nonparametric procedures were employed to analyze these data. The results of these analyses did not reveal significant differences between mothers' and fathers' stress levels in any subscale or the total score of QRS-S. In addition, significant differences between mothers and fathers of boys and mothers and fathers of girls were found only in the following three subscales: Life span care, Personal burden and Lack of personal reward. Moreover, the results indicated that mothers and fathers of children without disabilities reported significantly less stress than did those of children with severe or mild mental retardation, and mothers and fathers of children with mild mental retardation reported significantly less stress than did mothers and fathers of severe mental retardation in any subscale or total score of QRS-S, with the exception of the following subscales: Life span care, Lack of personal reward, Family disharmony, Physical limitations, Financial stress, and Prefer institutional care. Finally, the results showed significant effect of the interaction between the child's level of mental ability and child's gender on the mothers' and fathers' scores in the following subscale Life span care, Family disharmony, Physical limitations, Financial stress, and Prefer institutional care; with the exception of Family disharmony in which the interaction effect was not significant on fathers' scores. However, there was no significant effect on mothers' and fathers' scores in the other subscales or the total score of QRS-S. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,] [=]

26036. Jawad, Saleh Abdul. "The Balance of Power Among the Political Forces in the West Bank: Seizing Control of Institutions: Part 2", in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), April 19, 1993. p. 8-10. On the unionist level, Hamas achieved important an noticeable successes, particularly in the elections of the workers' committees of Makassed Hospital and the Jerusalem Electricity Company–both locations traditionally considered as strongholds of the national movement. It also achieved crucial penetration of other unions, such as the one at an-Najah University. But at the Birzeit University University elections, it did not nominate anyone. Generally, it is safe to say with some simplification, that Hamas enjoys 35-40% of the votes in the elections its decide to participate in.

Nevertheless, there are many locations and unions in which Hamas has no weight to be mentioned. For example, the General Federation of Palestinian Workers, womens' unions, and other committees like the Jordan Valleye Farmers Committee, and the Palestinian Karate Federation, which enjoys a membership of scores of thousands.

Hamas tries to concentrate on the results of the elections in places where the elections were distinguished by fierce competition. If we look at the situation comprehensively, however, it is clear that Hamas does not enjoy more than 25-30% of the votes. This range forms the base
level, which may go up or down in accordance with the prevalent political circumstances. In case an acceptable political settlement is reached, the influence and power of Hamas will decrease. But if the negotiations remain stuck in place, then Hamas will be able to achieve additional successes in the Palestinian street. [=]

26037. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. “Part 04: The Profession’s Composition and Activism”, in Lawyers and Human Rights in the Arab World: The Legal Profession in Jordan. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993. There are 2000 regular lawyers in the JBA. There are an additional 300 lawyers in the West Bank who legally are considered members of the Association. The total number of female lawyers is 400. Lawyers of Palestinian origin constitute the majority of the members of the Bar Association. There are also lawyers from other Arab countries practicing in Jordan. Palestinian groups are influential in the political life of the Bar, although in the election of the members of the Bar Council usually every political party presents its own list of candidates. The current president of the Bar Association is a pro-Iraq Ba’athist, and the Council consists of three Fatah [The ministry faction of the PLO led by Yasir Arafat] members, one member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) [A brother of the PFLP leader Nabil Hawatma serves as the Vice-President of the Bar Association.], and the others are Pan-Arabs. [Lawyers Committee interview with Dr. Kamal Nasser, Secretary General of the JBA and law professor, Amman, 3/3/1992; Lawyers Committee interview with Asma Khidir, attorney, Amman, 3/3/1992.]

26038. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. “Part 08: Assessment: The Jordanian Legal Profession and the UN Basic Principles On The Role of Lawyers: (B) Openness of the Profession”, in Lawyers and Human Rights in the Arab World: The Legal Profession in Jordan. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993. The requirements for joining the legal profession in Jordan are: to be a Jordanian national for at least 10 years (other Arab nationals are allowed to practice in the country according to reciprocal arrangements with the country involved); to be at least 23 years of age; to reside continuously in Jordan; to enjoy a good reputation and not have been convicted of any act breaching honesty, honor, or discipline or to have been or is accused of a previous job for one of these reasons; to have a law degree from a recognized university or institute (to be determined by the Bar Council); and to have completed successfully the specified internship period and not to be in the employ of the government or any municipality. Lawyers working in the public sector are therefore excluded from membership in the Bar Association. [Id., Article 8.] There is discrimination against people who may have been suspected of having committed an act involving breaches of honesty, honor or discipline but whose guilt had never been established by a court of law. The law excludes this category of people from joining the legal profession, thus opening the door to abuse in the interpretation of candidacy requirements. Applications for registration as a member of the Bar Association or as an intern must be submitted to the Council of the Bar Association. The applicant receives no reply within two months of filing the application, his application is considered rejected. [Id., Article 15.] Bar admission decisions may be contested before the High Justice Court (an appellate court), but its decision is final. The period of internship is two years for the holder of one degree in law and one year for the holder of two graduate diplomas, a Master’s or a Ph.D. The period required for each category may be extended up to one year by a decision of the Bar Council. [Id. Article 27.] During the training period the intern is obliged to attend the lectures organized by the Bar Association. While the Lawyers Committee was in Jordan it learned that the Council was considering extending the length of the internship to three years. [Lawyers Committee interview with Mazin Arshidat, Amman, 3/3/1992.] Barleaders interviewed by the Lawyers Committee denied the existence of any discrimination based on race, color, sex, ethnic origin, religion, political or other convictions, property, birth, or economic or others status. They insisted that the law considers any attempt to invoke such differences among Jordanian nationals an offense against the security of the state. In the opinion of other lawyers interviewed, including the Council member in charge of the intern lawyers, discrimination among lawyers does exist in three areas. First, lawyers from wealthy and prominent families receive privileged treatment from courts and other public agencies in comparison with lawyers of humble origins. For example, intern lawyers from wealthy backgrounds are usually admitted to the Bar Association even if their performance during the period of internship was not satisfactory, while other, more qualified candidates may be rejected to make room for them. Moreover, law graduates from privileged families are more likely than others to find law offices in which they can complete their internships. [Joint interview with Asma Khidir, Mazin Arshidat and Waddah Haddadin. Also interview with lawyer Imad Shargawi, Amman, 3/3/1992.] All these practices contravene Article 10 of the UN Basic Principles. Second, although there are 400 licensed female lawyers, only ten of them have private offices; the overwhelming majority of them earn wages in other lawyers’ offices. Male lawyers are frequently offered partnerships. Also, the health care service organized by the Bar Association does not cover child birth, although a male lawyer is given a stipend if he is arrested or forced temporarily stop his work due to sickness. Furthermore, the health care benefits organized by the Bar Association cover the family of a male lawyer but do not extend to the family of a female lawyer. Third, lawyers also complained of arbitrary treatment by the Bar Council. In one recent case, they claimed that the Bar Association decided to admit a judge who had been dismissed from the judiciary for corruption while it refused to admit another person who had been suspected of giving a bribe to a public servant, although the suspicion was never confirmed or brought before a court of law. [=]

26039. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. “Part 12: Recommendations", in Lawyers and Human Rights in the Arab World: The Legal Profession in Jordan. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993. In order to comply with the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the Jordanian government and Bar Association should take the following steps:

(1) The state of emergency should be lifted so that the rights of lawyers and other citizens can be guaranteed consistent with Jordanian and international law.

(2) The legal right of an accused person to have access to a lawyer of his/her own choosing at the investigation and trial stage should be scrupulously enforced. In accordance with Article 7 of the Basic Principles, all persons arrested or detained should have access to a lawyer not later than 48 hours from the time of arrest or detention.

(3) Provisions of emergency law allowing indefinite preventive detention should particularly be abrogated. The powers of the executive branch of government to dissolve the Bar Association and replace it with one of its own choosing, although never exercised before, should be abolished. These powers have a chilling effect on the Bar's independence.

(4) Article 108 of the legal profession statute, forbidding trade unions including the Bar Association from participating in joint gatherings and undertaking joint projects, should be abolished.

(5) Article 102(6) of the statute, denying the Bar Association the power to accept donations except upon the approval of the Council of Ministers, should be abolished.

(6) The government and the Bar Association should enact laws and regulations preventing discrimination among lawyers for reasons of sex, ownership of property and social origin with regard to both admission into and practice of the profession.

(7) The government and the Bar Association should establish programs aimed at informing the public about their rights.

(8) Effective means should be adopted by both the government and the Bar Association to make the right to legal aid a reality.

(9) The practice of preventing lawyers and other citizens from traveling abroad for lawful purposes should be abolished. This practice is particularly objectionable when it intervenes with a lawyer’s ability to carry out professional duties. Any person so impeded should have the right to seek redress from a court of law including compensation for any losses caused by the denial.
(10) The present oath required for admission to the profession should be changed to one providing for the respect of the Constitution and the law. [=]

26040. Miles, Bernard. "The Uprising of Youth: Intifada", in British Imperialism and the Palestine Crisis. Selections from the Anarchist Journal Freedom 1938-1948. London: Freedom Press, 1989. It is exciting, sometimes frightening, to witness as an outsider the birth of any new movement, to watch it from its uncoordinated, hesitant start, gather confidence, momentum, purpose and appeal until it reaches a stage of worldwide recognition. I was in a privileged position, as the senior UN official in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, to observe the genesis of the intifada as a movement, from its schoolyard origins in the Gazon city of Rafah in 10/1986 until the time it successfully challenged long-established attitudes and positions on the core problem of the Middle East-the Israeli/Palestinian dispute. Second, it has shaken the hitherto uncritical support by world Jewry for the Israeli government's hardline attitudes in its relations with the Palestinians. Third, it has enabled the PLO to make radical changes in its policies and now to pursue actively the path of peaceful territorial compromise with Israel over the land of Palestine. Finally, it has forced increasing numbers of Israelis to realize that the pre-intifada status of occupied lands and subject peoples can never be returned to, and that the days of Palestinians playing the role of helots to an Israeli Sparta are over. The Palestinians are now for the Israelis and entity, a people to be reckoned with... World leaders who whom to help should be clear as to the raison d'etre of the intifada. It is a movement started by the generation born or brought up under the Israeli occupation, knowing no other form of rule. Young people disillusioned by the lack of real interest in the world in solving the Palestinian problem; the charade of American shuttle diplomacy; the Jordanian illusion, which was no option in their opinion; the failure of the UN and the Arab League to project their case, and of the PLO leadership to achieve anything for them; even their parents and community leaders for having acquitted so docilely the humiliation of the status quo of occupation for so long. Young people sensing the contempt the average Israeli felt for all things Palestinians, the indignity of seeing their fathers go smiling, cap in hand to an Israeli official to seek approval for almost any activity, domestic or business. It was the young who sensed correctly that if they wanted to be free of Israeli rule, they must achieve it by themselves. It was the young who decided to take to the streets to show the world their contempt for Israeli rule. It was the young who agreed to defy death, maiming, beating and imprisonment to continue their campaign, who knew that for them a hero's death was better than a life of slavery. It was they who breathed life and self-respect again into their elders and led the whole community into the intifada. The young, in the course of action they chose, were certainly not the dupes and pawns of the PLO; indeed the PLO was taken almost as much by surprise as the Israelis at the onset of the Intifada. While the Intifada has entrusted the PLO with the negotiations, it is my opinion that the parameters are clearly laid down. They want the Israelis out of the West Bank and Gaza, but they want to live in peace with them. They will not accept autonomy under Israeli auspices because the young will not endorse it. They will not accept as the Israelis might want negotiations through traditional Palestinian dignitaries in the territories, because again the young will not agree to it. They will not accept elections under Israeli auspices, because they distrust the process and believe the candidates putting themselves forward are placing themselves at risk of incarceration in Israeli detention camps or deportation. They will not accept any scaling down of the intifada, unless it is accompanied by bottom-up guarantees that their objectives will be realized, for they know that the continuance of the Intifada, however painful, does much more harm to Israel. I believe these are the realities which must be taken into consideration by any country seeking to bring about an end to the Israeli/Palestinian dispute. The intifada has given the best possible opportunity for a secure, prosperous and peaceful future for both Israelis and Palestinians, living side by side in their own lands as neighbors, trading partners and future friends, it should not be missed. [=]

26041. New American View. "Israel: Civil War of Word: What Peace, If Any?", in New American View-News and Informed Commentary on the Pro-Israeli Lobby in America. Vol.8(12). June 15, 1993. Once upon a time, the Israelis used to tell their American cousins in no uncertain terms to keep their big mouths shut and their fat wallets open. The Israelis knew what was good for Israel and Zionism. American Jewry's job was to keep the money flowing into the Jewish state, and if American Jewry chose to load itself to the back of the loaded train, the Israelis would have no complaints. Jews who should make aliyah or raise the even tougher question of who is a Jew. Those days seem gone forever. Now, American Jews are openly getting deeply involved in Israeli politics. Some even think it is their right to criticize—and work against—the current Labor government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Last week's international edition of the Jerusalem Post illustrates the evolving relationship between the diaspora and Jewish state. There are side-by-side opinion pieces by Norman Podhoretz, editor-in-chief of the American Jewish Committee's neoconservative monthly Commentary, and the Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) national director Abraham Foxman. Foxman takes the traditional subservient position of American Jewry: "Israeli democracy should decide, diaspora Jews should support: the issue is not one of rights, but responsibility." We should remember, however, that Foxman's ADL is in serious criminal trouble, on the verge of being indicted by San Francisco's district attorney for stealing the confidential police files of its critics and political rivals—and providing at least some of the data to Israeli intelligence agencies. On the other hand, Podhoretz, who has made a career (after his Marxist days) of supporting the Greater Land of Israel strategy of Menachem Begin's and Yitzhak Shamir's Likud bloc, argues the contrary position. An Israeli at peace with its Arab neighbors would put Podhoretz and Commentary out of business. He writes: "The political dangers involved in American Jewish criticism of Israel's policies have faded. In the meantime, Israel may be confusing yearning for peace with opportunity." The debate is not really about the right of American Jews to criticize Israel. It's about the concept of land-for-peace. On one side are those Israelis—Rabin's Labor alignment, most of big business and investment—and the diaspora Jews who believe it is a worthwhile trade to give up the occupied areas of Gaza, the Golan Heights and the West Bank for peace and a chance to make Israel a viable economic state—perhaps even the Silicon Valley of the Middle East. On the other side are those Israelis—the Likud's Benyamin Netanyahu and the Zionists zealots, many already encamped in the occupied Arab lands—and the Jewish American neocon lobbyists whose paychecks and careers depend on an Israeli under siege by hostile neighbors. Peace and economic growth for the Jewish state have no meaning to these fanatics. Their Israel is a land of outdated Zionist dreams, of romanticized Masada suicides and glorious Bar Kochba slaughters—Jewish death wishes. As the peace process sputters and President Bill Clinton's "full partner" leadership lags, the situation is deteriorating swiftly—especially in Israel. The Likud is ready to pounce the moment that Labor falters. Peace resistance movements are springing up in the Jewish state. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reports that the followers of dead radical Rabbi Meir Kahane are training at several camps in the US with the intent of returning to Israel and forming military units to resist the transfer of territory to the Arabs. And there are other new activist groups agitating against the peace policies of the Rabin government. "Women for Israel's Tomorrow" advertises itself as an Israeli grassroots national movement against the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. "Pro Israel" is a new New York-based movement dedicated to preventing the return of the occupied territories and countering the views of such Jewish groups as "Americans for Peace Now." The conflict is reflected elsewhere within the Jewish American activist community. Officially, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) takes the position of not siding with either Labor or Likud. But according to the newspaper Davar, Harvey Friedman, vice president of AIPAC's Florida division who was in Israel last week, viciously attacked the peace policy of Prime Minister Rabin. Friedman said that Rabin's policy was based on Israeli concessions. He
said that he believed the Palestinians should be transferred to Jordan, and that Jordan should be designated as the Palestinian state. Unlike old soldiers, old Zionists don’t just fade away.

The Israelis are arguing with each other over the peace process and the concept of land-for-peace. So are the Jewish American lovers of Israel and Zionism. And the American factions are arguing with the Israeli factions. It’s getting messy, and maybe dangerous. [=]

26042. New American View. “Transfer Has Begun”, in New American View-Monitoring the Special Relationship Between the United States and Israel. Vol. 5(4), February 15, 1990. The Israeli government is quietly deporting hundreds of Palestinians from their homes in the West Bank, in what many describe as a “dry run” for a massive “transfer” of the Palestinian population from the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan or other Arab countries. Israel rationalizes these actions in the name of stricter enforcement of residency requirements for Palestinians living in the occupied territories. These requirements are so strict and so technical that they apply in many cases to individuals whose families have lived in the same village or house for generations. While the Israeli government says that 251 Palestinians have been deported under these new policy, other sources estimate that at least twice this number have been expelled to Jordan in the last year. The deportations are supposedly military operations, but many of the deportees are women and children. Typically, soldiers will come to a village after dark, with a list of village residents who are declared “illegal aliens,” subject to immediate deportation. The victims are granted only minutes to pack up their possessions, are bundled into military vehicles, and driven directly to the Jordanian border. To add insult to injury, the victims are often required to pay a fine for their “violation” as well as a fee for the transportation costs incurred by the government in deporting them, leaving them penniless. Israel’s deportation of Palestinian activists has received much publicity and worldwide condemnation, and the US government has put pressure on Jordan to end these politically inspired deportations. But the much more insidious practice of deporting average citizens has gone largely unremarked. The matter recently came to the attention of the US State Department, however, which called upon Israel to cease the practice immediately. Without acknowledging any wrongdoing, and without saying the policy was wrong, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said they would halt, but only temporarily. Rabin repeated the official Israeli line that the deportations were a simple matter of enforcing Israeli residency requirements. “We can’t allow everyone who comes to visit to stay without permission,” he said. But, he added, “We will deal with it more gently and tactfully. The policy hasn’t been changed,” he emphasized, “only frozen for the time being.”

Through many Palestinians admit they are in technical violation of Israel’s rules on residency in the occupied territories, they say that the Israeli law is purposefully written to destroy the framework of marriage and family upon which Palestinian life is built, and is designed to dash any hopes that families broken up by the occupation will ever reunite. According to Israeli law, the only Palestinians with any right to continue living in the territories are those who were registered during a census carried out on one day in September of 1967. According to Israeli authorities, those who were not there on that day, for whatever reason, are classified as aliens which the government has every right to expel. Palestinian women are particularly vulnerable because most were sent out of the country during this time to ensure their safety. Even persons who were born in the territories and who have married legal residents are denied permits. Children born to legal resident fathers, but whose mothers are not, are also subject to deportation. There are as many as 120000 Palestinians living in the occupied territory who are subject to deportation under these rules. Palestinians and Israeli human rights groups fear that the implementation of this policy may be renewed with a vengeance in order to make room for the expected wave of Jews from the Soviet Union. Despite international pressure being brought to bear on Israel to end these politically inspired deportations. But the much more insidious practice of deporting average citizens has gone largely unremarked. The matter recently came to the attention of the US State Department, however, which called upon Israel to cease the practice immediately. Without acknowledging any wrongdoing, and without saying the policy was wrong, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said they would halt, but only temporarily. Rabin repeated the official Israeli line that the deportations were a simple matter of enforcing Israeli residency requirements. “We can’t allow everyone who comes to visit to stay without permission,” he said. But, he added, “We will deal with it more gently and tactfully. The policy hasn’t been changed,” he emphasized, “only frozen for the time being.”

Jordan

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Jordan

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26043. Noakes, Greg [Compiler]; American Education Trust. “Issues in the News: From the Middle East Press: Jordan May Ban Mixed Sports Club”, in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (American Education Trust, Box 53062, Washington DC 20009), April/May 1993. pp. 55-57. The Jordanian Parliament, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, passed a draft law banning mixed-sex sports clubs, recreational centers and swimming pools. Arguing against the law, which would exempt hotels and tourist establishments, the Jordanian Times wrote that “Liberal and reasonable-minded people in this country should not sit idle while they see ‘the people’s representatives’ infringe on their rights and freedoms as citizens.” The legislation still must pass the Jordanian senate and be ratified by King Hussein. [=]


Despite this optimistic assessment, it is evident that human rights is still a significant issue. One leading Jordanian human rights source said that Jordan is still subject to the “entrenched interests of 40 years of authoritarianism.” This has left Jordan with a “martial law mentality,” that continues to surface in the implementation of new laws and regulations. Thus, according to the source, abuse and torture are no longer prominent, but neglect and mistreatment continue to exist. The source criticized the Jordanian judiciary’s continued subservience to the executive branch, and castigated the government for relying on martial law holdovers such as indefinite detention and the use of state security trials.

It is also clear that Jordan’s human rights situation has been affected by the increasing power and prominence of the Islamists. This was painfully evident, the human rights source argued, in the diminishing protection of women’s rights in Jordan. The source noted that Jordan’s National Womens Federation had been dissolved on a technicality, and that women were losing rights due to new restrictions on travel, inheritances, and pensions. The source pointed out that additional restrictions were under consideration in parliament and could be expected shortly. [=]

26045. Rifkind, Simon H.; Frank, Jerome N.; Fuld, Stanley H.; Tulin, Abraham; Handler, Milton; Guenlein, Murray I.; Fortas, Abe; Eno, Lawrence R.. The Basic Equities of the Palestine Problem: A Memorandum: Part 16: II: The Judicial and Moral Principles of Espostoe Forbid the Nullification or Abridgement of the Pledge to the Jewish People: Part 1 of 2. New York, September 10, 1947. We can do no better in opening the discussion of this subject than quote the unanswerable words of Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in 1939, in the debate on the White Paper. Referring to the "great experiment and bright dream" of the Jewish National Home policy, Churchill said: "It is stranger still that we should turn away when the great experiment and bright dream . . . has proved its power to succeed. Yesterday the Minister responsible descanted eloquently in glowing passages upon the
magnificent work which the Jewish colonists have done. They have made the desert bloom. They have started a score of thriving industries, he said. They have founded a great city on the barren shore. They have harnessed the Jordan and spread its electricity throughout the land. So far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population. Now we are asked to decree that all this and what has been done, all this is to come to an end... it is 20 years ago, since my right hon. friend (Prime Minister Chamberlain) used these stirring words: ‘A great responsibility will rest upon the Zionists, who, before long, will be proceeding, with joy in their hearts, to the ancient seat of their people. Thers will be the task to build up a new prosperity and a new civilization in old Palestine, so long neglected and mis-rulled.’ Well, they have answered his call. They have fulfilled his hopes. How can he find it in his heart to strike them this mortal blow.” [PDC, Vol. 347, No. 108, Cols. 2188-2189.]

Jews have indeed answered the call, as Churchill stated. They have done so with their substance, their manpower and their very lives on the faith of the pledge of the Nations. Hundreds of thousands of them have moved into Palestine with the backing of millions of Jews throughout the world, staking their own futures and the futures of their children on the continuing and ultimate fulfilment of that pledge. They did so on the assurance that they came “as of right” and that more and more of their fellow Jews would follow them to reconstitute with them that Jewish National Home which was the impelling motive of their coming, their sacrifices and achievements. They were never warned that after a short time further Jewish immigration would be artificially restricted or stopped and that they were to remain a permanent minority in the land under the Arabs. On the contrary, both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and the world statesmen who expounded them, promised those pioneers the exact opposite; and they acted in reliance on that promise.

The principles of both legal and moral estoppel therefore apply—principles which obtain in international law as well as in the municipal jurisprudence of every civilized nation in the world. These principles forbid the Nations now from abrogating or abbreviating their pledge to the Jews. To repeat once again the words of Lloyd George: “The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order to ensure that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered into the heads of anyone engaged in framing the (Jewish National Home) policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing.” [PDC, Vol. 347, No. 108, p. 22.]

The moral aspect of the situation was stated by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords in these words: “I cannot feel that it (the 1939 White Paper) holds out a prospect of reasonable justice to the Jews... In 1914, they were 8000; they are now (1939) more than 45000. They have been encouraged to enter the country; they have been encouraged to invest great sums of money in industrial and other enterprises. They have erected very noble buildings, and, apart from the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after tramping the earth responded to kind treatment. “The sooner the Jews farm it all, the better”, T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1909, after trampling through the desolation of Syria and Palestine, “their colonies are bright spots in a desert.” [Quoted in Nathan, Gass & Creamer, Palestine: Problem and Promise (1946), p. 51.]

Later, under the Mandate, the Jews had to struggle with the political obstacles which the Mandatory Power itself, in derogation of the administration of the very first ignored that injunction. Jewish settlers had to and did purchase land at ever higher prices. They bought desert areas, malarial valleys, swamps, hills and sand, on the theory that scientific methods and human devotion could resuscitate the derelict earth. Much or this land was purchased not from small Arab farmers but from large proprietors, most of whom were absentee owners. Full protection was given—by law to the small Arab cultivators. But the Jews have so far been able to acquire only a mere 1,802 million dunams out of the 26.3 million (around 6.5 million acres) which make up the total area of Western Palestine. This means that the Jews own a mere 6.4% of the land. The rest of the total area belongs to Arabs, other non-Jews, and the...
government; large sections of it are still derelict and practically uninhabited. The obstacles, both natural and political, only spurred on the new settlers. Dry land was irrigated, swamp land was drained, exhausted land was reclaimed. A striking example was the reclamation of the Valley of Esdraelon, which was a swamp when the Jews bought it. How these 136,000 dunams (about 34,000 acres) were made cultivable and habited is shown in the Report of the High Commissioner. Sir Herbert Samuel, in 1925: "By an expenditure of nearly £90,000 about 51 square miles of the valley have now been purchased by the Jewish National Fund and other organisations; twenty villages have been founded, with a population numbering at present (1925) about 2600; nearly 3000 donums (about 700 acres) have been afforested. Twenty schools have been opened. There is an Agricultural Training College for Women in one village and a hospital in another. All the swamps and marshes within the area that has been colonised have been drained, and cases of malaria are proportionately rare. An active trade in dairy produce has sprung up, mostly finding a market, by means of the railway, in Haifa. The whole aspect of the valley has been changed. . . . what five years ago was little better than a wilderness is being transformed before our eyes into a smiling countryside." [Colonial No. 15, 1925, pp. 34-35. Matter in second parenthesis is Sir Herbert's.]

Another type of problem had to be solved in the desolate and rocky hills. Here the Jewish settlers had to dynamite the rocks, build terraces, and fertilize the meagre soil in the fissures before they could plant trees. This was done with striking success, so that today many hill colonies grow peaches and apricots and grapes, while others are engaged in dairy farming.

In other places land has been reclaimed from the salt by intensive and ingenious efforts. The fertility of this land is frequently four times that of ordinary land. An English agricultural authority describes the Jewish agricultural achievement in enthusiastic terms. Sir E. John Russell writes: "Regions that but a few years ago were barren sand dunes, bare hills or pestilential swamps have been converted into fertile agricultural land dotted with pleasing villages, and where the people can live in the faith of their fathers and the children grow up happily. The labour was arduous, but it was cheerfully, even joyfully, undertaken and it was lightened by the generous help given by Jews all over the world." [Foreword by Sir E. John Russell to the English edition (Cameoil Press) of W.C. Lowdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise (1944), p. 7.]

In the last two years 33 new settlements were established, some of them in the Negeb, the "desert" in Southern Palestine. These Jewish settlements in the desert cover an area of about 90,000 dunams and are serving as experimental farms for dry farming. Water was, of course, the primary problem. The pioneers dug wells to a depth of from 110-140 meters. So far dry farming on these "experimental settlements" has yielded double the crops of those previously obtained by the primitive Arab cultivators. These and various other land experiments of the Jews in Palestine show what can be made of the rest of the desolate country and the entire Middle East. Indeed, it has been authoritatively called an object lesson for the whole world: "Inhabitants of larger and richer countries," wrote Dr. Lowdermilk, the foremost American soil conservationist, "may wonder at these superhuman efforts to reclaim land. But the time may come in thickly populated and semi-starving countries . . . when men, instead of being amazed by the efforts of Palestine's terrace-builders, swamp-drainers and soilwashers, will begin to imitate them." [W.C. Lowdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise (1944) p. 147.]

The important thing about these "superhuman efforts" is that they created an agricultural base on which the Jews can continue to build their commonwealth. They were undertaken and made for that express purpose. The Jews have thereby created a varied and rich agriculture in their small sector of Palestine. Their agricultural settlements rose from 70 in 1922 to 290 in 1946. Indeed, of all the countries in the Middle East, Palestine has for that reason shown the greatest progress in agriculture for the whole population.

Industry did not exist in Palestine in any important sense before the Jewish resettlement began. Nablus had a few primitive soap factories, Jaffa and Haifa some flour mills. Here and there Arab and oriental Jewish craftsmen fashioned ornaments or carved olivewood mementos for tourists. The country had a few tanneries, potteries, kilns, and oil presses. Before World War I the total capital investment in these industries amounted to around £1 million and provided a livelihood for 50 of the total population. [—]

26046. Rifkind, Simon H.; Frank, Jerome N.; Fuld, Stanley H.; Tulin, Abraham; Handler, Milton; Guerfein, Murray I.; Fortas, Abe; Eno, Lawrence R.. The Basic Equities of the Palestine Problem: A Memorandum: Part 17: II: The Judicial and Moral Principles of Estoppel Forbid the Nullification or Abridgement of the Pledge to the Jewish People, Part 2 of 2. New York, September 10, 1947. Establishing a modern industry in the backward land presented as many difficulties as did the agricultural problem To begin with, there was no skilled labor, no experience, no credit, no power, no natural resources except unused water power and the long ignored mineral salts in the Dead Sea, few transportation facilities, no domestic market and no tariff protection. Everything, including the fuel to generate the electricity in the plants at Tel Aviv and Haifa, had to be imported or created.

But the most important resource brought in from the outside was, of course, the Jewish immigrant. These immigrants carried with them enthusiasm, skill and will; and a few brought capital. Ingenuity and faith overcame obstacles. Industry has been successfully developed by Jewish effort; and its promise for the future is now conceded. As the Royal Commission of 1937 said: Two new points stood out. First, far more future immigrants were going to be 'absorbed' into industry and urban life than by agriculture and land-settlement. Secondly, so far from reducing 'economic absorptive capacity,' immigration increased it. The more immigrants came in, the more work they created for local industries to meet their needs, especially in building: and more work meant more room for immigrants . . . Unless, therefore, the Government adopted a more restrictive policy . . . there seemed no reason why the rate of immigration should not go on climbing up and up." [Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 62.]

Electrification is one example of what the Jews have wrought in industry. The Palestine Electric Corp., organized with capital which only the Jews could raise, built the first hydroelectric plant in the country at Tel Aviv, using the power of the Jordan. Rutenberg, a Zionist engineer and financier, is now the largest industrial enterprise in the country and supplies it with 92 of its electricity. Part of the power comes from a hydroelectric station at the Jordan, which Rutenberg was the first to harness, and the rest from oil-powered plants at Tel Aviv and Haifa. The Palestine Electric Corp. has increased its production of electric current about twenty times in fourteen years. It sold 11,500,350 kwh in 1932 and 233,055,000 kwh in 1946. The additional electrification and irrigation possibilities of the proposed Jordan Valley Authority are enormous.

Since the early Jewish settlements were rooted in the soil, a large part of the new industry was directly connected with agriculture. But as time went on, new manufactures grew up, such as the manufacture of textiles, leather, paper, clothing, light metals, chemicals, machinery, electrical appliances, and building materials. A number of specialized industries, which do not depend upon local resources, have also taken root. Among them are artificial teeth, which have found an export market, and diamond cutting, an industry that was transplanted from the Low Countries after the Nazi invasion. The diamond enterprises, in 1945, overcame obstacles. Industry has been successfully developed by Jewish effort; and its promise for the future is now conceded. As the Royal Commission of 1937 said: Two new points stood out. First, far more future immigrants were going to be 'absorbed' into industry and urban life than by agriculture and land-settlement. Secondly, so far from reducing 'economic absorptive capacity,' immigration increased it. The more immigrants came in, the more work they created for local industries to meet their needs, especially in building: and more work meant more room for immigrants . . . Unless, therefore, the Government adopted a more restrictive policy . . . there seemed no reason why the rate of immigration should not go on climbing up and up." [Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 62.]

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Building is a sure indication of confidence and progress. In 1936 about 11,000 Jewish workers—11% of the Jewish labor—were engaged in building projects, for which much of the stone and lime was supplied by Arabs. The war restricted operations, but on its conclusion an immense increase in building activities occurred. In 1946 an estimated £10 million were invested in building and some 18,000 rooms were completed.

Jewish industry in general has expanded steadily and its growth has not been halted even by the usual crises that accompany post-war periods. Industrial expansion is shown in the following table: [Excluding handicrafts which numbered in 1937, 4050 establishments with a
women in the middle east and north africa
jordan
www.referencecorp.net/downloads

1926: 583 establishments; 5711 employed.
1937: 1556 establishments; 21964 employed.
1943: over 2000 establishments; over 45000 employed.

In 1943 the total value of Palestine's industrial output amounted to about $173 million. [This does not include mineral oil, or the product of Government workshops and handicrafts] of which the Jewish share was 85%.

That the industrial and business sector of the Jewish economy is both sound and growing, is shown by the war and post-war developments. Palestine's Jewish economy had geared itself completely to the war effort. About 350 of its industry had produced directly for the armed forces. Under the pressure of urgent war needs, this industry expanded enormously—in the case of spindles and looms the increase was fivefold—and new enterprises were started where none had existed before. Some experts doubted whether this economy, with its war-inflated prices, would withstand the shock of post-war readjustment.

But the economy has held up remarkably well in the reconversion period. It has actually been purchasing capital goods abroad in order to re-equip old establishments and start new ones. It has shown its resilience by its ability to reabsorb the demobilized 26,000 Palestinian Jewish men and women in the British armed forces—all volunteers—quickly and smoothly. At the same time at least 31,000 Jewish immigrants, nearly all of whom were destitute, found a place in the economy between 1945 and 1946. Unemployment, never high before the war, is now below 30% of the total labor force—a negligible figure that is considered more or less "normal" in any economy even in periods of high prosperity. This post-war conversion, be it remarked, was achieved without any assistance from the Administration and sometimes, especially in matters of immigration, in the face of its opposition.

Before the war around 11% of Jewish industrial output was exported, and of this, only one-third went to the middle eastern Arab States. During the war industrial exports spurted up to 17.5% (£8.2 million) of the total industrial production, and again about one-third of it went to the states of the Arab League. The present Arab boycott, which became effective in 1946, in part reduced the value of exports to Arab countries from £2.7 million in 1945 to £5000000 the net year. A large part of this loss however, has been made up by increased exports to non-Arab countries. Palestine industry has found new markets and is developing others. As regards the countries of the Arab League, sooner or later Palestine will have the possibility of protecting its commercial interests even there, for when the present world-wide shortages have inevitably been transformed into surpluses, the Arab countries will be more than ever in need of markets for their main products; and Jewish Palestine will be the nearest and most important of such markets.

Thus have the Jews of Palestine and the Jews in all parts of the world wrought in the land on the faith of the international pledge which was made to them. Thus have they prepared that land and demonstrated its economic potentialities for the rapid absorption of the hoped-for and expected new mass Jewish immigration.

Nor have they done this with any injury to the Arab inhabitants. On the contrary, the Arabs have prospered and benefited both materially and culturally—with a large increase of population—from the Jewish resettlement, regardless of the clamorous propaganda to the contrary of Arab agitators and politicians.

Ten years ago, the Palestine Royal Commission, after considering all the evidence, came to the following conclusions [Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 93]: (1) Jewish capital has had "a general fructifying effect on the economic life of the whole country." (2) Arab industry and citriculture "has been largely financed by the capital thus obtained." (3) "Jewish example has done much to improve the Arab cultivation . . ." (4) "Owing to Jewish development and enterprise the employment of Arab labour has increased in urban areas . . ." (5) Jewish anti-malaria work and reclamation "have benefited all Arabs in the neighbourhood." (6) Jewish public health and welfare institutions have also served Arabs. "Hadassah, for example, treats Arab patients, notably at the Tuberculosis Hospital at Safad and the Radiology Institute at Jerusalem, admits Arab country-folk to the clinics of its Rural Sick Benefit Fund, and does much infant welfare work for Arab mothers." (7) The beneficent effect of Jewish immigration is shown by the marked Arab population increase in urban areas affected by Jewish development. "A comparison of the Census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that, six years ago (i.e., in 1931), the increase in Haifa was 80%, in Jaffa 62%, in Jerusalem 37%, while in purely Arab towns such as Nabulus and Hebron it was only 7%, and at Gaza there was a decrease of 2%.

Far from being economically harmed by Jewish immigration, Arab wealth and prosperity have steadily increased. This is shown by the tables in a Survey of Palestine (2 vols., 1946), which the Palestine Administration submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 12/1945 and January 1946.

A few comparative figures from those tables will illustrate this: In 1928 the total Arab winter crop was 118978 tons and the summer crop 83888. In 1942 the figures stood at 234674 and 488452, respectively.

In 1928 the Arabs produced 15576 tons of melons; in 1945 they grew 40627 tons. The Jews supplied the market.

In 1939 the Arabs had £3760000 deposited in their two banks; in 1945 this had leaped to £6.971 million. During the same period Arab banks increased their paid-up capital by about 600%.

In 1900 Arab land planted to citrus was around 45000 dunams; in 1945 it was about 133000. The Jews had supplied the impetus, the "know-how" and the marketing facilities. Increased Government revenue resulting from the Jewish resettlement enabled the Administration to spend more money on social services for the Arabs. "Arab witnesses . . . could not deny that such public services as had in fact been provided had benefited their people; nor could they deny that the revenue available for those services had been largely provided by the Jews."

The Jewish contribution to the revenue from income tax in Palestine amounts to approximately 68% of the total. Similarly, the Jewish contribution to the whole revenue amounts to 62.7% of the total, although Jews constitute but 33% of the population. The Arab and others' share is only 37.3%; but it is the Arabs for whom the great bulk of the revenue is spent.

Social services supported by the Government revenue are of benefit to them especially, since the Jews take care of so many important public services by themselves at their own separate expense. Thus 85% of the patients entering Government hospitals in 1944 were non-Jews. In the course of the Jewish resettlement the Palestine Department of Health expanded its budget of £34440 in 1924-25 to £543000 in 1944-45. Malaria, once the scourge of Palestine, has been reduced to a negligible figure by Jewish anti-malaria work—for the benefit of Arabs as well as the Jews. In 1922 malaria patients amounted to 7.17% of all patients treated; in 1942 this percentage dropped to 0.40%. Owing to improved health conditions, Palestine's Arab population has increased. Employment opportunities have furthermore attracted Arab immigrants from Syria and Trans-Jordan, thus reversing an historic trend. In 1913, for example, 2,000 Arabs emigrated from the Jerusalem district alone. In 1922-27 between 20000-30000 Arabs immigrated into Palestine; at the same time an average of 9300 Arabs emigrated from Syria annually.

Jewish public health stations, clinics, and improved hygienic conditions have sharply cut down the Arab death rate and, particularly, infant mortality. In 1924-30 the average infant mortality rate among Palestinian Arabs was one of the highest in the world—192 per 1,000 live births. By 1939 this was reduced to 121, compared with 203 for Egypt (1936-39). By 1946 this was further reduced to 90.7.

Not only has the Arab infant mortality thus been sliced by over 50%, but Arab school attendance has increased fivefold since the Jewish resettlement began.

Speaking in the House of Commons on 11/24/1938, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, summarized Jewish Palestine's boon to Arabs as follows: "If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe the Arab population of Palestine to-day would still have been round about the 600000 figure (instead of over 1
Evidence Regarding the Allegations of Soliciting Employment

Sen. Packwood's Spouse: (D) Ron Crawford: (1) Background.

Resolution for Disciplinary Action. Senate Report 104-137. District of Columbia: US Senate, Select Committee on Ethics, September 7, 1995. p. 187. Ron Crawford first met Sen. Packwood in 1968 during the recount of his first election. Mr. Crawford described the Senator as one of his closest friends. Mr. Crawford's consulting business is called F.P. Research Associates and he is a registered lobbyist. There is also a fundraising component to his business, but that is handled by his son.

In Senator Packwood's 1992 campaign, Mr. Crawford's firm was involved in raising money from PACs around the country. In a diary entry dated 10/8/1991, Senator Packwood recorded the following: "The advantage Ron brings to me in the Washington PAC scene is that much of his income is dependent upon his relationship with me." Senator Packwood testified that he does not know how much Mr. Crawford earns or how much of his income is dependent on him. Mr. Crawford has been active in fundraising in every one of Senator Packwood's campaigns. In 1991-92, Senator Packwood's reelection campaign paid Mr. Crawford's firm approximately $60,000 for fundraising, consulting and event management.

Mr. Crawford is a registered lobbyist for the National Cable Television Association and the American Bus Association and has been so since the early 1980's. At the time of his deposition, he had recently registered as a lobbyist for the Sturm Ruger Company. He has a ten year business relationship with this company. At the time of his deposition, he also recently had become a lobbyist for the National Restaurant Association. He has previously represented Shell Oil. Mr. Crawford recorded an entry in his diary that Mr. Crawford was in to see him on behalf of Shell Oil. He noted the following conversation: "He [Crawford] said, "I know how much you hate the oil companies." I said, "...I still hate the oil companies but I'll do you a favor." Senator Packwood testified that whenever anybody comes in like this and if you're going to do something anyway, you let them think it's a big favor.""

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the Israeli ministry of Justice, who both heads the Ministry's Department of Civil Claims and deals with seizures of land owned by the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The leak acquired some notoriety. After having been reported by other papers, it was mentioned by several MKs in the Knesset. Most Israeli newspapers (with the predictable exception of the Jerusalem Post) dealt with it at length. Gradually, its discussion began to focus on what might be termed the spirit of the Israeli Law when applied to Arabs, but the discussion has also delved at certain points into the nature of the legal order established by Israel in the Territories conquered in 1967: both in those areas which, like East Jerusalem (or the Golan Heights which will remain outside the scope of this report) were subsequently formally annexed, and in those areas which remain formally outside the borders of the State of Israel, under the authority of the military governors. The present report will be confined to the examination of Pi'a Albek's role within the area of the State of Israel, and of the deeper implications of her activities there. Her role in the Occupied Territories will be explored in the next report.

The Civil Claims Department, among its other duties, processes the claims of the Palestinians from the Territories whose relatives are killed by the Israeli troops under the circumstances not involving any "disturbance of public order." Yet the Israeli legal authorities often refuse to charge anyone responsible for the killings. According to the Israeli law, the State of Israel can in such cases be sued for financial compensation in a civil Israeli court. For many years the PLO and the Intifada leadership forbade the Palestinians from the Territories to engage in any such litigation. With the decline of the Intifada and the loss of its leadership's power, several Palestinians in the last year didn't nevertheless bring lawsuits to Israeli courts. A case in point is the lawsuit brought to the District Court of Tel Aviv by Mr. Muhammad Jarjun, the widower of the deceased Mrs. Safiya Suleiman Jarjun of Khan Yunes [Gaza Strip], who was clubbed by the soldiers and then shot in her belly and back from a close range, while doing nothing more than watering the garden in front of her house. In conformity with the usual procedure, the Tel Aviv district prosecutor approached Albek, in her capacity of the Head of the Civil Claims Department. Replying, Albek wrote the following instruction: "In addition to the usual defense arguments used in such cases, you should claim that the plaintiff could only benefit from the death of his wife, because he now no longer needs to support her as he did before. In the very least, therefore, he sustained no damage at all." (Quoted by the entire Hebrew press of 10/15/1991). Somebody subsequently brought the instruction to the notice of the minister of Justice, Dan Meridor (of Likud). He not only countermanded it, but also officially rebuked Albek, while imposing secrecy on the matter. In the end Albek's instruction was not followed, but Meridor's imposition of secrecy was not followed either.

The entire Hebrew press denounced Albek and her peculiar instructions, and so did a number of public figures such as the chairman of the Israeli Bar Association Advocate Khoter-Yishay. But three groups sprang to her defense. One such group were the settlers, particularly the religious ones. Speaking in their name, a settler leader Daniela Weiss extolled Albek as "that noblest woman." The second group were the leaders of the extreme right-wing parties, such as MK Elyakim Ha'etzni (who once had compared the Arabs to rats). Finally, the religious parties and their rabbis also rallied in Albek's defense. They may have been influenced by Albek's devout religious faith, by her being a descendant of a religious family and by the fact that her husband is a professor of Talmud at the religious Bar Ilan University. But no single Likud member dared stand up in her defense. Even such extremists as Sharon who, as will be shown later, had cooperated closely with Albek in the past, on this occasion preferred to keep silence. This only proves that a chasm still exists between Likud (which not only admits but also solicits Arabs as members and the three listed groups which stand for a rabid and undisguised Jewish racism and religious zealotry. As it turned out, other instructions of Albek concerning legal cases involving the Arabs have also been discovered by the Hebrew press. Some opinions are worth quoting. The leading article of Davar (10/16/1991) links these instructions of her to various official anti-Arab pronouncements made at various times in the past. Davar lists such pronouncements, among them "the 1956 'Allah will have mercy on them' blessing of a high Israeli army commander [general Ieka Shadmi] to the Arabs about to be killed in Qafq Qassem, or the suggestion of the former Chief of Staff and a present agriculture minister [Rafael Eitan] that the Arabs from the Territories, being no more than 'drugged cockroaches' might as well put into the bottles." After stating that "quite a lot of high rank officers and senior officials have nothing but contempt and loathing for the inhabitants of the Territories," Davar concludes that "although the attitude toward the Arabs as subservient beings is certain and unceasing, the individuals can and do vary a great deal. But the tone of official statements should refrain from expressing it."
abound. Let me give just one example out of many available. In an interview held after two years of Intifada ("I have nothing to be ashamed of," Haaretz, 12/8/1989), the retiring commander of the Israeli forces in Gaza Strip, colonel Tzvi Pogel, claimed that ordering all the male residents of a refugee camp to stand all night in a sewage pool was not punishment but "education," necessary in view of "the insufficient maturity of the Gaza Strip inhabitants to assume responsibility" which contrasts with the European "tradition of governance." The Custodian already operating under Sharon's authority, she gave instruction to confiscate the tiny shop. Of the two methods of "Judaizing East Jerusalem," as correctly explained by Danny Rubinstein ("The presence of the Absentees," Haaretz, 10/18/1991), all Jerusalem" in current use, Albek's is clearly superior to Sharon's other Arab residents formally became Absentees.... Theoretically, the Custodian of the Absentee Property could confiscate all houses and other property of all East Jerusalem Arabs on the ground that they were no longer its legal owners."

However, the minister of Justice at the annexation time, Ya'akov Shimshon Shapira, who was a little more mindful of legal implications than the usual run of Israeli ministers, noticed the absurdity of this situation. He submitted to the Knesset an amendment to the 1950 Law "by which East Jerusalem Arabs could legally own their property." The amendment was enacted by the Knesset, but it did not affect the inhabitants of West Bank (or of any other place) who had property in East Jerusalem. "Arabs from Bethlehem, Ramallah and all other locations in the Territories, as well as from outside of the Territories, suddenly found themselves no longer the legal owners of their houses, shops, land and whatever else they may have possessed in East Jerusalem." Nor did the amendment affect the status of Arabs, from either East Jerusalem or the Territories, in regard to property located in Israel which they had owned in the past or may acquire in the future. In regard to such property they remain "Absentees." This is why Albek could argue that any compensation, if paid in Israel, was to be transferred to the Custodian. Until recently, however, this law was not acted upon, except "under turnkey emergency." Rubinstein provides an example of such "emergency" which occurred "in Kfar-Akab, north of Jerusalem. The Custodian came to a local peasant, and after taking measurements carefully, determined that half of his house's courtyard was located on the territory annexed to Israel. In regard to this half of his courtyard, the peasant was to be considered an Absentee, and that half was confiscated from him. Ordinarily, however, the Custodian refrained from using his 'legitimate' but venomous authority."

Enrages Ms. Albek, though. Acting in coordination with Sharon, and with the Custodian already operating under Sharon's authority, she carefully scrutinized East Jerusalem property archives in order to discover "the Absentees," so as to confiscate maximum property. In this job, Albek was remarkably successful. As noted in some press reports, nothing was too insignificant to escape her attention. On an inspection tour in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, she noticed a tiny shop which looked as if temporarily shut down. Right on, she radioed her office computer, to find that the shop owner was a resident of the Territories, banned by order of the authorities from entering Jerusalem. "For me, these strangers are not human beings, but animals," said Albek as proposing to load them "like animals" on trucks and expel all of them from Germany. Rosenthal stresses that in Israel the advocacy of a "solution of the Palestinian problem" in the spirit of that neo-Nazi, commonly referred to as the "transfer," is not only popular, but also considered a legitimate policy option. Furthermore, "Pli'a Albek has clothed this solution in a legalistic phraseology." He adds: "Hatred needs to be cultivated and argued for. It consumes time that could be spent on cogitating on something else. After all, hatred is an all too human emotion. But once a target of hatred - a Jew, an Arab, a foreign laborer in Germany - is perceived as a mere object, one can relax, take a rest and treat him as one would wish, efficiently.... The perception of Palestinians as objects to be processed can be detected anywhere: at roadblocks, in the courts, during the Shabak interrogations and in [Israeli] political debates." I agree with Rosenthal wholeheartedly. But for me, his analysis warrants a conclusion that indiscriminate harassment and humiliation of the Palestinians in the Territories, which is inflicted everyday, carry greater weight than relatively rarer instances of killing, or even inflictions of wounds and torture. It is because the constant harassment and humiliation shows the Israeli authorities in the Territories as wanting to treat the Palestinians as mere objects, in contrast to Jewish religious zealots who do hate them.

However odious Pli'a Albek's functions in her capacity of the director of the Department of Civil Claims of the Ministry of Justice may be, she also performs a rather undefined but highly consequential role by establishing legal grounds for seizures of land owned by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem. The Hebrew press has devoted much space to ingenuity of her legal pretexts. She has experience, because she began her work in the winter of 1977-78. After Sadat's initiative, land confiscation and settlement construction was sped up drastically. Even today, only 20% of the already confiscated West Bank land has been used for settlement. The rest is still unused by settlers. [5]

26050. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 87: Pli'a Albek or the Spirit of the Israeli Law: Part 2. Israel, October 27, 1991. Ms. Albek's legal talents have blossomed in particular in cases involving land in East Jerusalem (and the Golan Heights). Their discussion must be separated from cases involving the Occupied Territories which have not been annexed, where the legal situation is different. As correctly explained by Danny Rubinstein ("The presence of the Absentees," Haaretz, 10/8/1991), all land and property of the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem was not legally owned by them, but by the State of Israel. Rubinstein recalls that a 1950 Israeli law was meant to apply without distinction to any conceivable territory which might fall under Israeli sovereignty. (The law was also retroactive.) As Rubinstein points out, "the law stipulated that anyone who either lived in any Arab country or was present on enemy territory after 11/1947, was to be transferred to an Absentee, which meant that all his property was to be transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Property) who was to administer it but who in fact owned it." The Custodian's office operates within the ministry of Housing, which, as Rubinstein notes, "is now headed by the minister Sharon." Rubinstein further explains that the law in question applied not only to genuine refugees absent from Israel, but "also to Arabs who had become Israeli citizens...even if they had been elected as Knesset members. Legally, they are still considered Absentees which means that legally, all their property belongs to the State of Israel. Hence their description as Present Absentees." Incidentally, no legal procedure has been instituted for proving that a given person is an Absentee. The Custodian, supposedly "acting on information received," has full authority to define any Arab as an "Absentee" arbitrarily, and confiscate a part or the whole of his property accordingly. In the process, he does not even need to notify the person affected, who may well have stay for no more than a single night on enemy territory. The law was applicable in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, as parts of sovereign Israel. As Rubinstein observes, "after the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel, all Arab residents formally became Absentees.... Theoretically, the Custodian of the Absentee Property could confiscate all houses and other property of all East Jerusalem Arabs on the ground that they were no longer its legal owners."

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various churches which cannot be defined as “Absentees.” Albek’s distinct method of “Judaizing East Jerusalem” does therefore run upon obstacles. Yet it makes progress. The way it works was quite minutely described by the Hebrew press in 4-5/1990, after the Jewish settlers took over St. John Hospice in the Christian Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem.

As described by Nahum Barnea (“The House: They all lie about it,” Yediot Ahronot, 5/11/1990), Gaby Baron (“The Mysterious Redeeming of Land,” Yediot Ahronot, Financial Supplement, 4/24/1990) and Israel Tomer (“Whose Custodian?,” Yediot Ahronot, Financial Supplement, 4/24/1990), Albek’s genre of the “Judaization of East Jerusalem” heavily relies on two key institutions. One is the Custodian of Legacies & Gifts, who operates within the Ministry of Justice, separately from the mentioned Custodian of Absentee Property. The other is the “Heimanuta” company which is a branch of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an agency of the World Zionist Organization. The Custodian of Legacies and Gifts is a junior official dealing with money or property donated or bequeathed to the State of Israel. His office’s budget is quite tiny. His utility lies in the fact that the assets he processes do not need to be included in the government budget and, therefore, are not subject to Knesset controls. As Tomer explains: “No law commands the Custodian to report to the Knesset or to anybody else the assets which he holds in trust. If there are any rules on how should he distribute the funds at his disposal, they are secret and not open to public inspection.... His decisions are not accountable to anyone.” Quite possibly, this innocuous Custodian Office may be a branch of the Israeli intelligence. In addition, the office has another advantage, which, by the way, the “Heimanuta also has. In Barnea words, “they are both the Labor [party] bailiwicks, at least for the time being.” Both agencies are staffed exclusively by Labor’s old timers. This means that if a scandal breaks open in either of them, the Labor faction in the Knesset cooperates with the government in hushing it up.

How exactly do these agencies operate? A high government official authorizes a payment to the Custodian from the reserve funds of his ministry. The payment does not need to be countersigned by the minister. In case of the St. John Hospice, such a payment of 3.6 million Shekels [$1.8 million] was according to Barnea authorized by Amsor Unger, the Director General of the ministry of Housing, who did not even bother to notify his minister. David Levy: The Custodian then transfers the money to the “Heimanuta.” Upon obtaining it the “Heimanuta” paid it to a mysterious Panamanian company. Together with some additional funds of unknown origin, the money was used by this company for bribing the Arabs subletting the Hospice to allow its takeover. Repossessed in this manner, the Hospice was subsequently offered free of charge to the notorious “Ateret Kohanim” Yeshiva for the sake of settling the place with Jews. According to Barnea, “Heimanuta” is engaged in this sort of wheeling-and-dealing all over Israel. For example, if suspicion arises that some “Upper Nazareth apartments reserved solely for Jews” may be sold or rented to Arabs, “Heimanuta” would “secretly provide their Jewish owners with some relief” so as to fend off the “danger.” Barnea believes that nothing comparable can be spotted even in South Africa, especially since “all operations of ‘Heimanuta’ are clandestine.” He comments: “On surface, this may look like a vital service for the Jewish settlers. Yet it makes progress. The way it works was quite minutely described by the Hebrew press in 4-5/1990, after the Jewish settlers took over St. John Hospice in the Christian Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. In light of what Baron discloses about the “Heimanuta’s” operating procedures (the responsibility for which lies squarely, via the JNF, with the World Zionist Organization), Barnea’s conclusion seems fully vindicated. It appears that “Heimanuta,” supposedly a non-governmental organization, has for many years “operated under the direct control of a ministry of Justice department headed by Ms. Ph’a Albeck.” Baron found “a rare interview” conducted a number of years ago with “the central figure in all such dubious purchase deals, Avraham Hilley, the director of the JNF Land Department.” Hilley, “who had been born in Aleppo, Syria,” was chosen to head this department on account of his mastery of Arabic and “expertise” in the so-called “Arab mentality.” “Hilley explained that the registry of land in ‘Heimanuta’s name restricts its use to Jews alone, irrespective of who might have paid the taxes out of which that land was purchased. It is because this kind of restriction is stipulated by the JNF statutes, and ‘Heimanuta’ is no more than a JNF subsidiary. But this condition is perfectly legitimate. Israel is entitled to place its lands at the exclusive disposal of the Jews. ‘Heimanuta’ is merely trying to get hold of every piece of land not yet owned by the Jews.”

Once the Palestinians become thus dispossessed, their expulsion, in popular parlance “transfer,” becomes a logical consequence of sorts. [4]
countries, whereas the Bucharest Conference had been initiated in response to the concern of the industrialized nations. This shift in concern and commitment was not surprising in view of the changing patterns of population growth.

(39) She emphasized that when individuals were deprived of essential services, there was a population problem, but when basic human needs were satisfied, population problems began to fade away. There are widespread fears that the world is facing a demographic crisis, but many of these problems were not attributable to high fertility rates or economic imbalances alone. By way of example, she pointed to the plight of the millions of refugees and victims of political conflicts. In particular, she described the terrible cost to the people of her own country and to the Palestinians of the continuing instability in the region.

(40) She referred, in conclusion, to possibilities for progress that might be achieved, for example, through an improved status for women, better education for both men and women, integrated rural development, and most fundamentally a renewed commitment to meeting basic human needs.

26053. UN: UN World Conference on Women. Impact On Women Of Recent Economic, Social Changes In Europe To Be Discussed At October Meeting In Vienna: Week-long Sessions To Set Regional Priorities; Preparation for Next Year's Fourth World Conference on Women. Vienna: UN Information Service, July 15, 1994. The impact of recent economic and social changes in Europe on the lives of women, the world-wide "feminization of poverty" and the need to improve women's participation in decision-making are among the issues to be addressed when high-level representatives of countries in Europe and North America meet in Vienna in October to forge a regional contribution to preparations for next year's World Conference on Women. Under the theme "Women in a changing world -- call for action from a regional perspective", the event will be the first high-level intergovernmental gathering in the region to address women's concerns. It is being organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), in cooperation with national committees, United Nations agencies, European institutions and non-governmental organizations working on women's issues. The ECE region consists of 54 countries in North America and Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States and Israel. Scheduled for 17 to 21 October at the United Nations International Center, the meeting is expected to review trends in the region and in individual countries, and to formulate proposals for inclusion in a "Platform for Action" to be considered by the Fourth World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing from 9/4-15/1995. Among the questions to be examined at the Vienna meeting is how the changing economic environment -- particularly in countries in transition to market economies -- affects women's role, including their participation in decision-making, and their situation in general. It will analyse the impact of economic trends on women's contributions to sustainable development, covering a wide range of economic sectors, including the "informal economy". Participants will consider adopting a regional plan of action on women and the economy, with special emphasis on efforts to improve women's situation in countries in transition. Debate on demographic issues is expected to focus on new insights and proposed methodologies for improving statistical research on women, as well as on the effect of demographic trends on women in the ECE region. Gender disparities in access to jobs and domestic responsibilities and the "feminization of poverty" will also be addressed, along with such matters related to women's entrepreneurship as women's need for commercial credit and property rights. The meeting will provide an opportunity for Governments in the region to share experience with strategies and instruments aimed at avoiding gender bias and improving women's participation in political and economic decision-making. Women's role in both the public and private sectors will be explored, including their role in the media. Proposals concerning decentralized forms of governance and women's role in promoting community-based development will also be considered. The meeting will be preceded by an ECE Regional Non-Governmental Forum from 12 to 14 October, in preparation for the 1995 World Conference.

26054. United National Information Center. UN Women's Conference Backgrounder: Part 10: Gearing Up For Beijing. United National Information Center, November 8, 1993. Preparations for Beijing are already under way at the global, regional and country levels. Ms. Mongella, the Conference Secretary-General, feels that preparations at the national level are especially crucial, as they are likely to have the most immediate impact on people's lives. All sectors of society should be a part of the process, she says, from Governments, NGOs, the private sector and the media to individual women and men of all ages. Preparations "should be a process of national reflection and reach the women at the grass roots, whose voices are seldom heard". Both nationally and regionally, Governments and NGOs are preparing reports on the situation of women since 1985, assessing obstacles and progress as well as stimulating broad national debate. These reports will be discussed at five regional preparatory meetings, scheduled to take place in 1994 in Indonesia, Argentina, Austria, Jordan and Senegal. At the same time, many of the issues to be debated in Beijing will also be considered at other upcoming international conferences, including the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, September 1994) and the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, March 1995). The 50th anniversary of the United Nations (1995) will provide yet another opportunity for highlighting women's issues. NGOs will play a vital role at the Conference and at a parallel NGO Forum. Planning for this event is progressing under the auspices of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (CONGO). As with previous United Nations conferences, the Beijing Forum is being planned as an event open to all. It will take place at the Beijing Workers' Sports Service Center, a site close to the Beijing International Convention Center where the World Conference will convene. Gathering and disseminating information on the situation of women will be one of the most important activities of the Conference and its preparatory meetings. In addition to the Platform for Action, the Conference will consider a second, updated edition of the United Nations publication The World's Women: Trends and Statistics; the 1994 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development; and an update on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. For further information, contact: Department of Public Information, Room S-1040, United Nations, New York, NY 10017, USA, tel. 212/963-5086, fax 212/963-3463. Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information Printed by the United Nations Reproduction Section, New York DPI/1424-November 1993-15M [="=]

The leadership King Hussein showed in signing a peace treat with Israel last 10/1994 reinforced Jordan's role as a partner in the Middle East peace process. US economic assistance bolster this role by supporting a stable and moderate government and aiding Jordan's economic and social development. USAID's strategy has been designed to stimulate economic growth in Jordan, to address rapid population growth and to improve the quality and availability of water.

To stimulate economic growth, USAID assistance has helped the Jordanian government take the steps necessary to improve prospects for Jordanian exporters, including eliminating export licenses, simplifying customs procedures, and redrafting laws that act as barriers to increased trade and investment. To slow population growth, USAID is helping Jordanian health and family planning programs improve outreach, education, services, and access to contraceptives. Jordan's fledgling democracy, its ability to "wage peace" and its continuing efforts in the regional peace process will depend on political and economic stability, which can only be achieved with US and other donor assistance. [=]


Who approves projects for USAID funding in Gaza/Jericho? Who makes the decision whether to fund long-term infrastructure projects or short-term projects?

Does the US have AID officials monitoring, Palestinian Authority spending of US foreign assistance? Where are the personnel located? How often do they visit Gaza/Jericho or other areas?

What monitoring mechanisms does the US have in place to ensure that no US funds go to individuals who support rejectionist groups like Hamas? Has there ever been any evidence that private voluntary organizations receiving US funds have diverted any of their funding to any individuals or organizations involved in rejectionist acts or terrorism?

When Vice President Gore met with PLO Chairman Arafat last month, he announced a $65 million pledge of assistance to the Palestinians. Is this new money or part of the $100 million per year pledge the US made at the donors conference in 10/1993?

Answer. The USAID program, from its inception 20 years ago and even today benefits all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has never been limited to Jericho alone in the West Bank. Prior to the Declaration of Principles, our West Bank/Gaza program aimed primarily at community development, small scale private sector promotion, health, and training/technical assistance. Subsequent to the DOP, we and most donors increased the size of our programs, but not necessarily the focus (although several signed on to the World Bank's Emergency Rehabilitation program which focused on infrastructure), and the US inaugurated a new housing program. By 5-6/94, it became clear that Gaza-Jericho was not economically self-sustaining, and we and other donors began shifting resources to help cover the day-to-day operations of the Palestinian Authority, including police. Most donors agreed informally to allocate up to 25% of 1994 pledges to start-up costs. By 12/1994, donors again reevaluated the impact of their programs, and determined that there should be more emphasis on visible and immediate infrastructure improvements, public works projects and long-term job creation, and private sector support. As a result, in 1/1995, we reprogrammed almost $40 million of our FY 95 funds to support these new objectives. The first of these projects ($8 million for public works projects and $11 million for a Gaza wastewater project) were announced in 3/1995.

The USAID Mission Director in Tel Aviv approves projects for funding. His decisions are taken on the basis of policy guidelines that have been worked at senior levels of USAID, in close coordination with the Department of State.

US project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is administered by USAID through private voluntary organizations, other grantees, US contractors, or UN agencies. These projects are administered in strict compliance with USAID's procurement, accountability, and reporting requirements, with USAID staff in the field monitoring project implementation. The USAID staff is posted at Embassies in Tel Aviv and Consulate in Jerusalem, and visit Gaza/Jericho daily.

Monitoring mechanisms and the recipients of our aid funds are described elsewhere in great detail. There is no evidence that any recipient of US funds in the West Bank and Gaza program has diverted any funding to individuals or organizations involved in rejectionist acts or terrorism.

The $65 million announced by Vice President Gore in 3/1995 was part of our total 5-year pledge of $500 million. However, only $22 million of the $65 million is relected in our FY 95 pledge of $100 million; the remainder reflects expected outlays for the life of the two projects that the Vice President announced.

Question. The US has provided the Palestinian police with Department of Defense vehicles and other equipment. From where did the equipment come? Are such equipment transfers counted in the $100 million per year the US has donated to the Palestinians?

Answer. The DOD assistance announced by Secretary Christopher in 3/1995 consisted of 200 vehicles and medical supplies. The vehicles, spare parts, and medical equipment that is being transferred--together with a previous shipment of 200 vehicles and spare parts--comes from both excess equipment and active stocks of the Department of Defense. The total value of these shipments is approximately $11 million. These equipment transfers have not been counted as part of our 5 year pledge. The Palestinians' need for health care equipment is large enough that DOD contributions would complement donations from other sources.

Question. When Secretary of State Christopher visited Gaza last month, he announced that the Department of Agriculture would provide assistance to farmers, and that Department of Defense would provide medical and humanitarian aid. Is this new assistance, or part of the $100 million pledge that the US has committed to since the donors' conference in 10/1993? What is the value of the USDA assistance? For how long will the DOD assistance differ from the health care already being provided to the Palestinians through other sources?

Answer. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has provided some technical assistance through its Agriculture Research Service (ARS). ARS horticultural experts have travelled to the West Bank and Gaza to evaluate the potential for cultivation of new flower varieties in response to Palestinian requests for assistance in promoting export crops that might substitute for more water-intensive citrus now grown in the areas. USDA, State and AID are now discussing possible follow-on steps, including procurement of tissue and training for Palestinian growers. The duration and overall value of USDA assistance has not yet been determined.

Question. What is the annual US contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees? What percentage of the US contribution to the UNRWA does to Gaza/Jericho recipients?

Answer. In FY 95, the US has contributed $70 million toward UNRWA's Regular Program Budget for FY 95 of $323 million. The US contribution supports core programs of education; health and relief services to over 3 million Palestinian refugees registered with the agency in Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.

The US contribution is not earmarked for specific geographic regions. UNRWA's CY 95 Regular Program Budget includes expenditures of $73 million for Gaza and $53 million for the West Bank.

Question. What US assistance has been channeled to the forthcoming Palestinian elections? What indications have we received from the various parties?
that women will be allowed to vote freely and for candidates of their own choosing?

Answer. US assistance for Palestinian elections is channeled through USAID's "Democratic Understanding and Development" project. This 5-year (1994-99), $20 million project ($10 million has been authorized to date) is designed to promote the development of democratic institutions and a civilian political culture in the West Bank and Gaza. The project has four components: elections, rule of law, civil society and governance.

USAID has awarded grants to private US voluntary organizations for projects on election monitoring, public opinion polling, and the establishment of an election resource center. There is also an ongoing project aimed at encouraging women to participate as candidates in the elections and in other civic activities. That program has revealed a great interest on the part of Palestinian women to participate fully in the elections. From the on-going Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on elections and electoral laws, it appears that gender will not be a factor in determining voter and candidate eligibility.

Question. What US assistance is being allocated to institution-building and the rule of law? How are these efforts progressing?

Answer. Both the US Information Agency (USIA) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have been funding institution-building and rule of law programs in the West Bank and Gaza since 1994.

USAID has initiated six subprojects under a general project definition of "Democratic Understanding and Development", a $20 million project for five years (1994-99), for which $10 million has been authorized. The subprojects include elections monitoring a resource center for education and training civic education on democratic principles, training for pollsters, journalists and broadcasters, commercial law reform assistance; and public opinion polling. The first phase of the commercial law reform project is near completion, with recommendations for developing dispute resolution mechanisms and sets of model contracts for financial transactions. In addition, USAID has granted AMIDEAST both an Institutional Development Project and a Legal Development Project, totalling $5.99 million for 3-year implementation. The first phase of the project, including a needs assessment of the judicial sector in the West Bank and Gaza, is near completion.

USIA has allotted $721,000 for rule of law projects in the West Bank and Gaza from 1994-96. USIA's three-phase judicial reform project includes an overall assessment of the Palestinian criminal and civil processes conducted by the Mayo group its final report will be issued in early 7/1995, and is expected to emphasize the implementation of correct procedures rather than the nature of the legal system. Follow-on projects plan to focus on criminal justice and alternate dispute resolution.

Question. Last summer, President Clinton expanded the definition of a Palestinian refugee so as to make available additional funds controlled by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) at the State Department. How much money has been allocated to date for the benefit of Palestinian refugees? Are the funds being channeled to private Palestinian voluntary organizations? To which organizations are the funds being transferred, for what kinds of programs are they being used, and which Palestinians are the recipients?

Answer. The Presidential Determination (PD 94-33) of 7/14/1994, did not obligate funds nor did it make available additional funds, nor did it affect the definition of Palestinian refugees. The purpose of the PD was to provide flexibility for PRM to work with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as UNRWA, should there be a need for specific projects or activities.

In FY 1995, PRM has contributed $70 million to UNRWA for its core programs of education, health and relief services for over 3 million Palestinian refugees registered with the agency in Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. During FY 1995, PRM has not funded NGO activities on behalf of Palestinian refugees. In FY 1994, PRM provided $40,000 to an American NGO, AMIDEAST, for a program to train 8 nurse-midwives from Gaza in maternal and child care.

Question. The US pledged $500 million to the Palestinians over a 5-year period. Based on AID's assessments, and given level funding over each of the five years, how much of the $100 million each year will go to private voluntary organizations, AID contractors, the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, and how much to the Holst Fund at the World Bank? Are there any other Palestinian recipients of US aid?

Answer. The following is a summary of the distribution of FY 1994 and an estimate for the distribution of FY 1995 funds available to USAID. The annual funding level for the West Bank and Gaza is $75 million. Given the evolving situation in the West Bank and Gaza, we cannot accurately project FY 1996-1998 disbursements at this time. However, we anticipate that our support for recurrent costs through the World Bank Holst Fund will decrease in future years and that assistance provided through contractors will increase. Other than the $5 million provided to the Palestinian Police Force in FY 94, no funds go directly to the Palestinian Authority (PA) or PLO.

Question. To whom does the US usually present foreign assistance checks—the economic minister of the Palestinian Authority, to Chairman Arafat, to the Holst Fund? Are different projects handled differently? If so, how?

Answer. No checks are presented to the Palestinian Authority nor are cash payments made to any AID grantee or contractor. In the case of the USAID grant to the Palestinian Police Force, funds were deposited in the Arab Bank of Cairo and disbursement to the police was managed by the US accounting firm Coopers and Lybrand. Disbursements to contractors and grantees such as US PVOs, the World Bank and the UN are made incrementally through letters of credit or federal reserve bank accounts for international organizations. The amount disbursed to a grantee or contractor is based on an annual budget that is incorporated into a rant agreement or contact and on a review of expenditure vouchers which are submitted by the grantee or contractor to USAID quarterly or more frequently.

Question. What procedures exist in Gaza-Jericho for granting permits, issuing licenses, establishing codes, and conducting inspections of construction projects in Gaza and Jericho? Does the US insist that certain standards be established and met for the projects it finances?

Answer. Construction projects using USAID funds are supervised by American contractors which verify design and specifications, make regular site inspections, review reports and insure sound construction standards. For example, the firm Louis Berger provides on-site design, engineering, and implementation monitoring for the Gaza Housing Project under which 192 apartment units are being built by one American and three local construction firms. [=]

26057. United States House; House Committee on International Relations, Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Appendix: Questions for the Record Submitted to Asst. Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau by Representative Hamilton: Jordan. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia: Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995, pp. 68-69. Question 1. Other than debt relief, what are we doing to help Jordan develop its economy and obtain financing for the large-scale regional cooperation it would like to carry out?

What is your response to the allegations that the US reneged on a longstanding commitment to modernize Jordan's armed forces if Jordan made peace with Israel?

What is your assessment of the strength of Jordanian opposition to the peace treaty with Israel? Are you concerned that Jordan may find itself isolated if the Palestinian and Syrian tracks stall?

Answer. Debt relief remains our highest priority in terms of assistance for Jordan. Our FY 96 budget request includes 7.2 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) $15 million in P480 Title I (food aid) and $7.97 million in Development Assistance (DA). The ESF and DA funds are used to fund USAID programs in Jordan that support water projects, tourism as a foreign earner and family planning.

We are also working with Jordan and Israel in the context of the Trilateral Economic Committee. This Committee is overseeing the creation of a Jordan Rift Valley Master Plan, which combines public and
private sector projects to enhance regional development and cooperation. A follow up to last year's successful Middle East/ North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca will be held in Amman at the end of 10/1995. This Summit should enhance private sector investment in Jordan and in the region.

The President and Secretary Christopher have committed to support Jordan's legitimate security needs. In 8/1994, a team of DOD experts identified serious deficiencies in the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) capabilities. In the FY 96 budget submission, the Administration requested $30 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $1.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. These figures reflect increases of $22.7 million in FMF and $0.2 million in IMET from FY 95 figures. We continue to consult with Congress and the Government of Jordan to explore ways to support Jordan's military modernization further.

King Hussein and the Government of Jordan are moving forward with implementation of the treaty and have reiterated their commitment to make this peace with Israel a warm peace. However, we have seen signs of increasing skepticism in the Jordanian populace. Although organized opposition to the treaty is not strong at this point, the recent disturbances among university students is a reminder of the potential for widespread dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of benefit of peace.

Jordan took enormous risks for peace when it signed a peace treaty with Israel, becoming only the second Arab state to do so. While King Hussein took this courageous step because it was in Jordan's interest, he clearly hoped peace would bring the support of the international community and economic benefits to his people. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher made a commitment to support Jordan as it took risks for peace and exposed itself to the enemies of peace. Jordanians are anxiously awaiting the outcome of the Administration's efforts to secure $275 million in FY95 and FY96 to forgive the remainder of Jordan's debt. Debt forgiveness would alleviate Jordan's high debt burden and encourage foreign private sector investment. News of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations decision to cut the Administration's request for $275 million for debt-forgiveness to $50 million was received in Jordan with deep disappointment.
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28000. -------. "Congressional Delegation Vistis Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria", in Presidents Report (National Council on US-Arab Relations), Spring-Summer 1992. A delegation of Congressional leaders was escorted by Dr. Anthony and Ms. Cindy Malvncini, Congressional Relations Coordinator at the National Council, on a fact-finding mission through Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria in April. The visit sought to acquaint staffers with the views of respective governments and US embassy officials to help them better understand the issues at stake for the United States in its relations with these countries. The delegation comprised senior staff members from several congressional committees, among them Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations. Delegates spoke enthusiastically about the experience. As one staffer commented, "it was more than 'fact finding' in nature; the trip embodied 'perception finding' or, better yet, 'misperception losing.' We generally only hear one side of the story in the US, and it is important that more of us become aware of the very real arguments made by those in the Arab world." While in Saudi Arabia, the delegation had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Abdullah Dabbagh, Secretary General of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry; Dr. Saeed Badeeb, Jaber Al-Sabah, Chief of Staff of Kuwait's Armed Forces. Senior Advisor for H.R.H. Turki Al-Faisal of the Intelligence Directorate; US Embassy staff; American business groups; H.E. Abdalla Bishara, GCC Secretary General; H.E. Abdallah El-Kuwaiz, GCC Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs; and H.E. Saif Al-Maskari, GCC Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs.

In Kuwait, the group met with Foreign Affairs Under Secretary H.E. Sulaiman Al-Shaheen, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shaikh Jaber bin Khalid Al-Sabah, and Dr. Rasha Al-Sabah and other leaders of the women's rights movement. In Syria, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Yusuf Shakkour, Speaker of the Parliament H.E. 'Abd Al-Gadir Qaddoura, University of Aleppo President Dr. Mohamed Ali Hourieh, Golan Province Governor 'Abd Al-Monem Hamwy, and US Embassy officials met the delegation. Highlights of the trip included visiting the Israel-destroyed town of Qunaitra in Syria's Golan Province; meeting Shaikh 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Tuwairj, Deputy President of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; discussing future regional security arrangements with Kuwaiti foreign and defense ministry officials; and observing the implications for US foreign policy stemming from the diversity of US interests vis-à-vis the three countries. The National Council has organized 12 Congressional study visits to the Arab world since 1986 in order to help bring about a more informed national debate on issues of vital concern to the United States. [ - ]


28002. -------. "Kuwait [former judge Emilio Gancayao, touring world to see condition of Filipina domestic workers, sees the low wages they earn as no compensation for the 'tragedies' they suffer]", in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 14, 1995. p. A2. [TXT]

28003. -------. "Kuwait Women Push For The Rights To Vote", in Seattle Times, March 12, 1996. p. A6. Forty Kuwait women lawyers, scientists and academics protested outside the legislature in a rare public dissent. The women, some members of the resistance to the Iraqi occupation, accused the Kuwaiti government of renegeing on a promise made during the war to give women political rights. Women have been struggling for political rights for 30 years. Women in Kuwait hold low positions in the civil service, oil industry and education, may drive and wear Western clothes, but lack political power and do not have social equality with men. [TXT]

28004. -------. "Lifting Women From Their Second-Class Status In Much of the Arab World Requires New and Better Educational Opportunities[Rashaal-Sabah, Undersecretary of Kuwait Ministry of High Education issued call in Suffolk University, Boston; she notes declining illiteracy rates among area's women]", in Chronicle of Higher Education, May 2, 1997. p. A47.


28006. -------. "Slavery and Resistance: The Trade in Maids: A Crime of the Capitalist System", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 10, 1995. p. 13. Exposed by the cases of Flor Contemplacion and Sarah Balabagan, governments have tried to act more concerned. Roy Seneres, the Philippine ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, admitted to the Reuters news service that contract domestic work "is a highly hazardous occupation that can be life-threatening." This year, for the first time, Persian Gulf courts convicted two employers of beating their foreign maids to death (though the sentences handed out were remarkably light). But the truth is that the governments of the Third World support and encourage this trade in human beings - because their capitalist ruling classes rely on this exploitation. For example, arrangements between imperialist banks and the Philippine ruling class have sunk the Philippines into about $35 billion of debts. Some estimates say there are three to four million Filipino workers abroad who sent back between $6.5-8 billion a year - much of which is siphoned off in various ways to pay the billions that Philippines must pay annually in debt interest alone. (Nation, 4/17/1995) A similar picture can be drawn of El Salvador, Mexico, Turkey, and many other Third World countries. It has been estimated that the 100,000 women forced from the Dominican Republic into the global sex industry represent a quarter of that country's foreign earnings. This means that the world's reactionary governments and leading banks strongly support the worldwide system of contract labor. In the Philippines, for example, the global trade in human beings is openly described as essential to the government's pro-imperialist "national economic strategy." The Philippine government calls immigrant maids "heroes of the Philippine economy." and Philippines President Ramos describes the migrant worker as "the Philippines' contribution to other countries' development." Capitalism mercilessly moves millions of human beings around the world - to better exploit them and extract the blood money of profit. The trade, exploitation and brutalization of millions of migrant workers is vital to the world capitalist system. These outrages must be exposed and fought, until the day comes when the world's revolutionary movements succeed in abolishing them forever. [ - ]

28007. -------. "Slavery and Resistance: The Trade in Maids: Introduction", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 10, 1995. p. 6. Sarah Balabagan was 15 when she left her Philippines home in 5/1994 to go to Mexico, Turkey, and many other Third World countries. It has been estimated that the 100,000 women forced from the Dominican Republic into the global sex industry represent a quarter of that country's foreign earnings. This means that the world's reactionary governments and leading banks strongly support the worldwide system of contract labor. In the Philippines, for example, the global trade in human beings is openly described as essential to the government's pro-imperialist "national economic strategy." The Philippine government calls immigrant maids "heroes of the Philippine economy." and Philippines President Ramos describes the migrant worker as "the Philippines' contribution to other countries' development." Capitalism mercilessly moves millions of human beings around the world - to better exploit them and extract the blood money of profit. The trade, exploitation and brutalization of millions of migrant workers is vital to the world capitalist system. These outrages must be exposed and fought, until the day comes when the world's revolutionary movements succeed in abolishing them forever. [ - ]
simple self-defense. Protests broke out in the Philippines and among Filipino workers in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, powerful forces within the UAE insisted that this first sentence was not extreme enough. In 9/1995, a new trial was held. This new court sentenced Sarah Balabagan to execution by firing squad. From prison Sarah wrote: "Even if I am ultimately executed, I still believe that what I did was right." Protests mounted worldwide. And the governments of both the Philippines and the Gulf states became more concerned. More than 2000 Filipinos were reported to have been trafficked from the Philippines to the UAE protested the death sentence at "prayer sessions" - a daring event, since local fascist laws forbid proletarian people to gather in public. New protests broke out in the Philippines. The Philippines government feared if Sarah Balabagan was executed, it could trigger a massive wave of revolt inside the Philippines. Another Filipina maid, Flor Contemplacion, was hanged in Singapore in 3/1995 after being framed for murder by her employer. The response of the masses in the Philippines to Flor’s execution deeply shook the government of General Ramos.

Under pressure, the president of the UAE had the execution of Sarah Balabagan called off. A new ruling announced that Sarah would be forced to pay the rapist's family $41000, serve a year in jail and be beaten publicly with 100 lashes. This is how the case now stands as we go to press. Sixteen-year-old Sarah Balabagan has already been in prison for 14 months - and still faces more brutal punishment for defending herself against a wealthy rapist. Look at the story of Sarah Balabagan: Here is the modern world of capitalism’s so-called "Free Market" - where the wealthy are "free" to buy and sell human beings at will. The trap that seized Sarah involved extreme poverty of the Philippines and semi-slavery in the Persian Gulf states - both of which are areas of the world dominated by US imperialism. In the main Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait, foreign workers make up 10 million of the 23 million population. More than a million are maids. And the brutal conditions faced by the workers of the Gulf - the extreme wealth built on oil and the extreme poverty of enforced slavery - are exactly the social relations defended and propped up by the US military who invaded this region during the recent Gulf War. The story of Sarah Balabagan is a living example of the capitalist "freedoms" that the US uses its military power to defend. The case of Sarah Balabagan has touched a deep nerve around the world because her oppression is all too common. Millions of proletarian people have been forced to leave their homes and villages - to travel to distant countries to perform the hardest and dirtiest work. Many work in slave-like conditions - hoping to send pennies home to feed their families. Millions of us want to see the worldwide capitalist trade in poor women stopped - and want a world where such poverty and mistreatment is abolished.

The International Labor Organization estimates that in 1990, 25 million people lived as migrant workers in other countries - not counting "illegal workers." Altogether, it is estimated that 70 million people work outside their home countries - not counting the one million people who settle permanently in new countries each year. In South Asia, there is a constant flow of people from the poorest countries - the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and others - to countries where wealth has been concentrated - Japan, Middle East oil states, Singapore. Many thousands of people cross the Pacific from the Philippines and China to the US. Rings of recruiters often smuggle Chinese workers in the holds of broken-down boats. In the western hemisphere, there is a constant flow of human beings northward from Latin America and the Caribbean islands up to the US. This traffic in human beings often takes the form of "contract labor". Global networks of recruiters who force people in the poor countries to pay huge fees and work years for no pay - on the promise that they will be able, some day, to send money back home to their families. In 1985, there were about 3.5 million contract workers in the Middle East alone - largely from the East Asian and South Asian countries of the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. This traffic in people has been growing rapidly and changing. Twenty years ago, the contract trade largely involved male workers for the oil fields, construction industries and skilled jobs. Over the years, much of it has become a trade in women. Malaysia's Asian-Pacific Development Center (APDC) estimates that between 1 and 1.7 million migrant women workers as domestics throughout Asia and the Middle East. In 1994, more than 300000 women workers left the Philippines, mostly as domestics. There are about 75000 working in Singapore, 50000 in Hong Kong, 40000 in England, 80000 in Italy, 60000 in Spain, 20000 in Greece, and 75000 in the Middle East.

In the US there was a scandal a few years ago - the Zoe Baird affair - where a ruling class woman was denied a top government post because she had employed an "illegal alien" as her household worker. In the Middle East alone - largely from the East Asian and South Asian countries - the average income is $730 a year - while the average income is $19000. Most of the women who leave the Philippines to work are in their late twenties and early thirties, often with children left behind in the Philippines. For example, Flor Contemplacion, the Filipina domestic worker who was hanged by Singapore's government, was 42 and had three children living in the Philippines. There is a recruitment network that trickles down to the villages and urban barrios in countries like the Philippines, Thailand, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. It is a transnational business - complete with newspaper ads and radio campaigns - and it siphons profits off of this human trade at every step. Often local businessmen do the direct recruiting work, using networks of families. For example, Sarah Balabagan's older brother was already working as a contract worker in the Persian Gulf when Sarah's family decided to send her too. The labor brokers often recruit workers by making big promises to their family - that the young women will be working as teachers or as nannies of wealthy families. But the biggest promise that is made is money.

A common wage of women in the Philippines, for example, is $2.50-3.00 a day. Even the Philippine government admits that this is only half of what it costs to live. Unemployment is so high that many people can't even get those wages. Women from Thailand and the Philippines, recruited to work in Singapore as maids, are told they can make six times the wages they could make in their own countries. And those sent to work in the Gulf states are told to expect 15 times as much as in the Philippines. Because of this, families often band together - selling lands, mortgaging homes or going into debt - to pay off recruiters and send off one of their daughters, in hopes that the money she sends back will help keep them all alive. Fees range from hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars. It is estimated that $820000 Filipinos leave their country every year. One estimate says that about 60% of the families in Manila, the Philippines capital, count on money sent from abroad to make it. This story is repeated throughout the poor countries of the world: Mexico, El Salvador, Nigeria, Senegal, India, and so on. [=]
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28009. ------. "Slavery and Resistance: The Trade in Maids: The Reality: Modern Capitalist Slavery", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), December 10, 1995. p. 13. Arriving in distant countries, filled with recruiter promises and hopes of a new life, women like Sarah Balabagan often run hard into a bitter reality. They have been recruited as the lowest paid workers -with typical salaries of $130 a month. Employers usually pay for their airfare - often $1500 or more - and consider that to be enough that the worker must repay before getting any wages. This creates a modern-day form of slavery called "peonage," where workers are legally forbidden to quit without repaying "debts" they owe. Such workers often have to work years for no money at all - and are held completely enslaved to their employer. Over and over again, these women have told how they were forced to work around the clock at backbreaking work, with no days off. Many work 16-hour days and are forced to sleep on mats under the stairs or near the toilets. Often their employers refuse to pay wages, forbid them to go outside the home, prevent them from contacting their families. In one case in India, the servants were locked into the house like animals when the employers left for a month. The keys were left with neighbors who came periodically to deliver food. In many countries, the contract women are forced to give their employers both their money and their passports - so they cannot quit or leave. Saudi Arabia requires this by law. Canada forbids migrant women workers to live in their own apartments. Singapore does not allow domestics to change jobs. The women often discover that they are expected to serve as sex slaves for their employers as well. The Chicago Tribune (11/17/1991) reported: "Social workers and government officials assert that 80% of Asian women exported to the Middle East are molested sexually. They say 1 in 9 Filipinas working abroad are raped. In households in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, immigrant women complain they are cheated out of wages, badly fed and, after a day's cleaning and cooking, expected to bed down with their 'male masters.'" Documented cases of beatings, rape and even murder are common. One woman, a former Philippines embassy official in Singapore, described how in one six-month period in 1990 there were 792 cases of employer abuse of Filipina domestic servants: including 6 suicides, 80 physical assaults, 2 murders, 144 beatings, 20 rapes, 128 cases of women wanting to return home, 66 cases of nonpayment of wages, and 5 cases of torture. There are reports of contract workers who have had teeth pulled out as punishment.

A government report in Sri Lanka reported that 2000 Sri Lankan boys below 14 were sent to work in the United Arab Emirates as racing jockeys. Some were deliberately underfed - to keep them down to "riding weight." Those who demanded to be sent home were burned with red-hot irons. (Chicago Tribune, 11/17/1995) Over this past summer, at least three maids in Kuwait died in one month from employer beatings; two Sri Lankans and a Filipina. In 1994 alone, about 600 Filipino workers returned home in coffins - many from murder, accidental death and suicide. Yet throughout the world the authorities defend and enforce the slave-like conditions of these workers. In the US, many immigrant maids are considered "illegals" and often cannot get even the basic legal protection. In the Gulf states, according to Human Rights Watch in Spring 1993, no employer has ever been convicted of abusing an Asian maid. At the same time, the Saudi government has executed at least 11 "servant women" over the last several years, and has had hundreds of women publicly lynched. In one documented case, Leonarda Akula, a Filipina working in Saudi Arabia, was publicly beheaded for killing her employers (a husband, wife and grown son) after she had been forcibly imprisoned in their household and sexually abused. In 1991, the Philippines Foreign Minister was asked what maids in the Gulf should do about rape. He responded, "Enjoy it." In short, Sarah Balabagan's story is the story of many hundreds of thousands of women. [=]

28010. Amnesty International. Press Release: Freedom of Information, London: Amnesty International, June 1992. [In countries around the world, journalists attempting to expose human rights violations have themselves become victims. Some have been killed outright. Others have been silenced by threats, harrassment and imprisonment. Writers, novelists and poets whose work is deemed critical of the authorities also risk detention, imprisonment, torture and, in some cases, death. Some of these journalists and writers are prisoners of conscience, jailed because of their professional activities or for exercising their right to freedom of expression.] On 7/8/1991, Luis Antonio Morales Ortega, a journalist well known for his investigations into human rights abuses in his native Peru, announced via Radio Wari, a local radio station, that he had received threats from the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command, a paramilitary group believed linked to the security forces. Just five days later, two men in a passing car shot Luis Morales dead as he tried to escape into the house of a relative in the city of Huamanga in Ayucacho department. During the previous month the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command had threatened staff at Radio Wari and forced them to broadcast death threats against two other journalists who had accused the security forces of committing human rights violations in Ayucicho. The text of the threats included the following: "We tell this rat, delinquent, terrorist, disguised as a journalist, this bloody dog Magno Sosa Rojas... that he will die like a beheaded dog... we are following his steps very closely, his days are numbered..." Since 1982, when Ayucicho was first placed under military control, at least 15 journalists have been killed by the security forces or groups linked with them. Journalists in other parts of Peru are also at risk. In 8/1991 the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command issued death threats against Jorge Chaves Morales, a journalist with 'La Republica', a Lima daily newspaper which has given extensive coverage to human rights issues. In Colombo, Sri Lanka, in the early hours of 2/18/1990, Richard de Zoysa, a journalist, broadcaster and actor, was dragged from his home by six armed men, some of whom were reportedly wearing police uniforms. The following day his naked body was washed up on a nearby beach. An autopsy found that Richard de Zoysa died instantly from gunshot wounds to the neck and head fired at close range. The Sri Lankan and international press has speculated about the possible reasons for the abduction and murder of Richard de Zoysa. His killing may have been linked to the "disappearance" in 1/1990 of Lakshman Perera, who had produced a play written by Richard de Zoysa called "Me Kauda? Mokada Koranne?" ("Who is he? What is he doing?"). a phrase used to describe President Ranasinghe Premadasa during the presidential elections in 12/1988. Other reports suggest Richard de Zoysa was killed in retaliation for his news reports on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. In 6/1990 Richard de Zoysa's mother, Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu, and Batty Weerakoon, the lawyer appearing on her behalf at the magisterial inquiry into the abduction of her son, received death threats warning them to stop pursuing the case. DrSaravanamuttu, who had witnessed her son's kidnapping, had named a senior Superintendent of Police as one of the abductors. The magisterial inquiry was discontinued on 8/30/1990, and no action has been taken against the police officer allegedly involved. Foreign and national journalists in Guatemala continue to receive threats, apparently from members of the security forces or those acting with their acquiescence. Some have fled the country. Others have been openly attacked. Byron Barrera Ortiz, a Guatemalan journalist, was shot by two men on a motorcycle while driving his car in Guatemala City in 10/1990. His wife, Refugio Araceli Villanueva, also in the car, was killed instantly. Shortly after the attack, Byron Barrera and his two children went to live abroad. Byron Barrera later stated that his life was saved only because he was wearing a bullet-proof vest. He said that he had been followed by two men on a motorcycle the day before the attack, an incident he reported to the police officer as one of the abductors. Byron Barrera had returned to Guatemala in 1985 after several years in exile. He was the director of the Central American News Agency, and vice-president of the Guatemalan Journalists Association. Byron Barrera had been the editor of the weekly newspaper, La Epoca, until 6/1988 when the newspaper's offices were fire-bombed, reportedly by members of the security forces. The newspaper, which had published many articles critical of the government, never reopened. In an open letter in 11/1990, Byron Barrera stated that "Guatemala continues to be a land for no one, a land of impunity, death and desolation". He added, "I have had to explain the truth to my children; the people of their country who are conspicuous for the ideas of freedom are assassinated." On 8/10/1990...
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1991, Byron Barrera returned to Guatemala to present evidence in the Fifth Court of Penal Justice in Amatitlan, Department of Guatemala, which was investigating the case. At a news conference he declared that he believed members of the armed forces were involved in the attempt on his life. Guatemalan journalists were anonymously warned not to continue publishing information on the Barrera case. In 8/1991, Juan Carlos Ruiz, Hugo Garcia and Silvino Velasquez received anonymous death threats, warning them to stop reporting on well-publicized cases concerning the alleged involvement of military personnel in human rights violations, including the attack on Byron Barrera. The Prosecution's Office of the Public Ministry which was investigating the cases reportedly received similar threats. Two lawyers hired by Byron Barrera were also threatened and have since withdrawn from the case. According to Byron Barrera, the authorities have shown little determination to proceed with the investigation into the attempt on his life and the killing of his wife despite evidence implicating members of the armed forces. Some countries bring criminal charges against those who publish real or implied criticism of the authorities. Such charges include "showing contempt", "spreading false information" and "sedition". Two journalists in Cameroon were convicted in 1/1991 of publishing an article critical of the government in Le Messager, a Douala newspaper. In 12/1990 the Cameroon government had introduced laws which tightened press censorship. The legislation enables the government to seize or ban newspapers "in case of conflict with the principles of public policy". On a number of occasions in early 1991 the authorities seized copies of Le Messager. One such confiscation followed the publication in April of the names of all those convicted or held in administrative detention in connection with a 1984 coup attempt. The article described poor prison conditions and named the prisoners who had died in detention since 1984. In September the authorities banned Le Messager and four other newspapers. In South Korea, Chang Ui-gyun, a publisher specializing on books on ancient Korean history, is serving an eight-year prison sentence under the National Security Law. In 1982 his publishing licence was withdrawn after he published a book of poetry which was critical of the government. Chang Ui-gyun then spent two years in Japan where he studied ancient Korean history at Kyoto University. While there he is said to have discussed North Korea's proposals for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. In 5/1986 he organized a meeting on Korean unification, where a song which he himself had written on the subject was performed. Shortly after his return to South Korea in 1987, Chang Ui-gyun was arrested and charged on several counts under the National Security Law, including that of transmitting state secrets. He denied all charges of espionage but was convicted by the court and jailed. Amnesty International believes that Chang Ui-gyun is detained for his peaceful political views and activities and that the charges of espionage against him have not been substantiated. In Rwanda at last 30 people accused of offences related to freedom of expression and association were tried between 3-10/1990. Further arrests and trials of journalists occurred in 1991. Although many newspapers have begun publication over the past two years, the government has been unwilling to tolerate open criticism of government officials or practices. Rwabukwisi Vincent, the editor of Kanguka newspaper, was arrested in 7/1990 and charged with "endangering the security of the state", apparently because he had travelled to the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, and met Rwandese exiles, including the former King of Rwanda. The State Security Court twice failed to convict him due to lack of evidence. But in 10/1990, after Uganda-based Rwandese exiles attacked Rwanda's northern border, the same court sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, apparently without hearing any new evidence. In 5/1991 Rwabukwisi Vincent was released by order of the Supreme Court, pending a new trial. A month later he was one of four journalists arrested for publishing articles critical of the authorities. Rwabukwisi Vincent was charged with endangering the security of the state, apparently because the authorities said that he had written for publication expressed support for the rebels. He was released in 9/1991 but the charges against him reportedly were not dropped. It is not clear whether or not he will be brought to trial.

Amnesty International continues to be concerned by the Iranian government's endorsement of threats against the life of Salman Rushdie, the British author of "The Satanic Verses". In 2/1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious edict) stating that the book was blaspemous and that it was the duty of Muslims everywhere to put the novelist to death. Amnesty International was not aware of any direct attempt by agents of the Iranian government to kill Salman Rushdie, but there were reports of attempted murder, including an attack on his public appearance in London in 1990. Amnesty International has repeatedly called on the Iranian authorities to withdraw their support for any threat to Salman Rushdie's life. Kenyan writers and journalists have been imprisoned for advocating multi-party democracy. In April Gitobu Imanyara collapsed from a severe migraine headache at the Nairobi Law Courts, where he was awaiting a ruling on an application for bail. He was returned to prison and held in a cell with no bed, mattress or other furniture. Although later admitted to hospital, he was kept chained and under armed guard. He was released on 5/29/1991, and the sedition charges against him were dropped. Gitobu Imanyara received the Golden Pen of Freedom award from the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers in early 1991. Following his release, he resumed his work at the Nairobi Law Monthly, despite continuing police harassment. Edward Oyugi, a writer and Professor of Educational Psychology at Kenyatta University, was sentenced on 7/11/1991, with three others to seven years' imprisonment for holding a "seditionous" meeting. He has been a consultant with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Council of Churches and has written books and articles on philosophy, sociology and psychology. Edward Oyugi and the three others had been arrested one year earlier following public debate on the issue of multi-party democracy in Kenya which led to widespread unrest in July 1990. Amnesty International expressed concern about the fairness of their trial and, in particular, that no steps were taken during the trial to investigate the prisoners allegations that they had been tortured.

No evidence was brought by the prosecution that the four had discussed or planned violence against the government. The sedition laws in Kenya have frequently been used to jail government opponents. Edward Oyugi was released on bail on 2/14/1992, along with the three others pending their appeal to the High Court later that year. In 1990 the Vietnamese authorities arrested several critics of the government - including journalists and writers - beginning a crackdown on intellectuals and dissenters which continued into 1991. Duong Thu Huong, a prominent Vietnamese writer and dramatist, was arrested in 4/1991, reportedly for trying to send "sensitive documents" out of the country, and held without trial until 11/1991. The author of many novels, poems, articles and plays, Duong Thu Huong has emerged as one of the most significant writers in post-war Vietnam. A former member of the Communist Party of Vietnam, she has since become one of its sharpest critics. In Saudi Arabia, Saleh al-Azzaz, a prominent writer and journalist, was arrested in 11/1990, reportedly while taking photographs of a demonstration. He was reportedly arrested on suspicion of being one of the organizers of the demonstration, in which dozens of Saudi women drove cars in convoy through the streets of Riyadh in protest against the country's prohibition of women drivers. At the time of his arrest, Saleh al-Azzaz was editor-in-chief of the magazine of the Saudi Arabian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Amnesty International considered him to be a prisoner of conscience, detained because of his involvement with a peaceful demonstration. He was released in March 1991, after four months of detention. In many countries journalists sympathetic to prohibited political parties or organizations, or working for publications aligned with them, have been subjected to human rights violations. Nawan Hamawi is one of a group of Syrians arrested in the mid-1970's on suspicion of having links with the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party. At the time of his arrest in 3/1975, he was the director of SANA, the Syrian news agency. He was detained without charge or trial in al-Mezze Military Prison. "Abd al-Karim Qutaifar, a playwright and actor, was also
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detained without charge or trial in Syria. He was arrested in 7/1983 on suspicion of being a member of the Party for Communist Action (PCA), a prohibited political party. Members of the PCA have frequently been imprisoned and tortured because of their opposition to the government, their demands for more democratic freedom and for the release of all political prisoners. Marwan Hamawi and 'Abd al-Karim Qutaifan, both of whom had been adopted by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience, along with over 1000 other prisoners were released in 12/1991. Hamadi Jebali, editor of the Tunisian weekly al-Fajr (Dawn), was sentenced by the military court in Tunis in 1/1991 to one year in prison for publishing an article calling on the abolition of military courts in Tunisia. Mohammed Nouri, the author of the article, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Both men were charged with "defamation of a judicial institution". Although Mohammed Nouri's sentence has expired he remains in prison, apparently under investigation for new charges. Al-Fajr, now banned, was the organ of an Islamic organization, al-Nahda, which does not have official recognition from the state. Members, sympathizers and suspected sympathizers of al-Nahda have recently been targeted for arrest, detention and torture. Dozens of writers and journalists were detained without charge or trial in Sudan after a military government, backed by the National Islamic Front, seized power from the elected civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 6/1989. They were imprisoned because of their peaceful opposition to the military government. Most were released after a general amnesty for political prisoners was announced in 4/1991. Arop Madut Arop, head of the Information Center at the Sudan Council of Churches, was arrested in 3/1990 after requesting a visa to attend a Church Service Development meeting in Germany. He was held without charge or trial until 5/1991. Under the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, Arop Madut Arop was the editor of the English language weekly newspaper, Heritage, until it was ordered closed by officials in 1988. Heritage had called for an end to the conflict in southern Sudan between the government and the armed opposition Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and had published a long interview given to Arop Madut Arop by the SPLA leader, John Garang. Shortly after the 6/1989 coup, the first part of the interview was reprinted in an Arabic language newspaper. Publication of the second part of the interview was stopped. Arop Madut Arop's arrest is thought to have been related to the government's disapproval of the article. Journalists in Turkey are frequently targeted for abuse while pursuing their professional activities. In 9/1991 the Turkish Press Council reported that during the first eight months of the year 44 journalists had been physically assaulted, in most cases by state employees, including police officers. Amnesty International has received numerous reports of journalists being tortured in police custody in Turkey. In 3/1991 eight journalists working for the weekly political review, Century, were arrested in Ankara and charged with membership of the Kurdish Workers Party, an illegal organization. While detained they were blindfolded and interrogated about their sources for articles they had written about the Kurdish conflict in the southeast of Turkey. Some were tortured; one said he was stripped naked, suspended by the wrists, and given electric shocks. The main charges against the eight were soon dropped but they continue to stand trial for alleged possession of firearms which they say they obtained for their personal protection after receiving anonymous death threats. Journalists and writers working in countries where governments face civil unrest have been particular targets for the authorities. In Kuwait Osamah Suhail Hussain, a Palestinian, was sentenced to death by the Martial Law Court in mid-6/1991, after an unfair trial which did not conform to international standards. Osamah Suhail Hussain and 23 others were accused of "collaboration with the Iraqi authorities" because they continued to work for the newspaper, al-Nida', during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. A Kuwaiti newspaper, al-Qabas, was taken over by the Iraqi authorities and renamed al-Nida' shortly after the Iraqi invasion in 1990. It was the only newspaper allowed to publish during the occupation. At the trial the identity of the chief prosecution witnesses was concealed and the defence was not allowed to cross-examine them. Trial documents presented to the court were not made available to the defendants or to their lawyers. Osamah Suhail Hussain was reportedly tortured with electric shocks, beatings and cigarette burns. On 6/26/1991, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of belief are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR has been ratified in many of the countries in which journalists have been the victims of human rights violations. Governments which deny civil and political rights to journalists flout international law and often flout their own constitutions. The struggle for human rights depends to a large extent on the free flow of information and on the courage and commitment of journalists and writers. Those who become victims of human rights violations because of their efforts to expose violations by governments deserve the full support of the international human rights movement. 

28011. Amnesty International. Press Release: Kuwait: Amnesty International Raises Concerns With Government Officials. London: Amnesty International, August 1991. In November an Amnesty International delegation visited Kuwait to assess the current human rights situation and meet government officials. In meetings with the Minister of Interior, the Public Prosecutor and Foreign Ministry officials, A's representatives raised issues of concern including torture, "disappearances", extrajudicial killings and forcible expulsions. The organization also reiterated its call for a review of the cases of all defendants tried and sentenced by Martial Law courts in 5-6/1991. In June Amnesty International had submitted a memorandum to the government detailing its concerns about the unfair trial proceedings, and had received no response. During the visit, officials told Amnesty International that a review of these cases was not possible on legal grounds; although martial law ended in June sentences passed under Martial Law courts were final. A's representatives visited nine women sentenced by these courts at Kuwait Central Prison. Information was also obtained on over 50 cases of Palestinians and Iraqis who were arrested after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and subsequently "disappeared" in custody. Amnesty International also received information on the scores of Kuwaitis and other nationals arrested by Iraqi forces during the occupation who are believed now held in Iraq. 

28012. Bollag, Burton. "New Parliament May Reconsider Plan to Separate Kuwait University Students By Sex", in Chronicle of Higher Education, November 15, 1996, p. A55. The plan to segregate Kuwait University's five campuses by sex, approved last year by the National Assembly, may now be deferred in the wake of an election in which political parties are outlawed in Kuwait, it is unclear how the question has been sharply debated in Kuwait, both in newspapers and in the university itself. The five vocational colleges are already segregated by sex. Rashaa al-Sabah of the Ministry of Higher Education warns that segregation of Kuwait University could be followed on a ban on the education of Kuwaiti women abroad.

28013. Carpio, Sheila. "Despots and Democrats: Political Change in Arabia: Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen", in Middle East Report, November-December 1993. pp. 2-7. The Yemeni parliamentary election has changed the parliament. The question has been sharply debated in Yemen, both in newspapers and in the university itself. It is unclear how the question has been sharply debated in Kuwait, both in newspapers and in the university itself. The five vocational colleges are already segregated by sex. Rashaa al-Sabah of the Ministry of Higher Education warns that segregation of Kuwait University could be followed on a ban on the education of Kuwaiti women abroad.
external support that each regime depended on, and by the longstanding goal of unification demanded by both sides. During the transition period, authority was shared by the two former national ruling parties (General Peoples Congress (GPC) in the north, Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) in the south), each of which retained control of formerly independent military and police apparatus. Some 40 political parties quickly emerged, of which the most prominent were Islah (Reform) Party (Saudi-backed alliances between the Israeli military, and the need to focus on continuing attacks on Palestinian children) and the Left-Green Line, and appropriate Israeli organizations and researchers. A list of such organizations and persons should be published in an upcoming NACC newsletter “Connections”.

We must continue to push the United States Government to tie its foreign aid to human rights. In the case of Israel, aid should not be given while a pattern of gross human rights violations exists. We must also assert that Israeli housing projects and settlement activities, whether in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, or inside the Green Line, are racist in character as long as they exclude non-Jews and therefore, should not receive any financial or other support, including loan guarantees for the settlement of Jewish immigrants. NGOs should engage in issue-focused, coordinated activities, using resources and documentation available within our network or otherwise available to our network. The NACC Fax Tree provides a good mechanism for such communication and coordinated activity. It should be used, expanded, and supported. The NACC can also produce sample letters to elected representatives for use in this issue-focused work. [=]

28016. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (b) Disappearance”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There were no reports of disappearances. Of the numerous disappearances that occurred in 1991, about 100 cases remain unresolved. The Ministry of Interior claims that, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it has renewed its efforts to resolve the cases, but has not yet done so. The Government has failed to issue death certificates in cases where those who disappeared are known to be dead. The Government’s failure to resolve these cases stems from an unwillingness to open and pursue criminal investigations into the causes of the deaths. According to the ICRC, Iraqi authorities took prisoner 609 Kuwaitis and residents of Kuwait, including 9 women, during Iraq’s occupation. These people are still missing or detained in Iraq. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which stipulates that the detainees be released. Iraq denies that it holds Kuwaiti detainees and refuses to account for missing Kuwaitis taken into Iraqi custody during the occupation. [=]

28017. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (i) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The constitution provides for individual privacy and sanctity of the home. The police must obtain a warrant to search both public and private property, unless they are in hot pursuit or suspect the presence of alcohol or narcotics. The warrant can be obtained from the state prosecutor or, in
the case of private property, from a judge. The security forces occasionally monitor the activities of individuals and their communications. By law males must obtain government approval to marry foreign-born women. However, the Government does not vigorously enforce the restriction, and Kuwaitis routinely obtain exemptions from the Ministry of Justice. The Government also advises women against marrying foreign nationals. [ ]

28018. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Kuwaiti citizens cannot change their system of government. Women and many others are disfranchised, only 30% of adult citizens are eligible to vote. Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister presides over a 16-member Cabinet. In accordance with the practice of the ruling family, the Prime Minister is always the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. In 1986 the Amir effectively dissolved the National Assembly by suspending the constitutional provisions on the Assembly’s election. The Assembly remained dissolved until 1992. The Amir had previously dissolved the Assembly from 1976 to 1981. An election was held for the National Assembly in 1992 in which 303 candidates ran for the Assembly’s 50 seats. Members serve 4-year terms. The Constitution empowers the Assembly to overturn any Amir decrees made during the dissolution. After the election, the Assembly used its power to revoke some decrees issued from 1986 to 1992. Since the Government prohibits political parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless, informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. Approximately 82000 citizens, almost the entire franchised male population at the time, registered to vote in the 1992 election. In 1994 the Assembly passed legislation extending the right to vote to the sons of naturalized Kuwaiti citizens, about 110000 males. Previously, the law had restricted suffrage to adult males who had resided in Kuwait before 1940 and maintained a residence there until 1959, and their male descendants. According to the 1994 law, naturalized citizens who have been naturalized citizens for at least 30 years will also be eligible to vote in 1996. A majority of candidates elected in 1992 have stated that they favored extending the vote to women, but Proposals to do so have been delayed in a legislative committee. The Amir and the Prime Minister have publicly stated that they support political rights for women, but have made no apparent effort to persuade the National Assembly. [ ]

28019. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Religious Minorities”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government is committed to providing for the welfare of children providing free education and health care to all children and a variety of other services. There is no child prostitution, child labor problem, or any pattern of societal abuse of children. However, in 1993 the Minister of Interior ordered all public and private schools not to enroll the children of parents without valid residence permits. Moreover, the Government orders the children of persons awaiting deportation to be held with their mothers at the women’s detention facility, in conditions unsuitable for children. [ ]

28020. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or
repatriation or a change in employers. On several occasions, the Philippine Embassy has sheltered over 200 women at one time, roughly half of whom complain of physical or sexual abuse and half have contractual complaints against their employers. The Government discontinues family entitlements to divorced women, but continues to make such payments to the divorced husbands who are expected by law and custom to provide for the children. The law discriminates against women married to foreign men. These women are not entitled to government housing subsidies which are available to other citizens. The law also requires Kuwaiti women to pay wedding fees for their foreign-born husbands and does not recognize marriage as the basis for granting residency rights to foreign-born husbands. Instead, the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By contrast, men married to foreign women do not have to pay residency fees for their spouses and their spouses’ right to residency derives from marriage. [=]

28022. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (c) Prohibition of Force or Compulsory Labor”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution prohibits forced labor except in cases specified by law for national emergency and with just remuneration. Nonetheless, there have been credible reports that foreign nationals employed as domestic servants have been denied exit visas if they seek them without their employers’ content. Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission from their original sponsors domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In many cases employers exercise some control over their servants by holding their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and has acted to retrieve passports of maids involved in disputes. By law domestic servants who run away from their employers may be treated as criminals. In some reported cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the costs involved in bringing them to Kuwait. The Government has done little, If anything, to protect domestics in such cases. [=]

28023. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work both full- and part-time. Employers must obtain permits from the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor to employ juveniles between the ages of 14-18 in certain trades. Education compulsory for children between the ages of 6-15. These laws are not fully observed in the nonindustrial sector, although no instance involving children have been alleged. There are an undetermined number of underage foreign maids who have given false information regarding their ages in order to obtain work. Some small businessmen employ their children on a part time basis, and there have been unconfirmed reports that some South Asian domestic servants under is falsified their age in order to enter Kuwait. Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest period [=]

28024. DS. “Kuwait: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. There is no legal minimum wage in the private sector. In 1994 the minimum wage in the public sector, administratively set by the Government, was approximately $630 a month (180 dinars) for citizens and $316 a month (90 dinar) for non-citizens. The Law establishes general conditions for work both the public and the private sector, with the oil industry treated separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribed additional conditions for the public sector. Labor law limits the standard work week to 48 hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14 workdays of leave each year, and established a compensation schedule for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who are specifically excluded from the private sector law labor, frequently work hours greatly in excess of 48 hours. The ILO has urged the Government to guarantee the weekly 24-consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than five persons. The law governing in the oil industry provided for a 40-hour work week, 30 days of annual leave and sick leave. Laws establishing working conditions are not always applied uniformly to foreign workers. The Labor Law also provides for employer-provided medical care and compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job related causes. The Law also requires that employers provide periodic medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the job (chemicals, asbestos, etc.). The Government has issued occupational health and safety standards; however, compliance and enforcement are poor, especially regarding unskilled foreign laborers. Employers often exploit workers’ willingness to accept substandard conditions. Foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled south Asian workers, frequently face contractual disputes, poor working conditions, and some physical abuse. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their continued employment, and legal protections exist for workers who file complaints about such conditions. Latest available figures for occupational injuries show 798 such occurrences in 1992, primarily in the sectors of construction and building, manufacturing, hotels, restaurants, and transportation. To cut accident rates, the Government periodically inspects establishments to raise awareness among workers and employers and ensure that they abide by the safety rules, control the pollution resulting from certain dangerous industries, training workers who use new machines in specialized industries, and report violations. [=]

28025. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 07: Respect For Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The right to individual privacy and sanctity of the home is provided for in the Constitution, but there were credible reports that authorities continued to ignore this right. Kuwaiti law requires search warrants issued by the court or the prosecutor unless the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect fleeing the scene of a crime or there is an indication of the presence of alcohol or narcotics on the premises. The prosecutor issues search warrants to conduct searches on public premises. Kuwaiti police frequently manned checkpoints on major roads to search for weapons, infiltrators, or persons without legal residence permits. Although drivers could legally refuse to have their vehicles searched, most allowed the police to do so. There were numerous credible reports of harassment and arrest of foreign nationals (especially peoples whose leaders were associated with support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, as well as bidoon) at checkpoints. Foreigners without residence permits were also subject to arrest and detention. In 1986 the Government restricted the right of Kuwaiti males to marry foreigners, decreeing that advance official
approval would be required. Government officials said that concern about meeting the State’s responsibilities for the children of non-Kuwaiti spouses residing outside the country motivated the action, but the Government was also known to be concerned about the growing number of Kuwaiti males marrying foreigners rather than Kuwaiti women. Kuwaiti women were publicly advised against marrying foreign nationals. The Government has only sporadically enforced the law. There is occasional surveillance of individuals and communications. [-]

28026. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 12: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Kuwaitis do not enjoy the right to change the head of state and government. The 30% of adult Kuwaitis eligible to vote (see below) choose the membership of the National Assembly. Under the Constitution, executive power is vested in the Amir and under him in an appointed Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister who, in accordance with family politics, has been the Crown Prince. Following the 1992 elections, the Prime Minister formed a 16-member Cabinet which included 6 elected Assembly members. While the Constitution places legislative power in the hands of the Amir and the Assembly, that has not prevented the Amir from twice suspending constitutional provisions and ruling extracomstitutionally. The most recent dissolution of the Assembly, decreed by the Amir in 7/1986, lasted until the 10/1992 elections. Although the Constitution grants the Amir the right to suspend the Assembly, it also obliges him to hold elections for a new Assembly within 2 months of the dissolution, otherwise the old Assembly regains its authority until the new one is elected. The 1986 decree circumvented the election requirement by suspending the section of the Constitution that called for new elections. The Constitution gives the Amir the authority to suspend its articles only during periods of martial law. The Amir declares martial law. The Amir had previously dissolved the Assembly from 1976 to 1981. In the Assembly's absence, the Amir rules by decrees having the force of law. He has the constitutional right to review and approve or overturn Amiri decrees made in its absence. After its convocation, the 1992 Assembly reviewed all of the Amiri decrees and revoked some of them, including the official secrecy law and an amendment to the law on public associations. Constitutionally, elections for the Assembly are to take place every 4 years by secret ballot. The electoral law provides that candidates for the Assembly be self-nominated, with multiple candidates permitted for the 50 seats. In 1992, 303 candidates registered for parliamentary elections. Kuwaiti law prohibits the establishment of political parties; however, the Government tacitly accepted the existence of several opposition political groups which acted much as political parties during the 1992 Assembly elections and the ensuing Assembly session. The law limits suffrage to adult males who resided in Kuwait before 1920 and maintained a residence there until 1989 and to their adult male descendants (21 years of age and older). According to current nationality law, naturalized citizens who do not meet the pre-1920 qualification but who have been naturalized citizens for at least 30 years must wait until 1996 to acquire the right to vote. This waiting period means that a large number of citizens do not have the right or the ability to participate in Kuwaiti elections. Distinctions based on parentage, length of residence, and gender limit suffrage to approximately 30% of the adult population. In the 1992 elections, approximately 82000 eligible Kuwaitis (almost the entire enfranchised male population) registered to vote. While a majority of candidates elected to the National Assembly expressed opinions favoring women's right to vote during their election campaigns, a public backlash after the election resulted in several proposals on this issue being held in committee. While both the Amir and the Prime Minister have publicly stated that they favor political rights for women, they have maintained that the National Assembly must decide the question. Non-Kuwaiti residents do not exercise any political rights, nor do they participate in decisions affecting their interests. [-]

28027. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's human rights and welfare through financial means. For example, the Government provides child benefit allowances and provides free education and healthcare to all Kuwaiti children. The Government also subsidizes infant formula. Governmental expenditures on children's welfare cover orphans, fosterchildren, handicapped children, and mentally impaired children. The Government also provides monthly financial assistance to approximately 10000 limited-income families with children. There is no pattern of societal abuse (including child prostitution) of children. Children of persons awaiting deportation are held along with their parents at the main deportation facility. The Ministry of Interior forbade schools, public and private, from accepting children who do not have valid residence permits. [-]

28028. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (c) National, Racial, Ethnic Minorities", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The plight of the bidoon (long-term residents of undetermined nationality) remained one of the most pressing human rights abuses in 1993. In the late 1980s and up to the time of Iraqi invasion the Government promulgated a series of measures that, inter alia, dropped the bidoon from the census rolls and stripped them of civil identification cards which had entitled the bearer to a variety of social services. Many of these persons were in limbo, without the legal right to work, attend school, travel in and out of Kuwait, or marry. The Government established a screening process to grant residence permits to bidoon who had served in the Kuwaiti military and security forces and their families and to bidoon in special categories (children of Kuwaiti/bidoon marriages). In 1993 the President of Kuwait's Martial Judicial Authority announced that bidoon may no longer join the Kuwaiti army. (This decree reversed a 1967 law which allowed bidoon to enlist, but did not affect the bidoon already in the army.) Foreign nationals are prohibited from having majority ownership in virtually every business other than certain small service-oriented businesses and may not own property. The Government continued its Kuwaitization policy, begun in 1991, applying significant labor and educational access restrictions to foreigners, especially Palestinians and other "suspect" nationalities. These persons found it difficult to obtain work and resident permits. The Government's tying of access to education to possession of a valid identification card which had entitled the bearer to a variety of social services. Many of these persons were in limbo, without the legal right to work, attend school, travel in and out of Kuwait, or marry. The Government established a screening process to grant residence permits to bidoon who had served in the Kuwaiti military and security forces and their families and to bidoon in special categories (children of Kuwaiti/bidoon marriages). In 1993 the President of Kuwait's Martial Judicial Authority announced that bidoon may no longer join the Kuwaiti army. (This decree reversed a 1967 law which allowed bidoon to enlist, but did not affect the bidoon already in the army.) Foreign nationals are prohibited from having majority ownership in virtually every business other than certain small service-oriented businesses and may not own property. The Government continued its Kuwaitization policy, begun in 1991, applying significant labor and educational access restrictions to foreigners, especially Palestinians and other "suspect" nationalities. These persons found it difficult to obtain work and resident permits. The Government's tying of access to education to possession of a valid identification card which had entitled the bearer to a variety of social services. Many of these persons were in limbo, without the legal right to work, attend school, travel in and out of Kuwait, or marry. The Government established a screening process to grant residence permits to bidoon who had served in the Kuwaiti military and security forces and their families and to bidoon in special categories (children of Kuwaiti/bidoon marriages). In 1993 the President of Kuwait's Martial Judicial Authority announced that bidoon may no longer join the Kuwaiti army. (This decree reversed a 1967 law which allowed bidoon to enlist, but did not affect the bidoon already in the army.)
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Constitution prohibits forced labor “except in cases specified by law for national emergency and with just remuneration”. Nonetheless, therecontinue to be credible reports that foreign nationals employed as domestic servants have been denied exit visas if they seek them without their employers’ consent. Foreign nationals must obtain a Kuwaiti sponsor in order to obtain a residence permit and cannot change their employment without permission from their original sponsors. Domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses from this practice because they are not protected by Kuwaiti labor law. Sponsors frequently hesitate to grant their servants permission to change jobs because of their financial investment in the servants. In many cases employers exercise some control over their servants by holding their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and has acted to retrieve passports of maids involved in disputes. Domestic servants who run away from their employers can be treated as criminals under Kuwaiti law. In some reported cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the costs involved in bringing them to Kuwait. The Government has done little, if anything, to protect domestics in such cases. [=]

28030. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Kuwait: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The minimum age under Kuwaiti law is 18 years for all forms of work, both full- and part-time. Compulsory education laws exist for children between the ages of 6-15. These laws are not fully observed in the nonindustrial sector. Some small businessmen employ their children on a part-time basis, and there have been unconfirmed reports that some south Asian domestic servants are under 18. The Minister of Social Affairs & Labor is charged with enforcing minimum age regulations. Employers may also obtain permits from the Ministry to employ juveniles between the ages of 14-18 in certain trades. Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours per day on the condition that they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a rest period of at least 1 hour. [=]

28031. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The 1946 labor and family code stipulates a minimum age of 8. Workers between the age of 8-16 cannot work in excess of 7 hours, with 1 hour of rest provided after 4 hours. They are also prohibited from working between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. There is a general prohibition against “jobs out of proportion with a worker’s age.” The labor code also prohibits certain types of mechanical work for children aged 8-13, and other types for those aged 13-16. The Labor Ministry is tasked with enforcing these requirements, but the civil war left it with few resources and a demoralized and sometimes corrupt staff. The law is not rigorously applied, and many younger children work in family businesses. [=]

28032. Evans, Kathy. “Prof. Alia Shoairb Sacked For Daring to Speak of Gay”, in Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 6, 1997, p. 5. Kuwaiti Prof. Shoaiib, in an informal conversation with a student, noted witnessing sex between women in a university bathroom (one being heavily veiled, indicating association with fundamentalist Islam); she was quoted in a local magazine, Al-Hadaf. Shoaiib has been dismissed from her position at Kuwait University, and the magazine is being sued for obscenity. Shoaiib, considered by some the first radical feminist in the GCC, is under investigation and is faced with loss of her citizenship.


Arab countries employ Asian workers not only because they provide a cheap labor force but because their “temporary” status prevents their integration into Middle Eastern societies, thus allowing them to be more easily exploited. In Kuwait, foreigners make up almost 70% of the population, yet they are treated with suspicion and disdain. Filipina contract workers living in Kuwait must abide by Islamic law, but do not themselves have any political rights.

Although both skilled and unskilled workers in the Middle East generally earn four to five times more than they would in the Philippines, overseas workers face extensive discrimination. Wage levels are set according to nationality and religion rather than skill, and at least three distinct “levels” are maintained. Americans and Europeans are paid the most, followed by the local nationals. Workers from the Philippines and other Asian countries are paid the lowest rate. A domestic worker receives an average of US $150 monthly, down from US $200 in earlier years.

The lack of legal protection in the host countries is another problem. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has consistently received reports from Philippine embassies abroad of abuses against the 10-15000 Filipino domestic workers in the Middle East. These workers suffer physical abuse, maltreatment, overwork, sexual harassment and rape, and violations of contract—employers changing terms of contracts, failing to provide promised living and working conditions, and recruiting or firing employees illegally.

According to Philippine Ambassador to Kuwait Alunan C. Glang, there were more than 5000 Filipina maids in Kuwait in 6/1987, most of whom had previously been teachers. In the first half of 1987, the Philippine embassy in Kuwait received complaints from 271 workers who had run away from their employers. Glang said that the most common problems were long working hours, no overtime pay, no days off, and violation of contracts.

Reports of rape of domestic helpers in Kuwait are frequent. At least 30 Filipina domestic workers were repatriated in 1987 after they complained of sexual abuse by their employers. Four domestic helpers in Kuwait who were made pregnant by their employers had to struggle to avoid penalties for “immorality.” The maximum penalty for fornication is death by stoning.

GABRIELA, a women’s organization, and KAIBIGAN, a group concerned with the welfare of migrant workers, staged protest actions. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs ordered the Philippine Embassy in Kuwait to negotiate for the repatriation of the Filipinas. After a week of hard battle, a little justice was finally won by three of the four pregnant Filipina domestic workers. Found guilty of rape by the Kuwait Islamic court, two of the attackers were sentenced to a seven-year prison term; a third was given only a 2-year term. Earlier, the employers had refused to acknowledge that they were the fathers. The three women gave birth the first week of 6/1987 in Kuwait hospitals which had earlier denied them admission. Ambassador Glang said that the Kuwaiti government allowed the women to deliver after the intercession of the Philippine embassy. He called the move very “generous.”

In order to stop abuses of domestic workers in the Middle East, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs may soon completely ban the sending of workers to that region. An alternative would be the recruitment of workers by the government itself instead of by private
recruiters—who have been sending workers to Kuwait illegally despite a ban on exporting labor to that country in effect since 10/1986. Finally, the Philippine government might negotiate agreements with the host countries under which they would enact laws protecting domestic helpers.


Dear Sir: We are a group of women’s organizations who are extremely pained at learning that four of our fellow Filipinas in Kuwait, abused by their Kuwaiti employers and now pregnant, are being denied the right to medical attention. They face the barbaric punishment of death by stoning if found “guilty” under Kuwaiti law, when they should in fact be indemnified for their physical, emotional and psychological pain and suffering. They have had to face the risks and uncertainty of working in a foreign country because of the inability of our own society to provide decent jobs for them.

We demand that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) extend, through our Embassy in Kuwait, full protection to these Filipinas against any form of harm. Our urgent concern is for their medical care during their pregnancies, because of the importance of medical attention during gestation.

Realizing the gravity of their situation, we demand the immediate repatriation of these Filipinas with sufficient indemnification from the government of Kuwait and an assurance that they will be allowed to bring home their babies.

We know that these women are not isolated cases. We are aware of so many cases of Filipina women who have become victims of sexual abuse by their employers, not only in Kuwait, but also in other countries where we export domestic helpers.

In this light, we also forward the following demands:

1. Establishment of bilateral agreements with countries where we export labor, especially Filipina workers.

2. Justice for all Filipina overseas workers.

We expect speedy action towards the resolution of this problem.

For the Dignity of Filipina Women.

Contact: Gabriela National Office, P.O. Box 4386, Manila 2800, Philippines. Philippine Resource Center, 2288 Fulton, Berkeley, CA 94720. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]


The South Asian region is relatively set apart from other areas, is well endowed with minerals and energy resources; there are significant hydroelectric resources; there is considerable potential for irrigation development, although there is annual flooding and droughts are common. The regional population of 1.1 billion is divided among India (850 million), Pakistan and Bangladesh (110 million each); the other states have small populations. Regional population growth rates are high; population densities are high; and 70% of the region’s people remain in rural areas. All countries of the region are classified as low-income, and four (Maldives, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal) are classified as least developed; recent regional growth rates have been modest but there is hope for higher rates. Regional investment rates are significant (India 23%, Pakistan 23%), but the manufacturing sector remains uncompetitive and largely state owned. Infrastructure development has been significant, but Nepal and much of the region still relies on wood energy; telecommunications infrastructure remains sparse. Poverty is very high (Bangladesh 70-80%, Nepal 60%, India and Pakistan 30-40%, Sri Lanka 20%).

South Asia is one of the main areas that has received World bank and IDA loans. India ($35.3 billion) is the largest borrower; Pakistan (seventh at $7.4 billion) and Bangladesh (thirteenth at $5.3 billion) are also large borrowers. The region has received 12.5% of World Bank global loans, 50.8% of IDA loans, and 21.4% of the combined loan total (this total is magnified by the creation of Bank-sponsored financing consortia that included the Asian Development Bank, Arab development funds, EC, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development). Some 93% of all loans were project loans; Bangladesh has received the largest proportion of non-project lending (28.2%). Sectoral lending shifted from agriculture and social sectors in the 1970s, to energy development in the 1980s.

The sectoral experience of the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s is summarized below:

Energy: has been the major focus of World Bank development loans, claiming almost one-third of all loans at $14.6 billion; rising from 15% before 1970, to 22% in the 1970s, to 35% in the 1980s. Energy loans have tried to stress local capacities (power plants in India, pipelines in India and Pakistan). In India, the emphasis in the early 1970s was state-level power development and regional transmission grids; in the late 1970s the emphasis shifted to large, coal-burning generation facilities built by the National Thermal Power Corp. (NTPC). Only a small part of the loans were routed through state electricity boards, the Rural Electrification Corp. or the Power Finance Corp. In Pakistan the Bank initially provided loans for the hydroelectric sector in the 1960s, in 1970-1972 to the Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) when Bank lending for energy development slowed. Much funding has been provided for pipelines and energy resource exploration in Baluchistan. In Bangladesh, due to a lack of alternative energy resources, lending has focused on natural gas development. In Sri Lanka, energy development loans were made only in the period when the United National Party was in power. Regionally, the power sector remains plagued by low productivity and poor system performance; network losses are high (India and Sri Lanka 20%, Pakistan and Bangladesh 25-40%). Investment has focused excessively on increasing supply, rather than to efficiency, economy in operations, demand management, or energy conservation.

The Bank has had some success in reducing high subsidies by the energy sector to agriculture by the State Electricity Boards in India, but generally, it has not been able to influence energy policy in much detail.

Transportation: before 1970, transportation was the largest sector of lending at 37%, but declining to 7-8% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Bank has loaned $1.5 million to Indian Railways since 1949 in sixteen loans: while early loans focused on increasing the rail network and equipment, later loans have focused on centralization, modernization and rationalization and have been less successful. Railroad loans to Pakistan have numbered eleven totaling $110 million: implementation and compliance problems were similar to those in India, with the loans generally less productive in Pakistan than in India. Numerous loans for roads and bridges have been made region-wide, with much of the total being used to repair flood damage in Bangladesh. Such projects have had serious overruns and delays in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Road loans have been significant only in Bangladesh and two Indian states due to the unwillingness of the Bank to become involved in the management of such small scale, dispersed projects. The Bank has funded transport coordination studies and studies on energy conservation, but has not followed up on these initial studies.

Industry: Bank assistance to industry include International Finance Corp. (IFC) operations. The majority of regional industrial development funding has been focused on fertilizer and petrochemical (41%) and development financing institutions (DFI) (48%). The Bank has supported fertilizer production since fertilizer inputs are required for higher agricultural production. In 1971-1986 the Bank loans $1.598 billion to India for fertilizer plants (including $811 million for plants for the Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative (IFFCO), after some hesitation by the Bank to lend to the public sector. The implementation of these projects has been slowed by Indian reluctance on Indian expertise and technology, but this has supported the emergence of a broader technical and engineering sector in India. In the 1980s, the Bank paused in making loans to the fertilizer sector: concluding in a 1987 study that the second generation natural gas based fertilizer plants had such high energy costs that they were not economically viable. The Bank has responded by trying to have the highest cost plants mothballed. Loans to Pakistan,
beginning with that for the venture between Dawood Industrial Group and Hercules Inc. in 1968. In Bangladesh, the Bank has financed the gas-based project in Ashuganj and financed the rehabilitation of three other plants. The Bank has made significant loans to the petrochemical industry in India through the state-owned Indian Petrochemical Corp. ($500 million), and provided refinery improvement loans to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The major DPI the Bank has operated in India has been the Industrial Credit & Investment Corp. (ICIC), with lesser involvement in the public sector Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). In Pakistan, the Bank operated through Pakistan Industrial Credit & Investment Corp. (PICIC), and through the public sector Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) and National Development Finance Corp. (NDFC). The Bank has worked with the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank but has had problems with political interference and the very low level of educational development in Pakistan. The first promote national identity in a society dominated by expatriate workers.

In 1960s, such loans to Pakistan totaled $77.5 million in 1977-1986, despite attitudes towards work. Much of the Kuwaiti women's role was to balance of payments problems, and inflation. Longva, Anh Nga. “Kuwaiti Women at a Crossroads: Privileged Society in a Land of Contrasts” in Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Kuwait. (and in Maharasthra and Madhya Pradesh, where most people were displaced) has made clear how very inadequate environmental planning of such projects has been, both by the Government of India and by the Bank (ignoring claims of indigenous peoples, los custodes, marginal farmers; poor implementing relief aid, lack of data on impacts, health hazards, and impact on fisheries). In Pakistan, Bank lending for irrigation breaks into three periods: the Indus Waters treaty in the 1950s, large dams and canals in the 1960s, and problems of waterlogging and soil salinity in the 1970s and 1980s. The Bank has been more successful in convincing the Government in Pakistan that irrigation projects should seek full cost recovery. In Bangladesh, flooding is the most serious problem, and UNDP and the Bank have sought to develop a coherent strategy to address the problem of flooding: only a few small projects proved to be cost effective enough to find Bank support. Minor irrigation development has been support by the Bank through the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation Corp. (BADC): most of these projects have mainly benefited local landlords, who have emerged in many areas as ‘waterlords’. Singificantly, in 1987-1988, floods in Bangladesh displaced 30 million people, highlighting the unresolved nature of the flooding issue in that country. In Sri Lanka, lending for irrigation development has focused in the Mahaweli Development Master Plan, which received four loans for as a part of the Bank lending. The next decade will see the Bank having

In Sri Lanka the Bank has worked through the Development Finance Corp of Ceylon (DFCC). Agriculture: some 29% of cumulative loans by the Bank were made in the agricultural sector, rising from 19% in pre-1970s to 39% in the 1970s, declining to 26% in the 1980s, seeking to back the Green Revolution through irrigation credit and extension, crop diversification, development of allied activities (agro-industries, dairies, fisheries, and tree crops), and improved resource management. Irrigation system development took 47% of Bank loans in the region as a whole, with agricultural credit at 19%. In India, irrigation has expanded from 23 million hectares in 1950 to 54 million hectares in the mid-1980s, and expanded into states where it was previously unknown (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa). However, while it has been relatively easy to boost the extent of irrigation, it has been harder to increase the efficiency of the systems. Project design has often been poor, and technical soundness and economic viability has often been overlooked in the haste to implement projects. Bank focus in the environmental aspects of irrigation has been limited to dam safety and resettlement of people displaced by the projects: the well-known Narmada Dam project in Gujarat (and in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, where most people were displaced) has made clear how very inadequate environmental planning of such projects has been, both by the Government of India and by the Bank (ignoring claims of indigenous peoples, los custodes, marginal farmers; poor implementing relief aid, lack of data on impacts, health hazards, and impact on fisheries). In Pakistan, Bank lending for irrigation projects have collapsed. The bank has failed, until recently, to blend other resource commitments, has often negatively affected other projects by loan recipients. Project monitoring and evaluation has been consistently weak: the Bank has only a very limited notion of whether its projects prove to be successful once direct funding ends. Bank efforts to extend the reach of projects sector-wide by financial covenants of various kinds have been generally quite unsuccessful. The Bank has provided some support for institution building at the national level, but has never been interested in institution building at a local level, ignoring many such opportunities. While the Bank has stated a major goal as being reduction of poverty in South Asia, it is not clear to what extent that has been successful: poorly designed Social Forestry projects in Sri Lanka have raised water prices, and local rural development projects in Bangladesh have been uniformly unsuccessful.

Conclusions: Bank project lending has fallen far short of expectations in the last 40 years. Resource transfer considerations have had negative impacts on the projects. The Bank has pursued an incremental strategy in attempts to influence national policy formulation: the approach has been generally unsuccessful due to the unwillingness of the Bank to use its sole option of exit. Sometimes, the Bank’s incremental approach has allowed complications to accumulate to the point that projects have collapsed. The bank has failed, until recently, to blend project and non-project funding; similarly, there has often, as in Pakistan, been no real linkage between projects and sectoral reforms. The late 1990s will require a higher rate of return from Bank projects, never a strong point for the Bank in spite of its willingness to subordinate other objectives to maximizing project return, even as project lending declines as a part of the Bank lending. The next decade will see the Bank having less resources, even as South Asian economies are undergoing macroeconomic and sectoral adjustments. [TXT]

28035. Longva, Anh Nga. “Kuwaiti Women at a Crossroads: Privileged Development and the Constraints of Ethnic Stratification” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, August, 1993. pp. 443-456. This article examines the position of Kuwaiti women and its socioeconomic context prior to the Persian Gulf War. The main areas examined are dress and attitudes towards work. Much of the Kuwaiti women's role was to promote national identity in a society dominated by expatriate workers. Little of this has changed following the war. And opportunity for change appears less.

A thief in the night, he sets himself apart from any claim to the sympathy and has banned workers from going to Kuwait because of the abuses once again demonstrated that when one chooses the path of cowardice as Philippine economy. The government attempts to look after its citizens PLO instead has chosen to attack the soul of the nation. By doing so it has treated that badly and expatriates contribute $1.79 billion to the fury was esp Rape and virtual slavery can be the results of working in countries like or influential benefactors—often members of the US Congress. Reid's workers find that the hoped for new life overseas is often a nightmare.

This despite the fact that the Palestinians have farmed the land for that he feared the sentence would intimidate other writers from taking up the oft-stated propaganda that the Jews have made the desert bloom. better for us to put down our pens and go home," Al-Hashem said, adding that the government chose instead to feed the insatiable Saudi appetite for arms. The Saudis, according to Levine, have no legitimate security concerns. Iran is a "paper tiger," and Israel poses no threat. "Clearly, there is no legitimate rationale for these enormous arms purchases," he said. "Except perhaps to satisfy the Saudi addiction to Western weapons." This sentiment was echoed, and expanded upon, by Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), who spoke for nearly an hour on "the tendency for this administration, but, even more, other nations in the world to step up the pace of weapons sales to Arab nations in the Middle East." The apparent logical discrepancy between condemning the Arabs for purchasing, with their own money, arms from the US and other suppliers, while the American taxpayer is forking over billions to Israel so that it can arm itself to the teeth, is explained this way: "We have a very small nation [Israel] which receives a large mount of aid . . . because through no fault of its own and against its strongest wishes it has been forced from its very existence to maintain a level of armament that is disproportionate. "What is disproportionate with regard to the state of Israel is not the amount of assistance that it gets in some abstract context; it is the burden that is imposed on Israel to arm itself, to devote much of its resources to armaments in self-defense." Frank then launched into a rationalization of Israel's seizure of the West Bank and Gaza, and their continued occupation. He described Israel's 1967 blitzkrieg (the Six-Day War) as an act of self-defense, and falsely claimed that these areas were "set aside and occupied because they were being used as bases for terrorist attacks on Israel. Frank's speech boils down to yet another long, dreary apologia for congressional rejection of any arms sales to the Saudis or any other Arab state—regardless of the benefits to the American people. To the likes of Frank, Levine and the other pro-Israeli stalwarts in Congress, what benefits Israel is far more important. Sen. Harry Reid (D-Neb.) tackled an altogether different issue regarding Israel on the floor of the Senate recently. Reid railed against recent arson attacks on the forests of Israel, allegedly orchestrated by the PLO. The forests of Israel have a special significance in Zionist mythology, lending credence of a sort to the oft-stated propaganda that the Jews have made the desert bloom. This despite the fact that the Palestinians have farmed the land for centuries, producing bountiful harvests. But perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that the forests of Israel are superb fund-raising gimmicks. Millions of dollars are raised in the US every year to plant trees in the Judean hills. And forests are named after especially generous or influential benefactors—often members of the US Congress. Reid's fury was esp eccially venomous toward the Palestinians. "Unwilling and unable to stand in fair combat against a nation outnumbered by millions," he shouted, "the PLO instead has chosen to attack the soul of the nation. By doing so it has once again demonstrated that when one chooses the path of cowardice as a thief in the night, he sets himself apart from any claim to the sympathy or respect of the civilized world. "We know the truth of Joyce Kilmer's thought that only God can make a tree, and we know the character of those who would destroy a forest by arson. I want the PLO to understand that we know, and that we will not forget," he concluded. This statement contains just about every tired myth promulgated by the Israelis and their vocal lobby in America. To wit, the Palestinians are cowardly, uncivilized, and murderous; Israel is the underdog, bravely standing up to bullies; and that when "the children of Israel returned from their diaspora in the latter 19th century . . . time, misuse and the travails of 2000 years . . . had laid waste their promised land." [=] 28037. Nimranee: Resource Center for Community Groups; Womens Unit of the Resource Centre for Community Groups. "Tragic Story of Migrant Workers in Middle East," in Nimranee-Sri Lanka Newsletter (Internet), Electronic Issue, n. 11, November, 1995. [You are free to post all or part of this information to other relevant places in Electronic or Printed form. Information is Free!]

In the economy of developing countries such as Sri Lanka, foreign exchange earnings are of greatest importance. Through total earning from the garment industry is the highest in figures, it is the migrant workers who bring in the highest net earnings of foreign exchange, in our country. The non-aligned summit conference held in Sri Lanka, in 1976 opened the gate for employment in the middle-east to Sri Lankens. Through brain-drain to western countries was prevalent before, those migrants aid not contribute much to our economy as they settled down in those developed countries.

The government that came into power in 1977 introduced the open economy which resulted in an exodus of migrant workers and boom of foreign employment agencies.

Many prostitutes in Colombo were among the house maids that left for middle east initially and they continued the oldest profession in the world there too. This created many problems for the urban and rural women who followed later some of these women who opposed the advances of their employers were maimed by brutal assaults while some committed suicide or became mentally deranged. Some were imprisoned and few were killed by their employers.

Those who left the torture houses to seek refuge in the employment agencies or the High Commissions fall from the pan into the fire. Children of the migrant women too suffer various consequences on their mothers are not around them.

"Tears of Kuwait" is an exhibition of photographs relating to the above, which should be an eye opener to our authorities to take immediate remedial measures. [=] 28038. Noakes, Greg [Compiler]; American Education Trust. "Issues in the News: From the Middle East Press: Kuwait Jails Journalist", in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (American Education Trust, Box 53062, Washington DC 20009), April/May 1993. pp. 55-57. A Kuwait court upheld a 3-month prison sentence imposed on journalist Fuad Al-Hashem for his criticism of Islamism and women who wear the niqab, or traditional facial veil while driving, the Saudi Gazette reports. Al-Hashem wrote in what benefits Israel is far more important. Sen. Harry Reid (D-Neb.) for his criticism of Islamism and women who wear the niqab, or traditional facial veil while driving, the Saudi Gazette reports. Al-Hashem wrote in

Noakes, Greg [Compiler]; American Education Trust. "Issues in the News: From the Middle East Press: Kuwait Jails Journalist", in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (American Education Trust, Box 53062, Washington DC 20009), April/May 1993. pp. 55-57. A Kuwait court upheld a 3-month prison sentence imposed on journalist Fuad Al-Hashem for his criticism of Islamism and women who wear the niqab, or traditional facial veil while driving, the Saudi Gazette reports. Al-Hashem wrote in

"Tears of Kuwait" is an exhibition of photographs relating to the above, which should be an eye opener to our authorities to take immediate remedial measures. [=] 28039. Rhodes, Belinda. "Service Without a Smile", in Far Eastern Economic Review, November 4, 1993. pp. 54-55. Expatriate Philippine workers find that the hoped for new life overseas is often a nightmare. Rape and virtual slavery can be the results of working in countries like Kuwait. Underemployment in the Philippines feeds the numbers of those seeking work overseas, a number that is growing 17% annually. Not all are treated that badly and expatriates contribute $1.79 billion to the Philippine economy. The government attempts to look after its citizens and has bashed workers from going to Kuwait because of the abuses
there.

28040. Selsky, Andrew. "Democracy Elusive In Kuwait; Prosperity's Back, But Emir Still Calls Shots", in Seattle Times, September 20, 1996. p. A18. Five years after the Persian Gulf War, Kuwait has been rebuit, yet tensions with Iraq remain and the monarchy completely dominates the country. Democracy remains a remote ideal, although 2 million b/d of oil are produced by a largely foreign work force. Many Kuwaitis had hoped that there would have been some movement toward democracy in the wake of the war, but the US restored the complete power of the monarchy. The Parliament has no real power, political parties are banned, and women do not have the vote. Kuwait foreign reserves of $100 billion were almost erased during the war, with $70 billion being sent to hire coalition troops and finance other aspects of the war. [TXT]

28041. Wockner, Rex. "Kuwait [Kuwait University may dismiss Prof. Alia Shoab who states Lesbianism is rampant atthe University; officially Homosexuality does not exist in Kuwait; novelist Leila Otham faces obscenity charges for two stories dealing with gays]", in Just Out (Portland), May 2, 1997. p. 4. [TXT]
France came on 11/8/1994, when 300 French police swooped on Muslim families needed Mr. Birri to secure their re-election. In addition to having it too transparent to take anyone in. The latest attack on Muslims in commented that, unlike the past, the representatives of the traditional process.” But he stressed that Paris would not spare any effort to enlist factor attracting votes to Mr. Birri’s list was its inclusion of prominent finding great difficulty in convincing its allies to work for an “independent both doctors living and practicing in the eastern Sayda and Jizzin area, engineering a rapid Arab capitulation to Israel in the so-called peace other projects, through her brother Saudi-Lebanese businessman Rafiq al-Zayn, Mr. Mustapha Sa’ad, leader of the Sayda-based Popular Nasriite Organization, to write in his name and have him elected. The candidates who won parliamentary seats in the South were, for the fourteen Shi’a seats: Mr. Nabih Birri Mr. Muhammad Fna'ysh, Mr. Muhammad Ra’ad, Mr. Habib Sadiq, Mr. Ali Usayran, Mr. Muhammad Baydoun Mr. Ayoub Hmayid, Mr. Abd al-Latif al-Zayn, Mr. Abdullah al-Amin, Mr. Said al’As’ad, Mr. Ali al-Khalil, Mr. Hasan Alawyyeh, Mr. Ahmad Ajami, and Mr. Imad Jabber; for the three Sunni seats: Mrs. Bahiyaa al-Hariri, Mr. Ahmad Suwayd, and Mr. Mustapha Sa’ad; for the two Maronite seats: Mr. Samir Azar and Mr. Sulayman Kan’lan; for the two Greek Catholic seats: Mr. Namd Salem and Mr. Michel Musa; for the single Greek Orthodox seat: Mr. As’ad Hardan, and for the single Druze seat: Mr. Anwar al-Khalil. Among the most interesting aspects of elections in the South was the makeup of the list headed by Mr. Birri. The list was the result of an alliance of interests among Amal, Hizballah, Mr. Rafiq al-Hariri represented by his sister, members of the traditional South Lebanese families, prominent allies of Syria, local leaders, and independent Christian candidates. This alliance, which was recognized as a tactical one and which is unlikely to endure inside parliament, had the advantage of gathering all the factors necessary to secure votes. The first of these was the cooperation between Amal and Hizballah, the two most influential militas in the region. Amal had four candidates on the list: Nabih Birri, Muhammad Baydoun, Hasan Alawyyeh, and Ayoub Hmayid; Hizballah had two: Mr. Francesco Sefir, who also met French parliamentrians and Lebanese exiles, which was recognized as a tactical one and which is unlikely to endure inside parliament, had the advantage of gathering all the factors necessary to secure votes. The first of these was the cooperation between Amal and Hizballah, the two most influential militas in the region. Amal had four candidates on the list: Nabih Birri, Muhammad Baydoun, Hasan Alawyyeh, and Ayoub Hmayid; Hizballah had two: Mr. Francesco Sefir - who went to Paris fresh from his appointment as cardinal (the highest rank next to the Pope in the Roman Catholic Church) by Pope John Paul II - was given a red-carpet treatment during his three-day visit. The new cardinal had talks with French prime minister Edouard Balladur and defense minister Francois Leotard. No eyebrows were raised, as they normally would be, over a meeting between a spiritual leader and a minister of war, presumably because the cardinal was not in France to promote peace in his country, but to help usurp power for fellow Maronites.

Sefir, who also met French parliamentarians and Lebanese exiles, reserved his main energies for conducting a bitter campaign against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Syria maintains 40000 troops to underpin efforts to settle the Lebanese civil war under the Arab League-brokered 1989 Taif accord. Syria and Lebanon signed a “Brotherhood and Coordination” pact on 5/20/1991, which was opposed by the Maronites who felt it would marginalize them. The pact bitterly divided the Maronites, whose militias began to fight each other. France, which at the time demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, opposed the pact and collided with Israel to sabotage it. Israel began to bomb targets in Lebanon, especially areas near Beirut, on the announcement of the pact, and Paris publicly warned Damascus against the folly of trying to incorporate its former colony. Sefir tried to revive French interest in overturning the pact and the Taif accord. But while receiving warm welcome and strong backing for his project from the French government and legislators, it became obvious that the west's main interest in Lebanon’s Maronites at the present time was subordinated to that of engineering a rapid Arab capitulation to Israel in the so-called peace process. Juppe admitted in his newspaper interview that France was finding great difficulty in convincing its allies to work for an “independent Lebanon based on confessional co-existence as part of the peace process.” But he stressed that Paris would not spare any effort to enlist the support of its European allies for the cause. While France pursues a Christian campaign in Lebanon it insists that its war on French Muslims is being waged to preserve French secularism. This catch-22 response is too transparent to take anyone in. The latest attack on Muslims in France came on 11/8/1994, when 300 French police swooped on Muslim homes in Paris and its suburbs and arrested 95 Muslims said to be “Islamic terrorists.” At least three Imams have been expelled because they refuse to toe the French line on the question of hijab. In its attack on the hijab in schools, Paris has claimed that wearing the hijab is against French educational secularism, that it is a symbol of subjugating women and of Islamic fundamentalism. One of 24 Muslim pups was told that unless they remove their hijab by 11/8/1994, they will be suspended from school near Paris. This effectively refutes the French authorities’ claim, Sonia, 18, says, “They have claimed that the hijab is a sign of the submission of women, that it is propaganda, that it is a sign that we are fundamentalists. But we are not forcing anyone to do anything against their will. It is the State that is forcing us. It is the State that is fundamentalist.” [—] 5001. -------. “Birri List Easily Sweeps South”, in Lebanon Report, October 1992. On September 6, the third round of legislative elections took place in the South. Elections were conducted on the basis of a newly created electoral district uniting the two muhafazas of the South and Nabatiyyeh. Candidates in the South were competing for a total of twenty-three seats. The list headed by Amal leader, Mr. Nabih Birri, won an overwhelming victory, with all twentytwo of its members getting elected to parliament and the number of votes ranging from 90000 to 117000 each. The place left empty on the list for the third Sunni seat allowed supporters of the independent candidate, Mr. Mustapha Sa’ad, leader of the Sayda-based Popular Nasriite Organization, to write in his name and have him elected. 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Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Lebanon

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Palestinian refugees inflicted in the Israeli terror attacks. Kessel claimed that, 'Israel has been bloodied by Katysha missiles' [sic: total dead in Israel zero], while noting that much of southern Lebanon is devastated. New Israeli airraids were made across southern Lebanon. The mayor of Kiryat Shmona called for further attacks on southern Lebanon since the Arabs cannot be trusted.

Warren Christopher termed the agreement a big step forward, and noted that the only goal was the extricate Israel from the crisis by 'ending the fighting'. Christopher makes no mention of any justice for the people of devastated southern Lebanon, speaking only to the needs of Jewish settlers in northern Israel and Jewish soldiers occupying southern Lebanon. Christopher concluded the fighting in southern Lebanon 'had been a good week in the peace process ... don't underemphasize the merits of the agreement' a sentiment Christopher noted, that was shared by Pres. Clinton, who was delighted by the results of the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon. Oddly, the agreement is characterized as an Israeli victory since the agreement calls for an end to the 'targeting of civilians', but every civilian death has been of a Lebanese or Palestinian at the hands of Israeli terror attacks.

A young Jewish woman in very high heels: "We should not feel guilty because they are doing this same thing to us [Jews]". A young Jewish man: "This is war. There is no problem." Two young women noted: "We have to kill them there because otherwise they would kill us here".

The report concluded with video coverage of Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps, refugee columns and villages. No Jew has died in the bloody, US-backed war. [TEXT]
civilians. Israel reported 340 IDF [Israel Defence Force] soldiers killed in the population more closely. More than 60 Palestinians were served with

By late December, the Lebanese police estimated the numbers control money going to families and institutions in the Occupied
government investigation estimated that 90% of the casualties were popular committees proscribed. Currency restrictions were introduced to

17,825 known to have been killed and over 30,000 wounded including activities, the Israeli authorities resorted to various measures. A number

Fateful Triangle. Two quotations to illustrate the cost in human lives and activities and create alternative structures to the Israeli Civil

' massacre' would be a more accurate description) in great detail in The Territories, and popular committees have been set up to coordinate such

Professor Chomsky has dealt with that campaign (or perhaps boycotts have been organised by Palestinians in the Occupied

Anarchist Journal Freedom 1938-1948. London: Freedom Press, 1989.] More than 360 Palestinians were reported to have been killed by early

A number of PLO killed was given as 4000. As to the methods adopted: "The first target was the Palestinian camp of Rashidieh south of Tyre, much of which, by the second day of the invasion, 'had become a field of rubble'. There was ineffectual resistance, but as an officer of the UN peace-keeping force swept aside in the Israeli invasion later remarked: 'It was like shooting sparrows with cannon'. The 9000 residents of the camp—which had been regularly bombed and shelled for years from land, sea and air—either fled, or were herded to the beach where they could watch the destruction of much of what remained by the Israeli forces. All teen-age and adult males were blindfolded and bound, and taken to camps, where little has been heard about them since." This is typical of what happened throughout southern Lebanon. The Palestinian camps were demolished, largely bulldozed to the ground if not destroyed by bombardment; and the population was dispersed or (in the case of the male population) imprisoned. Reporters were generally not allowed in the Palestinian camps, where the destruction was worst, to keep them from witnessing what had happened and was being done. There were occasional reports. David Shipler described how after the camps were captured the army proceeded to destroy what was left. An army officer, when asked why bulldozers were knocking down houses in which women and children were living", responded by saying: "they are all terrorists", is statement accurately summarises Israel's strategy and the assumptions that underlie it, over many years." It is interesting to note that General—as he then was—Sharon justified the massacre in the Lebanon as the way to maintain 'quiet on the West Bank'. How wrong he has proved to be!

According to Amnesty International (June 1989): "On 12/9/1987 demonstrations against the Israeli occupation erupted throughout the West Bank and Gaza, marking the beginning of the period of unrest soon to become known as the intifada. Since 9 December almost every day Palestinians, including children, have staged demonstrations in which stones, petrol bombs and other missiles have often been thrown at Israeli soldiers and settlers. The Israeli authorities have responded with force, which has often been excessive and indiscriminate, using such means as live ammunition, rubber and plastic bullets, teargas and gravel cannons. More than 360 Palestinians were reported to have been killed by early 4/1989 in shootings incidents alone. Thousands have been injured, many of them requiring hospital treatment. A number of Israeli soldiers and civilians too, as well as several Palestinians suspected of collaborating with the Israeli authorities, have been killed in violent attacks by Palestinians. As well as demonstrations and riots, mass strikes and tax boycotts have been organised by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and popular committees have been set up to coordinate such activities and create alternative structures to the Israeli Civil Administration. They have organised, among other things, food distribution, medical relief, and educational programs. Some Palestinian employees of the Israeli Civil Administration, particularly police officials, have resigned from their posts. In their attempt to suppress such activities, the Israeli authorities resorted to various measures. A number of Palestinian newspapers and institutions were closed down and the popular committees proscribed. Currency restrictions were introduced to control money going to families and institutions in the Occupied Territories. New identity cards were issued in the Gaza Strip to monitor the population more closely. More than 60 Palestinians were served with
deportation orders and 48 were actually deported. Villages, towns and refugee camps have been put under prolonged curfew, sometimes for a month or more, during which time electricity, water and telephones have often been disconnected. Trees have been uprooted and crops ruined. Dozens of Palestinian homes have been demolished or sealed up as punishment. During the first few months of the uprising hundreds of teenagers and young men were arrested, summarily tried on criminal charges, and sentenced to up to 18 months' imprisonment for throwing stones and setting up roadblocks. In March 1988, however, the Israeli authorities decided to make more use of administrative detention. More than 5000 Palestinians have been in administrative detention since the beginning of the Palestinian intifada most of them for six months; some repeatedly. At least 1,100 are reported to be on detention at present, the vast majority in harsh conditions in the Ketzlot detention centre in Israel. Administrative detention in Israel and the occupied territories can and has been abused to detain prisoners of conscience, held for the non-violent exercise of their right to freedom of expression and association.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, one of the few organisations still able to travel relatively freely in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, has accused the Israelis of deliberately stirring up tensions which culminated in Thursday's killing of at least four Palestinians in the West Bank village of Nahhalin "For five or six days before the killings, Israeli border guards had been systematically provoking the villagers by making religious and personal insults", an ICRC spokesman, Mr Carlos Bauverd, said. During the pre-dawn Israeli raid on Nahhalin, part of which was witnessed by the ICRC, Israeli soldiers opened fire "without discrimination and without restraint" he said. ... From the Nahhalin killings, the ICRC condemned Israel for an "increasingly frequent use of firearms and acts of physical violence against defenceless civilians". Mr Bauverd said that among recent violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention had been systematic violence against medical teams and ambulance drivers who were employed by the Red Cross and by the UN Works and Relief Agency for Palestinian Refugees. "These people have been pulled from their vehicles and beaten by Israeli soldiers. When drivers have tried to dismantle roadblocks to get to wounded people they have been arrested". ... Singled out for particular criticism was Israel's policy of deporting Palestinian activists to Lebanon, something which is outlawed under Article 49, collective punishments and the destruction of houses, and excessive violence against demonstrators. (Guardian 4/15/1989)

The role of the paramilitary Border Police in one of the bloodiest single incidents of the uprising has brought more unwelcome attention to a force that has often attracted controversy since it was founded as a professional frontier guard in 1953. Until the intifada erupted in 12/1987, its green-bereted men—known by their Hebrew acronym, Magavniks—had carried out most of the routine security duties in the West Bank. ... The Border Police, which answers to the Ministry of Police rather than Defence, is a 5500-strong regular force, although many of its lower ranks arrive after being rejected even as cooks or drivers by the army. Many hold extreme rightwing political views. ... (Guardian 5/8/1989)

Mr Shamir said in Tel Aviv that no effort would be spared to catch the murderers of Steven Rosenfeld, a 48-year-old American immigrant, found stabbed to death... near an Arab village adjoining the West Bank settlement of Ariel. He was the 21st Israeli to be killed during the intifada. About 520 Palestinians have been killed... "Israel's security forces will uphold this violence with an iron fist" Mr Shamir said, ... Ariel, with a population of 6,000, attracted controversy recently when it ordered refugees camps to be closed... (Guardian 6/25/1989)

In chilling proof that the Israeli Army has learned nothing in the 17 months since the intifada began, three Palestinians were killed and more than 140 injured in the Gaza Strip... hospital sources said, in the highest daily casualty toll since the uprising began 18 months ago. ... While the chief Israeli army spokesman, Brigadier-General Ephraim Lapid, said 77 people were taken to hospital. Gaza Strip hospitals reported treating twice as many victims. However, the UNRWA in Gaza said 400 Arabs were injured by gunfire, beatings or teargas inhalation on Saturday, Arab hospitals in Gaza said troops shot and wounded eight people in continuing protests yesterday. The violence occurred during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Fitr which is marked by prayers and visits to the grave of relatives. Gen Lapid said residents of Nuseirat refugee camp provoked the most serious violence. ... helicopter dropped teargas canisters and troop reinforcements were called in. In the clash, two people were shot and at least 42 people, including two Israeli soldiers were wounded. (Guardian 5/8/1989)

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In chilling proof that the Israeli Army has learned nothing in the 17 months since the intifada began, three Palestinians were killed and more than 140 injured in the Gaza Strip over the weekend, while one soldier suffered a broken jaw... A second depressing aspect of the latest events is that the Israelis are still using lethal force against youngsters with stones and sling-shots—a seven-month-old girl was among those hit by bullets. Most depressing of all is that with 466 Palestinians dead, in spite of the renunciation of violence by the PLO and its recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure borders, a change of administration in Washington and a more moderate line from Mr Gorbatchev's Moscow, peace in the Middle East is as distant as ever. (The Independent 5/8/1989)

The Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, said yesterday that proposals for Palestinian elections in the occupied territories were more public relations than substance, reinforcing Arab accusations that the initiative was aimed at ending the intifada without conceding real
political power to the Palestinians. He told a parliamentary committee that those elected would not form a parliament: "The elections have more importance from a public relations point of view than in a practical sense." (Guardian 6/27/1989)

As well as joining the kidnappers in the Lebanon the Israelis have been extending their territory there too. The Independent reported on the 25th April: While world attention has been focused on the crisis affecting Beirut and South Lebanon, Israel has been quietly extending the hold in areas to the south within its self-declared security zone. At the weekend, 300 farmers were evicted from their land just over the border from Israel. About 40 square miles of Lebanese territory were effectively annexed by the Israeli forces, according to Lebanese sources. It was the second instance this year of Lebanese citizens being expelled from their property in the south. In January, dozens of people were evicted from the Israeli-occupied town of Chebaa, on the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon, the snow-covered mountain ridge which forms the southern-eastern frontier between Israeli-occupied south Lebanon and Syria. It is at Chebaa that the 300 farmers have now arrived, together with what flocks and other possessions they were able to take with them. Having received no compensation for their lost land, they are now penniless and homeless.

Eight Palestinians, described by Israel as leaders of the uprising in the occupied territories, were deported to Lebanon yesterday, as the army went on alert to guard Jewish settlers planning mass marches in the West Bank today. The eight deportees, who were detained last August, included representatives of the mainstream Fatah movement and the leftwing Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. All had lost their appeals to the High Court. They were taken by helicopter to the Zumaria crossing point at the northern edge of Israel’s ‘security zone’ in southern Lebanon and ordered to cross into Syrian-controlled territory. The latest expulsions came as the authorities are seeking to streamline the process of deportation and increase the maximum single period of detention without trial from six months to a year. . . . The Shin Bet security service, meanwhile, was congratulating itself over Wednesday’s killing in Gaza of Muhammad Abu Nasser. . . . [He] was shot down m a taxi m what appeared to have been a pre-planned ambush. . . . (Guardian 6/30/1989)

In perhaps the most ominous development, the home in Jerusalem of a left-wing Knesset member, Dedi Zucker, was attacked. Mr Zucker, of the Citizens’ Rights Movement, and an outspoken critic of Israeli army excesses in the occupied territories, said youths involved in the attack shouted “Death to Arabs, death to Zucker” . . . . The attack on Mr Zucker’s house together with the jostling of the Labour Party leader, Shimon Peres, at the funeral of one of the victims on Friday, has had the leader writers raining against what Maavr calls “the terrible deterioration of Israeli society”. For The Jerusalem Post “Jews, the victims of racism themselves and are meting out collective punishment. The spectre of hatred is raging throughout the land, while passive bystanders allow the outrages to take place.” The fears of Maavr’s editorial writer that “the civil war is almost here” may seem hopelessly exaggerated. But passions are high, and Meir Kahane, the leader of the overtly racist Kahal movement, has little difficulty in tapping an underlying current of extremist feeling. (The Independent 7/10/1989)

“The [peace] initiative does not rule out the suppression of the intifada. We extend one hand for peace, and have the other hand free to strike at the rioters”, Mr Shamir said. Any hopes that he might show more flexibility on what the initiative terms the permanent settlement of Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza were equally dashed. He ruled out the main Palestinian demands: an Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state. “A Palestinian state will not arise and will not be.” Invoking an Old Testament oath, he declared: “Whoever says it—may his tongue cleave to the roof of his mouth”. Later to the Knesset itself, he spelled out his adamantine opposition to trading any land for peace, thereby ensuring the near impossibility of any Arab side even discussing the proposal: “We will not give the Arabs a single centime. We will not give them anything. That is it.” (The Independent 5/18/1989)

The defence establishment has already started implementing what Shmuel Goren, Co-ordinator for Activities for the occupied territories, called a fundamental change in policy, to give the Palestinians a foretaste of the repressive measures they can expect if they reject Israeli election proposals. Tens of thousands of Gazans have been ordered to pack up their jobs on construction sites and in restaurants in Israeli proper. Mr Goren said permits for Gazans to work in Israel will only be given in future for legitimate reasons. And he said the next step would be formulating a comprehensive policy towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Last month one Likud minister proposed sealing the territories off from Israel as a punitive measure. This would deprive many families of their livelihoods, particularly in Gaza, where there is little work. However the proposal was rejected by . . . chief of general staff, Dan Shomron. “We should not bring the Arabs to the point where they have nothing to lose” he told the Knesset foreign affairs and defence committee. (The Independent 5/18/1989)

In the Gaza strip, men and women with computer terminals and Polaroid cameras began the lengthy process of issuing yet another identity card to Palestinian residents to increase the scrutiny and supervision of those hoping to work in Israel proper. Gaza itself was at a standstill, brought to a halt by two competing agents of control: the underground leadership of the intifada had called for days of strikes to mark the anniversary of the 1967 defeat, and the Israeli army had placed the 650000 people of Gaza under indefinite 24-hour curfew. The flash new cards bore magnetic strips, like credit cards. The information stored on these, a military spokesman explained, would help control employment in Israel proper. Despite the intifada . . . neither Israeli employers nor Palestinian workers have managed to disengage themselves economically. Tens of thousands of Gazans continue to work in Israel, doing the jobs that no self-respecting Jew will do, washing dishes, humping cement, or clearing garbage. Those with prison records or who have served in administrative detention (internment) will not get the new cards. (The Independent 6/3/1989)

Four young soldiers were acquitted yesterday by a military court of the manslaughter of a 42-year old Palestinian beaten to death after trying to protect his son from arrest. They were convicted of the lesser charge of brutality. The judges advocate agreed with the accused that the victim died not from the beating at his house but from wounds suffered later when he was held at an army outpost. They concluded that the culprits would never be found among the 20 or so other soldiers who participated in the beating. This was the first trial of soldiers accused of beating to death a Palestinian in their charge since the beginning of the uprising . . . . During the trial earlier this year, soldier after soldier testified about systematic brutality in an atmosphere of fear and racial loathing . . . . Dedi Zucker. Knesset member for the left-wing Citizens’ Rights Movement, called the verdict the most important since the beginning of the Intifada. He said it was the first time a court had questioned the army’s policy. Prosecutions and disciplinary actions have been rare; the army protects its own. Two weeks ago, an Israeli colonel escaped with dismissal for ordering soldiers to break the arms and legs of Palestinians already arrested. Since the uprising began in 12/1987, two soldiers have been convicted of manslaughter. Nearly 500 Palestinians have been shot dead or beaten to death in this period. (The Independent 5/26/1989).[=]
Although he would have won his seat by default. On August 28, Shaykh for in the Christian areas of much of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the elections, while reports suggest that Mr. Lahoud, who represents one 15%. Even according to Mr. Khatib’s figures, at best no more than one in controversial. Mr. Bakhos’s car was blown up as a warning to stay out of and in each of the two districts of Batroun and Koura it was no more than substantial progress on the return of the displaced by Christmas of this in Tripoli, 75% in Denniyeh in the Akkar, 20% in Batroun, 26% in Zgharta, displaced to what has become an almost exclusively Druze region. Mr. Mount Lebanon, and the South. Despite statements from Minister of the large part, motivated by the Kata’ib decision to withdraw its candidates significant message which came out of the elections in the North was the publically admitted that “if voter turnout in the elections does not exceed 50%, the next parliament may not be legitimate, although it will remain legal.” According to official figures, the turnout in the predominantly Christian regions boycotting the elections was as follows: 6.5% in Jubayl (where only 0.55% of the Christian electorate voted); 12% in Ba’abda; and 13% in the Metn. In predominantly Druze areas, where many Christian displaced are registered, the turnout was somewhat higher, but still low 27% in the Shouf and 20% in Aley. Observers noted that a vast majority of the displaced did not vote in the latter two regions, while the almost certain victories of the pro-Jubayl lists may have kept away Druze voters aware that their votes would not count for much in a Christian boycott of elections not only affected voter turnout, but candidacies as well. In the week before the first round of elections, a committee of five Maronite deputies sought to arrive at a compromise with the government to reschedule elections “until more favorable circumstances existed in which they could be held.” This included Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz, Mr. Nassib Lahoud, Mr. Pierre Helou, Mr. Auguste Bakhos, and Mr. Fuad al-Saad. Of the five, only Mr. Buwayz refused to present his candidacy for the elections when the government decided to go ahead with the vote on schedule. He also resigned from the cabinet on August 26, as did Mr. George Sa’adah. Observers noted that Mr. Buwayz’s decision was, in large part, motivated by the Kata’ib’s decision to withdraw its candidates from the elections. Mr. Helou and Mr. Sa’ad were in a peculiar situation, however: as Maronite candidates from Aley, both men argued that they could not boycott elections as this may hamper the return of the Christian displaced to what has become an almost exclusively Druze region. Mr. Helou vowed that he would resign from parliament if there was no substantial progress on the return of the displaced by Christmas of this year. The argument was not lost on Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who stated that he “understood” the decision of the two deputies. The decision of Mr. Bakhos and Mr. Lahoud to participate in elections, however, was controversial. Mr. Bakhos’s car was blown up as a warning to stay out of the elections, while reports suggest that Mr. Lahoud, who represents one of the influential families in the Metn, was under pressure at least to remain off the Murr list. Mr. Buwayz’s decision not to participate in elections brought in its wake a wave of withdrawals from the electoral race in the Kisirwan. Shaykh Elias al-Khazen pulled out on August 27, although he would have won his seat by default. On August 28, Shaykh Rshaid al-Khazen, another Maronite from the Kisirwan, announced that he would not stand for elections. By August 29, only two candidates were left for five seats in the Kisirwan, and by election day only one. Elections were postponed until a later date, with Mr. Sami Khwayer, an ally of Mr. Elie Hobeika, as the sole candidate left. In Ba’abda, the significant event was the victory of another Hizballah candidate, Mr. Ali Ammar. With the victory of Muhammad Birjawi in Beirut, the election of Mr. Ammar brought Hizballah representation in parliament to six, counting those elected in the Shia list. Thisfigureis expected to rise after the third round of voting in South Lebanon. Observers suggested, however, that Mr. Ammar benefited greatly from the Christian boycott, since there was no possibility that a more moderate opponent could be voted in by Christian voters. Perhaps most embarrassing for the government were the elections in the qada’ of Jubayl. Not only was voter participation there exceptionally low, but in a number of villages, local inhabitants refused to allow buildings to be used as polling stations by state employees. In some cases, officials were forced to pitch tents or open polling stations in the trunks of their cars. In a record of sorts, Mrs. Maha Khoury As’ad won her Jubayl seat with only forty-one votes, from a total electorate of some 60000. [-] 30016. ————. “The Rejections By Region: The North: Islamists Break Through Official Karameh-Franjieh List”, in Lebanon Report, September 1992. Elections in the North took place on August 23, and were conducted on the basis of the muhafazah. In the city of Tripoli, the winners were, for the Sunni seats, Mr. Omar Karami (72358 votes), Mr. Amin al-Haif (56376), Mr. Muhammad Kabbaba (54354), Mr. Omar Mikawi (46988), and Shaykh Fathy Yakan (46393); for the Alawi seat, Mr. Ali Eid (60078); for the Maronite seat, Mr. Jean Ubayd (56385); and for the Greek Orthodox seat, Mr. Salim Habib (40020). In Tripoli district, the winners were for the three Sunni seats, Mr. Salih Khayr (49623), Mr. Mahmoud Tibbo (43055), and Mr. As ad Harmouch (3208). In the Akkar district, the winners were, for the Sunni seats, Mr. Waji Bani’ni (68934), Mr. Talal Miri’bi (62062), and Mr. Hassan Izzidin (41844); for the Greek Orthodox seats, Mr. Abdallah al-Rasi (47872) and Mr. Riyad Sarraf (42369); for the Maronite seat, Mr. Mikhail Daher (63701); and for the Alawi seat, Mr. Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahman (61700). In the Zgharta district, the three Maronite seats were won by Mrs. Nayla Mu’awad (90595), Mr. Sulayman Tony Franjieh (57038), and Mr. Estephan Naddaf (68470). In the Koura district, the three Greek Orthodox seats were won by Mr. Salim Sa’adah (51179), Mr. Farid Makari (50800), and Mr. Fayiz Ghosn (48188). In the Bsharreh district, the two Maronite seats were won by Mr. Qabalan Isa al-Khouri (51781) and Mr. Habib Kayrouz (51324). In the Batroun district, the two Maronite seats were won by Mr. Sayid Aqi (49950) and Mr. Manuel Younes (48682). While the results of the elections showed an overwhelming victory for Mr. Karami in the “List of National coalition” (25 of 28 seats), the final tally indicated that Mr. Karami had won 72358 votes, placing him only third on his list in terms of the total number of votes accumulated. Mrs. Nayla Mu’awad finished first on Mr. Karami’s list with over 90000 votes, while Mr. Sulayman Tony Franjieh, also on the list, won over 75000 votes. Perhaps the most significant message which came out of the elections in the North was the relatively low voter turnout. The North was generally assumed to be the region most enthusiastic towards elections, and both the government and opposition saw it as a test case for future voter participation in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the South. Despite statements from Minister of the Interior Sami al-Khatib that the turnout in the North varied between 65% in Tripoli, 75% in Denniyeh in the Akkar, 20% in Batroun, 26% in Zgharta, and 15% in Bsharreh, figures released by verification committees charged with counting the votes showed a different picture: in Bsharreh for example, the turnout was only 7.5%, while in Tripoli it was about 40%, and in each of the two districts of Batroun and Koura it was no more than 15%. Even according to Mr. Khatib’s figures, at best no more than one in four voters participated in elections in the predominantly Christian regions of the North.

This was significant given the fact that the Christian North had not publicly associated itself with the movement to boycott elections called for in the Christian areas of much of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the South. It is generally assumed that Mr. Karami’s list had official approval,
and included a number of political figures acceptable to Syria. Yet on August 9, Mr. Karami publicly complained that candidates were being imposed on him in the formation of his list, and that he did not have a sufficient margin of maneuver. It was reported that Mr. Karami intended to pull out of the elections, although he later denied it. Analysts noted that the episode probably signaled that Mr. Franjiyyeh, the major Christian candidate on the Karami list, was putting pressure on Mr. Karami to accept an alliance with the Syrians. On the eve of the elections, Stycked on the priority list of the Syrians leaned towards Mr. Franjiyyeh, and that Mr. Karami reacted in the way he Karami after his limited victory did to reestablish the "margin of maneuver" he complained had been taken away from him. Indicating a trend that was repeated elsewhere, two members of the Sunni fundamentalist group al-Jamahir al-Islamiyyah succeeded in breaking the virtual monopoly of the officially-sanctioned list. Shaykh Fathi Yakan won a seat in Tripoli, although there were few overtly religious themes in his campaign: he appeared in his posters wearing layman's clothes, and introduced his name with the title "Doctor" rather than "Shaykh." In Tripoli district, a second Jamah candidate, As'ad Harmoush, also won a seat. Meanwhile, only one candidate was elected from a list headed by Mr. Karami's cousin, Mr. Ahmad Karami, namely Mr. Riyad Sarraf, for the Akkar. In Batroun, the significant event was the withdrawal of Mr. Boutros Harb and Mr. George Sa'adeh from the electoral race. Mr. Harb, who had been minister of education in the previous Karami government, denounced the holding of elections under current conditions, noting that the government "had at no time been able to give a valid and convincing explanation for its stubbornness in holding elections at the present time." Mr. Sa'adeh, who is also the head of the Kata'ib party, and four other Kata'ib candidates had registered their candidacies for elections in the North, but under increasing pressure from within the Christian community, they withdrew on August 14. The Kata'ib decision was an important turning point in bringing about the withdrawal of other candidates elsewhere, especially since the party had been trying in recent months to remodel its image and appear as a national party, rather than as a parochial Christian one. Meanwhile, Mr. Sayid Aql, who won one of the Batroun seats, was expelled from the National Bloc headed by Mr. Raymond Eddeh for having decided to participate in elections. The National Bloc and Mr. Eddeh have repeatedly denounced what they refer to as elections "held in the shadow of occupation by foreign armed forces." According to observers, the voting in the North was characterized by tension between partisans of the various candidates, which led to fights, exchanges of insults, and worse. For example, on election day, a group of journalists from the newspaper al-Diyar were apprehended and beaten by armed men. The journalists accused men loyal to Mr. Omar Karami of having carried out the attack because al-Diyar's owner, Mr. Charles Ayyoub, was a candidate on the rival list of Mr. Ahmad Karami. On August 28, eight unsuccessful candidates called for the formation of a commission of inquiry to look into accusations of electoral fraud. The request came at a time when the debate within political circles centered around the long-awaited formation of a Constitutional Council to "arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections," as stipulated in article 19 of the new Lebanese constitution. The draft law for the establishment of the Council was passed by the government, but has yet to be acted on by parliament. In the interim, arbitration of electoral disputes is to be carried out by a parliamentary commission comprised of members of the new parliament. Critics charge that it is absurd to believe that the new parliamentarians will arbitrate objectively in disputes which may have a bearing on their own political future in the legislature. [-]


All is not well with the Lebanese family. This is seen not only in the falling birth rate—which may not be a bad thing in overpopulated Lebanon—but also in the decline of marriages and a rise in divorce. Accurate statistics are hard to come by, but indications are that the marriage rate has fallen by about a quarter from pre-civil war levels while divorces have risen by about 30%.

Fewer weddings are taking place for many reasons, most of them related to the country's dismal economy. The cost of living is high, jobs are few and wages are low, while housing is expensive and difficult to find. In addition, many young men pursuing their education elsewhere may in the country where they are studying.

A lawyer on the staff of Beirut's Sunni Moslem religious court, which regulates questions of marriage and divorce among the Sunnite community, suggested that marriages registered by his court had fallen by as much as 60% since 1982. A source at the Christian Greek Orthodox religious court in Beirut said that marriages went down by about 25% in the 1980s from levels of the preceding decade.

Between 30 and 40% of Christian marriages are estimated to have ended in divorce, compared with about 10% in 1975, when the civil war began. Records of the Moslem Shite religious court in 1990 showed that there were 3056 marriages and 869 divorces—a divorce rate of 26%. Factors contributing to this increase are poverty and displacement, with many Lebanese forced to live away from home and to practice a profession or trade not of their own.

Many of the divorces amounted to a retreat from marriage when couples found themselves unable to cope with formidable economic pressures. The average family income, according to statistics published by the General Labour Confederation, is about US$110—hardly enough to cover the basic food, shelter and clothing needs of a family of four or five.

The dearth of affordable housing is always a burden for a young couple just starting out. A flat of two or three rooms and two bathrooms is normally rented out at $200-300. Furthermore, many landlords refuse to issue contracts, enabling them to raise rents and evict tenants at will. An option is to buy an apartment—which can cost as much as $150000 to $250000 for three rooms and two bathrooms without hot water, central heating or telephone.

School fees and health care are other burdens. In Beirut, the annual tuition for the elementary grades in well-known private schools is about $2000. Medicines must be imported and therefore are expensive. About 16% of the population is of working age, and there are few and wages are low, while housing is expensive and difficult to find. In addition, many young men pursuing their education elsewhere may in the country where they are studying.

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"We can no longer leave this country, nor can we stay and lead an acceptable life," is a common complaint. Sixteen years of civil war have left the Lebanese family in a bind from which there seems to be no foreseeable deliverance.

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Concerned at the situation in the Occupied Gaza Strip. London: Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly (New York), May 17, 1993. p. 11, 30022. Amnesty International; International Secretariat. Press Release: condemnation of the PLO as a consequence of the deportations, again led the Gaza Strip on 16 May. Fatah -- the main faction of the Palestinian nationalist movement -- made a series of major concessions before the start of talks: hence, for Palestinians alleged to have collaborated with the Israeli authorities, the Madrid process required the Palestinians to begin with increased number of killings of Israeli civilians, as well as of a number of other refugees and rescue workers tried to save them. Still without an official death toll, many bodies were vaporized by the repeated Israeli attacks on the refugees in the UNIFIL camp. Most of the deaths came as Israeli 155mm shells slammed repeatedly into a large mess hall. Many surviving children had multiple amputations.

30021. Alin, Erika G. "West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and the Peace Process", in Journal of Critical Studies of Iran & the Middle East, Fall 1993. pp. 13-34. In 10/1991 direct Arab-Israeli peace talks started for the first time in 40 years, following the years of the Intifadah which brought greater attention onto the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The talks were based on the Palestinian willingness, as the weakest party, to compromise on being represented by the PLO. However, Palestinian opposition to the peace process has been considerable: many Palestinian question whether the present peace process is capable of resulting in a meaningful fulfillment of their nationalist aspirations. Palestinian nationalism has emerged as a consequence of the inability of Arab states to successfully confront Israeli military power. By 1974, the Palestine National Council endorsed the principle that a Palestinian state could exist only within the Occupied Territories. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, in the Occupied Territories, the emergence of a large migratory Palestinian work force undermined the traditional rural sociopolitical order, and led to a radicalized urban nationalism among Palestinians. By the end of the 1970s, this led to the spontaneous emergence of a broad spectrum of local community organizations in the Occupied Territories, including student, youth, professional, volunteer, labor and women's committees. These provided the training ground for independent Palestinian institutional development. By the early 1980s, Palestinians were coming to recognize that the only basis for an independent Palestine would be political compromise with Israel: much of this was rooted in the belief (documented by Abdul Sattar Kassem in 1982) that for much of the Arab world the issue of the Palestinians was unimportant. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the emergence of the Intifadah solidified the Gaza and West Bank Palestinians focus on a political settlement with Israel: just as the invasion limited the ability of the PLO of affect events in the Occupied Territories, the intifadah deepened the growth of independent institutional development. The 1980s saw a sustained effort by West Bank and Gaza intellectuals to both shift the public perception of the PLO towards that of a diplomatic organization, and to shift the willingness of Palestinians to accept a political compromise. While Palestinians were divided as to whether of not the Madrid conference was desirable, in general factions among Palestinians on this question reflected the underlying factions within the Palestinian nationalist movement: in general, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were skeptical about the peace process being able to fulfill their national aspirations. In addition, Palestinian suspicions were reinforced by Israeli unwillingness to slow the pace of new illegal settlements and by Israeli insistence on a very limited form of Palestinian autonomy. The US also gave Israel $10 billion in loan guarantees without requiring Israel to end settlement expansion. The Madrid process required the Palestinians to begin with a whole series of major concessions before the start of talks: hence, for many Palestinians the major effect of the Madrid talks was to call into question the legitimacy and the judgement of the PLO. Further, the mass expulsion of 400 Palestinians during the peace talks, and the Hamas condernation of the PLO as a consequence of the deportations, again led to questioning of the role of the PLO in the talks. Even if the peace process leads to elections, it is clear that the PLO will probably lose in free elections.

30022. Amnesty International; International Secretariat. Press Release: Israel And The Occupied Territories: Amnesty International Extremely Concerned At The Situation In The Occupied Gaza Strip. London: Amnesty International; International Secretariat [1 Easton Street, London WC1X 8DJ, UK], May 27, 1993. Amnesty International is extremely concerned at the deteriorating human rights situation in the Gaza Strip, occupied by Israel since 1967. It is particularly concerned about the upsurge in killings of Palestinian civilians by Israeli forces since the deportation to south Lebanon of more than 400 alleged supporters of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad in 12/1992. Since then, more than 100 Palestinians have been shot and killed by Israeli forces, at least 70 in the Gaza Strip. More than 30 were 16-years-old or younger. The month of May has already registered the highest monthly death toll since the end of 1992, with up to 24 people killed by Israeli forces, up to 19 of these in the Gaza Strip. Amnesty International believes that many of these killings are absolutely unjustifiable, and that some may amount to extra-judicial executions. It calls on the Israeli authorities to take urgent measures to redress this situation and to prevent the death toll at the hands of its forces from rising still further. Amnesty International is also concerned that the use of massive firepower by Israeli forces against dwellings in which Palestinians suspected of having committed serious crimes, such as participation in the killings of Israelis or other Palestinians, are alleged to be hiding in any amount to collective punishment. In May an Amnesty International delegation comprised of a staff member from the International Secretariat and Major Allan Hugstad, an officer in the Danish Army, visited Israel and the Gaza Strip to investigate recent cases of killings by Israeli forces and cases of house destruction. They also discussed the guidelines for the use of firearms and on house destruction operations with Israeli Defence Force (IDF) officials. The delegates also requested information on a number of individual cases. Cases of particular concern are those of people who were shot dead while apparently not engaging in any violent activity. They include: Rana Abu Tuyur, aged 11, killed on 12/19/1992 during clashes in Khan Yunis while on her way to buy milk; Rizq al-Fara, aged 19, shot dead on the same day while standing on his balcony after having gone to help carry Rana Abu Tuyur to a car; Maher al-Maja'idad, aged 8, shot dead in the street in Khan Yunis on 20 March 1993; Re'edah al-Garra, aged 13, shot by a soldier on 4/8/1993 while she was standing by the corner of her house; Najah Abu Dalal, a 34-year-old mother of six who died on 4/26/1993 after being shot in the head on 21 April by a soldier stationed on a tall building nearby while she was standing in a private courtyard; Fu'ad Timraz, aged 20, killed on 5/12/1993 in Deir al-Balah Refugee Camp by a single shot to the head also from a tall building nearby; and Fares al-Kurdi, aged 18 months, shot dead on 5/16/1993 during clashes in Jabalia Refugee Camp while he was sheltering in a shop doorway. The IDF has undertaken to provide Amnesty International with information on these cases. The Amnesty International delegation also visited scenes of houses destroyed by the IDF during operations said to be aimed at capturing Palestinians wanted for arrest. The buildings were massively destroyed and had been rendered uninhabitable. Amnesty International fears that the large number of houses damaged in each operation and the extent of the damage indicates that one of the aims, if not the main aim, of these operations is to impose a form of collective punishment on the inhabitants. This is reinforced by evidence that at least some of the dwellings may have been blown up from the inside after soldiers had completed their search and arrest operations. Amnesty International is awaiting clarification of such evidence from the IDF. Armed Palestinians have been responsible for an increased number of killings of Israeli civilians, as well as a number of Palestinians alleged to have collaborated with the Israeli authorities, since December. Responsibility for some of these attacks has been claimed by armed Palestinian groups, like the killing of two Israeli civilians and two Palestinians while engaged in a business transaction in the Gaza Strip on 16 May. Fatah -- the main faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) -- and Hamas acknowledged joint responsibility for their deaths. Amnesty International condemns such deliberate and arbitrary killings, and appeals to the PLO and Hamas to stop them. [ ]
cultural values, others consider it purely a failure of gender responsibility; i.e., women alone are responsible for this perceived lack of progress.

Literature is art, an expression of natural talent, and has little to do with whether one is a man or woman.

The concept of "feminism," for example, is now part of our global dictionary, its meaning and interpretation both applauded and decried. In modern literary criticism, another relatively new concept has appeared: "so-called" women's or feminist literature. With many definitions and appearances in numerous critical reviews, this issue continues to attract controversy.

I use the term "so-called" women's literature because there has never been any clear-cut definition of Arab women's literature. Most Arab critics, men, define it with vague, non-descriptive terms. Yet they all seem to agree that it is written by women, or deals with women's issues including emancipation, oppression, and denial of basic rights. However, some of these critics' pronouncements should be weighted with care since they seem strangely unaware of the extent to which their male prejudices taint their appreciation of the writings of women.

The view that male dominance in highly traditional Arab culture is primarily responsible for the slow growth of women's literature holds great sway at first glance. To a large extent, such potent obstacles to self-expression among women did influence women's writing and imposed considerable restrictions on women's freedom within the framework of the extended family.

The wider Arab society holds its own views on such issues. Living under the inhibiting restrictions of an earlier age, women did not have an adequate opportunity to share in the benefits accrued from the inevitable socio-economic changes that have occurred in different parts of the Arab world.

Such a lifestyle may well have harbored the spirit of change, but at the same time, it undoubtedly goaded women into raising their voices against the rigidity of the social structure and fueled their demands for greater social freedom. Numerous Arab women writers have criticized the position of women in the Arab world. The position of woman, they claimed, has become unbearable, particularly in regard to such matters as education; virginity and marriage; the concept of honor and dignity; and individual freedom, all of which are weighed on unbalanced scales. They called for a rethinking of men's relationships with every form of male authority - husbands, fathers, brothers and sons - and for the creation of a new understanding between men and women in our society.

The voice of women was first heard in the latter part of the 19th century with the appearance of essays, stories, poetry and articles on "women's issues" in various magazines and newspapers in certain parts of the Arab world. Writers of note during this period were: Wardah al-Yazji (1850-1914), Azynab Fawwaz (1850-1914), Labibah Hashim (1882-1952), Saima Sayegh (1889-1953), and Hana Kaslani Kurani (1870-1898). These women paved the way for the next generation of women writers, allowing their successors to take part in the development of the women's literary movement.

It should be noted that journalism played an important role in popularizing these women. Since the early part of this century, other women writers have emerged, displaying even greater resolve and courage in raising and discussing women's issues. Among these authors were Bahithat al-Badiyah (1886-1918) and Mayy Ziyadah (1886-1941).

The articles of al-Badiyah began to appear in Al-Jaridah newspaper in Cairo as early as 1907. In 1911, she published her most widely known book, entitled "Nisa'iyat" (Feminist Essays), a collection of several articles about prominent women in the Middle East. Her work is regarded by many as a landmark in Arab literature.

Ziyadah in particular admired the book, and as a result, wrote a critical study of the life and works of al-Badiyah. In her personal letters to al-Badiyah, Ziyadah gave encouragement and support to al-Badiyah's defense of women's rights. In one of her letters she writes:

"The days pass and we [women] are still in an unspeakable state of confusion. Man struggles in an economic war, he busies himself with many undertakings. When he wants to write literature, he does not reach the level of women's sentiments, for he writes from the viewpoint of his egotistic thinking and hardheartedness, whereas the woman enlivens her mind, emotions and passions."

She then calls upon al-Badiyah to combine her efforts with those of others in attempting to rescue this generation from "perplexity and hesitation," and asks her to help liberate women by making them aware of their social responsibilities.

The writings of Ziyadah, herself, during this period are considered to be an important contribution to women's literature because of their ringing endorsement of the emancipation of women.

Born in Nazareth of a Lebanese father and Palestinian mother in 1866, she lived for some time in Cairo. Then in 1914, at the age of 28, her home became a literary salon. Some of the most prominent writers of the time, including Taha Hussein, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq, Mansur Fahmi, Khalil Mutran and others, were frequent visitors to her salon.

Ziyadah had great influence on the literary life of the times due to her charm and intelligence and her charismatic personality. Her articles were in such demand by the readers of the Egyptian Al-Ahram daily newspaper that they dominated its front pages.

She is the author of a number of books that include "Equality," in which she calls for a society based on equality and justice with the full participation of women.

Ziyadah personified the cause of the Arab woman, analyzing the various significant factors in their lives, such as rights and obligations. Her major emphasis is given to the biological and social problems related to the nature of women. In a letter to the renowned Lebanese writer Khalil Gibran, she wrote:

"I basically share with you some opinions about women's liberation. Like many, a woman should have her own choice of spouse from among young people, according to her own desire and taste and without coercion from any quarter."

Her understanding of the role of women appears more clearly in a letter to the writer Lutfi al-Sayyid concerning the memorial ceremony on the 40th day after the death of Fathi Zaghul Pasha. In this letter she blames him for not extending invitations to women:

"It is strange that you did not invite women to such an important meeting, which might have a great impact on their way of life, open their minds to the importance of education, and teach them about the greatness of their fatherland and its noble personalities, whereas you do allow them to frequent the opera house."

The women writers of this era wrote in a number of literary forms: articles, essays, anthologies of poetry, and short stories. The output of short stories and novels was not abundant. It appears that most women writers of that day thought it best to deal with specific non-fictional subjects, concentrating mainly on educational and moral issues and confining themselves to traditional social commentary, for which fiction is not the best medium.

Up to the end of WWII, most works by Arab women were dominated by the sad and melancholy characteristics which reflected women's feelings within the context of their subjugation to the prevailing traditional, civic and religious codes. But paradoxically enough, female writers at the time displayed a genuine respect for tradition, coupled with a respect for emancipation.

Such issues are reflected in the work of Widad Sakakini, "Peoples Mirrors," written in Cairo in 1947. Sakakini was a writer who, through her stories, analyzed social events essentially from a feminist standpoint. She may be regarded as a defender of women's rights, but not a strenuous one. The majority of women writers focused mainly on the emotional aspects of women's problems. They did not discuss in depth any other matters related to an individual woman's political, social, or intellectual aspirations, nor did they advocate any real fundamental changes in her life.

Above all, writers such as Ziyadah, Bahithat, al-Badiyah, and Fawwaz seemed to be very much aware of the obstacles they had to overcome and the struggle they had been forced to wage in their attempts to assert the needs and rights of women. These obstacles include social and religious pressures, as well as women's economic and political powerlessness. All these matters were further complicated by the long and hated domination of the Ottoman empire and later by the unsettling
effect of Western imperialism. Imperialism oppressed many parts of the Arab world and its removal demanded continued struggle. It directly dominated the men, and as Qasim Amin states in his 1980 book, "Women's Liberation: In the East, we find the woman is in man's bondage and the man is in the government's bondage."

"When the women enjoy their personal freedom, the men enjoy their political freedom. The two cases are well-interwoven."

At the same time, Amin stresses that men has monopolized all rights, leaving nothing for the woman but what the master throws to his animal. The woman has been separated from the means of production and left without any economic independence. Amin goes further and draws a parallel between the woman's condition of lagging behind and the dominance of despotic and military regimes.

The spread and influence of imperialism throughout the Arab world preoccupied the people of the Middle East, both in their resistance to its influence and in their struggle for respective freedoms. It led the way to national revolutions in Egypt, Algeria and Palestine. In turn, these countries witnessed national independence heralding dramatic changes of a political, social and economic nature.

The women's literary movement drew momentum from this radicalization of their environment, and drew space under the impact of Western culture and the development of certain social and educational institutions. It thereby became possible for women to wield greater influence in many parts of the Arab world.

Certain Arab countries succeeded in gaining their sovereignty while others experienced a new form of occupation. Lebanon nurtured a new intellectual openness, while the Revolution of 1952 in Egypt generated radical social change, whose influence was felt not only in Egypt but also in the surrounding Arab countries. The principles and events of these two national movements, among others, affected the hearts and minds of the inhabitants, especially women.

Palestine, with its particularly rich literary past, was to know foreign invasion and military occupation. The calamity of Israel's establishment in 1948 carried great impact upon all aspects of national and cultural life, sweeping up in its wake the struggle of women and giving fresh material to a new generation of writers.

During the late '40s and into the '50s, many women writers appeared in the Arab world. One of them was the Lebanese writer Layla Ba'albaki, author of "I Live" and "A spaceship of Tenderness to the degradation experienced by the Muslim poor. As the Phalangists seized apartment blocks of the Lebanon's wealthy, lies the poverty and degradation experienced by the Muslim poor. As the Phalangists seized Karantina, more than two hundred civilians were massacred. Among those who witnessed the cold-blooded murder of the Muslims, were Martin Meredith and Donald McCullin of The Sunday Times. Donald McCullin recalls: "The first killing I saw I took for a random event. I was running through the alleys with the Phalange forward line. Two men came out of a house with their women and children. The women and kids were driven away. I ran after them to photograph and as I came back I saw the two men falling. They had been shot at point-blank range. "Then in the centre of the ghetto, I saw a man shot in front of a wrecked bus. He was middle-aged, obviously a civilian. I shot the man lying face-down beside the dead, middle-aged man. I took them to be husband and wife—they were close together, and had a few possessions scattered around them. Someone had set the woman's clothes on fire. I began to assume this was part of a pattern." The following day McCullin returned to Karantina, and his eye-witness account resumes: "As soon as we got into the area, we saw bodies everywhere. Not only men had been massacred, but women as well—though no children as far as I saw. There were bodies hanging half-out of windows, or in the middle of the street. There was a man lying beside his dog, who had been shot with him. "In the eleven years I have been covering wars I have never seen so much human carnage. I suppose Martin and I must have seen seventy bodies. And we did not look into houses, or everywhere they could have been."
of Arabic language and literature at Duke university, and author of War's Other Voices: Lebanese Civil War 1975-82. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press (forthcoming) She has written various articles and hooks on modern Arabic literature and feminist literary criticism, and is currently working with Margot sadran on an anthology of Arab womens writings Of the 19th and 20th centuries.] The War is one of the most important things in my life. It can't really be called writing. I found myself looking through a small, very filled with a stream of the omnipresent, extra-ordinary events. I was wrenched out of the mouth of a kalashnikov provided at once the subject and the endless flow of danger. There was no space could provide shelter against the ubiquity of danger. There was no longer any difference between the experiences of the home and the street. Private and public merged; more, they were wrenched into each other. This war has been variously described as economic, religious, political, civil and international. Economic because of the rapidly growing poverty belt of refugees from the Israeli-threatened South which was tightening its hold on the bourgeois centre of power. Religious because of widespread dissatisfaction amongst the various religious communities that proportional representation along confessionals lines was no longer equitable. Political because it represented a power struggle amongst communities or groups defined not as religious but as political units, e.g., Nasserist, Nationalist Socialist, Ba'hist. Civil because it was a crisis of tensions that generally embroiled the citizenry of the whole of Lebanon. International because it pitted Lebanese against Palestinians, and also engaged in perpetual conflict dozens of local militias who were supported by religious, political, or economic powers. 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The Beirut Decentrists described a 'situation' for which all were answerable, yet most—and particularly the men—resolutely rejected responsibility. In the literature of the Beirut Decentrists, the women stay in Lebanon and wait without a clear sense of why. The men fly to Paris, London and the Gulf states rattling off fine sounding excuses, or they stay to fight themselves irrationally into a war of gangfights. The issue of responsibility did not become central until the end of the 1970s when a protracted period of relative peace allowed the writers to venture assessments of behaviour. The Beirut Decentrists criticised those who left Lebanon in its time of need. Many also hinted at a radical transformation in identity. They described those who had left as having forfeited their right to belong. In all pre-1975 writings that deal with the question of emigration, it is axiomatic that whereas the men were expected to leave for a while, make good and then return to brighten the twilight years of aged parents and to conjure up images of dolce vita in the dreams of potential village brides, the women, especially rural women, were expected to wait. They were condemned to live in the shadow of tradition, excluded from the world of change that was Beirut, identified in the minds of many with the mahjar or lands of emigration. Should they decide to defy convention and follow the men, even if only to Beirut, they became outcasts. With the advance of the twentieth century, writers began to investigate the gulf between Beirut and the village, between modern and traditional life, between expected behaviour for men and for women. Were such dichotomies still possible? Or was it an evolving beyond the war that would make the unchanging reification of an idealised past? If change was to be introduced, how much could be accommodated? How? How quickly? Did any modification of the status quo threaten the villagers' identity? With the war, writers could no longer indulge in the luxury of idle reflection. The war, and all the change that it necessarily connoted, forced itself into the villagers' consciousness. Emily Nasrallah, a Decentrist whose entire oeuvre from 1982 until today, focuses on this dichotomy between modern and traditional, between Beirut and the Lebanese village, between men and women, has dramatised the incursion of the war onto village life. Radwan, the protagonist of her 1981 novel Flight Against Time, describes the latest air raid: '... the Israeli planes used burning bombs they called "napalm" and then "cluster" bombs.' [Flight Against Time (Ali-Qua aks al-zaman), Beirut, Muassasat Naufal 1981, p. 43. Hereafter, all page references will be included in the essay.] Later, he sees three planes swoop down on a village protected by four other planes that 'formed an air shield (that was a term he had heard on the radio: air shield). That was how they had bombarded Naha-al-Hasban (p. 56). The experiences in the village and those in Beirut became war experiences and survival became the key. The illiterate villager was sharing the fate of the sophisticated Beirut. As these two poles began to approach each other, attitudes to emigration began to change. Writers were no longer concerned with the female villagers' move to Beirut, but with the Lebanese citizens' move to the mahjar. The writings of the Decentrists epitomise the changing attitude of those who stayed in Lebanon vis-a-vis those who left. At first, when the violence was intense and peace was still being discussed as a not too distant prospect, there was little opprobrium attached to those who left for Europe or the Gulf. Those who stayed—mostly women and children (In the section on Lebanese womenmen, Rose Ghurayib writes that by 1980, 35% of
Lebanese households were headed by women; this is especially striking in an Arab country, Robin Morgan (ed.) Sisterhood Is Global, New York: Anchor Books, 1984, p. 418—stayed out of necessity or out of some dimly perceived notion of responsibility to others or to the country. However, as the violence persisted beyond all predictions of its ending and not all who stayed were killed or even injured, a new assessment emerged; those who left before and during the war no longer had a right to belong. All Lebanese had to stay in Lebanon to assure the survival of the country and of individual identity. Whereas most of the Beirut Decentrists’ literature published before 1979 merely hints at women’s steadfastness and men’s cowardly vacillation, by 1982 male protagonists had become explicit targets of the Beirut Decentrists’ bitterness. There is anger in this writing, but also a strange exaltation. Men who had always been the dominant class, to whom obedience had been an unquestioned duty, had proven themselves weak and unworthy. When the protagonist of Umayya Hamdan’s The Blue That Comes With The Wind (1980), challenges all who threaten her freedom of action, her male interlocutor complains: “You’re a woman and I’m an oriental man…. Deep in you are voices whose escape I fear.” [Umayya Hamdan, The Blue That Comes With The Wind (Al-azraq al-adim maa al-rih), Beirut 1980, p. 156.] As the patriarchal structure was falling apart, as the country was collapsing, women were finding a voice. The Beirut Decentrists recall the women writers on the First World War about whom Sandra Gilbert has written: “even though they mourned the devastation of the war . . . [they] felt that not only their society, but also their art had been subtly strengthened, or at least strangely inspired, by the deaths and defeats of male contemporaries.” [Sandra Gilbert, ‘Soldiers heart: literary, literary women, and the Great War’, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, VIII(3), Spring 1983, p. 446; see also p. 426.] Only in the Lebanese case, the men had not died nor had they been defeated. Decentrists like Nuha Samara describe men who had left the war zone for international capitals. From safe new homes, the men sent back tender letters, exhorting their wives to pray for peace so that they might return. [Nuha Samara, ’Two Faces One Woman’, in The Tables Lived Longer than Amin, Beirut: Manshurah Zuhair Balabak 1981, p. 112.] How could such an attitude foster gold star mother jingoism? [=]

30026. Cooke, Miriam. Women Write War: The Centering of the Beirut Decentrists: Part 2. Papers on Lebanon 6, Oxford, UK: Center for Lebanese Studies, July 1987. Then came the Israeli invasion. Within the space of a summer, dreams of renewal, models of patriotism were challenged. The war persisted but international intervention was no longer disguised. As Lebanon teetered on the edge of collapse, opportunism became rampant assuming an increasingly confessional aspect. Shi’as encouraged by Shi’i triumphs elsewhere mobilised. The relatively small though influential Druze community emphasised the construction of a new entity defined by the civil war context. The nature of Lebanese society was changing. This axiomatic mosaic was Lebanese females stayed, awaiting the return of their menfolk. From Schweifat she went on to earn her B.A. from the American University of Beirut. Throughout her university career she worked, writing articles and short stories for papers and journals to earn her keep. Her life was to be a model, an affirmation of a life for women beyond the narrow confines of traditional village life. In the meantime, however, she suffered the loneliness of the village girl in the big city and writing became her solace for absence. Writing became a passion. Her early writings, which include September Birds (1962) and The Oleander Tree (1968), reflect the concerns of Arab women writers of the 1950s and 1960s. Like Layla Ba’albaki and Colette Khuri, who wrote of the prison-house of domesticity and the stifling of women’s individuality within patriarchy. What was unique in the writings of Emily Nasrallah was her preoccupation with emigration. In 1962, Nasrallah published her first novel, September Birds, which won her acclaim at home and in the Arab world at large. This autobiographical novel recounts the story of Muna the village girl who witnesses the fates of her companions of the boys who leave, of the girls who stay, and of the boy who stays in the village and grows up to new situation impose a new role on the writer? A new function for writing? Before 1982, the Beirut Decentrists had consciously fragmented and subverted language so as to start anew. The fragmentation was for the construction of a new entity defined by the civil war context. The language available for the post-1982 writer was, therefore, either the language of the creatively fragmented wartime experience, or the language of the unfragmented remembrance of a pre-1973 Lebanon that had been consumed by the war. Writing, as in other novels, had to borrow from one of these two languages, for as Barthes writes in Language Degree Zero ‘Revolution must of necessity borrow from what it wants to destroy, the very image of what it wants to possess.’ [Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, tr. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith, NY: Hill 8: Wang 1978, p. 87. Hereafter, all page references will be included in the essay.] Writing, therefore, was resisted. Writing was also resisted because as a discursive project it was not so much a communication as the expression of history and the stand we take in it” (Barthes, p. i). How could the writer express a stand in a totally incomprehensible history? Events were so fluid that the role of witness gave way to that of ‘incarnation of tragic awareness.’ (Barthes, p. 3). Writers had to communicate awareness not facts. But how could the writer communicate when writing resisted communication? The instrumentality of communication had to be questioned. The Beirut Decentrists chronicled the Lebanese war from its inception and in some cases, such as Ghada al-Sammun’s Beirut 75 (Dar al-Afaq al-Jadida, 1975) and Etel Adnan’s ‘In the Heart of the Heart of Another Country’ (1973), they anticipated it. Their marginality to society and to literary canon gave them the perspective of the other. Exclusion gave them a holistic, if peripheral, vision that the exclusors had lost when they set themselves up as the all-important self, or centre. The writings of the Decentrists trace a thread of normality that links the usual accounts of violence and explosions. Writing allowed these women to perceive a routine that did not deny the war but rather pinpointed a new logic, the logic of the bullets. This logic undermined previously unquestioned modes of behaviour and allowed for the emergence of a new Weltanschauung, a new social order and civic structure. [=]
have the sensibilities of a girl [September Birds (Tuyur Ailul), Beirut: Mu'assasat Naufal 1980, pp. 180-189. Hereafter all page references will be included in the essay.]—and who rejects her traditionally sanctioned role. The tone is not angry but sad: like the migrating birds of September, she had left, but, unlike these birds, response to this instinct made her an anomaly in a society that excised the anomalous. During the thirteen years that intervened between the appearance of this first work and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Nasrallah wrote two novels, The Oleander Tree (1968) and The Pawn (1974), two collections of short stories, Island of Illusion (1973) and The Source (1978). Two children's books, Bahira (1977) and Little Shadi (1977), were published after the beginning of the civil war. In each work Nasrallah struggles with the conflicting values of her society that was at once modern (male) and traditional, even feudal (female). In Nasrallah's works the women were responding to the perceived mandate to be passive and the challenge to change. Some protested quietly, like the heroine of The Oleander Tree who ran away with the man she was supposed to marry but did not love and who then committed suicide. Some protested dramatically, like Muna in September Birds who left the village for Beirut. The latter were described as 'escaping' even if their departure was against their will. They were escaping the physical location but also their numbed condition of passivity. The violence they thus committed on village mores exacted a toll—ostracism.

A woman who chose a man's path might as well have died, and her return, if she dared risk it, would be greeted if not with hostility then at least with coldness. Return was impossible, rejection complete: 'the village had rejected me the minute I left it to sink my feet into another soil' (p. 244). Such was Nasrallah's portrayal of Lebanese society on the eve of the war. It was a two-tiered entity neatly divided geographically and demographically [On the eve of the civil war 50% of the population was in Beirut;] between modern Beirut and traditional, rural Lebanon. The gap between the two was being perceived. A first step: but the bridging was not yet conceivable. Then on 4/13/1975 tensions that had been simmering because—like the emigres—they preferred the cold north to the fire of Beirut.

The gap from the emigres. It changed expectations, but not reality. Demographically [On the eve of the civil war 50% of the population was in Beirut; was no longer even an option. The only options day, Farid challenges Lison to jump off a very high rock. No one thinks leaving for ever. However, after 1975 Nasrallah no longer describes the staying as passive, but as having been transformed by survival to wonderful moment he feels himself fly, only to crash into the reality of his physical limits. His friends are amazed, but they do nothing to help him: 'Lison recovered from his crash and looked around. No one. Neither the friends nor their leader. Gone.... He got up and continued rising not on his
own imaginary wings but on the hands of a giant will that had taken on the wager, challenged death and been victorious.’ (p. 114) - He gives no thought to the fact that his survival was clearly a miracle, and that another time he may not be so lucky.

In They Are Deceiving the Birds, Nasrallah again satirises the Lebanese who, like birds in large cages, think they are free. The female protagonist exposes the charade: for her the delusion of freedom is worse than the certainty of restriction. She sees through all such foolhardiness concern that the story correspond to their needs and expectations. In their own imaginary wings but on the hands of a giant will that had taken on the wager, challenged death and been victorious. The narrator recognises the futility of convincing her children of the importance of the communication for its own sake. She sets off in search of a better, i.e. more passive, audience. She chooses a neighbour. But this neighbour also has demands: “Who’s the story about?”, “Who told it to you?” (p. 175). When she learns that it is a ‘true’ story—a personal witness—she is not convinced that such a story is really a story. In their eyes the new occupiers of the story remind them of the story in which their needs and desires are undressed and urban love and support of homeland. ‘Life Twice’, ‘In Search of Randa’, ‘The Last Chapter’ are all stories that describe women’s steadfastness. The protagonist of ‘The Last Chapter’ is only Lebanese by marriage, yet she insists on staying even after her Lebanese husband had left. Another woman protagonist says: ‘We had revived from the debris. This “we” means the residue of the city who remained, those who did not emigrate despite all the real and imaginary reasons . . . those whose houses, offices and shops were destroyed and returned to repair or rebuild.’ Nasrallah, The Lost Mill (Al-la-huna al-da’a), Beirut: Mu’assasat Naufal 1985, p. 256. Future page references will be in the essay.] These women protagonists stay but they also advocate action. In The Wolf’s Throat, Nasrallah writes of a wolf that continually attacks a village. After one attack, the villagers gather to discuss what is to be done. The women remonstrate: ‘You’re wasting time talking. Tell us what to do.’ As in Dawn the women know that the storm seems more violent when we stand on the look-out tower. But when we confront it, it dissipates’ (p. 131). Although the recommended action is tied to superstition—the exhibition of a pair of old wolf-jaws—it is action. Theory becomes practice when Faris sets out at dawn with the jaws over one shoulder and a rifle slung over the other, and the ‘screams of the weak oppressed, the victims of the wolves’ aggression generation after generation roaring in his ears’ (p. 135). There is action, but there is alienation also. In A House That Doesn’t Belong To Her, the protagonist has lost her house to a bomb and is living in a friend’s furnished apartment. The symbol of her alienation is the key. Every time she tries to open the door her fingers automatically pick the wrong key, the one to her old house. Every time she is reassured by its familiar shape. She slips it into the keyhole, but then cannot move it. Every time she experiences the shock of separation as that which she had deluded herself to be hers is discovered to be another's. Although she lives alone, the house is peopled with objects that acquire life the moment she crosses the threshold. Photographs, whose innocent smiles have turned into ‘angry sharqafe’, glare at her accusingly, constantly repeating what she already knows: she does not belong. Apologetically, she retreats from the accusing stares. [Compare with Ghada al-Samman’s novel on the war Beirut Nightmares (Kawabls Bairut), Beirut: Manshurat Mu’assasat Naufal 1985, p. 256. Future page references will be in the policeman asks her if the story is true, to which she replies: ‘I don’t know the truth. ‘Which truth? The first or the second? The girl told me that the truth was different . . .’ ‘But the girl wasn’t with you when you were in the street: “Right. “So there was no witness.” ‘To what?” ‘To the truth. So you must be cross-examined under oath.’ ‘Officer, you’ve got to hear the story. I’ve added absolutely nothing to it: “Tomorrow in the courthouse you’ll tell it right from the beginning.” (p. 180) The only kind of story she can tell is one that others demand: the story of the witness in the dock. But what is this story that she so wants to tell? Is it true? Is it fictive? Is it literal? Is it oral? Is its purpose to communicate certain facts? Or does it have another function? To speak the hikaya of the war, the narrator must take others into consideration and engage the expectations of collective remembrance so as to be heard. She wants to speak her story, because the fictional reader as audience cannot satisfy her need for aggregation. Yet, when she has corralled a potential audience she refuses to release the reins of authorial control. She wants orality on her own terms. She rejects the conditions that others make because she needs to impose herself as only the written text can. Her story is to be what Ong calls ‘autonomous’ discourse that is context-free and not subject to question. She wants to tell her story, separated from its ‘living moment’. She refuses to be answerable for any of it. [Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word, London & NY: Methuen 1982, pp. 35, 78 and 82.] She is forced to writing. In A Simple Equation, the narrator tries to delude herself that writing and speech are interchangeable so that writing may be regarded as the execution of the intention to speak. The narrator wants to tell a widow the true story of her husband’s murder. When her courage fails, she writes the story down. Yes, she knows that writing is not the second element of an equation whose first part is speech. Writing is an independent form of discourse that hardens language and assumes a role for the writer. What of the writer who has not defined her role? She must speak so as to maintain the momentum of disorder.

She must speak, and to preclude rejoinders, she must write. Yet she can do neither. Her’s an oral text that happens to be written. Rejecting normal modes of communication, she searches for a language that will play on the edge of silence. In The Window, Rana, who is as old as the war, has lost her faculty of speech. One morning, the family awakens in the shelter and finds a window. A miracle. They are no longer holed up underground. However, they soon realise that Rana has painted it. She has tried to turn that subterranean cell into a balcony on the communication is suspended in favour of speculations about its nature. She must speak, and to preclude rejoinders, she must write. Yet she can do neither. Her’s an oral text that happens to be written. Rejecting normal modes of communication, she searches for a language that will play on the edge of silence. In The Window, Rana, who is as old as the war, has lost her faculty of speech. One morning, the family awakens in the shelter and finds a window. A miracle. They are no longer holed up underground. However, they soon realise that Rana has painted it. She has tried to turn that subterranean cell into a balcony on the edge of silence. In The Window, Rana, who is as old as the war, has lost her faculty of speech. One morning, the family awakens in the shelter and finds a window. A miracle. They are no longer holed up underground. However, they soon realise that Rana has painted it. She has tried to turn that subterranean cell into a balcony on

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30028. Cooke, Miriam. Women Write War: The Centering of the Beirut Decentrist: Part 4. Papers on Lebanon 6. Oxford, UK: Center for Lebanese Studies, July 1987. These women protagonists constantly affirm the need to belong as also the need for and the difficulty of communication. The narrator of A True Story is searching for an audience for a story she wishes to tell. Although there are many words in Arabic for story, the one that Nasrallah uses is hikaya, or narration as a spoken event. The narrator takes her story to her son and then to her daughter. But before they agree to listen, they ask: “Is it a true story”, “What do you consider the truth to be?” (pp. 173 and 174).
The action is in front of her, the only member of the audience. She assumes that the actors are acting for her since there is no one else present. Yet the masked players, who do not speak but only shout, ‘seem oblivious’ of her presence. Her role as audience/interlocutor is being ignored. Like the potential interlocutors in A True Story, she loses interest and wishes to leave. But it is not so simple. The ‘theatre’ has no exit; she has to stay, compelled to passive observation. She is trapped! Then, one of the players raises his mask. How long has she been there? ‘Since the curtain went up.’ Briefly, the line between stage and audience, between fiction and fact is sketched. So, she is in a real theatre. ‘What did you see?’ he asks. ‘What I see now.’ ‘What did you understand?’ She is relieved: maybe the anonymous masked players were just shouting and there was nothing more to understand? However, her relief is short-lived since she had understood nothing, why had she stayed? There were no exits. He pulls down his mask, plunging her back into her confusion and frustration. Her illusions of communication and understanding—that the shouts were shouts—are quickly shattered (pp. 197-198). Next, a woman separates herself from the human mass. How, she asks herself, did she know that it was a woman? From the voice. Yes, it was a wounding voice erupting out of the depths of creation and fluttering off into space spreading fear and pain. ‘She’s weeping for her son.’ A voice from nowhere reaches me. (p. 198) The woman’s voice is distinctive. Even if it does not utter words, it imparts meaning by creating spontaneous empathy. The father, (inexplicably recognised as such) joins the mother and they scream together. At this point, when the parents melt into a single scream, the narrator feels the foggy barriers surrounding her understanding, dissipate. She begins to weep, to share the feelings of those people with whom she could not otherwise communicate. To communicate is not necessarily to speak, nor is it to write, but to feel and thus to belong. However, at that moment of identification with a grief, the same disembodied voice tells her that she is not like the rest of the players, his mother. The protagonist insists: ‘But I am his mother!’ (p. 199). The voice answers: ‘Your tears are outside the theatre. Remember, you’re the audience.’ ‘But I’m the participating audience.’ I was delighted with my courage. The voice was silent, or maybe it had let me to watch the scenes. Then I saw the mother’s shape separate for the second, third, and fourth time. Then that recurrent mother began to form a wide circle, and the others became a dot to that circle. All of them are his mother (p. 200). The symbiosis of dot and circles, of mother and mothers, is assured through the maintenance of the Scream. The story ends when one of the mothers approaches the narrator with arms like ‘ropes of unearthly light’ outstretched, beckoning her on to the stage. The narrator is about to react, when the mother turns into a huge tree. The voice explains that the mother has ‘taken root in the soil’ (p. 203). It is as mother that she unites with the soil. When the voice leaves, the narrator realises that she is in the ‘theatre’ become forest. All of the mothers have become trees whose roots strive to reach down to the ‘living principle’ (p. 204).

This ending, the transformation of a mother into a tree, recalls the feminisation of society evoked in Those Memories and Flight Against Time. All Of Them Are His Mother confirms and extends the feminisation of Lebanon’s future. All who wish to consider themselves Lebanese must stay in Lebanon and become organically part of its regenerative soil. But who can plant such roots? Mothers. It is no longer enough to be a woman, or to act as one, to be a citizen of post-invasion Lebanon. With the invasion, writers acquired a new task. They had to learn to communicate outside the usual, now obsolete channels. Words as signifiers had lost their force in a society that refused to listen. A new language had to be found so that ear, eye, intellect and heart might be simultaneously engaged: ‘According to Steiner, language ‘shares, it mediates between, the crucial antinomies of inner and outer, subject and object, past and future, private and public. Language is far more than communication between speakers. It is the dynamic mediation between those poles of cognition which give human experience its underlying dual and dialectical form.’ George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Trans/ation, Oxford: OUP 1975, p. 83.’ In her seminal essay, ‘Maternal thinking’, Ruddick suggests a new language derived from what she calls maternal thinking. ‘... Maternal thought identifies priorities, attitudes, and virtues it conceives of achievement. Many women and some men express maternal thinking in various kinds of working and caring with others.’ [Sara Ruddick, ‘Maternal thinking’, in Joyce Trabant (ed.), lothering. Essay.s in Feminist Theory, Totowa: Roman and Allenan 1984, pp. 214 and 225.] Ruddick has identified three elements that characterise maternal thinking: the concern for the child’s preservation, growth and acceptability. In transposing these concerns to the Lebanese context, a revision of categories becomes possible. With the benefit of hindsight, it will become evident that Nasrallah, as well as others of the Beirut Decentrists, early in the war were already beginning to demonstrate a maternal attachment to Lebanon which they came to consider a child, sick and in need. As the fabric of society came unravelled, and particularly in the aftermath of the invasion, what Ruddick calls ‘preservative love’, which is not a feeling but rather ‘an activity of caring or treasuring creatures whose well-being is at risk’ [Ruddick, ‘Preservative love and military destruction: some reflections on mothering and peace’, in Trabant, Mothering, p. 240.] became dominant. It is in connection with the Beirut Decentrists’ dramatisation of the sniper that the last of the three characteristics of maternal thinking may be identified. With the eye of a mother, women protagonists describe snipers that are children and not anonymous personifications of impersonal war machines. [e.g. Daisy al- Amir, In the Vortex of Love and Hate (Fadwooinat al-kubb wa 1karahlya), Beirut: Dar al-Auda n.d. (1979), pp. 69-74. Hanan al-Shleich, Hikaiyat Zahra, Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li ’I-Nashr 1988, p. 144 (English transl., The Story of Zahra, London: Quartet Books 1986). Lina Makdidi Tabbaraba, Survival in Beirut, London: Onyx 1978, p. 37. See Miriam Cooke, War’s Other Voices. Women Writers on the Lebanese Civil War (forthcoming).] The recognition by the women protagonists of the child in the sniper gives a measure of parental power and authority over a usually abstracted element of the war. By extension from this synecdoche, women protagonists who have arrogated to themselves the role of mother to the child sniper can thus be said to have a measure of power and authority over the war itself, and over Lebanon, the sick child. The voice that Nasrallah’s and the Beirut Decentrists’ female protagonists had acquired by the eve of the Israeli invasion is not listed in the political chaos of the 1980s. In The Lost Mill it is extended and allows for a revision of behaviour in the 1975-82 period in radical feminist terms. The war has generated new values that transform what had previously been female passive into Lebanese active. In the feminisation of a collapsing society, maternal thinking, which puts the survival of the whole the child/Lebanon— before the survival of the self, becomes an answer to the chaos of language and communication. [–]


Arab Women’s Council

Activities: Registrant arranged a media tour, which included several interviews and appearances by members of the foreign principal, to communicate information to the American public that the principal is seeking peace and the cessation of bloodshed in Lebanon.

Finances: $332309 for the five month period ending 11/10/1982.
The current situation differed from what it was a year ago. She said she more than 400 Palestinians to Lebanon in 12/1993. There was real progress at the negotiating table and there was hope that with Security Council resolution 799 (1992) regarding the expulsion of misery and an increase in the suffering on the round. On the other hand, with the national and human rights of the Palestinian people as it had done frustrated over the lack of results in the peace talks, compounded by States had manoeuvred to sidestep the international resolutions that dealt Chazan, member of the Israeli Knesset, said there was a growing Israel an edge over all Arab States combined. Moreover, the United Center, Vienna, 8/23-24/1993. DPR, August 24, 1993. (24) Mrs. Naomi goals and had offered it great support in arms and equipment, giving Palestine: The Current Situation: Mrs. Naomi Chazan. Held in Austria 85. The United States had employed great efforts to fulfill Israel's interests and that of Israel. 30033. DPR. Tenth United Nations International NGO Meeting On The Threatening of holy shrines had continued unabated. by key government sectors, non-governmental organizations, other uprooting of trees, arrest and torture of thousands, expulsions and strengthening country programming process, entailing more participation no avail. Instead land confiscation, plundering and usurpation of homes, put children first. The regional office had encouraged an adaptive but to all States, the United Nations and human rights institutions, all was to opportunity for regional development and for a renewed commitment to all methods of struggle and had appealed through statements and protests (27) She went on to say that Israelis had realized that if Israel truly wanted to achieve peace, it had to talk to the PLO and that its best negotiator partner was the PLO. They had also come to realize that the closure of the territories had institutionalized the green line and had contributed to the lack of security of many Israelis. However, Israelis continued to be very fearful because they lived with a daily fear of violence. That threat and the frustration about the negotiations created a climate for the activities of extremists. (28) The past year had demonstrated for the Israelis that they could adjust well to changes which they had feared in the past. The challenge for the Government was to combat extremism while carrying public opinion along. The most critical factor was that the current Israeli Government had come into office with a totally different concept of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The current Government would pursue peace based on the end of the occupation of the Palestinian territories. (29) The two outstanding issues were the status of Jerusalem during the interim phase and the composition of the Palestinian delegation. At this juncture, it was possible to move ahead quickly. It was possible for Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate directly, possibly leaving the United States behind. Three processes could occur simultaneously: an amelioration of conditions on the round, a formal negotiating process and a final peace agreement. People on all sides were probably going to have to give up more than they thought possible. There was no alternative to a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians and without such a settlement it would be impossible to end the Arab-Israeli conflict which was the "last residue of the cold war". [=] 30031. DPR. "UNICEF Executive Board Approves Programme Expenditures For Middle East and North Africa Region, Including Funding For Palestinian Women and Children", in Division for Palestinian Rights, April 1994. On 4/27/1994, the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) approved $40 million from general resources and $102 million in supplementary funding, as it reviewed country programme recommendations for five countries of the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as those for Palestinian women and children in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank and Gaza. The recommendations are contained in document E/ICEF/1994/P.23. In introducing the country programmes, Mr. Sarojini Vijjadi, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, stated that the prospect of peace offered a unique opportunity for regional development and for a renewed commitment to put children first. The regional office had encouraged an adaptive but strengthened country programming process, entailing more participation by key government sectors, non-governmental organizations, other United Nations agencies, and donor country missions (see ICEF/1794). [=] 30032. DPR. Seventh United Nations European NGO Symposium On The Question of Palestine: Part 06: B. Panel Discussions: Panel 4: "NGO Forum: Who is doing what?". Held on 8/25-27/1993, at Austria Center, Vienna, Austria. 83. Ms. Samia Khalil (Palestinian), President, Society of In'Asl El-Urs, said that, although the Palestinian people had utilized all methods of struggle and had appealed through statements and protests to all States, the United Nations and human rights institutions, all was to no avail. Instead land confiscation, plundering and usurpation of homes, uprooting of trees, arrest and torture of thousands, expulsions and desecration of holy shrines had continued unabated. 84. Bilateral and multilateral talks had not advanced the cause of peace. In the final analysis it had become evident to the Palestinian people that the United States had worked only for the sake of its own interest and that of Israel. 85. The United States had employed great efforts to fulfill Israel's goals and had offered it great support in arms and equipment, giving Israel an edge over all Arab States combined. Moreover, the United States had manoeuvred to sidestep the international resolutions that dealt with the national and human rights of the Palestinian people as it had done with Security Council resolution 799 (1992) regarding the expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians to Lebanon in 12/1993. 86. In the absence of a national authority, Palestinian women had established societies and institutions to assist children, prisoners, the disabled and those whose houses had been dynamited and whose trees
had been uprooted. They had established schools, institutions and universities, hospitals, clinics, day-care centers and kindergartens.

87. She deplored that after nearly two years of bilateral and multilateral talks, the Palestinian cause had not yet advanced and was restricted to procedural arguments. She called upon NGOs to exert pressure on the United Nations to implement its resolutions by condemning the acquisition of land by force and calling for the implementation of international conventions.

88. Mr. Fritz Froehlich (Austria), Network of European NGOs in the Occupied Territories (NENGOOT), said that international and European NGO involvement in the occupied Palestinian territories was considerable but inconsistent. Over one third of international and European NGOs were church-related or affiliated. The various assistance programmes were not always properly structured, evaluated nor monitored. Often, cooperation between donors and recipients were based on personal relationships and lacked professionalism.

89. Obstacles to the development and delivery of assistance programmes included the denial of permits to and restrictions on the movement of NGOs in the occupied Palestinian territories, inequitable distribution of funds and the financial dependency of the NGOs on governmental foreign aid.

90. Several organizations had been formed to coordinate the work of the international NGOs, including AIVA, Association of International Volunteer Agencies (Jerusalem); CCINGO, Coordinating Committee of International NGOs in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem) and NENGOOT, ECCP, European Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine (Brussels) and CCP, International Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine (Geneva). The first three organizations AIVA, CCINGO AND NENGOOT addressed matters more related to relief, rehabilitation and development programmes in the occupied Palestinian territory. The ECCP and the ICCP working in cooperation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People had emphasized mobilization of support for the achievement of a comprehensive, just and peaceful solution to the question of Palestine.

91. In conclusion, he recommended the adoption of an NGO Development Code of Practice (DCOP), as originally proposed by the ECP-P NENGOOT, that could include development strategies, methods, monitoring, evaluation and communications.

92. Ms. Ruth Cohen (Israel), Member, Association of Women for Peace, said that the Israeli peace movement had been inactive and despondent. Although not in agreement with the negotiating positions in the peace process of the current Israeli coalition Government, the Peace Now movement was obliged to support the Government.

93. She referred to a new group “Gush Hashalom” (the Peace Block) within the Israeli peace movement, which believed in the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, withdrawal from all territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including East Jerusalem, withdrawal from South Lebanon and total equality between Jews and Arabs within Israel.

94. She concluded that in her view the Peace Now movement ought to oppose the policies of the Rabin Government as if there were no peace negotiations and also oppose to the Israeli position in the peace negotiations as if there was no Rabin Government.

95. Mr. James Graff (Canada), President, Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, said that in 1989, almost every country in the world had voted for a United Nations-sponsored international peace conference on the Middle East. Momentum had grown throughout Europe and among United States allies to free Palestine from 22 years of Israeli colonization and oppression.

96. Since then, the momentum for Palestinian statehood had sustained several shocks, among them, the Gulf crisis and war with its disastrous consequences for Palestinians and for the Palestine Liberation Organization; the initiation of a United States orchestrated peace process biased towards United States and Israeli objectives in the Middle East, and which ignored the United Nations and relevant United Nations resolutions and principles, while also excluding Europe from any significant role; and the election of a new United States Administration which in Mr. Graff’s view was more sympathetic to Israel than the preceding ones.

97. He observed that the international NGO movement was threatened with dissolution because of the financial crisis that had forced the ICCP office in Geneva to cease functioning.

98. He urged the international community to continue to press for an independent, secular, democratic Palestinian state in the occupied territories with Jerusalem as its capital unless the Palestinian community through its leadership determined otherwise.

99. Furthermore, he did not believe that it was for the NGO movement to decide whether the Palestinians should participate or not in the current peace process. A major focus on promoting government involvement in the development of economic infrastructures in the occupied territories was needed. In addition, special assistance was also required with the educational, social and psychological needs of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Throughout this process the expertise of the various Palestinian technical committees should be fully utilized. [=]

30034. DS. "Lebanon: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution states that the people have the right to change their government in periodic free and fair elections. However, the 1992 parliamentary election was not prepared or carried out impartially. There were widespread reports of irregularities an vote rigging, and non-Lebanese military forces exerted considerable influence over the preparation of lists of candidates, who were consequently assured of victory. The majority of Christians and many Muslims boycotted the election as candidates and voters to protest holding the election before Syrian military forces had been redeployed. Consequently, the election results did not reflect the full spectrum of the body politic and cast doubt on the people’s ability to change their government democratically. According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be held every 4 years. The parliament elects the President who serves one 6-year term. The President and Parliament choose the Cabinet. According to the unwritten “National Pact” of 1943, the President is a Maronite Christian the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim. Until 1990, seats in Parliament were divided on a six-to-five ratio of Christians to Muslims. Under the national reconciliation agreement reached in Taif in October 1989 members of Parliament agreed to alter the National Pact to create a 5:60 balance between Christian and Muslim members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also increased the number of seats in parliament and transferred some powers from the President to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Women have the right to vote, and there are no legal barriers to participation by women in politics. Three women were elected to Parliament in 1992. Other women hold policy-level positions in the Government. Palestinian refugee have no political right. An estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in Lebanon, generally organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the refugees are not elected, nor are there any democratically organized institutions in the camps. [=]

30035. DS. “Lebanon: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
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GPO. February 1995. The Constitution calls for social justice and equality of duties and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism.” In practice, aspects of the law and traditional mores discriminate against women. Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. In some cases, this means that children born to Lebanese mothers and stateless fathers are themselves stateless. The law stipulates that a woman must obtain her husband’s approval to open a business or engage in trade. The Parliament has not yet acted on an amendment introduced to change this law. Women may own property but often cede effective control over it due to cultural reasons. The law also accords preferential treatment to males accused of crimes of honor (see Section 1.e.). Religious groups have their own family and personal status laws administered by religious courts. Each group differs in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the concurrence of 11 of their husbands. Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, in business. Social pressure against women pursuing a career is strong in some parts of society. Males sometimes exercise considerable control over female relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or contact with friends and relatives. Violence against women occurs, the press frequently reports cases of rape. However, there are no authoritative statistics on the extent of spousal violence. Doctors and social workers believe most abused women do not seek medical help. The society’s emphasis on personal privacy and honor makes it difficult for women to seek legal redress. The Government has not expressed an interest in the problem of violence against women nor has it made an effort to combat it.

30036. DS. “Lebanon: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (c) Prohibition of Force or Compulsory Labor”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Although forced labor is not prohibited by law, the Government does not condone it. However, employers sometimes force some categories of foreign workers, especially those working as domestic servants, to remain in situations amounting to coerced labor.

30037. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 06: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, IncludingFreedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Each confessional group has its own court for family and personal status cases. There is a separate military court system. In refugee camps, Palestinian elements operate an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice; rival Palestinian factions often try their opponents without due process. Although Lebanese law provides the right to a fair public trial and the judiciary is considered independent and relatively impartial, influential politicians continued to intervene successfully to protect supporters from detention and prosecution. Government interference in the judicial process and low judicial salaries led to the resignation of several prominent judges and to corruption and bribery of others. The Government took steps to adjust salaries in September. Appointments of judges like other government appointments, is allocated on the basis of religious affiliation. The resignations, aggravating an already severe shortage of judges, dealt a blow to efforts to speed adjudication and erase a backlog of cases that had developed during the civil war. An inability to conduct investigations in areas outside effective government control also caused trial delays. The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called crimes of honor. Men, for example, are typically acquitted of murder charges in cases involving the murder of adulterous wives. By law, in some instances a female’s testimony before a notary public carries half the weight of that of a male. There are no known political prisoners, although political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese regimes are often detained without charges for short periods of time. [=]
on broadcasting. Exploiting the absence of a leal framework, the Government moved to close one of its critics, the Independent Communications Network (ICN). The station, owned by the publisher of Nida’ Al-Watan, was accused of inciting sectarian discord. In late December, the Civil Court permitted ICN to resume broadcasting and scheduled for February a hearing of the Government’s case against the broadcaster. The Public Prosecutor has asked for prison sentences of 3 years for ICN management. Lebanon’s partially state-owned television station, Tele-Liban, had long enjoyed virtual autonomy with respect to its news and public affairs programming. The Cabinet, however, reasserted in August the Information Minister’s legal right to monitor and effectively control Tele-Liban’s activities. In 1993 the Government revived police control over all nonperiodical publications, books, foreign magazines, plays, and films, which must be submitted to the Public Security Directorate for approval before distribution. A prize-winning film on national reconciliation was banned for several months and released only after the producer made some changes. The police briefly closed a play, The Rabbit and the Saints, acting on a request from the Maronite church. Censors later reversed the decision. Police confiscated a novel, “Garden of the Senses,” by a well-known local author, saying it had pornographic passages. Lebanon has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a nourishing private educational system, born from the inadequacy of public schools and an attachment to sectarian affiliations. Students exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government does not usually interfere with student groups. The Government’s arrests of students sympathetic to the exiled General Michel ‘Awn and to the Lebanese Forces in 1992 chilled student activism among those students in 1993. [3]

30039. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 11: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (c) Freedom of Religion”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government has estimated their number at 361000, but this figure only includes families of refugees who arrived in 1948. Some estimates of the actual number of Palestinians in Lebanon now range from 450000-500000. Although the Government in 1991 ended its practice of denying work permits to Palestinians, a strong bias against them continues to compel often highly trained Palestinian refugees to take menial work. Palestinians and other aliens may own land only of a limited size and only after obtaining the approval of five district offices. The law applies to all aliens, but for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner disadvantageous to the Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Kurds. Under Lebanese citizenship law, only Lebanese males may transmit citizenship to their spouses and children. Lebanon refused to admit 419 Palestinians deport by Israel on December 17, 1992. The deportees remained in an effective no man’s land between Israeli and Lebanese controlled territory inside southern Lebanon. The Government turned a blind eye to the supply of relief material to the deportees, despite a ban on such activity. By the end of 1993, all of the deportees had returned to the Israeli-occupied territories except for about 15 deportees who reportedly elected to remain outside the occupied territories to avoid imprisonment. [4]

30040. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 12: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Lebanese traditionally have enjoyed freedom of travel, domestic and foreign. The spread of government authority has removed barriers that blocked domestic travel during the civil war, but obstacles remain. Lebanese armed forces and Syrian troops maintained checkpoints in areas under their control. In the south, the SLA and IDF maintained tight restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of the security zone. There are some restrictions on foreign travel by Lebanese citizens. Husbands may block foreign travel by their wives and minor children. The introduction in 1993 of compulsory military service for many males aged between 18-21 meant that youths subject to the draft are required to register at a recruitment office and obtain a travel authorization document before leaving the country. Travel to Israel is illegal for all Lebanese citizens, but many do so through Israeli-controlled territory in southern Lebanon. There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to return. Many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons. Palestinian refugees with valid exit visas may leave the country. The Government began the process of encouraging the return to their home of over 600000 Lebanese displaced during the civil war. The process was slowed by financial constraints as well as lingering insecurity felt by the displaced. Hundreds of families, however, received keys to their homes and began to repair them. The Government concentrated its efforts on returning Christians to areas of the Shuf and ‘Alayh from which they had fled in the wake of Christian-Druze fighting in the mid-1980s. Lebanon has historically both generated and received refugees. There are approximately 180000 stateless undocumented persons in Lebanon. Although the families of some of them have lived in Lebanon for generations, they suffer broad discrimination since they are not accorded the legal rights enjoyed by the rest of the population. They include the inhabitants of border areas in dispute between Lebanon and Syria and Lebanon and Israel, Kurds, Syriac Orthodox, and members of other sects. These people do not benefit from such government services as the national social security fund, and cannot be employed by the Government. Concern about preserving sectarian balance was one obstacle to the naturalization of these people in the past. In 1993 political support grew for a plan to naturalize a confessionally balanced group of non-Palestinian stateless persons who have continuously resided in Lebanon for the past 15 years. The Government is reviewing applications. Most non-Lebanese refugees in Lebanon are Palestinians. The Government has estimated their number at 361000, but this figure only includes families of refugees who arrived in 1948. Some estimates of the actual number of Palestinians in Lebanon now range from 450000-500000. Although the Government in 1991 ended its practice of denying work permits to Palestinians, a strong bias against them continues to compel often highly trained Palestinian refugees to take menial work. Palestinians and other aliens may own land only of a limited size and only after obtaining the approval of five district offices. The law applies to all aliens, but for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner disadvantageous to the Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Kurds. Under Lebanese citizenship law, only Lebanese males may transmit citizenship to their spouses and children. Lebanon refused to admit 419 Palestinians deport by Israel on December 17, 1992. The deportees remained in an effective no man’s land between Israeli and Lebanese controlled territory inside southern Lebanon. The Government turned a blind eye to the supply of relief material to the deportees, despite a ban on such activity. By the end of 1993, all of the deportees had returned to the Israeli-occupied territories except for about 15 deportees who reportedly elected to remain outside the occupied territories to avoid imprisonment. [4]
The unwritten 1943 National Pact allocated power on a confessional system based on the 1932 census. The Pact stipulated that the President would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi'a Muslim. Until 1990, seats in Parliament were divided on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. Positions in the government were allocated on a similar basis between Christians and Muslims. Efforts to alter or abolish the confessional system were at the time not considered feasible. There were indications of Lebanon’s political and sociopolitical change, however, law in 1990. They included the adoption of the number of seats in Parliament and the division of seats equally between Muslims and Christians and the transfer of some powers from the President to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Parliamentary elections were held in 1992. The elections were not prepared and not carried out in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus. Because the results do not reflect the full spectrum of the body politic in Lebanon, they cast doubt on the ability of the Lebanese people to change their government through truly democratic means. Palestinians in Lebanon, with the exception of the few who have gained Lebanese nationality, have no political rights. An estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in Lebanon, ranging from several characterized as “Islamic” to numerous pro- and anti-Arafat organizations, many built around prominent individual leaders. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps, under the control of one or more political factions. Leaders are not elected, and there are no representative institutions that would permit popular participation in running camps. Fundamental protections and freedoms expected of governments exist in some but not all Palestinian areas. There are no legal barriers to participation by women in politics, but the culture discourages it. Three women were elected to Parliament in 1992. Two were related to deceased politicians, and the third is the sister of the Prime Minister. Very few women hold policy-level positions in the Government. [ ]

30042. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government has not placed priority on children's rights and welfare. There is no evidence of government spending to protect children, although Lebanon has ratified the Children's Rights Charter. The area of children's rights is one of many demands made on a state that is just emerging from years of social and financial chaos. The plight of children is a growing concern in Lebanon. A huge number of children are neglected, abused, exploited and even sold to disreputable adoption agents at a rate of $5000 for an infant, according to children's rights monitors. Hundreds of abandoned children are found in the streets, begging and cleaning car windows; others are hired illegally at low wages. Juvenile delinquency is rising. There are 428 cases before the Juvenile Court in north Lebanon alone, and many delinquents wait in ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. [ ]

30043. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. While not prohibited by law forced labor is not practiced or condoned by the Government. However, children, domestics, or other foreign workers are sometimes forced to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor. [ ]

30046. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 05: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (d) Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States...
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Lebanon
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Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5028(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. As of the end of 1993, a total of 9573 Palestinians were incarcerated in IDF (5308) and prison service facilities. Of those, roughly 68% had been tried and were serving sentences. 29.6% were awaiting charges or trial, and 2.3% were detained administratively, i.e., sentenced to a specific period of detention without formal charge or trial. In October Israeli authorities only arrested the detention of a suspect without a warrant. As of the end of the year, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were discussing the timing and numbers of additional releases. Since the beginning of the intifada in late 1987, Israel has routinely transferred Palestinian prisoners from the occupied territories to detention facilities within Israel especially to the Ketziot camp in the Negev desert and Megiddo prison near Afuia This practice, which continued in 1993, contravenes Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Estimates of the number of Palestinian residents of the occupied territories incarcerated within Israel range up to 7000. In 1993, there were indications that Palestinian prisoners were being transferred from detention centers in Gaza to facilities in Israel prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza scheduled to begin on December 13, 1994. The use of administrative detention for alleged security reasons without formal charges or a full opportunity for detainees to defend themselves continued in 1993. As of October, 277 Palestinians were held in administrative detention, compared to 620 held at the end of 1992. Detention periods are for a maximum of 6 months and are renewable. Evidence used at hearings frequently is declared secret and unavailable to either the detainee or his attorney. Israeli officials state that administrative detention is used only when IDF legal advisors have determined that there is sufficient evidence to detain a person and that the evidence has been corroborated by two sources. They assert, however, that the evidence cannot be presented in open court because to do so would Compromise the method of acquiring the evidence, which is often provided by informers whose lives would be jeopardized if their identities were known. Human rights monitors contend that administrative detention is often used when evidence against a suspect would not stand up in court. District military commanders may order administrative detention without formal Charges. Detainees may appeal detention orders or renewal of detention before a military judge. Attorneys may question security service witnesses concerning the general nature of the evidence. The Supreme Court may review rulings by military Judges and may examine secret evidence. Any soldier may arrest without a warrant a person who has committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense. Persons over age 12 are treated as adults by the court system. Persons arrested for common crimes are usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an attorney, and a statement of charges (although these opportunities are sometimes delayed). Bail is rarely available to those arrested for security offenses. Special summonses are reportedly issued to Palestinians wanted by authorities for security reasons.

Israeli Military Order 1369 allows authorities to sentence to 7 years’ imprisonment any person who does not respond to a special summons that is delivered to him or a family member or is posted in the Civil Administration office nearest his home address. Persons may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours and then must be released unless a warrant is issued. A warrant may be issued by a police officer for two periods of 7 days each. For extensions beyond 18 days from the date of arrest, the detainee has to be brought before a military judge, at which point he is entitled to defense counsel. In 1992 Israeli authorities shortened this period to 8 days for minors and those accused of less serious offenses (such as stone throwing). A military judge may extend the detention for a period of no longer than 6 months from the date of arrest. If there is no indictment during this period, the detainee must be released. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite detention until the end of the trial, though the detainee may be appealed. In the case of a detainee has the right to see a lawyer as soon as possible. In the cases of security detainees, however, officers routinely issue a written order to delay access to counsel for up to 16 days for reasons of security or to conduct the investigation.

Higher ranking officials or judges may extend this period by up to 76 more days for the same reasons. In June the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to consult a lawyer required the Government not only to inform a detainee of his right but also to advise the detainee of any orders preventing him from seeing a lawyer. Israeli regulations also allow prisoners to be held in isolation from family and from other detainees during interrogation. Israeli authorities claim that isolation is needed to protect detainees from post notification, and others assert that families and lawyers are normally notified much later and generally locate the detainee through their own efforts. Notification to the US Embassy or Consulate General of detained Palestinian-American citizens has almost always been through the family. The ICRC attempts to help by passing on to families (by telephone) the information it receives from Israeli prison officials. A senior officer may extend for up to 12 days denial of notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular officials. A military commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time. The Israeli authorities acted in a number of areas to improve prison conditions in the occupied territories after Palestinian prisoners staged an 18-day hunger strike in September and 10/1992 to protest prison conditions. Implementation of the specific measures, however, was not uniform throughout all detention facilities. In 8/1993, prisoners at Hebron prison staged a hunger strike to protest lack of water for toilet and bathing facilities. The Israeli Supreme Court agreed to consider a petition presented by the prisoners but, as of October, the case had not been resolved. In the meantime, Israeli authorities reportedly agreed to truck in water supplies to meet prisoner needs. In September the Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court to close the Ketziot Military Detention Camp in Israel because of inferior conditions of imprisonment.” The petition argued that the conditions at the camp, which reportedly houses 4900 Palestinian security detainees, violated the Geneva Convention. overcrowding (26 inmates to a tent), inferior diet, lack of adequate medical care, and lack of arrangements for religious worship were cited as key problems. At the end of the year, Ketziot camp was still in use. According to the IDF Judge Advocate General, the IDF has been granted a postponement to study the report of an advisory panel. Consideration of the case by the Supreme Court has been postponed until 3/1994. In 12/1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 799 which called for the immediate return of 416 Palestinians who had been deported to South Lebanon earlier that month because of their alleged association with Hamas—the Islamic Resistance Movement and the largest Islamist organization in the occupied territories—and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel agreed in March to a two-phase plan to return the deportees. In 9/1992 deportees returned from the edge of the Israeli-declared security zone in South Lebanon where they had been camped since 12/1992. Upon their return, the deportees were investigated by the Israeli authorities and some were freed while others were placed in administrative detention. In mid-December, the remaining deportees returned except for about 16 deportees who reportedly elected to remain outside the occupied territories to avoid imprisonment. Like those who had returned in September, the 137 who returned in December were subject to interrogation and investigation. As of the end of the year, approximately 60 remained in detention In addition to the deportees in southern Lebanon, Israel allowed 30 pre-intifada deportees to return to the occupied territories in May as a confidence building measure. Among those who returned was one former West Bank mayor elected in 1976 and later deported to Jordan. [6]

Opinions freely in speech and in writing. However, the Government restricts this right significantly. It permits no spoken or printed criticism of the President or the legitimacy of the regime and strictly controls the dissemination of information. Persons violating these restrictions are subject to arrest. The Government has imprisoned several journalists for years for failing to observe press restrictions. The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture & National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press, prevent publication or distribution of any material regarded as threatening or embarrassing to the Government. Commonly censored subjects include the Government's human rights record, allegations of official involvement in the Lebanese drug trade, and aspects of the Government's political and security role in Lebanon. Censors remove from imported publications articles critical of the Government's role in Lebanon. The Ministry of Culture & National Guidance censors fiction and nonfiction works, including films. Censorship is stricter for materials in Arabic. Censors remove material critical of the Government, offensive to any of Syria's religious groups, too graphic in its description of sex, unfavorable to the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict, or partial to sectarianism. Censorship also affects films available at foreign cultural centers. The Government, or the State Television owns and operates the radio and television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. There are no privately owned newspapers. The Ministry of Information censors the televised news programs to ensure they follow the government line. The Government does interfere with radio or television broadcasts from neighboring countries. The law prohibits citizens from owning satellite receiving dishes. In early 1994, security forces began to confiscate satellite-dish components but later halted the practice. Although ownership remains illegal, citizens resumed installing satellite dishes without any apparent government action. However, in November the Government announced that it would fully implement the ban on private dishes and create a monopoly to distribute satellite programs to selected consumers. Nonetheless, there was greater openness in 1994 in the media's coverage of regional developments, including the peace process. The Government aired extensive coverage of the peace agreement reached between Arab parties and Israel, e.g., the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Government also permitted more media criticism of government performance. Several newspaper articles highlighted government malfeasance and low-level, but not high-level, corruption. Public school teachers are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy, although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at the university level. [ ]


[Submitted to Connexions by Yvonne Deutsch, Israel, 5/1991 ]

[The first version of this paper was presented at the 4th International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, Hunter College, City University of New York, 6/1990.]

This article is dedicated to the memory of Lil Moed who worked with us in creating feminist peace activity.

It is a natural reaction to hate those who have made us suffer. It is also a natural reaction to inflict pain because one has suffered pain, and to justify it ideologically. In this small land both our peoples are stuck in a fateful embrace. I believe that our finding each other here is potentially for of protest and solidarity activity and it was no longer the sole patrimony of Zionist and the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state is regarded by many Jews as the political solution to the Jewish problem of suffering from persecutions. It became especially urgent after the Holocaust when Palestine, later Israel, became the homeland of many Jewish refugees. The ideal was to create a new Jew which would be the antithesis of the weak and helpless Jew of the Diaspora. In the process of shaping a common national sentiment and identity the Jewish people did not succeed at merging into the region nor becoming an integral part of it. The Jewish historical lack of existential security, combined with the history of the establishment of the state and the Arab reaction to it, made the Israeli Jews develop, again, a ghetto mentality. We did not succeed in freeing ourselves from the Jewish-outside-fearful mentality and no matter how strong we are in terms of military strength, we still hold an internal self-image of weakness. Today we are occupiers and aggressors but we feel as though we are occupied. This state of mind and psychology of the people, which is very well used by the politicians, makes it difficult to undertake protest activity against Israeli military actions against the oppression of the Palestinian people, and to hold solidarity actions with them.

With the Intifada, one could see a sizable awakening in the scope of protest and solidarity activity and it was no longer the sole patrimony of marginal avant-garde groups. The majority of the activity was carried out by women, be it in the "mixed" groups where they had an important organizational role, or in the women's groups which were set up in the first two years of the Intifada. There are precedents for this political phenomenonof women's groups involved in peace activity--beyond simply the women's issues. For example during the War in Lebanon in 1982, a group of feminist women organized protests against the war. [Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon. ] This development is part and parcel of a worldwide development of women's activities in favour of peace.

We can clearly see the influence of feminist consciousness which creates a new and critical definition of militarism. This influence was
possible in Israel partly because of an increasing lack of confidence in the army that started after the 1973 war [In 1973 Israel was taken by surprise by the Egyptian and Syrian attack; confidence in the army's capacity to defend the State was questioned, the myth of the all capable army was shattered and this created a crisis in Israeli society.] and came to a peak in the war in Lebanon, which was regarded as a war of choice. [In zionist history, Israel goes to war only when it has no choice because of the Arab states' inability to destroy Israel].

"Clearly, they did something against the security of the State, otherwise killing in concrete daily life. In the need to create a feminist political culture with which we can identify, and in the transformation of the role of the same woman who was recounting the story of her deported husband. about the occupation while connecting it to the meaning of violence and nationalisation. These questions of beliefs, values and identities were open to women, in varying degrees, according to personal security and self-identity, and according to our age and social class.

Political activity at the time of crisis of identity and values combined with active emotional dealing with those issues represents the oneness of the political and personal. We raised in the public consciousness subjects of emotional and political significance, and this is in line with our belief in the destructive effect of the split between the personal and the political, a split which enables the existence of the evil within us. Aside from raising the subjects of women's role in peace making and the influence of occupation on women's lives, we also raised subjects like racism, prejudice and fear as obstacles to peace. [For that reason and as women, we also must discuss our attitudes towards the army both on a personal and public level. This is one of the most difficult subjects to deal with and we had--so far--not dared to discuss it publicly.]

Within this maze and confusion there are among us those who have a vision of creating a political culture of women--and we have to commit ourselves to a culture of peace.

Culture, or political culture, cannot be created out of a vacuum. It must have links with those aspects of the women's culture--that exist in the private sphere and the backyard of history--which are relevant for creating a peace culture. We have the role of exploring that culture of women and adjusting it to our political and cultural needs, while creating changes according to feminist criticism.

For example, in the ancient Jewish literature, written towards the end of the fifth century [Lamentations Rabba, which is a text of lamenting the army that started after the 1973 war [In 1973 Israel was taken by surprise is a painful process because we all were brought up on the myth of the defending and moral army. Women can say that they would have liked to be pacifists and at the same time recount with pride that their son is serving in one of the elite units of the army. To belong to the army means to belong to the people and State. And for many of us, being ex-refugees, or immigrants, it is difficult to undergo the process of cutting the umbilical cord with the Israeli society. It is difficult to discover that the feeling of belonging within us is no longer as significant as it was, and that perhaps for the building of a different and peaceful future we must also seek other sources to root our feeling of belonging.

"The process of political and feminist consciousness raising and change of attitudes is linked to a painful process of questioning existential problems of self-determination, belonging, alienation, womanhood, manhood, the attitude toward the army, war, peace, justice, violence, and nationalism. These questions of beliefs, values and identities were open to women, in varying degrees, according to personal security and self-identity, and according to our age and social class.

Political activity at the time of crisis of identity and values combined with active emotional dealing with those issues represents the oneness of the political and personal. We raised in the public consciousness subjects of emotional and political significance, and this is in line with our belief in the destructive effect of the split between the personal and the political, a split which enables the existence of the evil within us. Aside from raising the subjects of women's role in peace making and the influence of occupation on women's lives, we also raised subjects like racism, prejudice and fear as obstacles to peace. [For that reason and as women, we also must discuss our attitudes towards the army both on a personal and public level. This is one of the most difficult subjects to deal with and we had--so far--not dared to discuss it publicly.]

Within this maze and confusion there are among us those who have a vision of creating a political culture of women--and we have to commit ourselves to a culture of peace.
the lamenting women to the Israeli culture at the end of the 20th century, we do not satisfy ourselves with the role of lamenting and containing the pain but instead seek ways to influence the grass-roots level and the political system as a whole. We do not settle for the social role of lamenting and of accepting the madness of killing. We do not accept the existence of a women’s culture in the backyard of history, and are struggling for a change in which our world vision will be of political significance and of decision making. [According to anthropological research, in hunting and gathering societies there existed separate social organisations for men and women, but the men would not envisage going to war without first receiving the women’s explicit agreement.]

In the different women’s organizations, in the meetings and dialogues that have developed among women there can be potential for the building of solidarity and sisterhood among women. Some of us see the occupation and the national conflict as delaying the advancement of the women’s struggle in their society. However, a peaceful political solution is not only seen as a stage along the road toward cooperation between Israeli, Palestinian and Arab women, it is also one way of dealing with the role of women in our societies. The hope is that the joint experience between Israeli and Palestinian women will develop trust among the women of the area and will eventually lead to the development of a sense of common gender identity that will have a significant influence for social change in the region. We also hope that we, the women, will find the way to deal with the challenge of creating a peaceful life in the area. Today the national identification of both sides does not let us challenge publicly every issue that should—like the essence of war and armed struggle—be discussed for the purpose of creating a Women’s Peace Culture. It does not let us work together on women’s issues. A political solution to the national conflict is only a step that will free us from the restrictions of this reality. Hopefully, it will enable Palestinian, Israeli and Arab women to commit ourselves to non-violence, which is crucial in creating peace culture.

Following the crisis in the Gulf and the disappointment of many Israelis in the Palestinian reaction of supporting Saddam Hussein, the Israeli peace movement lived through a crisis, and the level of activity was lowered. At the same time, and also in view of the general feeling of helplessness regarding the political developments in Israel in particular and in the Middle East in general, the number of women in black vigils grew smaller. The political developments in the area also played a significant role in the development of the relationship between Israeli and Palestinian women. After long months of common political work, we not only failed in organizing a common political event for 12/1990, but our relationships also almost reached a dead end. A year after “1990—Time for Peace”, the world leaders started a war. We found ourselves prisoners of a war that is not ours. The culture of war—or militarism—had its victory over the culture of peace.

In days of war, because of the direct threat on Israel, most of the women found it difficult to continue standing in the open expressing opposition to the occupation. In Jerusalem and Tel Aviv some of the women returned to the vigil only after three weeks had passed. During the war, more than ever, we had to go to the streets with a clear message, not only against this specific war but against all war, against the principle of war and destruction. During this time of war many of us had to spend more time with our small children. We tried to keep our sanity in the microcosms of our families and protect our children and ourselves from the terrible fear. We lived under the fear of destruction and were exposed day and night, through the media, to the terrible war which was used as a legitimate means to achieve political and economic goals. We had to take out to the public sphere the alienation, the disgust, the fear, the anguish and the effort to develop a culture of peace within our homes.

Since the war, the Palestinian people are going through new measures of oppression under the Israeli occupation. In effect the Israeli government has created two large ghettos for the Palestinians, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Exit from the territories is by special permit only; on the whole only those Palestinian workers who are essential to the functioning of the Israeli economy are issued such permits. And the territories have no adequate economic infrastructure to cope with the influx of labour, this being due to a deliberate colonialist occupation policy over the past 24 years.

The Israeli peace movement (including the women’s movement) still has not recovered from its crisis and there is a clear regression in the scope of the activities. Today (5/1991), only 11 vigils continue to stand every week and many women feel burnt out and helpless. During the last three years we have dedicated our political activity in Israeli society to changing attitudes among Israeli women. Now apart from continuing this trend, some of us think that political change will occur only under international economic and cultural pressure.

We are also looking for ways to continue our political relationships with the Palestinian women. In the middle of the month, an Israeli, Palestinian and International women’s peace conference was held in Geneva. [This conference was postponed from 12/1990 to 5/1991.] But there is a strong feeling that in many respects we are in regression compared with the near past.

For the creation of peace culture inside the Israeli society we must deal both emotionally and politically, with painful basic issues, which the Israeli-Jewish society tends to repress, and which are connected with the establishment of the Jewish state. The exposure of the truth, as well as learning to deal with it, has to be a main issue in creating a culture which is supposed to be in touch with the needs of the peoples of the whole region.

The Israeli society should be aware of the price Palestinians paid, and are still paying, for the self-determination of the Jews. In the process of consciousness-raising concerning the meaning of the establishment of the Jewish state for the Palestinians, and their view of it as the catastrophe of ‘48, we must become aware of the fact that on the basis of this historical development, we have the duty to create a culture of peace in the area. It is not the right of “bleeding heart liberals,” but the duty of a people whose self-determination brought destruction and pain upon others.

As mentioned above, the creation of the Israeli identity, as a contrast to the Jewish diaspora identity which was seen as humiliated and helpless, did not succeed in freeing us from our self image as weak and persecuted. The continuation of having an inner image of being persecuted and humiliated, while at the same time developing a militaristic culture, creating a feeling of belonging to the society on the basis of army service, and viewing the army as a “holy” institution, is a danger to our society’s mental and social health. The army is not perceived by Jewish Israelis as a necessary evil in a reality of danger or war, but as an institution with political, social and economic power, which defines social values and priorities and forms the main origin of status and belonging in Israeli society. The present political situation, in which even western societies argue for the need of values of peace but have not yet chosen to stop the reliance upon weapons, it is difficult to put forward a unilateral demand of destruction of all weapons and the investment of military resources in social development, although in the utopian political view this should be the attitude. It should very clearly be the ideological-cultural demand of the women working for peace, social justice and freedom. But it should be emphasized that women from the so-called developed countries should have the main responsibility for it.

In the 40 years of its existence, Israel has not succeeded in integrating itself in the region, and has contributed to the creation of alienation and hate between itself and the Arab peoples. It entrenched itself to the development needs of the Arab peoples and the third world, and allied with the western world, which relies on economic exploitation of the “third” world. In creating an alternative culture of women, we must ally ourselves with the need of the peoples, in particular with the women’s needs in the area in which we live. We must break the alienation and ignorance and get in touch with Arab feminist women and women’s culture which is often hidden behind the veil.

It is a grave mistake of Israeli feminism to rely only on western feminism, which suits our personal self-determination needs. We, the women with feminist consciousness, must get in touch with Arab feminism and strive to create a feminism which will grow out of the region and which will develop itself from the women’s culture existing
here, and which will be suitable to the needs of women in the Middle East. We must stop turning our backs on the region in which we are living and we must break the wall of estrangement which helps the hate towards us grow. Our loyalty should be to the eastern region in which we are living, and we, the women, must be the bridge between west and east or between north and south.

I wish to express my thanks to Sherna Berger Gluck for her useful remarks and to Andre Rosenthal for the translation of the article into English. [This article is from Walking the Red Line, Israelis in Search of Justice for Palestine, edited by Deena Hurwitz, forthcoming from New Society Publishers (Philadelphia, PA and Santa Cruz, CA).] [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, CA 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$22 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]

30049. Efrat, Roni Ben. “Rehumanizing the Expellees: 45 Days in a Tent: Part 4”, in Challenge, March-April 1993. p. 8. Every evening the tent became an open forum. Serious questions were asked while sweet tea was passed around in disposable plastic cups. Should there be an appeal to the High Court of Justice? Should the Palestinians make their return to the peace talks conditional on the expulsion issue? People expressed their disappointment with the Rabin government and debated whether the Arab parties ought to withdraw their support. These evenings were attended by a broad spectrum of personalities, including Arab members of the Knesset, heads of Arab municipal councils, representatives of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, laborers who arrived from their villages after a day’s work, rabbis, Jewish peace activists, and students.

A small generator-powered black and white television was turned on for the news programs and political features. The camp was granted media coverage during its activities.

In addition to demolishing stereotypes and suspicions on both sides, the tent became an address for all citizens who wanted to express their protest against the expulsions. A continuous stream of peace organizations and residents of Arab villages have arrived at the tent, bearing fruit, cakes, and food. Each evening a volunteer from “Women in Black” has arrived with a steaming pot of soup. The tent visitors’ book was quickly filled with meditations, comments, and words of gratitude from the visitors. Many activists from Meretz have visited the tent and registered their opposition to the position of their representatives. One of them wrote: “As a member of the Citizen’s Rights Movement (Ratz), I am dismayed to be in the midst of such dark times for which my party is partly to blame. Be brave and strong and know that most of the members of the Citizen’s Rights Movement support your struggle.”

30050. Efrat, Roni Ben. “Rehumanizing the Expellees: 45 Days in a Tent: Part 5”, in Challenge, March-April 1993. p. 9. The camp’s around-the-clock activities (practically on Rabin’s doorstep) and icy conditions on both sides, the tent became an address for all citizens who wanted to express their protest against the expulsions. A continuous stream of peace organizations and residents of Arab villages have arrived at the tent, bearing fruit, cakes, and food. Each evening a volunteer from “Women in Black” has arrived with a steaming pot of soup. The tent visitors’ book was quickly filled with meditations, comments, and words of gratitude from the visitors. Many activists from Meretz have visited the tent and registered their opposition to the position of their representatives. One of them wrote: “As a member of the Citizen’s Rights Movement (Ratz), I am dismayed to be in the midst of such dark times for which my party is partly to blame. Be brave and strong and know that most of the members of the Citizen’s Rights Movement support your struggle.”

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political organization, "Mahber Fekri Hagei"—the organization which agitated for national independence since 1941. Working women in textile factories and service industries also played a progressive role in the underground working class movement which began in the early 1940's and formally organized into the Eritrean Trade Union in 1952. When the sham federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia was imposed on the Eritrean people by the then US dominated UN, political and mass movements were to be suppressed. The workers were subjected to brutal and inhuman methods of repression and torture. The underground until 1958. In 3/1958, a four-day general strike paralyzed the country. Women workers joined the strike and militantly fought for the economic and national rights of the Eritrean people. The union and the workers movement was brutally crushed by the fascist Ethiopian government and in an attempt to further weaken and liquidate the workers movement by economically weakening the country, Ethiopian rulers moved many factories and industries to Ethiopia—thus causing the migration of thousands of workers to neighboring countries. Since then thousands of women have been forced to leave the country, many as contract workers to the Middle East, and Europe. Presently thousands of women workers are found in the Sudan, Italy and Ethiopia ruthlessly being exploited as cheap labor. In 1961, the armed struggle began under the leadership of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and with great patriotic sentiments, women from different parts of Eritrea joined the national liberation struggle. However, the revolutionary potential of women was not fully understood by the reactionary leadership of ELF and it never took active mobilization and organizing of women as its task.

Furthermore because of its backward and feudal chauvinistic ideas, it oppressed and exploited working women, causing their disenchantment and migration to the Sudan. Nevertheless, Eritrean women continued to resist Ethiopian colonialism and its masters US imperialism and Israeli Zionism. Thousands of working women in the Sudan continued to support the armed struggle financially and sheltered the fighters in time of need. Eritrean women workers in the Middle Eastern countries, although they were not politically organized, gave active support to the struggle even under the great hardships they experienced. With the formation of the EPLF, the Eritrean national liberation movement vigorously developed correct political line, mobilizing and uniting the masses under a revolutionary political program against their number one enemy. Thus the participation of women increased and their role in the struggle clearly identified. In 1977, they are now able to contribute wholly on an equal basis to the Eritrean revolution, and gain their liberation in the process. Under the leadership of the EPLF, women fighters are given political as well as military training. They participate in combat units, medical services, educational and agitational propaganda units. The EPLF believes that the mobilizing and organizing of women is a primary and necessary task for the success of the revolution, and is carrying out this program seriously and conscientiously. In 1974, the armed struggle intensified and under the leadership of EPLF, both fronts coordinated their attacks on the increasing aggression of the Ethiopian troops and scored brilliant victories. During this period, thousands of women from urban and rural areas joined the revolution contributing to the successful development of the Eritrean people's war. In the February war peasant women fought against the aggression troops with knives and swords, throwing spices and pepper to burn and blind the eyes of the enemy. Not only do mothers contribute fine sons and daughters to the revolution, but also in the liberated areas women are being organized to build the basis of the new society. Lenin pointed out, "in the experience of all liberation movements, the success of a revolution depends on the extent to which women take part in it." And today, in the Eritrean revolution we see the participation of women further developing and contributing to the victories of the people's war. Since a significant percentage of Eritrean women are today found in foreign countries, their participation and organization is very important. Eritrean working women in Italy, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia etc. are a great potential force who are now beginning to get organized into political organizations such as the Eritrean for Liberation in Europe, EFLNA, etc. The Eritrean women's struggle as part of the Eritrean people's national liberation movement is vigorously developing and is also reflecting the worldwide victories of the women's movement of which it is an integral part.

30052. Farhat, Albert [compiler]; Saleh, Hanna [compiler]. Sun Rises from the South: The Israeli Aggression Against South Lebanon, Facts and Testimony: Facts and Figures About the Aggression. Beirut, 1978. p. 26. The following pages give an account of the atrocities committed by the Zionist invaders and the size of the huge destruction and losses, as well as the great material damages they inflicted on the South, its people, its land and the signs of life in it. These are the facts and figures about the aggression, but they are only preliminary figures, since they do not include the damages and losses in the regions which Israel handed over after its so-called withdrawal to fascist gangs, those regions where UN troops have not entered until now. Hence, these figures cannot be considered as compromising a comprehensive census that encompasses all the results left over by the war which Israel launched against people, houses, schools, places of worship, villages, towns, fields and plantations. In spite of that, they gave a clear picture of the Zionist terrorism which was exercised in the South. What do these facts say? The invaders manifested their racist, fascist hatred against peaceful civilians. It can be said they killed in their air raids, in the shelling of their tanks and in their collective massacres civilians only. They left behind more than one thousand bodies [Reuter News Agency quoted the International Red Cross, giving the figure of 1000 killed, but a UN report on 3/1978, four days after the war started, gave the figure 700 killed until then.], most of which were bodies of old people, children and women. A large number of these victims were not killed by air raids or shelling, but directly by invading soldiers. In the town of Al-Khiyam alone, they killed more than 50 persons including old men and women in one massacre. In the massacre of Adloun, perpetrated by a seaborne Israeli commando unit in an area not reached by the military invasion, 17 southern refugees, mostly women and girls, were killed, in addition to children whose ages ranged between a year and a half and 13 years. In Rashaya el-Fokhar, they entered a church and perpetrated inside it a massacre against the inhabitants who took refuge there away from the barbarism of the invaders.... In the village of Abbasiya alone, they destroyed the houses over their inhabitants, killing 140 persons.

If these "samples" of atrocities give a picture of Zionist fascism, they indicate on the other hand the failure of the aggressors to meet face to face the fighters who resisted their invasion with courage. So they resorted instead to the killing of innocent people. These "samples" also reveal Israel's aims in forcing the largest number of the inhabitants of the South to emigrate, and in uprooting them from their land and villages. In the course of organized killing and terrorism, Israel committed a very large number of premeditated crimes, not only during the military operations, but after the ceasefire, and even after the UN troops took up position in the occupied areas. Most of the acts of torture and kidnappings to which the inhabitants in the occupied villages were subjected had taken place after the lapse of a few days on the occupation of those villages. Testimony to this is what happened in the villages of Ain Be'al, Bazourieh, Barashit, Nakoura, Bint Jbeil, Kuleia, Jabrin and others - where kidnappings took place, ending mostly in assassinations and barbaric torture inside Israeli jails. Most of the operations, in which houses were blown up and plantations burned, took place at intervals that followed the aggression. In Bazourieh, for instance, scores of houses were blown up after the lapse of eight days of the entry of Israeli troops to the village. The same case applies to Abbasiya, where 150 houses were blown up. After more than one month of their invasion, the Israelis were burning fields and plantations in Rashaya el-Fokhar and Kharoby with their phosphorous bombs. The same things happened in lbi el-Saká.

The thefts and acts of looting directly committed by the Israelis are but evidence of Zionist "civilization." Those acts took such wide proportions that even the Israeli news media could not keep silent on them. And in their attempt to minimize these scandals, "Haartz" newspaper published in Tel Aviv says, "The Israeli soldiers looted moderately...they only stole whatever their pockets and sacks could take, such as transistor radios, small valuables and old relics.... As to big thefts," Haarts says, "they were committed by unruly and undisciplined elements from the rear units." So the front units were for killing and...
The losses which the Israeli invasion caused to the agricultural wealth of the South exceeds, according to preliminary estimates and figures, one billion Lebanese pounds. For in addition to damaging tens of thousands of dunums of cultivated land and to damaging and destroying more than 150000 olive, almond, fig, orange and banana trees, the invading troops bulldozed and destroyed large areas of cultivable land in a way that made the land quite unusable. These results which the Israeli invasion made a point of achieving, including the emigration and dispersal of more than 270000 refugees, reveal Israel's final objectives in turning the South into an uninhabited region, making it lose its national identity in order to facilitate Israeli expansionist ambitions. In the following pages, there are statements and figures about the losses and damages based on an investigation made by a mission from the Lebanese "An Nidaa" newspaper that visited the South, on a report by the Higher Relief Committee (set up by the Lebanese government in order to relieve and help the victims of the Lebanese civil war), on a report by the UN Office for Refugee Affairs, and also on certain statements and figures released by the International Red Cross Committee in Lebanon. [=]

Farhat, Albert [compiler]; Saleh, Hanna [compiler]. Sun Rises from the South: The Israeli Aggression in South Lebanon. Facts and Testimony. Beirut, 1978, p. 16-17, 22-23. Munira Saleh, a refugee from Hanin: "A woman, in her seventh month of pregnancy, was killed with a bayonet piercing her stomach. And an old man was burned after he was wrapped in blankets." ("An Nidaa" newspaper, 3/22/1978) Hassan, a 12-year old boy from Bint Jebeil: "I saw our house on fire and my comrades in school dying in front of me. I ran away without taking anything with me. I left behind my books and my toys, my bed and my desk." ("L'Orient-Le Jour" newspaper, interview made by Desiree Akiki, 4/12/1978) David Hirst, correspondent of the "Guardian" newspaper, writes, "...Israeli soldiers were talking to me and to my colleague of the United Press and the 'Voice of America' softly and gently. Then they became criminal and vicious when they saw one villagers shaking. It seems that to the Israelis everyone is a disguised terrorist. The officer in charge of the soldiers asked us, 'Were there any civilians killed during the shelling?' So we pointed our fingers towards a house under whose debris an old woman was lying. We answered him that only civilians had been killed; all who had been killed were civilians." Captain Ouzi Dayan, relative of the Israeli Foreign Minister, replied when he heard our story, "I don't like to tell you this, but I was the one who gave the order to shell the school," and he pointed to a Centurion tank and said, "This is the tank which shelled from a distance of 1200 meters." (David Hirst in a report from the village of Hedatha to the "Guardian") Khalil Abu Zeid, a refugee from Zawtar: "The planes were shelling Taybeh and after that we could only see thick clouds of smoke covering the sky of the region. My son was looking after our three cows, and the enemy rained on him with 500 mm automatic fire. He was saved as if by miracle. The enemy also directed its fire against children running in the village's square. I saw with my own eyes 5 civilian cars running on the Alman road northwards. Israeli planes chased them and fired their shells at them, killing all their 40 passengers." ("As Safi" newspaper, 3/25/1978) Yousef Saadeh, Mukhtar (headman) of Ibl el-Saki, says, "What can I say? As you can see they have left nothing. They broke down the school and destroyed the church. They bulldozed the olives (about 10 dunums) and dug trenches around the village (also about 10 dunums). In any case, whatever they do we still support the joint forces and are proud of them.... But why did they destroy the school...this is the teacher standing here. Ask him how the school was." The school teacher said, "The school was one of the best government schools in the region, and had 325 students enrolled. Its large library was looted and not a single book left in it.... This is a shame." The Mukhtara then began speaking again: "We lost about 20000 olive trees...what a loss! The age of every tree was not less than 50 years and some of the trees were 400 years old. The more the olive tree gets older the more fruit it bears." ("An Nidaa" newspaper, 5/21/1978) Aziz Hawil from Sarifa (15 years) said, "The Israelis were throwing down 'reservoirs' that would explode. They threw down pens and exploding toys. When Kamal el-Din, who is of my age, picked up a toy, shining like gold, it exploded in his hand, and he was wounded in his leg and eyes. Hussein Awad was also hit and had a broken leg. So was Ali Eid (10 years) and his condition is grave." (Testimony received by Zahra Mir'i of "An Nidaa" newspaper, 3/20/1978) The correspondent of "An Nahar" newspaper Sa'id Meallawi: "Rashaya el-Fokhar was subjected to a total assination attempt. Neither the people, nor the church or houses or trees were saved. What the airforce's shells forgot, the Israeli bulldozers remembered, and wiped out the towns landmarks. "There is no road to Rashaya and anyone going there should infiltrate. Mountainous paths are not easy to cross. Anyone entering Rashaya would have to pass along the cemetery path where the dead bodies' smell spreads, and where some bodies appear wrapped in blankets. They are thought to belong to the victims of the church shelling two days before the occupation. After that, you see a destroyed jeep left over by the Israelis near the fountain at the entrance of the town. You see on the roadblocks.... The asphalted road is filled with debris, while commercial stores and even complete streets have disappeared. Even churches were looted and shelled and electricity poles stretched on the street far away from their positions." ("An Nahar" newspaper, 4/17/1978) Suleiman Sheddad says, "In Ibl el-Saki there are 300 houses, 90 of which have become uninhabitable. Most of them have brick foundations, and houses were either mined or blown up, and the rest destroyed. Ibl el-Saki used to yield a yearly crop of 100 oil Kantars. The olives and the oil are gone, and 3 artesian wells are out of use." ("An Nidaa" newspaper, 5/21/1978) Wafika Hammoud told us, "They were not satisfied with destroying, but they bulldozed the ruins. They want to hide the traces of their crimes. We lost four killed. Three of my nephews were taken away to Israel, and we know nothing about them." ("An Nidaa" newspaper team, 4/25/1978) Weizmann's testimony: Eizer Weizmann, the Israeli Defense Minister, told Knesset members of the Halikoud bloc during a heated session on 3/21/1978, in the wake of the criticism directed against the Israeli soldiers asking us, 'Were there any civilians killed during from A to Z. Mahmoud Sabri from El-Kantara said, "We met him at the desk." 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Lebanon

Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Lebanon

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children and his pregnant wife. The planes hit them and turned them into bones. Darwish's mother buried him and his family in the lot of land near their house. She made her cupboard a coffin for the bones. Poor mother of Darwish, she buried Darwish who was torn up in pieces." (Interview made by Alawi Sobh, "An Nida" newspaper, 3/29/1978)

"Engineers say that mines are not always the worst problem. They are usually of the type directed against groups, and they are planted in areas that become occupied and in places where they may be seen. But the problem lies in finding the time to discover all those mines before they explode. Israeli troops planted around 5000 or 6000 mines of the 'mice-trap' type, and 2000 of them were rendered ineffective. The real problem is the presence of a number of rockets, shells and cluster bombs spread at random in the different parts of the region. French engineers have already exploded 2889 cluster bombs, 856 rockets and shells, and defused 2172 mines. Engineers say there are still unexploded mines and shells that would make a whole unit busy for several years." ("An Nahar" newspaper, 7/6/1978, from the "weekly report of the UN troops command in Lebanon about the work of the French engineering unit specialized in finding and defusing mines and planted bombs in the regions of Juwaya, Ghandoor, Arzoun, and Derdeghia.") Haji Abdel Hassan Waafa, Mukhtar of Bazouria, said, "Israel came with her missiles and planes, and the shelling of the town went on for three and one-third hours.... When they occupied the southern part of the town, large numbers of tanks and armored vehicles entered. We had never seen such a thing before. The Israelis began searching the houses, putting everything in disorder.... Eight days after their entry into the town, they blew up 10 houses, looted commercial stores and stole 40 chairs from the Husseiniya." ("An Nida" newspaper, 5/21/1978) The fire which Israeli occupation forces caused by firing phosphorus bombs at the forests and plantations of Rashaya el-Fokhar was extended to the plantations of Ibl el-Saki, Khiyam and the Hasbani river course. This took place in the presence of the UN troops. (Report from Jamila Hussein in Hasbaya to "An Nida," 5/27/1978)

Massoud Jarada (75 years, Rashaya al-Fokhar, said, "On the morning of 3/15/1978, the Israeli attack began. I went out with my wife and the town's inhabitants to take refuge in the church, hoping Israel would not shell places of worship. What happened was that the shelling was concentrated on the church - where the people took refuge. The shelling was fierce, and the people started running out of the church. Only persons who stayed in there were the aged people.... After the shelling ceased, the search for the lost persons began. I could not find my wife. On that sad day many people died, and we found their bodies inside the church and outside it. My wife's body was found burned inside the church." ("An Nida" newspaper, 5/17/1978, interview made by Diab Kursaifi) The priest Marouni, in the Maronite bishopric in Tyre, said, "The attack was very fierce. There are still persons of the Mufid family under the debris after their house fell on them. The Israeli shelling from gunboats was also directed against the nuns' schools of St. Joseph and the Bishara Church....." ("An Nida" newspaper, 3/23/1978, interview made by Ahmed Manfashi) Zeinab Kansou (11 years) said, "Israel drove us away from our houses after she destroyed half of them with her planes. I don't like her at all. When the bomb was falling I would open my mouth in order not to die from the pressure. Until now, the buzz of planes is still in my ears." ("An Nida" newspaper, 3/22/1978) A woman refugee from the town of Bint Jbeil said,"I was surprised. I didn't know it was the war until the parachutists landed in the streets of the village. They killed my husband and my brother without my knowing how. I didn't see them. The tanks in the streets ordered the inhabitants to come out of their houses with their hands up. They did. But Khodr did not heed the order and ran towards his house. A tank followed him and ordered him to come out with his hands up. Khodr came out with his hands behind his back. The tank fired its gun at him and Khodr fell at the doorstep of his house. Later, masked men came to search the men and their bodies for signs showing they had participated in fighting against the Zionists. Afterwards, bullets started raining, I do not know who among the men died." ("An Nida" newspaper, 3/28/1978) [7]


The campaign had begun 7/11/93 and was to last through 8/19/93.

"Now the main problem in terms of human rights is related to the situation in Lebanon. We also feel that right now that is what all the Israeli public and international media is concerned about," said campaign leader Eitan Felher.

In condemnation of the disregard for open-fire regulations and the unprecedented number of Palestinian children killed from 12/9/92 to 6/8/93, B'Tselem had organized several actions, most important of which was a discussion in the Knesset 7/22/93 among members of Meretz, Labor, Hadash, the Arab Democratic Party and the Likud.

No agreement was reached by the groups.

Felher told Al-Fajr, "It is not enough that people discuss. In the end, there must be some concrete steps."

"The main purpose of the campaign - changing the policy so that the killing will be stopped - has not been achieved yet," he noted.

He explained that the activities will resume when the situation in Lebanon calms down. [7]

30055. Greenberger, Robert S. "Rock and Roll Seems Here To Stay In Assad's Syria; Small Potatoes and Derivative, It Has State's sanction If It Steers Clear of Politic", in Wall Street Journal, January 21, 1994, p. A1. "Rock is widely played in Syria in both live performances and in recorded form as long as it is as apolitical as it is in the West. Using the media for dissident speedily ends the careers of performers, in Syria as elsewhere. Many rock performers supplement their music income by having other jobs (one prominent rocker, Ammar Alani, is a dentist). Elvis is king, but local black-fingermailed rocker Sally al-Shreiki gave a dramatic performance at the Russian Cultural Center. Her group, More Guts, plays songs by Nirvana, Ozzy Osborne and Metallica. Her goal is an all girl group. The grandfather of Syrian Rock is Rockestra, which pioneered the use of lights, smoke machines and large speakers. In the 1960s, the major bands were Dynamite and Bluebats. In 1968, Johnny Komives, a Hungarian-Syrian drummer, started a rock band named Tigers; he had learned the styles of the Beatles, Presley and Bill Haley and the Comets in Beirut. Syrian markets are filled with bootleg audio CDs, ranging from Bob Dylan to Meatloaf. The Syrian rock scene is drug free, but beer flows freely; most of the musicians are dedicated amateurs (many loaning each other the very expensive musical equipment). Some musicians are mild peace activists, hoping for a peace with Israel. At the same time, a quarter of music requests to Damascus TV show 'Letters & Songs' are for rockers such as Elton John, Iron Maiden and Guns'n Roses. Local photographers Hallah al-Faysal has shocked people with nude self-portraits, and Damascus talk radio features people denouncing higher prices."

30056. Ibrahim, Mohammed. "Letter to Hillary from a Lebanese Child", in Crecent Ibrahim, International, September 1-15, 1996, p. 6. Dear First Lady: I am lying in hospital with multiple wounds and dying. I am too young to have committed any crime and therefore do not deserve the punishment that has been meted out to me. I write to you because you are a mother and you have a child. Perhaps you can understand a little of what my mother is going through now. She is sitting next to my bed crying. She tries to smile at me through her tears. When I used to fall or get hurt, my Mama would kiss my hurt and the pain would feel so much better. But now even though she smothers me with her love and kisses, the pain I have is too much for my small body to bear. There are all sorts of tubes going in and out of me. On 4/18/96, I was rushed into surgery when I was a discussion in the Knesset 7/22/93 among members of Meretz, Labor, Hadash, the Arab Democratic Party and the Likud. No agreement was reached by the groups.

"The main purpose of the campaign - changing the policy so that the killing will be stopped - has not been achieved yet," he noted. He explained that the activities will resume when the situation in Lebanon calms down. [7]
20059. Lebrecht, Hans. "Israeli Communists Protest Attacks in Lebanon", in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), May 4, 1996, p. 14. The Israeli Communist Party condemned the Israeli attack on Lebanon in a statement that read, in part: "The Labor-Metzger government loaded celebrations for the 48th Independence Day with the heavy burden of a dreadful war in Lebanon [which killed] hundreds... Contrary to what the government alleges, this war is endangering the lives of the residents of Galilee. Therefore, the CPI calls upon all Jewish and Arab Peace forces to act with all their might to stop the war in Lebanon, to [remove] the Israeli army [from Lebanon], and struggle for peace without occupation to be negotiated with Syria and Lebanon. The CPI, together with her front-partners of Democratic Hadash, in common with [those] concerned about the future of the peoples [of the Middle East] will tirelessly act for rescinding the closure that starves the Palestinian population in the 'territories', for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the capital of which will be eastern Jerusalem, side by side with the state of Israel. The CPI will continue to head the struggle for a democratic, just and equal society, fight against the privatization as well as against curtailting the rights of the working masses and women, and struggle for full equal rights of the Arab population in Israel." The statement as condemned the Israeli government for 'driving out 500000 Lebanese from their homes as well as for the horrible massacre of refugees at the Kana-Kaf [Qana] UNIFIL camp. [TEXT]

20060. Lebrecht, Hans. "Protest Against Israeli Bombing Spreads", in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), April 27, 1996, p. 4. There has been more protests in Israel after the massacre of Lebanese refugees at the Qana refugee at the UNIFIL camp. The dissent is mainly among the 18% of the Israelis who are Arabs. The refugees had fled their village by earlier Israeli artillery attacks. During the first eleven days of this attack on Lebanon, some 500000 refugees have been forced from their homes by more than 18000 artillery shells and airraids. Lebanese authorities estimate that 330 civilians have been killed so far. The economic infrastructure of southern Lebanon has been almost completely destroyed. The Clinton Administration has supported this new Israeli attack on Lebanon. A general strike was organized by the Monitor Committee of the Arabs in Israel. Demonstrations and mourning ceremonies have been conducted in major Arab villages and towns in Israel. The largest Arab demonstration was in Nazareth, which even included a few Jews from Nazareth-Elit and Haifa. Nazareth Mayor Ramon Jereissi, a member of Hadash, representatives of the Democratic Womens Movement, and Hadash chairman Hashem Mahameed called on Peres to return to peace talks, end the closure of the Occupied Territories, and to withdraw from all Occupied Territories. The massive demonstration in Nazareth was attacked on three sides by Israeli police and border guards, who tear gassed people and beat many. Many demonstrators were severely injured. In Kafr-Kana, near Nazareth, Mahameed, Hadash member of Knesset Tamar Gozansky, Communist Party of Israel General Secretary Muhammad Nafa'a, and former CPI General Secretary Meir Vilner conducted addressed protesters, denouncing Israeli atrocities and recalling that Hadash and the Communist Party were the first political parties to criticize the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. [TEXT]
We were interrupted by a female employee who told us smoking was forbidden in the restaurant. "Oh, is it?" I replied, feigning innocence. "Sorry about that. I promise I won't smoke any more after I've finished this cigarette." Since, from her accent, she was obviously not Swedish, I went on: "Where are you from?" "Beirut, Lebanon," and, curiously and curiously, "Burj al-Barajneh"—the same refugee camp in which Rawia had lived.

I took a back seat while Rawia and she jabbered away in a flood of Arabic, until I noticed her look at me and ask Rawia a question which made her burst into laughter. I asked Rawia the cause for her mirth. "She wants to know whether you are also a Palestinian from Beirut." I joined in the laughter, and thoroughly enjoyed the woman's consternation when I replied that I was not only not a Palestinian, but a South African, Jewish, and presently living in ISRAEL!

Rawia spoke about her life with her family in a P.L.O. refugee camp in Lebanon. Rawia's parents formerly lived in a village in the Galilee, like their parents and grandparents, for many generations. During Israel's War of Independence in 1948, Rawia's parents, sister and two brothers moved to Lebanon, like thousands of other Palestinians, and were housed by the P.L.O. and UNWRA. Rawia was born in the village of Tel ez-Zatar, where her mother worked in a textile factory, and her father opened a bakery. Life was comparatively comfortable and Peaceful until 1976, when Lebanese Phalangists (Para-militia squads of ruling Maronits in Lebanon) attacked the village. Rawia's family moved to Burj el Barajneh and again took up the threads of a relatively normal life.

When she was ten years old, Shi'ites bombed Burj al-Barajneh, relentlessly and ceaselessly, day after day after day, until the place was a shambles of havoc and destruction. A mass of dead bodies lay in the streets, a mass of wounded, people bleeding, people with shattered limbs, people crying for help, for water. But there was no help, no food, no water, no medical supplies. There were just skeletons of what had been homes and shops, and broken water pipes, with the precious liquid gushing out into the gutters. Those who were able to do so, walked or crawled and helped those who could not, to get out of the inferno in which men, women and children were being callously and wantonly murdered.

Rawia's mother, who had sustained "only" a shattered forearm, was one of the ambulatoires who went in search of water, in search of anything to relieve the horrible suffering and anguish. All the men were taken away, including Rawia's father, and were never seen or heard of again. Her old and ailing grandfather was the only male survivor of her family.

30063. Lentan, Esther. "The story of a Palestinian woman in exile: Neither Kings nor Princes nor Politicians: Part 3", in Challenge, January-February, 1992, p. 35. Rawia is very much afraid that the Palestinians will be sold down the river by those who agree to a peace conference which excludes the P.L.O. "We are being used by the princes and kings and politicians for their own political ends. We do not want, nor do we need, others to speak for us. We can speak for ourselves. We want to control our own destiny and not have our destiny decided by those who would use us for their own devious political purposes and betray us or jettison us when our usefulness has been exhausted." [Esther Levitan is a member of the African National Congress] [\red]

30064. Misailides, Bobbis. "Coalition Government Collapses In Turkey", in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), July 1, 1996, p. 3. The three-month-old coalition government of the Motherland and the True Path parties collapsed in Turkey June 6 after Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz resigned. Yilmaz stepped down in the face of a no-confidence motion put forward by Necmettin Erbakan's Refah (Welfare) party, which is described in the big-business media as the party of "Islamic fundamentalism." The minority capitalist-coalition government was put together in March to keep Refah (RP) from power after the party came in first in December's general election, capturing 158 of the total 550 seats in parliament. Both the Motherland Party (ANAP) and Tansu Ciller's True Path Party (DYP) are posing as the defenders of secular Turkey. The fall of the bourgeois government in Turkey registered the crisis the rulers face in their capacity to form a regime stable enough to impose further austerity measures on workers and farmers, and to continue their bloody war against Turkey's Kurdish population. The insecurity felt by capitalist interests was registered by a sharp drop in Istanbul's stock exchange. "The only news is bad news," said Atlıla Yesilada of Global Securities. "But if we haven't reached the bottom we are probably very close to it." The Turkish lira fell to 78340 against the dollar while average annual inflation is running at nearly 60%. Since taking office, Yilmaz promised Turkey's capitalist families, the International Monetary Fund and imperialist banks which are pushing to collect Turkey's nearly $74 billion foreign debt, that his government will squeeze working people further. He announced a package of austerity measures that included steep tax increases, cuts in health care, and the raising of the retirement age to 65 years for men and 60 for women. He vowed to continue the privatization of state owned industries such as the Turpas oil refinery, the pharmaceutical company Pefkim, and Turkish Airlines. Half of Turkey's manufacturing industry and 60% of its financial sector are owned by the state. Since modern Turkey emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman empire in the 1920's, tobacco, oil, shipbuilding, and...
Austerity measures similar to those Yilmaz tried to push through, were attempted by previous governments, including the one of Ciller. These attacks faced widespread resentment among working people and provoked strike mobilizations that eventually led to the downfall of her government last October. On May Day, tens of thousands of working people gathered at Kadikoy square in Istanbul to celebrate this international day of struggle and to protest Yilmaz's austerity attacks. The protest, which was declared illegal by the government, was organized by the General Workers Federation Turk Is, the illegal Federation of Public Workers, the Revolutionary Workers Union Federation DISK, and the labor federation Hak Is, which politically looks to Refah. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is banned, also participated with its own banners. The police attacked the protest brutally, killing three people and wounding 45. The cops arrested some 220 unionists.

Turkey's capitalist rulers have also failed to stop the resistance of Kurds for their national rights, which is centered in the southeastern part of the country. This region is being ruled under "state of emergency" measures. Estimates of the Kurdish population range between 10-20 million among the country's 63 million people (no official census identifying Kurds is allowed). Poverty and the war by Turkey's army have forced millions of Kurds from the countryside into the shantytowns around the big cities. Istanbul's population, for example, is growing by an estimated 400,000 people per year, many of them Kurds. A report from the UN "Habitat Summit" held in Istanbul on June 6, said that "the migration has fostered a discontented and explosive population that is growing by the day in Turkey's major cities." This growing discontent among Turkey's workers and peasants was registered in the growth of Erbakan's Welfare party. In scattered local elections held on June 3, the Refah gained 33.5% of the vote in 41 local polls across Turkey. It increased its vote by 3.5% over what it received in the same districts in the December general elections at the expense of the ruling bourgeois coalition. The ANAP came in second with 21%, while the DYP trailed third with 12%. Refah has presented itself as the voice of the poor in the ghettos of the cities and the impoverished peasants in the countryside. Leaders of the party oppose imperialist intervention in Arab countries. They denounced the recent massive bombing of Lebanon by the Zionist regime in Israel. The party's vice-president Abdullah Gul said on June 9 that an RP government would cancel the recent five-year military cooperation agreement between Israel and Turkey, which was backed by Washington. The government crisis was precipitated by charges of corruption brought against Ciller by Refah deputies. Motherland decided to support the corruption probes against its coalition partner. Ciller is accused of making millions for her personal coffers from sales of state-owned industries during the privatization campaign by her government. After the resignation of Yilmaz, Erbakan proclaimed victory. "By the end of June," he said, "the RP will form a government that will receive a vote of confidence." Erbakan called both ANAP and DYP to participate in his new government.

30065. Montell, Jessie. "The Fertility Imperative: Part 3", in Challenge, September-October, 1992, p. 25. There are certain ideological checks upon Israel's "cult of fertility." A regulation instituted in 1989 states that artificial insemination (a highly accessible technology which can be performed without medical assistance) can only be conducted in recognized clinics. The regulation further stipulates that all unmarried women seeking artificial insemination will need to obtain the approval of a psychiatrist and a social worker. Professor Shenkar, director of the artificial insemination clinic at Hadassah Hospital, Ein Karen stated in an interview that lesbians "will not fulfill the hospital's criteria."

Israel, it appears, is only interested in Jewish babies produced within the heterosexual nuclear family. While an unmarried heterosexual or lesbian woman who has children may be fulfilling her "duty to reproduce, she is not fulfilling her duty to become part of a family unit in the patriarchal definition of the word and thus she constitutes a threat to the ideology of Jewish national reproduction.

The priority Israel gives to reproduction and fertility does result in some legislation beneficial to women. Regarding employment, for example, the Women's Employment Act of 1954 protects a woman from being fired during pregnancy and grants a 12-week paid maternity leave, as well as paid absences for postnatal care and nursing of the infant. None of these absences can damage a woman's seniority or her promotion rights. A woman who does not work outside the home is defined as a "housewife" under the National Insurance Law of 1968 and is entitled to such benefits as accident insurance and a retirement pension just like any other worker. In certain instances, women organizing politically have also benefited from the familialistic orientation of Israeli society. Although the feminist campaign to raise the issue of domestic violence initially provoked ridicule and disbelief, it eventually succeeded in garnering the support of a broad spectrum of government agencies and women's organizations - as soon as domestic violence came to be understood as a threat to the primacy of motherhood and the stability of the family.

Women's anti-war activism also successfully capitalized on the cultural symbolism of motherhood. "Parents Against Silence," one of two major anti-war movements demanding withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon in 1983-4, came to be known as "Mothers Against Silence," because the majority of the members and leaders were women. The name evokes the powerful symbolic foundation: women protesting against war becomes an extension of their culturally assigned role of life-givers. And in fact these women claim that they were protesting out of concern for the safety of their sons; they were protesting not as activists, not as feminists, but as mothers.

While feminism made some inroads into these priorities, a woman without children in Israeli society - even a well educated woman - is a source of pity. The demographic race is no more a solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict than is the military race. Women's voices against both these races must be clearly heard.[=]
ton countries in South-East Asia. In both periods, this exploited labour force did not lead to the creation of a permanent under-class of migrants in the way that US capital created a black under-class. This was because the exploitation of migrants was not based primarily on physical differences, but rather on their lack of English. While Vietnamese refugees can be found in sweatshops and on factory floors along with migrants from eastern Europe, non-English speaking migrants tend to be concentrated in menial, low-paid jobs. English-speaking migrants are more commonly located in the higher paying professions. The cultural and linguistic barriers that provide the basis for the super-exploitation of migrants are overcome through the generations.

Institutional barriers do not prevent second and third generation migrants, who have acquired language skills, from entering professions. The children of migrants, in other words, are native-born Australians. Aborigines, despite their tens of thousands of years in Australia, were not even legally citizens until the 1967 referendum. Racial prejudice against migrants of colour does not of course always provide a direct and immediate material benefit to someone. On arrival in Australia, many Indians and Japanese do not join the super-exploited layers of the work force, yet they may still face some discrimination. Some interpret this prejudice as the product of another individual’s ignorance. But such “personal” prejudice is a by-product of the institutionalised racism that serves material interests. If we are serious about fighting racism, we have to be willing to challenge the ruling class which uses it to divide people who have common interests. Similarly, in tackling sexism, we have to challenge the same system, which creates and perpetuates the structured inequality between men and women. The historical exclusion of women from education, the lack of publicly funded child-care facilities, which forces women to stay at home, and the systematic underpayment of women are examples of how discrimination against women is structured into the system. By defining woman’s primary role as housewife and mother, capitalism profits enormously from women’s unpaid social labour. Thus sexism, like racism, has a material base in the drive of capital to make super-profits. We need independent women’s and anti-racist movements to challenge and change this situation. When women have organised themselves independently of the major political parties, they have been very successful in winning changes. Pressure from the second wave of the women’s movement in the 1970s forced governments to introduce a range of legal reforms relating to women’s wages, access to education and better employment opportunities. The Jobs For Women campaign which recently won its 14-year anti-discrimination battle against BHP shows that women organising in defence of their interests is essential for change. People of colour also have to organise together in anti-racist movements to bring about change. The mass black liberation movement in the US played a major role in raising consciousness about, and opposition to, racism. In Australia, Aboriginal people have been able to win reforms through their organisation in land rights and other movements. Focusing on personal prejudice within small groups, such as feminist collectives, does nothing to alter the power relations of society. Mass movements which challenge the structures and institutions of racism are the most effective way of breaking down the root cause of personal prejudice.

It is only in this context that consciousness raising can occur on a large scale: people change their attitudes through action, not through being told how racist they are. Today, in the absence of anti-racist and women’s movements, academic postmodernist theories have influenced much thinking about sexism and racism, persuading many people that mass action is irrelevant to political strategy. Postmodernists argue that the whole concept of a unified mass movement is “phallic” and “problematic”. They say that solidarity and sisterhood are just another way of using “discourse” to “mask power relations”, and that because women come from such different class and racial backgrounds there can be no solidarity. We need to reject romanticised ideas that seek to present all women as equally oppressed. However, we will not be able to defeat sexism and racism unless we do unite in a mass way to fight back. Sisterhood, as an expression of political solidarity, is something we can unite around. While the strength of the women’s movement comes from its autonomy, this does not mean that it can fight sexism in isolation from other progressive movements. The strength of each movement for human liberation comes from other movements which also challenge the common enemy. This is the important connection between the women’s, the anti-racist and the workers’ movements. [=]

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party line are expressed through the American Jewish media, or through membership in communal organizations, censorship and an attempted imposition of orthodoxy will simply not work. The changes taking place are positive ones, for the most part, as they express the desire of most American Jews to live—and think, and express themselves—as Americans first. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir urges Jewish journalists to “exercise caution” when reporting on Israel. [ ]

30068. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Forum 85, Nairobi, Kenya: The Women's Decade: Filmforum: Skirting the Issue: Government Confiscation of the Motion Picture 'Leila and the Wolves", in Connexions. An International Women's Quarterly, numbers 17-18, October 1, 1985. pp. 20-21. Leila and the Wolves by Lebanese director Heiny Srour had passed the censors and was scheduled to be screened the second to the last day of the Forum. A good-sized crowd had turned out to see this provocative film on the history of Lebanese and Palestinian women only to discover that it had been confiscated by the Censorship Board.

This unfortunate incident symbolized the merging of two battles that had permeated the conference for ten days: the exercising of censorship by the Kenyan government and the conflict in the Middle East. The comprehensive film schedule, which revealed excessive preparation, had been made worthless by the Kenyan Censorship Board. Daily there was talk of some film being censored or detained. Concurrently, heated exchanges were taking place over the situation in the Middle East. Not only could no middle ground be reached, but most mention of Palestine or Israel deteriorated into argument, accusation or denial. The Kenyan government appeared to panic over the ongoing battle between Palestinians and Zionists.

It was in this atmosphere that Leila and the Wolves was withdrawn. Regarding the issue of censorship, it became the straw that broke the camel's back. During the entire conference participants and organizers had been frustrated by never knowing from day to day which films would be screened. Furthermore, the NGO Organizing Committee would not take a stand against censorship. Instead, the attitude that "these are the rules and we must not object because we are guests" was put forth by the Committee as well as the Forum newspaper. The act of censorship was not questioned and, indeed, even discussing the issue became taboo.

The following is a transcript of a spontaneous demonstration which took place after everyone heard that the film had been confiscated. While at the movie theater, a petition was immediately drafted. The audience then debated what plan of action should be taken. Some wanted to march to the Censorship Board, others wanted to return to the Forum site to collect more people. The fact that demonstrations are illegal put a damper on the first suggestion. So everyone returned to the Forum, where the shouting attracted Dame Nita Barrow, the NGO convener. The article begins with the director addressing the crowd outside in the main organizers of the Filmforum, Mrs. Hannah Fisher, gave a priority list to Lebanon. And I would like to say that a similar film on the history of Israeli women called Anou Banou was screened without any problem. Now please listen to Dame Nita Barrow who has been doing everything she can since this morning to release the film. And she’s on our side.

Dame Nita Barrow: May I ask that women of this Forum please return with me to the Peace Tent where I can speak with you over a microphone there. The Peace Tent has been put here as a place to resolve differences. There have been many problems in relation to the films. We are more aware of them than any of you could be.

[After assembling in the Peace Tent] Please take every man I see out of here. I say out of here and I mean out of here. Please get the man out of the back of this tent. You women are marching about the wrong things. You should be marching for the privilege to be able to resolve your differences yourselves. Get the men out of the tent. If there are any men in any sight of the tent, this meeting cannot go on. If those men do not move, find security immediately and say that the problem I have is not with the women of the Forum, it is with the men who refuse to do what we ask.

Members of the Crowd: You’re diluting the issue. Let’s get to the background of this.

Dame Nita Barrow: I’m fully prepared to have the background, but first I would just like to ask what purpose you expect to achieve when you go out of the grounds of this University. Because in this country, which I’ve made clear and I repeated this morning several times, you have no right to march unless you obtain official permission. As long as you are on the grounds of the University, you are under a certain amount of protection.

If you have a question to discuss, as I have been discussing all day about this particular film, then we find alternatives. If there are no alternatives, we find what steps we can take. I hear hotheads saying it is the government, it is the films, we want the films. Do you really believe that by marching out of here downtown you’re going to get the films?

Members of the Crowd: Do you really think we'll get it by talking here?

Dame Nita Barrow: You may not get it by talking here, but you have far more chance of getting it talking as we are doing. You are not going to get it shown, I can assure you. You might not even get it back; and I know and respect this producer. In fact I was delighted when she came. She stated to me early this morning that her film had first passed and then they had come and taken it away and removed the passing.

I hope she told you that it was because some women had violated something that we worked very hard to obtain, that the films would be passed by documentation to expedite them. The documentation was taken at face-value. And as I have found out, some of her own countrywomen showed a film which violated that. Now I hope she told you that. As a consequence, she has suffered with a film that is very good. But let me say now, that it is not going to increase any chances if you proceed to march. It puts you in personal jeopardy. I only wish that those who wish to march so after I’ve explained the case. But as you leave you leave by one entrance and you give up your Forum badge because you are not marching in the name of the Forum.

Now I want to be clear. I have no protective rights over you. The choice is yours. Alternatively we can get a caucus on what is to be done. We still have 24 more hours. The floor is over to you.

[Hubbub from the crowd] I'm not having a cacophony of sound. One person at a time can speak. After that those who wish to march can proceed to do so. We'll have your badges collected.

Heiny Srour: Sisters, I'm going to explain the case. Now the organizers of the Filmforum, Mrs. Hannah Fisher, gave a priority list to the Kenyan government three days ago. It included my film so they would have enough time to screen it. Two days ago we had a piece of paper stating it had cleared the Kenyan Censorship Board. And then 24 hours later, they came to the premises of the Kenyan National Theater, right here at the University, and took the copy by force. And that you have to know is illegal. They have no right whatsoever to take back a copy which does not belong to them.

Dame Nita Barrow: Just a moment. Just a moment.

Heiny Srour: With respect, Dame Nita, really, honestly. Thank you very much for everything you are doing. I know you have been working on this case since the morning, but I think it is also, with respect to everything you've said, a fact that the Kenyan government is doing something illegal by taking the film forcibly after having given their permission to show it.

Now I heard, and I don't know the facts, so maybe you will be able to document this. I heard that in fact they are withdrawing this film because some Lebanese women showed a film about the issue of the Lebanese war and the Israeli invasion. I don't know what happened. But I know certainly something, which is that I am part of the Filmforum. I am part of nothing else. I am a filmmaker; I am an artist. Now why on earth...
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is it that a film showing the contribution of Arab women in history is not shown?

I think that the whole issue of censorship first should be opposed, whether for me or for the rest of my colleagues in the Filmforum who have been censored, especially the video filmmakers. First of all the issue of censorship is wrong because I happen to believe that we are old enough to make up our minds and we shouldn't be treated like little girls. I think it is extremely insulting. Number two, on this particular film, I think the Kenyan government ought to respect themselves enough that once they have given the agreement on paper to show it two days ago, they should stick by that. I don't know whether it is true that other Lebanese women violated the laws or didn't violate the laws. I know one thing. I am part of the Filmforum and I should not be punished as a Lebanese for mistakes other Lebanese have or have not made. I just cannot accept this logic. I will also not accept that an Israeli woman makes a mistake and that other Israeli women get punished. That's wrong.

My issue is not just over my film being censored and being withheld illegally. I am sick, me and all the women filmmakers, and I would like them all to speak. All the women filmmakers who came from all over the world to show their videos and films are sick and tired of the disruption of the Filmforum because the Kenyan government has been treating us like little children who are not adult enough to make up our own minds. It is sad that on an occasion like this, when women are coming from all over the world, and it's a very exceptional occasion, we are going to be censored and treated like little children. On which occasion on earth are women not going to be censored? This is the whole issue quite frankly. Censorship touches all women, so I would now like to debate this important issue here.

Dame Nita Barrow: I'm sorry, the Peace Tent is closed to that debate because for us the issue of censorship has been an ongoing battle. And what is more, the people who brought things here knew there was censorship. We have tried to short-circuit it.


30069. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Introduction: Women and Militarism: We're in the Army Now," in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 11, December 1, 1984, pp. 2-3. The US invasion of Grenada has faded from the front pages to be replaced by the latest casualty reports in Lebanon. As the year draws to a close, the cruise missiles have arrived at Ghelmom, the Common, the Soviets have walked out of the Geneva arms talks, and the largest peace demonstrations since WWII have taken place in Europe. The screaming headlines have ignored or successfully de-emphasized are the multitude of wars that have been continuing for days, months, years--in which the major involvement of the US and other industrial nations has been that of supplier of arms.

In this issue we present examples of how militarism affects women's lives, how we as women suffer from the act of war and how we perpetuate it. While putting together this issue our discussions revolved around the complexity of militarism, the nature of its power and its relationship to women.

Militarism is a deeply embedded, ongoing set of processes which operate long before and long after actual battles are fought. Women's role is often portrayed as secondary to the serious business of soldiering. However, without participation, the institution of militarism would come to a grinding halt. Once we recognize the active roles that women play, we can begin to see the many possible ways that militarism can be challenged.

Militarism is directly supported by the ever-expanding arms industry, which encompasses a vast number of jobs both directly and indirectly connected to actual arms production. Such diverse fields as computer science, medicine, communications, nuclear technology and the food industry are part of this huge network which also includes arms trading, storage and transport industries. The weapons industry is dependent upon the civilian sector for labor, and women are there--in offices, labs, warehouses, hospitals and on factory floors.

In 1982, the US, the world's leading arms exporter, supplied one and a half times more weapons to other countries than did the USSR. Weapon manufacturers and supplies worldwide sell to any nation or group wanting to buy, regardless of where they sit on the political spectrum. Like any other item produced in our consumer society, markets for the endless surplus of weapons must be found. The drive for political and economic control, national security, or liberation struggles provide these markets, and when they falter, the suppliers encourage them.

Militarism is also linked to the consumer practices of our society. A standard of living that makes extravagant use of resources encourages industrial nations to look constantly for newer and cheaper sources of raw materials and goods. We continually see the pattern repeated: multinationalis appropriate arable land that was once used to grow basic foodstuffs. The power of multinationalis is stronger than the pressure of a country of people, which is why they can exert to oppose this trend. To fully assure the Peoples continence acquiescence to the needs of multinationals, military force or the threat of force is often required, for it takes guns as well as money to make people act against their own interests.

Beyond the economic factors which militarize society, an ideological support system is needed to mobilize Peoples hearts and minds to the diverse needs of militarism. Every nation on earth uses propaganda to direct its citizens to “direct” behavior. For nations whose streets are free of battle, propaganda is used to make militarism attractive. In other countries, where war is not an event seen only on television, the luxury of not being involved is no longer there.

Propaganda formulates several categories for women in order to provide incentives and support to soldiers. They are cast as wives, mothers, sweethearts, prostitutes, and nurses--or as the enemy, justifying rape, mutilation and murder, any of which is likely to earn a soldier respect and medals. The roles propaganda assigns to women, and that women play voluntarily or involuntarily, not only help to justify but also motivate soldiers to play theirs.

Besides its mobilizing function, propaganda in its less direct forms provides an even more subtle yet equally vital service for the military, and thus militarism. Suffused throughout the society at large, propaganda at this level is designed to construct a social reality in which the presence of the military is seen as a normal, essential and familiar point of reference in daily life. Absorbed throughout the society, militarism as a "mindset" appears in language, fashion, games, etc.

If the militarization of a society, economically, psychologically and ideologically, is a concrete reality of militarism, it is also then a state of war. Indeed actual combat is but one facet of war. Seen this way, there are very few countries that are not in some way at war. For example, in 1982, the US, the world's leading arms exporter, supplied one and a half times more weapons to other countries than did the USSR.

And is the war really over when the gunfire has stopped? Can the war be said to have ended when the government announces a cease-fire? Does the war end when the soldiers are withdrawn from the battlefield? Or when the armistice is signed? Is the war really over when the politician declares the war to be over? Is the war really over when the trade embargo is lifted? Is the war really over when the withdrawal of military forces and the release of prisoners is announced? Is the war really over when the victims demand peace?Can the war be said to have ended when the government announces a cease-fire? Does the war end when the soldier is withdrawn from the battlefield? Or when the armistice is signed? Is the war really over when the politician declares the war to be over? Is the war really over when the trade embargo is lifted? Is the war really over when the withdrawal of military forces and the release of prisoners is announced? Is the war really over when the victims demand peace?
Q: How effective is the women's organisation?
A: From 1982-87 the splits in the PLO affected our struggle and the masses, especially women. Women play an active role in all the uprisings of our people, but when there are political and military defeats the women go back to their homes. We are pioneers, wanting to mobilise women again, to return their confidence in the revolution and the hopes which began with the revolution. Many women lost their hopes with the splits in the PLO and the besieging of the camps in Lebanon. In Lebanon our women are sharing and defending the camps which are besieged, defending our national identity and not just providing material support.

In Syria and other parts of the Arab World we are far from the hot spots, but we have had good results. After the restoration of the PLO more women were participating, but since the beginning of the present uprising in the Occupied Territories a big change has happened among our masses in general. Among women it is very clear, they are passionately with the Uprising. The important thing now is how to mobilise that passion.

Q: What effect is the Uprising having on women living outside Palestine?
A: People in the Occupied Territories are very well organised; everyone has a role. Do you know that from the beginning of the Uprising until June 4, 728 women have had miscarriages because of tear gas or beatings? This and other news really affected our women, really mobilised them. They want to do something. What we as an organisation have to do is give them an answer in an organised way. Many women are sharing in strikes outside the Red Cross and United Nations offices, and they are celebrating important days such as International Women's Day. On June 1, International Child Day, we organised a camp for children. The children went to UNICEF with a declaration and flowers to take to the children in Palestine via UNICEF officials. The children were only able to participate with the support of their mothers. The number of children killed in the Uprising is 52, ranging from children a few days old to fifteen years old. Two days ago (June 11) in the Gaza Strip people discovered a three-year-old child thrown in a well.

Q: What support can women here give?
A: Spread the word about what is going on, but not just what we say, try to go in groups and visit the area. We are in need of doctors and medicine for the thousands who have been injured. Milk is also needed and support for universities, kindergartens, nurseries.

Further Reading: "Water, Bread, and Mortar Shells," Connexions n. 26, 1988 [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.1=[-]

30071. Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Woman, Mother, Organizer, Hijacker: Palestine", in Connexions. An International Women's Quarterly, number 16, Spring 1985, pp. 22-23. [The following interview with Heiny Sour, a Lebanese filmmaker and director of the film Leila and the Wolves, was conducted by Manny and excerpted from Spare Rib, a British feminist monthly, no. 132, 3/1985.]

Q: How did you become a filmmaker?
A: As a child I was not allowed to dance, play the piano or even to draw. I was sent to a French school, which punished me if I spoke Arabic, but I didn't want to express myself in the coloniser's language. Lebanon is a merchant society, a sectarian society. I was born in a Jewish community, Jews in Lebanon, being a minority without parliamentary representation, are obsessed with respectability. Being an artist wasn't respectable. The model was Einstein. But my parents themselves unconsciously were good artists. My mother's drawings are great and my father is one of the best singers in the Jewish community. And despite themselves, they helped me. Without that cultural background, I would not have been able to create those marriage scenes, songs and dances in the film.

Q: How did the sectarian society hinder you as an artist?
A: I almost conformed and nearly became a chemist, but my teacher told me, "Be a good artist, and not a bad chemist." At the age of

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Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] =-


Leila Khaled is a member of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an executive member of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) from 1974-1980, and now, living in Syria, she heads the PFLP's women's organisation, established in 1986. Her political activities are varied, but she is most famous in the West for her role as a hijacker in 1969 and 1970. In an interview with Leila in Benghaz, Libya, on 6/13/1989 (while I was attending an International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Uprising in the Occupied Territories), she spoke about the hijackings and how they were an important part of her political work and that of the Palestinian national liberation movement.

A: I hijacked two planes, the first in 1969 for which I was imprisoned in Syria for 45 days. The second, in 1970, was an El Al plane from Amsterdam. My comrade, Patrick, a Sandinista from Nicaragua, was killed. They didn't shoot me. The plane landed in Britain and I spent 28 days in British custody. My release came after the PFLP hijacked a BOAC plane to demand the release of all our comrades imprisoned following the hijacking of four planes.

Q: Why did you take part in the hijackings?
A: In 1967 our masses and our revolution became besieged inside the Occupied Territories. We had to do something to speak for the revolution. Our orders were clear; we were not to kill or injure anyone on the planes. We followed those orders. I had two hand grenades, which I opened, and of course you cannot close them again. I held them tight so they would not explode, even when we were captured.

After 1970 we (the PFLP) decided to stop this kind of activity because it no longer had a political use. In the beginning our cause was not known—the world saw us as refugees, only in need of clothes and food. We were obliged to do something to form the question "Who are they?" and to answer this question during the course of our revolution. It was not possible to have the question and answer at the same time.

Q: How did you become so politically active?
A: I was twenty-four at the time of the hijackings, but my political career began when I was fifteen years old because of the effect of the mother I had on me. All the time when I was a child my mother would say we had everything in Palestine and nothing outside, not even our dignity. I learned that if only I return to Palestine I will be able to obtain it. Even our oranges were in Palestine!

My eldest brother also affected us through his political activity. I am the sixth child out of twelve. We are all organised.

Myself now have two sons, aged five and two-and-a-half. I was afraid to become a mother because my life is so dangerous. They are already beginning to understand our situation, but they are still young. The other day my eldest son came from school saying that another child had told him, "Your mother has stolen planes." He demanded to know where the plane was so he could go and play with it! He knows that King Hussein, Reagan, and Israel are against the Palestinians, but he can also know--the world saw us as refugees, only in need of clothes and food. The world saw us as refugees, only in need of clothes and food.

Q: How has your political work continued?
A: Since the hijackings I have been assigned to internal organisation and mass work for the PFLP. From 1974-1980 I was an Executive Committee of the GUPW until the PFLP formed its own organisation in 1986. It is not parallel to the GUPW; our members are either comrades or supporters of the political line of the PFLP. Our main role is to teach women how to organise and work either in the women's union or in general. Because we are outside our land we face many economic and social problems, and they affect the women most. Therefore it is important to organise women because we do not believe in work that is not organised.

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Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Lebanon

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18 in 1962, two films that were turning points for me were Fellini's 8 1/2 and Cleo de Cinq a Sept by a French woman, Agnes Varda. I told myself then that painting is not a big loss, dancing is not a loss, writing is not a loss; it is filmmaking that I must do. I felt cinema was the language that I wanted to express myself with. When I saw the Fellini film, I thought, "I am a woman, I can never be a filmmaker." But when I saw the film by Agnes, first I thought, "I can make it." Then I saw that she was a European woman, and I thought, "Why not me?" This was the turning point for Palestinians. As for the Lebanese case, I chose the Civil War. This enabled me to select examples, samples of history which show women in the spontaneous uprising of a town in Palestine in the '20s; women in armed struggle in the countryside in Palestine in '36-'39; women in a massacre in Deir Yassin; women in the Civil War in Lebanon. The patterns of women's lives in all the above situations are nearly the same. And in all these situations, if women don't bargain for themselves from the beginning, they will be the ultimate losers, like in the French, the Russian, the Iranian Revolutions.

I want women to invade men's empires, their political, economic bases, not like Indira Gandhi or Golda Meir, but to change men's laws, change the game of politics, and to say the hell with your rules, games. We want to set different rules, and play different games. I want my films to express this intervention.

Q: How has your film been received in the Jewish community?
A: I am a freak in the Jewish community. I think all Jewish thinkers and artists become so when they make a decision to leave the Jewish community, because the community is warm and supportive but stifling and self-destroying. There is a tradition of Jewish radicals being expelled from the community which I benefited from. But most of all I benefited from the cosmopolitan life in Beirut which, before the Civil War, was culturally very fertile and exciting. Being Jewish was a hindrance because your family didn't want you to mix with gentiles in case you married them.

Q: Can you tell us specifically how Jewish women are oppressed in Arab countries?
A: I don't like the trend of thought among Zionists that your Jewishness is your first identity. I feel I am first a woman, then an Arab, and through Lebanese women, because part of the film is on Lebanon. Because I was born in Lebanon, where you have half a million Palestinians out of a population of about three million. During very crucial years of my life the Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil was a very big issue. Even in the Arab world, the Palestinian woman, the image of Palestinian women, were made a cause celebre. These token women are used by political parties institutions and states to hide the daily lives of the majority of women. These women are made to be symbols to compensate the reality. I respect them. They are brave, but I'm saying that these women are being used. My film is precisely about the silent, unglamorous sacrifices of the women in Lebanon. During the Civil War, each militia had its token woman. Incidentally, the Phalangists had more token women than the rest of them. If sectarianism is guiding the gun, women had better not use the gun. In the Palestinian part, it is a just war. Women should participate, but at this moment we are not getting anything out of it. In the Lebanese part of the film, I am saying that it is an absurd war. It is a power struggle between the Christian Maronites and Muslims, and women make enormous sacrifices. The Western-made image of Lebanon under the Christian rule was that it is the only democratic country in the Middle East. Let me tell you about this democratic land; the same Islamic rules that have governed Saudi Arabia have governed Lebanon. The "honour" killing of women (for allegedly bringing dishonor upon the family) continues; two women are killed by the male relations in a week in a country of only one and half million women, and the killers go free. But there is a law if a man kills his neighbor's dog, he will be imprisoned for three months.

Q: When did you think of making the film? And how long did it take?
A: Ideas came to me very early on. Since I was a kid, I heard my mother say, I am the only servant who is not paid and doesn't have holidays, and she was from the upper class and had two servants to serve her. Such things were brewing in my head. It took me six years of my life, from script writing, fundraising, shooting, and completing and doing nothing else. It was finished in the summer and then shown at the Edinburgh Festival.

Q: Why did you include different historical periods?
A: Why shouldn't women be ambitious? Because men only want women to deal exclusively with women's issues like home, family and so on, they want to ghettoize us. I resent this. We should deal with the public affairs and political issues too. I brought in the history of Palestine since the Balfour Declaration in 1917 up to the massacre at Deir Yassin in 1948, which was the turning point for Palestinians. As for the Lebanese case, I chose the Civil War. This enabled me to select examples, samples of history which show women in the spontaneous uprising of a town in Palestine in the '20s; women in armed struggle in the countryside in Palestine in '36-'39; women in a massacre in Deir Yassin; women in the Civil War in Lebanon. The patterns of women's lives in all the above situations are nearly the same. And in all these situations, if women don't bargain for themselves from the beginning, they will be the ultimate losers, like in the French, the Russian, the Iranian Revolutions.

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movement emerged protesting the war. When reports of the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla leaked out, PM Begin tried to silence reports by terming them 'blood libel', continuing to say: 'goyim kill goyim and they want to kill the Jews'. Begin used the Holocaust to silence those who questioned the mass murder of Palestinians; Begin resorted to the standard tactic of labeling the present enemy of Israel, here Arafat, as a 'new Hitler'. Sen. Alan Cranston, a deeply committed Zionist, stated that reports of the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla were typical of the false historical reports of the blood libel: of course, Cranston was merely trying and succeeding in a disinformation effort to cloud the issue of the real mass murder of Palestinians by US-financed Jewish soldiers.

However, many Israelis compared the prevalent Israeli racism against Palestinians to the racism they suffered from under Nazi rule; dissidents saw the similarity of pogroms against Jews in Russia in 1905 with the daily pogromist killings of Palestinian children by Jewish soldiers. The brutality of Jewish soldiers in Lebanon discredited the war on Lenin, which the author ascerts was justified and proper. The Anti-Defamation League jumped to defense of the slaughter of Palestinians, classifying all anti-Israel statements and graffiti in the US and Europe as anti-semitism. The author states, without citations and in clear exaggeration, there were pogroms against Jews in Rome and Paris in Europe after the massacres in Beirut. Begin responded by stating that Jews were free to do anything they pleased because the world hates Jews; in a brilliant public relations campaign, Begin effectively used the Holocaust to prevent any open criticism of massacres of Palestinians by Jewish soldiers in Lebanon. The author wonders how the 'Zionist dream' [i.e., Zionism is the ideology of Jewish racial supremacy in Palestine, based on a worldwide mobilization of the Diaspora Jews behind Israel.] of the 'traditionally helpless Jew' had come to be seen as a racial supremacist movement that sought to exterminate the Palestinians 'by the efficacy of its war machine' (a perception Rubinstein sees as anti-semitism). [Amnon Rubinstein, former dean of Tel Aviv University School of Law, is now Minister of Communications and a member of the Knesset.][TXT]


Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are subjected to attacks not only by Israeli troops who claim that they are riddling the camps of PLO guerrillas, but also by factions of Lebanese militias who are sometimes armed by the Israelis. The Phalangist Party, supported by Israel, is particularly hostile to the refugees. Other Lebanese non-Shi'ite factions such as Amal, led by Syrian-backed Nabih Berri, systematically laid siege to the camps in 1985 in an attempt to rid the country of targets for Israeli invasion. They have used both direct military force and starvation techniques. Lebanese Shi'ites claim that they are sympathetic to the Palestinians, but that they are unable to help the refugees openly for fear that Lebanese hostile to the refugees will find out.

[From an article written by Rosemary Sayigh, Race and Class, XXIX, 1, 1987.]

The most recent round of the sieges of the Palestinian refugee camps by Amal militia in Lebanon began with Rashidiyyeh on 9/30/1986. The siege of Bourj Barajneh [Lebanon] began on 11/4/1986 and that of Shatila on 11/25/1986. Although the siege of the camps is, at the time of this writing, officially lifted, its re-imposition remains an ever-present threat. The testimony that follows is from R.Z., a social assistant with Najdeh Association, who lives and works in Bourj Barajneh. [Editor's note: Najdeh is a Lebanese cooperative, involving both Palestinians and Lebanese, which works to provide vocational training and social welfare programs that help individuals achieve self-sufficiency.] Married, with four children under nine years of age, R.Z. stayed through the siege until 2/22/1987, when she left to seek medical care for her children. She was interviewed on 3/5/1987.

In the morning of the first day of the battle [11/4/1986], I was on the street and saw Amal militia gathering. Two or three days before, they had begun throwing explosives on the camp, and it looked as if something was about to start. So I returned to the camp and asked a friend to keep an eye on my children while I did some case work. While I was filling out a questionnaire, a shot rang out. News came that a young man from the camp had been sniped at and killed. I ran home, and while I was running the shelling started. I found my children at home, and put them in the safest part of the house. Of course, the first thing I did was to go and buy provisions, that would last a month at most. But the fighting became more violent each day and, with deaths mounting on both sides, there was little hope for a solution.

We stayed in our home for a long time, but then it got hit by a rocket. The children were very frightened so we went down into the shelter. We stayed there a week.

The first two months were bearable. There was food, there was water. People could take it. Of course, many were killed. But we had got used to the shelling, we had got used to death. My cousin was killed, and was buried without his family even seeing him.

At the beginning people ate well three times a day as usual. When the first month ended, we began to eat only twice a day. If we had known how long the siege would last we would have eaten only one meal a day from the beginning, so as not to be completely cut off later. The last month of the siege was the period of hunger. Of course, some of the organisations helped civilians, but later most of the food was given to the fighters.

Food began to be extremely scarce in the third month; we were hardly having one meal a day at that stage. We made tea with sugar and water, and joked with the children, "Come and have supper." My little daughter of ten months kept saying "Bidi ibsi, bidi ibsi" (ibsi = khubz, bread). I felt like crying. From where can I get her bread?

Once when we had been two days without a meal, my children were crying, they wanted to eat. I had no food left; my father-in-law's house had no food left. So I decided to go to my mother--she has only my father to feed, and you know how old people store bags of food. Her home is far and I was afraid of the shelling, but I was obliged to go because my children were crying. So I went and brought a dish of shishbarak from her. How happy and pleased the children were! Then a child came and stood there and said, "Auntie, will you give me something to eat?" I told him that I'd got just enough to feed my own children. He stood there by the wall, crying. So I told him, "Come, you are like my children," and I put some food on his plate. My children cried out that they hadn't hadenough, but I told them, "The important thing is that you've got something in your stomachs."

People were obliged to knock on doors in search of food for the hospitalized: "My son is wounded. If you have anything..."

There are families that didn't have a father; they depend on monthly allowances that hardly cover the cost of bread. People all felt for each other, they wanted to help others, but when there was nothing left. Once a young man said to me, "You, as a member of Najdeh, should help me." He wanted sugar. I told him, "By God, I haven't got sugar for my own children. But wait here [his leg was amputated] and I'll bring you some sugar." I went to my mother and told her that I wanted sugar for my children. Of course, she gave me some. I brought it and gave it to him.

In the last period, people picked grass from the cemetery, boiled it, put salt on it and ate it. And many women were sniped at while picking grass. There is no shelter there at all.

Water and fuel shortages also caused serious problems. Water went on coming to us for about 2.5 months there was still diesel oil to work the pumps. When maize gave out, they siphoned off a few hundred litres from a petrol station near the camp. They gave most of it to the hospital, and some was used for pumping water, but it only lasted two days. There was no water for washing. We used to wait for rain to be able to wash our clothes.

If we wanted water badly, we had to get it from the bases at the front line. There was a woman with five children--they have no father--she went to get water and was sniped at and killed there. Her children were left homeless. Many people were killed at the water place.

The shelters are burdened with many more than they can serve. Probably this is what made sicknensses spread--no space, people on top
of each other, no water.... Some quarters are deprived of shelters. For example, Tarshia only has one shelter and it is constantly under sniper fire. There are nearly 20000 people in Bourj, but there are only seventeen shelters, the largest of which can hold 300 people.

They would declare a cease-fire and then suddenly shell the camp, so as to cause the greatest possible number of losses. One missile fell on seventeen children, killing five immediately and wounding the rest. It was right at the beginning. There was a cease-fire and people were leaving and entering the camp. It was the day of the funeral of the young man who was killed on the first day of the siege. So the women all left their children to go to the funeral. They finally felt secure because there was a cease-fire and there was no shelling. The children were clustered together under a water-tank. A woman was baking ma'aleesh and feeding them when the first missile came down. Every young man carried two children, and brought them under the shelter to hospital. My house was in front of the hospital, all the wounded came past it.

Another incident that greatly affected the people of Bourj was an attempt by four young Palestinians to get a lorry load of food into the camp, one day in 2/19/87. They got through all the checkpoints and reached the entry of the camp, in front of the Amal building. But Amal discovered them and hit the lorry with a shell, burning it and killing the young people. People all wept when they knew that four young men had died for their sake. Amal propaganda said that the lorry was full of whisky and hashish. How could anyone believe that? How could they kill people trying to bring in food?

In the last period, people began to get desperate, to despair. There was talk about what to do. The majority decided that we were ready to sacrifice fighters but not to surrender. Because we knew what would happen: rapes, killings, insults and lootings.

In spite of harsh siege conditions, social institutional work continued, and played a role in helping people to resist. Soon after the beginning of the siege, we in Najdeh invited the Social Committee to meet. We divided up the work--for example, some helped the wounded, some helped people in the shelter. We had about 560 tins of milk powder, not enough for the whole camp, so we didn't distribute them. Instead, we stored them, and later they solved the crisis for nursing mothers and infants under six months. Without food or vitamins to make milk, mothers' breasts dried up and most could not suckle their babies, even those born during the siege. So our milk powder solved a very serious problem.

We also distributed clothes--especially to families whose homes were on the front line. When the siege began, it was still almost summer. When the winter weather came, many people were without winter clothes. We bought clothes from the shops [inside the camp] and distributed them to children and needy people. We also organised daily visits for the wounded, to take them gifts and raise their morale. Members in community development convinced them that a broader, global perspective was essential. Much of this book emerged from UN conference marking the UN Decade for the Advance of Women. The Bangalore founding group also organized a series of seminars for the UN sponsored NGO Forum in Kairobi, Kenya, in 7/1985. The DAWN founders met again in Brazil in 1986 to set up a permanent organization to broaden the group activities, the DAWN Secretariat, the Institute of Social Studies Trust (ISST) based in New Delhi, initiated DAWN, until it moved to the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro.

Institutions that provided funding for DAWN in its first phase include the Ford Foundation, Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation With Developing Countries (SAREC), Finnish International Development Agency (FINIDA), the Population Council, and the NGO Forum Secretariat. Institutions that provided support in the first phase include: Women & Development Unit of the University of the West Indies (WAND), Association of African Women for R&D (AAWORD (Senegal)), Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), Asian & Pacific Development Center (APDC), Pacific & Asian Women's Forum (PAWF), Asian Women's Research & Action Network (AWRAN), El Colegio de Mexico; UN Institute for Training & Research for the Advancement of Women (Santo Domingo), Indian Council of Social Science Research, International Council for Anthropological &
Ethnological Sciences, Indian Association of Women's Studies, Economists Interested in Women's Issues Group (India), Centre for Women's Development Studies (New Delhi), International Women's Tribune Center (New York), ISIS International (Rome and Santiago), Internation Center for Research on Women (Washington DC), Mediterranean Women's Studies Institute (Athens), Carlos Chagas Foundation (Sao Paolo), Centro de la Mujer Peruana Floria Tristan (Lima), Federeacion de la Mujer Cubana (Havana), Brazilian Rights Council (Sai Paolo), Arab Women's Studies Association (Beirut), Women & Development Consultancy Services Ltd. (Kenya), Institute for Social Studies (Hague), and Kali for Women (New Delhi). [TEXT]

30076. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 97: Israeli Policies in Lebanon: Part 1 of 2. Jerusalem, March 8, 1992. Two points need to be stated firmly at the opening of this report. First, the assassination of Sheikh Musawi, together with his family and others who happened to be in his company, was no more than an episode in a new, more aggressive and more far ranging Israeli policy in Lebanon, which also implies an adoption of a tougher stance towards Syria. This is why the assassination cannot be perceived as in any way connected with the preceding successful Palestinian guerilla attack on an Israeli army camp. Coincidence of the two events in time has no deeper meaning. According to all the better informed Israeli military correspondents, the timing of the Mussawi's assassination depended on his known regular attendance of a yearly memorial meeting held at the tomb of Sheikh Bader (also assassinated by the Israeli forces, in 1984) in the village Jibshit, located very close behind the borders of the "Security Zone" (henceforth referred to as "Zone"). Due to the regularity of his attendance of that event, he became a convenient target for murder at that particular time of the year. The knowledge of the Israeli Intelligence about the Hizbollah is in fact quite poor. The assassination conveyed the opposite impression, thereby confirming the Intelligence's boasts.

The new Israeli policy in Lebanon was designed by the army. Alex Fishman ("Pity that we did not think about it beforehand", Hadashot, February 21, 1992) reports that "it took the army much time to persuade the political authorities that their negotiations with Hizbollah were a waste of time", and that "a policy change could have already been detected in January", on the basis of unprecedented Israeli activities outside the Zone, like threatening to shoot at anyone on sight, and thereby forcing the villagers to flee the area en masse. Avi Benayahu ("The circle of the Lebanese mud", Al Hamishmar, February 21, 1992) likewise says that "the [Israeli] decision to hit Mussawi was reached by a senior army echelon, faithful to the doctrine of high frequency strikes at the interests of terrorist organizations, wherever and whenever available intelligence data allow them". (The peculiarities of a language in which the murder of a child, P. 5 is referred to as a "strike at the interests of terrorist organizations" will be discussed in a separate section of this report).

What reasons dictated the adoption of the new policy? The avowed Israeli rationale, faithfully reiterated by most Western media, was the failure of negotiations for the release of an Israeli navigator, Ron Arad. It does not deserve to be treated seriously. Even according to the official Israeli announcements, Arad is in Iranian hands, not Hizbollah's. Apparently no other Israeli captive remains in enemy's hands. Several other names regularly mentioned in this context refer to soldiers missing ranks. So do some Lebanese Druzes, some of them recruited from Sunni. From other sources it is known that many Shi'ites serve in its ranks. So do some Lebanese Druzes, some of them recruited from villages located outside the Zone. The contrast between the denominational composition of the SLA and of its security system is an example of the Israeli "divide and rule" methods, which in the not too remote future may well be applied to dominate bigger Arab territories, by the way of exploiting rivasries within the population of Lebanon. (To all appearances, the Zone and the adjacent areas of Lebanon already serve as a testing ground for future Israeli conquests.) Edelist describes the methods of the SLA as ferocious in the extreme, comparing them to massacres in the style of Sabra and Shatila. He recounts how an Israeli colonel G. commanding some Israeli forces stationed there, once attended "a briefing" with SLA officers. His reaction was that "we just cannot keep up with such standards". Yet the security system of SLA commanded by Akel Hashem is according to Edelist prepared to commit even worse atrocities than the army, not just in interrogatory torture, but

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For this, however, radio broadcasts obviously could not suffice. From mid-November the Israeli press kept reporting the massive desertions from the ranks of the Israel-controlled "South Lebanese Army" (SLA), in spite of pay rises. According to these reports, it was not easy to find replacements for the deserters, even through "usual Israeli methods", like telling the extended families to deliver a specified amount of recruits, with collective punishments befalling families for their non-compliance, and distribution of permits to work in Israel as a reward for their compliance. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities considered the former commander of that army, general Antoine Lahad, no longer fit to carry out the new tough policy, and therefore, as Edelist reports, decided to grant Lahad an Israeli army pension (but for colonels, not generals!) to enable him to quietly retire in Paris, supposedly in order to guarantee a better education for his 13 years old son. "Lahad will probably be replaced by one Akel Hashem, about 40, a picturesque personality, who for an extended period of time headed the SLA security system". Since that "system" is notorious for brutally torturing thousands of people, and for atrocities in its concentration camps, the consequences of this appointment - which, as it seems, has already taken place without being formally announced - can be predicted. Edelist's account of Akel Hashem's pursuits and of the security system under his command deserves a closer scrutiny.

The security system of the SLA is, according to Edelist, "manned mostly by the Sunnis", who are a rather small minority in the Zone, inhabited preponderantly by the Shi'ites and Maronite Christians. The latter are not admitted to the security system. Akel Hashem himself is a Palestinian, and therefore a stranger to the whole security system under his command. By contrast, the SLA itself has 40% Christians and 20% Shi'ites. In such a composition of the SLA and of its security system is an example of the Israeli "divide and rule" methods, which in the not too remote future may well be applied to dominate bigger Arab territories, by the way of exploiting rivasries within the population of Lebanon. (To all appearances, the Zone and the adjacent areas of Lebanon already serve as a testing ground for future Israeli conquests.) Edelist describes the methods of the SLA as ferocious in the extreme, comparing them to massacres in the style of Sabra and Shatila. He recounts how an Israeli colonel G. commanding some Israeli forces stationed there, once attended "a briefing" with SLA officers. His reaction was that "we just cannot keep up with such standards". Yet the security system of SLA commanded by Akel Hashem is according to Edelist prepared to commit even worse atrocities than the army, not just in interrogatory torture, but...
also in military operations aimed at "softening the population". In one case recounted by Edelist, "Akel's group carried out several operations" earning a distinction of being named by local residents as "savage animals of a heretofore unknown species". But, comments Edelist, "in the Israeli army nobody knows nor wants to know", about such exploits.

In addition to dealing with all varieties of Israeli stooges, Edelist describes the role performed in Lebanon by the Israeli army. According to Edelist, it seems that the Israeli military, between the apportionment of security and the黛尔已 rectangle information available in the Hebrew press, Israeli soldiers are stationed in Lebanon in quite impressive numbers, both in the Zone and beyond its boundaries. Israeli forces present in Lebanon are of two kinds: the counter-insurgency units doing their patrolling on foot and shooting on sight anyone they suspect of being a saboteur, and Apache helicopter units either attacking specified targets or transporting the former units to far-away spots for the sake of raiding villages or other targets, or shooting roadblocks on the highways in order to search the passing cars. Such operations extend to areas well beyond the Zone, which thus find themselves under an actual, even if somewhat indirect Israeli occupation. From the Israeli army's viewpoint, this mode of domination is more cost-effective than direct occupation as it existed in 1982-85, at least in the sense that relatively small but highly mobile Israeli troops, comprised exclusively of volunteers, suffice for the task. Unlike during the 1982-85 occupation, the masses of non-combatant soldiers or "ordinary" ground forces need no longer be deployed, with the burden to the Israeli army and society reduced accordingly. The only "lesson" which the Israeli army learned from its erstwhile Lebanese experience was purely tactical: that its mistake lay in its cumbersome method of direct rule, not in the occupation itself. Contrary to dogmatic assertions of some foreigners, the Israeli army still seems to believe that it can occupy large Arab-inhabited areas, provided it relies on "right" occupation methods, now tested in South Lebanon, with results considered positive. The assault helicopters, especially the Apaches, perform a crucial role in terror operations conceived of as an essential ingredient of this new occupation tactic. In this context it needs to be recalled that, as described in report 89, the Israeli army in 1991 acquired huge quantities of Apache helicopters from the U.S., considerably exceeding in the process the entire amount of the U.S. annual military aid. It needs to be recalled as well that the American reaction to the murder of Mussawi was perfidious enough to be interpreted as its approval. Can it be presumed that the American military establishment has a stake of its own in learning about this new tactic of indirect domination of densely inhabited territories? An affirmative answer to this question cannot be precluded in advance.

Edelist's facts convey an impression that not only the Lebanese Army in the north is indirectly controlled by Israel, but also the Lebanese government in Beirut always comply with Israeli instructions, either right away or after being suitably threatened. This impression is reinforced by many facts on the ground, and by hints of other Israeli correspondents. The Lebanese appeals for American protection, conveyed either directly or via Syria, have totally failed. An apparent Israeli reason for this might have been conceived of as an essential ingredient of this new occupation tactic. In one apparently had some successes. The above mentioned Israeli colonel G. "has only praise for the operational capabilities of Hizbollah. Unlike the fecklessly performing PLO guerrillas, Hizbollah men know what they do. They have a superb Intelligence and are good in planning. They don't knock their head up the wall. They don't attack right where the Israeli or SouthLebanesetroops are stationed in force, but study the area and prepare their actions carefully. They operate in cells, they know what they are doing, and act between the lines of Israeli and Hizbollah territories. Their attackers are local inhabitants. One cannot attack Hizbollah bases, because none exist". Under those circumstances, the Israeli army began to rely on two strategies. The first was the random terror aiming at the entire population of the area. It has been reported in the media, whether under the name of "softening" activities, or otherwise. The second strategy, first adopted in response to the rather successful Hizbollah's katyusha strikes at the Israeli territory after Mussawi's murder, was to prod Syria to extend its control over Hizbollah by mounting the threats of unspecified but devastating Israeli "hits", which were conveyed to Damascus via the Americans. This fact has been reported by several Israeli military and political commentators, of whom some, e.g. Alex Fishman ("It just happened to them", Hadashot, February 28) noted with relief that "we were lucky that the Americans indeed intervened with Syria and obtained the cease fire, since we had lost control of the situation". The Israeli public appreciated this cease fire, regarding it as the Israeli army's success, after the week of uninterrupted katyusha attacks had brought a reversal of the mood: from earlier exultation (led by official propaganda seconded by many press commentators) to despondency. As for the army and the minister of Defense Arens, they confined themselves to expressing their satisfaction with the results of the new Israeli policy in Lebanon, the Mussawi assassination included. It can be safely predicted that this policy will be pursued in Lebanon also in the future, probably on an increasing scale, and in all likelihood also elsewhere. [-]

30077. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 97: Israeli Policies in Lebanon: Part 2 of 2. Israel, March 8, 1992. Reactions of the Israeli public to the events of the week, which began with the murder of Mussawi and ended with the cease fire deserve a further comment. There were three fundamental kinds of reactions: of those who can be regarded as informed, those in the name of the Israeli Security System, of the better informed military or political correspondents who, after sharing the initial euphoria, later had some wary misgivings about the military establishment's wisdom on strictly pragmatic grounds, and finally of a handful of principled critics of Mussawi murder who were allowed to express themselves in print. In a sense, the reactions of the first listed kind are the most important, because they are quite unknown outside Israel, and because they can be assumed to faithfully reflect the viewpoints of the commanders of the Israeli army, concretely of its Chief of Staff, general Ehud Barak, and his Deputy, Amnon Shahak (no kin of mine!). In all probability, the two were responsible for designing the new Israeli policies in Lebanon and for the Mussawi murder, which began to be implemented after being cleared by the minister of Defense Arens and by the Prime Minister Shamir. Some elements of the reasoning behind the new policies were provided - or rather hinted - in TV talks of the generals in active service. Also, the military correspondents were allowed to describe "the euphoria", or "the contentment" of the generals, especially during the first days after the murder. But more thorough explanations of the subject were reserved for ex-generals and ex-intelligence insiders.

One of them was general (reserves) Yossi Peled, the Commander of the Northern Command (and thereby in charge of the Lebanese affairs) for five years until he retired from active service early in 1991. General Peled ("To keep the initiative", Yedioth Ahronot, February 21) wants to continue such feats of arms as "hitting Mussawi" in the name of the Israeli Security System, of the better informed military or political correspondents who, after sharing the initial euphoria, later had some wary misgivings about the military establishment's wisdom on strictly pragmatic grounds, and finally of a handful of principled critics of Mussawi murder who were allowed to express themselves in print. In a sense, the reactions of the first listed kind are the most important, because they are quite unknown outside Israel, and because they can be assumed to faithfully reflect the viewpoints of the commanders of the Israeli army, concretely of its Chief of Staff, general Ehud Barak, and his Deputy, Amnon Shahak (no kin of mine!). In all probability, the two were responsible for designing the new Israeli policies in Lebanon and for the Mussawi murder, which began to be implemented after being cleared by the minister of Defense Arens and by the Prime Minister Shamir. Some elements of the reasoning behind the new policies were provided - or rather hinted - in TV talks of the generals in active service. Also, the military correspondents were allowed to describe "the euphoria", or "the contentment" of the generals, especially during the first days after the murder. But more thorough explanations of the subject were reserved for ex-generals and ex-intelligence insiders.
from the military point of view is filled with superlatives. "I believe that hitting Mussawi was an extraordinary achievement, for which the Israeli army can only be congratulated in exalted terms, because it proved truly extraordinary qualities of both the execution and its preparation by army Intelligence," Peled indicates that an operation on such a scale "must have been prepared for many months or even years ahead". The rather down-to-earth truth is that the "operation" involved no more than the use of a dozen attack helicopters and several tanks. Still, it happened as planned, Peled reports, according to Fishman (February 28) the Army Intelligence learned "from the Beirut papers of Thursday" that Mussawi had intended to visit Jisbsh on Sunday, and timed the assassination accordingly. Moreover, Fishman informs that the poor army officers "had their eyes red from sleep deprivation", because, far from "years ahead", they had only days to plan the raid.

General Peled reveals that "the war against terror requires an account settling which is a perfectly legitimate concept. The concept refers to the need to physically exterminate those who take decisions resulting in the loss of human life". But Peled has a dilemma here. For on one hand, "hitting only the heads of terror [organizations] will not produce the expected results", and on the other, "hitting only the executors of terrorism" will not suffice either. He sees the resolution of this dilemma in "an interlocked method of operation", that is in doing both. This alone will produce desirable effects. Of course, when Peled speaks of the "loss of human life", it does not even occur to him to include the loss of Arab lives into account, especially if caused by Sharon, Eltan and suchlike. It is also obvious that the concept of "account settling" implies the Israeli "right" to assassinate any heads of states or of political movements in the Middle East, a "right" which may well be soon exacted by facts on the ground. Peled reminds his readers that "Arab mentality" is very different from "our mentality", especially from the mentality of the Israeli General Staff. He claims that the methods he advocates are well-adapted to the Arab mentality.

The tenet of a different Arab "mentality" also figures prominently in an article by Benyamin Merhav ("To beat them or not to beat them", Yedioth Ahronot, February 20). Merhav, once a senior Intelligence official, responsible for Israel-China connections in the Foreign Service, had advanced to the post of Director General of the Foreign ministry from which he was recently dismissed by Foreign Minister David Levy, apparently because of his hawkishness, too extreme for Levy's tastes. Impressed by the strength of this change, Merhav lists four factors with which Israel has to contend in Lebanon: Iran, Syria, the Lebanese government and the Shi'ites. As for the first two, Peled advocates a mixed approach, alternating pressures with negotiations until they halt "the flow of money and other facilities" to Lebanon, with the effect of "speedily strangling the Shi'ite pressure". However, "the blow they thus received convinced them that they were left with no choice except to lick their wounds and acquiesce. The [Israeli] message can be assumed to have been absorbed by them, at least for a time, even though they are still likely to do a thing here or there. After what we did to them, we can proceed to building up good relations with the Shi'ites of South Lebanon, since, in conformity with the best existential traditions of the Lebanese communities, the Shi'ite community included, they now know that they have no other choice if they want to survive and to prosper". This is why Merhav wants Israel to keep behaving "as it has done". In saying all this Merhav undoubtedly represents the viewpoint of the Israeli "security system", which can be also presumed to be supported in this design by its American counterpart. Consequently, the policies Merhav advocates can be presumed to be pursued in the future on a larger scale than heretofore. The Israeli "security system" may be mistaken in its assessment of katyusha attacks into consideration. He says that "he does not feel like ..."
"after killing one important Arab, the katyusha attacks managed to disrupt life in the North for almost a week". But he gives vent to a sense of personal satisfaction. "One does not need to be a bloodthirsty chauvinist to feel mighty pleased by the sight of a Hizbollah leader blasted up into the air and falling down in pieces. One can assume that the image of a bearded fellow with black turban on his head being accurately hit by an Apache helicopter missile must for an average Israeli be quite thrilling, especially since it is all the contrast between their qualities and ours. O army, how gorgeously thou performest!" Denker is relatively dovish, so he can be relied upon for sensing what the feelings of "average Israelis" on such occasions are, at least during the first day of two after the event.

This style of analysis finds its best practitioner in the person of Uzi Benziman (A long-term account) Haaretz, February 28), a correspondent who can be presumed to reliably report the real thinking of the Israeli government. According to Benziman, during the katyusha attacks and the consequent massive deployment of the army forces in Lebanon, "the atmosphere [in Jerusalem] was traumatic". But after the cease fire the mood shifted into that of relief. "Right now, both in Jerusalem [the location of the Prime Minister's Office] and in Tel Aviv [the location of the ministry of Defense] those responsible for the killing of Abbas Mussawi and for the army's retaliations to the hail of katyushas perceive the whole affair as best evidence of Israel's profound political and strategic wisdom all the way through". The highest manifestation of this wisdom was the Israeli threat of "multi-directional strikes", duly transferred to Syria. The results of making this threat are perceived as unqualifiedly beneficial. "Those who made it are self-contended to the point of assuming that the entire sequence of events from Mussawi killing up to the return of the Israeli force to its bases is now going to directly influence the negotiations between the Israelis and the Syrians and Lebanese in Washington... By this logic, the wheel of violence is presumed to have succeeded in setting the wheels of the political [process] in motion after nothing else had worked. This success, claim the self-contended men in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, will from now on propel the progress toward an ultimate stabilization of the entire Middle East". Benziman remains skeptical. He notes that the negotiations in Washington have been hardly leading anywhere. He admits that the Lebanese border is now quiet, but attributes it, in my opinion rightly, primarily to inclement weather. It can be safely predicted that, when the weather improves, especially in the coming summer, "the self-contended men in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv" will rush to "propel the progress toward an ultimate stabilization of the entire Middle East", in the Israeli style.

Allowed to criticize the Israeli policies were in practice only the Hebrew press satirists, who traditionally enjoy in Israeli greater license than others at times of emergency. But this meant that although moral points were made with some fortitude, political and strategic criticism has been lacking, as not suitable in the satirical genre. Let me give two examples. The following appeared on the satirical page of Hotam (February 21): "Did you pay sufficient attention to the fact that the day after the terrorists committed a barbarous and inhuman murder in the [Israeli] recruit training camp, the Israeli Airforce raided the refugee camps of Rashidiya and El-Hilwa in Lebanon, killing a Palestinian terrorist mother and her three terrorist children in a civilized and humane retaliation?"

Even more to the point was Haaretz satirist B. Michael ("The child is absent", February 21). He asked: "Where could the little son of Mussawi disappear? Only one day after the operation he could not be found in the Israeli media. The casualties of that operation were described as 'Abbas Mussawi and co-passengers in his car'. In Beirut, a mass demonstration was held 'to commemorate Mussawi and the members of his organization'. The demonstration demanded to avenge 'the death of Mussawi and his men'. The child was not mentioned likewise. Neither was that little child mentioned on TV when the minister of Defense was interviewed in a notably sycophantic way... It did not occur to the minister that a body of a little child burned alive may perhaps need some clarification. The child was just absent: from that interview, from the press, from the reports, from all [published] photographs. Did he really ever exist?" B. Michael concludes by asking a question thus far never answered: "Where can we find an Israeli politician who would express some sorrow, even hypocritical or insincere, about burning alive the innocent little son of Mussawi?"

The assassination of Mussawi has had many consequences, one of the most deplorable being its evaluation by a majority of Israeli public as a great success. This evaluation may well tempt Israel to try to achieve similar "successes", only larger is scale. He who under such circumstances still believes in "peace process", lives in the world of delusions. [x]

30078. Shpiegel, Efraf. "Women in Black Will Not be Intimidated: Part 4: Persistence is power: A bereaved mother speaks.", In Challenge, July, 1990, p. 12. I began my own private peace campaign at the time of the Israeli-Lebanon war. Until then I was one of the silent majority, with the attitude that no matter what I thought or felt, there was nothing I could do to change anything apart from exercising my right to vote every four years. With the Lebanon war, my attitude changed. My son Yo'av participated in that war. I had many talks with him about the war, I became involved. I started to closely examine what I heard, saw and read in the media. I started to suspect that I and thousands like me were being brainwashed, were being manipulated. My son Yo'av was killed in that war. He and thousands young people like him on both sides were deprived of their lives. My son's death politicized and radicalized me... for he had died for nothing... his dying revealed to me war's tragic wastefulness and evil futility. I became an ardent protagonist of peace. The intifada would have never broken out if Israel's leaders had been sincere in their desire for peace; if they had been prepared to meet with the Palestinians, to talk with them; if they had recognized that rebellion is a natural response of a people under occupation.

As a devoted Zionist, I am convinced that in the final analysis both occupier and occuped can only suffer from occupation. I need peace in order to live in my country. I need cooperation with people in the neighboring states in order to live in prosperity.

This, in a nutshell, is what Women in Black want when they say "No to Occupation". True, for each one of us these simple words have various connotations, but in essence they express our longing for attitude that no matter what I thought or felt, there was nothing I could do to change anything apart from exercising my right to vote every four years. With the Lebanon war, my attitude changed. My son Yo'av participated in that war. I had many talks with him about the war, I became involved. I started to closely examine what I heard, saw and read in the media. I started to suspect that I and thousands like me were being brainwashed, were being manipulated. My son Yo'av was killed in that war. He and thousands young people like him on both sides were deprived of their lives. My son's death politicized and radicalized me... for he had died for nothing... his dying revealed to me war's tragic wastefulness and evil futility. I became an ardent protagonist of peace. The intifada would have never broken out if Israel's leaders had been sincere in their desire for peace; if they had been prepared to meet with the Palestinians, to talk with them; if they had recognized that rebellion is a natural response of a people under occupation. As a devoted Zionist, I am convinced that in the final analysis both occupier and occuped can only suffer from occupation. I need peace in order to live in my country. I need cooperation with people in the neighboring states in order to live in prosperity. This, in a nutshell, is what Women in Black want when they say "No to Occupation". True, for each one of us these simple words have various connotations, but in essence they express our longing for peace; they express our message that as women we succor life, not destroy it; that we are determined and committed to create a world free from war in which our children may flourish and thrive until old age. This basic instinct for preservation of life is identical for Palestinian women, Israeli women for ALL women everywhere. My friends often ask how I can bear the hostility, curses and spits from passers-by. True, I sometimes ask myself what the point of it is; there are so few of us; how long will it take before there are enough of us to actually change things.

Yet there is no way that I can or will stop my protest. Because I know that if I do, life will have no meaning for me. I also know that our very persistence is powerful and that knowledge is a source of encouragement for me.

Look at the women who stand together with me, Friday after Friday, in the cold of winter, in the heat of the summer, and I am proud that we find the strength to be true to our consciences and ourselves. If I am ever asked "Where were you in these dark days", I shall be able to reply: "In the streets, protesting".

The greatest achievement of Women in Black it seems to me is that our name and message have become an integral part of the Israeli scene and cannot be ignored. I believe that we influenced Peace Now to change. Previously it confined its demand to Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and did not mention the Occupied Territories. Today it can no longer ignore the issue and has to take a stand. There can be no discussion on women's rights and violence towards women in the family, without including the rights of Palestinian women in the Occupied Territories and a peace for Palestinian women... for he had died for nothing... his dying revealed to me war's tragic wastefulness and evil futility. I became an ardent protagonist of peace... for he had died for nothing... his dying revealed to me war's tragic wastefulness and evil futility. I became an ardent protagonist of peace.
After the murder of Palestinian workers in Rishon LeZion, it was very special for me to participate in the vigil, and I believe that many felt as I did. An unprecedented large number of women took part in the vigil that Friday, as though to make a public statement that we are here to stay. It is important for the world to know that all Israelis are not followers of Shamir, that there are others Israel's also.

The day after the massacre in Rishon, I went to the hospital to visit the Palestinian workers who had been wounded, to express my grief and anger. I am also involved in Women for Coexistence, a movement comprising Arab and Jewish women from Israel. We hold house meetings with Palestinian women from the Occupied Territories at our homes. The meetings are informal and are intended to accommodate women who find it difficult to go out into the streets to demonstrate.

I believe that if the protests for peace do not multiply and intensify, the present situation will seriously deteriorate. I have a feeling that the recently formed Israeli government is leading us towards a dreadful confrontation, to a war that will not stop at Israel's borders. I don't know how this affects others, but for me, it makes me want to shout louder, and louder still.

30079. Tucker, Cynthia. "Oklahoma City Bombing Makes Americans, Like Israelis, Victims of Terrorism", in NewHour, April 18, 1996. Tucker argues that the Oklahoma City bombing makes Americans the victims of terrorists. This draws Americans closer to [Jewish] Israelis, who have long been victims of terrorism. She notes she is encouraged by the increasing pressure in America to silence inappropriate dissent: she sees free speech as encouraging people on the fringe to be terrorists and welcomes the growing intolerance among Americans for those who do not share the 'mainstream' belief system. [Tucker is associated with the Atlanta Constitution. [This program comes on the day after the Cana massacre in southern Lebanon.] [TX]

30080. UNCHR. Human Rights and Refugees: Part 21: Violation of Human Rights and Refugees: Violations of the Rights To Life, Liberty and Security. Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 20. World Campaign for Human Rights. Geneva: UNCHR, June 1993. In some places refugees are regularly subjected to attacks and abuse. Many have died in military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements. Young males and minors are frequently recruited into armed or guerrilla bands and forced to fight in civil wars. Attacks on refugee camp have been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly in numerous resolutions. The Commission on Human Rights has also been concerned with specific cases, such as attacks on Palestinian refugees in Lebanese camps and attacks on the Thai-Cambodian border. Refugee women and children are a particularly vulnerable group. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) makes a specific provision for giving 'appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance' (art. 22) to the refugee child. Women make up a large proportion of the world's refugee population. They are very frequently subjected to physical and sexual abuse in countries of refuge.

30081. WAO: Women Against the Occupation; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Women Inside and Out: No Court, No Trial, No Jury: Israel/Palestine: Part 02", in Connexions. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 14, Fall 1984. pp. 24-25. [The following was written by Women Against the Occupation (WAO), an Israeli feminist group formed in 6/1982 as "Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon" in direct response to the Israeli invasion. WAO continues to oppose all forms of occupation perpetrated by Israel and to expose the links between militarism and the subjugation of women. Recently they have been demonstrating with Palestinian women regarding the treatment of women political prisoners in Israel. Also included is an update from Democratic Palestine, n. 3, a monthly of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 5/1984.]

Neve Tirzeh prison was built by the British prior to 1948. In 1971 the Israeli authorities decided to convert it to a model prison. Located near Ramleh on the West Bank, it is a kind of women's annex to the huge men's prison there. It houses both prisoners indicted under common law, the majority being Israeli, and those detained under "security" provisions who have long sentences, the vast majority being Palestinian. It is overcrowded; six women often occupy a cell measuring 2 meters by 3 meters.

On 11/4/1983, 100 Palestinian and Jewish women held a sit-in at the International Red Cross office in East Jerusalem. Although thousands of Palestinians are imprisoned by the Israeli authorities, both in Southern Lebanon and in Israel, the sit-in was aimed specifically on the fate of 32 women in the Neve Tirzeh prison. Since then some have been released.

When the women refused to cook meals for their guards, seeing this as a humiliating and degrading demand [they didn't refuse to do other work], their already poor situation rapidly deteriorated. Since 5/1983 they have been locked in their cells 23 hours a day. All reading and writing materials have been denied and family visits, which used to be once every two weeks, have now been cut to once every two months. Even this restriction is arbitrary. One mother has not been allowed to see her daughter in four months and was told to come back in another two.

At the sit-in, one of the women's lawyers reported on a new, more horrifying development. On 10/31/1983, the women noticed that the guards were removing books from the library that their families had brought them. The prisoners started shouting and banging on their cell doors, demanding their books be put back. In response, a special unit of the prison authorities was called in and started spraying [what was believed to be] tear gas into the small, crowded cells. The women ran to the windows and broke the glass in order to breathe. The guards then started beating them with clubs and spraying even more gas. They fell to the ground choking, barely able to breathe, unable to help one another.

The cells were thick with gas. It clung to the walls and floor, to their clothes, to their bodies. When they washed their clothes to rinse out the gas, they weren't allowed to hang them outside their cells to dry. Guards who entered the cells for a search, threw the wet clothes on the floor, contaminating them once again.

Despite the fact that one doctor and three paramedics were present, the prisoners were denied any treatment for three days. Even then the care was minimal, consisting of Vaseline for their burns and Tylenol for pain.

On 3/6/1984, the women declared a hunger strike in anticipation of International Women's Day. The prison administration tried to get the women to send a delegation in hopes of getting them to end the strike. The women, however, had been boycotting any contact with the authorities since the gassing and thus refused. Instead, they demanded the return of their library. When this demand was fulfilled, the women ran to the windows and broke the glass in order to breathe. The guards then started beating them with clubs and spraying even more gas. They fell to the ground choking, barely able to breathe, unable to help one another.

The victory of the women political prisoners in Neve Tirzeh, who attained all their demands in this round, points to two elements which are the key to victories in prison strikes generally. First, the organization and determination of the prisoners themselves, and second, broad, active solidarity from outside the prison.

[Women Against the Occupation also sent us this article and interview which illustrate the broad definition of imprisonment as practiced by the Israeli authorities.]

Town Arrest Under Israeli Occupation: Although many people associate town and house arrest with "banning" as practiced by South Africa, they are unaware that the State of Israel has been using this tactic on hundreds of Palestinians since its inception in 1948.

A holdover from the British Mandate Emergency Regulations, town arrests are a means to limit political activity on a supralegal level. There is no court, no trial and no jury, hence the person has little recourse.

In the Occupied Territories, the military governor of the area decides when a person is"danger to the security of the state" and confines her/him to their town during the day and to their home from sundown to sunup. Within the Green Line (Israel's pre-1967 borders) the person is called before a judge, but any resemblance to justice stops there. The Shin Bet, Israel's FBI, passes on information to the judge while
the person accused is not allowed to hear the charges on the grounds that it would violate security. Not knowing the charges, the person is obviously powerless to defend her/himself.

Town arrests are usually imposed for six months at a time with an ever present option for renewal at the end of the sentence. So far the maximum amount served has been seven years. It is often given to political prisoners upon completion of their prison term to inhibit any political challenge. When the whole concept of town arrest transcends the law, the fact that there is an Israeli law which forbids punishing a person more than once for the same crime is irrelevant.

Needless to say, daily life under town arrest is virtually unbearable. The person must report to the local police station between one to three times a day. In addition, the police often barge into the person's/house in the middle of the night to check up on them. The detainee is thus under constant surveillance. Work or study often becomes impossible especially if the person comes from a small village with limited resources. In 1/1984 there were over 70 people under town arrest.

Amal Labadi is a 26 year old Palestinian woman who was under town arrest in her village on the West Bank until 1/1984. She was freed with no explanation given by the military authorities. At the time of this interview, she had not yet been freed.

"In my case, town arrest prevents me from conducting my activities. I've been active all my life. Now I'm a member of the higher committee of the Women's Work Committee of the West Bank and Gaza. This committee works to build a Palestinian women's movement in the Occupied Territories and urges women to take part in all levels of society--socially, politically and economically.

"I must have daily contact with women in the refugee camps, cities and villages in order to persuade them to go out of their houses, to raise their consciousnesses. So, because of town arrest, I can't talk with women on simple social issues such as how to take care of their children and their own health. By my teaching women first aid, to read and write, I'm jeopardizing Israel's security.

"Besides these activities, I'm treasurer of the Union of Public Institution Workers which organizes workers from three villages, including mine. I must travel between these villages for my union work, meeting with workers, etc.

"On the personal level, I'm now seven months pregnant. My doctor is in Jerusalem and I need to see him every week, but I must ask permission to travel there from the military commander. This situation threatens my life and the life of my child. I was sick with a cold last week but was refused permission to see my doctor. I'm among the few who have a phone in the village so at least I could phone him. When the time comes for me to deliver my child, I must ask for permission from the army to go to the hospital. I won't have my baby at home with no doctor or nurse in the village. I'll go to the hospital, and if they want to arrest me and my baby afterward, let them!"

"Besides this, my husband is imprisoned in Gaza. I asked permission to visit him but this was turned down yesterday. He has ten more months to serve, and I probably won't be able to see him. I used to visit my mother in Ramleh five times a week since she is 65 years old and ill. I'm the only one who can visit her regularly, and her doctor said she is unable to take care of herself, but my request to be permitted to visit her was not even answered. Of course, my social life has also been disrupted. I can't visit friends or family or be present at family occasions.

"One of the reasons I believe I'm under town arrest was because of my relations with Women Against Occupation. Apparently when both peoples meet to discuss common issues this endangers security. But this will not stop us. If I can't travel to peace-seeking Israelis, they come to me."


In 6/82, the group Women Against Occupation [originally called Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon] was formed in Israel as a direct response to the war in Lebanon. With its massive destruction of a civilian population, this war quickly lifted the facade of Israel's higher moral status for those who still clung to that antiquated belief. Using the excuse that the PLO was storing arms in southern Lebanon, the Israeli Army bombed hospitals and schools there. Cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs, two particularly barbaric types of weapons supplied courtesy of the United States, rained upon southern Lebanon. Electricity was cut off and food supplies were not allowed to enter Beirut for days. The massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, horrifying as they were, were but symbols of the greater destruction wrought upon Lebanon by the Israelis. As the days, months and now year drag on, it becomes increasingly clear that this is a war of terror designed to liquidate as many Palestinians as possible and to petrify into submission those who are left alive.

In addition to being highly critical of the invasion, many Israeli Jews have begun to reexamine their own society and to discuss the role of war in their lives. Beyond its dubious military aims, war serves as a smoke screen to cover up many of Israel's internal problems. How convenient to conduct a war financed by the USA, which at the same time deflects attention from Israel's continued occupation of Arab land from the 1967 war, from the 130% yearly inflation rate, from the increasing conflict between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, and from the continuing oppression of women.

Women Against Occupation was organized both to protest the war and to expose the links between militarism and the subjugation of women. Although many anti-war groups sprang up following the invasion, we felt that it was important to organize specifically as women. When a heckler at one of our demonstrations told us that we "would be better off baking cakes for the soldiers," it was evident that the attitude is that it is a woman's duty to support the men at war, and if there was to be anything said or done, it should be by men.

Yet it was precisely the anticipation of this attitude which caused our group to raise the slogan "Silence means approval," which embodies our position that it is our right and duty to protest against the war for several reasons: women should be perceived as equal members of society and should take part in and responsibility for any decision made by the society they live in; we believe that since women do not (as a rule) initiate wars or take an active part in them, they have every right to protest against this situation which has been imposed on them; the fact that society traditionally demands women to reproduce, take care of the home and children, suffer violence, and support the men from behind the lines, provides the very grounds for women's right to object to war.

In a militaristic society one's worth comes from having served in the army, from having been on the front lines. Those who have not served are considered unworthy of speaking out and of participating fully in the nation. Such a claim is raised against Israeli Arabs, whose non-service in the army is often used to legitimize their oppression and to silence them. Although Jewish women do serve in the army, they do so in primarily supportive and servile roles (teaching, secretarial, etc.) and are thus excluded from full national participation. Issues which relate
specifically to women such as battery, abortion, and reform of divorce laws are given short shrift. Even within the anti-war movement our views are not taken seriously, because we have not seen "action."

The repercussions of this action have been acutely felt by Palestinian and Lebanese women since the invasion. In this war, directed as it is at a civilian population, women and children suffer heavier casualties than men, who are mobile. To the women who are not killed or injured, the daily pressures of looking for food and water when there is little to be had, of taking care of the wounded, and searching for male friends and relatives who have been dragged off by Israeli soldiers into "detention camps."

The effects of war, however, extend much further than its direct physical consequences. They serve to reinforce the entire social structure, particularly the role delegated to women. First, women are used as alibis for war, "it is waged for our protection and for the security of our families."

Later, we are expected to be grateful and nurturing toward those who risked their lives on our behalf. Yet, the hypocrisy of the vanquishing army toward women is clear: to its own women it projects a sentimental glorification of the home and family, to enemy women there is overt hatred and an attempt to destroy these same institutions.

The recent debate in Israel over abortion and the new tax law, which will give more aid to large Jewish families, expose the reactionary way in which a militaristic society views women. Several months ago a $50 surcharge was imposed on all Israeli citizens leaving the country. The added revenue is to be allocated to all families with four or more children in which the father has either served in the army or has been exempt from military service due to religious reasons. More recently the government changed a law, which gave a sum of money to every mother at every birth enabling poor families to buy needed equipment, clothing, etc. for the child, to a law giving subsidies only to women bearing their fourth child, and again only to those belonging to families meeting the above-mentioned stipulations. In short, these laws apply to Jews only.

Hand in hand with increased aid to large families is a restrictive abortion law. IN 1979 a clause in the abortion law enabling women to abort on socio-economic grounds was repealed, making abortion legal (but not free of charge) only in cases of incest, rape, religious reason, severe physical damage to the mother or child, and other extreme cases. It is not a coincidence that the issue of abortion comes up in the midst of war. Dr. Haim Sadan, advisor to the Minister of Health, said in an interview that "abortion has resulted in the loss of 20 [army] divisionism and the anti-war movement and we participated in the Fifth National Feminist Conference in Haifa, where our workshops on the war and on Arab women were the most heavily attended.

At this point our group is predominantly Jewish, although Palestinian women have participated in our various activities. Recently, we have been making contact with Palestinian women outside of our group in Arab villages and on the West Bank. We have begun to visit Palestinian women who have been imprisoned for being politically active. We feel this is a first step toward closer communication with Palestinian women.

In the above statement, we have raised a few points which we believe can throw some light on the correlation between the permanent state of war which exists in our region and the oppression of Jewish and Palestinian women. We believe that ending this state of war by establishing an independent Palestinian state and guaranteeing all Palestinians human and democratic rights is a major issue in our struggle for women's emancipation.

Further reading: "Israeli Response to War: An Israeli Feminist Account", in American Friends Service Committee Women's Newsletter, Volume 4, Number 1, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PH 19102. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]

30083. Women Against Occupation; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Israel: Women Against the Occupation: Womens Wombs Are Mobilized to Produce More Soldiers and to Solve the Demographic Problems: Part 01", in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 11, December 1, 1984. p. 9. [In response to an inquiry to the Israeli group Women Against Occupation about their activities, Connexions received the following reply dated 10/10/83.]

Our group does not have a clear cut position about each issue that exists here, for example, the question of Zionism. There are women in our group who are anti-Zionist (myself included) and support the establishment of a democratic and secular state in all of Palestine. Others support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories, either as a minimum program or as a permanent solution. Since all positions are decided on by consensus, we have not gone on record as supporting any defined political solution and do not exclude Zionist women from joining our group. Actually the only positions one has to agree upon when joining are women's liberation (broadly defined). Israel out of Lebanon and the occupied territories, and self-determination for the Palestinians. I see this as the broadest possible political basis on which women can organize as feminists, since I see the state of war between Israeli and our Arab neighbors and the oppression of Palestinian rights as the main issue blocking women's emancipation in Israel and that of Palestinian women.

I think it is really astounding that such a group emerged, since I've been politically active for some years and the feminist movement here has always been small, limited and crippled by elitism and has refused to take political positions.

Right now we are involved in several projects. The main ones are support for the strike of women Palestinian political prisoners, We held a second demonstration last week with the participation of the prisoners' families and members of women's groups in the West Bank. It looks as if this is going to be a long and bitter struggle since both sides are determined to win and we need all the international support we can get.

Another project is establishing ties and permanent relations with women's groups in the West Bank. We have already met with them and will continue in order to work together on all relevant issues. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]
Libya

32000. "ISA Delegates See Workers' Situation: Low Wages and Lack of Jobs", in Correspondence (KMU International (Philippines)), April–June 1994, p. 5-6. One of the most common observations of the ISA delegates was the employers' rampant violation of minimum wage laws. This was due to the unlimited pool of unemployed aching to be hired for even less pay. This was the most obvious in the Subic Bay Municipal Area (SBMA), site of the former US naval base which has been transformed as one of the country's leading industrial sites. To be eligible to even apply for a job at the SBMA, workers must present a certificate of voluntarism stating that they have provided their labor free of charge to the SBMA. Workers volunteer from one week to eight months doing such tasks as sweeping streets or waving flags for visitors. And yet, the only jobs available are five-month contractual positions. At the Angeles City branch of the Swagman Hotel, part of an Australian-owned chain notorious as a prostitution front, the ISA delegates found out that counter girls were paid P28 a day. Their main income came from selling their sexual labor to foreigners. They are paid P500 for a night; P200 goes to the Swagman as a commission. Customers also pay P400 a night for a room. The ISA delegates further discovered that children as young as 10 years old were being sold for sex. [\*]

32001. "ISA Delegates See Workers' Situation: Repressed Workers' Rights", in Correspondence (KMU International (Philippines)), April–June 1994, p. 5. In Daraga, Albay, about 10-hours drive south of Manila, the ISA delegates met with workers at the Isarog Pulp and Paper Mill (IPPM) factory who, after 11 years, finally forged a collective bargaining agreement with the company management. Since starting operations in 1974, the management of IPPM has resisted all attempts by the workers to form a union to the extent of retrenching the union officers in 1977. The ISA delegates saw that the highest rate and most severe forms of repression were in industrial centers and export processing zones like those in the Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon regions. In such industrial enclaves, a "no union, no strike" policy is the norm. At the Union Plastic Co. located at the Laguna International Industrial Park, 60 kilometers south of Manila, the company’s Korean owners have been trying to shut down the factory to bust the union. The common practice is to reopen the company under a different name, hire new, mostly contractual workers, and make sure no union is formed again. This is what Seaplus, a company in Sorsogon did. It changed names three times to neutralize attempts to form a union. In the Japanese-owned Furusawa Rubber Co. in Laguna, workers went on strike when management dismissed 40 union members. Things were equally bad at the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ), approximately 100 kilometers north of Manila. The BEPZ was established by Marcos in 1972 and is still considered a showcase by the Ramos regime. Out of 59 factories operating in the zone, only 19 have unions. 67% of the workers are casual employees, many of them young women in temporary training schemes, earning a mere 75% of the minimum wage. 90% of the total work force receive less than the minimum wage. There was a time in 1987 that 95% of BEPZ workers were unionized. In 1988, however, the Aquino regime launched an anti-union offensive in the BEPZ. By 1991, 100 officials had been arrested, three murdered, two shot dead at a picket, and one woman organizer raped. [\*]

32002. Barclays Bank. Libya: An Economic Survey; Part 29: Cost of Living. London: Barclays Bank, December 1968. The cost of living throughout the country has increased considerably during the past six years and is continuing to increase each month. This is due not only to the shortage of accommodation and the steady rise in wages, but also to the shortage of labour. With the influx of expatriate staff of oil companies, business and residential accommodation in Tripoli and Benghazi is at a premium. Private furnished accommodation is almost impossible to obtain. Unfurnished flats can be found from £L100-120 per month in the town and semi-detached villas in the suburbs cost £L120-L160, with rents over £L200 per month for first-class accommodation. Good office accommodation is difficult to find and it is impossible to give an accurate guide of the probable rent. Domestic help is difficult to obtain and with the drift to well paid employment with oil companies, those available command from £L50-70 per month. Vegetables, fruit and meat are the main local supplies available and most other foodstuffs are imported. Even local supplies vary with the season and climatic conditions. There is a State National Insurance scheme which provides free medical treatment to all employees. As from 1/1/1969, contributions are on a sliding scale according to income and will increase each year for four years. There are in addition in the main towns private clinics run by qualified doctors for private patients. [\*]

32003. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Israel and the Occupied Territories: Part 11: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (c) Freedom of Religion", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, February 1994. Israeli law provides strong guarantees of freedom for all faiths. Approximately 82% of Israeli citizens are Jewish, Muslims, Christians, and Druze, and members of other minority religions make up the remaining 18%. Each recognized religious community in Israel has legal authority over its members in matters of marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring the case to religious courts. Orthodox religious authorities have exclusive control over marriage, divorce, and burial in all sectors of the Jewish community, whether or not they are Orthodox. Missionaries are allowed to work in Israel. According to the Justice Ministry, the Government has not applied a 1977 antiproselytizing law, prohibiting the offering and receipt of material benefits as an inducement to conversion, against any individuals or organizations for several years. Travel to visit religious sites or perform religious obligations in and outside Israel is widely permitted. (See separate report on the occupied territories on denial of rights of Muslim and Christian Palestinians to worship at holy places.) In 1993 Israel approved the pilgrimage to Mecca (for both the hajj and the umra) of over 4000 Israeli Muslims. However, for security reasons, the Government forbids participation in the hajj by males under 30 years of age. The Government asserts that travel to Saudi Arabia, a country formally still in a state of war with Israel, is a privilege and not a right for Israeli Muslims. In 1993 the Government welcomed the visit of 192 Libyan pilgrims to Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. [\*]
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government provides subsidized medical care and education, improving the welfare of children over the past 25 years. Declining revenues and general economic mismanagement, however, is leading to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Female circumcision, which has been condemned by international health experts as damaging to physical and mental health, is reportedly still practiced among tribal groups in remote areas of the south. [=]


32007. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Libya: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government has subsidized education and medical care, improving the welfare of children in the past 25 years. However, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some tribes located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation which is usually performed on young girls. [=]

32008. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Libya: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Both law and traditional Islamic attitudes restrict women's rights. How ever, Mr. Qadhafi has led efforts to improve the status of women and expand their access to educational and employment opportunities. Women may serve in the military. No information is available on the extent to which violence against women is a problem in Libya. [=]


32010. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Sudan: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (c) Prohibition of Force or Compulsory Labor", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. Although the law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, slavery persists. The taking of slaves, particularly in war zone, and their export to parts of central and northern Sudan continued in 1994. Captives were forced to do agricultural and domestic work, and some women were forced to serve as concubines. Although in some instances local authorities took action to stop instances of slavery, in other cases the authorities did nothing. There were also several unconfirmed reports that some captives were exported to Libya. In its 1993 World Labor Report, the ILO noted that traditional slavery survived and is increasing in modern-day Sudan in the context of the ongoing civil war (see Section 6). The SPLA and SSIM continued to force southern men to work as laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into their fighting forces. [=]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Libya

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175.

Primary schools 68/69: 1069; 74/75: 1957; Classrooms 68/69: 8311; 74/75: 19168; Male pupils in 68/69: 183080; Female pupils in 68/69: 87537; Total pupils in 68/69: 270617; 74/75: Male pupils 296255; 74/75: Female pupils 242312; 74/75: Total pupils in 74/75: 538567; Teachers 68/69: 8161; Teachers 74/75: 22960.

General Preparatory schools 68/69: 144; 74/75: 421; Classrooms 68/69: 818; 74/75: 3006; Male pupils in 68/69: 25637; Female pupils in 68/69: 3544; Total pupils in 68/69: 29181; 74/75: Male pupils 70391; 74/75: Female pupils 25579; 74/75: Total pupils in 74/75: 95970; Teachers 68/69: 2076; Teachers 74/75: 5817.


General Secondary schools 68/69: 25; 74/75: 70; Classrooms 68/69: 250; 74/75: 551; Male pupils in 68/69: 6237; Female pupils in 68/69: 944; Total pupils in 68/69: 7181; 74/75: Male pupils 13024; 74/75: Female pupils 3170; 74/75: Total pupils in 74/75: 16203; Teachers 68/69: 608; Teachers 74/75: 1651.


(2) University education: Great attention has been paid to university education. Allocations earmarked for this stage in the Five Year Development Plan 1976/1980 amount to LD 554.216 million distributed as follows: LD 276.216 million for Tripoli University, and LD 278 million for Benghazi University. The newly built Benghazi University is large enough to receive 10000 students. Its design, equipment and construction were on the latest model.

(3) Eradication of illiteracy: A timetable for eradicating illiteracy was laid down in the Development Plan. This will take place within the framework of a comprehensive programme participated in by various organizations, the Arab Socialist Union and women’s revolutionary formations. The Programme sets 1980 as a date for stamping out the illiteracy of all citizens. The following table illustrates the number of classrooms and illiterates according to the programme of illiteracy eradication during the years 1973, 1974 and 1975.

NUMBERS OF ILLITERATES AND CLASSROOMS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1973 No. of Illiterates</th>
<th>1974 No. of Classrooms</th>
<th>1975 No. of Illiterates</th>
<th>1976 No. of Classrooms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>50000;</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>50000;</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>30000;</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>30000;</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misrata</td>
<td>9000;</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>9000;</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Missions: The number of missions for higher studies which are not available in the Libyan Arab Republic has greatly increased. About 900 students were sent abroad within the Development Plan 1973/1975. Those students are to specialize in the fields of science, technology, industry and agriculture with the purpose of providing the Universities and the various sectors of development with their needs.

(5) Curricula and training: Great efforts have been exerted to develop curricula to present the latest scientific methods and the philosophy of education in the Libyan Arab Republic after the Revolution. The State spares no effort to train teachers in the latest methods of education. The following table shows what has been done in the field of training teachers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Training Courses</th>
<th>No. of Training Centres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>41;</td>
<td>116;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>9;</td>
<td>116;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebha</td>
<td>13;</td>
<td>116;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabra</td>
<td>10;</td>
<td>116;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Libya); Department of Information & Cultural Affairs (Libya). The Human March In The Libyan Arab Republic: Part 25: Youth and Social Welfare. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1976. The First of September Revolution is distinguished by its youthful leadership. Therefore, it is only natural that due attention has been given to the Arab Libyan youth. Studies have been carried out to pinpoint the problems and needs of youth in the Arab Libyan society, and plans have been drawn to utilize the energies and potentialities of the young generation: (1) Scouting for boys and girls has been encouraged. (2) Two sports complexes have been established, one in Tripoli and the other in Benghazi. (3) Sports playgrounds and clubs have been established in various parts of the Republic. There are now 129 sports clubs in the Libyan Arab Republic open for all sports.

Sports for the people: Sports for all is a principle adopted by the...
Revolution. To realize the policy based on this principle and to enable as many people as possible to practice sports, twenty centres for youth were set up. They are distributed as follows: (1) Two centres, one in Tripoli and the other in Benghazi. (2) Three centres in each of Zawiya, Sebha and Misrourata. (3) A centre in each of Derna, Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Al Khalji, Khoms and Gheryan.

Each youth centre includes play grounds for different sports, halls for music, drama, lectures and other activities. Also 10 hostels have been built in Benghazi Tripoli, Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Misrourata, Zawiya. Derna, Al Khalji, Sebha, Al Khoms and Gheryan. Each youth hostel is divided into two parts, one for girls and the other for boys. Each has 200 beds and sitting, dining and reading rooms. (1) Five summer resorts for youth have been established. They are in Jolyana area (Benghazi), Sussex area (Al Jabal Al Akhdar), Tajura (Tripoli), Nileli area (Zawiya) and Misrourata area. Each summer resort is well equipped with bedrooms, dining rooms and big halls for different activities. (2) Five sports complexes have been established in Sebha, Majr, Zuwarra, Derna and Misrourata.

Youth welfare: Special care is given to youth to instil in them the spirit of the Revolution. They are trained and given the chance to play their role in the social change taking place in the Libyan Arab Republic. Such interest is translated into the following activities: (1) Camps for the popular revolution for voluntary work. (2) Sports and cultural competitions. (3) Organizing tours to neighbouring Arab countries. (4) Supporting the Libyan Youth Hostels Society. (5) Setting up a chess society.

World youth conferences: The Revolution has also extended facilities to youth and encouraged them to travel abroad where they can exchange thoughts and views with other youths. To prepare the Arab Libyan Youth for these activities, seminars and conferences were held under the supervision of experts and specialists in youth affairs. The seminar on new features of the youth movement, the first sports planning conference in the Libyan Arab Republic, and the central camp for training youth leaders are just a few examples. The Libyan Arab Republic participated in the youth sports, conferences, festivals and sports' training courses which were held on Arab and international levels. The Libyan Arab youth also took part in the following conferences and festivals: (1) The First Arab Youth Festival (Algiers 1972) (2) The Joint Festival for the Youth of the Libyan Arab Republic and Tunisia (3) Palestine Football Cup Round (Benghazi August 1973), (4) The First Arab Youth Festival on Aviation (Cairo - August 1974), (5) The Second Arab Youth Festival (Tripoli July 1975), (6) The Arab Schools Sports Round (Alexandria - August 1975). (7) The First African Youth Festival (Dakar December 1969) (8) The Second African Youth Festival (Tunisia July 1973). (9) The Fourth Conference for the African Youth Movement (Benghazi - March 1974), (10) The International Conference of the Political Movement of the Youth of the Arab Countries and Europe (Tripoli, May 1973 - Paris, December 1974).

Social Affairs: Pursuance of social welfare policy during the last six years has realised signal achievements. National objectives have been made clear in our social welfare work. This work included extending social services and encouraging the establishment of cooperatives and public societies to participate in the revolutionary development of the country. Following is a brief survey of some of these activities and achievements:

Social welfare centres: These centres instruct girls and mothers in matters related to the establishment of a happy and sound family life. Families with low income are trained in manual work, domestic industries, vocational and other work that can help in raising the family income. There are 26 of these centres in the various cities and villages of the Libyan Arab Republic.

Girls’ and boys’ care institutions: These institutions and orphanages look after orphans and poor families. There are six of them in Libya extending refuge to 643 girls and boys. Education is also provided for the orphans in these institutions up to the secondary stage. Priority is given to the orphans of these institutions to join vocational training centres. The Ministry of Labour provides suitable jobs for them following their graduation.

Old age homes: There are three of these homes in Libya. They shelter 273 old men and women. These homes, also, provide care to old men and women who lack necessary family care.

Blind and handicapped rehabilitation centres: In these centres, the blind and handicapped receive vocational training that enables them to be active and useful members of the society.

Juvenile delinquents centres: These centres were affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, but they have been turned over to the Ministry of Social Affairs in response to the new attitude of the Revolution and the society toward delinquents. Two centres are now being built in Tripoli and Benghazi on international standards.

Nurseries: In a society that accepts and encourages women to work, it has become necessary to provide care for the child and furnish facilities for working, women. There are now 19 nurseries which provide care for about 2894 children. Others are under construction.

Social security: On 10/10/1973, one of the most important laws was promulgated, providing for security and equality among the citizens namely the Social Security Law No. 72 of the year 1973. Beneficiaries of the Social Security law receive free medical care in addition to financial and material help. Expenditures to cover pensions and help for the beneficiaries of the Law amounted to LD 3,928,746 during 1974. [=]

32014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Libya); Department of Information & Cultural Affairs (Libya), Ministry of Labor (Libya). The Human March In the Libyan Arab Republic: Part 26: Labor. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1976. The Arab Libyan is of the opinion that work guarantees freedom because work is essential to earn a living. It is a proved fact that bread is the way to freedom, which can never be enjoyed by the hungry or the unemployed. Various programmes, therefore, have been undertaken with the purpose of preparing a generation of skilled labourers, creating work opportunities not only for the Libyans, but also for brothers and friends, and to put an end to the habit of dependency by those who leave their farms in search of easy jobs.

Revolutionary labour legislations: (1) Minimum daily wage of the labourer has been increased to two dinars instead of one half dinar. (2) Labour agents have been outlawed. Labour offices are entrusted with the task of making contacts with employers to find the appropriate job for the unemployed. (3) Relations between the labourers and their employers were organized through defining worker's rights in leaves and working hours, prohibiting arbitrary lay-offs, protecting labourers against occupational dangers and regulating employment of women and children. (4) Reorganization of trade unions and syndicates, granting them more liberties. (5) Worker's representation on the Boards of Directors of their companies. (6) Raising the minimum compensation for sickness, retirement and pensions from 8-30 dinars per month. Special care is given to pregnant working-women. (7) Rehabilitation of the disabled and care for juvenile delinquents.

Training: To create skilled productive labourers, training programmes have been undertaken and man, vocational training centres were established. The training budget, amounted to LD 18 million in the Three-Year-Development Plan (1973-1975) Vocational raining centres established: date amount to 22 centres in comparison to 4 centres before the Revolution. In addition, the Ministry of Labour sends abroad trainees in various fields to meet the requirements of the economic and social development plan. There are now approximately 1035 trainees.

Labour education: The State has paid due attention to labour education to make workers aware of their rights and duties and to help them carry out their role in building the democratic socialist society effectively. Various labour education centres have been set up as Higher Institutes for Labour Education in Tripoli, Benghazi and Al Khalji. The following table shows allocation earmarked for the labour sector in 1975:

Vocational training 18643. Labour education 2.7 million. Social Security centres 3 million. [=]

demand for the hats has emerged among Tunisian women. The origin of the chechia hat is believed to be Chechnya. Spreading from that region, Tunisian-produced chechias are worn from Sudan to Nigeria (Nigerian exports are made through Libya). As women became more active in public life, they wanted a more convenient headgear, and the chechia was modified to have a point in the front. After introduction, decorated chechias became popular at discos. In the bazaar, merchants are skeptical that a hat that had not changed in 500 years can remain a fad when its fashions change every day.

32016. O'Brien, Jay. "Sudan's Killing Fields", in Middle East Report, November-December 1989. pp. 32-35. While in 1988, Sudan had its best harvest in a decade, as many as half a million refugees in Southern Kordofan province died of starvation and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to Ethiopia and other areas in Sudan. At the same time, vast squatter settlements in Khartoum have brought the city to 4 million. While there have been reports of the crisis in Sudan, describing the warfare between the Islamic north and Christian, Black south, the real engine for the crisis is a history of class struggle and rivalries among the Sudanese bourgeoisie. When Sudan became independent in 1956, it had two factions in its emergent ruling class: the agrarian elite, based in irrigated cotton-for-export (coalescing around the Ansar), and the commercial bourgeoisie (coalascing around the Khartiya, and the Democratic Unionist Party). As the world cotton market stagnated, the agrarian elite shifted to sorghum production for domestic food consumption; the 1968-1973 Sahelian drought proved a financial windfall for Sudan, which could export food from the Gezira scheme areas. However, the slowing of exports created a crisis in hard currency earnings, and led to a spiraling decline in exports as export crops were hit with higher taxes, and production and irrigation systems declined. In 1973, the fall in cotton prices led to a balance in payments crisis, leading Sudan, under intense pressure to adopt IMF-World Bank stabilization policies. This led to a rapid deterioration in Sudan's rural population. In 1983, the 1972 truce in Sudan collapsed as the Jonglei Canal through the Sudd swamp was being built, the southern oil was taken north for refining. Nimeiri failed to build a viable coalition based on the leftist Sudan Socialist Union, and brought the Muslim Brotherhood into the government; opposition forced it to fall around John Garang to form the SPLA, which seized much of the south. Droughts, beginning in 1980, had by 1984 pushed much of the northern rural population to famine; on 4/6/1985, Nimeiri was deposed by the army. In 4/1986 elections, the Umma Party came to power, as the National Islamic Front (backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and financed by the Saudi-owned Faisal Islamic Bank) took a fifth of the seats in the Parliament. Under the Libyan financed Umma, all factions worked to loot the assets of the Sudanese government; the economy became stricken by strikes, inflation, and crumbling of the physical infrastructure. The traditional balance of power has broken down under the impact of 'Islamic' banks such as Faisal Islamic Bank, which has emerged as the most powerful commercial institution in the country; FIB remains protected from taxation and oversight by its 'Islamic' status. The decline of the economy led to hoarding, shortages, and petty corruption; even postage stamps can only be bought now in the black markets. Neither faction has the power to displace the other, so all have resorted to looting and pocketing resources; private militias bristle with arms and munitions (Umma affiliated militias are the strongest), while police have to account for each bullet they are issued. In Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile provinces, Umma armed militias are merely tribal groups, who have used their arms to raid neighboring Black tribes to seize their cattle, and women and children for enslavement. While there has been a move toward talks between the SPLA and government, it is hard to see how a society that has broken down so far can be pieced back together. But nothing can begin until the civil war ends. [TXT]

32017. Salt, Jacqueline: Solomon Frank. "As Christmas Approaches... It Is Beginning To Look A Lot Like Chip Berlet Works With The Cops, Part 1 of 3", in National Alliance, December 24, 1992. pp. 2-5. In the mid-1980s, as Bill Clinton was beginning to build his coalition through the [Zionist-financed] Democratic Leadership Council, the left started to rebuild by creating the Citizens Party, Consumer Party of Pennsylvania, California's Peace & Freedom Party, and the New Alliance Party. Fred Newman, founding the International Workers Party (IWP), after a brief alliance with Lyndon LaRouche's National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC) [now the National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC)], then a former member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) member and just before he turned right, disband ed the IWP in 1979; in 1982 he helped found the New Alliance Party (NAP), which emerged out of the Dump Koch movement. In 1977, Dennis King (with links to the Communist Party-USA) attacked NAP as a form of sick psychopolitics; about the same time, [John Foster] Chip Berlet (previously a reporter for CounterSpy) in 'Public Eye' falsely accused NAP of being a LaRouche front group based on brainwashing. Nevertheless, NAP, under the leadership of Dr. Leonora Fulani, grew in the late 1980s, often working with other progressive groups such as the Christian Institute.

In 1984, Berlet became the head of Public Eye, at then time closely linked to the Communist Party-USA, succeeding founder Harvey Kahn. At that time there were serious problems at Public Eye, such as the continuing role of graphic artists William Lemmer (who had been exposed as a government informer who had spied on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War) and the libelous accusations of Kahn (who alleged that NCLC, the National Labor Federation of Marxist Eugenio Finetti and the IMP were a 'distinct coalition... with cultic trappings') which faced a lawsuit by Newman. Despite the continuing reviverberations of Kahn's charges, the NAP grew: joining forces with South Bronx City Councilman Gilberto Gerena-Valentini, Marxist Ted Taylor and New Jersey community leader Mamie Moore to develop the National Federation of Independent Unions. Due to continuing controversy, berlet agreed in a 1984 telephone conversation that the accusations against NAP would be retraced: however, he never honored that commitment. [q.v. From Tapes of a Telephone Interview With new Alliance Movement Leader Dr. Fred Newman Conducted By Left Counterintelligence Researcher Chip Berlet and Public Eye Researcher Daniel Stern in 2/1984.]

Berlet's first issue as editor of Public Eye focused on an attack on the National Labor Federation, just days before an FBI raid on the Natted's Brooklyn headquarters. The FBI seized the groups files and databases in one of the most intense attacks on a leftist organization in history. Yet, Berlet made a pro forma protest, but continued to attack the National Labor Federation, providing justification for the FBI raid. In addition, a small editor's note in that issue reaffirmed the accusation that NAP was a cult. Apparently believing that he had been successful in irreparably damaging the National Labor Federation, Berlet worked for a while in Chicago at Midwest Research Associates (funded by heiress Jean Hardisty, a Democratic Party activist). In 1987, that organization and Berlet would relocate to Cambridge, Massachusetts, resurfacing as Political Research Associates (PRA).

In 1984, Ronald Reagan was re-elected. The Democratic Party would spend the following years in an intense internal struggle, with Jesse Jackson announcing a second run for the Democratic nomination, and Sen. Al Gore working through the Democratic Leadership Conference to position itself for eventual political takeover of the party, leaving Michael Dukakis to run a hopeless Liberal campaign against George Bush in 1988. Disarray in the Left led the Village Voice to embrace Jesse Jackson in 1988, after denouncing him as an anti-semite in 1984, and the disarray continued into 1992, when many socialists, feminists and Black revolutionaries backed Bill Clinton after being handed over by Jackson to his lobbyist ally Ron Brown. In this period, NAP continued to grow, although in 1985 Dennis Serrette, accused by some of being a CIA-plant, and who was Fulani’s former lover, left the party and resurrected Berlet's old charges that the party was a brainwashing cult. [TXT]
Farrakhan, Vernon Bellecourt of the American Indian Movement, Dr. Mohammad T. Mehdí (Arab scholar), leaders of the Democratic Alliance in Colombia, the PRD in Mexico, Zairens Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba. Fulani worked with the Congressional Black Caucus, the California Peace & Freedom Party and the Libertarian Party. In 1987, Fulani, Bellecourt and Farrakhan traveled to Libya at the Reagan air raids on Tripoli.

In 1987, Berlet received $75000 from Chicago speculator Richard Dennis, and Berlet reoriented his research to a fulltime attack on the Left, and especially on the NAP. This was coincident with an attack on the NAP by the FBI (once again the attacks of the Berlet and FBI happened at the same time). One FBI document, following an FBI warning that "Members of the New Alliance Party may be armed and dangerous" dated 2/23/1988, signed by US Army director of Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Co. James R. Linnen, and addressed to FBI Terrorism Section Steven L. Pommerantz, stated that: "At a recent meeting of law enforcement and intelligence officials held in Washington, DC area it was mentioned that the FBI may be investigating a black militant group known as the 'New Alliance'. This group allegedly advocates the violent overthrow of the US Government and is comprised of members of the Black Panther Party and the Weather Underground..." Significantly, the FBI would choose to base its analysis of the NAP on the Berlet article "Clouds Blur the Rainbow": both the FBI and Berlet would term the party a "political cult".

In 1992, Fulani’s presidential campaign was targeted in the Nation by Bruce Shapiro and in New York Newsday by George Jordan, each of whom argued that the FEC should deny the candidate matching funds. Jordan would republish that article in Emerge, adding the statement that the FBI started to target Fulani after her trip to Libya. In 19909, Berlet received a further contribution of $112000 from Richard Dennis, allowing Berlet to publish his Right Woos Left: Populist Party, LaRouchian, and "The truth is that the entire right-woos-left thesis is backwards. The impact of Berlet’s Right Woos Left—which he has been center/left coming together you would be doing just what Berlet is doing. The right and left, but top and bottom. Given that the Elite cannot reestablish Counterintelligence Researcher Chip Berlet and everybody else are well aware of this. They’re well aware that the coalition that could produce a genuinely competitive third-party presidential candidacy in 1996 will not be your traditional ultra-left/reformist left coalition. It will bring together the center-left-polulism and progressiveism—including many ordinary folks who subscribe to the kinds of theories and worldviews that Berlet and the FBI are trying to tarnish with the Right Woos Left brush and drive out of the progressive movement. It will be bottom—the massess—against the top—the two party ruling class bureaucracy.

"The truth is that the entire right-woos-left thesis is backwards. The right isn’t wooing the left. Why would it? Up to a month ago, the right had control of the White House. It still controls or influences major social, political and economic institutions. What could it possibly want with the left, which is weak and impotent? No, if anyone is doing any wooing, it is the left that’s wooing the right. The left has been chasing after the Democratic Party as the Democratic Party has transformed from a liberal political force into one way over on the center right. Meanwhile, NAP has become more and more obviously left, and, as well, is leading the move to work with populist-center forces. By contrast it is Berlet and the new York Times and the Village Voice and the Nation magazine and the FBI which spent last year demonizing the Perot ovment, NAP and anything else that falls outside of the traditional left-right paradigm. But if you hold onto that paradigm, the right wins. If you are willing to risk abandoning that paradigm to create a new political configuration, then you just might do something revolutionary! If you wanted to undermine that centerleft coming together you would be doing just what Berlet is doing. You would be publishing Rights Woos Left. You would be getting ready to publish an updated version of Clouds Blur the Rainbow which PRA is planning to release at the end of this month. I agree with Ace Hayes, You couldn’t find a better ‘psypsy’ plan to deal with the new potential for the left if you went down to J. Edgar Hoover to get one." [TEXT] 32019. Salt, Jacqueline; Solomon Frank. “As Christmas Approaches... It Is Beginning To Look A Lot Like Chip Berlet Works With the Cops, Part 3 of 3: From Tapes of a Telephone Interview With New Alliance Movement Leader Dr. Fred Newman Conducted By Left Counterintelligence Researcher Chip Berlet and Public Eye Researcher Daniel Stern in 2/1984”, in National Alliance, December 24, 1992. pp. 2-5. Chip Berlet: “I should point out that I’m the new kid on the block at Public Eye. I’m the new editor as opposed to the old editor, and if there was some way I could avoid having to write articles about this ongoing topic, I would. Our analysis of your group has changed over the past few years. Dramatically, the change seems to have come at the same time we had some problems with some of the theories and worldviews that Berlet and PRA are trying to tarnish with the Right Woos Left brush and drive out of the progressive movement. It will be bottom—the massess—against the top—the two party ruler class bureaucracy."
and a relatively short article on IWP. The reason for including the three at
the same time is that we have taken a lot of heat over the past few years
for not clarifying things further in our first series of articles [1977 in Public
Eye]. Of the three groups, we are going to identify two as being, in our
opinion, cult-like, and they are Natlfed and NDPC. Now, you may
disagree with that, but at least you know where we're coming from. At the
same time, we've been getting a lot of heat from people saying we've got
to some response to the IWP stuff, too..."

Fred Newman: Would it be inappropriate for me to ask, I don't
know what you mean by a lot of heat? I mean, from which side, from
whom?

Berlet: "Heat from leftists, communists, socialists and community
organizers saying either put up or shut up. Is that clear enough? People
saying the article may have been correct and interesting in 1976, but that
is not where you leave these things lie. In fact we are going to retract the
statement we made about Union Wage. [Public Eye falsely asserts Union
Wage was a IMP front.] I think we should have retracted that years ago
myself. In any case, the heat is mostly from groups, including funders
and researchers, who say, you've made a lot of charges in this article
and then you're silent on it, and that's wrong. I wish I could have let
sleeping dogs lie. I tried to do that a couple of years ago in a little blurb on
the National Labor Federation, but all that did was cause more chaos. So.
this is, I hope, going to be our opus, our last look at thee matters as far as
I'm concerned, except for LaRouche, and it is an attempt basically to
state what we know, and hope that polemics take care of the rest. It is not,
as far as I'm concerned, looking at IWP's offspring--that's the work for
leftists and others who need to carry out principled discussions but not
the focus of a magazine that keeps track of right-wing groups and
government repression..."

["Chip Berlet will continue his work on NAP..." -- From a letter by
Jean Hardisty, director of Political Research Associates, soliciting funds
for PRA. Berlet is now employed by PRA.] [TXT]
Morocco

34000. ------. "Disillusion in Morocco", in Economist, March 25, 1995. p. 44. While King Hassan was recently received in Washington DC by Pres. Clinton, at home the economy remains stalled by the refusal of EU to open its markets to Morocco. In the US, King Hassan signed an agreement for a $200 million electricity project. However, unemployment is 17% (trade unions say the real rate is double that level), and 70% of the population is under 30. Islamic fundamentalists have gained a strong presence in universities, and female students are expected to go to where Islamic garb; 'unislamic' lecturers are boycotted.

34001. ------. Interview: "Valomet: Call Me Abu Khaled", in Biladi-Jerusalem Times, April 14, 1995. p. 14. When Jean Claude Valomet first visited the Gaza Strip in 1986, he had no idea that he would find the kind of misery, abject poverty and harsh occupation that he did. He felt that he was living on a planet other than Earth. He visited several charitable institutions in the Gaza Strip. On one of his visits, he met with Yusra Barbari, the director of the Women's Union in Gaza, who proposed he adopt Palestinian children from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in need of aid. He liked the idea, and when he went back to France, he proposed it to various friends and associations. The upshot was the establishment of the Loire Region Society, Gaza-Jerusalem. Q: Tell us more about the society. A: The society was founded in 1987 before the Intifada in the Loire Region in western France, 450 kilometers from Paris. It has no official branches outside of France, but it has a liaison bureau in Jerusalem. Q: What services does it offer? A: The services are meant purely for the Palestinian people. What we offer are not material contributions as such, but training and rehabilitation programs. We train Palestinians in sports, social services, and administration. We also offer lecturers and workshops in the arts, mainly in cinema, drawing, and photography. Q: Who benefits from these services? A: We focus on the young. We collect young people from many countries, for instance Palestinians and Israelis, French and Moroccan. The idea is for them to get familiar with the other's culture, religion. We also fight against racism and discrimination and for human rights. One of the most important jobs is to develop ties of friendship between peoples in the Middle East. Our aim is to encourage the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. We focus on culture. Within the framework of the peace process, we set up joint exhibitions between Palestinian and Israeli artists to bring the points of view of the two peoples closer. We also organize conferences on Palestine and Israel every two years in Paris. It includes a Palestinian-Israeli cultural exhibition in cooperation with L'Institut du Monde Arabe. Q: How do you choose the participants in your program? A: We have a representative in Jerusalem, Abdel Abu Rumeileh, a graduate of French universities, who now teaches French at the Ibrahimieh Community College. He is the one who chooses our candidates for use, each in his own field, based on the needs of the Palestinian people. He then submits the list to the French Consulate in Jerusalem. We then secure the workshops, bed, board and transport. Priority goes to those who speak French. Q: Once they have finished their courses, is there a follow-up program to verify if their experience is contributing to the institutions? A: Our ties with those individuals and institutions are continuous, either through our representative in Jerusalem, or through my recurrent visits to Palestine or through our correspondence. Q: Before the Palestinian National Authority came to power, you were working with private institutions. Is your link to the PNA now direct? A: Nothing has changed in the relationship. We do not aspire to create links with the PNA at the expense of other institutions. Our aim is to offer services to the people. Then again, many of those institutions are affiliated to the PNA. Q: What of the project of twinning Palestinian cities with French cities? A: As a society, we act as intermediaries for various municipalities. For instance, we created a twinning between the Municipality of Sain Herblain two years ago. Q: What did Saint Herblain offer its twin Bethlehem? A: There has been cooperation only on a very small scale since the agreement was signed two years ago. I am now in Bethlehem in the company of a group of tourists who are senior citizens. The group will take back with it an impression of life in Bethlehem and the needs of the city. They will recommend various projects that could reinforce the relationship. You might be surprised to hear that there are many people in France who do not know there are Palestinian Christians. Q: Where do you get your funds from? A: Our budget comes from the marketing of Palestinian goods in France, such as olive wood handicrafts, Palestinian embroidery, glasswork from Hebron and some antiquities. Another part comes from the fees paid by the 4000 members of the society. The rest comes from the French government. Q: How did you develop the idea of the society? What help did you have? A: After my visit to Gaza in 1986, I presented the idea to the Municipality of Saint Herblain, and also to the Palestine-French Medical Society. This society agreed to adopt several children. In cooperation with the French Consulate in Jerusalem, the municipality asked the citizens of the Loire Region to help make this idea a success. Q: Did you choose to adopt a Palestinian child yourself? A: Yes, and that was even before the society was established. I adopted a Palestinian child from Qalqiliya over 16 years ago. He is Khaled Al-Hajjar. He is my son. And I am Abu Khaled. This is the way people know me in Palestine. Q: How did you meet your son? A: I got to know Khaled through the In'ash Al-Urs Society in Ramallah, after I inquired about the possibility of adopting a Palestinian child. They brought us together. We have been in contact for over 16 years. He is now a married man with children. And I am now a grandfather. [=]
export performance, USAID will initiate projects to increase the competitiveness of firms by increasing market share in selected European Community (EC) export markets from 3% to 5% by 1997; increasing new markets as a percentage of total exports from 28% in 1992 to 40% by 1997, and by reducing tariffs for industrial goods from 47.5% in 1993 to 37.5% in 1997 and for basic agricultural commodities from 70%-100% in 1993 to 50%-75% by 1997. Through US-Moroccan institutional linkages, scientific, technological and commercial interactions will be facilitated.

(3) Increased Availability of Affordable Housing and Services for Low-Income Urban Families. To improve the quality of life, as well as to increase the numbers of stakeholders in the economy, USAID will continue to work with Moroccan local governments and the National Housing Upgrading Agency to increase the quantity of affordable and decent housing for low-income families and to reduce the number of families living in shantytowns. To this end, USAID will reduce the number of households living in slum conditions in the total urban population from 6.3% in 1993 to 5.8% in 1994; increase the number of households newly served by infrastructure under the program from 14000 in 1993 to 27800 by 1997; and increase the number of serviced plots under the program from a total of 38280 in 1992 to 103500 in 1997.

(4) Stabilizing Population Growth Maternal and Child Health. Assistance by USAID, by far the principal donor supporting family planning activities in Morocco, has contributed to a 32% decline in the total fertility rate, from 5.9 in 1979 to 4.2 in 1992. Over the same time frame, the infant mortality rate has declined from an estimated 89 deaths per 1000 live births to 57, and contraceptive prevalence has increased from approximately 19% to 41.5%.

OTHER FY 1995 USAID-managed ACTIVITIES: None.

OTHER DONORS: The United States is not a major financial contributor to Morocco. Significant resources are provided to Morocco by the World Bank, the IMF, France, Spain, several other European countries and a number of Arab countries. USAID maintains close working relationships with the multilateral donors and informal coordination with other bilateral donors, including private voluntary organizations (Helen Keller International, American Middle East Foundation, Catholic Relief Services) and Peace Corps.

FY 1995 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REQUEST: The Administration requests $22.139 million in Sustainable Development funds for: broad-based economic growth ($8.974 million); population ($10.425 million), environment ($840000); and democracy ($1.9 million). In addition, $1.3 million in Promoting Peace funds for regional activities are requested. [USAID/Rabat Mission Director: Martin Dagata.]

34004. Arney, Megan. "In Brief: Workers in Morocco Hold Sit-In", in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), June 24, 1996, p. 2. Since May 20 47.5% in 1993 to 37.5% in 1997 and for basic agricultural commodities private investment in housing and urban development, with a ratio of up to 10:1 private and public funds; provision of environmental infrastructure services to some 100000 people in unserviced neighborhoods in the city of Tetouan; and, due to the public health benefits of urban environmental upgrading, reduced incidence of hygiene-related diseases such as cholera, which have dropped dramatically in participating neighborhoods. More than 90000 people will also have the opportunity to legalize their insecure squatter status through a title buy-back scheme.

(3) Increased Availability of Affordable Housing and Services for Low-Income Urban Families: Housing programs have resulted in sales to low-income families of nearly 15000 new housing lots with legal title and basic infrastructure (water, sewer, and electricity); inducement of private investment in housing and urban development, with a ratio of up to 10:1 private and public funds; provision of environmental infrastructure services to some 100000 people in unserviced neighborhoods in the city of Tetouan; and, due to the public health benefits of urban environmental upgrading, reduced incidence of hygiene-related diseases such as cholera, which have dropped dramatically in participating neighborhoods. More than 90000 people will also have the opportunity to legalize their insecure squatter status through a title buy-back scheme.

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FY 1995 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REQUEST: The Administration requests $22.139 million in Sustainable Development funds for: broad-based economic growth ($8.974 million); population ($10.425 million), environment ($840000); and democracy ($1.9 million). In addition, $1.3 million in Promoting Peace funds for regional activities are requested. [USAID/Rabat Mission Director: Martin Dagata.]

"Literally linking arms against indiscriminate deforestation by the lumber industry, these Himalayan villagers protectively hug the trees when lumberjacks approach to fell them! The Chipko movement's primary objective is to force the state government of Uttar Pradesh to change its antiquated forest policy. Most of the deforestation that takes place in this area is not because of wood collecting to meet basic energy needs but the result of the insatiable demand of the lumber industry.

"After a serious flood and landslide five years ago, people of this region came to realize that their lives were intricately interwoven with the surrounding forest, and that official policy since colonial times had been tearing that web apart. As the thick, broad-leaf forests on the mountain tops were slowly sold away, the humus sponge that held the monsoon water back disappeared. Perennial streams now dry up soon after the monsoon season, and the collection of firewood has become a major preoccupation of the hill women. This deforestation has increased soil erosion and decreased local agricultural productivity.

"The ecological usefulness of the government’s afforestation programs in the region can be disputed. Under these programs, most of the felled oaks, rhododendron, and other broad-leaf trees are replaced with pine, because they grow faster and their wood is wanted in the market. But pine forests do not produce any humus to absorb water or increase soil fertility. Without urgent, proper management of these forests, the agricultural economy of a vast region of plains as well as hills will be threatened.

"The Chipko leaders have organized large voluntary afforestation programs, planting broadleaf trees in mountain areas and along riverbanks to halt erosion and provide a source of fuelwood. Yet the fact that the villagers themselves practice such conservation techniques, and feel impelled to bodily prevent the razing of trees, illustrates the failure of the country’s development strategy. Instead of trying to link the life and economy of the local people, and thereby their development, with the rational exploitation of the only resource surrounding them (in this case, the forests) the government continues to support policies that regard these resources as things to be sold to the highest bidder.

"Much more than local awareness is called for; institutional awareness and concern is imperative. In recent years there have been some encouraging signs of institutional awareness, at least at the international level. These developments include the establishment of the UN Environmental Program and the development of the World Bank policy for environmental as well as industrial forestry. ["Forestry: A Sector Policy Paper," District of Columbia: World Bank, 2/1978.] The US Department of State and its Agency for International Development recently sponsored a strategy conference on tropical deforestation. [US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, Proceedings of the US Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation, District of Columbia, 10/1978.] The papers presented at the Seventh World Forestry Congress, held in Buenos Aires in 1972, are probably the most comprehensive set of papers on silviculture as it is practiced today around the world. [A summary of the Seventh World Forestry Congress and a list of the 142 papers is in "Commission I: The Silviculturists," Unasylva, Special Issue, no. 104, 1972, pp. 15-30; individual papers are available from the authors or on microfiche from the FAO, Rome. The proceedings of the Eightth Congress (Jakarta, 1978) should provide a comprehensive updated overview when available.] Numerous LDC governments (including Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, India, China, and South Korea) are now showing serious concern over deforestation, [Erik Eckholm, Planting for the Future: Forestry for Human Needs, District of Columbia: Worldwatch Institute, 2/1979.] and these institutional developments may foreshadow increased financial support for forest management in the LDCs. However forest conservation and reforestation projects will continue to face stiff competition for funds and institutional support. Industrial and agricultural projects that show a quick profit and give a more immediate response to the LDC’s urgent need for economic growth are likely to continue to receive higher priority. Forestry projects that do receive priority and funding will still face formidable ecological, bureaucratic, and (perhaps even more formidable) sociological obstacles.

"Several types of programs have been proposed to offset the adverse effects of deforestation in the LDCs. These proposals include:
- Better management of existing forest resources;
- Reforestation;
- Tree Plantations;
- Rangeland management with grazing controls and pasture improvement;

Restriction of new land clearing, based on soil capability studies;
- Development of agro-forestry techniques for people who now have no alternative to planting annual crops on steep slopes;
- Dissemination of more efficient wood cooking stoves;
- Development of biogas and solar stoves to replace wood and charcoal burners; and

Intensification of agriculture and other employment-creating forms of rural development in order to reduce the agricultural pressures on the remaining forest lands."


Tropical deforestation is caused by a combination of (1) need for additional agricultural land, (2) need for additional fuelwood, and (3) a sustained world demand for tropical woods operating in the absence of effective and enforced programs for forest conservation and management. Synergisms are often involved. For example, although a growing population of subsistence farmers is clearing land to grow food, access to such land is possible in many cases only because commercial logging operations have opened the forests in response to growing domestic and foreign demand for wood products. [Willem Meijer, IndonesianForest and Land Use Planning, Lexington: University of Kentucky, Botany Department, 1975.] Access and transportation are also factors in the economics of clearing steep slopes. Even if the soil washed...
away after only one or two crops, farmers can support themselves over several seasons of clearing by selling firewood or charcoal on the regional market if transportation is available. [Willem Meijer, Indonesian Forest and Land Use Planning, Lexington: University of Kentucky, Botany Department, 1975; T. E. Lovejoy, “The Transamazonica: Highway to Extinction,” Frontiers, Spring 1973.] One of the causes of the growing world demand for forest products is, of course, population growth, but increasing urbanization, a major factor, and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is well aware of both. Edouard Saouma, FAO Director General, stated recently that, based on projections of past trends:

“Over the next 16 years it is expected that consumption of forestry products will rise by 75% to an annual roundwood equivalent of 4 billion cubic meters. If international development strategies were to increase the buying power of the masses of people in the developing world, even by a small fraction, projected consumption figures would be far higher.”


In addition, possibilities for earning foreign exchange, needed by many LDCs to reduce large foreign debts, will continue to be a motivating factor in establishing tropical forest policy [Larry Rohter, “Amazon Basin’s Forests Going Up in Smoke,” Washington Post, 1/5/1978, p. A14.] and will therefore also influence the possibilities for ameliorating the tropical deforestation trends.

While techniques and technologies are being developed that will assist in protecting and expanding forests, other technical developments may affect the future of tropical forests adversely. A variety of faster, less costly technologies are being developed to replace cutting and burning, the traditional methods of clearing. For example, Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant used widely by US armed forces in Vietnam, is reportedly available in farm supply stores in the Amazon basin, where it is used to clear land for cultivation. [Larry Rohter, “Amazon Basin’s Forests Going Up in Smoke,” Washington Post, 1/5/1978, p. A14.] The chemical 2,4,5-T, one of two herbicides contained in Agent Orange and invariably contaminated with the toxic compound dioxin, is now banned in the US [Clive Cookson, “Emergency Ban on 2,4,5-T Herbicide in US,” and Alistair Hay, “Dioxin: The 10-Year Battle That Began with Agent Orange,” Nature, 3/8/1979, pp. 108-09.] because it has been linked with birth defects and miscarriages. [The Comptroller General of the United States has recommended that the Department of Defense conduct a survey of any long-term medical effects on military personnel who were likely to have been exposed to herbicides in South Vietnam (Health Effects of Exposure to Herbicide Orange in Vietnam Should Be Resolved, District of Columbia: US General Accounting Office, 4/6/1979.) Another innovative technique for efficient clearing of tropical forests in Brazil is the correntao. [Larry Rohter, “Amazon Basin’s Forests Going Up in Smoke,” Washington Post, 1/5/1978, p. A14.] This involves the use of very large anchor chains, roughly 100 meters in length and weighing up to 10 tons. Enormous tractors attached to each end drag them through the forest, uprooting trees and everything else in the path. [This technique was used earlier (and may have been developed initially) in the US, where it was used in arid-zone range management. Undesirable woody vegetation was scraped from the land with heavy chains, after which preferred range grasses were sown. (John Valentine, Range Development and Improvement, Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1974, p. 516.)]

Still another technological development likely to significantly affect at least the Brazilian tropical forests is the "floating papermill." In 1978, industrialist Daniel Ludwig’s floating papermill (longer than two football fields in size) was towed from its construction site in Japan through the Indian and Atlantic Oceans to its final destination along the Jari River, a tributary of the Amazon. Time magazine, reporting on the $250 million plant, commented that by 1981 the factory “will turn out 70 metric tons of bleached Kraft pulp a day, enough to make a single strand of toilet paper stretching more than 6.5 times around the world... To feed the mills’ appetite, Ludwig’s crews have cleared nearly 250,000 acres of jungle so far and planted 81 million fast-growing trees.” [Daniel Ludwig’s Floating Factory: A Giant Pulp Mill for the Amazon Wilderness,” Time, 6/19/1978, p. 75.] Eventually, Ludwig plans to “tame” an area of rain forest almost the size of Connecticut.


Sociological research on community cooperation and institutions will also be necessary if village-level woodlots to meet woodlot and environmental needs are to be widely established. [Erik Eckholm, Planting for the Future: Forestry for Human Needs, District of Columbia: Worldwatch Institute, 2/1979.]

34006. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1989. pp. 1143-1154. The Constitution of Morocco provides that the country shall be governed by constitutional monarchy with a representative Parliament and an independent Judiciary. However, the ultimate authority rests with the King, who retains the discretion to terminate the tenure of any minister and dissolve Parliament to rule by decree. The current Parliament was formed in 1993 by a two-stage process: the election of 222 deputies by direct universal suffrage and selection of the remaining 111 deputies by labor organizations and other constituency groups. International observers found the direct elections to be generally fair with some irregularities. However, the second stage was marred by credible reports of widespread manipulation and fraud. When three major political parties refused to participate in the government without a far-reaching shift in power in favor of the Socialists, the King appointed a government of technocrats who, with minor changes, remained in office in 1994. The security apparatus comprises several overlapping police and paramilitary organizations. The direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, Surete Nationale, and the judicial police are departments of the Ministry of Interior and Information. The Gendarmerie Royale reports directly to the royal palace. Security force abuses continued in 1994, especially in cases involving perceived threats to state security. Morocco’s mixed economy is based on agriculture, fishing, light industry, phosphate mining, tourism, and remittances from overseas workers with illegal cannabis production a significant factor. Since the early 1980s, the government has pursued an economic reform program that has contributed to a generally strong economic growth, low inflation, and low fiscal and external deficits. The Government has embarked on a program of privatizing state-owned enterprises. In 1994 the Government made substantial progress on several human rights fronts. The King granted amnesty to 424 political prisoners- the Government began paying stipends to former inmates who survived incarceration at the notorious Tazmamart Prison; a 1934 law allowing the imprisonment of political opponents was abrogated; incidents of press censorship decreased; and the Deputy Ministry for Human Rights expanded its operations and continued dialogs with local and international human rights groups. However, several basic human rights problems remained unaddressed. Credible reports indicate that security forces frequently abused detainees and prisoners and caused the deaths of three persons in custody; state agency responsible for past and present human rights abuses were not held accountable by the weak and maliable judiciary or even subject to public investigation; many persons remain in prison for advocating independence for the Western Sahara; many young girls remain subject to exploitative domestic servitude; and the Government failed to make significant reforms in the manipulation-
proven electoral system and continued to suspend the right to due process and freedom of speech and association. The ubiquitous nature of the Ministry of Interior and Information means that virtually all allegations of governmental human right abuse involve in employees. The Ministry is responsible for authorizing associations and political parties, the conduct of elections, including cooperation with the United Nations in a referendum on the status of the Western Sahara—the oversight of the presidential pardon and expedition of the official pardon; the direction of most security forces, the appointment and training of many local officials; the allocation of local and regional budget; and the oversight of university campuses. Less formally, the Ministry exerts substantial pressure on the judicial system. In 2/1994 comments to Parliament, reiterated in 11/1994, the Minister of Interior made clear that Ministry employees will not be held to answer for allegations of abuse brought by Parliament, other ministries, or nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s). [=]

34007. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, February 1994. Moroccan women suffer various forms of discrimination, both legal and cultural. Under the Criminal Code, women are generally accorded the same treatment as men. Men are not accorded equal treatment under family and estate law, which is based on the Maliki school of Islamic law. In marriage, for example, a husband may repudiate his wife, but the wife may not repudiate her husband. The situations under which a woman may sue for divorce are far fewer than those permitted to men. Women inherit only half as much as their male siblings. Moreover, even where the law guarantees equal status, cultural norms often prevent a woman’s exercise of those rights. When a Moroccan woman inherits property from a father or husband, for example, male relatives may force her to sign over her interest. Many well-educated women succeed in breaking into the professional ranks, particularly in the areas of law, medicine, education, and government service. There are, however, few women in the top echelons of their professions. Women comprise approximately 24% of the work force, with the majority of them in the industrial, service, and teaching sectors. Women have the right to vote and to run for office. Some women have been elected to municipal councils and two women were elected to Parliament in 1993. There are no women on the CCCH, nor are there any women serving as government ministers. Women suffer most from inequality in the rural areas. Rural women perform most hard physical labor; the rate of literacy, particularly in the countryside, is noticeably lower for women than for men; and girls are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys. Women who earn their secondary school diploma, however, have equal access to university training. The law and social practices governing violence against women reflect Morocco’s Islamic culture and the importance placed on the honor of the family. The Criminal Code includes severe punishment for men who are convicted of raping or violating a woman or girl, and the defendant bears the burden of proving his innocence. However, sexual assaults often unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss of virginity. A rapist may be offered the opportunity to marry his victim in order to preserve the honor of the victim’s family. Although a woman who is the victim of rape is entitled to have her husband’s family pay for compensation according to the general law governing marriage, it is rare for this to be done. Women who become pregnant outside of marriage are often stigmatized, particularly if they are married. In 1993, a Royal decree was issued that provided for the criminal punishment of anyone who committed incitement to a stoppage of work; and the crime of violating a woman’s right to receive compensation for injury or death. The law criminalizes the practice of forced marriage, and women are not permitted to marry without the consent of their parents.

34008. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, February 1994. Morocco launched in November a campaign to vaccinate children against preventable diseases. However, the Government takes little action to promote child welfare in the areas of child labor and education. The announced illiteracy rate is 55%, and the actual rate is higher, especially in rural areas. At year’s end, the Moroccan daily L’Opinion summarized several cases involving the physical abuse of young maids by their employers. At least two 1993 cases were before Moroccan courts. In the first, a Casablanca police officer and his wife were arrested for severely beating a 6-year-old maid recruited from poor rural relatives. In the second, a military officer’s wife from Meknes was arrested for the murder of a 14-year-old maid who died after admission to a hospital exhibiting symptoms of torture and starvation. After citing scores of examples of the abuse of young girls employed as domestics, "L’Opinion concluded that documented cases were merely the tip of the iceberg and accused the Government of callous indifference to the problem. [=]

34009. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, February 1994. The Minimum Age of 14 covers the employment of children between the ages of 12-16. Those under the age of 16 may not work after school (between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m.) nor more than 10 hours a day. The normal workday is 8 hours, only in a few exceptional professions are any workers permitted to work more than 10 hours per day. In practice, children are often apprenticed before age 12, particularly in handicraft work. The argument is made that they need to acquire skills, such as weaving or rug making, before they reach the age of 12. Five years of primary education is compulsory, starting at age 7, but enforcement in the countryside and poorer urban areas is lax. Special regulations govern the employment of children between the ages of 12-16. Those under the age of 16 may not work nights (between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.) nor more than 10 hours a day. The normal workday is 8 hours, only in a few exceptional professions are any workers permitted to work more than 10 hours per day. In practice, children are often apprenticed before age 12, particularly in handicraft work. The argument is made that they need to acquire skills, such as weaving or rug making, before they reach the age of 12. Five years of primary education is compulsory, starting at age 7, but enforcement in the countryside and poorer urban areas is lax. Safety and health conditions as well as salaries unenterprises employing children are often substandard. The use of minors is common in the rug-making and tanning trades, many of whose products are exported. Children are also employed informally as domestics and usually receive little or no wages. Poverty and a pervasive cultural acceptance of child labor keep abuse of the child labor laws prevalent nationwide. In 1993 a Casablanca policeman and his wife were arrested for severely beating a 6-year-old maid, recruited from labor, rural relatives. The Ministry of Labor, through its corps of labor inspectors, is responsible for enforcing child labor regulations. Child labor laws are generally well observed in the industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the inspection mandate of labor inspectors does not include domestic employees. [=]
The most publicized police brutality case involved the death on May 16 of Mustapha Hamzaoui in the jail at Khenifra. Hamzaoui, a former law student and activist with the left-wing Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates, was arrested on May 16 on suspicion of verbally assaulting four young women. According to Khenifra authorities, he was interrogated twice while in custody and then committed suicide by hanging. Alleging that the body bore evidence of multiple cigarette burns and mutilated genitalia, Hamzaoui’s family refused to accept his remains without the performance of an autopsy. Although the Ministry of Justice sent a physician to examine the body, no autopsy report was made public. Khenifra authorities subsequently released a statement confirming the finding of suicide and impugning Hamzaoui’s character. Despite appeals and a legal motion filed by the OMDH, no further government investigation or response has been made. Hamzaoui’s family is reportedly under government pressure to drop the matter. In another case, Abdellah Bentawet died while in detention in a Tangier jail. He was arrested on June 1 after being involved in an altercation. Members of his family allege that, while they were visiting the detainee, a security agent began to beat him and demanded payment of approximately $16 for his release, which the family refused to make. On the following day, Bentawet’s family was informed that he had committed suicide. Bentawet’s family reported that the body bore a large facial cut and that the authorities refused to allow them to view the entire body. An autopsy ordered by local authorities found no indications of violence yet concluded that death was caused by hanging. The police involved in the Hamzaoui, Bentawet, and Azzag deaths were all employed by the Ministry of the Interior. No disciplinary actions have been instituted against them. [≡]

Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Morocco
www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

34010. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (a) Political and Other Extra-Judicial Killings", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Credible reports document that at least three persons died in police custody in 1993 due to Moroccan security force brutality. The most publicized police brutality case involved the death on May 16 of Mustapha Hamzaoui in the jail at Khenifra. Hamzaoui, a former law student and activist with the left-wing Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates, was arrested on May 16 on suspicion of verbally assaulting four young women. According to Khenifra authorities, he was interrogated twice while in custody and then committed suicide by hanging. Alleging that the body bore evidence of multiple cigarette burns and mutilated genitalia, Hamzaoui’s family refused to accept his remains without the performance of an autopsy. Although the Ministry of Justice sent a physician to examine the body, no autopsy report was made public. Khenifra authorities subsequently released a statement confirming the finding of suicide and impugning Hamzaoui’s character. Despite appeals and a legal motion filed by the OMDH, no further government investigation or response has been made. Hamzaoui’s family is reportedly under government pressure to drop the matter. In another case, Abdellah Bentawet died while in detention in a Tangier jail. He was arrested on June 1 after being involved in an altercation. Members of his family allege that, while they were visiting the detainee, a security agent began to beat him and demanded payment of approximately $16 for his release, which the family refused to make. On the following day, Bentawet’s family was informed that he had committed suicide. Bentawet’s family reported that the body bore a large facial cut and that the authorities refused to allow them to view the entire body. An autopsy ordered by local authorities found no indications of violence yet concluded that death was caused by hanging. The police involved in the Hamzaoui, Bentawet, and Azzag deaths were all employed by the Ministry of the Interior. No disciplinary actions have been instituted against them. [≡]

34011. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Although the Government ratified the Convention Against Torture in June, 1987, the extent to which it has been implemented remains unknown. While no prisoner who was confined there, many of whom apparently died there. However, the Government refuses to comment on past or present activities at the Tazmamart detention facility, notorious for its harsh treatment of prisoners, have not been verified. After years of denial, King Hassan acknowledged for the first time in a May interview that the futility had existed. However, the Government refused to comment on past or present activities at the Tazmamart site or to provide an accounting of the prisoner who were confined there, many of whom apparently died there. The few surviving prisoners who were released from Tazmamart have indicated that their continued liberty is conditioned upon their silence regarding the circumstances of their imprisonment. There is no indication that the Government is investigating Tazmamart abuses for the purpose of bringing those responsible to justice. [≡]
extrajudicial pressures. Secular court judges are not well paid. Cash payments to unscrupulous judges are widely reported to be commonplace in routine criminal cases. Likewise, judges hearing cases involving challenges to royal authority or state policy are vulnerable to political pressure, especially from the Ministry of Interior. The accused in such cases do not enjoy the procedural safeguards needed to ensure a fair trial. Comments made by the prosecutor during the Tabit trial, for example, clearly indicated that the sitting judge was following instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and the Palace. Islamic court judges are paid by the parties for services in settling inheritance cases, with compensation often a percentage of the assets involved. Aside from external pressures, the secular court system is also subject to resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with less serious offenses often receive only cursory hearings, with judges relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the alleged offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years) appointed attorneys often provide inadequate representation. Proceedings in the cases of three labor leaders convicted of expressing antigovernment views were concluded in 1993. In May the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of Nouib Amaoui who was sentenced in 1992 to 2 years in prison for defaming the Government after a trial widely criticized for being politically motivated and for procedural irregularities and restrictions on public and press access. In July Amaoui was granted a royal pardon and released. Driss Lagnhimi was convicted in 1993 for insulting the person of the King during a public discussion between members of different unions. He also received a royal pardon following denial of his appeal in April. The Court of Appeal also upheld the conviction of Ahmed Belaichi who was sentenced in 1992 to 3 years in prison for “affront to the military” after a trial in which several defense witnesses were not permitted to testify. He remains in prison. Moroccan human rights organizations periodically publish lists of prisoners of “opinion,” prisoners accused of armed conspiracy or violence for political reasons, and prisoners convicted following demonstrations or strikes. These groups estimate that Moroccan prisons now hold 500-600 prisoners in these categories, of whom approximately 100 are held for crimes of politically motivated violence, and approximately 300 were arrested in connection with strike or demonstration activities. Because the Government defines several categories of speech as criminal, it regards political prisoners as common criminals. [=]

34013. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (a) Freedom of Speech and Press", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, but by Moroccan law and tradition negative commentary is forbidden on three topics: the monarchy, Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. Statements on these subjects may be deemed crimes against state security. In addition, many Moroccans are careful not to criticize the foreign or domestic policies of the Government for fear of reprisal. Mustapha Dadao, a Marrakesh student arrested in 1992 for allegedly shouting offensive slogans at a May Day rally, was convicted in January of "insult to the King" and sentenced to 5 years. A year was added to his sentence when he commented that his trial had been "superficial. Fifteen Oujda students were convicted in January of illegal demonstrations and distribution of untruthful tracts susceptible of disturbing the public order" and received sentences ranging from 1 month to 1 year. In March two students received 2-month sentences for protesting against a new examinations schedule. In June five Kenitra youths received 3-month sentences for holding a demonstration protesting the death in detention of Mustapha Hamzaoui. Press freedom is significantly restricted, though the limits are not clearly defined. A 1958 decree Rives the Government the authority to register and license domestic newspapers and journals. In practice, authorities use the licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending publications may be declared a danger to state security and may be seized, the publisher’s license may be suspended and equipment destroyed. Article 55 of the Press Code empowers the Government to censor newspapers directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or events. The Government tolerates satirical newspapers, but often stages editorials in the opposition parties’ dailies. The tone of those editorials became especially sharp during the 1993 election campaigns. The press also continued in 1993 to report allegations of torture and other harsh treatment, abuse of authority, and prisoners’ complaints of degrading conditions. In particular, the flagrant abuses perpetrated by Casablanca police officers revealed during the Tabit trial were widely reported. In November the opposition news daily L’Opinion ran a series of editorials critical of the state of democracy in Morocco. The paper’s editor was summoned to the office of the Minister of Interior. The paper thereafter ran an open letter to the Minister condemning his alleged threat to imprison the editor. Other opposition papers have subsequently editorialized in support of L’Opinion’s stance against the Minister. Government control of the media generally is exercised through directives and guidance” bulletins from the Ministry of Interior. The media regularly engages in self-censorship, prompted by a desire to avoid the Government’s attention and possible sanctions. The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press, and the Arabic daily Al Anbaa. The Government owns the only television station receivable nationwide without cable or satellite dish antennas. Dish antennas are available, though expensive, and permit free access to a wide variety of foreign broadcasts. Morocco’s sole private station can be seen in most urban areas with the rental of an inexpensive decoder. Northern residents can receive Spanish stations with standard antennas. The Government does not impede reception of foreign broadcasts. A great number of foreign news publications are available, particularly from Europe and the United States.

Although generally tolerating a broad spectrum of opinion in the foreign press distributed in Morocco, the Government continued in 1993 to ban those editions of foreign publications that contained articles about Morocco deemed particularly offensive. For example, distribution of the February 6 and March 29 editions of Le Monde were blocked apparently because they contained articles describing efforts of a major Moroccan company to acquire a foreign radio station, offering an unflattering appraisal of Moroccan-French relations, and questioning the fairness of the Moroccan elections. Moroccan authorities searched the hotel room of a British journalist, who was preparing a story on the Tabit trial, questioned her regarding her activities, and later confiscated her notes at the airport. Moroccan universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but the Government prohibits academic investigation of the Islamic roots of the monarchy. Limited research and publishing on Islam and Islamic fundamentalism is tolerated. Ministry of Interior approval is a prerequisite to tenure in all disciplines. Professors complain that the Ministry often confines tenure on political, rather than purely academic grounds. [=]
Government denied permission for the march. Authorities broke up a variety of peaceful demonstrations in 1993, often injuring and arresting the participants. In April a sit-in organized by the Moroccan National Association of Unemployed Graduates to call attention to the lack of employment available to recent graduates was forcibly dispersed by authorities. In June a sit-in organized by a group of blind students to publicize their inability to access public buildings was similarly disrupted by authorities. In November and December, members of a political group were injured or arrested when police forcibly broke up another demonstration in front of the Ministry of the Interior. The Government continued to impede the ability of human rights groups to hold public meetings, often by denying necessary permits. Another effective restraint on assembly rights is imposed by the Government’s practice of closing mosques to the public shortly after religious services, thereby removing any potential for the practice, common in other Muslim countries, of using mosque premises for political activity. The right to form organizations is limited. Under a 1958 decree, persons wishing to create an organization must obtain the approval of the Ministry of the Interior before holding meetings. In practice, the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from forming legal organizations. Islamist and leftist groups have the greatest difficulty in obtaining official sanction. Twenty-nine Islamist groups have been active within Morocco. Membership in two of these groups, Justice and Charity and Jama’a Islamia, has been outlawed due to perceived anti-monarchy rhetoric. Political parties must also be approved by the Ministry of the Interior, which uses this power to control participation in the political process. [2]

34015. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993, Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Although freedom of movement within Morocco is provided for in the Constitution, in practice security forces set up roadblocks throughout the country and stop traffic at will. In some regions the roadblocks have been maintained in the same places for years, creating what some characterize as internal frontiers. In the Western Sahara, which is administered by Morocco, movement is restricted in areas regarded as militarily sensitive. The Interior Ministry restricts the freedom to travel outside Morocco in certain circumstances. For example, it has refused to issue passports to a number of Moroccans, including certain political activists, former political prisoners, and Baha’is. In February the OMDH published a list of 62 former political prisoners, human rights monitors, lawyers, and others who continued to be denied passports. In a series of spring meetings, CCDH members met with Ministry of the Interior officials and requested status reports on several passport applications. By years end the Ministry issued passports to 46 persons on the OMDH list. Some former political prisoners after being issued passPorts, were denied exit at border points on the basis that government computers had not been updated to reflect their eligibility to leave. There continued to be reports of instances in which police seized passports at border points or otherwise blocked the exit of Moroccans trying to leave the country, usually without explanation. Women must have permission from either their fathers or husbands to obtain a passport. A divorced woman must have her father’s permission to obtain a passport and, if she has custody of the children, she must have permission of the children’s father for passports to be issued to the children. Although the King has characterized the male consent requirement as contrary to Islam and the Constitution, no changes in these provisions were made in 1993. There are frequent allegations of corruption in the passport offices; applicants are reportedly forced to pay gratuities to obtain application forms and to make sure that the application is not lost in the bureaucratic labyrinth. All Moroccan civil servants must obtain written permission from their ministries to leave the country each time they wish to do so. Moroccans may not renounce Moroccan citizenship, but the King has the rarely used power to revoke it. Ten thousands of Moroccans hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more countries. While in Morocco they are regarded as Moroccan citizens. As a result, the Government has sometimes refused to recognize the right of foreign embassies to act on behalf of dual nationals or even to receive information concerning their arrest and imprisonment. Dual nationals also complain of harassment by Moroccan immigration inspectors. Moroccan law encourages voluntary repatriation of Moroccan Jews who have emigrated-Moroccan Jewish emigrants, including those with Israeli citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The law also encourages the return of Saharans who have opposed Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict. Returning former members of the Polisario, a group seeking independence for the Western Sahara, who are deemed to pose no threat to security are integrated into Moroccan life. [2]
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return of Saharans who departed Morocco due to the conflict in the Western Sahara--provided they recognize the Government's claim to the region. The Government does not permit Saharan nationalists who have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory. [=]

34017. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995, pp. 1143-1154. The Government has taken little action to end child labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as domestic servants. Orphanages are often party to the practice of adoptive servitude, in which families adopt young girls who perform the duties of domestic servants in their new families. Credible reports of physical abuse are widespread. The practice is often justified as a better alternative to keeping the girls in orphanages. It is ingrained in society, attracts little criticism, even from human rights groups, and is unregulated by the Government. In 1994 the Government continued a campaign to vaccinate children against preventable diseases. [=]

34018. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995, pp. 1143-1154. Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination. Under the Criminal Code, women are generally accorded the same treatment as men, but are not accorded equal treatment under family and estate law, which is based on the Malikite school of Islamic law. Under this law, husbands may more easily divorce their wives than vice versa. Women inherit only half as much as male heirs. Moreover, even where the law guarantees equal status, cultural norms often override the law, as in cases where a husband asks for divorce without legal justification; and recognize a wife's priority of right to custody of young children after a divorce. Women's groups unsuccessfully requested that the Moudouwana, or Code of Personal Status, which is based in part on the Koran. With the active support of the King, limited reforms of the Moudouwana, consistent with the Koran, were effected in 1993. The amendments allow a wife to divorce a husband who announces an intent to take a second wife; grant a wife unspecified allowance rights, based on the husband's income, in cases where a husband asks for divorce without legal justification; and recognize a wife's priority of right to custody of young children after a divorce. Women's groups unsuccessfully requested that the Moudouwana changes include expanded rights to combat spousal violence, a problem human rights groups confirm is commonplace. Although a battered wife has the right to complain to the police, as a practical matter she would do BO only if prepared to file for divorce. Spousal abuse is grounds for divorce, but even if abuse is proven, divorced women do not have the right to financial support from their former spouses. Hence few victims report abuse to authorities. The law and social practice concerning violence against women reflects the importance society places on the honor of the family. The Criminal Code includes severe punishment for men convicted of rape or violating a woman or girl. The defendants in such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss of virginity. A rapist may be offered the opportunity to marry his victim in order to preserve the honor of the victim's family. The law excuses the murder or injury of a wife caught in the act of committing adultery, however, a woman would not be excused for killing her husband under the same circumstances. While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine, education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of their professions. Women comprise approximately 24% of the work force, with the majority of them in the industrial, service, and teaching sectors. Women suffer most from inequality in the rural areas. Rural women perform most hard physical labor, the rate of literacy, particularly in the countryside, is noticeably lower for women than for men. Girls are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys. Women who earn secondary school diplomas, however, have equal access to university training. [=]

34019. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Morocco: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995, pp. 1143-1154. Abuse of the child labor laws is common nationwide. The law prohibits the employment or apprenticeship of any child under 12 years of age. Education is compulsory for children between the ages of 7-13. Special regulations govern the employment of children between the ages of 12-16. In practice, children are often apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the handicraft Industry. The use of minors is common in the rug-making industry and also exists to some extent in the textile and leather goods industries. Children are also employed informally as domestics and usually receive little or no wages. Safety and health conditions as well as salaries in enterprises employing children are often substandard. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child labor regulations which are generally well observed in the industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic servants. [=]

34020. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Western Sahara", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995, pp. 1143-1154. The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario, an organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan Government assumed administration of the Western Sahara's northern three provinces after Spain withdrew from the area in 1976, and it extended its administration to the province of Oued ed Dahab in 1979 after Mauritania renounced its claim to it. After unifying the Western Sahara, the Moroccan Government undertook a massive economic development program that has resulted in substantial growth in the region's towns. Since 1973 the Polisario has challenged successfully the claim of Spain and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces have fought intermittently since 1976, although there have been no significant clashes since a 1991 cease-fire and deployment to the area of a United Nations contingent, known by its French initials, MINURSO. In 1976 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that Morocco was not entitled to sovereignty over the territory. According to the Court, the people of the Western Sahara, the Saharawis, are entitled to self-determination. Reports by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest. In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario accepted the United Nations' plan for a referendum that would allow the Saharawis to decide between integration with Morocco or independence for the region. The referendum was scheduled for January 1992 but was postponed because the parties could not agree on the common list of eligible voters. The United Nations continues to seek a compromise on the voter issue. In 8/1994 MINURSO personnel began to hold oral hearings for voter applicants in Laayoune. [=]
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and Tindouf, Algeria. At such hearings, applicants may present evidence of identification and residence, as well as oral testimony from tribal elders on the bona fides of the applicant’s claim to voter eligibility. Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Laayoune, Smara, and Boujdour have participated in Moroccan elections. The southern province of Oued ed Dahab has participated in Moroccan elections since 1983. Sahrawis fill all 10 seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament. The population of the Western Sahara in the 86% of the population in the Western Sahara. Sahrawi-administered administration is subject to Moroccan law. UN observers and foreign human rights groups report that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against those suspected of supporting the Polisario. Sahrawis who returned to Morocco from refugee camps administered by the Polisario have presented strong circumstantial evidence that they were tortured by Polisario security officers in the camps. However, there were no reports that camp residents were tortured in 1994. After years of denying that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for Polisario-related military or political activity, the Government released 300 such prisoners in 1991. Entire families and Sahrawis who had “disappeared in the mid-1970’s were among those released. The Government has failed to conduct a public inquiry or to explain how and why those released were held for up to 16 years incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The Polisario claims that the Government continues to hold more than 800 Sahrawis as political prisoners. The Government formally denies that any Sahrawi noncombatants remain in detention. However, in announcing an amnesty for political prisoners in July, King Hassan declared that any prisoner who questions Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara would not be eligible for amnesty. Observers interpreted the King’s remarks as implying that the Government still holds some Sahrawi nationalists in prison. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Morocco holds 69 Sahrawi combatants as prisoners of war (POW’s), and the Polisario holds between 600-3000 Moroccan POWs. In 1994 ICRC representatives visited both groups of prisoners but had not released any reports at year’s end. The Polisario has separated out 200 Moroccan soldiers and offered them for repatriation along with another group of 26 POW’s reportedly in need of medical attention. The Government of Morocco, believing that the offer is predicated on the Polisario greater legitimacy, has not officially responded to them. Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in militarily sensitive areas. Elsewhere, security forces subject travelers to arbitrary questioning, detention, and abuse. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, using figures provided by the Government of Algeria, estimates that approximately 166000 refugees live in the camps near Tindouf, Algeria. However, the Moroccan Government maintains that no more than 80000 refugees inhabit the camps. The Government alleges that the residents are held in the camps against their will, an allegation denied by the Polisario. There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are relatively moribund. The 16% of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding. The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor (UGTSARIO), does not have any activities in the Western Sahara. There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining agreements in 1994. Most union members are employees of the Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85% more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara. Workers in the Western Sahara are exempt from income and value-added taxes and receive subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuels, and utilities. Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist in the Western Sahara. Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common in the Western Sahara than in Morocco, primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ children such as rug knotting and garment making.

A government work program for adults the Promotion Nationale, provides families with enough income so that children need not be hired out as domestic servants. Children in the few remaining nomadic groups presumably work as shepherds along with other group members. Adult unemployment in the Western Sahara is below 5%. The minimum wage and maximum hours for work are the same as in Morocco. In practice, however, employees in some fish-processing plants may work as much as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the 10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum allowed by Moroccan law. Occupational health and safety standards in Western Sahara are those enforced in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the employment of women in dangerous occupations. [ ]

34021. Davis, Hannah Penrose. Unmarried Women And Changing Conceptions Of The Self In Sidi Slimane, Morocco. New York University. Dissertation. 382pp. AAC 9306764. [Advisor: Abu-lughod, Lila] This dissertation is an ethnographic study of unmarried women in the Moroccan city of Sidi Slimane. The focus is on changes in conceptions of self, gender, and sexuality, in the context of the rising age in marriage, the growth in women’s activities outside of the domestic sphere, the increase in social contact between unmarried men and women, and the increasing importance of transnational culture. The study of the cultural transformation in conceptions of the self is problematized through a critique of models of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, self and other. In order to address these potential problems, the object of study is defined not as ‘Moroccan women’ but as the ethnographic encounter itself; the goal is not to define a ‘Moroccan’ self, but to consider a range of possible selves. If various selves manifest themselves at various moments, the loci of these manifestations are significant. The first consideration is of the urban setting, a middle-sized city dating to the colonial era. What sites are open to unmarried women, to mixed groups? How do social relations take shape on the street, in cafes, in the bath house, in the beauty salon? Next, the social situation of marital strategizing is examined in detail. Particular attention is paid to the notion of modesty or shame (hsuma). Despite the importance of modesty in marking hierarchical relations between the sexes and the generations, there exists an array of immodest selves. As social power changes, new possibilities are present for the positive vectoring of immodest selves. The range of possible selves open to an unmarried woman depends on her economic resources, status, and access to local and transnational cultural reservoirs. The possibilities are also limited by violence, here considered in its quotidian, minor form. Examining these limits on conceptions of the self is a way of conceptualizing social power. In order to more fully explore and problematize the ethnographic encounter, the dissertation also includes fictionalized accounts based on the author’s field work. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [ ]

34022. Hull, Richard W. African Cities and Towns Before the European Conquest: Part 3: Physical Definitions of Cities and Towns. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. pp. 33-49. African urban life characteristically took place within walls. Walls defined cities, provided for defense, and gave residents a sense of security and order. The design of the Marinid gateway at Rabat, Morocco, or the gates of the Moroccan city of Sidi Slimane. The focus is on changes in conceptions of self, gender, and sexuality, in the context of the rising age in marriage, the growth in women’s activities outside of the domestic sphere, the increase in social contact between unmarried men and women, and the increasing importance of transnational culture. The study of the cultural transformation in conceptions of the self is problematized through a critique of models of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, self and other. In order to address these potential problems, the object of study is defined not as ‘Moroccan women’ but as the ethnographic encounter itself; the goal is not to define a ‘Moroccan’ self, but to consider a range of possible selves. If various selves manifest themselves at various moments, the loci of these manifestations are significant. The first consideration is of the urban setting, a middle-sized city dating to the colonial era. What sites are open to unmarried women, to mixed groups? How do social relations take shape on the street, in cafes, in the bath house, in the beauty salon? Next, the social situation of marital strategizing is examined in detail. Particular attention is paid to the notion of modesty or shame (hsuma). Despite the importance of modesty in marking hierarchical relations between the sexes and the generations, there exists an array of immodest selves. As social power changes, new possibilities are present for the positive vectoring of immodest selves. The range of possible selves open to an unmarried woman depends on her economic resources, status, and access to local and transnational cultural reservoirs. The possibilities are also limited by violence, here considered in its quotidian, minor form. Examining these limits on conceptions of the self is a way of conceptualizing social power. In order to more fully explore and problematize the ethnographic encounter, the dissertation also includes fictionalized accounts based on the author’s field work. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [ ]

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hinterland, were often invested with spiritual qualities, the cities being seen as a microcosm of the cosmos. Dogon village form is modeled on a human body, with a blacksmith's force at the north symbolizing the head, community shrines at the south to the feet, and women's menstrual huts to the hands. The ibo of eastern Nigeria carried this form the farthest, with regions developed with a cluster plan that created a forestland-farmland matrix in which there were hundreds of villages, in a contiguous, parkland hinterland, with a size of height below the 50th centile of the NCHS standards. For the second survey 64 children in different households were selected. Thirty-one households were defined as PD with a child weight gain for age above the 50th centile and 33 as ND with a child below the 25th centile for weight gain for age of the NCHS standards. The hypotheses tested were: (1) PD children live in better housing than ND children; (2) PD children belong to families of smaller size, have more actively employed members, and consume more food than ND families; (3) Characteristics of fathers of PD children are different from those of ND ones; (4) Characteristics of mothers in PD are different from those of ND groups; (5) Certain desirable characteristics of the children are higher in PD than in ND children; (6) PD children eat more frequently, and consume a larger variety of foods; and (7) PD children have a higher birth weight than ND ones. The results of the study show that PD children belong to families of smaller size than do ND ones. PD fathers were significantly taller than ND ones. Mothers' literacy and better attitudes towards growth increased significantly the probability of having a PD child. The mother's use of either traditional or modern medicine, her attitude toward hand washing, and the time she spends on child care were significantly associated with this probability. Higher child birth weight was the strongest predictor of positive deviance. Anorexia decreased significantly the probability of having a PD child and PD children spend significantly more time eating than ND ones. This study suggests that small family size, greater mothers' literacy, better education of mothers with respect to hygiene and child nutrition, lower child anorexia, and higher birth weight are important determinants of positive deviance and should be considered in programs aimed at alleviating malnutrition in Morocco and perhaps in other poor countries. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]

34023. Jacobsen, Sally. “World Bank Says It Pays To Teach Girls: Millions to Be Spent to Prove Its Point”, in Seattle Times, October 6, 1994. p. A2. The World Bank will promote the education of girls as the best strategy to lift families out of poverty worldwide and raise their standard of living. The bank now spends about $2 billion per year on education, with 41% earmarked for girls' education: in the 1980s less than 15% of such funding was earmarked for girls. US Treasury undersecretary Lawrence Summers notes that investment in girls education may be the best possible investment in the developing world. In three such programs, the emphasis on girls education is being increased: in Bangladesh parents receive a small stipend for each girl that attends school; in Pakistan all girls' schools are being established in poor neighborhoods; and in Morocco female teachers have been added to rural schools for all girl classes. [TXT]

34024. Kapchan, Deborah Anne. Women In The Marketplace: Transitional Economies And Feminine Discursive Domains In Morocco. University Of Pennsylvania. Dissertation. 328pp. AAC 9235160. [Advisor: Abrahams, Roger D.] This study examines marketplace discourse and performance in Beni Mellal, Morocco, focusing on their relation to both new constructions of gender and social transformation. The intersection of the marketplace with feminine performance is a cross-roads, where the past meets the future, where tradition is recreated and "the modern," al-est, is socially and personally incorporated. There is one theoretical trajectory that informs all the essays in this manuscript: it is the tripartite notion that (1) the marketplace—both in its local itinerant form and in its international guise—is a forum for transition; (2) that transition relies on an intensification of social license; and (3) that in granting permission for the opening of social boundaries and categories, license, in turn, provides the conditions for the hybridization of social and expressive forms. This hybridization is traced in various contexts; among them, women's marketplace oratory, the ritual life of the Moroccan bride, the words and behavior of female performers (shikhat), the discursive construction of the maid by middle-class women, and "talk" (al-hadra) about magic. In all of these contexts, the author pays close attention to how social change is effected by transgressive behavior and by what the author calls, "revoicing," that is, the appropriation of authoritative discourse and its transformation from within. Throughout the book, the phenomena of linguistic and cultural hybridization are examined as they emerge in the expressive economies of women. Linguistically, hybridization is witnessed in the mixing of formally non-compatible genres and registers; in the moral economy, it manifests in the collision of the values of honor and reciprocity with those of the (inter)national marketplace and commodity culture; whereas in the gender economy, hybridization is exemplified in the redefinition of gender space and new formulations of social authority. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]

34025. Lemtoumi, Aicha. Determinants Of Positive Deviance In Nutrition In Morocco: A Case Study Of Hay Abiregreg (1987-1989). Cornell University. Dissertation. 184pp. AAC 9113258. The present study investigates the determinants of positive deviance in nutrition in Hay Abiregreg, a suburban area of Rabat, the capital city of Morocco. The study is based on a sample of 316 children six to 36 months of age where the weight and height were measured. One-hundred and forty-six households were selected for the first survey which used the children's weight for age and weight for height. Seventy-four children from different households were defined as positive deviants (PD) with a child weight for age and weight for height above the 50th centile of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) standards. The other 77 children were defined as negative deviants (ND) with weight for age below the 25th centile and weight for height below the 50th centile of the NCHS standards. For the second survey 64 children in different households were selected. Thirty-one households were defined as PD with a child weight gain for age above the 50th centile and 33 as ND with a child below the 25th centile for weight gain for age of the NCHS standards. The hypotheses tested were: (1) PD children live in better housing than ND children; (2) PD children belong to families of smaller size, have more actively employed members, and consume more food than ND families; (3) Characteristics of fathers of PD children are different from those of ND ones; (4) Characteristics of mothers in PD are different from those of ND groups; (5) Certain desirable characteristics of the children are higher in PD than in ND children; (6) PD children eat more frequently, and consume a larger variety of foods; and (7) PD children have a higher birth weight than ND ones. The results of the study show that PD children belong to families of smaller size than do ND ones. PD fathers were significantly taller than ND ones. Mothers' literacy and better attitudes towards growth increased significantly the probability of having a PD child. The mother's use of either traditional or modern medicine, her attitude toward hand washing, and the time she spends on child care were significantly associated with this probability. Higher child birth weight was the strongest predictor of positive deviance. Anorexia decreased significantly the probability of having a PD child and PD children spend significantly more time eating than ND ones. This study suggests that small family size, greater mothers' literacy, better education of mothers with respect to hygiene and child nutrition, lower child anorexia, and higher birth weight are important determinants of positive deviance and should be considered in programs aimed at alleviating malnutrition in Morocco and perhaps in other poor countries. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.]

34026. Mannin, Ethel. Women and the Revolution: Part 28: Women and Past Revolutions: The Spanish Revolution (1936-?). New York: E.P. Dutton & Co Inc., 1939. In order to understand the issues at stake in Spain, it is important to realize that the civil war which began in 7/1936 did not arise, as it were, out of the blue. It was the crisis of five years of great struggle of the Spanish masses against the reactionary and oppressive forces of the Right—the landowners and capitalists, the Church, the Army, 1931 saw the Republicans and Socialists triumph in an overwhelming majority at the General Election; Alfonsa I died, and Spain was declared a Republic amid general rejoicing. Various minor reforms were passed, but Spain still remained a semi-feudal country, dominated by rich absentee landlords, the Army, the Church, the police. Dr. Conze points out that "all Spanish movements. whether bourgeois or working-class, must be anti-clerical if they want to get away from feudalism". He refers to a "politically-minded army" and a "belligerent clergy . . . the biggest reactionary political body in Spain". He points out that the Church is the biggest proprietor of land and buildings, and that "the bigger the cathedral the filthier the slums", that the clergy are chiefly responsible for the illiteracy in Spain—only 46 per cent of the population above the age of six are literate, the highest percentage in Europe—and that "only if they can manage to keep Spain as a semi-feudal country, do the priests have any chance of keeping their power". [In: Spain To-day (see subsequent footnote).] In alliance with this enemy of the people there is the army officered by "professional patriots of the Spanish aristocracy", and the landowners holding vast estates in which they take no interest, handing them over to the management of his Cacique, who is invariably heartedly hated by the peasants. When the workers and peasants realized that the Republic left them with the same old bad conditions of feudalism and oppression as before, they revolted; the workers went on strike; the peasants seized the land for themselves; thousands of revolutionary workers were imprisoned and shot by the Government troops—that
Republican Government they had themselves elected and in which they had placed such faith: by 1933 the Right was again on top. But the Spanish proletariat was not beaten in spite of that; there was a series of strikes, and in 1934 the great agriculture strike. In September there was a general strike in Madrid, and when Gil Robles, the Roman Catholic Fascist leader, held a Fascist parade in the Asturias, there was a general strike there. The Government organized round-ups of revolutionary workers to be used as better houses for armed workers; for all militant workers, imprisoned and trained to the police and Fascist-like every day, suppressing the further seizure of the land, head of the control committee of workers. The Anarchists defended their continued to support the Government, which became more reactionary. Collectivization of October 24th, with a delegate of the Generalidad at the Exchange Building, which the Anarchists had seized from the Fascists shortly after the election in emphasis of its revolutionary position as opposed to the Democratic one; the Communists and Socialists had placed themselves at the service of the POUM which stood not merely for the defeat of Fascism but for the triumph of the Revolution. The Government troops were beaten back by workers armed with revolvers and dynamite! The Commune lasted a fortnight before it was finally overwhelmed by the sheer superiority of numbers of the Government's forces—which included troops from Morocco. The Asturians had plenty of rifles and machine-guns, but were short of ammunition. The Government sent over bombing aeroplanes; defeated Catalonia could send no help. Yet in the face of these tremendous odds the Asturians held against the Government troops and its Foreign Legion for eight epic days. Sixty badly equipped men held Llanes for six and a half hours against an attack of 5000 trained soldiers. The village of Cinadevilla was seized only over the dead bodies of every revolutionary holding it. Women fought side by side with the men. General Ochoa called an armistice with the Asturians; he promised that the bitterly hated riff-raff of the Foreign Legion should not enter the villages; the revolutionaries promised to disband their Red Army. They did so—and immediately the Moors were let loose upon the defenceless men, women and children of the Asturias. The “blood bath” which followed recalled the massacres which followed the defeat of the Paris Commune. 1500 people were massacred in this “armistice” and there was a tremendous round-up of Socialists, Anarchists and Communists throughout Spain. In all 35000 workers were imprisoned, including Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader. Yet still the Spanish workers were not defeated: their organizations had been declared illegal, yet they continued to organize, and strike followed strike. The Asturian workers had been defeated, but their action had given enormous impetus to the workers’ movement throughout Spain. The Church which had—through its priests—great influence on the women in the elections of 1933, had little power over them in the 1936 election, with the memory of the blood-bath of the Asturias still fresh in their minds. Even the Anarchists, normally opposed to any form of centralized government, voted in favour of the Popular Front of Socialists, Liberals, Republicans, Communists; it was a United Front against the Right, and it swept the country. Without waiting for the formal consent of the Government, the 35000 prisoners were freed, and in some districts the peasants seized the land. The Azana Government legalized the acts of the workers, and carried out various reforms concerned with hours and wages under the pressure of strikes. But when the first flush of excitement of victory over the Right had died down the workers found themselves once more saddled with a bourgeois, capitalist government, upholding private property and private profit; the Popular Front, they began to realize, contained too many bourgeois, Liberal elements for it ever to lead to Socialism; it could only, in the words of Dr. Conze, “tie the workers’ movement to the bourgeois state”. And the workers’ movement was not prepared to be so tied. Discontent spread; there were strikes everywhere, organized by the CNT (the Syndicalists) and the POUM (the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unity, brother party to the Independent Labour Party in England). The POUM broke away from the Popular Front shortly after the election in emphasis of its revolutionary position as opposed to the Democratic one; the Communists and Socialists continued to support the Government, which became more reactionary and Fascist-like every day, suppressing the further seizure of the land, shooting the revolutionary peasants, breaking the strikes, and imprisoning the leaders, censoring the Press. But it takes more than the reactionary tactics of a bourgeois government to smash the workers’ movement in Spain, and Dr. Conze, who was there in 5/1936 makes the following first-hand observations in his book: “Proletarian symbols are found everywhere, on houses, walls, churches and railway carriages. Everywhere the mysterious initials which sum up the aspirations of the working class. Everywhere U.H.P. (Union of Proletarian Brethren), U.P.C. (Union of Proletarian Communists), U.G.T. (Socialist Trade Union). Everywhere hammer and sickle, and inscriptions like Viva Caballero and Muerte a Gil Robles. Everywhere large posters call the workers to a meeting, or small posters call for a strike or for a boycott... The greeting of the clenched fist has become the common property of all militant workers. It is the best introduction to any working-class quarter... All over Spain it was the same—clenched fist was the usual greeting. Russian films are shown at the cinemas. In the evening many Spaniards take a stroll about 6-7 o’clock on one of the main streets. When I was in Spain ten years ago these streets were filled in the evening with well-dressed people. Now the workers dominate the scene. Few well-dressed people are ever seen.” In 7/1936, the Fascist military revolt started in Morocco.

An Englishman, Major Pollard, flew General Franco from the Canaries to lead the troops in Spain. Major Pollard now sits snug in Sussex. What does he feel when he reads in the Press of his friend Franco’s massacres of civilians? Is it a glow of satisfaction that he has done his bit in helping to save Spain from the Spaniards? . . . When the Barcelona garrison joined the Fascist revolt a day or two after the insurrection in Morocco, the workers poured out into the streets to face the machine-guns and the trained forces of Fascism armed with no more than sticks and stones. “Viva la Republica!” they cried, and “Viva la Fai”.

[The FAI—the Federation of Iberian Anarchists. In control of the Trade Union organization, the CNT to which the majority of Catalan workers belong and which has great influence throughout Spain.] Overwhelmed by this almost superhuman demonstration of workers’ solidarity the troops refused to obey their officers’ orders to fire and went over to the workers in masses. In one barracks a sergeant and his men arrested the officers, then placed himself at the service of the POUM which stood not merely for the defeat of Fascism but for the triumph of the Revolution. The Government reluctantly armed the workers, and a popular militia was formed. Fascism was crushed in Catalonia, and within a week, with control in the hands of the workers’ syndicates, lorry loads of men and munitions were being rushed to the different fronts—with the triumphant cry:—“Viva la Fai!” Immediately after the Fascist rising had been crushed in Catalonia, tremendous organized energy of the United Working Class was poured into the task of consolidating workers’ control of industry, transport, the land. Committees of the armed workers reorganized industry under workers’ control; factories, railway companies, steamship companies, hospitals, public services, etc. were handed over to the syndicates; luxury hotels were commandeered and used as canteens for feeding and where necessary housing the dependents of the milicianos, or as headquarters for the various workers’ committees. By 1937 the counter-revolution had got to work. In March, the Generalidad, the Catalanian Government, ordered the return of power to the police and the disbanding of Workers’ Patrols. This was followed by an order from the Valencia Government to all workers’ parties and trade unions to collect arms from their members and surrender them within forty-eight hours. On the Aragon Front arms were refused to Anarchist and POUM fighters. In April the disarming of the workers began to be carried out by the National Republican Guard throughout Catalonia.

This went on all through April. Matters came to a head in May when the workers were forbidden to hold their May Day demonstrations, and a joint Anarchist and POUM meeting in Valencia was suppressed. On May 3rd the Government provoked the Barcelona Rising, by sending Assault Guards, led by Communists, to take over the Telephone Exchange Building, which the Anarchists had seized from the Fascists the previous July and held ever since, according to the Decree of Collectivization of October 24th, with a delegate of the Generalidad at the head of the control committee of workers. The Anarchists defended their occupation of the building with a machine-gun trained on to the police.
from an upper-story window. POUM is constantly being accused, in Communist quarters, of having attacked the Government and started the rising; actually POUM was opposed to the rising which followed the assault on the Telegraph Building, but when the workers of the CNT were out on the streets it naturally joined them and gave them its armed support. From May 3rd to the 8th Barcelona was in a state of civil war. The CNT appealed to the police to come over to the side of the workers as well as to the workers of the POUM. On July 19th, and to the people of Barcelona they issued the following statement pointing out that they were not attacking, but merely defending themselves against the usurping of their rights, and then an appeal to them for their support, and to clean out the reactionary, counter-revolutionary government of the Generalitat. The full story—not to be found in the ordinary newspaper—is to be found in the supplement to the June 11th issue of Spain and the World, the Anarchist paper. [Obtainable from Whiteway Colony, Stroud, Glos.] In the July 2nd issue, Emma Goldman makes the following comment: "...the glorious achievements of the CNT-FAI between July 19th (1936) and the first days in May (1937) have received a terrible jolt. I fear very much that the CNT-FAI will not recover from it so soon. From the moment leaders of the CNT-FAI entered into ministries and submitted to the conditions imposed upon them by Soviet Russia in return for some arms, I foresaw the inevitable price our comrades will have to pay.... The concessions made by the CNT-FAI were the first wrong step taken in the rise of the Revolution. We foresaw, and we did not hesitate to call the attention of our Spanish comrades to it, that they were about to roll down a precipice.... The Anarchist participation in the Government and the concessions made to Russia have resulted in almost irreparable harm to the Revolution." The outcome of the struggle, deplored by Emma Goldman and severely criticized by the French Anarchists when the news reached them, was that the CNT compromised and came to terms with the U.G.T., with the object of forming "a new workers' democracy". In 10/1937, Emma Goldman wrote me from Spain, "The situation here is overwhelming.... Above everything looms an optimism and faith in the triumph of the struggle; one is filled with awe. Having come close to the insurmountable difficulties confronting the CNT-FAI I can understand better the concessions they have made and are making. I cannot reconcile myself to some of them, but I realize that when one is in a burning house one does not consider one's possessions; one tries to jump to safety.... To see what I have seen is to be carried away by the splendid courage of the CNT-FAI and of the workers in general." She refers also to the "miracle of the besieged city of Madrid", before "the epic grandeur" of which "all fault-finding seems so insignificant": Frightful atrocities were committed by the Communists against the Anarchists after the defeat of the Barcelona rising; imprisonments, executions, and persecutions of revolutionaries, were as numerous and as brutal as in the days of the workers' struggle before 7/1936, and for some time it looked as though the Revolution had been completely crushed, and nothing more could come out of the defeat of the workers. It was then that things went wrong, to the tune of "win the war first and make the revolution afterwards". If the Spanish Revolution is lost Stalin will have had a considerable hand in it, as was the case, as we have seen, with his "assistance" in the Chinese Revolution. Brea is of the opinion that whatever happens now in Spain there will be no democracy; "the country will be in far too dismembered a state, economically, to admit of anything but a dictatorship. Whether this dictatorship be Fascist, bourgeois or proletarian"—that is to say whether Franco wins, or the Spanish Government, or the workers—"only the outcome of this present struggle can decide, but a dictatorship of some sort it will be. It is idle to talk of democracy.... There will be little left of Spanish economy when the war is over, and what remains will need sticking together with something considerably stronger than the past of democracy—the only prospect offered by Stalinism in Spain is to win the war and to lose the Revolution. We believe that if the Revolution is lost, the war can only with difficulty be won, and after all, for what? The people at least will have nothing, with even the 'breath of democracy blown away.' Opposed to this gloomy forecast, of course, is the important fact of Spain's old and strong tradition of anarchism; the Anarchists made the Revolution and they have not lost it, despite their setbacks; if the Revolution wins there is no need to assume that it will necessarily be a proletarian dictatorship, such as Brea predicts, and every reason to assume that it would continue along the libertarian anarchist-syndicalist lines it was already so successfully developing, in Catalonia, particularly before the May Rising. [-]

34027. Memnissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society: Part 1: Introduction: Roots of the Modern Situation. Revised and Updated Edition. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987. pp. 11-24. What is at issue in Morocco and the Middle East is not an ideology of female inferiority but rather a set of laws and customs that keep women subjugated. The central institutions of Islamic society are those that assure male control of the family. The 1957 Code du Statut Personnel is simply a transposition of seventh century religious law. However, the problems of modernization of Islamic society have lead inevitably to calls for reinforcing tradition. These contradictions in Islamic societies resolve into three major areas: the need for sexual equality as a basis for social modernization, Arab nationalism, and the need to be Muslim. Muslim society posits men and women as enemies. Even as Muslims societies try to modernize, Shari’a has become the focus of psychological resistance to the West and its military, political
and economic intervention. Moroccan nationalism did succeed in driving out the foreigners, but failed to provide the basis for an ideology of modernization of Moroccan society.

34028. Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society. Part 2: The Traditional Muslim View of Women and Their Place In the Social Order. Revised and Updated Edition. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987. pp. 25-86. Classical Islam held that sexual energy could be channeled to be a positive force for society and to service the Muslim order. The regulation of sexual instincts was to be the basis of the new Muslim social order; by contrast, unregulated sexuality could lead to fitna (disorder). Mernissi compares the sexual psychologies of Imam Ghazali (Muslim, 1050-1110) and Freud (Viennese Jew, mid-twentieth century) [an odd choice that is perhaps a product of receiving her PhD in Sociology at Brandeis University]; both construct the social belief that women are destructive of the social order.

Sexuality remains only partially civilized in Islam: the institutions of polygamy and divorce by repudiation illustrate the failure to civilize male sexuality. Yet, this system institutionalizes female resentment, granted the female sexual insatiability that is posited in Islam. This Muslim style of nuclear family would be the basis for the new Islamic society, since it would be more tractable to the new Muslim social design that the tribes. The modification of marriage law effected a fundamental transformation of Arab society at the time of Muhammad; even as Muhammad had a strong need to reintegrate into society the women who lost their status with the breakdown of tribal society. Female self-determination conjures the image of the breakdown of the Muslim order for Muslim men, the return of the matriarchy and promiscuity of the Jahiliya, even in such simple acts of female self-assertion as pursuing a university degree or working for a wage.


In Morocco, male-female relations are undergoing a difficult period of transformation. Women are now entering “male... public spaces”, which has created a deep anomic in Moroccan society. In rural areas, where villages maintain tight control over the sexuality of the young, many engage in conduct believed by society to be deviant (a questionnaire found: 14% masturbate or practice sodomy; 20% practice homosexuality; 34% go to a brothel in a nearby town). Generally, sexual segregation in Morocco is breaking down, allowing what the Muslim order condemns as a deadly enemy of civilization: love between men and women in general, and between husband and wife in particular.

This breakdown in Muslim society is based on a rigid spatial segregation of male and female into public and private domains, respectively (the “Public Universe of the Umma” and the “Domestic Universe of Sexuality”). Any transgression of these iron segregations is a “danger to the social order.” This intense and perfect division of society creates two different codes of conduct: (1) for the Umma, equality, reciprocity, aggregation, unity, communion, brotherhood, love, trust; and (2) for the Family, inequality, lack of reciprocity, segregation, separation, division, subordination, authority and mistrust.

34030. Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society: Part 4: Conclusion: Women's Liberation in Muslim Countries. Revised and Updated Edition. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987. pp. 165-178. While women’s liberation is usually seen as a spiritual issue, in the twentieth century it is largely a question of women getting wage-paying jobs, and the social decision to allocate sufficient resources for women to be able to find jobs. Building daycare centers and canteens is major step towards women’s liberation in a modernizing society. However, at the same time, the United States' modern capitalism maintains an army of unpaid workers in the form of housewives, even as the US claims it unable to provide canteens and daycare. Arab society’s have no coherent policy on this issue. Yet change is shaking Muslim societies. "The Arab woman is a central element in any sovereign future..." and the ally of women’s liberation in the Arab world is the state.

34031. Messina, Maria Giovanna. Celebrations Of The Body: Female Spirituality And Corporeality In Islamic Morocco. State University Of New York At Stony Brook. Dissertation. 411pp. AAC 9128549. [Advisor: Hicks, David] This dissertation provides an anthropological analysis on a source of cultural reflection and meaning common to all societies—the human body. The assumption here is that the body is used as a means of communication and as a basis for thinking about other things. The concern for the body is analyzed in the context of contemporary, Islamic Morocco. Although Islamic notions of purity and pollution pertain to females and males alike, the ethnographic data in this dissertation focus almost exclusively on the symbolism and social organization of women in the madina of Fez, primarily in the hammam or public bath, at home during ordinary and special "occasions" such as henna parties, and on the significance of fasting, especially during the holy month of Ramadan. The discussion explores the various ways women enact their commitment to the faith, celebrate life, feminine beauty, as they decorate and protect their bodies with henna, care for their material and spiritual "selves" through these occasions. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [=]

34032. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Ex-Political Prisoners Barred From Leaving Morocco Despite Liberalization. New York: Middle East Watch, September 1991. A recent communique from the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH) and an open letter to Morocco’s Interior Minister have called attention to that country’s denial of passports to many former political prisoners. This practice runs counter to pledges made by the government in 1990 to liberalize the procedure for obtaining passports. In the past, Moroccans faced various obstacles when applying for passports, including a requirement that they prove they were gainfully employed and possessed a certain amount of financial resources. The procedures were eased somewhat in 4/1990, when Minister of Interior and Information Driss Basri announced what he termed a revolutionary “decision to abolish these prerequisites and to approve all passport applications unless an applicant is determined by the Ministry of Interior to pose a risk to public order or public health or to national security. Basri also promised that all applications would be processed within one month, and that anyone who was turned down would receive a written explanation. In 11/1990, [The report, Morocco's second periodic submission on measures it had taken to give effect to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as provided in Article 40 of the Covenant, was originally due in 1986. (Morocco ratified the ICCPR in 1979. The Human Rights Committee opened its examination of Morocco's report at its 11/1990 session in Geneva, and then, in an unusual step, adjourned examination of Morocco until 7/1991. Deliberations were delayed further after the Moroccan delegation refused to par i capita in July when it discovered French television cameras poised to film the Committee's hearing. The Committee ruled that since the sessions were public, the cameras should be permitted to stay. Morocco is currently scheduled for continued examination at the Committee's next session in 10/1991.) The Moroccan government claimed in its report to the UN Human Rights Committee that “for nationals, the freedom to leave Moroccan territory is subject only to the prior obtaining of a national passport. Nevertheless, according to the OMDH, acquiring a passport is, for many, more than a mere formality. While acknowledging that a significant number of new passports have been issued under the revised guidelines, the organization charged that there are also large numbers --the extent is not known -- of citizens who served out the prison terms to which they were sentenced or were
released in a royal pardon, and even some who were found innocent in cases that had a political tinge, who have been denied the right to leave Moroccan soil." The US State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 also reported that the streamlined procedures had not benefitted ex-political prisoners. Though delays are not uncommon, most Moroccans receive passports within one month of application," the report stated. "This is not true for certain political activists, former political prisoners, or for Moroccan Baha'is." [The right to travel is also subject to gender discrimination in Morocco. Regulations require a married woman to obtain permission from her husband before she can obtain a passport. This requirement has been protested by the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, an independent women's group based in Rabat. See also Abderrazak Moulay Rachid, La Femme et la Loi en Maroc, Editions le Fennec, Casablanca, 1991.] The right to travel abroad is well-established in international law and in the domestic law of Morocco. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Morocco is a signatory, provides: Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including their own. Article 9 of the 1972 Moroccan Constitution also guarantees to "all citizens the freedom to travel and to settle in all parts of the Kingdom. In at least two cases, Morocco's Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in Tangier have each ruled that the right to travel enshrined in the Constitution applies to foreign as well as domestic travel, and have ordered the Ministry of Interior to issue passports to persons who have filed proper applications for them. In theory, the procedure for obtaining a passport is simple. Moroccans first submit their application to local authorities. If they do not receive their passport within one month, they then must re-apply to the Ministry of Interior, which is obliged to provide a written explanation if the passport is refused. If the applicant is rejected or does not receive a timely response, he or she may appeal to Morocco's Supreme Court. On 6/26/1991, the National Bureau of the OMDH issued a statement condemning violations of the right to travel and the withholding of passports. "In addition to new cases . . . concerning the refusal of passports to a number of citizens because of their political views or activities, there are a number of cases where passports have been taken away from their owners in an arbitrary fashion, or citizens have been prevented from leaving Morocco without legal justification, despite their possessing passports."[=] 34033. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Ex-Political Prisoners Barred From Leaving Morocco Despite Liberalization, Part 2. New York: Middle East Watch, September 1991. The OMDH has a dossier of some 20 complaints from persons who have applied unsuccessfully for passports, most of whom are former political prisoners suspected of affiliation with one of the outlawed opposition parties or movements, such as Ila al-Amam ("Forward") and the 21st Mars Movement, two Marxist groups that were active in the 1970s and early 1980s. Members of the recognized opposition parties who never have been imprisoned do not generally encounter passport difficulties. Refusal of passports often takes the form of the government's failure to respond to an application. In an open letter to Minister Basri dated 6/28/1991, the signatories-three well-known former political prisoners and one outspoken defense lawyer associated with the opposition, charged that their passport applications, submitted one year or more earlier, had gone unanswered. Abderrahim Berrada first applied for a passport in 1977, and applied a second time on 5/17/1990. He is a lawyer who has participated in some of the major political trials in Morocco. Although never arrested, he has been the object of threats and intimidation for his defense of persons accused of political crimes. Berrada also wrote for the magazine Kalima, noted for its independent coverage of controversial socio-cultural issues, such as the status of women. Kalima ceased publication in March 1989 after four issues of the monthly magazine had been banned over a one-year period. The three other signatories have each been detained and/or tried in the past for their political activities: Fouat Abdelmoumni was disapperad in 5/1977. Like hundreds of other Moroccan political activists who have "disappeared," Abdelmoumni's arrest was never confirmed by the authorities; he was held incommunicado, and during the three years of his detention was never brought before a magistrate or formally charged. He also underwent torture. Released in 5/1980, Abdelmoumni was "disappeared" again in 1/1983. He was held secretly and without charge in the notorious Derb Moulay Cherif detention center, near Casablanca, until his release in 12/1984. Abdelmoumni is a member of the Administrative Commission of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, a nongovernmental organization. He applied for a passport on 7/11/1989. Abdellah Zaazaa was arrested in 1/1975 by men in plainclothes who forced him into an unmarked car. He was tortured during a year of secret detention at Derb Moulay Cherif, after which he was transferred to an official prison. In 1/1977, he was tried by the Criminal Court of Casablanca for his political activities with the Ila al-Amam group and sentenced to life in prison. He was not accused of any violent crime. Zaazaa was freed by a royal pardon in 5/1989. He applied for a passport on 10/3/1989 in order to visit his wife, a French citizen residing in France. After an international campaign on Zaazaa's behalf, a government official informed him during a private meeting that a decision had been made to prevent him from leaving the country. The official was not able to identify who had made the decision. Sion Assidon was secretly detained in 2/1972 and tortured. He was convicted by the Criminal Court of Casablanca in 1973 for his political activities, including membership in Ila al-Amam, and received a 15-year sentence. He was not accused of any violent crime. Assidon was freed by a royal pardon in 8/1984. He applied for a passport on 7/16/1990. [=] 34034. Middle East Watch; Human Rights Watch. Ex-Political Prisoners Barred From Leaving Morocco Despite Liberalization, Part 3. New York: Middle East Watch, September 1991. The OMDH noted that the many letters about travel restrictions it had sent to the Interior Ministry both before and after implementation of the streamlined procedures had gone unanswered. Similarly, Middle East Watch contacted the Embassy of Morocco in Washington, D.C., on July 15 requesting information about the issuance of passports and about the cases of the four signatories of the open letter, but seven weeks later has received no reply, despite several follow-up queries. In the view of Middle East Watch, failure to reply to a passport application effectively amounts to a denial. The discriminatory denial of a passport to a former political prisoner is particularly abhorrent because it constitutes an additional form of extrajudicial punishment of someone who has already served a criminal sentence. Singling out citizens for their political views is also a violation of their freedom of expression. Middle East Watch urges the Moroccan government to respect the right to travel abroad for all its citizens and to cease the arbitrary denial and seizure of passports. Middle East Watch endorses the OMDH's view that a passport is merely an administrative document to which every citizen is entitled without distinction; that preventing citizens from leaving Morocco is within the sole competence of the judiciary, and that only of course if there are legal reasons that would justify this measure, which can only be of a temporary nature." To urge Moroccan authorities to issue passports to Abderrahim Berrada, Fouad Abdelmoumni, Abdellah Zaazaa, and Sion Assidon and to allow all citizens, regardless of their past or present political views or activities, to exercise their right to travel abroad, write to: Driss Basri, Minister of Interior & Information, Quartier Administratif, Rabat, Morocco; Ambassador Mohammed Belkhayat, Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco, 1601 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20009 [=] 34035. Minority Rights Group. Sahrawis of Western Sahara: Part 12; The Sahrawis At the Start of 1979. Report 40. London: Minority Rights Group, February 1979. The SADR, brought into being on 2/28/1976, groups the 100,000 people in the camps, the 5000-strong army and, at the most, a further 20000 Sahrawis still in the occupied territory (eg 80% of the population of El Aaiun had already fled to the camps by 2/1976, according to the IFHR report). Supreme authority is in the hands of a revolutionary council, drawn from and controlling the government and the army. The prime minister since the beginning has been Mohamed Lamine, but the founder and first secretary-general of Polisario, Sayed el
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Wali, was killed in mid-1976 and replaced by Mohamed Abdelazziz. The equally vital post of foreign minister is held by Ibrahim Hakim. The 1976 provisional constitution, aligned with those of Algeria and Libya, describes the new state, in its most decisive aspects, as Arab, Islamic, socialist, working for Arab unity. Radical social change is a central principle: tribal, racial, caste and sex discriminations have been outlawed. Already in 1/1976, a Sahrawi spokesman told the writer that 'it's no secret that a person's tribe', the divisiveness of tribe, once an invader had been neutralised, was always a major factor in breaking up the Sahrawi unification. Slavery, notably of blacks, was current throughout the Spanish administration; it is a regular claim by the Moroccan camp that Polisario sometimes kills its black prisoners. The privileged position of the hereditary patriarch (sheikh) is said to be ended - the leaders are in fact all young. It is our aim to make a reality of the political and social rights of men and to open up new vistas to them in national construction within the limits of our national resources and Islamic religion; women receive training in the use of weapons. There are unions of students, women and general workers. The mineral wealth is national property. Goytsilo has acknowledged that the Sahrawis 'present a series of social, cultural and economic characteristics different to those of their Maghreb brothers (Moroccan and Algerian)'. If the desert people put the outlined principles into practice, they will demonstrate in the most convincing manner a further major difference from the Moroccan regime.

It remains to describe the lives of the Sahrawis in the invaded desert and in the refugee camps. Those few thousands who remained behind in 11/1975 saw Spanish control replaced by a barbaric and yet more repressive occupation. The fate of those who demonstrated the least resistance (such as refusal to kiss Hassan's portrait or the Moroccan flag, each forcibly distributed in quantity) will have been gathered from the refugees' experiences. The Spanish passed their lists of Sahrawi dissidents to the invaders, these rounding up whole families, in particular in retribution for Polisario attacks; the women especially suffered. The Sahrawis were made to live in camps around the military posts, to act as human shields against Polisario raids. Nomadism, already greatly reduced by Spanish policy aided by the long drought (to 28% by 1975), was entirely halted; all domestic animals were appropriated or killed. A curfew was declared, movement was restricted. Petrol was rationed, Sahrawi-owned vehicles had to be painted red and white so that, if their owners fled, they would be easily recognised in the open desert. The invaders also took measures to avoid petrol and food reaching Polisario. As amongst the occupying forces, bribery rapidly became the key to survival: food, water, lodgings, permits, all reached extortionate values. The Sahrawis have claimed that their staple food and drink, roasted and ground barley and tea, have been deliberately kept in short supply to lower their morale. One further element in Hassan's strategy has been the steady implantation of Moroccan and Mauritanian civilians in the annexed desert. Designed to sway any future referendum in the invaders' favour, the immigration would greatly increase the task of holding a valid consultation. The manoeuvre, doubtless encouraged by the Israeli precedent, was at its peak late in 1978; with a cash inducement families from the Agadir and Marrakesh regions were being taken down to the Sahara in weekly military convoys. One report is that between a third and a half of the inhabitants of the Moroccan-occupied zone are now of non-Sahrawi origin. Moroccan propaganda attempts to conceal the truth behind an idyllic picture of life in the territory which, thanks to the Plan d'Urgence, will soon become the best of all possible deserts. In 1/1978 a Spanish journalist described the dominant sensation there: fear. There are civilian detention and torture camps near El Aaiun (El Jreida, El Bachicha) and Dakhla (Punta de la Sarga). Sahrawi civilians are similarly held in Morocco (Ouarazate, Sidi Ifni, Casablanca, Kenitra) and in Mauritania. Repression of Sahrawis resident in Morocco and Mauritania, particularly in the former's Sus region, has been the subject of detailed Polisario reports. The zone below Goulimine is forbidden to all except those who live there. Many are Sahrawis, a proportion of those having moved north from Spanish territory after conflict with the colonial authorities, in particular the 1957-8 war. Moroccan repression of these Sahrawis began after a well-known 1972 demonstration, at Tan-Tan, in favour of independence from Spain -- rather than absorption by Morocco. Subsequent peaks of police activity have come during the visit of the UN Mission, during the 'peace' march and, throughout the war, after Polisario attacks. In the Sus too the Sahrawis have been forced to move into the settlements. School, work, social events, all bring the enforced homage to Hassan and Morocco. The Sahrawi reports list dozens of men and women who have been arrested after being apprehended for the lack of a permit, and imprisoned without trial; many were taken at Tan-Tan, Tarfaya, Goulamine and Zak. Families have been transported entire, including that of Mohamed Lamine, the Republic's prime minister. To look, speak or dress like a Sahrawi is to be open to arrest; meetings, even festivities such as weddings, risk police intervention. The entire south being under military control, the forces of repression behave without restraint. In the more northerly cities where there are Sahrawi quarters, such as Agadir, the police operate an unofficial curfew, sometimes beating up Sahrawis out after dark Sahrawi students, all over Morocco, have been arrested just before the end of term, to stop them joining Polisario (this was at the beginning of the war). Nothing can be done, internally, to help these people; the people political left has ignored their plight. Amnesty International's general report on Morocco implies a dark future for its Sahrawi residents. Similar repression in Mauritania appears led by the Moroccan forces; in February 1978 they apparently opened fire, at Dakhla, on civilians demonstrating against their exactions. A month later, following a Polisario attack on Nouadhibou, both Moroccan and Mauritanian troops fired on Mauritanian civilians thought to be sympathetic to the Sahrawis; the war and the behaviour of the two armies stationed along the railway have combined with the drought to cause the people of the region to flee southwards. The railwaymen have struck rather than carry the troops; a derailment in 12/1977 was the work of Mauritanians, according to Polisario. The Algerian press claims that even members of Ould Daddah's own party had demonstrated at Udaychott against the annexation and the war, being then arrested and sent to a special camp set up by Morocco's notorious Col. Dili. In addition to the counter-accusations of Algerian abduction, imprisonment and killing of Sahrawis at Tindouf, listed earlier, Morocco has charged Algeria with the persecution of Sahrawis resident in Europe. It was claimed that all of them, some 700, took out Moroccan or Mauritanian identity documents and joined POLISARIO (the Moroccan-formed association for Sahrawis), then receiving threats through the Algerian amicales (similar associations for Algerians in Europe). Both Morocco and Algeria have alleged the expulsion of enormous numbers of their own citizens, with expropriation of their possessions, by the other country. Life if the Tindouf camps is preferable to that in the occupied settlements but the combination of burning sun, sand-storms and cold winter nights with the lack of adequate food, medicine and shelter again provides a harsh existence. By 10/1976 there were 22 camps, the largest of those visited by the IFHR having 7800 inhabitants in 660 tents. Eighty percent of the refugees were women and children. Only 10% of the tents were of Sahrawi manufacture (woven animal hair), the rest, rapidly wearing out, gave little protection; there was not a blanket per person. The region's natural resources are limited to a few wells: food, fuel and water have to come by truck from far away. In 5/1976 a team of Swiss doctors reported that a person had to live for a month on a few kilos of cereals, dried vegetables, sugar and powdered milk, a few dates and a ration of oil and tea; the diet was deficient in fats, protein and vitamins. The IFHR reported malnutrition, dehydration, rickets, with a list of the common diseases: hepatitis, bronchitis, TB, trachoma, conjunctivitis, chronic diarrhoea, with anaemia by 1977. The Swiss doctors said that one in four babies died in the first fifteen days. The Sahrawi Red Crescent looks after the refugees but has few skilled workers and a chronic shortage of medical supplies. Morocco has claimed that aid goes to finance 'Algeria's mercenary army' or simply into Algerian pockets but the IFHR found it important to underline that we were struck by the perfect organisation of the camps. The distribution of aid is rapid and very fair. Our delegation felt that here was one of the rare instances where international aid will be used to the full. In 1979, the many camps have been grouped into three wilayas.
The proliferation of the image in this traditionally iconoclastic setting began when the French brought movies, photographs and newspapers to Morocco along with the Protectorate. Mass images become central to the creation of power, knowledge and the creation self. Novel arrangements of visibility transformed relations of men to women, public to private, being to knowing. New disciplines of sight do not banish if I had to choose between my trade and marriage, I would definitely become central to the creation of power, knowledge and the creation self. The role of the image is an ambiguous one as the personal use of media technology among Arab culture, politics and warfare. All except the very aged, the sick and the smaller children take part in the camps' homeguard network. There are frequent festivities, in particular on important anniversaries, beginning with processions and communal discussions and ending with singing and the acting of Sahrawi plays and mimes. These occasions bring together the greater part of the Sahrawi people.


China: 90% of males, 3% of females.
Morocco: 90% of males, data not available on females.
Nepal: 87% of males, 72% of females.
Papua New Guinea: 85% of males, 80% of females.
Philippines: 78% of males, data not available on females.
Indonesia: 75% of males, 10% of females.
Bangladesh: 70% of males, 20% of females.
Thailand: 70% of males, 4% of females.
France: 70% of males, 50% of females.
Denmark: 68% of males, 49% of females.
República of Korea: 68% of males, 7% of females.
Spain: 66% of males, 10% of females.
India: 66% of males, 26% of females.
Poland: 63% of males, 29% of females.
Zambia: 63% of males, 56% of females.
Japan: 63% of males, 12% of females.
Uruguay: 60% of males, 32% of females.
Argentina: 55% of males, 18% of females.
Tunisia: 56% of males, 6% of females.
Yugoslavia: 57% of males, 10% of females.
Netherlands: 57% of males, 42% of females.
Malaysia: 56% of males, 2% of females.
Italy: 56% of males, 32% of females.
Sevidia: 54% of males, 37% of females. [Multinational Monitor is copyrighted by Essential Information Inc. [1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Room 411. Washington DC 20036. Tel: (202) 833-3932. Cable: MULTMON] and is reprinted by permission.]

34037. Ossman, Susan Marie. Moving Pictures: Mass Images And Society In Morocco. University Of California, Berkeley. Dissertation. 309pp. AAC 9203671. The proliferation of the image in this traditionally iconoclastic setting began when the French brought movies, photographs and newspapers to Morocco along with the Protectorate. Mass images become central to the creation of power, knowledge and the creation self. Novel arrangements of visibility transformed relations of men to women, public to private, being to knowing. New disciplines of sight do not banish if I had to choose between my trade and marriage, I would definitely become central to the creation of power, knowledge and the creation self. The role of the image is an ambiguous one as the personal use of media technology among Arab culture, politics and warfare. All except the very aged, the sick and the smaller children take part in the camps' homeguard network. There are frequent festivities, in particular on important anniversaries, beginning with processions and communal discussions and ending with singing and the acting of Sahrawi plays and mimes. These occasions bring together the greater part of the Sahrawi people.

Q: How did you become a butcher?
A: I started helping out in my father's shop when I was eight years old. I watched as he worked and sat behind the cash register. One day when my father fell ill, I saw my chance and started cutting the meat. I began filling in, and working on weekends and holidays. Then I finally gave up studying in order to supervise the whole operation.

Q: At what level did you abandon your university studies?
A: I gave up after my final exams for the B.A. When I failed them I decided to work full time in my father's shop. He could not do the work any longer, and my brothers had no desire to be butchers, whereas I found great pleasure in it.

Q: How do people look upon a woman butcher?
A: Many of my customers think that I am a boy, maybe because of my hair. The regulars know who I am and treat me the same way they treated my father. The same goes for the vendors in the government market; we all help each other here, and they are always there when I need them.

Q: What kind of difficulties have you encountered during your career?
A: I truly can do everything. I go to the karnat [wholesale market] and buy whatever is necessary for the store, and of course, I can cut the meat. For a whole year now, I have been working alone in order to meet my family's financial needs.

Q: Do you feel that by being a woman you attract more customers?
A: Of course. It plays an important role in attracting young men as well as women. But I treat them all alike--courteously and seriously. I command their respect, and they treat me like anyone.
else. I am a colleague, and nothing else. Occasionally I have problems with some customers who try to get fresh, but I am capable of protecting myself.

Q: What do you think about Moroccan women and their possible pursuit of vocations like yours?

A: I strongly believe that it is up to them to learn whatever there is to learn, and to practice all possible trades. There should be no difference between men and women. There should be no prejudices or restricted vocations, and no one should be stereotyped. I don't accept that my place is in the home. I fully believe that I belong here. What strengthens my belief is that I enjoy my work. I feel as though I am in the limelight which makes me feel good--I know I am where I belong.

[Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [=]

34039. Robey, Bryant; Rustein, Shea O.; Morris, Leo. "The Fertility Decline in Developing Countries; Family Size Is Decreasing in many Third World Countries; The Reasons Provide The Key to Slowing Population Growth", in Scientific American, December 1993, pp. 60-67. The Third World is undergoing a fertility revolution, with women of a hundred cultures, and social and economic status, starting to desire smaller family sizes. Birth rates have declined one-third since the 1960s, from women having an average of six children to an average of four children each. The forecast "demographic transition" of the Third World, seen as following the US-UK model of birth rate declines after economic growth brought relative prosperity, and taking decades, has been superceded by a decline in birth rate even without economic improvements. However, despite this transition, population growth will boost world population to 10 billion by 2050. The massive study of the CDC has found: a 50% reduction in fertility rates in Thailand in the last 12 years from 4.6 in 1973 to 2.3 children in 1987; in Colombia from 4.7 in 1976 to 2.8 in 1990; in Indonesia down 46% in 1971-1991; in Morocco down 31% in 1980-1992; and in Turkey down 21% in 1978-1988. Outside China, 38% of women in the Third World now practice birth control, or 51% with China (compared to 70% in the First World): 80% of the Third World women using birth control use modern methods, with sterilization the main method of birth control in 9 of the 16 countries studied. Traditional methods of birth control (such as abstinence) is practiced in only four African countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Togo) and all have high fertility; by contract fertility since the 1970s fell by 26% in Botswana, 35% in Kenya, and 18% in Zimbabwe. Despite AIDS, only 4% of married couples use condoms. The main determinant of contraceptive use is contraceptive availability, especially when linked to mass media information on family planning: in Niger 16% of urban women compared to 3% of rural women use contraceptives; while in Nigeria contraceptives use rose from 6% in 1990 to 11% in 1992 alone. Some 120 million women in the Third World are not practicing family planning now; however, in every country outside Sub-Saharan Africa except for Haiti and Pakistan, the majority of married women are practicing birth control; in Africa, in three countries (Mali, Liberia, Uganda), only 20% of family planning needs are being met. If unmet demand for contraceptives was met, the use in the Third World could immediately surge from 51% to 60%, which would reduce average fertility from four children per women to three, reports Steven Sinding of the Rockefeller Foundation: this reduces forecast world population to 8.4 billion (dropping the Third World states population then from 6.5 billion to 5.1 billion). However, even if there is no increase in percentage of women practicing family planning, there will be another 100 million women needing contraceptives by 2000 simply due to population increase.


34041. United States House; House Committee on International Relations. Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Appendix: Prepared Statement by Terrence J. Brown, Deputy Asst. Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development: Morocco. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia: Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995. pp. 32-33. Morocco has played a significant role in the Middle East peace process in recent years. It is also a voice of moderation in the Arab world and a bulwark against radical Islamist influence. The US welcomes King Hassan's leadership in convening the Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca last 10/1994. With USAID assistance, Morocco has achieved significant progress in addressing many of the fundamental problems that hamper its economic and social development, although much remains to be done. Current projects include efforts to reduce rapid population growth; improve child and maternal health; limit urban pollution and sanitation; strengthen natural resource management, particularly in water use; and promote economic growth through support for privatization and small business and microenterprise development. [=]


Attacks carried out in broad daylight are fairly common these days. Of course, not against you gentlemen. That would be unacceptable. Only against unescorted young women, preferably pretty ones.

A casual glance at the newspapers reveals front page stories about women being attacked in major cities in Morocco. You can't just pass it off as something that happens to others. Every woman is a potential victim, and no one is safe.

In one widely publicized case, a young woman was waiting for a bus on her way to work at 7:30 in the morning. She was taken aback when a young man she'd never seen before addressed her. She told him he was mistaken, but he insisted he wasn't, calling her his "wife" and ordering her to come with him or else he would call the police. Embarrassed bystanders thought they were witnessing a family quarrel and uncomfortably looked away. Some gazed at the sky, others looked at their feet or consulted their watches. Naturally, no one interfered. After all, she was his wife and didn't that mean he could abuse her in front of a crowd of people without anyone lifting a finger? In this case, however, our early morning victim had internalized the message of women's liberation and equality. So she screamed at the top of her lungs. When bystanders pretended not to hear her, she resorted to a tried and true method and burst into tears.

Two officials who had been nearby were moved by this display of feminine weakness, and even though she was the man's "wife," they flagged down a passing police van. While the assembled crowd looked on, the police scrutinized the pair's identification papers and established that the man was an unsavory character who had planned to rape and rob his victim.

The remarkable thing about this story is the unmitigated gall of these rapipts who make use of this clever line "This is my wife," which, of course, lets them get away with anything. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.][=]
36000. AID. Congressional Presentation, FY 1995: Part 116: Asia and Near East: Regional Activities: Stabilizing Population Growth, District of Columbia: AID, February 28, 1994, Assistance for child spacing, business plans, training, education and communication as well as technical assistance for service delivery and data collection will be provided. Funding in the Near East region will be used for population research, the analysis of population trends, comparison of population program performance among countries and continued support for child-spacing activities in Oman. [=]

36001. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 01: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy without popularly elected representative institutions or political parties. Oman has been ruled by a sultan of the Al Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. While maintaining the ruling family's long tradition of firm control over all important matters affecting the State, Sultan Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id has brought leaders from the tribal system into his Government, and much decisionmaking is consensual in accordance with longstanding tradition. Since his accession in 1970, he has balanced tribal, regional, and ethnic interests in composing the national administration. The Cabinet of Ministers is appointed by and responsible to the Sultan. The State Consultative Council, an advisory body formed in 1980, was replaced in 1991 by the Majlis Ash-Shura or Consultative Council. This body represents the Sultan's measured effort to broaden participation in government. The Consultative Council's mandate is to review new laws pertaining to economic development and social services prior to their promulgation. It may summon Ministers to appear before the Majlis to discuss the Ministries' policies and plans. Oman is strategically located at the entrance to the Persian Gulf opposite Iran. Oman is concerned with internal stability and security, given the tensions in the region, the proximity of Iran and Iraq, and the potential threat of political Islam. The security apparatus is pervasive but professional and well trained, it is under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Palace Office Affairs. The police are under the full control of the highest levels of government. Reports of human rights abuses by security personnel are rare. Almost totally undeveloped when Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, Oman has used its modest oil revenues to make impressive economic progress and improve public access to health care, education, and social services. Almost 80% of the Government's revenue comes from its oil production, but it is seeking to diversify Oman's free market economy and stimulate private sector activity. Individuals are free to associate with others in pursuing commercial interests, but only Omanis may own real property. In 1993 the Government lifted restrictions on foreign ownership of Omani stocks and bonds. There was no essential change in the human rights situation in 1993. A number of basic rights continued to be restricted or denied, particularly the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association, the right of citizens to change their government, and worker rights. Additionally, various forms of discrimination against women remain, although women have made tangible progress in some areas of public life. Civil and political rights are not formally codified, but in the absence of any challenge to stability and order, the authorities generally respect the integrity of the person. Freedom of religion is generally respected. [=]

36002. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 04: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There were no reports of torture in 1993. There were a few unconfirmed reports that some prisoners had been beaten during pretrial detention. In particular, there were a few instances of police beating suspects accused of crimes against women and children. One defendant on trial in the Magistrate Court alleged he had been abused but retracted his accusation in court. [=]

36003. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 06: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, IncludingFreedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There were no reports of denial of a fair public trial. In addition to civilian courts, which treat misdemeanor and felony criminal cases, the court system includes Shari'a courts, which handle family law, an authority for the settlement of commercial disputes under the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, and a board to hear labor disputes under the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor. The Magistrate Court is a criminal court and adjudicates violations of the Criminal Code. A rarely used security court system handles internal security cases. Provincial governors arbitrate minor matters in rural areas but do not have the authority to detain persons. The various judicial systems are subordinate to the Sultan. In most cases they operate independently, but the Sultan may intercede in cases of particular interest, especially those concerning national security. Judicial practice in Oman conforms in most part to Islamic prescriptions for a fair trial before experienced and impartial judges. Oman's criminal judges, all Omani, and professionals who have trained at legal institutions in various Arab countries after completing their bachelor's degrees. A college Graduate may become a judge in the civilian courts at age 28 after 3 years of postgraduate study and 1 to 2 years' apprenticeship as a judge trainee. In the Islamic, or Shari'a, court system, a high school graduate may join the ranks of Shari'a court judges generally after a 23 after completed a 6-year course at one of Oman's four higher institutes for Islamic studies and an apprenticeship. There were no reports in 1993 that judges were transferred or missed for political reasons. Oman's Criminal Code, enacted in 1974, does not explicitly state the right of the accused during the criminal process but instead relies heavily on tradition and procedures instituted by the Magistrate Court. There are no written rules for admission of evidence during trials or codified procedures for entering cases into the criminal item. In a criminal trial, the accused is presumed to be innocent. He may be repented by an attorney, but this is not a legal requirement, and the Government will not pay for counsel. Defendants have the right and are expected to be present at trial, they may present evidence; and they may confront witnesses by asking questions put through the judge, who is generally the only one who may question witnesses The police have the responsibility to prosecute cases before the Magistrate Court. Trial is before a single judge for misdemeanors and minor felonies and before a panel of three judges for serious felonies. There are no jury trials, and, while there is no explicit right to a public trial, court proceedings are generally open to the public. The accused person, or his lawyer, may read the police charge sheet," which summarizes the case against him. There is no procedure by which the defense may seek the deletion of elements of the charge sheet prior to trial, but the inadequate may delete charges during the trial. The police or Public Prosecutor (a senior police officer) may add charges after inspection of the file by the defense and during the trial. During the trial, witnesses may be called by the judge, prosecution, or defense. The prosecution or the defense may cross-examine witnesses through (and with the approval of) the judge, but there is no procedural right to cross-examination. The prosecution and defense may challenge the reliability of statements or authenticity of documents in their closing statements to the judge. Judges frequently pronounce a
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verdict and sentence within 1 day after a trials end. Jail sentences of over 3 months and fines of over $1,300 are subject to appeal before a three judge panel. However, judgments in serious felony cases may not be appealed because they are heard in the first instance before the highest judicial panel; there is no other court of appeal. The Public Prosecutor's office may also appeal a sentence that it believes to be too light, although it may not appeal an innocent verdict. The President of the Magistrate Court chairs the Court of Appeals, which may opt not to consider an appeal it finds ill-grounded. The Shari'a Court generally allows attorneys representing both parties to appear before the judge. Judgments may be appealed within 30 days to an appeal court within the Shari'a court system, and the appeals are heard by a senior judge. Commercial matters brought before the authority for the settlement of commercial disputes are heard before a panel consisting of two judges and a member of the Chamber of Commerce. Once a case is filed, the authority may summon the parties to appear and often seeks opinions from auditors and other experts. Cases involving fines of over $20000 (10000 Omani rials) may be appealed to a five-member panel and receive a fresh hearing. There was no evidence that the legal system discriminated against minorities. However, in the case of discrimination against women, the Shari'a courts adhere to Islamic law equating the testimony of one man with that of two women. A capital sentence requires the Sultan's ratification. There were no reports of political prisoners in 1993. [\[...

36004. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 07: Respect For Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The police are not required to have a warrant in order to search a private residence, police, or vehicle. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops on both oral and written communications, and Omanis are guarded in both areas. A 1986 law banned marriage between Omanis and foreigners (defined as not including citizens from the Gulf Cooperation Council states). However, many prominent Omanis are married to foreigners, and some were married after 1986. Recently, a new marriage law was promulgated which set forth the conditions allowing marriages between Omanis and foreigners. Omanis may now obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior if they can justify their desire to marry a foreigner and can show the financial ability to support the foreign spouse. [\[...

36005. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 14: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There are many forms of discrimination against women in this traditional society, even though some women, primarily in the capital, have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the media. An estimated 14% of all civil servants are women. The occupational areas available to women are gradually expanding beyond the traditional held of teaching, as secretarial work, medicine, and communications have become acceptable professional areas for women over the last several years. However, some observers have noted a contraction of opportunities for women as the Government becomes more concerned about employment opportunities for men. In addition, some employers are concerned that female candidates for jobs might leave the work force to marry or have children, further diminishing women's opportunities for employment or for professional training. Schooling for girls is available to the same extent as for boys in urban areas and increasingly so in rural areas. In general, the level of education that girls attain remains below that of boys; however, the gap appears to be narrowing. Over 90% of Oman's children reach grade five of primary education. Women constitute roughly half of the 3000 students at Sultan Qaboos University. Women students constitute the majority in the colleges of arts, education, and Islamic sciences, and science and business. Over half of the first graduating class of the college of medicine in 1993 were women. The number of women students in the country's law schools has become severely restricted in a reflection of a reluctance both among employers to hire trained females for work in these fields outside the capital area and among trained females to accept work in them. The gains achieved by a small minority of women are largely irrelevant to the great majority, who live their lives within the confines of the home. Many females in the rural areas are illiterate. The lack of female education in some outlying areas of the country, where poverty is higher, combined with communal and tribal customs that dictate a subsidiary role for women, makes it difficult for most adult women to participate fully in the modern sector. By law, women are to receive equal pay and benefits for equal work. The Government, by far the largest employer of women in the country, enforces this regulation within its ministries, where women serve in professional and senior managerial positions. Women in the private sector earn salaries equal to those of their male counterparts. Women can sometimes have difficulty in obtaining land grants or subsidized government housing loans because the Government presumes that they will reside with a male relative, be it husband or brother. Legal provisions for female employees, including a provision for liberal maternity leave, are observed in both the public and private sectors. The Labor Law, in some ways very progressive, allows women with infants time off during the day to nurse. Oman society's interpretation of Islamic precepts on the status of women also results in de jure and de facto discrimination in a number of areas. Islamic inheritance laws are strictly interpreted. A woman may receive only one-eighth of her husband's property when he dies. Daughters receive less than sons. In urban, educated families, many women have property in their own names; less educated women do not usually have that protection. Because of the relative lack of education among older women, many are unaware of their rights. Others are reluctant to use the court system out of fear that they might forfeit family support by bringing a matter before the court. There is no evidence that there is a pattern of spouse abuse. Because of the closeness of Oman's extended families, battered women often seek family intervention to remove and protect them from violent domestic situations. [\[...

36006. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Oman: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government has made the health, education, and general welfare of children a priority in its budget. Medical care for Omani children is free, and a highly effective child immunization program has helped bring about dramatic improvements in child health. Communities in a few towns in the interior and in the Dhofar region still practice female genital mutilation (circumcision). The total number of cases nationwide is small and declining annually. [\[...


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However, according to the Labor Law, employers of more than 50 workers are required to form a joint body of labor and management representatives as a forum for communication between the two groups. However, implementation of this provision of the Labor Law appears to be uneven, and it is unclear how often the committees that do exist meet. Generally these committees discuss such questions, for example, as living conditions in a company housing compound. Wages and hours are not a matter in the view of these committees; they are agreed upon by workers and employers in individual contracts within the guidelines delineated by the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor under the law. The committees are not formed across company lines, membership is confined to management and labor representatives from each individual company. The 1973 Labor Law (as amended) defines conditions of employment for both Omani and foreign workers. The Labor Law covers domestic workers and construction workers but does not cover temporary workers (those in Oman for less than three months). Foreign workers constitute at least 50% of the work force if one includes the traditional Omani occupations of fishing, subsistence farming and herding—and 80-90% of the work force in the modern sector. In August the Government promulgated a new regulation effective in 3/1994, aimed at reducing the number of expatriate shopkeepers. The regulation prohibits the hiring of additional workers after that date. The initial concerns of the Omani business sponsors and the foreign shopkeepers have eased because the Government is allowing unlimited hiring of expatriates before the deadline and may consider amendments to the final regulation. Citizens of India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka continue to seek employment in Oman in large numbers, generally entering into employment contracts prior to their arrival. Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or more workers. Similarly, any employer with 50 or more workers must establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company, any employee Omani or foreign, may file a grievance with the Labor Welfare Board, which comprises 6 inspectors who arbitrate disputes. Lower paid workers, such as clerks, mechanics, and salesmen, use the Board regularly. Both plaintiff and defendant may retain and be represented by counsel. Worker representatives may present collective grievances, but most cases are filed on behalf of individual workers. The Board has a docket of about 150 cases per month, about 80% of which involve foreign nationals. Sessions convene daily procedures are informal and summary in nature. The Board operates impartially and generally gives workers the benefit of the doubt in grievance hearings. Disputes that the Board cannot resolve are referred to the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor for decision. Complaints involving employer-employee relations should be brought before the magistrate court if there is an allegation of criminal wrongdoing. There are no export processing zones in Oman. [=]  36009. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There is no minimum wage in Qatar, although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The 48-hour workweek with a 24-hour rest period is prescribed by law, although most government offices follow a schedule of 36 hours a week. Employees who work more than 48 hours a week, or 36 hours a week during the Muslim month of amadan, are entitled to overtime. This law is adhered to in government offices and major private sector companies. It is not observed in the case of domestic and personal employees. Domestic servants frequently work 7 days a week, more than 12 hours a day, with few or no holidays, and have no effective way to redress grievances against their employers. Qatar has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry & Public Works, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964 as amended in 1984 lists partial and permanent disabilities for which compensation may be awarded some connected with handling chemicals and petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not specifically set rates of payment and compensation. Foreign workers must be sponsored by a legally recognized organization or a Qatari citizen. Foreign workers need a sponsor to receive a visa to enter Qatar as well as the sponsor's permission to leave. Theoretically, any worker may seek legal relief from onerous work conditions. However, domestic workers, who experience the most difficulties, generally accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. =]  36010. DS. "Oman: Introduction", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy which has been ruled by the Al Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no political parties or elected representative institutions. The current sultan is Qaboos Bin Said Al Sa'id who acceded in 1970. Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy issues, he has brought tribal leaders and other notables into the Government. Much decisionmaking is by consensus among these leaders according to longstanding tradition. In 1991 the Sultan established a 69-seat Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, which replaced an older advisory body. Council members are selected from lists of nominees proposed by each of the 59 wilayats (regions). After the country's first national census in 1993, the Sultan expanded the membership of the new Council to 80 seats. The Council has no formal legislative powers, but may question government ministers and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social policy. The entire security apparatus falls under the authority of the Ministry of Palace Office Affairs which coordinates all intelligence and security policies. The internal security service investigates all matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police performs regular police duties, provides security at airports, acts as immigration officials, and maintains a small coast guard. There were no confirmed reports indicating that these agencies were involved in human rights abuses in 1994. Since 1970, Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive economic progress and improved able access to health care, education and social services. The government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private investment. The Government continues to restrict or deny important human rights. In 1994 the Government detained 200 people in connection with an alleged plot to destabilize the country. The
Government charged 131 of these suspects with sedition and tried them in secret before the State Security Court. The detentions and secret trials raised serious questions about freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to due process. Other human rights restrictions included infringements on the freedoms of expression and association. The Government does not guarantee full rights for workers and women. As a practical matter, the people do not have the right to change their government, inasmuch as the Government took several steps in 1994 to address human rights concerns. It increased the number of seats on the Consultative Council and allowed women to take part in nominations for Council members. In 11/1994 the Government selected two women to serve on the Council. The Government also joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) and began to draft a new labor law that addresses worker rights. [ ]

36011. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5208(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The judicial system does not always ensure fair trials based on internationally accepted norms. The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate misdemeanors and criminal matters- the Islamic, or Shari'a, courts, which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance; the Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD)--the Labor Welfare Board--and the Real Estate Committee, which hears tenant-landlord disputes. A State Security Court tries cases involving national security. Although it is administrative distinct from the other courts, magistrate court judges have presided over trials in the State Security Court. The various courts are subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases. However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has overturned a decision of the ASCD or the magistrate courts. The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There are no written rules of evidence, or codified procedures for entering cases into the criminal system or any legal provision for a public trial. Criminal procedure have developed by tradition and precedent in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide defendants with the written charges against them, defendants are presumed innocent, and have the right to present evidence and confront witnesses. The prosecution and the defense question witnesses through the judge, who is usually the person to question witnesses in court. There are no jury trials: a single judge tries misdemeanors; a panel of three judges tries felonies and security offenses. Magistrate court judges must be citizens. Public prosecutors are senior police officers. They may bring additional charges after defense attorneys have inspected the charge sheet or during trial. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit right to be represented by counsel. The Government does not pay for the legal representation of indigents. Judges often pronounce the verdict and sentence within 1 day after the completion of a trial. Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines over the equivalent of $1300 to a three-judge panel. Defendants accused of national security offenses and serious felonies do not have the right of appeal. Death sentences, which are rare, require the Sultan's approval. The Government tried 131 persons for subversion in secret before the State Security Court, which issued verdicts on 11/12/1994 (see Section 1.d.). The Court sentenced two defendants to death and the others from 3 to 1 year in prison. The Sultan later commuted the death sentences to prison terms. The defendants did not have a fair trial by international norms. There are no known political prisoners. However, the secrecy of the subversion trials prevents any independent assessment of the Government's assertion that the defendants were actual subversives found guilty of plotting to destabilize the country. [ ]

36012. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (a) Freedom of Speech and Press", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5208(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There is no legal protection for free speech or press. The law prohibits any criticism of the Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of government officials and agencies, but such criticism rely receives media coverage. The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information censors may act against any material regarded as politically, culturally, or sexually offensive. However, journalists and writers generally censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editors reflect the Government's views, although the authorities tolerate some criticism on foreign issues. The Government discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic issues, and seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals by subsidizing their operating costs. In late August, all four daily newspapers reported the arrest of the 200 alleged subversives only once—by publishing the dispatch of the government-owned Oman News Agency without further comment. On several occasions in 1994, the Government prohibited the entry onto the market of several foreign newspapers. The authorities prevented distribution of the August 6 edition of the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat, reportedly because it contained some statements regarded as critical of the Majlis Ash-Shura, and of the 11/7/1994 edition of the Financial Times reportedly because it contained an article critical of the Government's economic policy. Customs officials sometimes confiscate video cassette tapes and erase offensive material. The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners. The Government controls the local radio and television companies. They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The appropriate Government authority, such as the Sultan Qaboos University, the police, or the relevant ministry must approve cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars. Most organizations avoid controversial issues for fear the authorities may cancel their events. Academic freedom is restricted, particularly regarding controversial matters, including politics. Professors may be dismissed for going beyond acceptable boundaries. [ ]

36013. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5208(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government does not restrict travel within the country except to military areas. While a man may travel abroad freely, a woman must have authorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative to obtain a passport. The Government does not have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or undocumented aliens. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country has effectively screened out would-be refugees. However, in 1994 the Government offered temporary refuge to several thousand Yemenis displaced by the civil war in Yemen. [ ]
United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives. By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government has made the health, education, and general welfare for children a budgetary priority. There is no pattern of familial or other child abuse. Communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still practice female genital mutilation. Experts believe that the number of such cases is small and declining annually. [=]

36015. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Women face many forms of discrimination. Most women live their lives in the confines of the home. Widespread illiteracy hampers women's ability to own property, participate in the modern sector of the economy, or even inform themselves of their own rights. Government officials frequently deny women land grants housing loans, and prefer to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. Many educated women face job discrimination because perspective buyers fear they might quit to marry or raise families. Government grants for study abroad are limited almost exclusively to males. Many aspects of Islamic tradition also discriminate against women. Islamic law favors male heirs in adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women are reluctant to take an inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family. Some educated women have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the media. An estimated 14% of all civil servants are women. Two women also serve in the Consultative Council. In both the public and private sectors, women are entitled to liberal maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women, observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Women constitute roughly half of the 3000 students at the Sultan Qaboos University and are a majority in the colleges arts, education, science, business, and Islamic studies. There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse but information is scant and difficult to collect. Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint with the police, but more often seek family intervention to protect them from violent domestic situations. There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign females employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances. [=]

36016. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (b) The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The current law does not provide for the right to collective bargaining. It requires that employer of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-management committee as a communication forum between the two groups. The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness of these committees is questionable. In general, the committees discuss such question as living conditions at company-provided housing. They are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor. The current law defines conditions of employment for some Omani and foreign workers. It covers domestic servant and construction workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50% of the work force and as much as 80% of the modern-sector work force. Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace. Employers of 10 or more workers. Similarly, any employer with 50 or more workers must establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company, any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in such cases may be represented by legal counsel. There are no export processing zones. [=]

36017. DS. "Oman: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of workers. The minimum wage for nonprofessional workers was about $156 a month (60 rials). Minimum wage guidelines do not cover domestic servants, farmers, government employees, or workers in small businesses. Many foreigners work in fields exempt from the minimum wage statute. The Government is lax in enforcing minimum wage guidelines for foreign workers employed in menial jobs. However, foreign workers with high skills are frequently paid more than their Omani counterparts. The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to permit some savings to be sent home. The private sector workweek is 40-45 hours and includes a rest period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government officials have a 36-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 Per week. Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced. Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Boards rulings are not binding. Every worker has the right to 12 days of annual leave during the first 3 year of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers provide many foreign nationals, including maids, with annual or biannual round-trip tickets to their countries of origin. All employers are required by law to provide first aid facilities. Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the Department of Heath and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As required by law, they make frequent on-site inspections. The law states that employers must not to place their employees in situations involving dangerous work. However, the law does not specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous work without jeopardy to his continued employment. [=]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Oman

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in Qatar, although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The 48-hour work week with a 24-hour rest period is prescribed by law, although most government offices follow a schedule of 36 hours a week. Employees who work more than 48 hours a week, or 36 hours a week during the Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to overtime. This law is adhered to in government offices and major private sector companies. It is not observed in the case of domestic and personal employees. Domestic workers typically work 7 days a week, more than 12 hours a day, with few or no holidays, and have no effective way to redress grievances against their employers. Qatar has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy & Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964, as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not specifically set rates of payment and compensation. Foreign workers must be sponsored by a citizen or legally recognized organization to obtain an entry visa, and must have their sponsor's permission to depart the country. Theoretically, any worker may seek legal relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic workers generally accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. [=]

36019. Eickelman, Christine. Women and Community in Oman. New York: New York University, 1984. The author resided in Oman in 1979-1980 (her husband [Dale Eickelman] was studying ideas on leadership and political authority in inner Oman on NSF grant) in Hamra, an oasis on the western edge of the Jabal al-Akhdar, a village of 2500 and the tribal capital of the Abriyin. The village economy was based on falaqi (which are based on the dates, particularly during meals, which are the primary source of food) supplemented by herding of sheep and goats. The village women were self-confident but lived in a matrix of precisely determined status. Women never undertook market activities; most food was available as local products sold by small merchants, although a larger volume of trucked in foods (including canned and frozen) was now available. While the community is based on extended families, most families reside in nuclear family units. The major social distinction is between shaykhly and non-shaykhly families: while the household work of women in both types of families is similar, shaykhly families typically have servants. While many servants are former slaves, there is still much stigma associated with slave origins, and many have taken up activities such as shopkeeping, many younger descendants of slaves continue to have few opportunities other than being clients of shaykhly households. Women and men are separate for much of the day, and families guard their privacy (especially during meals, which are almost always private, with guests eating separately). Overlying this formal division of social space is a dense network of visiting relationships among women and the visits of women peddlars. Cumulatively, the formal and informal visiting relationships of men and women are termed hayyan (family cluster), within walking distance and of like status, that define the scope of normal social interaction. A high social value is assigned to the absence of public conflict; by extension, open conflict in Omani society can have very serious implications. Conflict is normally concealed, and is associated with low status families.

Hamra is undergoing a period of decline, having been an important regional center until the mid-twentieth century. In 1826, the Awdah Zahrani line of the Abriyin settled in Hamra, establishing it as the tribal capital. The major landowners in Hamra are descendants of the lineages. Until recently the majority of educated people in Hamra were of shaykhly descent. The integration of Oman into a broader international trade led to the decline of cotton as a cash crop and of the local production of textiles, in the face of imports from British India. Before the developing of trucking, Hamra had been a caravan entrepot: one example of this. Hence the Ministry is ready to assist families whose circumstances require that they should receive help in the form of immediate cash payments. Such circumstances arise when extreme climatic conditions in some areas of Zanzibar and the East African littoral. Sultan Qaboos, coming to power in 1970, brought a period of rapid modernization to Oman. Hamra became a minor administrative center for the national government even as regional traditional agriculture based on the falaj declines. In 1980, 43% of Hamra's men were employed outside the area, with most in the army, in the capital or in Abu Dhabi. In the early 1970s, many descendants of slaves were quick to join the army or police. In Hamra, the government has set up a system of modern employment patterns based on new construction using brick is replacing the older mud brick: non-shaykhly families have been especially interested in newer housing areas, and the shift in settlement has led to the decline of the old market.
the Sultanate result in natural disasters. There are also 'unnatural disasters' such as fires. Assistance payments in such distressing situations provide relief for the victims, as well as compensation for their material losses. As part of its plan to pool available resources and develop the local communities, the Ministry encourages citizens to become self-sufficient and self-reliant, and avoid over-dependence on others. The goal here is to improve families' living standards, incomes and overall conditions and transform them into productive units. The Ministry endeavours to achieve this through its livelihood projects, which consist mainly of small business ventures like kiosks, stalls and small shops. These projects enable people to generate their own incomes and reduce their dependence on state assistance. Sound social planning and the elimination of social ills can only be achieved through proper theoretical studies and practical experience in the field. The Ministry has carried out a number of studies of 'negative social phenomena' with the aim of discovering their causes and finding ways of overcoming them. Studies include a survey of public opinion on currently prevailing dowry levels, a study of social and environmental motivations and their effect on the Omani farmer and agricultural development, as well as the provision of pest control programmes and veterinary services. Other services included seed and fertiliser distribution, and a number of other useful activities. Omani women are already playing a vital role in the professions, government, and commerce, in addition to their traditional ones within the family. The main aim of the rural women's development part of the Programme is to liberate women in the rural areas from negative practices and customs that are damaging to health and social well-being. Another essential aim is to eliminate female illiteracy, encourage women to join adult education classes and teach women good housekeeping. In 1992, 84 rural women's development centres, and 454 women were engaged in making clothes.

Women and Children: Women and children form one of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour’s most important responsibilities and departments have instituted a wide range of social and educational activities and programmes to meet their needs and create a healthy new generation to carry the national process forward. Mothers and children took on a new importance when planners recognised that they form one of the basic elements of development, since the children of today are the men and women of tomorrow. Hence it was vital to identify the needs of the next two sectors (women and children) to enable them to make progress in their health, and social and cultural lives. Careful, well thought-out planning was required in order to achieve this. Several women’s and children's welfare social centres have been set up in different parts of the Sultanate to operate welfare programmes for Omani women, raise their social, economic and cultural levels, and, by teaching them the skills needed to improve their standard of living, involve them in the country's social development programmes. At present there are seven of these centres in al Khodh, al Amerat, Bidbid, Ja’alan Bani Bu Hasam, Ras al Hadd, Qurayat and Sohar. These centres train women in needlework, embroidery, and home economics, as well as in traditional local crafts to improve their skills and protect this particular heritage from extinction. Marketing facilities are provided for these products by the centre. The centres also organise lectures, courses and literary classes, and pay home visits to the families concerned. The priority given to child care through the Ministry's Children's Department reflects the fact that children are one of the most important sectors of the community. In furtherance of its objective of providing children with happy and fruitful lives, the Department organises visits to ensure compliance with the Ministerial Decision regulating day nurseries. There were 16 such nurseries in 1992. The Ministry has established Omani Women's Associations in various parts of the Sultanate to give voluntary work a more prominent role. The first Omani Women's Association was established in Muscat in 1971, and played a pioneering part in women's voluntary work in the region. In succeeding years Associations were established in Salalah, al Buraimi, Sohar, Sur, Taqah and Mirbat. More recently they have been established in al Khabourah, Ibra and Ibi, Saham, Nizwa and al Mudhaibi. In 1992 there were thirteen such associations in the Sultanate. On a lighter note, Omani women staged an international class fashion show, based on traditional dresses from all
part of the Sultanate, in May this year. The show was attended by fashion experts and journalists from many parts of the world.

Labour Sector: The Labour Sector of the Ministry is responsible for the national work-force employed in private sector enterprises and companies as well as foreign imported labour. This is a very important part of the Ministry's work, particularly in view of the growing demand for manpower and the consequent need for increased efforts to protect that manpower and to maintain it in a healthy and socially acceptable condition. The Ministry has been handling these problems through a number of channels. The main ones are:- local recruitment, work permits, training subsidies, labour inspection, employee welfare, statistics, computers, occupational health and safety, and external labour relations. The Ministry's policy is to increase the recruitment of local labour for private sector companies and enterprises, because it is committed to the principle of replacing foreign manpower and supporting Omanisation. Omanisation is making steady progress, and all possible steps are being taken to ensure that rewarding job opportunities are available for every Omani who is willing and able to work. The Ministry's figures indicate a significant increase in the Omanisation of the private sector during 1992. Successes along the road to Omanisation are a result of constant government moral and material support for the achievement of this goal. By far the most important example of this was the announcement by the Supreme Committee for Vocational Training and Labour to the effect that private sector employers would receive substantial compensation for salaries and allowances paid to employees and those taken on from October 1991 for a period of up to three years. The great advances achieved by the country since the accession of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos created an urgent need for imported labour from Arab and other countries, in order to enable the goals of the Development Plans to be met, since the available national manpower was insufficient to cover all the country's needs. In this situation it became the Ministry's function to reconcile the manpower requirements of the Development Plans with locally available labour, and to supervise the importation of foreign workers needed to bridge the gap. In ensuring that both employers and employees comply with the provisions of the Oman Labour Law and Ministerial Decisions implementing it, the Ministry endeavours to ensure that the law serves the interests of both sides. According to 1992 figures, over 14000 establishments were inspected that year. To guarantee stable employer-employee labour relations under the provisions of the Omani Labour Law, the Ministry's Labour Welfare Services work to resolve problems that might disrupt production in private sector enterprises and companies. In doing so, these Services endeavour to achieve a balance between the two sides. In this connection 2,928 claims were filed in 1992. The most important of these involved appeals against dismissal, termination of service or cancellation of contract between employer and employee. Computerisation was introduced in 1991 in order to achieve maximum speed, accuracy and flexibility in dealing with the public's business. The Ministry computer organisation has a fundamental role in collecting and collating data about the movement of national and foreign labour in the private sector, to produce quarterly and half-yearly reports on the size of the workforce in that sector, and to produce statistics on a monthly basis for the Ministry of Finance and Economy's Research Department and the Development Council's Manpower statistics Department. The protection of the workforce from occupational hazards is one of the Ministry's main responsibilities. Through its occupational safety and health regulations the Ministry encourages employers to provide medical care and appropriate healthy housing with all modern conveniences, and to ensure that the work environment contains nothing that is likely to cause occupational diseases or accidents. The Ministry keeps abreast of all industrial and other developments taking place in the country, and through its frequent inspection campaigns, it ensures that the highest standards of occupational safety and health are maintained. [2]

36021. Ministry of Information (Oman). Oman 1993; Part 27: Youth, Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, 1993. In his address to the nation on National Day in November 1992. His Majesty Sultan Qaboos announced that 1993 was to be the Year of Youth. It is exactly ten years since he announced the first Year of Youth, a clear indication of the importance that His Majesty attaches to the development of the youth of the nation, as representing the future of the Sultanate, and of the personal interest he has shown in the nation's young people and the role he plays in their advancement. The combination of a high birth rate with rapidly rising health standards, and a corresponding fall in the infant mortality rate, means that the youth of the country represent an increasing proportion of the total population of the Sultanate. Those who knew Oman before 1970 and visited the towns and villages of the Interior, will still clearly recollect the sight of youngsters blinded by trachoma, infected eyes, and infected dust, whilst the mortality rate amongst children from malaria and dysentery was grievously high. The contrast now could not be greater; apart from the recorded tremendous improvement in health standards, the evident fitness and alertness of the young is most noticeable. Physical fitness is now widely popular amongst young people, with their keenness on every form of sporting activity. In 1992, the responsibility for supervision of all youth affairs was entrusted to the Ministry of Education, and in 1986 its title was amended accordingly. In 1989, the Higher Council Youth approved an integrated nation-wide plan for expanding and improving youth facilities, including the construction of sports and youth centres, support for the expansion of existing clubs, and the organisation of national sporting and recreational activities, to which His Majesty personally donated half a million Rials. By a Royal Decree of 1991, Sports and Youth Activities were placed under a General Organisation for Sports and Youth Activities (GOSYA), supervised by the Council of Ministers, and the President of which is H.E. Ibrahim bin Hamoud Al Subhi. In outlining the programme for the Year of Youth, H.E. Ibrahim Al Subhi announced that it is likely to cause occupational diseases or accidents. The MinistryLabour Law, the Ministry's Labour Welfare Services work to resolve the problems that might disrupt production in private sector enterprises and companies. In doing so, these Services endeavour to achieve a balance between the two sides. In this connection 2,928 claims were filed in 1992. The most important of these involved appeals against dismissal, termination of service or cancellation of contract between employer and employee. Computerisation was introduced in 1991 in order to achieve maximum speed, accuracy and flexibility in dealing with the public's business. The Ministry computer organisation has a fundamental role in collecting and collating data about the movement of national and foreign labour in the private sector, to produce quarterly and half-yearly reports on the size of the workforce in that sector, and to produce statistics on a monthly basis for the Ministry of Finance and Economy's Research Department and the Development Council's Manpower statistics Department. The protection of the workforce from occupational hazards is one of the Ministry's main responsibilities. Through its occupational safety and health regulations the Ministry encourages employers to provide medical care and appropriate healthy housing with all modern conveniences, and to ensure that the work environment contains nothing that is likely to cause occupational diseases or accidents. The Ministry keeps abreast of all industrial and other developments taking place in the country, and through its frequent inspection campaigns, it ensures that the highest standards of occupational safety and health are maintained. [2]

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recognition of the keen interest that he has shown in the scouting movement in the Sultanate, His Majesty Sultan Qaboos was installed as Chief Scout during the National Celebrations. Scouts and Guides are encouraged to participate in projects which aid society, one of the most rewarding of which is the organisation of an annual course for the handicapped under the auspices of the Oman National Committee for the Care of the Handicapped, part of the State effort to enable the handicapped to undertake work which will give them a secure and dignified life and help them make a positive contribution to society. These courses have been so successful that handicapped people from other member States of the AGCC are now joining them. The National Organisation for Scouts and Guides is keen to increase membership and encourage the formation of Scout and Guide packs in schools at all educational stages. The Organisation provides uniforms, badges and other requirements, and supervises leadership training and development. Statistics show that numbers are growing in both sections of the movement, which now have over 10000 members. Oman participated in the 32nd World Scouts Conference in 1990, which was attended by over 1000 scouts from 132 countries, and won high praise at the 19th Arab Scouts' Conference in Cairo. In February 1995, the fourth Ship for World Youth, organised by the Japanese Government, called at Mina Qaboos with 185 youngsters, including 20 Omanis, on board. As part of their programme for seeing places of interest in the Sultanate, the youth groups visited the Sultan Qaboos University, where they joined in sports and cultural activities. The National Organisation for Scouts and Guides is establishing a camp at Al Madlah in the Wilayat of Musan'a. A committee has been assigned the task of planning and supervising the execution of the various phases of the camp, including utilities, services, activities centre, and a headquarters. Work has already started to prepare the camp for over 1000 scouts in the annual camps during the mid-year vacation. [=]

36022. Ministry of Information (Oman). Oman 1993; Part 33: Justice, Awqaf, and Islamic Affairs. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, 1993. Islam is the religion of the Sultanate of Oman, and under Islam, religion and law are interwoven. Thus Shari'a Law is the law of Oman. Awqaf are donations and bequests to religious foundations and charities. It was only natural, therefore, that following the accession of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos, the processes of religious affairs and of the law should be conducted by the same Ministry. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs was established. In spite of the great distances and wide deserts which separate Oman from the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, Oman was one of the first countries to embrace Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet, by acceptance rather than conquest, a faith to which it has staunchly held over the ensuing centuries. The Ministry provides some of the most important social and religious services, and endeavours to ensure justice for every citizen who has suffered injury to his person or his property, or in any of the rights guaranteed to him under the Islamic Shari'a Law or Royal Decrees. As far as social work is concerned, the Ministry provides religious services, spiritual guidance in the form of preachers and counsellors in the mosques, and the training of and appointment of Imams. In addition, it takes care of the properties of orphans and bequests left to them, investing them so that they produce the best possible growth and returns. It also collects the zakat and distributes it to those entitled to it, teaches the Holy Koran, and looks after the Waqf (plural Awqaf) properties. Zakat is a religious tax, originally representing 5 or 10 per cent of earnings from the land. Today, revenue from zakat go the Ministry, which organises zakat revenues and expenditure. The Ministry is divided into two main sections, namely Justice and Awqaf, and Islamic Affairs. Each section is headed by an Under-Secretary, who is responsible to the Minister for the running of his section, which has its own prerogatives and functions. Under the Justice section are the Shari'a Courts, of which there are 45 in Muscat and other principal towns in the wilayats. Each court has at least one judge (qadi), an assistant judge and his deputy, with a team of clerks responsible for documents and court records. In the Shari'a courts, each judge is responsible for hearing civil and criminal cases filed by citizens against each other, reaching judgements on and solutions to disputes, and how to settle them. The Court of Appeal, in Muscat, considers judgements by the Shari'a courts when appeals are lodged against them. At the highest level is the Complaints Committee to which there is recourse by those who are not satisfied by the judgements given at the two lower levels. Rulings given by the Complaints Committee are final. Studies at the Institute of Shari'a Jurisprudence, Counsel and Guidance, consist of two stages: students who have qualified for the Islamic Studies Preparatory Certificate, or at an equivalent level, undertake a general Shari'a course of three years length. Those completing this stage may then continue to the specialisation stage. Alternatively, they may be appointed to appropriate posts in the Shari'a courts or the Ministry. Students are accepted for specialisation in Shari'a jurisprudence if they have attained a minimum of 60% in the examination at the previous stage. After graduation, they are appointed as deputy judges or to appropriate posts at the courts or the Ministry. Students who wish to specialise in Counsel and Guidance are accepted for this if they have been successful in the final examination of the Shari'a studies stage. After graduation they are appointed to Counsel and Guidance posts as Imams and Preachers.

The Awqaf and Islamic Affairs section of the Ministry is responsible for:

(1) Spreading the teachings of the True Islamic Religion within the Sultanate through counsel, guidance and the various media, and setting up Islamic libraries;
(2) Taking part in Islamic activities abroad, through organisations, conferences and seminars, and exchanging visits with members of the Islamic community and brotherly Arab states;
(3) Making preparations for the Haj (pilgrim) season in coordination with the Saudi authorities and relevant local organisations;
(4) Establishing, restoring, maintaining and administering mosques;
(5) Organising zakat revenues and expenditure;
(6) Overseeing and maintaining all types of awqaf, and endeavouring to increase their revenues, develop them, and regulate their affairs;
(7) Taking charge of Bait Al Mal (Public Treasury) properties, and setting rules and regulations for maintaining them and developing their resources;
(8) Looking after and maintaining the property of orphans and bequests for them, implementing Shari'a court decisions related to these bequests, and the regulations dealing with them. The Holy Koran schools are the basic source for those wishing to absorb the teachings of the Holy Koran and learn the elements of reading and writing, especially in the more remote areas. These schools, of which there are currently more than 500 in the Sultanate, played an important role in training many generations before secular modern schools became widespread. Today they still play a vital role and attract numbers of boys and girls each year. The Ministry also operates summer holiday centres throughout the Sultanate for teaching the Holy Koran and to ensure that students from regular schools have access to Koranic studies when the schools are in recess. The Grand Mufti of Oman, His Eminence Sheikh Ahmed bin Hamad Al Khalili, has revealed a plan to set up an Islamic university in the Sultanate. He has said that once the final decision has been taken, and the university has become a reality, all the existing Islamic institutes in the country could be incorporated into it. [=]

36023. Montgomery, Lori. "In UN Treaty on Child Rights, Some See a Threat To Parents". In Seattle Times, June 8, 1995. p. A3. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, not yet ratified by Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Brunei, and Oman, is being criticized by some US Christians as giving children the right to sue their parents, to read pornography, to have homosexual sex and refuse to go to church. Federal officials reject this interpretation of the treaty, but many Christian groups, including Phyllis Schafly of the Eagle Forum, and Concerned Women for America, have lobbied their members to disseminate this interpretation of the treaty. The Childrens Defense Fund responds by stating that the treaty has been endorsed by Margaret Thatcher and the Vatican. Howard Davidson of the American Bar Association Center on Children & Law
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sees the fears of these groups as ‘preposterous’. [TXT]

36024. Teves, Oliver. "UN Panel To Tackle Abuse of Women Working Abroad; More and More Women Throughout Asia Have Been Leaving Their Own Countries To Find Work—and The United Nations Says They Are Also Finding Themselves Exploited and In Danger", in Seattle Times, May 28, 1996, p. A7. Working 20-hour days as a housemaid, without days off, a Filipina maid in Oman described how she had to keep scissors under her pillow to protect herself from the sexual advances of her employer's son; she finally was allowed to leave Oman by fabricating a story about a sick child in the Philippines. A panel of 50 UN experts convened in Manila to survey such stories of abuse of women overseas workers; how 50% of Asian overseas workers are women, up from 15% two decades ago. A decade ago, the majority of Philippine overseas workers were men working in construction, now 55% of the 5 million Filipinos working overseas are women. In the first five months of 1996, some 94136 Filipino workers encountered serious problems, compared to 40971 in all of 1995, reports the Kanlungan Center Foundation. Some 80% of all Sri Lankan expatriate workers are women, nearly all working as housemaids in the Middle East; at any given time, hundreds of these Sri Lankan maids are being harbored in Sri Lankan embassies after fleeing abuse from their employers. [TXT]

36025. United States House; House Committee on International Relations. Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Appendix: Prepared Statement by Terrence J. Brown, Deputy Asst. Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development: Tunisia and Oman. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia: Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995. p. 33. In recognition of Tunisia’s growing ability to manage its own development challenges, USAID will close its Tunisia Mission by 9/30/1995. Over the last 35 years, USAID assistance was instrumental in helping Tunisia reduce its population growth rate, train young people for leadership roles in the government and the private sector, and strengthen its economy through infrastructure and agriculture projects. The USAID Mission in Oman will close by 9/30/1996. USAID assistance has resulted in better trained Omani professionals. USAID has helped to improve urban water supply systems in Oman’s two major cities, which include one third of the Sultanate’s total population. We have also improved family planning programs. [=]

36026. Wikan, Unni. Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982. With her husband Fredrik Barth, the author was in Sohar, Oman, a town on the Batinah coast for six months in 3-8/1974 and 12/1975-1/1976. Sohar had a population of 15000, and was capital of a governorate with 22000 people. The Batinah coast has a distinctive culture, and an ethnic mix of Arabs, Baluch, Ajam (Persians) and Zidgalis (they have a language similar to kutchi, appear to come from Sind, but consider themselves to be Arabs); lower status people include the Bedouin and outcaste Zatut (traditionally smiths and performers, peddlers, and performing polluting functions such as circumcision of boys and girls), as well as ex-slaves. Her study dealt only with Arabs, since she could speak that language.

Sohar remains a small scale town of merchants, but few ships dock in the primitive port. Sohar has become a backwater. Sohar was the site of the first modern hospital in the region. Its modest importance is based on being near the largest valley of the Batinah coast, Wadi Jizzi, albeit a hot and dry valley (there is no rain for eight months a year). Water supplies are produced by a network of falaj (pl., aflaj) or qanats. The coast as whole has 150000 people. Sohar is also halfway between Muscat and Abu Dhabi or Dubai, and Sohar is well connected to these other cities by well maintained roads. Physically, Sohar mainly is in a small belt half a kilometer wide between sea and palm groves, and extends 3-4 kilometers along the coast. There is a small CBD with post office, municipality building, customs house, cafes and two gas stations; few women enter this part of town.

Segregation of the sexes is a basis of Sohari social reality; women are conspicuous absent from public places. However, the degree of sexual segregation that survives on the Batinah coast is unusual in the region (perhaps surviving in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia). Essentially all public space is the exclusive domain of men. The author derives her conception of the character of women and sexuality in Islamic society from Memissi’s Beyond the Veil (q.v.) and Nawal El-Saadawi’s Hidden Face of Eve (q.v.). The burqa, the face mask worn by women of the community, epitomizes female modesty and pride, and both conceals and enhances female beauty (unlike the more covering veils worn by Bedouin women).

The xaniths (“Transsexuals or Transvestities”) are conceptualized as a third gender, and are socially considered to be women (with gender assignment being a product not of anatomy but of behavior), although they are legally considered to be men. There are about 60 xaniths in Sohar who see themselves as women; many men were xaniths for a while and then became men again; xaniths appear in all ethnic groups and classes. Some xaniths are homosexuals; some are homosexual prostitutes (prostitution is seen as sinful but not unlawful), which is socially more acceptable than the possibility that a xanith can be bisexual; however, xaniths have easy social acceptability.
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38000. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 07: Respect For Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of the home provide a great deal of protection against arbitrary intrusions for most citizens and residents of Qatar. A warrant must normally be obtained before police may search a residence or business, except in cases involving national security or emergencies. However, warrants are issued by police officials themselves, rather than by judicial authorities. There were no reports of unauthorized searches of homes in 1993. The police and security forces are believed to monitor the communications of suspected criminals, those considered to be security risks, and selected foreigner. With prior permission, which is usually granted, Qatari citizens may marry foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits for their spouses. [=]

38001. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 11: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There are no restrictions on internal travel, except among sensitive military and oil installations. Generally, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel. However, Qatari men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by placing their names with immigration officers at ports of departure. Technically, Qatari women employed by the Government must obtain official permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known to what extent this regulation is enforced. All Qatari citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local labor pool. Foreigners who work in Qatar must have a sponsor (usually an employer) in order to enter the country. They must also obtain the sponsor’s permission to leave. The Government has no formal refugee policy. Those attempting to enter illegally including officials seeking to defect or to take refuge from nearby countries, are refused entry. Asylum seekers who can obtain local sponsorship or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they keep their employment. Foreign women married to Qatari are granted resident permits and may apply for Qatari citizenship. However, they are expected to give up their foreign citizenship in exchange. [=]

38002. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 14: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The activities of Qatari women are closely restricted both by law and by traditional customs. For example, Qatari women are prohibited from applying for drivers’ licenses unless they have permission from a male guardian. This restriction does not apply to non-Qatari women. Qatar adheres to Sharia’a law in matters of inheritance and child custody. While Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their husbands, non-Muslim wives do not, unless a special legacy is arranged. In cases of divorce, it is rare for wives to obtain custody of children and impossible if the father is Muslim and the wife is not. Women may attend court proceedings but are generally represented by a male relative. Qatari women are largely relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker, but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the news media. However, the number of professional women is too small to indicate whether they are receiving equal pay for equal work. Increasingly, Qatari women are receiving government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities overseas. Although Qatari women are legally able to travel abroad alone, traditions and social pressures cause most to travel with male escorts. Violence against women, primarily foreign domestic workers, occurs in Qatar but is not believed to be widespread. However, some foreign domestics working in Qatar (especially those from South Asia and the Philippines) have suffered severe mistreatment. In keeping with Islamic law all forms of physical abuse are illegal, and the maximum penalty for rape is death. The police actively investigate reports of violence against women. In 1992 and 1993, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest and punish offenders, both Qatari and non-Qatari. However most domestic worker victims do not press charges for fear of losing their jobs and being deported. The law is applied unevenly, with Qatari facing lighter punishment than foreigners. [=]

38003. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Great importance is placed upon children in Qatari society. The Government provides most medical care for free to all residents, including children. Qatari children and the children of expatriates employed by the Government are allowed to enroll in public schools without charge. [=]

38004. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Qatar: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Minor children between the ages of 15-18 may be employed with the approval of their parents or guardians. However, younger non-Qatari children sometimes work in small family-owned businesses. Education is compulsory through age 15. While the laws governing the minimum age for employment of children are not strictly enforced, child labor, either Qatari or foreign, is rare. Very young children, usually of African or south Asian background, have been employed as riders in camel racing. While little information is available on wages and working conditions for these children, accidents involving serious injury or death have been known to occur. [=]

38005. DS. "Qatar: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy without democratically elected institutions or political parties. It is ruled by an Amir from the Al Thani family. The 1970 Basic Law institutionalizes the customs and mores of the country’s conservative Islamic heritage. These include respect for the sanctity of private property, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and punishment of transgressions against Islamic law. The Amir holds absolute power, the exercise of which influenced by consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of any citizen to appeal...
because they fear the Government may cancel their residency permits. 

Increasingly, women are receiving equal pay for equal work. 

Censors renew the content of local newspapers, books, and other locally the roles of mother and homemaker, but some women are now finding to the privately owned press and the state-owned electronic media generally represented by a male relative. Women are largely relegated to 

sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Joint Committee Print. 

The activities of Qatari women are closely 

The freedoms of both speech and press are significantly restricted. 

The Government operates an efficient security apparatus. The civilian security apparatus, controlled by the Interior Ministry, is comprised of two sections: the police and the General Administration of Public Security and the Investigatory Police (Mubahhat) which is responsible for sections of residence cases. There have been reports of police officers in the Mubahhat physically abused suspects. There were no such reports in 1994. The armed forces have under their jurisdiction another enforcement organization, known as the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), which intercepts and arrests terrorists and monitors political dissidents. The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal natural resource, but the counts extensive natural gas resources are expected to play an increasingly important role. The rapid development of the 1970s and early 1980s created an economy in which expatriate workers, mostly South Asian and Arab, outnumber Qatari by a ratio of 4 to 1. The Government tries to reduce this ratio by offering many government jobs only to citizens. There was no significant change in the human rights situation in 1994. Human rights remain closely restricted. He main problems continued to include the denial of the right of citizens to change their government, arbitrary detentions in security cases, and restrictions on worker rights and the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. Women's rights are closely restricted, and non-Qatari workers face systematic discrimination. 

Foreign cable television service was introduced in 1993, but censors review broadcasts for objectionable material. There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructor at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship. 

DS. "Qatar: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. 

There are no restrictions on internal travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. Generally, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel. However, men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by placing their names with immigration officers at ports of departure. Technically, Qatari women employed by the Government must obtain official permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the Government may face restrictions in their right to travel abroad. All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the labor pool. Foreign workers must have a sponsor, usually their employer, to enter or depart the country. The Government has no formal refugee policy. Those attempting to enter illegally, including persons seeking to defect from nearby countries, are refused entry. Asylum seekers who can obtain local sponsorship or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are employed. Foreign women married to Qatari citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for Qatari citizenship. However, they are expected to relinquish their foreign citizenship. 

There is no pattern of societal abuse of children. 

There were no reports of unauthorized searches of homes in 1994. The police and security forces are believed to monitor the communications of suspected criminals, those considered to be security risks, and suspected foreigners. With prior permission, which is usually granted, Qatari may marry foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits for their spouses. 

The Government adheres to Shari’a law in matters of inheritance and child custody. While Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their husbands, non-Muslim wives do not, unless a special legacy is arranged. In cases of divorce, wives rarely obtain custody of children and never if the wife is not a Muslim. Women may attend court proceedings but are generally represented by a male relative. Women are largely relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker, but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the news media. However, the number of professional women is too small to determine whether they are receiving equal pay for equal work. Increasingly, women are receiving government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities overseas. Although women are legally able to travel abroad alone (see Section
2.d.), tradition and social pressures cause most to travel with male escorts. Violence against women, primarily foreign domestic workers, occurs but is not believed to be widespread. However, some foreign domestics, especially those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been severely mistreated by employers. In keeping with Islamic law, all forms of physical abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The police actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the last few years, the Government has demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders who are citizens usually receive lighter punishments than foreigners. Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for fear of losing their jobs. There is no independent women's rights organization, nor would the Government permit the establishment of one.

38011. DS. "Qatar: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Minors between the ages of 16-18 may be employed with the approval of their parents or guardians. However, younger non-Qatari children sometimes work in small family-owned businesses. Education is compulsory through age 16. While the laws governing the minimum age for employment of children are not strictly enforced, child labor, either Qatari or foreign, is rare. Very young children, usually of African or south Asian background, have been employed as riders in camel racing. While little information is available on wages and working conditions for these children, accidents involving serious injury or death have been known to occur. Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the employment of minors in jobs which are judged as dangerous to the health, safety or morals of minors. Employers must also obtain permission from the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
Saudi Arabia

40000. ------. "Enslaved in the Desert Kingdom", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), July 21, 1996, p. 7. A glaring indication of the parasitic nature of Saudi society is the fact that at least half of Saudi Arabia's total work force of about 8 million are "guest workers" from other countries. These contract workers come from Asia, Africa and other countries of the Middle East. They perform the most physically demanding and low-paying jobs, such as construction laborers and domestic workers. They are brutally exploited - and often treated by the Saudi employers as slaves. During and after the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states kicked out hundreds of thousands of Palestinian, Yemeni and other workers who were accused of sympathizing with Iraq. Today it is estimated that more than 60% of the 7.6 million guest workers in the Gulf states are from Asia. According to one report, over one million Filipinos work as contract laborers in Saudi Arabia. These workers come from poor countries, and the recruitment agencies lure them with promises of high-paying jobs in oil-rich Saudi Arabia. But upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, many workers find that they are victims of "contract substitution." The Saudi employers present them with contracts that call for lower pay and worse working conditions than what was promised by the recruitment agency. The workers have little choice but to accept the new terms, since they have already paid fees to the recruitment agency, and they are not allowed to work for anyone else but the employer holding the contract. According to a report by Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, "Many foreign laborers work extremely long hours. In particular, the domestic servants interviewed by the Minnesota Lawyers Committee all reported working seven days per week, sometimes 12-18 hours per day." Employers often delay payment of wages for weeks or months, and those who complain are quickly fired. Most women contract workers in Saudi Arabia work as maids. Because they work in the private confines of an employer's home, they are subject to the worst abuse - including beatings and rape. The Minnesota Lawyers Committee reports: "Domestic servants returning from Saudi Arabia routinely complain of being overworked, underpaid and undereat by their employers. They also complain of beatings and sexual harassment, adding that there is nowhere to turn to remedy their situation."

The Committee recounted the story of one worker: "One young woman worked as a domestic servant in Damman from 3/1990 until even performed Hajj! But the Saudi regime has repeatedly violated the sanctity of the Haramain and it cannot be put past them to have done so again in the case of Mrs. Tien as well. Megawati's other strong card is the fact that she is the daughter of the country's founding father, Sukarno. No hero himself but Sukarno's misdeeds have largely been forgotten over the 30-year period. Megawati rides on a wave of nostalgia, drawing upon people's sympathies. She would not be the first to do so. The region has several other examples where sympathy vote has gone to daughters/widows of slain or dead leaders. This trend started with Mrs. Bandranaike in Sri Lanka where she is now the president while her daughter rules the country as prime minister. In nearby Bangladesh, the widow of one slain leader has been replaced by the daughter of another. Even in the so-called largest democracy in the world - India - the Nehru name carried Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv to power for more than two decades. In neighboring Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto continues to enjoy the perks of office because of her family name. Megawati may be able to turn the tide in the huge archipelago. Suharto's sons are also there but they seem to be more interested in amassing fortunes. Indonesia may be entering a period of political turbulence now that Suharto's ill health has been confirmed by his trip to Germany. If Megawati's challenge becomes really serious and Suharto's health improves, the iron-fisted general may even knock her off. Nothing can be put past him. After all, he has the dubious distinction of killing a million people before. What is one more person, albeit a lady, added to this list?

40002. ------. "Saudi King Fahd's $5 Million Help Bosnian Children [Saudi aid to Bosnia in the last year is estimated at $150 million;
Women's Quarterly, n. 21, June 1, 1986. pp. 6-7. This article was written discouraged, more and more women's colleges have appeared within the

“Education: Women Only!: Saudi Arabia”, in Connexions. Because travelling abroad for educational purposes is now foreigners must work within the ‘kafil’ or guarantor system, which almost things were happening too fast, eroding the traditional values of the

press reports of crimes committed by foreigners are common; but husbands or brothers abroad to study. The conservative authorities felt many ways. Saudis both fear and victimize foreigners in their country; women and offering women matching scholarships if they followed their

accept non-Saudi Arab women very easily, finding them threatening in ten years ago when the government was encouraging the emancipation of strong sense of superiority vis-a-vis other Arabs. Saudi women do no The total separation of the sexes is being felt much more now than

time to develop sidelines in trade to supplement their income. Saudis have a level, however, there were still many openings for women professors.

new towns are remarkable; however, within blocks of skyscrapers there the field of education provides one of the major employment opportunities for non-Saudi  Arabs, Saudi urban development and women to find jobs in government schools--a critical problem because

funds for family planning assistance. [\=} to convince the authorities that the profession is not against the principles of strategic importance to the United States. The United States has an interest in encouraging and supporting the growth, development, and stability of a democratic, Western-oriented Turkey.

USAID STRATEGIC PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:

(1) BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH: The cash transfer provides balance-of-payments support as the Government of Turkey continues to implement a private-sector-oriented economic stabilization and reform program. The funds are used for the service of nonmilitary debt owed to the US Government or multilateral institutions. A small grant has been provided to the International Executive Service Corps to assist Turkish small businesses to establish joint ventures with US businesses.

(2) STABILIZING POPULATION GROWTH: Family planning assistance is provided to increase availability and effective use of modern methods of contraception, especially through access to more effective, long-lasting methods.

USAID PROGRAM RESULTS:

(1) BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH: The cash transfer freed up Turkey's resources that would otherwise be programmed for US non-military and World Bank debt repayment.

(2) STABILIZING POPULATION GROWTH: In family planning, good progress has occurred in clinical service delivery systems, voluntary sterilization, training, and social marketing of contraceptives.

OTHER FY 1995 USAID-MANAGED ACTIVITIES: None.

OTHER DONORS: In 1992, the top five major bilateral donors (Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan) provided a total of $391 million.

FY 1995 PROMOTING PEACE REQUEST: The Administration requests $100 million in Promoting Peace funds to continue the Turkish debt relief program, $5.5 million million in Sustainable Development funds for family planning assistance. =[

40003. -------. “US Executes The Weak, Says Amnesty International Leader” in the US death sentences are imposed disproportionately on the poor, minorities, the mentally ill, and those without adequate legal counsel with Haiti, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, the US executed children, with 34 now on death row”, in Seattle Times, October 28, 1994. p. A15. [TXT]


Turkey is a close, valued ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its location between Europe and the Middle East is of strategic importance to the United States. The United States has an interest in encouraging and supporting the growth, development, and stability of a democratic, Western-oriented Turkey.

Through the discovery of oil, American, British, and Dutch companies moved in and by the 1940s, Saudi Arabia was catapulted into the modern capitalist world. The royal family and Wahhabi religious revivalists tried to keep their country closed to decadent Western ways by limiting foreign penetration to the Eastern province, where the oil was located—an almost plausible concept since Saudi Arabia is a vast country with a population of barely a few million. But it has proved impossible for Saudi Arabia to jump from being the poorest country in the world to the richest without disrupting the old way of life.

Women in Saudi Arabia: I arrived in the Western Province of Saudi Arabia for the first time in 1975. I quickly found a Lebanese teacher of Arabic and began to carry out my research at the ARAMCO library. [ARAMCO is the Arab American Oil Company—the leading oil company in Saudi Arabia. With its great power and influence, it acts as a sort of state within a state.] I made friends with the local Saudi women, and thanks to them and their children, started to understand something about life in a small Saudi town where people were growing richer by the day—although their new wealth did not seem to change their social status.

Saudi women are allowed to work as they please provided they do not interact with men. In its attempt to emancipate women, Saudi Arabia does not wish to fall into the predicament of the West where women joining the workforce are placed in positions subservient to men and earn less salaries. In today’s Saudi Arabia, secretaries are all men, as is house help. Women are to be gradually integrated into the workforce as the society matures and becomes capable of digesting new values without forsaking the fundamental tenets of Islam.

Women are segregated from men in daily life. They are not allowed to sit in cafes or in some restaurants even when accompanied by their husbands. Dinner parties and weddings are segregated, and busses have a special section for women. In theory, women can set up any business they please if it is staffed by women and cater to women. They are financially independent and have their own banks. In selecting a job that may be considered non-traditional, women must be creative in order to convince the authorities that the profession is not against the principles of Islam.

Women Teaching Women: During my second stay in Saudi Arabia, which began in 1984 I found that it had become more difficult for women to find jobs in government schools—a critical problem because the field of education provides one of the major employment opportunities for women. Most of the positions were filled even though the requirements had become more stringent: a college education is now required where a high school diploma was once enough. At the college level, however, there were still many openings for women professors.

The total separation of the sexes is being felt much more now than ten years ago when the government was encouraging the emancipation of women and offering women matching scholarships if they followed their husbands or brothers abroad to study. The conservative authorities felt things were happening too fast, eroding the traditional values of the country. To counter this, the jurisdiction of women’s education was removed from the progressive Ministry of Education and placed under the Ministry of Religion.

Because travelling abroad for educational purposes is now discouraged, more and more women’s colleges have appeared within the
country. Some of them are independent entities: others are part of the existing men's universities, where women's sections are wedged in as separate schools—usually a carefully guarded building which is for the most part self-contained. Due to a lack of female professors, men often lecture in women's classes, but a new law has made it impossible for non-Muslims to teach in women's colleges or in grade schools (although this law is occasionally waived, especially in the case of foreign language courses). Courses at educational colleges and in some of the liberal arts are taught in Arabic. However, the schools of medicine, architecture and some of the liberal arts carry out their instruction in English because there are few Arab professors and literature in these fields is more readily available in English. Many of the teachers are not native speakers of English and often speak it poorly. With the new restriction on hiring only Muslim women for the women's colleges, the problem is further compounded, detracting from the general level of education. All of this encourages those who have the means and who speak English to seek an opportunity to study abroad in defiance of government policy.

In spite of such difficulties on the higher levels, the education offered in girls' grade schools is of a higher quality than in the boys' schools, at least in the urban areas. According to the new more conservative laws about the separation of the sexes, boys, with the exception of preschoolers, have to be taught by male teachers. It is hard to find male teachers on the elementary level, Saudi or non-Saudi. Elementary school teachers with the proper credentials are usually women and tend to be the ones willing to open private schools and exercise their creativity. This is probably due to the fact that education is one of the few fields open to women, whereas men have more lucrative fields of employment open to them in engineering and industry.

The education of women is carried out according to clearly spelled-out regulations. Every school follows the government syllabus, teaching a given lesson on a given day. Secondary education in particular is based on religious texts. Private schools often supplement this government curriculum with additional information, all of which has to be approved by the authorities. Approval is usually granted, provided that the school is able to defend its philosophy in accordance with Muslim law.

Working at the Women's Institute: When I returned in 1984, I had a job in the city of Al-Khobar as the language program coordinator at the Women's Institute—an organization comparable in some ways to a community college. It was set up by the local wealthy families as a non-profit, charitable educational organization catering to women's needs.

Women's institutes have long existed as social as well as intellectual centers in Saudi Arabia. Often they were organized and financed by the tribal aristocracy or by the merchant class of a town. In the 1960s and 70s they gained a modern dimension, fostered by the more progressive elements in the government. Their immediate aim is adult education for women, not necessarily in a vocational sense, but rather as a means to find enough teachers to staff the language school, and the programs that were written were approved by the authorities. I left the Institute feeling I had accomplished most of my goals and hoping that they would continue to be carried through. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505.]

Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [s]

40007. Al-Hazzaa, Abdulaziz Mohammed. Scenario Projections For Women In Saudi Arabia: Their Changing Status, Educational And Employment Opportunities By The Year 2010. Two Volumes. (educational Opportunities, Women's Status), University Of Minnesota. Dissertation. 414pp. AAC 9324660. [Advisor: Hopkins, Charles R.] The aim of this study is to develop scenario projections about the future roles of Saudi Arabian women by the year 2010. First, the study attempts to anticipate future changes on the conservative cultural attitudes toward women. Second, the study tries to project their future educational programs. Third, the study projects possible future employment opportunities for women. Finally, the study investigates possible government policies and legislation which are needed to encourage greater participation of women in the labor force. Two methods were applied for this research. The first step was to conduct Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) interviews with a panel of "experts." The aim of the interviews was to "elicit" three different scenarios regarding the future role of women: the "optimistic scenario," the "pessimistic scenario," and the "most probable scenario." The second step was the development of a questionnaire based on the information generated during the interview
process. Summaries from the interviews were sorted out in the form of 107 future trends in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered to a panel of 172 experts and they were asked to indicate the desirability and probability of each trend. The findings were reported by creating three different scenarios: the "most probable scenario," the "even chance scenario," and the "least probable scenario." In terms of socioeconomic and cultural changes, the projections call for more changes than persistence. Employment projections call for greater participation of women, especially in the fields of education, health, social and cultural affairs. Although access to education and employment will increase the status of Saudi women outside the family, it will not offer much change in their status at the family level. Their position will be trapped with the struggle over preserving the authenticity of culture. In terms of educational future, even though women will become the majority in the Saudi schools and universities by the projection period, they will lack the educational opportunities in the fields of science and technology. Finally, the government is not expected to issue any radical legislation to improve the general position of women. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts]

40008. Altorki, Soraya; Altorki, Soraya [editor]; El-Sohi, Camilla Fawzi [editor]. Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your Own Society: Part 3: At Home in The Field. Modern Arab Studies. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. pp. 49-68. Although returning to her own society in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia made it possible to start work very quickly, there were other problems that required resolution. Being a woman of Saudi ethnic origin gave her immediate access to Saudi domestic life, an area of study quite remote for researchers of other origins. However, being an unmarried woman did impose constraints on the research she could undertake. Yet the very conduct of her research was troubling to her informants: why was she unmarried, why was she pursuing a career, and why was she living abroad?

In anthropology there is a curious correspondence between the Western folklore about the status of women in an Arab society and the findings in the fieldwork by foreign, non-Arab researchers: this is not the product of genuine research, but rather is a product of the isolation from and the separation from Arab society by their foreign observers. For many such observers, the purpose of their fieldwork is simply to reinforce their cultural prejudices and embroider their prejudices with colorful anecdotes about the Muslim natives. This inability to perceive the social realities in Arab culture results from the paradox that while women are denied access to much information in their societies, the central decision-making role women have in marriage selections (a role concealed by the form of women being an object in the marriage trade) is characterized by the very large informal role women play in Arab societies. There remains a role for both insiders and outsiders in the study of societies.

40009. Amnesty International. Press Release: Saudi Arabia: Women Detained For Driving Cars. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [1991] Forty-nine women who participated in a demonstration in protest at the country's traditional prohibition against women driving cars were detained in Riyadh on 11/6/1990. They were held for some hours, but were later released the same day. During the demonstration dozens of women drove cars in convoy along a main thoroughfare in Riyadh. Salih al-'Azzaz, a prominent writer and journalist, was also arrested on suspicion of being one of the organizers of the demonstration. He was reportedly taking photographs of the demonstration at the time of his arrest. In late December, he was reportedly still held incommunicado at the General Intelligence Headquarters in Riyadh, where he was believed to be at risk of torture. Amnesty International considers him a prisoner of conscience and has called for his immediate and unconditional release. A week after the demonstration the ban on female drivers was formally made law. The law states that anyone violating the prohibition for women to drive is liable to an unspecified deterrent punishment. [=]

40010. Banerjee, Chandra. "Desperately Poor, India Parents Send Children Off to Beg; Without Hope, Some Families Have Tried to Make a Living By Selling Their Children To Beggar Traffickers", in Seattle Times, January 22, 1997, p. A7. Impoverished Indians in West Bengal have been selling their children, in particular burned or deformed girls, to beggar traffickers. The beggars were then shipped to Saudi Arabia and other countries where they were worked for handouts. Disabled children are especially prized, since Muslims are very generous during pilgrimage and the children can collect substantial sums. This obscure practice has come to light with the deportation of 76 such Indian girls last week. One trafficker noted that a $3000 investment in children could be double in three months. Such investors included local government officials, schoolteachers and local politicians. [TEXT]

40011. Brooks, Geraldine. "Diplomat Status Shielded a Saudi Prince: Servants Alleged Abuse But a US Court Tossed Out Case", in Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1994. p. A12. [TEXT] Prince Saad, 76, living in Houston, is alleged to have paid slave wages to servants, even as he paid $500 a night for prostitutes. The female servants report being held as prisoners, being beaten, and being forced to eat table scraps. Finally, they succeeded in escaping, and after six months in hiding, finally brought suit against the Prince. Although not a diplomat, the Prince and his activities were deemed to have diplomatic immunity. Indeed, under an opinion supporting summary judgement, the court ruled that the enslavement of the domestic servants was appropriate to avoid visa problems. The Judge went on to argue that since the beatings of the servants took place in the Hotel Ritz, that there was no reason to override the presumed diplomatic immunity of the Prince.


Political Propaganda: None Reported. [-]


H.R.H. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Activities: Registrant was responsible for public relations and media relations for the foreign principal in connection with his special mission on behalf of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and his subsequent fundraising efforts as Special Envoy of UNICEF. Registrant's activities included arranging luncheons, dinners, tours of various children's hospitals and other events.

Finances: $270000 for the four month period ending 11/10/1982.
Political Propaganda: None Reported. [-]


UNICEF - special envoy Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia (c/o Gray Co.)
Activities: Registrant distributed news articles prepared by the principal to US newspapers.

Finances: $5625 for the 12 month period ending 10/12/1982.
Political Propaganda: None Reported. [-]

40017. DPR. “General Assembly Resumes Consideration of the Question of Palestine”, in Division of Palestinian Rights, April 1989. On 4/19/1989, the General Assembly resumed consideration of the question of Palestine at the request of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of the Arab Group. The debate began with a statement by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the text of which reads as follows:

"Today the Assembly is meeting once again at the request of the members of the Group of Arab States to discuss the dangerous situation that prevails in the occupied Palestinian territories. That situation is deteriorating day by day because of the stepped-up repression being exercised by the Israeli forces against the Palestinians, who are resolutely pursuing their heroic resistance to the occupation, a resistance that is now entering into its sixteenth month. Notwithstanding the indignant protests voiced by the international community, Israel, the occupying Power, continues to ignore the resolutions with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories that the Security Council has adopted since the beginning of the intifadah, in particular resolutions 605 (1987), 607 (1988) and, 608 (1988) and the statement by the President of the Security Council of 8/26/1988. Moreover, Israel refuses to respect any of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning Jerusalem, the unlawfulness of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the deportation of Palestinian civilians, the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the violation of human rights and the right to return of the people displaced in 1967. We note with regret that since the suspension of the forty-third session of the General Assembly - one that was characterized by many historic events, including, inter alia, the first anniversary of the intifadah, the proclamation of an independent Palestinian State, the peace initiative of His Excellency Chairman Yasser Arafat and the commitment by the vast majority of Member States to a peaceful and negotiated settlement - the repression in the occupied Palestinian territories has not lessened but has, on the contrary, become increasingly brutal, with a daily toll of dead and seriously wounded and massive destruction. I should like to submit to the Assembly a few details about the latest tragic events that have occurred in the occupied territories. These details have already been brought to the urgent attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in five letters addressed to them on behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People since the beginning of 1989. On 1/5/1989 the Acting Chairman of the Committee indicated that 12/1988 was being referred to by members of the Israeli Parliament as "Black December. During the course of that month Israeli soldiers killed 31 Palestinians and wounded more than 400 others. In my letter of 25 1/1989 I pointed out that the Israeli Minister of Defence [Yitzhak Rabin] had announced "tough new measures" against Palestinians accused of throwing stones in the occupied territories. The measures included, inter alia, allowing a greater number of soldiers to fire on demonstrators and to seal or destroy homes. During the month of 1/1989 more than 30 Palestinians, mostly young people, were shot and killed. On 3 March I informed the Secretary-General that 22 Palestinians had been killed during the month of February, including 8 children under 15 years of age, and that more than 250 had been wounded. I also noted that unidentified explosive devices had killed or wounded a number of Palestinian children. On 3 April I pointed out that in the prior month repression by Israeli armed forces had caused the death of at least 23 Palestinians, including a four-year-old child, and that more than 350 Palestinians had been wounded. In my last letter, dated 14 April, I drew the attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council to the escalation of violence by the Israeli military as well as Israeli settlers. In the course of a raid on 13 April against the village of Nahhalin, at least five Palestinians were killed and 25 others wounded by members of the Israeli border police, accompanied by settlers. That incident has aroused the serious concern of the international community and has led to statements of protest by the United Nation- Secretary-General, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International. The New York Time of 4/18/1989 - yesterday - reported that six more Palestinian had been killed in a single day in the occupied territories. Those most recent victims bring to at least 560 the number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli army since the beginning of the intifadah. On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to voice a vigorous protest against the escalation of blind oppression that Israel, the occupying Power, is inflicting upon the Palestinian in the occupied territories and, in particular, against the increasingly frequent participation of armed Israeli settlers in such repression. The Committee believes that the international community has a duty to redouble its efforts to guarantee the protection of the Palestinians subject to the occupation and to bring about Israel’s withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories in accordance With the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 8/12/1949 and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. (A/45/PV.92). [-]

40018. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 01: Introduction”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, February 1984. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without democratically elected institutions or political parties. It is ruled by descendants of its founder, Ring Abdulaziz Al Saud, known in the West as Ibn Saud, who unified the country in the early part of the 20th century. The concept of separation of religion and state is foreign to Saudi society and governance. The legitimacy of the royal regime depends on a large degree on its perceived adherence to the precepts of a puritanically conservative form of Islam. There is no written constitution. The legal system is based on Islamic religious law. Traditional practice calls for consensus in government, internal social cohesion respect for private property, and private economic enterprise. Since the death of King Abdulaziz, the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons who themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. Legislative changes announced in 3/1992 however, granted the King the exclusive power to name the Crown Prince. They also called for establishment of an appointed Consultative Council (Majlis Ashhura) and for similar provincial assemblies. A 60-member Council has been
formed and was formally inaugurated on December 29. Political parties are not permitted in Saudi Arabia. Political expression that is unfavorable to the regime is forbidden. There are no elected assemblies. Police and border forces under the Interior Ministry are responsible for internal security. Security personnel committed human rights abuses during the year. Massive oil revenues have transformed Saudi Arabia's centuries-old pastoral, agricultural, and commercial economy. Agriculture accounted for about 5% of the GDP. Domestic transformation has been marked by rapid urbanization, large-scale development of economic and social infrastructure, the emergence of a welfare state and technocratic middle class, and the importation of millions of foreign worker for skilled and menial labor. It has also been marked by widespread expenditure of public funds in ways that improved the quality of life for most Saudis but have also enriched members of the royal family and their associates. With some important exceptions, mainly the hydrocarbon sector which accounted for one-third of the GNP and three-fourths of the Government budget, the economy remains largely in private hands. Human rights continued to be pervasively abused. Principal human rights problems include torture and other abuse of prisoners and incommunicado detention; prohibitions on or severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech and press, peaceful assembly and association and religion; the denial of the right of citizens to change their government; and systematic discrimination against women and other religious minorities and suppression of workers' rights. The Mutawwa'in, Saudi Arabia’s official proctors of proper moral behavior, and other religious zealots acting as vigilantes continued to harass and abuse Saudis and foreigners of both sexes. [\textsuperscript{[\textvisiblespace]}]

40019. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 06: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The judicial system is based on Islamic jurisprudence (the Shari'a). Regular Shari'a courts exercise jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. In Saudi courts, the defendant appears before a judge who determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards and, if warranted, imposes sentence. Although Saudi law requires that trials be public, almost all trials are closed and are held without legal counsel present. The advice of lawyers is available before trial, and lawyers may act as court interpreters for those unfamiliar with Arabic. However, trials occur in which the defendant does not understand Arabic and does not have a translator. Sentencing is not uniform and may vary according to the nationality of the defendant. Iraqi refugees and third-country nationals regularly receive longer sentences for the same offense than do Saudi citizens. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review. Appeals against judges' decisions are automatically reviewed by the Justice Ministry or, in more serious cases, by the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Judicial Council to ensure that court procedures were correct and that judges applied appropriate legal principle and punishments. Cases involving capital punishment must also be reviewed by the King. The Shi'a community is permitted to adjudicate exclusively non-criminal intra-Shi'a disputes according to their own legal tradition. Although the independence of the judiciary is prescribed by law, jurists are nevertheless aware of, and reportedly have on occasion acceded to, the power and influence of royal family members and their associates. At the provincial level, governors have reportedly threatened, and even detained, judges with whom they disagreed. In one reported case, for example, a domestic servant from another country was raped repeatedly by her employer, who videotaped and photographed the act. Despite the graphic evidence, the employer, a prominent doctor, was not prosecuted because of his connections with government officials. The servant was charged with prostitution and deported. Members of the royal family and of other powerful families are not subject to the same legal constraints as other Saudis. Judges do not for example, have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family. The Justice Ministry is responsible for the appointment, transfer, and promotion of judges. Judges may be disciplined or removed only by the Supreme Judicial Council, a Body of Senior Jurists, or by royal decree. The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed personnel and civilian government employees charged with violations of military law. Court-martial decisions are reviewed by the Ministry of Defense & Aviation and the King. Under Shari'a law as applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes directed against Muslims receive harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of accidental death, the amount of indemnity or blood money paid to relatives varies with the religion and sex of the victim. The number of political prisoners being held at year's end was unknown owing to the Government's policy of not providing data or responding to inquiries about such persons, conducting closed trials, and detaining persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation. [\textsuperscript{[\textvisiblespace]}]

40020. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 07: Respect For Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The sanctity of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most fundamental of Islamic precepts and legislative changes announced in 3/1992 included provisions for the Government to maintain the sanctity of the home from unlawful intrusions. However, Saudi religious police (Mutawwa'in) continued to enter homes to search for evidence of un-Islamic behavior and to harass and abuse perceived transgressors. Saudi police must generally demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain permission from the provincial Governor before searching a private home, but warrants are not required. Saudi customs officials routinely open mail coming into the Kingdom to look for forbidden items, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim religious material. Informants are reliable reported to be regularly used for internal security matters. Most social and Islamic religious norms and strictures affecting personal life are matters of law and are enforced by the Government. Saudi women may not marry non-Saudis without government permission, which is rarely given. According to Islamic strictures, Saudi women are prohibited from marrying any non-Muslim, while Saudi men may marry Christians and Jews. Saudi men must obtain approval to marry women originally from countries other than the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). During Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting and abstinence, the prohibition against public eating, drinking, or smoking during daylight hours is enforced on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Prohibitions against alcohol and pork products, and material deemed pornographic are strictly enforced and apply as well to foreign residents. Both Saudis and foreigners were targets of harassment by members of the Mutawwa'in or by religious zealots acting as vigilantes. The Mutawwa'in sought to enforce their power and influence of royal family members and their associates. At the provincial level, governors have reportedly threatened, and even detained, judges with whom they disagreed. In one reported case, for example, a domestic servant from another country was raped repeatedly by her employer, who videotaped and photographed the act. Despite the graphic evidence, the employer, a prominent doctor, was not prosecuted because of his connections with government officials. The servant was charged with prostitution and deported. Members of the royal family and of other powerful families are not subject to the same legal constraints as other Saudis. Judges do not for example, have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family. The Justice Ministry is responsible for the appointment, transfer, and promotion of judges. Judges may be disciplined or removed only by the Supreme Judicial Council, a Body of Senior Jurists, or by royal decree. The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed personnel and civilian government employees charged with violations of military law. Court-martial decisions are reviewed by the Ministry of Defense & Aviation and the King. Under Shari'a law as applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes directed against Muslims receive harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of accidental death, the amount of indemnity or blood money paid to relatives varies with the religion and sex of the victim. The number of political prisoners being held at year's end was unknown owing to the Government's policy of not providing data or responding to inquiries about such persons, conducting closed trials, and detaining persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation. [\textsuperscript{[\textvisiblespace]}]

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sensitive subjects, such as crime or terrorism, is often published only members of the audience. US and British officials formally protested the Mutawwa'in action by claiming there was credible evidence of transgressions of Saudi law involving alcohol or drugs. Government reforms announced in July created a Ministry of Islamic Affairs; the Mutawwa'in have been incorporated into this Ministry and will be under its supervision. [=]

40021. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 08: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (a) Freedom of Speech and Press", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Freedom of speech and press is severely limited by law (Article 39 of the Basic Law) and in practice. Criticism of Islam, the ruling family, or the Government is not allowed. The potential presence of informers renders criticism of the regime rare. In May a group of six Saudis, including some signers of earlier petitions, announced the formation of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). Although the organizers described their group as a human rights organization, they also expressed concern that the Government was not adhering closely enough to Islamic precepts. When the CDLR criticized the Government in the international press, several of its members, including the son of one of the founding members, Mohamed Bin Abdullah Al-Masari, were detained. The Government dismissed all six of the CDLR founders from their government jobs. The CDLR was denounced by the Senior Council of Ulema for overstepping the bounds of legitimate Islamic behavior and expression. One of the six signers withdrew from the Committee. In August a group of 38 professors was detained for a period of several weeks because of their public efforts to obtain the release of Al-Masari. He was released from custody in November. Since 1991 criticism of media tapes and petitions signed by dozens of religious figures calling for closer government adherence to Islam have been circulated widely through informal channels. King Fahd, in a public speech in 12/1992 stressed the right of all Saudis to approach senior officials directly to offer advice but criticized the authors of the petitions for what he called their improper use of the pulpit. The press is privately owned. It is effectively controlled by a 1982 media policy statement and a 1965 national security law which expressly prohibits the dissemination of public criticism of the Government in any print or broadcast medium. The media policy statement enjoins the press to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of Saudi Arabia. Editors in chief are appointed with the explicit approval of the Ministry of Information, and the Government has the power to have them removed. Newspapers receive guidelines issued by the Information Ministry on governmentpositions on sensitive issues, and the government-owned Saudi Press Agency (SPA) expresses the official viewpoint on such issues. In 1993 a newspaper editor was fired and later reinstated for an editorial lauding the King's position on opposing Islamic extremism. The editorial was said to be too strident in its criticism of Islamic extremism. The editor in chief of another newspaper was transferred to another position, and one of his editors was deported because of a comic strip to which religious authorities objected. Domestic news concerning sensitive subjects, such as crime or terrorism, is often published only after the perpetrators have been arrested, convicted, and sentenced. Most foreign news that does not directly concern Saudi Arabia is presented objectively. Foreign press access to Saudi Arabia is tightly restricted. Saudi television and radio are state owned and operated. Foreign programs and songs are heavily censored, with references to politics, religions other than Islam pork or pigs, alcohol or sexual innuendo removed. In 1993 a television producer was fired for allowing a scene to be shown on Saudi television in which a man kissed a woman on the cheek.

Although foreign news is generally presented on television and radio in an objective manner, news about subjects affecting Saudi Arabia is tightly controlled, and conflicting viewpoints are usually not offered. There are an estimated 100000-200000 private satellite dishes operating in the Kingdom which receive foreign broadcast. Despite widespread installation of satellite dishes, the status of these devices remains ambiguous. Importation and sale of the dishes were resumed after their prohibition in the summer of 1992 at the behest of religious leaders who objected to television programming available on satellite channels. Mutawwa'in were reported to have damaged satellite dishes on private residencies with air rifles and sling shots to prevent their use. Foreign publications circulate but may be censored for materials deemed immoral or critical of Saudi policies and actions. Entire publications are sometimes withheld from distribution. In 1993 the issues of the International Herald Tribune containing articles from US newspapers critical of the Saudi Government's economic policies as well as issues of another newspaper that discussed the articles, were not distributed in Saudi Arabia. Academic freedom is also constrained; for example, the study of evolution, Freud, Marx, and Western philosophy is proscribed. Some professors believe that classroom comments that could be taken as antiregime will be reported to the authorities. There continues to be an injunction against the study of music in educational institutions through the university level. There are, however, some private organizations for the study of Western classical music. Artistic activities in schools and universities and in society in general continue to be luted and subjected to arbitrary closure. There are a few private art galleries, principally in Jeddah and Dhahran. Abstract and representational artists as well as photographers in general are allowed to work. However, in 1993 an exhibit of photographs prepared by a Saudi woman and sponsored by the French Embassy was closed hours before the opening, allegedly because the invitation card depicted the image of a woman, although she was completely veiled. Cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, other than those that are strictly folklore, are prohibited. [=]

40022. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 09: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (b) Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. These rights are strictly limited. The Government prohibits public demonstrations as a means of political expression or presenting grievances. Tribal, familiar, and economic interest groups informally aggregate public opinion, which their leaders express to high officials. Political parties are prohibited, but nonpolitical clubs and professional groups may be organized with the permission of the authorities. The few existing professional groups are permitted to maintain contacts with their recognized international counterparts. Public meetings are segregated by sex. Foreign members of groups seeking to hold unsegregated meetings risk arrest, incarceration, and deportation unless these meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions. A children's winter concert at the Yantai International School attended by 200 people was raided by four Mutawwa'in and two policemen. The intruders grabbed children performing in the concert and pulled them from the stage. The Mutawwa'in tried to confiscate cameras and video equipment from members of the audience. US and British officials formally protested the
matter with senior Saudi officials, who reported that the incident was being Riven high-level attention and that an official investigation was being conducted. The officials gave assurances that the matter was taken very seriously by the Government and that such an incident would not recur. On December 30, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a diplomatic note stated that the Government neither approves nor agrees with this behavior by members of the (Mutawwa’in) organization and that the necessary measures have been taken to ensure that what they have done will not be repeated in the future. [–]

40023. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 12: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Citizens cannot change their government peacefully. There are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few Saudi citizens have a voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The King rules the country in matters civil and religious, within limits established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders. The King's legitimacy is based upon his adherence to the tenets of Islam, his descent, his selection by consensus of the royal family, his ability to govern, and his perceived concern for the welfare of the nation. The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in turn appoint subordinate officials with Cabinet concurrence. Ministers may retire only with the King's permission. In August the King announced that Cabinet ministers would have 4-year terms, with the possibility of reappointment. In 1992 King Fahd announced the formation of a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, which is to be an advisory body to the King and the Council of Ministers. In August the King announced a constitution for the Majlis Ash-Shura and the names of the 60 Majlis Ash-Shura members. The Majlis was formally inaugurated on December 29. In September the King announced rules and regulations for the provincial assemblies and their memberships. There are no regularly elected officials in Saudi Arabia. Political parties are not permitted, but there are no publicly organized opposition groups. Traditionally, public opinion has been expressed through client-patron relationships and affinity groups such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. The open-door audience (majlis) remains the primary forum for expression of opinion or grievance. Any male citizen or male foreign national may attend these sessions held by the King princes, or important national and local officials. Occasionally, women without male relatives present petitions in some majlis sessions. Since the assassination of King Faisal in 1976, Saudi kings have reduced the frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Access to King Fahd, to whom decisions even on some apparently minor matters are referred, is considered by ordinary Saudis to be quite difficult, in part due to strict security measures. Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic delay or insensitivity, requests for redress or assistance, and criticism of particular acts of government affecting personal or family welfare. Broader “political concerns”—Saudi social, economic, or foreign policy—are raised only occasionally. As governmental functions have become increasingly complex, time consuming, and centralized in Riyadh direct public access to senior officials has become more difficult. Either the King or the Crown Prince meets with Sunni religious officials at least once a week. This institutionalized but indirect means of ascertaining public opinion through consultation falls short of internationally accepted democratic practice. Participation by women in the process is severely restricted, although there are reports that women may seek redress through female members of the royal family. [–]
from the vast majority of occupations. Free, but segregated, education through the university level is available to Saudi women. Women constitute 55% of all university graduates but are excluded from studying certain subjects such as engineering, journalism, and architecture. Saudi men are able to study overseas; Saudi women generally can do so only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative. Despite the high percentage of university graduates, women make up only 5% of the workforce. Most employment opportunities are in the field of education, with some available in health care and a relative few in business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Women wishing to enter nontraditional fields are subject to arbitrary discrimination. In August the Ministry of Commerce announced that it had stopped issuing licenses to women and students who wished to undertake maintenance, contracting or janitorial services. When asked for clarification, a Ministry official said the ban would be temporary. [\*=]

40025. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government provides all Saudi children with free education and medical care. Reports of societal abuse directed against children are rare except for the practice of female circumcision which is thought to persist among African nationals, especially in the southwestern Tihama region. [\*=]

40026. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 21: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (c) Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Forced labor has been prohibited since 1962 by a royal decree that abolished slavery, and Saudi ratification of ILO Conventions 29 and 105 have the force of law. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia continues to perpetuate the master-slave relationship remain; a great number of former slaves chose to remain in the princely households where many now enjoy a quasi-familial status as household supernumeraries. Additionally, since employers generally exercise control over the movements of foreign employees, situations that could be described as forced labor can occur, especially in remote areas where workers are unable to leave their place of employment. Diplomats desiring to visit work sites to check on the welfare and conditions of citizens of their countries were sometimes denied access. There also have been reports that female domestic workers sometimes have been prevented from leaving the homes of their employers and forced to work 12-16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Maids who run away from their employers are often returned to the employers by Saudi authorities against the maids wishes. In addition, there have been reports of workers whose employers refused to pay several months or even years of accumulated salary or other promised benefits. Domestic workers, i.e., maids and family drivers, are not covered under Saudi labor law. However, nondomestic workers have recourse to the labor courts. Foreign workers have reported, however, considerable difficulty in attempting to enforce their rights under Saudi law. [\=]

40027. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia: Part 22: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-operated businesses or in other situations that are construed as extensions of the household, e.g, farmers, herdsmen, and domestic servants, since they are not covered by Saudi Arabia's labor regulations. In other cases the labor regulations provide for a minimum age of 13, which may be waived by the Labor Ministry with the consent of the juvenile's guardian. Children aged 13-18 are prohibited from working more than 6 hours per day. Children under age 18 and women may not be employed in hazardous or harmful conditions. The Ministry of Labor has employed power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity charged with enforcing the minimum age for employment of children, the Justice Ministry has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. [\=]
Government's legitimacy is based on its adherence to the Shari'a and upon the consent of the governed, who are obliged to obey the ruler as long as he continues to govern according to Islamic law. [40029. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (f) Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995.]

Saudi Arabia is a strictly religious state, with the government enforcing religious law and morality. Women are subjected to strict social segregation, with women-only areas and segregated events. While there are some health clubs for women in the United States, health clubs for Saudi women are closed to non-Muslims, and women's rights organizations have been closed recently.

The Mutawwa'in, a religious police force, has been involved in the closure of commercial establishments during the daily prayer measures. They have arrested and deported women for expressing opinions or gathering in segregated areas. The authorities monitor any large gatherings, and public access to senior officials has become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized.

The Government provides all children with free education and medical care. Children are subject to strict social segregation. Boys and girls are segregated in social situations at age 7. Boys are segregated by sex in schools starting at age 7. Girls are usually expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups. Women seek redress through female members of the royal family. Governmental functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized.

40031. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The King rules in matters of civil and religious, within certain limitations established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.

The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as first deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in turn appoint subordinate officials with Cabinet concurrence. In 1993 the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura.

Women's rights in Saudi Arabia are severely limited. Women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, and many women have been closed to non-Muslims. Women's rights organizations have been closed recently. The authorities monitor any large gatherings featuring a fashion show and dancing as not an appropriate activity for women. [40032. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995.]

Citizens may not marry non-Saudis without government permission. Although women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, and women have the right to marry Christians and Jews. Men must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Both citizens and foreigners were targets of harassment by members of the Mutawa'ain—and even by religious vigilantes acting independently of the Mutawa'ain.

The Government has not condemned the actions of religious vigilantes or sought to disband such groups. The Mutawa'ain continued to press for enforcement of their strict standards of social behavior, including the closure of commercial establishments during the daily prayer observances, appropriate dress in public, and avoidance of video tape rental shops. They harassed Saudi and foreign women for failure to observe strict dress codes, and for being in the company of males who are not their close relatives. They also harassed non-Muslims attempting to conduct religious services (see Section 2.c.). [40033. DS. "Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995.]

Women in Saudi Arabia are subjected to strict social segregation, with women-only areas and segregated events. Women's rights organizations have been closed recently. The authorities monitor any large gatherings, and public access to senior officials has become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized.

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Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. By religious law and social custom, women have few political and social rights, and are not treated as equal members of society. Women, including foreigners, may not legally drive motor vehicles or ride bicycles and are restricted in their use of public facilities when men are present. Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in specially designated sections. Women risk arrest by the Mutawwa’in for riding alone in a vehicle driven by a male who is not an employee or a close male relative. By law and custom, women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see Section 2.d.). In public women are required to wear the abaya, a black garment covering the entire body, including the head and face. The Mutawwa’in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than Western women; nonetheless, in recent years they have increased pressure on Western women to wear the abaya and cover their hair. Women are also subject to discrimination in Islamic law which stipulates that daughter receive half the inheritance awarded to their brothers—reflecting the fact that men have financial obligations to their mothers and sisters. In a Shari’a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two women. Although Islamic law permits polygyny, it is becoming less common. Islamic law limits a husband to four wives, provided that he treats each wife equally. In practice such equality is left to the discretion of the husband. Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but men may divorce without giving cause. If divorced or widowed, a woman normally may keep her children until they attain the age of 7. Children over 7 are awarded to the divorced husband. Divorced women who are foreigners are often prevented by their former husbands from visiting their children after divorce.

Women have access to free, but segregated, education through the university level. They constitute 56% of all university graduates—but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering, journalism, and architecture. Men are able to study overseas; women may do so if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative. Women make up only 6% of the workforce. Most employment opportunities for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in business philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Women wishing to enter nontraditional fields are subject to arbitrary discrimination. Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if they are required to live apart from their families. All workplaces where women are present are supposed to be screened by sex. Contact with male supervisors or clients is allowed only by telephone or facsimile machine. Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. ‘Islamic advice’ columns in the press sometimes recommend the strict disciplining of women, an expression understood to encompass some degree of physical force as part of a proper marriage.

There were credible reports that some Western women married to Saudis, and their children, have suffered physical abuse from the spouse or father. Appropriate embassy officials must seek the assistance of government officials to intervene in such cases. The Government does not keep statistics on spousal or other forms of violence against women. Embassies receive many reports that employers abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. In general, the Government considers such cases as family matters and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress in the courts due to the court’s strict evidentiary rules and the women’s own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious associations to which these women could turn for assistance. [=]

40034. DS. “Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (c) Prohibition of Force or Compulsory Labor”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Forced labor has been prohibited since 1962 by the royal decree that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor, has the force of law. However, employers have significant control over the movements of foreign employees, giving rise to situations that might involve forced labor—especially in remote areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work. Sometimes sponsors prefer foreign workers from obtaining exit visas to pressure them to sign a new work contract. In another pressure tactic, sponsors may refuse to provide foreign workers with a “letter of no objection” which would allow them to be employed by another sponsor. The labor laws do not protect domestic servants. There were credible reports that female domestic servants were sometimes forced to work 12-16 hours a day, 7 days a week. There were numerous confirmed reports of runway maids. The authorities often returned runaway maids to their employers against the maids’ wish. There have been many reports of workers whose employers have refused to pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other promised bene its. Nondomestic workers with such grievances have the right to complain before the labor courts, but few do so because of fear of deportation. The Government abets the exploitation of foreign workers because the system for enforcing work contracts is weak and generally favors Saudi employers. [=]

40035. DS. “Saudi Arabia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The minimum age for employment is 13 years, which may be waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of the juvenile’s guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-operated businesses or in other situations that are construed as extensions of the household, e.g., farmers, herdsman, and domestic servants. Workers in such fields are not pected by labor regulations. There were reports that children aged 5-12 years are used a jockeys in camel racing. Children under age 18 and women may not be employed in hazardous or harmful industries, such as mines or industries employing power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity charged with enforcing the minimum age for employment of children, the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. [=]

40036. Dewaidi, Ali Mohammed Jameel. Selected Factors Influencing Saudi Arabian Student Teachers’ Attitude Toward Classroom Educational Media And Technology Utilization. Boston University. Dissertation. 306pp. AAC 9308137. [Advisor: Kelley, Gaylen B.] Problem. The purpose of this study was to investigate the interrelationship between selected demographic and attitudinal factors which may influence the utilization of educational media and technology (EM&T). The study focused on (1) gender difference in frequency of utilization, (2) gender difference in attitude, (3) relationship between student teachers attitude and the frequency of utilization, (4) correlation between student teachers attitude and the perception with regard to academic field of specialization, availability of media, ability to access a media specialist, administrative and peer support and classroom physical set up and arrangement. Procedure. A questionnaire was designed, tested and used to collect data from 282 student teachers. The study used the methodology of a descriptive survey approach. Findings. (1) There was no significant gender difference in frequency of EM&T utilization. (2) There was no significant gender difference in attitude toward EM&T. (3) Significant correlation was found between student teachers attitude toward the utilization of EM&T and the frequency of their utilization of EM&T. (4) No significant correlation was found between student teachers attitude toward the utilization of EM&T with respect to media availability, ability to access a media specialist, peer support and
encouragement, and classroom physical set up and arrangement. (5) Significance correlation was found between student teachers attitude toward the utilization of EM&T and their perception with respect to their academic field of specialization and administration support and encouragement. Conclusion. The findings of this study suggest that there is an appreciation of EM&T benefits and advantages. Student teachers could not utilize EM&T due to obstacles. Steps should be taken to lead to greater EM&T use. (6) EM&T in schools, factories and service industries also played a progressive role in the society. It encouraged the mobilization of women workers movement to become another inspiration to the African and all who still suffer identified. They are now able to contribute wholly on an equal basis to the world’s struggle for freedom.

40037. Eritreans for Liberation in North America. “Eritrean Women in the Struggle for National Independence”, in Eritrea Liberation (Eritreans For Liberation in North America), March-April 1976. On the occasion of International Women’s Day we hail all the oppressed women struggling for liberation. In the spirit of the militant working women of the Paris Commune, the women who fought for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Chinese Revolution, women all over the world have risen up to emancipate themselves from super exploitation and to contribute to the liberation of all the laboring masses. We hail the Vietnamese and Cambodian women who smashed the US imperialists and their lackeys under the leadership of NLF and the NUFC. The victory of the Mozambican, Guinea Bissau and Angolan women in liberating themselves and their nation from the yoke of Portuguese colonialism has become another inspiration to the African women and all who still suffer under imperialist-feudalist domination and exploitation. Women have always been an important force in revolutionary struggles of all oppressed people in the history of mankind, and today, more conscious of their role, women are getting organized and militantly joining the forces of national liberation and proletarian revolution. In Palestine, Oman, Zimbabwe, Latin America and other parts, women are taking an active and important role in the ranks of revolutionaries waging armed struggle against imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and their lackeys. All over the world women are organizing themselves as a section of the exploited and oppressed masses and waging struggles for their emancipation and the liberation of all mankind. As Lenin pointed out “working women, the most oppressed among the oppressed, never have a cold stand aside from the broad path of the liberation movement.” " and the Eritrean women are no exception to this worldwide truth. Eritrean women, oppressed and exploited as workers and peasants as well as women, by colonialism, feudalism, imperialism and Zionism for many decades have a long and rich history of resistance. To illustrate this there is a traditional saying in Eritrea “for the land the woman fights.” As early as the 1800’s when the Italian colonialists invaded Eritrea, peasant women fought side by side with the men, to defend their country. Women fought against Italian colonialism when they took away the fertile land from peasants and calling it “domaniale” and gave it to the Italians who immigrated to Eritrea to become settler farmers. During Italian colonialism, thousands of peasants including women were reduced to agriculture laborers and wage workers in the towns. After WWII, British imperialists occupied Eritrea and continued to plunder the country’s wealth and exploit the labor of the masses. At this stage, Eritrean people’s struggle took an organized form and many women actively participated in the struggles of the first political organization, “Marher Fekri Hager”--the organization which agitated for national independence since 1941. Working women in textile factories and service industries also played a progressive role in the underground working class movement which began in the early 1940’s and formally organized into the Eritrean Trade Union in 1952. When the sham federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia was imposed on the Eritrean people by the then US dominated UN, political and mass movements began to be suppressed and the labor union had to go underground until 1958. In 3/1958, a four-day general strike paralyzed the country. Women workers joined the strike and militantly fought for the economic and national rights of the Eritrean people. The union and the workers movement was brutally crushed by the fascist Ethiopian government and in an attempt to further weaken and liquidate the workers movement by economically weakening the country, Ethiopian rulers in collusion with the local feudal chauvinists and the upper strata of the ruling class of the then US dominated UN, political and mass movements began to be suppressed and the labor union had to go underground until 1958. In 3/1958, a four-day general strike paralyzed the country. Women workers joined the strike and militantly fought for the economic and national rights of the Eritrean people. The union and the workers movement was brutally crushed by the fascist Ethiopian government and in an attempt to further weaken and liquidate the workers movement by economically weakening the country, Ethiopian rulers in collusion with the local feudal chauvinists and the upper strata of the ruling class of the
advice. Consulting women is done outside, through their institutes.” He noted: “In elections, candidates require publicity for their campaigns, and this could lead to negative campaigning which is not approved in Islam. Seeking public office was disapproved of by the Prophet Mohammed, and this would hinder a number of religious and educated people from becoming members.” He also observed that elections would raise tribal considerations and the possibility of vote buying, and that such a system would bring power with as high of qualifications as appointment by the monarch, meeting in UK with PM John Major, he observed: “We have [US] experts and trainers, especially in aviation... There is not in the kingdom an occupation army, and I would like to confirm that there are no complaints whatsoever about US training personnel.” [TXT]


Rep. Cass Ballenger (GOP - North Carolina) was elected to the seat vacated by James Broyhill in western North Carolina, 10th Congressional District. For the pro-Israel community, Ballenger is a welcome change from the negative record of Broyhill. He was a co-signer of the resolution of disapproval against the proposed sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia and voted in favor of the FY 88-89 Foreign Aid bill. Ballenger stands a very good chance of being reelected in this heavily Republican district. Chester Rothman is very close to Ballenger. In 1987 RPAC contributed $500 to his campaign.

Rep. Helen D. Bentley (GOP - Maryland) is a second term Congresswoman from Baltimore. She defeated “Doc” Long in 1984 after 2 losing tries. The pro-Israel community was a strong backer of Long who was Chairman of the Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee and therefore the Arab Lobby was supportive of whoever opposed him. Since her election Bentley has voted in favor of foreign aid to Israel and against the Saudi Arms Sale. In 1986 RPAC contributed $1000 to Bentley's campaign.

Rep. Ben Campbell (Democrat - Colorado) defeated incumbent Mike Stang in 1986. At first we were not certain how he would be on our issues, but the staff around him is very sympathetic to Israel, and has been receptive to our members. He recently signed the letter Pres. Reagan expressing opposition to the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and voted in favor of foreign aid. He faces a tough reelection bid in 1988.

Rep. Howard Coble (GOP - North Carolina) is a second-term Congressman from Greensboro. Coble is from the moderate wing of the Republican party in North Carolina. He has a solid relationship with the Jewish community there, who speak very highly of him. He has been with us all the way so far. In 1986 he won reelection by 79 votes and can anticipate in a highly contested race once again. In 1987 RPAC contributed $500 to his campaign. [=]


Rep. Bill Green (Republican - New York) - A Jewish Republican member on the Appropriations Committee who could face the most expensive House race ever.

Rep. Tony Hall (Democrat - Ohio) - A former member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and now on the Rules Committee.
Rep. Steny Hoyer (Democrat - Maryland) - After boosting a field of 31 candidates in a 1981 special election, Hoyer is one of the new members of the Appropriations Committee, and a potential Senate candidate in 1986 against Senator Mac Mathias.
Rep. Jack Kemp (Republican - New York) - A rising national figure, Kemp is the Ranking Republican on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations whose outspoken support for Israel is exceptional.

Rep. Pete Kostmayer (Democrat - Pennsylvania) - After regaining his congressional seat last year, Kostmayer returned to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He faces a difficult reelection.
Rep. Tom Lantos (Democrat - California) - A Jewish survivor of the holocaust, and very active member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Near East Subcommittee.
Rep. Mel Levine (Democrat - California) - Freshman Jewish member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who is highly effective and politically savvy.
Rep. Elliot Levitas (Democrat - Georgia) - Southern Jewish member gaining in seniority and influence.
Rep. Bill Lehman (Democrat - Florida) - A veteran Jewish member of the important Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
Rep. Norm Lent (Republican - New York) - An outspoken supporter and co-author of the 1981 Long-Lent Resolution disapproving the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia. [=]


As an example of an innovator, I interviewed a trained nurse midwife, Sister Battool, in the provincial capital who was known even in rural areas throughout the region for her new type of female circumcision which leaves the clitoris intact, sewn beneath a small flap of tissue. She operates a private practice from her home, across the street from the provincial hospital. She was sought out by many, including the wealthiest families, to do circumcisions, attend childbirths, and perform small surgeries such as opening problematical infibulations after marriage and repairing poorly done infibulations and post-childbirth reinfibulations.

Being probably the most renowned circumciser in the province and beyond, Sister Battool is in a key position both to observe trends and to influence the type of circumcisions done. She has not totally refused to do pharaonic, but she has supported and popularized her less harmful form of circumcision. In her view, since it is quite harmful to remove all the tissue, she prefers to remove only a small part of the prepuce, leaving the erectile tissue intact. Thus her “Sunna” is far less severe than a clitordectomy, thereby reducing the chances of the commonest complications (hemorrhaging, shock, septicemia) and preserves sexual sensitivity. Although she attempts to persuade clients to opt for minimal tissue damage, she said she does the operations however they wish. Although she said that some people still insist she “take it all,” many more of her clients have now been willing to consider intermediate forms.

She also has noted a marked increase in the demand for Sunna, perhaps 70 percent of the circumcision requests in her practice in 1989.
Even so, she reported that people who are ready to give up pharaonic were asking for some degree of closure over the urethra, although calling it Sunna, in order to avoid the sound of urination, which is considered unfeminine. She contends that many village midwives also avoid clitoridectomy while still irrigulating, since when they go too deep in their cutting they hit major arteries and the bleeding is so profuse and hard to control that they soon learn to leave most of the clitoris in place beneath the infibulation.

Sister Battool has found that a major concern of parents considering pharaonic circumcision is the expectation that an eventual husband will not find sex with their daughter pleasurable unless she is tightly infibulated. Indeed, according to Sister Battool, the main reason for social resistance to abandoning circumcision is that the men want it to continue. Her tactic for countering this argument is to convince parents to leave it up to their daughter to decide when she is older: she can always be infibulated later.

One of the most salient issues relevant to female circumcision is the issue of marriage-ability. Parents who know the risks of the operation are still taking a risk if they change to Sunna or abandon circumcision altogether, since marriage is a key to social status and economic security. If a woman's only route to economic security is to get married--as it has been in the Rahad villages--then the cultural definitions of marriage-ability will be vital to her social survival and well-being. The definition of marriage-ability continues to include virginity (still largely socially constructed through infibulation). [The intensity of the cultural supports to female circumcision can be judged from the following case. A family brought Sister Battool a hemophiliac daughter they wanted to have circumcised, against their doctor's advice. She, too, tried to talk them out of it, and explained the grave risks. The family was adamant, however, saying that even if she died in the process they could not leave her uncircumcised. [Eventually she was circumcised; she survived, but it required the transfusion of 16 pints of blood.]) While virginity and infibulation may eventually be disassociated--and this has certainly been the case for some of the younger, educated men and those who have adopted religious values against the pharaonic tradition--until such change is well established, individual families will still have to face considerable risk in the decision not to circumcise.

If, however, women's opportunities increase for economic security and well-being outside the role of marriage--such as through education and employment--there may be a countervailing social support to taking that risk. At present, however, continuing government-sponsored religious fundamentalism appears to be limiting those options, and marriage continues to be vital.

A significant problem for marriage has been developing in the form of escalating costs of marriage, especially for middle-class families, in the urban and more developed rural areas. In the Gezira village and in the urban areas the problem of women in their twenties not being able to find husbands was considered very serious, to the extent that numerous villages have had community meetings to propose communal commitments to minimal bride-wage payments and restricted levels of festivities. Though some villages have made such pacts, others have too many migrant workers, returning from labor stints in the oil-rich countries, who prefer lavish weddings. For families whose daughters are not being married by the men who are delaying marriage because of the rising costs, there is great concern for their daughters' well-being in the long run. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis is that this situation will influence parents to be even less willing to take the risk of leaving a daughter uncircumcised if they perceive this still to be an important factor in her finding a mate.

Further research on the effects of this is needed. If age of first marriage increases, women's first pregnancies will be at significantly later ages, which, though an improvement over the extremely early marriages prevalent in the past, may increase risks slightly over the more favored late teens to early twenties period. Also, a late start in a strongly pro-natalist situation may result in decreasing birth intervals for women who marry late, which would have implications for the health of both mothers and infants.

The Islamic movement is perhaps the most important cultural debate at present. Although the people of the northern two-thirds of the country have been predominantly Muslim for centuries, Sudanese folk Islam has displayed wide variation and many pre-Islamic beliefs and practices have been syncretized. Muslims practiced pharaonic circumcision of females, venerated saints, and participated in zar spirit possession, despite occasional criticism of these practices by some religious leaders. The prohibition of alcohol seemed to be considered traditional, and many intellectuals were not too strict about fasting at Ramadan. Certainly the majority of the population--whether Muslim or not--was not pleased when the former president (Jaffar Nimeiri) attempted to Islamicize the political system, instituting hudud punishments like the amputation of the hands of thieves and prohibiting alcohol.

But by 1989, Islamism has become a much more influential ideology with concomitant divisive impacts. Some of its roots lie in the experience of the large numbers of Sudanese migrants who have worked in the Gulf, the import of Saudi and Kuwaiti television programs, the social influence afforded the external powers (especially Saudi Arabia) who held important economic control strings, and the strong Sudanese history of allegiance to religious leaders (perhaps inspired additionally by the theocratic movement's successes in Iran). Its effects include political repression, following the accession to power (in 1989) of the Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashir government, including the firing of many intellectuals, including university professors and health officials.

In the Gezira village, a zar adept I observed in the 1970's had offered a source of treatment and group support for women's social and emotional ills with her twice weekly clinics. In trance, she offered magical treatments--along with coffee, moral support, and the companionship and advice of other clients. But in 1989 her clinics were not being held, and she and her possessing spirit were arguing about whether to resume them, an argument I interpreted as indicative of her increasing orthodoxy of Sudanese Islam and the decline of heretofore syncretized folk traditions.

Generally, the Islamic movement has not as yet had the effect of strict sex segregation in health services: every physician I asked believed that the respect for physicians as professionals--who could, whether male or female, treat patients of either sex without compromise to anyone's morality--was deeply established in Sudan. Even though there might be a few of the urban young women students allied with the Islamic movement who are unwilling to be seen by male physicians, none of the university or medical people I spoke with believed this to be a problem. Two doctors even claimed the opposite was becoming a problem--that young women deprived of male company were seeking out male physicians for contrived complaints--but I did not investigate this. In any case, even an extremely pious fundamentalist woman physician I interviewed saw no contradiction between her beliefs and either the physical examination by physicians of the other sex or her discussion of sexual matters (for her research) with both men and women--though she herself chose to specialize in maternal and child health.

One other relevant development was the founding by National Islamic Front organizations of private clinics where, I was told, patients could receive better care than that offered in government hospitals and clinics but at lower cost than the physicians' private clinics. [Most physicians still continue to be employed by the government, but a majority of them operate private clinics also, a long-standing practice.] Such alternative services seem to be for the purpose of binding the public closer to the movement. They are financed, as is the NiF, primarily by the Islamic banks.

Many of the individuals who have experienced religious revitalization have questioned and abandoned practiced considered by many religious leaders to be unislamic, such as spirit possession cults and pharaonic circumcision, in favor of more orthodox Islamic emphasis on the five pillars of Islam. Although zar has not been abandoned entirely in the villages I studied, the practice of it had definitely declined. One spirit-possessed woman in Abdal Galli who held twice-weekly healing clinics in he 1970s, now does not trance, though she says the spirit is pressuring her to go back to it and she intends to before long. Other women referred to zar as a somewhat silly old custom that they say is
dying out as the young women have become better educated and more knowledgeable about religion.

Sunnī circumcision is mentioned frequently as the appropriate Islamic alternative to pharaonic among those who are reform minded. Certainly the individuals most affected by the Islamic movement seem to favor doing "Sunna only"—though there is no consensus on precisely what form of operation that entails—or going along with public health efforts to abandon all forms of female circumcision.

Yet I believe there is another possible impact which is the result of educatedwomen's interests turning to religious studies. The growing importance of Islam in cultural debates had at times contributed to greater involvement of women in the study and reinterpretation of Islamic texts. One example of how this has begun to influence health is the case of the fundamentalist woman doctor mentioned above, whose research and religious study on female circumcision have led to some innovative views.

Through religious study of early Islamic writings, she began to question the received interpretations of the Hadith concerning female circumcision. She has concluded that the form of surgery to which the Prophet Mohammed gave his approval was not clitoridectomy, but removal of the prepuce only. [She cited an early Islamic text by Ibn Al-Qawim Al-Joziyah entitled "Tuhfat al-Modud li Ahkam al-Moukul" (roughly, "Gems of the Prophet Regarding Regulations of Birth")] and further, that later interpretations which claimed the purpose was to reduce female sexual desire were wrong. Since the "proper Sunna" (as she was considering calling it) is similar to experimental surgeries to increase clitoral stimulation for anorgasmic women, which she had read about in American medical journals, she believes it is the enhancement of female sexuality, rather than its suppression, that was the original goal. Since all sex for Muslims should be within the bonds of marriage, there would logically be no reason to reduce either women's or men's pleasure. Therefore, in her view, not only pharaonic circumcision but also the clitoridectomies currently being called "Sunna" would be against Islam.

In her research in a rural area east of the Blue Nile, she has encountered strong resistance in most communities to the idea of modifying female circumcision at all. She believes the current Ministry of Health policy will therefore fall on deaf ears, and she feels it is realistic to consider an alternative approach. In her community health work she is considering asking that people do only this "proper Sunna," rather than the clitoridectomies, if they are willing to give up pharaonic. She intends to proceed carefully, since if people were to misunderstand and perform clitoridectomies, which would reduce the sexual desires of women for their husbands, this would be harmful. She feels strongly that she is enjoining both by Islam and by medical value to "do no harm," and therefore would discourage all circumcisions. [2]

40042. IORES. "Al-Nahda Women's Society Works to Perpetuate Traditional Designs", in Saudi Arabia-Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 1996. p. 5. The Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women recently sponsored the first exhibit of the Artisans Workshop Center in Riyadh in an effort to keep alive artistic traditions of the past. The exhibit was organized as part of the society's campaign to foster a new awareness of the creative beauty of traditional designs in Saudi Arabia. The 4/3-4/1996 exhibit in Riyadh focused on traditional doors and their intricate designs, color schemes and woodwork. Often examples of intricate craftsmanship, the doors are striking items of traditional art and utility. Members of the society have worked together to study the traditional designs and are coming up with ways to translate them into useful and decorative everyday items. Artisans recreate the images from the doors onto objects such as blankets, shawls, wooden boxes, cups, vases and even t-shirts. As a result of the efforts of society members, techniques which were once used hundreds of years ago are again being utilized through the interpretations of the twentieth century artisans in modern materials. The exhibit in Riyadh featured traditional doors and the designs derived from them, as well as their applications in modern materials. "We keep alive the designs of old, as they appear on the old doors, by reproducing the designs on useful contemporary items of all kinds," according to one of the members of Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women who commented on the exhibit. "Our goal is to create items which will not only reflect our rich heritage and culture, but which will perpetuate our visual traditions for generations to come," she said. Ultimately, the group has plans to market the items worldwide in order to bring international attention to the richness and variety of art in Saudi Arabia. All of the pieces created at the Artisans Workshop Center are to be sold with part of the proceeds being donated to charitable organizations in the community and the remainder being used for further expansion of the center. [3]

40043. IORES. "News Briefs: Saudi Arabia Receives Arab League Literacy Award", in Saudi Arabia-Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 1996. p. 7. The Arab League Educational Scientific & Cultural Organization (ALESCO) singled out Saudi Arabia's efforts to eradicate illiteracy for special recognition. ALESCO Director-General Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim presented a special award to Minister of Education Dr. Muhammad Bin Ahmad Al-Rasheed on 3/23/1996. Accepting the award, Dr. Al-Rasheed stated that the prize reflected the government's commitment to education, from combating illiteracy on the lowest levels of education to the highest spheres, including the medical sciences, engineering, technology, computers and space sciences. The latest statistics show that the illiteracy rate in Saudi Arabia has fallen to 14.87% among men and 35.5% among women. [2]

40044. IORESA. "News Briefs: Work Begins on New Disability Research Center in Riyadh", in Saudi Arabia-Monthly Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, February, 1994. p. 7. Prince Sultan Bin Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Saudi Benevolent Association for Handicapped Children, announced the start of construction work on a 40 million riyal ($10.66 million) Disability Research Center in Riyadh. The new center will focus on applied research and manage research programs and grants with the objective of improving facilities and services for the disabled. Prince Sultan explained that the new center will provide researchers and physicians with access to the latest information and facilities in this field. It will also fund basic and advanced research programs in cooperation with the King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology and various Saudi universities and hospitals. [2]

40045. IORES. "Press Headlines", in Saudi Arabia-Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 1996. p. 6. During 4/1996, Saudi Arabian newspapers reported on a variety of topics related to the Middle East and the world. Major headlines reported that: The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz hosts 500 Bosnian priests who will perform Hajj as his guests. Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz meets with visiting Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 536 million riyals ($142.9 million) have been allocated for new road projects in and around Makkah to facilitate the Hajj. Madinah Province Governor Prince Abdul Majeed Bin Abdul Aziz opens a new girls college in Yambu. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Jamil Al-Hujeilan presents proposals to a Riyadh meeting of the GGC Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry for the unification of GCC economic, labor and electricity policy. The Saudi-American consortium Yemenco signed a $500 million deal to establish a duty-free zone in Aden, Yemen. The King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals and Japan's Petroleum Energy Center begin a joint research project to recycle oil residues into useful products. [2]
Majed said the occasion reflects the humanitarian approach of the Saudi nation toward a segment of the society whose members have failed victim to physical disability. "These projects are an indication of this country's commitment towards its citizens and of the direct support such activities receive from the government," the Makkah Province Governor said. The Jeddah center will consist of two medical and educational buildings and an administration building, covering over 981,000 square feet. A week earlier, Makkah Province Deputy Governor Prince Saud Bin Abdul Mohsen laid the foundation stone for a 107,639 square foot handicapped children's center in Makkah. This center, expected to cost $2.6 million, will offer the latest technological equipment and will also include educational, rehabilitation, and medical departments. Prince Saud expressed hope that the new center would positively contribute to the services available for handicapped children in the Kingdom. He urged philanthropists to support charitable societies. At the ceremony, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Saudi Benevolent Society for Handicapped Children Prince Sultan Bin Salman Bin Abdul Aziz expressed appreciation for the support extended by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz toward the benevolent society. He also praised the support and attention given by the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs and other government agencies. The society helps handicapped children to lead normal lives and is one of the most important such organizations in the world. The Riyadh-based organization provides education and physical rehabilitation to enable handicapped children to become independent and integrate into society. It accepts children ranging in age from three to thirteen years and provides accommodations for those who need it. The society’s center in Riyadh, which is in its eighth year of operation, has accommodated more than 1600 children. The society is currently building a disability research center, the Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz Center for Research on Disabled People. Located in Riyadh, the center will focus on applied research and manage research programs and grants with the objective of improving facilities and services for the Kingdom’s disabled. It will provide researchers and physicians access to the latest information and facilities in the field. [≡]

40047. IORESA. Photograph: "Saudi Nursing Students Graduate from GMU", in Saudi Arabia-Newsletter of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, June 1996, p. 6. One of the eleven Saudi Arabian students to graduate from the George Mason University College of Nursing and Health Sciences receives his diploma from Dean Dr. Rita Carter in Fairfax, Virginia, last month. This was the first group of students to graduate from American universities under the sponsorship of the Saudi-US University Project. Also present at the ceremony were Project Director Dr. Jerold Principato and King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center Career Development Director Mohammad Al-Hogali. [≡]

40048. Jehl, Douglas. "Jidda Journal: Saudis Feast Freely From the TV Dishes; The Rooftops of Jidda Bristle With Global Television Satellite Dishes [the technology was almost unknown before the Gulf War; Government ignores the content of programming as long as its viewing is private; seller of dishes shrugs and notes: ‘That is bad for the children and it is bad for Islam’]", in New York Times, January 23, 1996, p. A4. [TXT]

40049. Joseph, Suad; Stork, Joe. "Interview: Gender and Civil Society: An Interview With Suad Joseph", in Middle East Report, July-August, 1993, pp. 22-26. The Western model of the nation-state, which has come to dominate the world, is based on the individual citizen, separated from communities. This model is explicitly based on the male property owner as the social actor: hence, society is seen as ‘an association of autonomous, individualized, contract-making persons. This gender basis of civil society is combined with patriarchy. In the Middle East, many argue that the extremely rigid gender hierarchies are the outgrowth of pre-existing patriarchy in a post-colonial context: creating a neo-Patriarchy. Modernism has promoted the separation of women in a domestic sphere, with Saudi Arabia being the extreme case in which the state has the resources to enforce such strict gender boundaries. [Joseph is an editor of Middle East Report, teaches anthropology at University of California-Davis, and is a founder of the Association for Middle East Women's Studies and the Middle East Research Group in Anthropology.] [≡]

40050. Lado, Augustine; Hinds, Betty. "In War Ravaged Sudan, The Appealing Trade In Human Chattle Still Shows No Sign of Diminishing", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 31, 1993, pp. 18-19. The State Department, British Anti-Slavery Society, ILO and Africa Watch have documented the survival of a slave trade in Sudan, especially victimizing the people of the Nuba Mountains. The sldave trade in Sudan is on a far larger scale that other reported survivals of slavery in Mauittania, Saudi Arabia, and Sierra Leone. In 1987 alone, at least 7000 Blacks are reported to have been enslaved. The most recent documented slave raid was in 3/1993, in Bahr-el-Gazal province: some 6000 government troops killed 1000 people and enslaved 300 women and children. This was similar to the raid in 1/1986 when soldiers raided Dinka villages killing 612 and enslaving7000. The present leader of Sudan, Gen. Omar Hassan el Bashir, is reported to have Nuer and Dinka slaves in his household, from the period in which he was the military commander in Mjuld. This issue should be brought before the UN by the US. [Augustine Lado is president of Pax Sudani, a human rights organization.] [TXT]

40051. Lazzerini, Edward J.; Gross, Jo-Ann [editor]. "Discourse as a Cultural Expression of Identity: Beyond Renewal: The Jaddid Response to Pressure For Change in the Modern Age", in Muslims In Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992. pp. 151-166. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Islamic communities of the Russian empire, led by the educated elites of Muslims in Crimea, Azerbaijan and the Volga region, developed a response to the Russian cultural and political environment that sought to reform Islam with an "all-embracing effort". Two major forms of traditional Islamic reform are the individual and ascetic path of Sufis and the conservative call of right-wing orthodoxy for ‘communal revitalization (epitomized by Ibn Taymiya (13th-14th century); and the Wahhabis (Arabia), Idrisiya (North Africa) and Faraizi (eastern Bengal) of the 18th-19th). Notably, in many areas, an Islamic revival movement was underway which combined both conservative and Sufi elements. Although there were traditional Islam scholars like Qursavi, born in Kazan province in 1783, has sometimes been seen in the West and by Soviet researchers as a precursor of the Jaddid movement; however, Qursavi's criticism of Islam in the Russian Empire of his day was based on its irrelevance to the concerns of Muslims, and proposed a conservative, rather than a revolutionary, return to the fundamentals of Islam: Qursavi was a renewal, not an innovator. However, by the late 17th to mid-18th century, a more revolutionary approach to the challenge of Russian colonialism was emerging, in mass movement frequently informed by Sufis (for example, calls for jihad by Imam Mansur (1785-1791), Shaykh Muhammad of Yaraglar (1825), and Imam Samii (1834-1859)). Although there were traditional Islamic methods of protest, the failure of these traditional patterns of renewal to challenge Russian colonialism (including the 'enlightened imperialism of Catherine II, the sustained economic growth in the Volga and Crimean Tartar regions, and in Azerbaijan with the growth of the oil industry around Baku, and the psychological challenge of the inexorable expansion of the Russians) led to the emergence of a modernized Muslim elite that participated actively in the Russian administration (such as Abbas Kuli Aga Bakhiranov (1794-1848), Mirza Fethali Ahundov (1812-1878), Cokan Valihanov(1835-1865), and Mirza Kazem-Bek (1802-1870)), some of whom even converted to Christianity (Kazem-Bek). However, their writing contributed the emergence of Jadidism, which was advanced most forcefully by Ismail Bey Gasprinski (1851-1914), a Crimean Tatar: the measure of Gasprinski's innovation was his awareness that the conditions of the Russian Empire were a new challenge to Islam without historical precedent. Without rejecting the wisdom and experience of his Islamic heritage, Gasprinski’s Jadidism argued that Muslims (1) must use the analytical tools of Western historiography, (2) that refocusing on Islam would have to focus on Islam as a cultural force, (3) that education must meet practical needs, (4) that women must be empowered and
moved to a more central role in society. (5) material productivity must be increased to end Muslim economic stagnation, and to this end Muslims must embrace technological innovation and industrial mechanization.

40052. Mahmoud, Tahir. “Muslims in Hijra: The Influence of Malcolm X,” in Crescent International - Special Supplement, April 1996. p. 9. Muslims are a community of the hijra (migration). Since the entire earth belongs to God, he has enjoined his creatures to move about the earth and settle wherever they find comfort. In the Qur’an, Allah says that he created humankind from dust then spread them across the earth (30:20). In obedience to this command, Muslims have spread to all corners of the globe. At the advent of Islam, they travelled to spread the message as well as to trade. The companions of the Prophet even reached China. It was certainly known to the Muslims of the time because in a famous hadith, the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, “acquire knowledge even if you have to go to China for it.” Sa’ad ibn Waqas, one of the Prophet’s companions, settled in China. Muslim history in North America is often dated to the early part of this century. This is a limited view. Maps prepared by Muslims in the eleventh century clearly show the complete shoreline of North and South America. These could only have been prepared if Muslims had arrived in these lands prior to that date. Thus the claim that Columbus was the first to arrive in America is a colossal fraud, perpetrated by the west, as in most other instances. Recent studies have shown that as early as a thousand years ago, Muslims had arrived in America. What happened to the early Muslims and where they went still needs to be investigated but writings on stones dating back to that period also show the kalima. After the Europeans arrived, African Muslims brought in their millions as slaves. The white slave masters forced them to change their names and abandon their religion. The immense interest in Islam among African-Americans is reflective of this reality. For them, Islam is the route to the rediscovery of their lost broadcasting, and VCR tapes) in satisfying both types of media needs was also examined. The third objective was to ascertain the role of private television production companies in local television production and their relationship with Saudi TV officials. To achieve the first two goals, the researchers sampled young Saudi viewers. Participants were selected from high school and college students living in Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam. A total of 349 self-administered questionnaires were collected and analyzed using various statistical procedures (t-test, ANOVA, factor analysis, regression, and chi-square) to test the study’s hypotheses. To accomplish the third goal, executives and/or owners of private television production companies in Saudi Arabia were interviewed. Using the maximum variation procedure, the researcher met with 11 representatives from small, medium, and large-scale companies that were actively involved in television production. Results showed that foreign television programs were very popular among young Saudi viewers. Egyptian entertainment-type programs were more popular than similar American shows. Regional television sources also were very popular among young viewers who preferred to watch them more than Saudi TV. This situation was more salient in media-rich regions than media poor ones. Egyptian and Western television programs, which are shown frequently on Saudi TV, were used to satisfy needs related to surveillance/understanding, interpersonal utility, and social conformity more than needs related to entertainment/diversion, parasocial interaction, and personal identity. The sociocultural effect of foreign television programs, as perceived by Saudis, was relatively strong, particularly among different regions and groups (high school and college students). [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [v]

40053. Merdad, Adel Siraj. Foreign Television Programs And Their Sources: An Empirical Analysis Of Media Usage And Perceptions Of Its Effects By Young Viewers In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia (Television). Wayne State University. Dissertation. 332pp. AAC 9321802. [Advisor: Spalding, John W.] The aims of this study were threefold. The first goal was to measure and compare to what extent Saudi youths in three cities (Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam) were exposed to television programs, particularly foreign ones. This also involved assessing respondents’ perceptions of the effects of such programs on Saudi culture and society. Comparison was achieved through hypotheses-testing format with various subgroups of the sample. The second goal was to assess cognitive and affective media needs that motivate young Saudis to watch television programs, especially Egyptian and Western ones. Further, the helpfulness of four media sources (Saudi TV, Egyptian TV, Gulf states broadcasting, and VCR tapes) in satisfying both types of media needs also was examined. The third objective was to ascertain the role of private production companies in local television production and their relationship with Saudi TV officials. To achieve the first two goals, the researchers sampled young Saudi viewers. Participants were selected from high school and college students living in Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam. A total of 349 self-administered questionnaires were collected and analyzed using various statistical procedures (t-test, ANOVA, factor analysis, regression, and chi-square) to test the study’s hypotheses. To accomplish the third goal, executives and/or owners of private television production companies in Saudi Arabia were interviewed. Using the maximum variation procedure, the researcher met with 11 representatives from small, medium, and large-scale companies that were actively involved in television production. Results showed that foreign television programs were very popular among young Saudi viewers. Egyptian entertainment-type programs were more popular than similar American shows. Regional television sources also were very popular among young viewers who preferred to watch them more than Saudi TV. This situation was more salient in media-rich regions than media poor ones. Egyptian and Western television programs, which are shown frequently on Saudi TV, were used to satisfy needs related to surveillance/understanding, interpersonal utility, and social conformity more than needs related to entertainment/ diversion, parasocial interaction, and personal identity. The sociocultural effect of foreign television programs, as perceived by Saudis, was relatively strong, particularly among different regions and groups (high school and college students). [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [v]
times. The reason for this is that Riyadh is located in the middle of the Arabian peninsula, adjacent to a number of wadis which collect rainwater and have enriched the city's underground water resources. This has meant that it has always had plentiful water for irrigation purposes.

The Center of Unification: Riyadh was the nucleus for the unification of the various regions of Saudi Arabia. It was here that King Abdul Aziz, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, began his quest to establish a stable, unified state under the banner of monotheism.

Climate: Riyadh has a dry continental climate, with very hot summers and cold or moderate winters. It has fine weather for most of the year and the average maximum temperature is 35°C (95°F). There is relatively little wind during the winter, but the city is sometimes subject to dusty northerly winds during the summer. There is little rainfall in Riyadh. When it does fall, it often comes in heavy showers which can cause flash floods.

Area: The best indicator of Riyadh’s rapid growth is its area. Sixty years ago, it was only 8.5 square kilometres (3 square miles). By 1950, this had expanded to 85 square kilometres (30 square miles). In 1968, when the first master plan for the capital city was drawn up, an increase in its area of about 110 square kilometres (59 square miles) was expected. Today, it is 1,600 square kilometres (600 square miles) in area, including a number of open areas in its new suburbs.

Population: In 1918, the population of the capital was 19,000. By 1960 it reached 160,000. Seventeen years later it had grown to 690,000 inhabitants, and in 1982 it reached 1.2 million. The population passed the two million mark in 1986.

The Building Boom: To cope with this extremely rapid expansion in population, a great deal of building had to be done in Riyadh, financed by the economic boom the Kingdom has enjoyed. It has benefited from the government’s expansionist policies in the development of cities, towns and villages, and from building loans provided from central funds. These factors have made Riyadh a major centre of population and communications, not least because, being a desert city, it has unlimited room for expansion. The government has distributed plots of land to tens of thousands of citizens free of charge, and grants interest-free loans to anyone wishing to build a house. These loans are repayable over 20 years, and if the loan is settled on time a discount of approximately 25% behind the loan is given. Riyadh Municipality and its Branches: As a result of this growth, many new suburbs have appeared in Riyadh, such as, Urajia, Laban, Qadsisiyyah, Al-Quds, Al-Qairawan... and the city has been subdivided into 17 separately administered areas, known as branch Municipalities. These are: Dirah, Batna, Shumaisi. Manufa, Malaz, Murabba, Ithqah, Olayya, Maathar, Nasseem. Al-Shamal. Al-Janoub. Al-Rawdhah. Urajia, Ithqah, Hayat, and Dirah.

The City’s Accomplishments: As a result of the great attention given by the state to construction projects, the Municipality of Riyadh has achieved important improvements, which include: (1) Carrying out its routine organisation and planning responsibilities by beautifying the city and keeping it clean. The Municipality has achieved good results from its campaign under the slogan “Let’s Keep Riyadh Clean”, later “Riyadh, the Clean City” and in a third phase “Let’s Keep Riyadh Cleaner”; (2) The municipality has established a large number of public gardens, parks and green landscaped areas, with fountains, artificial waterfalls, streetlamps and other utilities. The municipality has also bought eight orchards in different parts of the city and transformed them into public gardens and parks; (3) The municipality has planted islands in the middle of the streets, and provided sources of water for the irrigation of parks and gardens; (4) More than 100 children’s playgrounds have been established in various parts of the city; (5) A number of gardens and parks have been established to outstanding technical specifications. The most important ones are the Suwady, Yamamah, Aziziah, Al-Zahr’ah, Jareer, First Rabwah and Mohammed Ibn Al-Qassim gardens; (6) Several commercial markets have been established in various parts of the capital, including the vegetable, meat and fish markets. These were designed to bring services closer to the inhabitant a’l’d reduce traffic jams in the city centre; (7) A number of multi-storey car parks have been built, and have made a major contribution to absorbing part of the dense traffic and improving its flow by reducing the number of cars parked on the streets.

Important Modern Landmarks: During the rapid development which has taken place in the city of Riyadh, many ministries and governmental organisations have set up major modern landmarks in the city which rival similar features in the world’s most advanced countries. The following are some examples: (1) King Khalid International Airport: Located at a distance of 35 km (22 miles) from the city centre, this airport is built on an area of 225 square km (87 square miles) to serve fifteen million passengers annually. It was designed and equipped to form part of the city’s overall modernisation process, its roads being linked with the rest of the Kingdom’s road network to make it the core of traffic passing through Riyadh in different directions. The modern Islamic style of architecture was adopted in the construction of the airport's buildings, and the nature of the city's weather was also a factor in its design. It was decorated with paintings by a large number of Saudi artists and furnished with arrival and departure lounges, entrances, exits, restaurants, car parks, escalators and tunnels to take passengers to their aircraft. The airport has its own mosque. A unique architectural achievement whose design matches that of the other airport buildings. It has finely designed doors and windows, the doors being decorated with verses from the Koran. The mosque can accommodate several hundred worshippers. (2) The Gulf Bridge Flyover: This flyover, built by the Communications Ministry, is an unprecedented engineering achievement. It took about two years to complete. The three-level bridge, connected with the city’s busiest traffic routes, is 2200 metres (2400 yards) long and 37.5 metres (41 yards) wide. This gigantic project, with its attached tunnels and crossings, is regarded as one of the major landmarks of the Saudi capital. (3) The Television Complex: The large television tower has become a unique landmark in the city of Riyadh. Rising 176 metres (577 feet) into the air, the tower can be seen from all parts of the city. At its summit, there is a diamond-shaped restaurant for high-ranking visitors which overlooks almost the whole city. The television complex was built on an area of 33000 square metres (355000 square feet), adjacent to the administrative and financial office complex of the Information Ministry and facing the Radio Riyadh complex. Just behind the Radio complex is the Information Centre building. These buildings form an integral information complex, particularly since the buildings of the Engineering Affairs Department, Internal Information and Stores are all located on Amr-Ibn-Al-Asa street. There are two television channels: one Arabic, and the other English and French. Arrangements have already been made to start transmitting on a third channel. (4) King Fahad International Stadium: The King Fahd International Stadium was established in Riyadh by the General Presidency of Youth Welfare in 1988. It is characterised by its tent-shaped design, and the unprecedented benefit of a translucent, highly durable and fireproof cover designed to provide maximum weather protection for spectators. The stadium was designed to accommodate 80,000 spectators. The old Youth Welfare Stadium in Malaz. Riyadh can accommodate 45000 spectators and is equipped with a wide range of sports facilities including swimming pools and indoor sports halls. (5) The Diplomatic Quarter: The city of Riyadh may be the only capital which has a single area comprising all the embassies and consulates of friendly states. This is the Diplomatic Quarter. Built on an area of seven million square metres (8.4 million square yards), 8 km (5 miles) from the city centre, it is situated on high ground overlooking the natural greenery and beauty of the Wadi Hanifa with avast desert backdrop. Designed to accommodate 120 diplomatic missions, the Quarter now contains about 80 missions of various sizes. It has five residential neighbourhoods, equipped with all the necessary facilities, which can accommodate 31,000 diplomats and their families. (6) The Foreign Ministry Complex: The Foreign Ministry complex is a unique example of Islamic architecture, combining tradition with the latest advances in the field of construction. It contains offices for the various departments and sections of the Ministry.

Itseye-catching, innovative design, with marble-clad walls and floors decorated with fine Arabic calligraphy and surrounded by green gardens and fountains, make it another landmark in the Saudi capital. (7) The Qasr-Al-Hukm Area Development Project: Qasr-Al-Hukm is the
office of the Governor of the Riyadh region. It comprises offices, departments and divisions of the Governorate, and the Grand Reception Hall where the Governor receives citizens, listens to their complaints and acquaints himself with their problems. Normally he will discuss these problems directly with citizens and either take action himself or refer them to the appropriate departments for review. This is an ideal example of the open-door policy followed by the government of Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince, Second Deputy Prime Minister, regional governors and ministers: there are no closed doors between officials and ordinary people. Qasr-Al-Hukm is located in the centre of the capital city of Riyadh. As the governorship's responsibilities have steadily increased, both in carrying out the region's affairs and in modernisation and development projects, work has begun on the Qasr-Al-Hukm Development Project. This scheme aims to develop the area in which the Governor's palace is located, and at the same time preserve its original historical monuments such as the Al-Masmak Palace, from which the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was launched at the beginning of this century. The project includes the establishment of commercial and cultural centres, car-parking areas and all the other facilities which form part of the modernisation of the Saudi capital.

Transport and Telecommunications: The city of Riyadh is a major transport and telecommunications centre for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both by virtue of being the capital city and because it is located at the centre of the national road network linking it with the various provinces in the north, south, east and west of the country. A ring road has been built around the city to allow trucks and vehicles to transit the city without passing through the centre. This has led to a marked drop in traffic jams. Riyadh is linked with Dammam by a railway line starting at King Abdul Aziz Port in Dammam and ending at the Customs area in Riyadh. This has facilitated the handling of goods arriving in Riyadh via Dammam, as well as the transport of passengers. The Ministry of Post, Telegraphs and Telephones (P.T.T.) has completed a number of large-scale telecommunications projects using satellites and co-axial cables. There are 17 automatic telephone exchanges in Riyadh, with a total capacity of 253000 lines, in addition to 951 lines for coin-operated telephones. There are Post and Telegraph offices in all parts of the city, as well as a centre for computerised telephone information and another for the control of the telephone network. The main P.T.T. building in the capital city is famous for its elegant design and superb engineering, making it one of the city's most prominent buildings. There is also a collective bus transport network. Its regular services cover all quarters of the city using about 300 buses on twenty-one bus routes.

Water: The supply of water for everyday consumption has been one of the main problems facing the city of Riyadh. Wells used to be the main source of water, but this water started to recede until eventually it became very scarce and failed to meet the inhabitants' needs. A number of studies were carried out to solve this problem, and in 1956 the first deep Artesian well was drilled to a depth of 1400 metres (4600 feet). This was a successful, but also expensive means of obtaining water, and the excessive use of underground water may mean salt water being brought in from the Eastern Province. A Royal Decree has therefore been issued, banning the drilling of any new wells in order to conserve this precious water and regulate its consumption. Riyadh's water resources can be summarised as follows: (1) Dams: Five dams have been built near Riyadh with the aim of storing rain and storm water for human consumption on the one hand, and increasing the supply of underground water on the other. These dams are: (a) Wadi Hanifa Dam (b) Hair Dam (c) Laban Dam (d) Nammar Dam (e) Olab Dam. The storage capacity of these dams totals about 12 million cubic metres (15.7 million cubic yards). (2) Salboukh Water Project: This consists of 16 wells with a daily capacity of 60000 cubic metres (78000 cubic yards), together with a filtration plant, cooling towers, precipitation tanks, a desalination plant and an electricity plant with a capacity of 21 megawatts. (3) Wasei Water Project: This consists of 62 wells of varying depths, producing 200000 cubic metres (260000 cubic yards) daily. Located 110 km (70 miles) from Riyadh, it comprises integral pumping stations, pipelines, overhead and ground tanks, a filtration plant and an electricity plant. (4) Bowai Water Project: Located 65 km (40 miles) from Riyadh, this consists of 18 wells with a daily capacity of 80000 cubic metres (104000 cubic yards) of water. (5) Jubail Desalination Popeline Project: This is a pioneering project in the field of pumping sea water from the coasts to the cities lying inland. Two pipelines have been built from the desalination plant in the industrial city of Jubail to the city of Riyadh, 466 km (290 miles) long and with a total capacity of 210 million gallons a day. This project was commenced in 1983.

Educational Development: Education in Riyadh has progressed by leaps and bounds since the unification of Saudi Arabia. Before that, it was confined to religious schools and a number of mosques. According to statistics for the 1983/4 financial year, there were 218 primary schools with a total of 74081 pupils, 75 intermediate schools with 23095 pupils, 23 secondary schools with 11244 pupils, seven private schools numbering 1060 students and eight religious institutes and colleges numbering 1904 students. In addition, the kindergarten of Riyadh's Model Institute contained 939 children. A number of adult education centres and schools aimed at eradicating illiteracy have also been established by the Ministry of Defence and Aviation, the Interior Ministry, the National Guard and other organisations. In 1959 a Royal Decree was issued establishing a department to oversee the education of girls, with branches in various parts of the Kingdom. According to a census carried out in 1983/84, there were 179 primary schools for girls, with a total of 65674 pupils. There were also 62 intermediate schools numbering 22274 pupils, 32 secondary schools with 13000 students, and an intermediate educational college with 404 students. In addition, there were 75 colleges aimed at adult education and the spread of literacy, totalling 7182 students. A number of training centres for female primary school teachers were set up and later closed because the country had achieved self-sufficiency by training graduates from intermediate colleges. There is also a Girls Education College with 1990 students, the Faculty of Arts for Girls with 213 students, and the Higher Institute for Social Services, with 252 students. King Saud University was the first university to be set up in the Arabian peninsula, opened on 10th November 1957. This now numbers about 25,000 students, with a campus covering an area of 9 square kilometres (31/2 square miles) and including all the university's academic, administrative, residential and service facilities. The Imam Mohammed Ibn Saud Islamic University has also been founded in Riyadh. Its nucleus, the Religious Institute, was established in 1950, and the colleges for the teaching of the Sharia (Islamic Law) and Arabic Language were opened at a later stage. The colleges were incorporated to form the University by a Royal Decree on 9/10/1974. Work on the new university city is about to be completed.

Specialized Scientific and Educational Centers: Riyadh contains a number of specialised scientific and educational centres. These include: 1. King Abdul Aziz Cultural Centre (Darat) 2. King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology 3. King Fahd Security College (affiliated to the Interior Ministry) 4. King Abdul Aziz Military Academy (affiliated to the Defence and Aviation Ministry) 5. King Faisal Air Force College (affiliated to the Defence and Aviation Ministry). 6. King Khalid Military College (affiliated to the National Guard). These are in addition to a number of colleges and institutes for specialised studies affiliated to various ministries and governmental bodies.

Health Care: The city of Riyadh contains a number of internationally-recognised hospitals to which cases of serious diseases are referred from many different parts of the world. These hospitals have been set up and administered by a number of governmental bodies, including the Ministries of Health, Higher Education, Defence and Aviation, the Interior (Public Security) and the National Guard. There are also a number of private hospitals. The hospitals under the supervision of the Health Ministry include: 1. Riyadh Central Hospital 2. Prince Salman Hospital 3. The Obstetric and Paediatric Hospital 4. The Hospital for Infectious Diseases 5. The Hospital for Chest Diseases. The Ministry of Higher Education and King Saud University operate the King Abdul Aziz and King Khalid University Hospitals. The Ministry of Defence and Aviation also has two prominent hospitals: (1) The Armed Forces Hospital which is famous for having successfully performed a number of complicated operations using sophisticated equipment and highly-qualified medical staff. (2) The Flying Hospital. This is a unique project.
consisting of 17 aeroplanes of various types and sizes, equipped to provide medical care for patients, including major operations whilst the plane is en route to a hospital. The Fying Hospital's fleet includes a fully-equipped plane capable of flying long distances and reaching any place in the world. The King Fahd Hospital is administered by the National Guard and provides a comprehensive range of medical services. The Public Security Directorate has its own recently-expanded hospital providing health care to Public Security personnel and their families. Apart from these, there is the King Faisal Specialised Hospital, which covers 52 different medical specialisations and is regarded as one of the most sophisticated hospitals by world standards. This also has a medical research centre associated with it. The King Khalid Eye Hospital has added another highly-specialised medical institution to the country's health care resources. The King Fahd Medical City, a major medical project, is currently under construction. There is also the National Hospital belonging to the Social Security Organisation. In addition to these, there are clinics and primary health care centres in all areas of Riyadh. These are administered by the Ministry of Health and a number of governmental and private bodies.

Riyadh Zoo: Riyadh Zoo dates back to 1957, when it comprised animals presented to the late Kings Abdul Aziz, Saud and Faisal. Initially, it was very modest both in terms of its design and its facilities. Eventually it was closed in 1981 and a comprehensive renewal programme took place. The zoo was reopened in 1987, and now covers an area of 134000 square metres (160000 square yards) and was designed to allow the animals open spaces as well as places to sleep at night. The zoo also contains gardens, rest areas, children’s playgrounds, fountains, artificial lakes, and other services and administrative facilities. The zoo includes 40 species of animals including birds of prey, Australian animals, hyenas, gazelles. llamas, rhinoceroses, monkeys, reptiles, Asian wild animals, bears, elephants, giraffes, camels, leopards, lions and tigers of various types and origins. Riyadh Zoo has become one of the city’s most important places of leisure and recreation.

The Industrial Area: Within the framework of the comprehensive industrial development experienced in the Kingdom over the past decade, the capital city of Riyadh has undergone its fair share of progress. The number of licences issued for the creation of factories and industrial units has exceeded 1000. Most of these factories have actually started production, though some are still under construction. There is ample proof of the city’s successes in the industrial field than the fact that the Industrial City established in Riyadh already covers a total area of 451028 square metres (541000 sq yds), totally given over to industrial enterprises. Another city has subsequently been set up, covering a total area of 21 million square metres, including service and management facilities. Plants of land in this new industrial city have been distributed to industrial dressers from every First Lady. In 1987, the museum closed the "First Ladies: Gown and Coat" exhibit at the National Museum of American History was established in 1914, when Helen Taft donated a gown to the museum. Since then, the Smithsonian has received Inaugural gowns and other collections from every First Lady. In 1987, the museum closed the "First Ladies Gowns Collection" when it was discovered that a number of the gowns were deteriorating. The new exhibit, entitled "First Ladies: Political Role and Public Image," opened in 1992. The exhibit examines the public and private roles of First Ladies within the context of women's and presidential history, and documents the accomplishments of First Ladies as domestic and political partners, advocates of social change, hostesses, promoters of the arts and culture and as campaigners. The "First Ladies: Political Role and Public Image" exhibit is divided into three major sections: "Political Roles," "The First Ladies Gown Collection" and "Shaping the Public Image." Mrs. Clinton's gown will be displayed with those of First Ladies Barbara Bush, Nancy Davis Reagan, Rosalyn Carter, Elizabeth "Betty" Bloomer Ford, Patricia Ryan Nixon, Claudia "Lady Bird" Taylor Johnson and Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy. In addition to Mrs. Clinton's Inaugural gown, the Clints have donated several additional pieces of memorabilia—one of President Clinton's watches, Chelsea Clinton's ballet slippers and the State Gift presented to the Clintons by King Hussein. "The Smithsonian Institution has my great admiration for its continuing efforts to educate and enlighten the American public in all aspects of our national history and culture. The gowns in this exhibit don't just represent one day or one evening in the life of the First Ladies. They reflect the times in which they lived, and provide us with a sense of our nation's rich history." — First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
This chapter follows the general pattern of the symposium, the aim of which is stated to be to familiarize the Soviet public with the ethnic composition, culture, and life of the peoples of South West Asia and also with their present position and struggle for independence conducted against oppressors both local and foreign. In a preliminary short historical outline Hijaz, Mecca, and Medina are said to have originated as old trading stations of the Sabaean kingdom and the monotheistic religion of Islam, which began at the juncture of the 6th and 7th centuries A.D., no mention being made of Muhammad. The chapter comprises five sections as follows:

Main occupations: A description of the economy of the nomads. The prevalence of nomads in Saudi Arabia is due to lack of water and to a change-over from settled and oppressive taxation. It has partly counteracted the tendency of nomads to settle. The economy of peasants and of townspeople is briefly described.

Social relations: They are mainly feudal with survivals of patriarchal-kinship life, the degree varying as between nomads and settled cultivators. Among nomads social relations are mainly patriarchal-feudal. There are many remains of a family group-tribal organization, but they are a cover for feudal relations which are developing due to the abuse of the tribal aristocracy of their position to exploit poor tribesmen. Among peasant cultivators feudal and semi-feudal relations predominate. The employees of ARAMCO are striving to improve their lot through strike action.  

Family life: This is described in terms of paternal authority, the status of women, marriage and marriage customs, upbringing of children, and burial rites. Marriage between cousins is a survival from pre-class society when the woman was the property of the kinship group.

Material culture: A description of nomad dwellings, clothing and ornaments, food and transport.  

Language and spiritual culture: The importance of the Koran as the basis of classical Arabic. The literary renaissance in the 19th century and its impact on a group of writers in the Hijaz in the 1920s. Popular music and dances described. The essence of Wahhabism and its continuing opposition to pervasions of Islam and pre-Islamic myths. In a final paragraph on the anti-imperialist movement, Saudi Arabia is said to be successfully defending her independence, in conjunction with other Arab states, against the West and especially the US. [From: “Part III: The Arabian Peninsula: 1955-1958”, in A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography. New York: June 1959. pp. 14-15.]

40058. Pomeroy, William. "Rising Anti-Imperialist Sentiment in Philippines", in Peoples Weekly World (New York), May 27, 1995. p. 15. The execution of a Filipina domestic worker. Flor Contemplacion, in Singapore has led to an upsurge of nationalism among Filipinos, with accusations that the Philippine government has ignored the travails of millions of Filipino expatriate workers. Almost a dozen Philippine government officials have been forced to resign due to protests. Nearly 3 million Filipinos work in other countries, remitting $8.09 billion per year to the country (4% of the GNP). Hundreds of thousands of Filipinas work as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, where they are forced to surrender their passports to their employers, and often endure ‘near slavery, abuse, and rape’. Filipinos in the Gulf who have joined outlawedunions have been imprisoned, lashed and even executed. Philippine governments from Marcos to Aquino to Ramos have been indifferent to the conditions endured by expatriates, mainly due to the 25% unemployment rate, and 60% poverty rate in Philippines. [TXT]


MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION: In view of the evidence gathered by this Commission with regard to the potential consequences of assigning women to combat positions, current DoD and Service policies with regard to Army, Air Force and Naval aircraft on combat missions should be retained and codified by means of the re-enactment of Section 8549 of Title 10, S.C. which was repealed by Public Law 102-190, Sec. 531 for the Air Force, and reenactment of the provisions of 10 USC, sec. 6015 prohibiting women from assignment to duty on aircraft engaged in combat missions, which was repealed by Public Law 102-190 for the Navy, and codification of Army policy. (Adopted: Y: 8; N: 7; A: 0).

Overview:
Concur with the Majority Recommendation as adopted. Some women who fly combat aircraft in non-combat missions testified before the Commission. Indications are that some women can fly them quite well under non-combat conditions. Flying combat aircraft, however, transcends the question of peacetime capability. Some of the issues associated with women in air combat include the increased probability of becoming a POW, readiness, cohesion, morale and effectiveness problems associated with pregnancy, and physiological/aeromedical problems that may reduce the flexibility of assignments of women in combat aircraft.

Discussion Points:
The Nature of Air Combat:
(1) Combat fighter pilots testified to the difference between flying and fighting an aircraft.

--Air Force Lt Gen Buster Glosson, who was responsible for much of the air campaign strategy and its daily execution in the Gulf War, told the Commission:

"There are those who say technology has removed the personal demands and the horrors of combat. That is just simply not true. To me, the air combat arena comes down, as I said, to stamina and cohesion.

One, stamina is fairly straightforward to deal with from an Air Force point of view. From a medical standpoint, it can either be accomplished or it can't. And so we don't think that there is very much room for subjective judgment in that arena, and we are not trying to instill any.

But the common perception of a combat air mission -- to plan the mission to the target, brief with a wingman, fly an hour or two, 15 minutes of intense being fired at and avoidance of the ordnance --avoidance of the threat, deliver your ordnance and return and have the rest of the day off -- is simply a misconception.

The physical demands encompassed in this area are tremendous. The high speeds of the modern aircraft, as a result of technology, the high rates of turn that require the high instantaneous G loads that literally makes your body shake or may put you in G lock, as we call it, when you lose consciousness, that we have to deal with all the time -- the current requirement for sustaining consciousness is strength and endurance, and to us that is overall stamina.

The jury is out on what the final verdict will be on that issue, but, like I said, it should not be a problem for either you or I; it should be black and white.

Let me share a personal example in the Gulf war. The 14th Air Division, which I was the commander, had about 800 fighters in it. The F-15Cs at Taif that I was asking -- at Tabuk, I'm sorry, that I was asking to fly missions over and around Baghdad, those young men were flying seven- to nine-hour missions, of which about 70% of the time was in hostile territory.

Now, let's think about that from the standpoint of something we all can relate to. Think about getting on an airplane at Dulles Airport, flying to Frankfurt, Germany, sleeping for eight hours, and coming back this way, sleeping for eight hours and going back again, every day, day after day after day."

--Air Force Col Richard F. Jones, Chief of Flight Medicine at the Air Force surgeon general's office told the Commission:

"[T]here are some differences in combat versus non-combat aviation... [C]ombat aviation differs predominantly in the one area, in my mind, and that is that the combat pilot has to fly, fight and win."

--Navy LT John Clagett, a Top Gun instructor, told the Commission at hearings in Los Angeles:

"[Y]es, we do have women flying F-18s today, and that is a fact.
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia

www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads

They are certainly not flying the F-18s that any of us have flown in the fleet or out in the combat missions. To compare the missions that they are doing today to what we are doing is like comparing driving on the L.A. Freeway to driving in the Indianapolis 500. It's just not the same.

We are out there max performing the greatest airplane in the world every day, or attempting to. The women are not asked to do that. That is not their job. They have not been trained in the missions that we have been trained in. They have not performed the missions we have been performing.

And I just really object to the news or whatever coming out and saying, 'Oh, they're already doing that job.' That's not true. Yes, they are flying F-18s. They're not flying combat mission F-18s, you know, and to put them in the same role is just ludicrous." --Fellow panel member, Capt Patrick Cooke, USMC; agreed.

"The second area that I would like to address is, due to the advancement in technology that we have witnessed throughout the years, a lot of people would like to refer to aerial combat as being a long-range game, where we have long-range missiles, and we are talking about mileage there, where you can probably kill your opponent, but in actuality it's a game of inches, and, again, the outcome of that game is life or death.

What I mean by inches is, as you pick up an opponent, dear at your six o'clock, doing 550-plus knots, or miles an hour, and you look over your shoulder, and he has launched a missile at you, the only thing that you can do to save your life is to break back, or turn back into that threat, to neutralize him as best you can.

Now, I know that somebody is going to try to do some studies where they put people in a centrifuge and just sit them there and say, 'Let's see how many Gs that you can pull,' but I doubt there is going to be any simulation to see whether somebody is going to be able to, A, look over their shoulder while they are doing that under the high G force, and also work the switchology of the aircraft.

And I said it was a game of inches; while doing that high G maneuver over your shoulder, still maintaining a tally-ho on the enemy, and potentially reversing the roles, you still have to have the physical capability under that high G situation to get the first weapon off on that opponent should there be a role reversal, and that's where the game of inches comes in. Not only do you have to be able to pull hard on the pole and make that maneuver, but you have to do it with visual acuity, while maintaining sight of your opponent and ensuring that your weapons system is on him before it's on you." [=]


40062. Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women. Women in Combat: Report to the President: Part 219: Panel One Findings Approved By The Commission. District of Columbia: Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1993. (1.66) The Miller/Moskos survey reveals that of those surveyed, 22% of the women soldiers deployed to the Gulf believe they were "in combat roles". 71% of those surveyed did not believe they were; 9% were not sure. It should be noted that men did not participate in the survey. Source: (a) Panel 1 Report; 10/23/1992, p. 114. (b) Moskos, Dr. Charles C. and Mille Laura."1992 Survey on Gender in the Military [Army]." B/W 8/82 1992. [=]
right in perceiving the delay in granting the guarantees as the most important cause of the present economic crisis in Israel. He writes: "mass immigration from the former USSR came to an end. That immigration was the central factor which after 1989 moved the wheels of Israel's economy. Was it possible to prevent the decline of immigration while maintaining economic growth? Yes, it could have been done. Without the Shamir administration's clash with Bush over the settlement policy, the US government would have received the guarantee that it had been "cleared" with the US, with the effect of improving the entire economic situation. Why was the guarantee postponed for as long as 18 months? In order to understand it, let us move two years back. On 4/12/1991, the chief political correspondent of "Haaretz", Uzi Benziman, reported that on his first visit to Israel, the then State Secretary Baker, "opened his conversation with David Levy [then Israeli Foreign minister], by saying that Sharon must be stopped" from building settlements at all conceivable West Bank locations. As Benziman made crystal clear, Baker didn't ask Israel to stop all settlements, or even to quantitatively reduce its extent. All he wanted was to stop provocations through establishing settlements in the most ostentatious manner for merely symbolic reasons. As a pro quo, he offered 8 concessions to Israeli demands made by Shamir's ultra-right government. The concessions, which Benziman rightly called "major achievements", included the following: "It is agreed upon that a Palestinian state is not to be a subject of negotiations [between Israel and the Palestinians]; it is agreed upon that the Palestinian delegation is to be selected rather than elected; it is agreed upon that [Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338 are subject to two different interpretations, each as valid as the other", so on and so forth. The religious settlers, however, feeling strong as a result of being backed by Sharon and other right-wing politicians, were adamant in rejecting any concessions to the US, eventually forcing Sharon to renegotiate on his deal with the US and to let Sharon proceed with the settlement as before. Only when it turned out that, as Benziman put it ("Haaretz", June 28, 1991), "a tacit agreement linking together the [Israeli] government, the leadership of [Jewish] settlers and the American Administration proved unreachable", the US began threatening Israel that the guarantees may be withheld in retaliation to the settlers who just "could not resist a temptation to bring caravans to a new settlement", Benziman explained their point of view: "A kind of esprit de corps has evolved in the Jewish settlements in the Territories, sanctimonious, self-congratulatory, and megalomaniac. Their frame of mind is reminiscent of the bitterness of the French settlers in Algeria towards their mother country... Their mood was angry, but it went together with their conviction that they have been chosen by the grace of God. The leaders of the religious settlers firmly believe that they are in a better position than others to decode the inner intent of the Gentiles to be more rather than less "uppity to the Jews". The response of a host of other settlers in the same spirit can be safely omitted from this presentation. But an exception must be made for the already deceased leader and founder of Gush Emunim, Rabbi Yehuda Zvi Kook who still is essentially quoted. According to rabbi Kook, the autonomy's greatest evil is that the Jews willing to grant it consider themselves weak, instead of putting their trust in God and refusing to grant an autonomy in line with his commandments. Had they done so, God would be certain to reward them in these times of Redemption by endowing them with unrivalled strength. The religious settlers and their closest allies in the National Religious Party have remained true to those principles. But their supporters in the major right-wing parties, Likud and Tzomet, already speak a different language. They speak of Israeli security and they fail to recognize the Arabs as Gentiles. Thus, the Likud party admits Arabs as members. One of its MKs, As'ad As'ad, is a Druze, on close terms with Netanyahu. Tzomet also enjoys a significant Druze support. A group of Druze reserve officers remain on friendly terms with the party leader, Rafael Eitan. This is why the alliance of the religious settlers with their secular supporters, much as it may seem at the moment close, must be regarded as potentially fragile. Among the actual stipulations of the autonomy agreement discussed by the Hebrew press, by far the most important is the formation of a Palestinian police force empowered to enforce order in the Palestinian society without which the autonomy is said to be unfeasible. The nature of its authority was clarified by Ron Edelst ("Hadashot", May 2, 1993) and described in detail by Tzvi Gilat and Ronny Shaked ("Yedioth Ahronot", April 30). Edelst, whose "connections" with Shabak's Chief were discussed in report 120, describes the autonomy as stemming from "a major and rather all-purposive deal agreed upon between Israel and the PLO. Its most important stipulation is the transfer of some administrative functions to self-government authorities, on the condition of establishing in advance an operative dialogue between the Israeli security agencies [i.e. Shabak and the "Minority Department" of the Police which acts as Shabak's front] and their Palestinian counterparts still to be formed. The purpose of the dialogue is a joint prevention of any act of the ordinary acts, i.e. of terrorism". Apart from Edelst, no other Hebrew press commentator has explicitly mentioned the formation of "the Palestinian counterparts of Shabak". But implicit hints pointing in the same direction have abounded. The cooperation between the Israeli and the "autonomous" secret police forces aiming at "prevention of
terrorism", must be regarded as the crucial stipulation of "the deal agreed upon between Israel and the PLO". Israel's consent to the scheme can in my view be attributed only to the abject and systematic failure of Shabak to perform its duties. This failure is well-known in Israel and has been discussed in several of my reports. After all, few Hamas guerrillas have been caught by Shabak, in spite of the seal-off which was supposed to enable them to capture. For example, a group which killed Naim Stoltdano in 12/1992, Shabak's success at capturing the guerrillas who nominally identify themselves as belonging to the Fatah has been far from impressive either. The only partial recent success which Shabak can claim, has been against the "Red Eagle" guerrillas affiliated with the PFLP, who are no more than a tiny force within the Palestinian resistance and who avoid attacking Israeli troops or police and specialize in killing the usually unarmed Jews. Shabak's ineptitude, which must by now dishearten its top ranks, has been fairly steady since the inception of the Intifada, due to the decimation of the ranks of its collaborators at the hands of the Intifada militants. The idea of the formation of "Palestinian counterparts" of Shabak, to jointly fight terrorism in the Israeli meaning of the term, can only stem from the recognition of Shabak's misperformance. The Palestinian police can be expected to act as a mere front for "the real work" to be performed by the secret police, in replication of the division of labor between the Shabak and the Palestinians who before the Intifada served in the Israeli police. The PLO can be expected to command both the secret police and overt police, and be rewarded in the process by being permitted to clamp down on its own enemies within Palestinian society. The scheme bears some resemblance to the "Village Leagues" of Sharon, but while the leaders of the latter were recruited from among the dregs of the society, the commanders of the two Palestinian police forces can be expected to come from the ranks of the PLO, primarily from the Fatah, which commands the loyalty of a large number of prestigious Palestinian leading families and prestigious Palestinian intellectuals. The arrangement also bears close resemblance to relations existing between American Intelligence agencies and local police forces in countries such as Panama. [=]

40065. Shahak, Israel. The Autonomy Agreement and the Domestic Conflict in Israel: Part 2 of 4. Shahak Report 121. Israel, May 5, 1993. Gilat and Shaked concentrate on these aspects of the autonomy which infuriate the religious settlers the most. Accordingly, they ignore the Palestinian secret police and deal only with the one which is going to be armed and uniformed, and thus strike the eyes of religious settlers as a constant reminder of the breach of their religious principles by the Jewish state. While noting that "officially, the plans for the Palestinian police remain classified", Gilat and Shaked reveal its organizational principles. The [Israeli] plans allow for the formation of a police force of several thousand, equipped with light weapons, which have been defined by [the Police minister] Shahal as nothing more than "revolvers and submachine guns". The powers of this police are defined as "enforcing the traffic regulations, securing the public order, combating the drug use and controlling crime. The [Israeli] Police ministry assures us that this Police will closely cooperate with the Israeli police". The Palestinian police seems to be already in the process of formation as a force totally subjugated to the Israeli authorities. According to a radio announcement (May 4) by the chairman of the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Defense Affairs, general (reserves) Onri Orr (Labor), Israeli authorities will have to approve the hiring of each single policeman. Gilat and Shaked quote the former ([Klikud] Police minister Ronny Milo, proving that he stood by ostensibly the same principle. This shows again how little things changed when Labor replaced Likud. The names of the two commanders of the Palestinian police force have been published by the Hebrew press some time ago. Both are former Jordanian police officers who right after the conquest of the West Bank in 1967 joined the Israeli police and served in it with distinction, until they resigned in the spring of 1988, forced to do so by the Intifada. Even thereafter, however, they managed to remain on good terms with the Israeli authorities. They are reported by the Hebrew press to have already begun training "a nucleus" of the Palestinian police in “Egypt and Jordan”.

Gilat and Shaked discuss the cooperation between that police and the "Shabak investigators, who may even train some police officers and share information with them". The Palestinian police will be not authorized to deal with "security matters" unless it acts in "cooperation" with Shabak, i.e. provides the latter with the still scarce information. This is why this cooperation will be so essential. Gilat and Shaked report that "the main barrier of the Palestinians has consented to a continuous, determined release of administrative detainees in Israel in exchange for freeing some others, regardless of how much the Israelis may be indignant at the latter's release. The future administrative detainees will also be transferred to Israel". Palestinians apprehended by the new police, though, will be held in prisons located in the "autonomous territory". Without it being said explicitly, it can only mean that Shabak will retain all its present powers in the Territories and will use them there as deemed fit.

What the Hebrew press now stresses, is the racist nature of the Palestinian police's statutes. The problem stems from the most vociferous objections of the religious settlers to the prospect of being detained or even having their identity checked by a Palestinian policeman, whenever they happen to find themselves in the "autonomous areas", which they will be always able to enter at will. (One has to understand that the roads linking their settlements with Israel or with each other will anyway remain outside the Palestinian police's jurisdiction.) In order to appease the settlers, the official pronouncements keep reiterating that, as Gilat and Shaked put it, "the Israeli plans envisage that whenever a Jewish driver may be involved in the Territories in a traffic accident, all a Palestinian policeman can do is to request him kindly to stay in place, pending the arrival of an Israeli policeman and disposal of the case by the latter". But the religious settlers still refuse to be appeased. Gilat and Shaked quote the reaction of one of the more vocal of their spokesmen, Uri Elitzur. "Think for yourself. Let us assume that a Palestinian policeman requesting your wife to stay in place happens to be an exceptionally nice person. Can you believe that he will confine himself to that request?" Other settler leaders made it clear that they will treat such a request by an armed Palestinian policeman as an unforgivable insult. As the already mentioned Pinhas Wallerstein explained to Gilat and Shaked, "we instructed our men to open fire to kill in such a case". No government spokesmen would be able to follow Wallerstein's words, even though under Israeli law (which applies to the settlers) they constitute a clear case of incitement to violence which is a punishable offense.

In other words, the Israeli government in advance envisages that the Palestinian police are going to be subject to racist humiliations while performing their duties. But racism is nothing new to those Palestinian policemen who served in the Israeli police between 1967-1988, and wore Israeli uniforms, not the "autonomous" Palestinian ones now planned for the new police. As the Hebrew press repeatedly noted throughout that period, and as anybody, including myself, could see, the Palestinians serving in the Israeli police in the Territories (but not in Israel) operated under severe constraints dictated by racist considerations. In contrast to the Arab press or the PLO propaganda which would never mention it, Palestinian policemen who in 1988 resigned under the pressure of Intifada, and were subsequently interviewed by the Hebrew press, would voice their resentment over racism they had been subjected to with extreme bitterness. A Palestinian policeman in the Territories, although often armed and always wearing an Israeli uniform, had no power to stop, let alone to arrest, any Israeli, even in cases of traffic accidents. All he could do, was to request him politely to stay put pending the arrival of an Israeli policeman. The dining rooms were segregated, the Palestinian policemen being forbidden to even enter the rooms the Israeli policemen were dining in. I still remember how surprised I was to watch such racist practices already in 1968. But now, the religious settlers advance such racist concepts far beyond anything practiced before 1988, without being effectively challenged in any way. In my view this only shows that Israeli Jewish society, also under Rabin, steadily evolves toward the right.

One unit of what really is the new Palestinian police already functions, still without uniforms, under the name of the "Orient House Guards". Their connections with Shabak were discussed in report 120.
The unit is indirectly commanded by Feisal Husseini, and directly by an ex-Israeli police officer. A bit of information about the range of their exploits has been provided by Khaled Abu-Tu’ama ("Yerushalaim", April 23). "Husseini’s men, popularly dubbed ‘Feisal’s thugs’ are often brutalizing the residents of Eastern Jerusalem. Last week, 5 of them serving in the subunit of Husseini’s personal guards, beat up an editor of a Palestinian weekly, who they said had deviated from PLO’s official line." Also known are other incidents of the same type, invariably targeted at individuals who dared say something in public this unit would dislike.

In my estimate, the incidence of such acts is on the increase.

More sinister still is the involvement of "Feisal’s thugs" in commercial disputes between members or proteges of the Hussein clan and persons affiliated with rival clans. Abu-Tu’ama recounts an already notorious case, which occurred about two weeks before the date of his article. It involved two clans, "both supporting the Fatah", he says. One, the Ja'afar clan, enjoys the feudal protection of the Hussein clan, "and is very close to Feisal Hussein", whereas the other, the Natshe clan, is in rivalry with it. First some respective clansmen quarrelled over some trivial point of honor. At that stage the Natshe clan scored a triumph by wounding one of their rivals. But then, the Ja'afar clan "appealed for help of several dozens of local Fatah militants, some employed as Feisal’s personal guards". At the same time, the Natshe clan brought a busload of reinforcements from among the clansmen from villages around Hebron. The ensuing battle was truly royal, even though it involved nothing more than sticks and fistfights. It was fought "in a market place" (Nuristan) in East Jerusalem, in front of thousands of astonished local residents, and in front of quite amused Israeli police and Border Guards who, although present didn't intervene. The Hussein-backed coalition won, and their adversaries (some requiring hospitalization) had no choice but to flee the scene. Whereupon the victors, still at daylight time, proceeded to vent their anger at the shoe shop of Adnan Natshe. "Feisal's thugs first assaulted me and my family and then ruined our shop", complained Adnan Natshe to Abu-Tu’ama. But that quote and a description of the whole incident appeared only in the Hebrew press. The Arab press refused to cover it, no doubt in order to avoid "deviating from PLO's official line" and suffering the consequences. While seeking to submit a complaint to the Israeli police of "the united Jerusalem", Adnan Natshe and members of his clan were, according to my sources, turned down with scoff and scorn. In despair, they turned to Dr. Sari Nusseir to intervene with Feisal Hussein in order to be granted "a cease fire", in the end graciously accorded them. The compensation for the losses, estimated at 20000 Shekel "will have to be discussed when Mr. Husseini, who is now preoccupied with his foreign travels, will be at leisure to look into the matter".

Such clan warfare is an increasingly common occurrence. Largely owing to it, the Israeli rule in the Territories was before the Intifada relatively secure. Of course, Palestinian customary silence about it mightily helped Israel in the process. The popular committees which mushroomed during the Intifada did all they could to substitute democratic authority for clan conflicts. They achievement was uniquely great, but unfortunately devoid of any durability. The greatest mistake of the PLO bureaucracy was to let it die down. But this was also a mistake of many foreign observers who failed to notice this aspect of the Intifada, because they preferred to indulge in Stalinist cliches rather than voice their genuine support for the just cause of Palestinian freedom. Anyway, the great achievement of the Intifada is already gone. We are back to square one, and it will show regardless of whether or not "Feisal's thugs" put on uniforms.

The just described story also accords with my opinion, seldom voiced even in the Hebrew press and never in the Arab one, that the Palestinians in the Territories tend to view both the delegation to the "peace talks" and the PLO bureaucracy with cynical indifference bordering on hostility. I am not referring here to the Hamas’ supporters whose attitudes and real influence need to be discussed separately. Nor am I referring to the PLO’s "refusal front organizations" e.g. the PFLP, whose futility and failure to achieve anything is by and large scorned by ordinary Palestinians. Such attitudes were expressed by the Dean of the Philosophy Department at the Bir-Zeit University, Dr. Mussa Budeiri, in an interview granted Nahum Barnea ("Yediot Ahronot", April 30). “Budeiri thinks that Feisal Hussein is one of the most ludicrous characters he has ever met. ‘You, the Israelis, view the Palestinian society with so much condescensionas if we were still in the 1920s. Because of that you consider Hussein important because of his family background’. Budeiri also makes another point, citing his Bir-Zeit students as an example. He says that Palestinians are usually ignorant of their own history. ‘All they know is a story of a myth of a dervish with a sword who in no books in Arabic dealing with history of the Palestinian people, and this may explain that ignorance.’ In Budeiri’s view the Palestinian youth at large is not overly impressed by the exploits of Feisal Hussein’s father as a commander of Palestinian forces in the vicinity of Jerusalem in 1948 and his death in battle, because they don’t know much about it. ‘Only you, the Israelis, think that Feisal’s father is still venerated by us as a hero and that Feisal is a great leader. But those who know Feisal intimately, know better. ‘The same can be said about Arafat. Israelis are convinced that the Palestinians do nothing the whole day apart from wishing Arafat. Today I was on business in the office of a Ramallah money-changer. People were talking there about the returning Palestinians. ‘Sure’, said the changer, ‘even Arafat is about to return. Didn’t we learn from an Israeli TV newscast that his wife had recently bought for herself a luxurious residence in Ramallah? Everybody was roaring with laughter.”

“ I asked: ‘But why the Palestinians hate Hanan Ashrawi?’ ‘Because Hanan Ashrawi and Bibi Netanyahu resemble each other at least in one respect. Both never believe in what comes out of their mouths. Both are staging a permanent show-off. True, I know Hanan better of the two. It was Ted Koppel who made her into what she now is. Once she appeared on his show, she already was a spokeswoman for the Palestinian cause’.” [s] 40066. Shahak, Israel. The Autonomy Agreement and the Domestic Conflict in Israel: Part 3 of 4. Shahak Report 121. Israel, May 5, 1993. In his somewhat earlier article, Yoram Binur ("Hadashot", April 16) explains why the delegation, and in particular Feisal Hussein, are so much targets of popular hatred. It is because of the contrast between the privileges bestowed on them by Israeli authorities and the destitution of the masses engineered by the very same authorities. And another factor contributing to their being hated is the unsavory reputation of some of them for financial matters. “Even Arafat must realize that the prestige of the Palestinian delegation has plummeted, in spite of Abd-el Shafi still being its head. During the first days of the seal-off we could see it clearly. Right upon imposing the seal-off, Israel announced that all members of the delegation [about 150 persons] were to obtain permits letting them and their cars pass all checkpoints. The members of the delegation at once rushed to Civil Administration offices nearest to their place of residence to pick up these permits. It now happens so often that a peasant woman from, say, the Ramallah district wants to sell some vegetables in Jerusalem, but is turned back by the army at a checkpoint, while watching how a delegation member from her area, driving in his new expensive car, is respectfully let by the soldiers through. This is what produced a wave of popular resentment. This week the delegation members were forced to announce that upon the expiry of their present permits they will not renew them. ‘Still, our reputations have already been damaged’, a member of the delegation admitted to me with a sigh. ‘We ourselves are responsible for our popular image of a bunch of careerists and pleasure-seekers, entertaining themselves in luxurious hotels abroad while our people here suffer unbearable hardships’. Let me supplement Binur's story by pointing out that the permits are valid for 6 months, so that at the time of their renewal no one may remember such promises any more. Not a single delegation member had enough courage to return his permit at once, or to refuse to take it in the first place. This is why their promises not to renew them in the future can hardly be expected to impress anybody. Binur discusses the financial reputation of the delegation members, pointing to the evident contrast between Abd-el Shafi and Feisal Hussein. Unlike Abd-el Shafi, “who has never sought to derive any personal benefits from his political opinions, and who while heading the delegation continues to work as a physician in the Red Crescent, without employing body guards to be seen at the gate.
of his house... Husseini's lifestyle does not contribute to his popularity. In the eyes of the hundreds of thousands of refugee camp residents, Husseini is regarded as a rich man who hautishly keeps distance from ordinary people". Binur describes the repudient furniture of the "Orient House" and the haughty treatment accorded ordinary Palestinians who may happen to find themselves there, and he contrasts it with Abd-el ShafII's habitual courtesy. Then he says that "unlike Abd-el Shafi, Husseini has been the target of a truly inspired policy, attuned to the very expectations of the place, its institutions, its people, its needs. That policy is likely to generate power but not popularity: domestic politics and distribution of money. It was Husseini, for example, who forced the charismatic refugee camp-born former chairman of the Journalist Association in the Territories, Radwan Abu-Ayash, to withdraw from politics. In the days when the money still flowed to the Territories freely, Husseini was a major distributor of Fatah's money. People applying for money could always be seen lining up in front of his private office. Of course, some applicants felt they were treated unjustly, and now recall it, blaming Husseini". One can see why Budeiri, when asked by Barnea about "the possibility of establishing a democratic Palestinian state" under the present conditions answered: "No. A Palestinian state cannot be democratic, just as no Arab state is democratic".

I have concentrated in this presentation on the formation of the Palestinian secret and uniformed police and on the mood of Palestinian public opinion. I perceive these two factors as indirectly corroborating Edelist's version of a deal Israel made with the PLO. What I mean, is that Palestinian hostility toward any such deal could paralyze it from the start, unless the population of the Territories were forced to accept it by terror of the police as currently envisaged. Compared to the agreement about the police, other points of the Israel-PLO deal can be treated more cursorily, insofar as information about them becomes available. In my view, the PLO has already accepted the basic Israeli approach to be outlined below. In discussing the deal, however, I'll take the liberty to often skip exact source references.

All autonomous authority is to be derived from Israeli authorities, as represented by the military governors, who instead of having their headquarters in Palestinians towns, will have them elsewhere. Currently, the Palestinian delegation still opposes the Israeli proposals regarding the size and the character of the "autonomous" parliament or council, its electoral procedures, etc. But, as Gilat and Shaked inform, "the PLO leadership does not oppose the idea of the elections in principle, but in practice is against them. Arafat prefers to appoint the representatives himself, even when - and if - the elections to the autonomy council are held". It was therefore resolved within the framework of the deal in question that Israel will agree to let "the Chief of the PLO appoint the council members, at first temporarily, and thereafter permanently".

The Territories are going to be divided into three types of areas. Some are going to be placed under direct Israeli control, and the right of settling there will be recognized by the Palestinians. In the West Bank this area will include the "Greater Jerusalem", the Jordan valley and its extension toward the Dead Sea coast, which together with a belt parallel to the Green line, will surround the West Bank and partition it into two separate pieces. Numerous army camps and all Jewish settlements together with major highways connecting them, regardless of how close they may run to Arab towns, will be located in the areas of this category. Those army camps, settlements and highways will divide the "autonomous" area into smaller enclaves.] The second type will consist of what is defined as "areas actually inhabited by the Palestinians", to be put under the autonomy. New settling will be forbidden there, and the right to issue construction permits will be granted the "autonomous" Palestinian authorities. Yet the latter will operate under Israeli supervision extending upon different sectors of the administration. The third type areas, now officially referred to as "the state lands", will consist of the lands seized by the State of Israel from the Palestinians, but not yet settled by the Jews. Such areas will be put under a joint jurisdiction of the two sides, but with the status quo recognized by both, and the right to veto any change granted to both. If the Palestinians may use that right to veto any further settlement in those areas, Israel may be in the position to veto all Palestinian development, including even construction of houses. A similar classification of land will be applied in the Gaza Strip, except that the "state lands" can be assumed to account for a much smaller proportion there. No accurate information about the size of the West Bank lands belonging to the various categories is as yet available.

The demographic status quo is to continue. Only those Palestinians will have the right to reside in the Territories who were counted in the census taken by the Israel in 9/1967, or, if born thereafter, hold a proper birth certificate. The expellees forfeit this right forever, unless they are granted any act of favor. The Israeli-PLO deal therefore rests on the assumption that the Palestinians who do not have the thus defined residence rights can acquire them only through Israeli "gestures". The Hebrew press commentators interpret such form of population control as suiting the best interests of the Palestinian delegation. The well-informed Avinoam Bar-Yosel ("Maariv", April 30) says that "at the beginning of the negotiations [between Israel and the PLO] about readmitting expellees, the security branches [i.e. the Shabak] feared that some returnees may enjoy too much popularity. They were particularly afraid of Akram Haniye and some others. Realizing the extent of their popularity, they feared that upon returning, such individuals might undermine the power base of the present members of the Palestinian delegation, especially of Feisal Husseini, with the effect of complicating the negotiating process. Even though their names were personally proposed to Israel by Yasser Arafat, the authorities in Jerusalem refused to let them return because they presumed Arafat's intention was to neutralize Feisal Hussein's emergent personal power base". Bar-Yosef cynically remarks that "a review of the sequence of Israeli gestures in the aftermath of the mass expulsion may well lead to the conclusion that Israel could gain more by readmitting the 400 Hamas militants and confining them in an Israeli detention camp. This holds true even if the terror wave Israel has endured since the expulsion is not taken into account". Undoubtedly, Israel wants to keep the power of the delegation and of Feisal Hussein, unchecked by other Palestinians. The decisions to grant or deny readmissions to individual Palestinian expellees can be expected to be affected by this consideration. Israel reserves for itself the right to veto any changes in present taxation. At the same time, however, it reassures the Palestinian delegation that the autonomy authorities, if they so desire, can have full powers to allocate or distribute tax revenues as they may like, provided they assume the burden of enforcing the collection of taxes. This may turn out to be a "State lands" category, of which only the Palestinian police, most likely only its secret component, may be in the position to solve. The problem stems from the fact that many Palestinians have refused to pay any taxes already from the inception of the Intifada; or else they have paid only their minimum need to extract from the Civil Administration urgently needed permit or licence. In the Gaza Strip there are many who do not even pay their electricity bills, or who prefer to connect themselves to the electricity grid in places unknown to the Israeli authorities.

This is why the right to spend tax revenues as deemed fit may well pale in importance compared to another right Israel is willing to grant the autonomous authorities from the moment a preliminary agreement is signed: namely the right to freely distribute the donations which may arrive from abroad. According to Edelist (ibid.), they are likely to include a huge Saudi donation, effected on the prompting of the US. Without estimating the size of this donation (other commentators estimate it at $100 million), Edelist concludes "that the Saudis must therefore be a central factor in the big deal [between Israel and the PLO], even if they avoid exposure to limelight. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, and in view of all their conflicts with Iran, the Saudis have needed to enhance their prestige as the protectors of Islam, to the point of providing some support for Hamas. But Americans never tire of making them mend their ways and they succeed in it. A sign of the American success in this venture was last week's Saudi official announcement that Saudi Arabia was going to stop boycotting the American companies trading with Israel". According to Edelist, the Saudis will soon be duly rewarded for that decision.

"It is known that in the past Saudi Arabia kept flooding the successive Israeli governments with requests to be granted by Israel some kind of authority to administer Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem and mark them by the Saudi flag. So far, all such messages have been..."
rejected outright. But now, the Saudis may well be granted such rights as a reward for their role in bringing the peace process to its successful conclusion*. Edelist has so far been alone in disclosing the very existence of such Saudi requests in the past. But his information must be true. Israel is now indeed likely to grant the Saudis some supervisory functions. And the permission to fly their flag over the Al-Aqsa Mosque now appears to be in Israeli best interest, as it would preclude flying a Palestinian flag there for that matter a Jordanian one which resembles the Palestinian closely. (Both of them, along with the flags of some other Arab states, are made up by various combinations of white, black, red and green colors, each of them representing a major Arab dynasty, with the effect that the four colors together symbolize the Arab nation as a whole. The Saudi flag, however, is no more than an emblem of the country’s royal family, and carries no such connotations. Given this fact, the Israeli “experts on Arab mentality” can only regard the Saudi flag as apt to influence the Palestinians in ways deemed by those “experts” to be “positive”.) Certainly, most of those who voted for Labor or “Meretz” could not care less about whether Saudi flag could be seen in Jerusalem, whereas many in their ranks would fearously object to a Palestinian flag there. True, the religious settlers and their right-wing allies are sure to feel debase if any Gentile flag flies over Jerusalem, and to run amok with indignation. An agreement with the Saudis could therefore aggravate the domestic tensions in Israel. [=]

40067. Shahak, Israel. The Autonomy Agreement and the Domestic Conflict in Israel: Part 4 of 4. Shahak Report 121. Israel, May 5, 1993. The viability of the Israeli-PLO deal, however, depends not only on the US and Rabin, but also on the consent of the Knesset and in the last analysis on the mandate of the Israeli electorate. (The extent of the Palestinian opposition to the deal will not be discussed in this report.) Since the religious settlers oppose any kind of autonomy intransigently, and already succeeded in squashing the agreement Israel had reached earlier with the Bush Administration, the Hebrew press commentators remain apprehensive. Some of them even expect that the religious settlers may not shrink from launching a civil war over the deal. The columnists like Ron Edelist even declared they would volunteer to fight in such a war in order to fell the settlers down to their knees. On March 26 Edelist addressed the religious settlers in an open letter, which deserves to be quoted extensively. After reminding his readers that in 1948, in the inception of Israel, its army crushed a civil rebellion by shelving “the ‘Altalena’ ship and thus forestalling the development which could not but have been uncontrollable, irrational and contrary to the Jewish national interest”, he proceeds to telling the religious settlers that they may yet be treated likewise. He blames them for their brinkmanship, admitting his own share of responsibility for it. “It is you who have administered for 25 years a racist conquest regime, adorned with pageants of haughtiness and faked heroism. Let me also ignore your sanctimonious boasts of the ‘marvellous relations with your neighbors’ which you used to make early to those who, while seeing a tree, will understand that it is a tree and not something else. Only gradually I realized that I was dealing with almost pathological lunatics, dangerous to themselves and to their environment. I still don’t understand how could I let them and myself go on so far. "It is apparent that we are both moving toward a violent confrontation which may be Jewish-Arab, but may also be internecine Jewish. I want to know that in either case I will not be on your side. This time I am not going to be impressed by your sanctimonious habit of raising your eyes up to the heavens and invoking Jewish brotherhood. I will not let myself be dragged into a religious war or a racist gang warfare. From now on, there will be a complete separation between one belligerent - you - and another - me. Until one of us gets defeated”.

As mentioned in report 120, of all Hebrew press commentators Edelist is on the closest of terms with Shabak and its Chief. But whether the public at large know this, and his entourage share his opinions is an open question. Certainly, from the date Edelist wrote his article until the date of this report nothing has been done to restrain the religious settlers or their allies, who therefore felt free to escalate violence. By the end of the Hebrew press already recognized that, as the chief political commentator of Haaretz, Uzi Benzman put it (“Haaretz”, April 30), the government was afraid of the settlers rather than the other way round. “Among the government members there are some who do not believe that current Israeli positions can avoid resulting in a fratricidal shedding of Jewish blood. In eye to eye conversations, those ministers take the liberty to intimidate that for the first time since the formation of the State of Israel, political struggle will involve the use of firearms and the attempts to assassinate the politicians. It cannot be determined whether such fears are based on intelligence estimates or whether the ministers voicing them simply fear for their own life and limb as visible targets of possible assassination attempts. But the political-decision makers already clearly assume that the coming political contest in Israel will be stormy, violent and sordid in the extreme, to the point of necessitating a special organizational effort by the police and Shabak for the sake of protecting the lives of public figures.” The settlers are supported by the right-wing parties. “Meanwhile the general staff of the right-wing parties in the Knesset, coordinated by Netanyahu, is parallelly to the settlers seeking to bring the government down, primarily by exerting pressure on the Shass party. They assume that the Shass party remains the Achilles heel of the coalition, and that here lies a non-negligible chance of frustrating Rabin’s plans. The pressure on Shass is going to be maintained by staging a permanent protest vigil in front of the home of [its spiritual leader] rabbi Ovadia Yosef. The leaders of the right-wing parties anticipate that in the event of being denied Shass’ support, Rabin will dare concede nothing to the Arabs, even if assured of the support of 61 MKs in favor of...
concessions. In any case, the Knesset right wing will try to deny legitimacy to 'a blocking majority' with 5 MKs from the Arab parties. They will argue that such a majority has no right to determine the fate of the Jewish state. Any withdrawal from the Territories, and any change in the present status of Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District will be presented as futile". The government coalition crisis which right now unfolds, was at least in part caused by such pressures upon the government by the settlers. The government responds to those pressures in several manners. On the one hand, it keeps reassuring the public that the agreement envisages no essential changes. As Benziman puts it "the government, at least for the time being, will keep reassuring everybody that no withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District is being contemplated, and therefore that all the claims of the settlers to the effect of the existence of risks to their security are baseless. As to the Golan Heights, a partial withdrawal from them is intended, but is certain to be scheduled to last very long, so as to subject the real intentions of Syria in regard to sticking to the terms of mutually negotiated peace to a continuous test". The ploy may work, because even "the leaders of the settlers recognize that the great majority of Israeli Jews are not overly concerned, and in case there will be no peace, the Prime Minister's 'honesty' will offer us no consolation". It is still too early to appraise this cynicism's worth in terms of political expediency.

On the other hand, the government is sure to appeal to the memory of Menahem Begin, in line with Rabin's great successes in presenting himself to the voters as Begin's true successor. "The leaders of the settlers know that the idea of autonomy in its Israeli understanding enjoys a modicum of popularity in the public mind by virtue of being associated with the memory of Menahem Begin, and they recognize that this factor could make it very difficult for them to sway the public against the autonomy". In pursuit of this tactics, Begin, his Likud associates and their policies are now extolled by major columnists in the Histadrut-owned "Davar", which is the Labor party's mouthpiece. Its political commentator, Khami Shalev, writes (April 30) that "Rabin conducts the negotiations about the future of the Territories in exact conformity with Likud's ideology. He has not relinquished the Golan Heights and he keeps the option of the formal annexation of the Territories by Israel open until the very end". Shalev acknowledges that Likud has been right in accusing Rabin of having deceived the voters, because apart from the seal-off of the Territories all his policies ran amiss of what he had promised before the elections. But Shalev appreciates it when voters are deceived. "Promising to stand firmly by a rigidly defined principle in order to subsequently renge on it is no deception but a mark of sophistication in policy-making. This was done by Moshe Dayan... . This was done by Menahem Begin... . It was Yitzhak Shamir who didn’t hesitate to openly avow that ‘for the sake of the Land of Israel lying is permitted’". Unfortunately, Shamir himself didn’t lie. Contrary to what he avowed, he prided himself in doing exactly as he said. He announced he was going to fill the Territories with Jews and he at once proceeded to do exactly that. He said he would concede nothing, and has never conceded anything. True, he did deceive the Americans. But to the Israelis he kept telling the truth and behaving accordingly. The inevitable consequence of this 'honesty' was the stalemating of the peace process, our involvement in some quite superfluous settlements and the Intifada”. Remarkable as this statement is, one should beware of interpreting it to mean that unlike Shamir, Rabin tells the truth to the Americans while deceiving the Israelis. It can be seen that he deceives everybody non-stop, his closest associates included. Along with other pro-Labor journalists, Shalev advises the government to lash out at Likud for being unable to deceive its own followers intelligently. In conclusion, Shalev says that "if Rabin succeeds in delivering peace, people will soon forget all his 'deceptions'; and in case there will be no peace, the Prime Minister's 'honesty' will offer us no consolation": It is still too early to appraise this cynicism's worth in terms of political expediency.

In the meantime the power of the right wing politicians to draw crowds to their rallies bears no comparison with the noise they are capable of making in the Knesset. The rally held in Jerusalem on April 28, addressed by Netanyahu and the leaders of all other right-wing parties, drew about 4000 demonstrators, most of them recognizable as religious settlers, their various allies, or apparatchiks of various parties.
Syria

42000. ------. "Genital Cleansing [Australian forces controlled brothels in Aleppo, Syria in 1942, where strict cleaning was required by prostitutes after each client; however, abrasion from such cleaning may be a source of infections]", in AIDS Newsletter, August 1993. p. 14. [TXT]

42001. ------. "Israel Blocks Beirut's Port; Helicopter Attack Kills Six Civilians", in Arizona Daily Star, April 14, 1996. p. A18. In a new, uncompromising escalation, Israel has cut all trade to Lebanon, and staged a helicopter gunship attack on an ambulance that killed six civilians. Israel denounced continuing Hezbollah attacks that have killed zero Jews today, and which have cumulatively killed zero Jews. Maj. Gen. Amiriam Levine justified the slaughter of non-Jewish civilians, including children, in the helicopter gunship attack on the ambulance since: "...they were operating from where Hezbollah fired Katyushkas and where we have warned residents to evacuate", noting that gunship attacks on ambulances are a standard Israeli practice. The head of The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Philippe Gaillard, was stunned by the Israeli proclamation that ambulances are legitimate military targets, stating that such attacks break all norms of international law and humanitarian law.

Israel demanded more mass refugee movements, stating anything that moves in a broad sweep of villages is by definition Hezbollah and hence a legitimate military target. Lebanon has protested Israeli 'aggression' [sic: quotes in the original article, expressing the newspaper's support for the Israeli attack on Lebanon] before the Security Council. There is fear of the war spreading, since Israeli forces have staged attacks on Syrian army positions in Lebanon. [TXT]

42002. ------. "Israeli Troops [conduct military maneuvers in the Golan Heights as Israeli officials warn with increasing urgency that a Syrian attack on Israel is imminent; in Hebron Jewish troops attack the funeral of a Palestinian boy beaten to death by a Jewish settler]", in Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1996. p. A1. [TXT]

42003. ------. "It's a Boy! Warren, You Did It!", in World Today (CNN), April 26, 1996. Toasting the new 'peace agreement' by proclaiming 'It's a Boy!' [sic: the traditional cause of Jewish celebration, in contradiction to 'It's a Girl' which is traditional cause of Jewish dismay.], Peres proclaimed the massive Israeli devastation of southern Lebanon (destruction of roads, power plants, water systems, setting Lebanon back a decade in reconstruction, noted Brent Sadler in Beirut). Peres praised Warren Christopher for enforcing Israeli demands on the ruins of southern Lebanon, by proclaiming over champagne, "Warren You Did It!!!". Kessel characterizes Christopher's success as a 'triumph'. Warren Christopher hovered at Peres' elbow. The agreement will end Katyusha attacks, as Christopher noted 'allowing civilians to leave the airraid shelters' [Christopher seems to be speaking only to Israeli concerns, ignoring the 500000 Lebanese refugees forced to flee their homes under threat of Israeli terrorist attacks]. Israel receives an absolute guarantee of security, and Christopher announced that Israel has an absolute guarantee of security in the 'security zone' inside Lebanon, but Israel reserves right of 'self-defense' which allows Israel to attack at will.

The 'boy' agreement is seen as a plus for the Peres re-election campaign. 'Unfortunately', in the words of Gerrold Kessel (Israel CNN newsreader) the stature of Assad was enhanced by the brutality of the Israeli attacks and the misery of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian refugees inflicted in the Israeli terror attacks. Kessel claimed that, 'Israel has been bloodied by Katyusha missiles' [sic: total dead in Israeli zero], while noting that much of southern Lebanon is devastated. New Israeli airraids were made across southern Lebanon. The mayor of Kiryat Shmona called for further attacks on southern Lebanon since the Arabs cannot be trusted.

Warren Christopher termed the agreement a big step forward, and noted that the only goal was the extricate Israel from the crisis by 'ending the fighting'. Christopher makes no mention of any justice for the people of devastated southern Lebanon, speaking only to the needs of Jewish settlers in northern Israel and Jewish soldiers occupying southern Lebanon. Christopher concluded the fighting in southern Lebanon 'had been a good week in the peace process ... don't underestimate the merits of the agreement' a sentiment Christopher noted, that was shared by Pres. Clinton, who was delighted by the results of the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon. Oddly, the agreement is characterized as an Israeli victory since the agreement calls for an end to the 'targeting of civilians', but every civilian death has been of a Lebanese or Palestinian at the hands of Israeli terror attacks.

Israeli critics argue the agreement is not adequate since Hezbollah may still be allowed to defend itself from Israeli raids deep inside Lebanon. Kessel, adopting a clear advocacy for Israeli aggrandizement, argued that any withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon must follow 'a very long period' of complete Israeli domination of southern Lebanon, measured by the end of all resistance to the Occupationby the people of south Lebanon. Pres. Clinton stated that 'since the agreement was in writing, it is more likely to be respected' and called for 'civilians on both sides of the border' to return to their homes [Israelis to their undamaged homes. 500000 Lebanese and Palestinians refugees to a devastated wasteland, in which all infrastructure has been devastated.][TXT]
(14) Farid Makari: Forty-five year old Greek Orthodox engineer from Enfeh in the Koura. Formerly a contractor in Saudi Arabia.
(16) Omar Miskawi: Sunni lawyer from Tripoli. Former member of the Superior Islamic Law Council, and former member of the Mufti's Consultative Council. Currently head of the Association of Islamic Noble Deeds in Tripoli.
(17) Nayla Mu'awad: Maronite originally from Bsharri. Appointed in June 1991 to the seat of her deceased husband former deputy and President of the Republic Rene Muawad. Won the most votes of any Northern candidate in recent elections.
(20) Riyad Sarraf: Greek Orthodox surgeon from Akkar, born in 1928. Brother of former deputy (from 1943-1972) Ya’coub Sarraf. Works at the Islamic Hospital in Tripoli, and is popular in the area. Only candidate from Ahmad Karami's list to be elected to Parliament.
(22) Shaykh Fathy Yakan: Sunni cleric and writer from Tripoli, born in 1933. Degrees in electronic engineering and Arab and Islamic studies. Secretary General of the Jama‘ah al-Islamiyyah in Tripoli. Known for his close ties to the PLO, he ran a secular campaign, presenting himself to candidates as "Doctor" rather than as "Shaykh".

42006. -----, "The Rejections By Region: The North: Islamists Break Through Official Karami-Franjiyyeh List", in Lebanon Report, September 1992. Elections in the North took place on August 23, and were conducted on the basis of the muhafazah. In the city of Tripoli, the winners were, for the Sunni seats, Mr. Omar Karami (72355 votes), Mr. Amin al-Halif (53678), Mr. Muhammad Kabaara (54354), Mr. Omar Miskawi (46988), and Shaykh Fathy Yakan (46393); for the Alawite seat, Mr. As Ad Ed (60078); for the Maronite seat, Mr. Jean Ubayd (56385); and for the Greek Orthodox seat, Mr. Salim Habib (40020). In Tripoli district, the winners were for the three Sunni seats, Mr. Salih Khayr (49623), Mr. Mahmoud Tibbo (43055), and Mr. As ad Harmoush (3,208). In the Akkar district, the winners were, for the Sunni seats, Mr. Wajih Ba'tini (68934), Mr. Talal Mir'ibi (62062), and Mr. Hasan Iziddin (41844); for the Greek Orthodox seats, Mr. Abdallah al-Rasi (47872) and Mr. Riyad Sarraf (42688); for the Maronite seat, Mr. Mikhail Daher (63701); and for the Alawite seat, Mr. Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahman (61700). In the Qgharta district, the three Maronite seats were won by Mrs. Nayla Mu'awad (90599), Mr. Sulayman Tony Franjiyyeh (75098), and Mr. Estephan Duwayhi (68470). In the Koura district, the three Greek Orthodox seats were won by Mr. Salim Sa'adah (51179), Mr. Farid Maki (50800), and Mr. Fayiz Ghosn (48188). In the Bsharreh district, the two Maronite seats were won by Mr. Qabalan Isa al-Khoyu (51781) and Mr. Habib Kayrouz (51324). In the Batroun district, the two Maronite seats were won by Mr. Sayid Aqi (49550) and Mr. Manuel Younes (48682). While the results of the voting showed an overwhelming victory for Mr. Omar Karami's "List of National coalition" (25 of 28 seats) the final tally indicated that Mr. Karami had won 72358 votes, placing him only third on his list in terms of the total number of votes accumulated. Mrs. Nayla Mu'awad finished first on Mr. Karami's list with over 90000 votes, while Mr. Sulayman Tony Franjiyyeh, also on the list, won over 75000 votes. Perhaps the most significant message which came out of the elections in the North was the relatively low voter turnout. The North was generally assumed to be the region most enthusiastic towards elections, and both the government and opposition saw it as a test case for future voter participation in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the South. Despite statements from Minister of the Interior Sami al-Khatib that the turnout in the North varied between 65% in Tripoli, 75% in Dinniyeh in the Akkar, 20% in Batroun, 26% in Zgharta, and 15% in Bsharre, figures released by verification committees charged with counting the votes showed a different picture: in Bsharre for example, the turnout was only 7.5%, while in Tripoli it was about 40%, and in each of the two districts of Batroun and Koura it was no more than 15%. Even according to Mr. Khatib's figures, at best no more than one in four voters participated in elections in the predominantly Christian regions of the North. This was significant given the fact that the Christian North had not publicly associated itself with the movement to boycott elections called for in the Christian areas of much of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the South. It is generally assumed that Mr. Karami's list had official approval, and included a number of political figures acceptable to Syria. Yet on August 9, Mr. Karami publicly complained that candidates were being imposed on him in the formation of his list, and that he did not have a sufficient margin of maneuver. It was reported that Mr. Karami intended to pull out of the elections, although he later denied it.

Analysts noted that the episode probably signaled that Mr. Franjiyyeh, the major Christian candidate on the Karami list, was putting pressure on Mr. Karami to accept certain Franjiyyeh allies on the list. It was even suggested that the Syrians leaned towards Mr. Franjiyyeh, and
that Mr. Karami reacted in the way he Karami after his limited victory did to reestablish the "margin of maneuver" he complained had been taken away from him. Indicating a trend that was repeated elsewhere, two members of the Sunni fundamentalist group alJama'ah al-Islamiyyah succeeded in breaking the virtual monopoly of the officially-sanctioned list. Shaysk Fathi Yakon was a seat in Tripoli, although there were few overtly religious themes in his campaign: he appeared in his posters wearing isayman's clothes, and introduced his name with the title "Doctor" rather than "Shaykh." In Tripoli district, a second Jama'ah candidate, As'ad Harmouso, also won a seat. Meanwhile, only one candidate was elected from a list headed by Mr. Karami's cousin, Mr. Ahmad Karami, named Mr. Riad Sarraf, for the Akkar. In Batroun, the significant event was the withdrawal of Mr. Boutros Harb and Mr. George Sa'adeh from the electoral race. Mr. Harb, who had been minister of education in the previous Karami government, denounced the holding of elections under current conditions, noting that the government "had at no time been able to give a valid and convincing explanation for its stubbornness in holding elections at the present time." Mr. Sa'adeh, who is also the head of the Kata'ib party, and four other Kata'ib candidates had registered their candidacies for elections in the North, but under increasing pressure from within the Christian community, they withdrew them on August 14. The Kata'ib decision was an important turning point in bringing about the withdrawal of other candidates elsewhere, especially since the party had been trying in recent months to remodel its image and appear as a national party, rather than as a parochial Christian one. Meanwhile, Mr. Sayid Aql, who won one of the Batroun seats, was expelled from the National Bloc headed by Mr. Raymond Eddi for having decided to participate in elections. The National Bloc and Mr. Eddi have repeatedly denounced what they refer to as elections "held in the shadow of occupation by foreign armed forces." According to observers, the voting in the North was characterized by tension between partisans of the various candidates, which led to fights, exchanges of insults, and worse. For example, on election day, a group of three journalists from the newspaper al-Diyar were apprehended and beaten by armed men. The journalists accused men loyal to Mr. Omar Karami of having carried out the attack because al-Diyar's owner, Mr. Charles Ayyoub, was a candidate on the rival list of Mr. Ahmad Karami. On August 26, eight unsuccessful candidates called for the formation of a commission of inquiry to look into accusations of electoral fraud. The request came at a time when the debate within political circles centered around the long- awaited formation of a Constitutional Council to "arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections," as stipulated in article 19 of the new Lebanese constitution. The draft law for the establishment of the Council was passed by the government, but has yet to be acted on by parliament. In the interim, arbitration of electoral disputes is to be carried out by a parliamentary commission comprised of members of the new parliament. Critics charge that it is absurd to believe that the new parliamentarians will arbitrate objectively in disputes which may have a bearing on their own political future in the legislature. [ =] 42007. ------. "UK Rally by Islamic Group Blocked Under Strong Pressure", in Creasional, International, September 16-30, 1996, p. 8. An unholy coalition of politicians, policemen, Jewish groups, gay activists, the media and Arab regimes - united by a shared hatred of Islam has blocked a conference legally convened by a London-based organization. The "Rally for Survival," organized by the al-Muhajiroun group, was called off two days before it was due to be held on 9/8/1996 at a venue in East London. The cancellation followed a strong warning by the Home office (interior ministry) that anyone advocating violence at the conference would be prosecuted, and homosexuals and a right-wing Jewish student group threatened to hold demonstrations at the venue. Shaikh Omar Bakri Muhamad, (the media invariably pointed out his Syrian nationality) leader of al-Muhajiroun insisted to the last moment that the meeting would go ahead despite the mounting pressure from the British and other governments, as well as from the media and Zionist lobbies. However, he had no option but to call it a day after the management of the London Arena, Docklands, where the rally was to be held, demanded extra payments to meet increased security costs. The management, which consulted the police, denied that they were under pressure from the police or politicians to cancel the rally. Alex McRendle, general manager of the London Arena, said it had become clear that the venue's usual security arrangements would be inadequate. "The organizers had an obligation to meet any additional costs, but unfortunately due to the amounts involved they decided this morning they could not," adding that they might look for an alternative, but to cancel the rally. The London Times admitted in an editorial on 9/9/1996 that it was the contents of the rally that really worried the British establishment! Anjem Choudary, a spokesman for the organizers, told an ITV news program that the additional costs were not the only problem. "Even if we could meet the additional cost, we do not think we could maintain the security because of bomb threats and a demonstration which was to be held outside," he said. The rally took on a very high profile following reports that, in addition to the presence of hundreds of overseas activists, the rally would hear taped messages from Shaik Omar Abdur-Rahman, who is serving a life sentence in New York, Sheikh Muhammad Husain Fadhlullah, the spiritual head of Hizbullah, and Shaikh Osama bin Laden, the Saudi millionaire mujahid. A chorus of protests from Arab countries, led by Egypt, as well as from British and Jewish politicians, demanded the cancellation of the meeting and sought to portray the Shaikhs as dangerous terrorists and fugitives. As if that were not enough, the media sought to denounce British Muslim activists, even though they were not due to attend the rally, if only because some of them, like Dr. Kamil Siddiqi, were actually dead. An editorial in the conservative Daily Telegraph on 9/7/1996 warned that it would be a mistake to tar all Muslims with the radical brush, asserting that non-Muslims can do business with moderates like Dr. Zaki Badari, whereas even many Muslims would have no truck with radicals like Dr. Kalim and Omar Bakri. "Of the 1.5 million Muslims who are believed to live in this country, many have no time for those whose radical opinions make the headlines - the late Kalim Siddiqi, founder of the Muslim Parliament, or Omar Bakri Muhammad," it said. "It is with the moderate tendency, of which Dr. Zaki Badawi, principal of the Muslim college in London, is a leading member, that non-Muslims can establish a dialogue." The British, who pride themselves on their "liberal" laws, which do not allow the banning of public meetings like the "Rally for Revival," are demonizing Muslims to have cause to amend the law. Meanwhile, they use terrorist and sharp practices to block meetings by radical Muslims. In a press statement, the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain said it is "concerned that Muslims should have to pay for security," when Salman Rushdie has had millions spent on him by the British taxpayers. It appears Muslims have no right to protection for their point of view. The press release went on to point out that terrorist outfits like the Mujahidin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which is responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people in Iran, is free to organize rallies and run a radio station but Muslim activists are barred. In the case of the Muhajiroun conference, intimidation and the raising of charges for the venue have worked. The London Arena management demanded an additional fee of 15000 pounds. If it is any consolation to the al-Mahajiroun organizers, Muslims in other kuf kuf countries have faced similar tactics. In some cases, far greater security surcharges were demanded. In Toronto, Canada, when Islamic workers tried to organize an anti-Rushdie rally in 3/1989 the Toronto City Hall demanded $2 million insurance! Never before or since have such outrageous demands been made. The Muslims, however, were determined to hold their rally and did so at another venue. [ =] 42008. ------. "World Political Parties Accuse US of Intensifying Tension on Korean Peninsula, Part 2," in Peoples Korea, April 9, 1995, p. 3. The party of the congress for the independence, the military party for the establishment of the Council was passed by the government, but has yet to be held on 9/8/1996 at a venue in East London. The cancellation followed a strong warning by the Home office (interior ministry) that anyone advocating violence at the conference would be prosecuted, and homosexuals and a right-wing Jewish student group threatened to hold demonstrations at the venue. 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42009. ———. Table: "Occupational Composition of Baath Party Membership, Number and Percentage, 1980", in Middle East Policy, March 1993. p. 9. Doctors, Pharmacists: 298, 0.08%. Engineers: 1104, 0.30%. Lawyers & Judges: 401, 0.11%. Nurses: 752, 0.20%. Teachers: 19668, 5.27%. Public officials: 31390, 8.41%. Workers: 51224, 13.70%. Artisans: 3547, 0.95%. Peasants: 65859, 17.63%. Students: 183355, 49.10%. Other: 15879, 4.25%. Total: 373477.

Source: Hizb al-Baath Al-Arabi Al-Isthiraki, Tadarir al-Mu’tamar al-qutri al-thamin wa muqarrathatihi (Reports and Resolution so the Eighth Regional Congress, Damascus, 1985, pp. 35-58.) [↩]

42010. ———. Table: "Occupational Composition of Baath Party Membership, Number and Percentage, 1984", in Middle East Policy, March 1993. p. 9. Doctors, Pharmacists: 1255, 0.23%. Engineers: 3793, 0.69%. Lawyers & Judges: 688, 0.13%. Nurses: 1853, 0.35%. Teachers: 40598, 7.55%. Public officials: 48103, 8.94%. Workers: 73965, 13.75%. Artisans: 4220, 0.78%. Peasants: 74665, 13.88%. Students: 267255, 49.70%. Other: 21523, 4.00%. Total: 537864.

Source: Hizb al-Baath Al-Arabi Al-Isthiraki, Tadarir al-Mu’tamar al-qutri al-thamin wa muqarrathatihi (Reports and Resolution so the Eighth Regional Congress, Damascus, 1985, pp. 35-58.) [↩]

42011. Clinton, Bill. United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World. President Clinton Address to the UN General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993. Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates and guests: It is a great honor for me to address you and to stand in this great chamber which symbolizes so much of the 20th century—it's darkest crises and its brightest aspirations. I come before you as the first American President born after the founding of the United Nations. Like most of the people in the world today, I was not even alive during the convulsive World War that convinced humankind of the need for this organization, nor during the San Francisco Conference that led to its birth. Yet I have followed the work of the United Nations throughout my life, with admiration for its accomplishments, with sadness for its failures, and with conviction that through common effort our generation can take the bold steps needed to redeem the mission entrusted to the UN 48 years ago. I pledge to you that my nation remains committed to helping make the UN’s vision a reality. The start of this General Assembly offers us an opportunity to take stock of where we are and as common shareholders in the progress of humankind and in the preservation of our planet. It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The Cold War is over. The world is no longer divided into two armed and angry camps. Dozens of new democracies have been born. It is a moment of miracles. We see Nelson Mandela stand side by side with President de Klerk, proclaiming a date for South Africa's first nonracial election. We see Russia's first popularly elected President, Boris Yeltsin, leading his nation on its bold democratic journey. We have seen decades of deadlock shattered in the Middle East, as the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization reached past intransigence and suspicion to shake each other's hands and exhilarate the entire world with the hope of peace. We have begun to see the doomsday weapons of nuclear annihilation dismantled and destroyed. Thirty-two years ago, President Kennedy warned this chamber that humanity lived under a nuclear sword of Damocles that hung by the slenderest of threads. Now, the United States is working with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and others to take that sword down and to lock it away in a secure vault where we hope and pray it will remain forever. It is a new era in this hall as well. The superpower standoff that for so long stymied the United Nations’ work almost from its first day has now yielded to a new promise of practical cooperation. Yet today we must all admit that there are two powerful tendencies working from opposite directions to challenge the authority of nation states everywhere and to undermine the authority of nation states to work together. From beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world toward integration. These forces are fueling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization. But they also threaten to destroy the insulation and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people feel more insecure. At the same time, from within nations, the resurgent aspirations of ethnic and religious groups challenge governments on terms that traditional nation states cannot easily accommodate. These twin forces lie at the heart of the challenges not only to our national governments but also to all our international institutions. They require all of us in this room to find new ways to work together more effectively in pursuit of our national interests and to think anew about whether our institutions of international cooperation are adequate to this moment. Thus, as we marvel at this era’s promise of new peace, we must also recognize that serious threats remain. Bloody ethnic, religious, and civil wars rage from Angola to the Caucasus to Kashmir. As weapons of mass destruction fall into more hands, even small conflicts can threaten to take on murderous proportions. Hunger and disease continue to take a tragic toll, especially among the world’s children. The malignant neglect of our global environment threatens our children’s health and their very security. The repression of conscience continues in too many nations. And terrorism, which has taken so many innocent lives, assumed a horrifying immediacy for us here when militant fanatics bombed the World Trade Center and planned to attack even this very hall of peace. Let me assure you: Whether the fathers of those crimes or the mass murderers who bombed Pan Am Flight 103, my government is determined to see that such terrorists are brought to justice. At this moment of panoramic change, of vast opportunities and troubling threats, we must all ask ourselves what we can do and what we should do as a community of nations. We must once again dare to dream of what might be, for our dreams may be within our reach. For that to happen, we must all be willing to honestly confront the challenges of the broader world. That has never been easy. When this organization was founded 48 years ago, the world’s nations stood devastated by war or exhausted by its expense. There was little appetite for cooperative efforts among nations. Most people simply wanted to get on with their lives. But a farsighted generation of leaders from the United States and elsewhere rallied the world. Their efforts built the institutions of postwar security and prosperity. We are at a similar moment today. The momentum of the Cold War no longer propels us in our daily actions. And with daunting economic and political pressures upon almost every nation represented in this room, many of us are turning to focus greater attention and energy on our domestic needs and problems. And we must. But putting each of our economic houses in order cannot mean that we shut our windows to the world. The pursuit of self-renewal in many of the world’s largest and most powerful economies—in Europe, in Japan, in North America—is an essential precondition for the world’s larger ambitions.
absolutely crucial, because unless the great industrial nations can recapture their robust economic growth, the global economy will languish. Yet the industrial nations also need growth elsewhere in order to lift their own. Indeed, prosperity in each of our nations and regions also depends upon active and responsible engagement in a host of shared concerns. For example, a thriving and democratic Russia not only makes the world safer, it also can help to expand the world’s economy. A strong Russian economy will create millions of jobs worldwide. Peace in the Middle East, buttressed, as it should be, by the repeal of outdated UN resolutions, can help to unleash that region’s great economic potential and calm a perpetual source of tension in global affairs. And the growing economic power of China, coupled with greater political openness, could bring enormous benefits to all of Asia and to the rest of the world. We must help our publics to understand this distinction: Domestic renewal is an overdue tonic. But isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon. Let me start by being clear about where the United States stands. The United States occupies a unique position in world affairs today. We recognize that, and we welcome it. Yet with the Cold War over, I know many people ask whether the United States plans to retreat or remain active in the world and, if active, to what end. Many people are asking that in our own country as well. Let me answer that question as clearly and plainly as I can. The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead. We cannot solve every problem, but we must and will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace. In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace. With this statement, I do not mean to announce some crusade to force our way of life and doing things on others or to repudiate our institutions, but we now know clearly that throughout the world, from Poland to Eritrea, from Guatemala to South Korea, there is an enormous yearning among people who wish to be the masters of their own economic and political lives. Where it matters most and where we can make the greatest difference, we will patiently and firmly align ourselves with that yearning.

Today, there are still those who claim that democracy is simply not applicable to many cultures and that its recent expansion is an aberration—an accident—in history that will soon fade away. But I agree with President Roosevelt, who once said, “The democratic aspiration is no more a recent phase of human history. It is human history.” We will work to strengthen the free market democracies by revitalizing our economy here at home; by opening world trade through the GATT, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and other accords; and by updating our shared institutions, asking with you and answering the hard questions about whether they are adequate to the present challenges. We will support the consolidation of market democracy where it is taking new root, as in the states of the former Soviet Union and all over Latin America. And we seek to foster the practices of good government that distribute the benefits of democracy and economic growth fairly to all people. We will work to reduce the threat from regimes that are hostile to democracies and to support liberalization of nondemocratic states when they are willing to live in peace with the rest of us.

As a country that has over 10 different racial, ethnic, and religious groups within our borders, our policy is and must be rooted in a profound respect for all the world’s religions and cultures. But we must oppose everywhere extremism that produces terrorism and hate. And we must pursue our humanitarian goal of reducing suffering, fostering sustainable development, and improving health and living conditions, particularly for our world’s children. On efforts from export control to trade agreements to peace-keeping, we will often work in partnership with others and through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. It is in our national interest to do so. But we must not hesitate to act unilaterally when there is a threat to our core interests or to those of our allies. The United States believes that an expanded community of market democracies not only serves our own security interests, it also advances the goals enshrined in this body’s charter and its Universal Declaration of Human rights. For broadly based prosperity is clearly the strongest form of preventive diplomacy, and the habits of democracy are the habits of peace. Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest. It rewards tolerance, not hatred. Democracies rarely wage war on one another. Growth in trade can be more reliable routes to prosperity than trade in arms. And the stewardship of our global environment. And democracies, with the rule of law and respect for political, religious, and cultural minorities, are more responsive to their own people and to the protection of human rights. But as we work toward this vision, we must confront the storm clouds that may overwhelm our work and darken the march toward freedom. If we do not stem the proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure. If we do not strengthen the capacity to resolve conflict among and within nations, those conflicts will smother the birth of free institutions, threaten the development of entire regions, and continue to take innocent lives. If we do not nurture our people and our planet through sustainable development, we will deepen conflict and waste the very efforts that make our efforts worth doing. Let me talk more about what I believe we must do in each of these three categories: non-proliferation, conflict resolution, and sustainable development. One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—whether they are nuclear, chemical, or biological—and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away. We know this is not an idle problem. All of us are still haunted by the pictures of Kurdish women and children cut down by poison gas. We saw Scud missiles dropped during the Gulf war that would have been far graver in their consequences if they had carried nuclear weapons. And we know that many nations still believe it is in their interest to develop weapons of mass destruction or to sell them or the necessary technologies to others for financial gain. More than a score of nations likely possess such weapons, and their number threatens to grow. These weapons destabilize entire regions. They could turn a local conflict into a global human and environmental catastrophe.

We simply have got to find ways to control these weapons and to reduce the number of states that possess them by supporting and strengthening the IAEA and by taking other necessary measures. I have raised non-proliferation one of our nation’s highest priorities. We intend to work to make it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships with the world’s nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for non-proliferation but increasingly open trade and technology for those states that live by accepted international rules.

Today, let me describe several new policies that our government will pursue to stem proliferation. We will pursue new steps to control the materials for nuclear weapons. Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations. We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever. As we reduce our nuclear stockpiles, the United States has also begun negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. This summer, I declared that to reduce the number of states that possess them by supporting and strengthening the IAEA and by taking other necessary measures. I have raised non-proliferation one of our nation’s highest priorities. We intend to work to make it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships with the world’s nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for non-proliferation but increasingly open trade and technology for those states that live by accepted international rules.

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controls in the United States to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War world, where we seek to enlist the support of our former adversaries in the battle against proliferation. At the same time that we stop deadly technologies from falling into the wrong hands, we will work with our partners to remove outdated controls that unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly restrain growth and opportunity all over the world. As we work to keep the world's most destructive weapons out of conflict, we must also strengthen the international community's ability to address those conflicts themselves. For as we all now know so painfully, the end of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace. Indeed, it simply removed the lid from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territorial animosity. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin has said that a wounded nationalism is like a bent twig forced down so severely that when released it lashes back with fury. The world today is thick with bent and recoiling twigs of wounded communal identities. This scourge of bitter conflict has placed high demands on United Nations peace-keeping forces. Frequently the blue helmets have worked wonders.

In Namibia, El Salvador, the Golan Heights, and elsewhere, UN peace-keepers have helped to stop the fighting, restore civil authority, and enable free elections. In Bosnia, UN peace-keepers, against the danger and frustration of that continuing tragedy, have maintained a valiant humanitarian effort. And if the parties of that conflict take the hard steps needed to make a real peace, the international community, including the United States, must be ready to help in its effective implementation. In Somalia, the United States and the United Nations have worked together to achieve a stunning humanitarian rescue, saving literally hundreds of thousands of lives and restoring the conditions of security for almost the entire country. UN peace-keepers from over two dozen nations remain in Somalia today. And some, including brave Americans, have lost their lives to ensure that we complete our mission and to ensure that anarchy and starvation do not return just as quickly as they were abolished. Many still criticize UN peacekeeping, but those who do should talk to the people of Cambodia, where the UN's operations have helped to turn the killing fields into fertile soil through reconciliation. Last May's elections in Cambodia marked a proud accomplishment for that war-weary nation and for the United Nations. And I am pleased to announce that the United States has recognized Cambodia's new government. UN peace-keeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era's conflicts. The reason we have supported such missions is not, as some critics in the United States have charged, to subcontract American foreign policy but to strengthen our security, to protect our interests, and to share among nations the costs and effort of pursuing peace. Peace-keeping cannot be a substitute for our own national defense efforts, but it can strongly supplement them. Today, there is wide recognition that the UN peace-keeping ability has not kept pace with the rising responsibilities and challenges. Just 6 years ago,about 10,000 UN peace-keepers were stationed around the world. Today, the UN has some 80,000 deployed in 17 operations on 4 continents. Yet until recently, if a peace-keeping commander called in from across the globe when it was nighttime here in New York, there was no one in the peace-keeping of fice even to answer the call. When lives are on the line, you cannot let the reach of the UN exceed its grasp. As the Secretary General and others have argued, if UN peace-keeping is to be a sound security investment for our nation and for other UN members, it must adapt to new times.

Together we must prepare UN peace-keeping for the 21st century. We need to begin by bringing the rigors of military and political analysis to every UN peace mission. In recent weeks in the Security Council, our nation has begun asking harder questions about proposals for new peace-keeping missions: Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins. The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. The United Nations must also have the technical means to run a modern, world-class peace-keeping operation. We support the creation of a genuine UN peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff, with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and with a modern operations center with global communications. And the UN's operations must not only be adequately funded but also fairly funded. Within the next few weeks, the United States will be current in our peace-keeping bills. I have worked hard with the Congress to get this done. I believe the United States should lead the way, and I will work to continue to see that we pay our bills in full. But I am also committed to work with the United Nations to reduce our nation's assessment for these missions. The assessment system has not been changed since 1973. And everyone in our country knows that our percentage of the world's economic pie is not as great as it was then. Therefore, I believe our rates should be reduced to reflect the rise of other nations that can now bear more of the financial burden. That will make it easier for me as President to make sure we pay in a timely and full fashion.

Changes in the UN's peace-keeping operations must be part of an even broader program of United Nations reform. I say that, again, not to criticize the United Nations but to help us improve it. As our ambassador, Madeleine Albright, has suggested, the United States has always played a twin role to the UN—first friend and first critic. Today, corporations all around the world are finding ways to move from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, improving service, reducing bureaucracy, and cutting costs. Here in the United States, Vice President Al Gore and I have launched an effort to literally reinvent how our government operates. We see this going on in other governments around the world. Now the time has come to reinvent the way the United Nations operates as well. I applaud the initial steps the Secretary General has taken to reduce and to reform the United Nations bureaucracy. Now we must all do even more to root out waste. Before this General Assembly is over, let us establish a strong mandate for an Office of Inspector General so that it can attain a reputation for toughness, for integrity, for effectiveness. Let us build new confidence among our people that the United Nations is changing with the needs of our times. Ultimately, the key for reforming the United Nations, as in reforming our own government, is to remember why we are here and whom we serve. It is wise to recall that the first words of the UN Charter are not "We, the government," but "We, the people of the United Nations." That means in every country the teachers, the workers, the farmers, the professionals, the fathers, the mothers, the children—from the most remote village in the world to the largest metropolis—they are why we gather in this great hall. It is their futures that are at risk when we act or fail to act. It is they who ultimately pay our bills. As we dream new dreams in this age when miracles now seem possible, let us focus on the lives of those people—and especially on the children who will inherit this world. Let us work with a new urgency and imagine what kind of world we could create for them in the coming generations. Let us work with new energy to protect the world's people from torture and repression. As Secretary of State Christopher stressed at the recent Vienna Conference, human rights are not something conditional, founded by culture, but rather something universal granted by God. This General Assembly should create, at long last, a High Commissioner for Human Rights. I hope you will do so soon and with vigor and energy and conviction. Let us also work far more ambitiously to fulfill our obligations as custodians of this planet, not only to improve the quality of life for our citizens and the quality of our air and water and the earth itself but also because the roots of conflict are so often entangled with the roots of environmental neglect and the calamity of famine and disease. During the course of our campaign in the United States last year, Vice President Gore and I promised the American people major changes in our nation's policy toward the global environment. Those were promises to keep, and today the United States is doing so. Today we are working with other nations to build on the promising work of the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development.

We are working to make sure that all nations meet their commitments under the Global Climate Convention. We are seeking to complete negotiations on an accord to prevent the world's deserts from further expansion. And we seek to strengthen the World Health Organization's efforts to combat the plague of AIDS, which is not only killing millions but also exhausting the resources of nations that can least...
afford it. Let us make a new commitment to the world’s children. It is tragic enough that 1.6 million children died as a result of wars over the past decade. But it is far more unforgivable that, in that same period, 40 million children died from diseases completely preventable with simple vaccines or medicine. Every day—this day, as we meet here—over 30000 of the world’s children will die of malnutrition and disease.

Our UNICEF Director, Jim Grant, has reminded me that each of those children has a name and a nationality, a family, a personality, and a potential. We are compelled to do better by the world’s children. Just as our own nation has launched new reforms to ensure that every child has adequate health care, we must do more to get basic vaccines and other treatment for curable diseases to children all over the world. It’s the best investment we’ll ever make. We can find new ways to ensure that every child grows up with clean, drinkable water, that most precious commodity of life itself. And the UN can work even harder to ensure that each child has at least a full primary education—and I mean that opportunity for girls as well as boys. And to ensure a healthier and more abundant world, we simply must slow the world’s explosive growth in population. We cannot afford to see the human race doubled by the middle of the next century. Our nation has, at last, renewed its commitment to work with the United Nations to expand the availability of the world’s family planning education and services. We must ensure that there is a place at the table for every one of our world’s children. And we can do it. At the birth of this organization 48 years ago, another time of both victory and danger, a generation of gifted leaders from many nations stepped forward to organize the world’s efforts on behalf of security and prosperity. One American leader during that period said this: “It is time we steered by the stars rather than by the light of each passing ship.” His generation picked peace, human dignity, and freedom. Those are good stars; they should remain the highest in our own firmament. Now history has granted to us a moment of even greater opportunity, when old dangers and old walls are crumbling. Future generations will judge us, every one of us, above all by what we make of this magic moment. Let us resolve that we will dream larger—that we will work harder so that they can conclude that we did not merely turn walls to rubble but, instead, laid the foundation for great things to come. Let us ensure that the tide of freedom and democracy is not pushed back by the fierce winds of ethnic hatred. Let us ensure that the world’s most dangerous weapons are safely reduced and denied to dangerous hands. Let us ensure that the world we pass to our children is healthier, safer, and more abundant than the one we inhabit today. I believe—I know—that together we can extend this moment of miracles into an age of great work and new wonders. [=


Finances: None Reported.

Political Propaganda: None Reported. [=


Mindful of the principles and humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 8/12/1949 for the protection of war victims, of the principles and provisions of international law and of the obligations arising therefrom, to condemn the practices of the Israeli authorities in the Occupied Territories and to insist with the organs of international law the continuous refusal of Israel to respect the Geneva Conventions of 8/12/1949, all States parties to the Conventions have undertaken to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances,

Recalling also all the resolutions of the General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights condemning the practices of the Israeli authorities in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel, which affirm the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, to these territories, in particular resolution 1992/2 of 2/14/1992 of the Commission on Human Rights,


Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories submitted to the General Assembly and the relevant reports of the ILO, the UNESCO and the WHO,

Recalling with great concern the press releases issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva on 1/13/1988, on 8/18/1988 and on 5/21/1992 with respect to repeated violations by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and the continuous refusal of Israel to apply the provisions of the Convention in the occupied territories,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions in this respect,

Deeply alarmed at the persistent refusal of Israel to respect the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and the refusal of Israel to apply the provisions of the Convention in the occupied territories,

1. Reaffirms that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, itself constitutes a gross and systematic violation of human rights and an aggression under international law;

2. Also reaffirms that the continued perpetration by the Israeli occupation authorities of deliberate killings of Palestinians, including children, breaking limbs of young men and causing grave harm to their physical integrity, subjecting cities, villages and camps to living conditions designed to strangulate and destroy them by imposing curfews, as happened in the Gaza Strip on 5/25/1992, and preventing their provision with food and medical supplies, firing gas bombs into houses, mosques, churches and hospitals, thus causing the death of many people by asphyxia, severely beating pregnant women and throwing gas bombs inside their homes, thereby causing them to miscarry, torturing Palestinian detainees, imposing collective punishment and administrative detention upon thousands of Palestinians, expelling and deporting Palestinians from their homeland, confiscating land and establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, bringing Jewish immigrants from several parts of the world and settling them on these territories, thus modifying their demographic character, closing schools and universities and desecrating holy places and demolishing houses, all constitute grave violations of the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

3. Further reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, is applicable to the Palestinians and to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel, and that the continued disregard and rejection of the provisions of the Convention by Israel constitute gross violations of the principles of international law, and that it is therefore the responsibility of the international community to provide protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Convention, until the end of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories;

4. Calls upon the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, to apply article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect by Israel for the Convention and to secure protection for the Palestinian people under occupation, until the end of this occupation;

5. Reaffirms once again the right of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation by all means, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and affirms that the intifadah of the Palestinian people, which began on 12/8/1987, is one such means confirming their determination to liberate their land from Israeli occupation and to exercise their inalienable national rights on their national soil, above all their right to self-determination;

6. Also reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland in accordance with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 12/12/1948, to self-determination without foreign interference and to establish their independent sovereign State on their national soil, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Commission on Human Rights, and the right to self-determination of all peoples;

7. Condemns the policy of Israel for: (a) Its gross violations of the rules of international law and of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and calls upon Israel to desist immediately from those practices and to withdraw from the Palestinian territories and other occupied Arab territories, in accordance with the principles of international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions; (b) Establishing Israeli settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories and calls for them to be dismantled, and confirms that all measures taken by Israel with the purpose of annexing these territories or altering the political, cultural, religious or other character of Jerusalem and the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 are illegal, null and void: (c) Its continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and its defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 47 (1981) of 12/17/1981, and reaffirms that the decision by Israel in 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void; (d) The inhuman treatment and terrorist practices in violation of human rights which the Israeli occupation authorities continue to exercise against Syrian Arab Citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan for their refusal to carry Israeli identity cards and in order to force them to carry such cards, practices which constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and requests all States and competent international organizations not to recognize any Israeli laws, jurisdiction or administration in respect of the occupied Syrian territory;

8. Reiterates its support for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, in which all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, would participate on an equal footing, and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 11/22/1967, and 338 (1973) of 10/22/1973, as well as of all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular those that define and confirm the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right to self-determination, and calls for the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from all occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem;

9. Confirms that any attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the framework of the above mentioned international conference or that is not based on the international legitimacy constituted by the principles of international law that govern armed conflicts among countries, as well as the relevant United Nations resolutions on Palestine and the Middle East, will not contribute to solving the real problem, and will maintain the current conflict that threatens the area with continuous wars;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Subcommission, at its forty-fifth session, with an updated list of reports, studies, statistics and other documents relating to the question of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, with the texts of the most recent relevant United Nations decisions and resolutions and the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and with all other information relevant to the implementation of the present resolution.**
International Committee of the Red Cross on 5/23/1993, concerning the continuing violation by Israel of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 9/12/1949, including the deportation of Palestinian citizens from their territory, the killing of civilians, including children, and the application of the policy of collective punishment against the Palestinian people. Reaffirming its previous resolutions in this respect, the most recent being resolution 44/10 of 8/26/1999.

Deeply alarmed at the persistent refusal of Israel to respect the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and to apply it to the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories, and at the systematic and established violations of human rights by Israel over the past 26 years and its persistence in killing, wounding and arresting Palestinian people and in deporting and expelling Palestinian citizens.

Taking into account the ongoing process of negotiation between the parties concerned since the Peace Conference on the Middle East convened at Madrid, and encouraging this process to reach speedily a just and lasting peace settlement on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 11/22/1967 and 338 (1973) of 10/22/1973 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions.

1. Reaffirms that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, itself constitutes a gross and systematic violation of human right and an aggression underinternational law;

2. Also reaffirms that the continued perpetration by the Israeli occupation authorities of deliberate killings of Palestinians, including children, breaking limbs of young men and causing grave harm to their physical integrity, subjecting cities, villages and camps to living conditions designed to strangle and destroy them by imposing curfews, as happened in the Gaza Strip on 5/25/1992, and preventing their provision with food and medical supplies, firing gas bombs into houses, mosque, churches and hospitals, thus causing the death of many people by asphyxia, everely beating pregnant women and throwing gas bombs inside their homes, thereby causing them to miscarry, torturing Palestinian detainees, imposing collective punishment and administrative detention upon thousands of Palestinians, expelling and deporting Palestinians from their homeland, confiscating land and establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, bringing Jewish immigrants from several parts of the world and setting them on these territories, thus modifying their demographic character, closing schools anduniversities, desecrating holy places and demolishing houses, all constitute grave violations of the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 9/12/1949, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

3. Further reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, is applicable to the Palestinians and to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel, and that the continued disregard and rejection of the provisions of the Convention by Israel constitute gross violations of the principles of international law, and that it is therefore the responsibility of the international community to provide protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Convention, until the end of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories;

4. Calls upon the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 8/12/1949, to apply article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect by Israel for the Convention and to secure protection for the Palestinian people under occupation, until the end of this occupation;

5. Reaffirms once again the right of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation by all means, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and affirms that the intifadah of the Palestinian people, which began on 12/8/1987, is one such means confirming their determination to liberate their land from Israeli occupation and to exercise their inalienable national rights on their national oil, above all their right to self-determination;

6. Also reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland in accordance with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 12/12/1948, to self-determination without foreign interference and to establish their independent sovereign Staton their national soil, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Commission on Human Rights;

7. Condemns the policy of Israel for: (a) Its gross violations of the rules of international law and of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and call upon Israel to desist immediately from those practices and to withdraw from the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories, in accordance with the principles of international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions; (b) Continuing the policy of deporting Palestinian citizens and for expelling them from their homeland, as happened to more than 400 Palestinian citizens on 12/17/1992, and calls upon Israel to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the most recent being resolution 799 (1992) of 12/18/1992, as well as with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights, and to refrain from such a policy, which violate the principles of international law; (c) Establishing Israeli settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories and calls for them to be dismantled, and confirm that all measures taken by Israel with the purposes of annexing these territories or altering the political, cultural, religious or other character of Jerusalem and the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 are illegal, null and void; (d) Its continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and its defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 12/17/1981, and reaffirms that the decision by Israel in 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void; (e) The inhuman treatment and terrorist practices in violation of human rights which the Israeli occupation authorities continue to exercise against Syrian Arab citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan for their refusal to carry Israeli identity cards and in order to force them to carry such cards, practices which constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949, and requests all States and competent international organizations not to recognize any Israeli laws, jurisdiction or administration in respect of the occupied Syrian territory;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the SubCommission, at its forty-sixth session, with an updated list of reports, studies, statistics and other documents relating to the question of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, with the texts of the most recent relevant United Nations decisions and resolutions and the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and with all other information relevant to the implementation of the present resolution." [=]

42015. DPR. "SubCommission On prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Adopts Resolution on Situation In The Palestinian and Other Arab Occupied Territories By Israel", in DPR, August 1991. At its 27th meeting, on 8/23/1991, the Subcommission of the Commission on Human Rights adopted the following resolution concerning the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel (E/CN.4/1992/2).


The Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Human Rights, in particular the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples,

Mindful of the principles and humanitarian provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, of the principles and provisions of

international law and of the obligations arising from the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.

Noting that, in accordance with article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, all States parties to the Conventions have undertaken to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions under all circumstances,

Recalling all the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights condemning the practices of the Israeli occupation authorities in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel, which affirm the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 8/12/1949 to these territories,


Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories submitted to the General Assembly and the relevant reports of the International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization,

Recalling with concern the press releases issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva on 1/13/1988 and on 8/18-19/1988 with respect to repeated violations by Israel of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949 and its continuous refusal to apply the provisions of the Convention in the occupied territories,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions in this respect,

Deeply alarmed at the persistent refusal of Israel to respect the Fourth Geneva Convention and to apply it to the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories, and at the systematic and established violations of human rights by Israel over the past twenty-four years and its persistence in perpetrating acts of killing, wounding and arresting against the Palestinian people and in the deportation and expulsion of Palestinian citizens,

1. Reaffirms that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, itself constitutes a gross and systematic violation of human rights and further constitutes aggression under international law;

2. Also reaffirms that the continued perpetration by the Israeli occupation authorities of deliberate killing of Palestinians, including children, breaking the limbs of young men and causing grave harm to their physical integrity, subjecting cities, villages and camps to living conditions designed to strangulate and destroy them by imposing curfews and preventing their provision with food and medical supplies, firing gas bombs into houses, mosques, churches and hospitals, thus causing the death of many people by asphyxia, severely beating pregnant women and throwing gas bombs inside their homes, thereby causing them to miscarry, torturing Palestinian detainees, imposing collective punishment and administrative detention upon thousands of Palestinians, expelling and deporting Palestinians from their homeland, confiscating land and establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, bringing Jewish immigrants from several parts of the world and settling them on these territories, thus modifying their demographic character, closing schools and universities, desecrating holy places and demolishing houses, all constitute grave violations of international law and the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 8/12/1949;

3. Further reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the Palestinians and to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel, and that the continued disregard and rejection of the provisions of the Convention by Israel constitute gross violations of the principles of international law, and that it is therefore the responsibility of the international community provide protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, until the end of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories;

4. Calls upon the States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to apply article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect by Israel for the Convention and to secure protection for the Palestinian people under occupation in accordance with articles 9-12 of the Convention;

5. Reaffirms once again the right of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation by all means, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and affirms that the act of resistance by the Palestinian people which began on 8 December 1987, is one such means of confirming their determination to liberate their land from the Israeli occupation and to exercise their national rights on their national soil;

6. Also reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, to self-determination without foreign interference and to establish their independent sovereign State on their national soil, in accordance with resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Commission on Human Rights, and the principle of the right to self-determination of all peoples;

7. Condemns Israel for: (a) Its gross violations of the rules of international law and of the Fourth Geneva Convention, of 12 August 1949 through the systematic practices mentioned in the present resolution, and calls upon Israel to desist immediately from those practices and to withdraw from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by force, in accordance with the principles of international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions; (b) Establishing Israeli settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories and calls for them to be dismantled and confirms that all measures taken by Israel with the purpose of annexing these territories or altering the political, cultural, religious or other character of Jerusalem and the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 are illegal, null and void; (c) Its continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and its defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 12/17/1981, and reaffirms that the decision by Israel in 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void; (d) The inhuman treatment and terrorist practices in violation of human rights which the Israeli occupation authorities continue to exercise against Syrian Arab citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan for their refusal to carry Israeli identity cards and in order to force them to carry such cards, practices which constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 8/12/1949, and requests all States and competent international organizations not to recognize any Israeli laws, jurisdiction or administration in respect of the occupied Syrian territory;

8. Reiterates its support for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, in which all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, would participate on an equal footing, and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 11/22/1967, as well as of all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular those that define and confirm the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right to self-determination, and calls for the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from all occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem;

9. Confirms that any attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the framework of the above-mentioned international conference or that is not based on the international legitimacy constituted by the principles of international law that govern armed conflicts among countries, as well as the relevant United Nations resolutions on Palestine and the Middle East, will not contribute to solving the real problem, and will maintain the current conflict that threatens the area with continuous wars;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the SubCommission, at its forty-fourth session, with an updated list of reports, studies, statistics and other documents relating to the question of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, with the texts of the most recent relevant United Nations decisions and resolutions and the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied
Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Syria

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Territories, and with all other information relevant to the implementation of the present resolution. [27th meeting 8/23/1991.] [=]

42016. DPR. "UNICEF Executive Board Approves Programme Expenditures For Middle East and North Africa Region, Including Funding For Palestinian Women and Children", in Division for Palestinians Rights, April 1994. On 4/27/1994, the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) approved $40 million from general resources and $102 million in supplementary funding, as it reviewed country programme recommendations for five countries of the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as those for Palestinian women and children in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank and Gaza. (The recommendations are contained in document E/ICEF/1994/P/L.23.) In introducing the country programmes, Mr. Sarojini Vittachi, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, stated that the prospect of peace offered a unique opportunity for regional development and for a renewed commitment to put children first. The regional office had encouraged an adaptive but strengthened country programming process, entailing more participation by key government sectors, non-governmental organizations, other United Nations agencies, and donor in-country missions (see ICEF/1794). [=]

42017. DPR. "World Health Assembly Adopts Resolution Concerning Health Conditions of the Arab Population In The Occupied Territories, Including Palestine", in DPR, in DPR, May 1992. The World Health Assembly, at its forty-fifth session, adopted the following resolution at Geneva on 5/14/1992 (see WHA 45.26):

The Forty-fifth World Health Assembly,

Mindful of the basic principle established in the WHO Constitution, which affirms that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security,

Seriously concerned by violations of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, Recalling the need for the occupying power to observe strictly its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), to which it has notably not conformed in such basic areas as health,

Aware of its responsibility for ensuring proper health conditions for all people who are victims of exceptional situations, including settlements that are contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,

Recognizing the need for increased support and assistance for the Palestinian people, as well as the Syrian Arab people in the Golan under Israeli occupation, and for stronger cooperation with them,

Expressing its deep concern at the negative effects of the practices of the occupying power against the Palestinian people in the field of health during the Intifadah, at a time when social and economic conditions in the territory were deteriorating,

Expressing deep satisfaction at the commencement of peace talks among the parties concerned in the Middle East, starting with the Madrid Conference and continuing in the peace negotiations between the said parties,

Expressing the hope that these talks will lead to a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, based on the principles of international legitimacy and, in particular, on relevant United Nations resolutions,

Regretting the refusal of the Israeli authorities to allow the Special Committee of Experts to visit the occupied Arab territories,

Having considered the report of the Director-General on the Health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, [WHO document A/45/31.]

1. Asserts WHO's responsibility to promote for the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health as one of the fundamental rights of every human being,

2. Expresses the hope that the peace talks will lead quickly to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, so that the Palestinian people can develop their health plans and projects to participate with the peoples of the world in the achievement of WHO's objective of 'Health for All by the Year 2000.

3. Expresses concern at the deterioration in the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories affirming that it is the role of the World Health Organization to assist in the provision of health care to the Palestinian people and the other Arab populations in the occupied Arab territories;

4. Stresses that the policies of the Israeli authorities in the occupied Arab territories are not consistent with the development of a healthy and free people in the needs of the population of the occupied Arab territories, and that it is the role of the international community in its contribution to the peace process to assist the Palestinian people in their efforts to enjoy this basic human right and the privilege of being responsible for their own health system;

5. Deplores the continuing deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, which seriously affects the living conditions of the people, compromises in a lasting fashion the future of the Palestinian society, and prevents the economic and social development of those territories;

6. Expresses its deep concern at the Israeli refusal to permit the Special Committee of Experts to visit the occupied Arab territories, requesting that Israel allow the Committee to fulfill its mission of investigating the health conditions of the populations in those territories;

7. Thanks the Chairman of the Special Committee of Experts for his note and requests the Special Committee of Experts to continue its mission and report on the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories to the Fortysixth World Health Assembly;

8. Recalls resolutions WHA42.14, WHA43.26 and WHA44.31 and commends the Organization’s efforts to prepare and implement the special technical assistance to improve the health conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories;

9. Thanks the Director-General for his efforts, requesting him, in the light of relevant Health Assembly resolutions; (1) to continue the efforts to implement the special assistance programme, emphasizing the primary health care approach, in coordination with all Member States, observers referred to in Health Assembly resolutions related to this item, and all other organizations involved in health and humanitarian activities; (2) to further coordinate health activities, in particular in priority areas such as maternal and child health, an expanded programme of immunization, water supply, sanitation and prevention of pollution; (3) to monitor and evaluate the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories, in particular the proposals contained in the reports of the Special Committee of Experts, and given the deterioration of the health conditions of the inhabitants of those territories, to adopt all available measures in this regard, and to assist the Palestinian people in developing health manpower capable of shouliding the responsibility of their health; (4) to pursue the implementation of special technical assistance to improve the health conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories, in cooperation with all WHO Members and observers referred to in Health Assembly resolutions related to this item, taking into consideration a comprehensive health plan for the Palestinian people; (5) to provide the systematic support required to the WHO collaborating health centres in the occupied Arab territories, and strongly encourage the management of those theses by Palestinian experts; (6) to continue his efforts to seek funds from extrabudgetary sources in support of the special technical assistance programme; (7) to report on the above to the Forty-sixth World Health Assembly;

10. Calls on all Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute to the special assistance programme to improve the health conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories." [13th plenary meeting 5/14/1992.] [=]

42018. DS. "Lebanon: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
regimes are often detained without charges for short periods of time. The broadcaster. The Public Prosecutor has asked for prison sentences of 3 murder charges in cases involving the murder of adulterous wives. By Communications Network (ICN). The station, owned by the publisher of so-called crimes of honor. Men, for example, are typically acquitted of Government moved to close one of its critics, the Independent conduct investigations in areas outside effective government control also standards or promote Israel. The honor code has no discernible impact a backlog of cases that had developed during the civil war. An inability to enmity, slander Lebanese leaders or friendly nations, violate moral shortage of judges, dealt a blow to efforts to speed adjudication and erase programming which would disturb public order, stir ethnic or sectarian religious affiliation. The resignation, aggravating an already severe and major stations signed an honor code in February banning of judges like other government appointments, is allocated on the basis of Parliament. Pending passage of new regulations, the Information Minister organization of the broadcast media- this proposal is controversial, including Freedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Taif Accord also increased the number of seats in parliament and transferred some powers from the President to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Women have the right to vote, and there are no legal barriers to participation by women in politics. Three women were elected to Parliament in 1992. Other women hold policy-level positions in the Government. Palestinian refugee have no political right. An estimated 17 Palestinian fragment operate in Lebanon, generally organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the refugees are not elected, nor are there any democratically organized institutions in the camps. [=] 42019. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon; Part 06: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Each confessional group has its own court for family and personal status cases. There is a separate military court system. In refugee camps, Palestinian element operate an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice; rival Palestinian factions often try their opponents without due process. Although Lebanese law provides the right to a fair public trial and the judiciary is considered independent and relatively impartial, influential politicians continued to intervene successfully to protect supporters from detention and prosecution. Government interference in the judicial process and low judicial salaries led to the resignation of several prominent judges and to corruption and bribery of others. The Government took steps to adjust salaries in September. The appointment of judges like other government appointments, is allocated on the basis of religious affiliation. The resignations, aggravating an already severe shortage of judges, dealt a blow to efforts to speed adjudication and erase a backlog of cases that had developed during the civil war. An inability to conduct investigations in areas outside effective government control also caused trial delays. The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called crimes of honor. Men, for example, are typically acquitted of murder charges in cases involving the murder of adulterous wives. By law, in some instances a female's testimony before a notary public carries half the weight of that of a male. There are no known political prisoners, although political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese regimes are often detained without charges for short periods of time. [=] 42020. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Lebanon; Part 09: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (a) Freedom of Speech and Press", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Lebanon has a long heritage of freedom of opinion, speech, and press, although many Lebanese journalists have been killed and kidnapped in the past two decades by Lebanese and foreign factions. Although there were repeated attempts to muzzle the media, Lebanon has continued to be a free country. The Government's policies and leaders continued. Dozens of newspapers and magazines are published throughout Lebanon, financed by various Lebanese and foreign groups. While the press is nominally independent, press content often reflects the opinions of these financial backers. In addition, a legal framework exists to impose restrictions on the media. Some restrictive press regulations were imposed during the civil war but remain in place, such as Decree 104 of 1977. Laws prohibit attacks on the dignity of the head of state or of foreign leaders, authorize the prosecutor general to shut newspapers for up to 1 week without reference to the courts if articles appear that, in the view of the authorities, threaten Lebanese foreign relations or incite sectarian conflict, and prohibit the publication of state secrets. A special publication court exists to try cases involving these matters. The 1991 Lebanese-Syrian security agreement contains a provision effectively banning informational activity that could endanger the security of either state. In April and May the Government temporarily shut down three newspapers. Nida’ Al-Watan, owned by a vocal Maronite critic of Prime Minister Harray, was accused of inciting sectarian discord and suspended for 38 days. It had alleged that Hariri was buying Christian church property in a bid to Islamize Lebanon. Al-Safir, one of Lebanon’s most popular dailies, was closed for publishing alleged state secrets. It had printed the text of an Israeli proposal submitted to the Lebanese delegation to the Middle East peace talks. During the paper’s 1-week suspension, it appeared using a valid permit for the moribund Beirut Al-Masa’ newspaper. Trials in both cases are under way. Al-Shara was closed for 1 week after printing a cartoon that was deemed insulting to the President’s family. In October the Public Prosecutor charged two newspapers Al-Liwa and Ad-Diyar, with slandering government officials. The Government also made a new charge against Nida’ Al-Watan in October for publishing a story alleging that Japanese Red Army members were present in Lebanon. The authorities denied the story and said it harmed Lebanon’s reputation. A pro-Awn publication was closed in October for distributing pornography. Direct press criticism of Syria and its role in Lebanon virtually vanished in 1993. One leading journalist was subjected to anonymous threats after writing columns critical of aspects of Syrian policy in Lebanon. Other reporters described a widespread practice of self-censorship on matters related to Syria. Diverse political groups, particularly former militias, operated a wide variety of unregulated radio and television stations. As these groups accepted the spread of state authority and began to manage their broadcasts on a commercial basis, heavily slanted propaganda diminished. The Taif accord calls for the regulation and organization of the broadcast media- this proposal is controversial, however, and the Government has not submitted a draft law to Parliament. Pending passage of new regulations, the Information Minister and major stations signed an honor code in February banning programming which would disturb public order, stir ethnic or sectarian enmity, slander Lebanese leaders or friendly nations, violate moral standards or promote Israel. The honor code has no discernible impact on broadcasting. Exploiting the absence of a legal framework, the Government moved to close one of its critics, the Independent Communications Network (ICN). The station, owned by the publisher of Nida’ Al-Watan, was accused of inciting sectarian discord. In late December, the Civil Court permitted ICN to resume broadcasting and scheduled for February a hearing of the Government’s case against the broadcaster. The Public Prosecutor has asked for prison sentences of 3 years for ICN management. Lebanon’s partially state-owned television station, Tele-Liban, had long enjoyed virtual autonomy with respect to its news and public affairs programming. The Cabinet, however, reasserted in August the Information Minister’s legal right to monitor and effectively control Tele-Liban’s activities. In 1993 the Government revived police
control over all nonperiodical publications, books, foreign magazines, plays, and films, which must be submitted to the Public Security Directorate for approval before distribution. A prize-winning film on national reconciliation was banned for several months and released only after the producer made some changes. The police briefly closed a play, The Rabbit and the Saints, acting on a request from the Maronite church. Censors later reversed the decision. Police confiscated a novel, "Garden of the Senses," by a well-known foreign author. It had been published in several other countries. Lebanon has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a nourishing private educational system, born from the inadequacy of public schools and an attachment to sectarian affiliations. Students exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government does not usually interfere with student groups. The Government's arrests of students sympathetic to the exiled General Michel 'Awn and to the Lebanese Forces in 1992 chilled student activism among those students in 1993. [s]

42021. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 02: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (a) Political and Other Extra-Judicial "Killings", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Credible sources report that undercover units disguised as Palestinians killed 27 Palestinians as of late November. This number represents a significant decrease from the 45 Palestinians reported killed by undercover units in 1992. As in 1992, the task of the undercover units appeared to have been to arrest activists wanted by the authorities for serious crimes. The undercover units also focused on stone-throwers or graffiti-writers. Human rights organizations continued to charge that the undercover units targeted certain activists, in some cases killing suspects under circumstances in which it may have been possible to apprehend the without killing. Israeli authorities acknowledge the operation of special undercover units whose members circulate among Palestinian activists and claim that such units observe standard rules of engagement applicable to other IDF units and that all killings and allegations of misbehavior are investigated. Investigations of abuses by IDF troops are conducted by IDF investigators. These investigations rarely result in imposition of serious punishment. According to the Israeli Government, the investigation into the killing of a child by an undercover unit did result in an undercover unit lieutenant's conviction on charges of negligence. The officer was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment and was demoted to the rank of sergeant. According to some human rights groups, the General Security Service (GSS) was responsible for at least one extrajudicial killing—the death of Omar Khamis Yusef Al-Ghula who, according to eyewitnesses, was handcuffed and offering no resistance when he was shot by a security officer on January 27. The Israeli Government states that members of an army patrol shot and killed Al-Ghula, while he was in their custody, when he attempted to draw a handgun. The military prosecutor for Gaza investigated this case. He concluded that the soldiers acted in accordance with the rules of engagement and that the file be closed. Palestinian attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians in 1993 resulted in the deaths of 49 Israelis in the occupied territories, compared to 23 such deaths in 1992. Most deaths were by knife or gunfire. After a series of killings and stabbings of Israeli soldiers and civilians in Israel and the occupied territories in the first 3 months of the year, the Government sealed off the West Bank and Gaza from Jerusalem and Israel on March 29 for an indefinite period as a means of reducing the number of Palestinian attacks on Israelis. As of mid-December, 79 Palestinians had been killed by other Palestinians, most often because of alleged collaboration with Israeli security services but also because of disputes between political factions or street gangs or because of personal feuds. These killings included Palestinian women accused of collaboration with Israeli authorities, infidelity, or prostitution. (The Government of Israel claims that 139 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians in 1993.) Sixty-six of these killings took place in Gaza, a dramatic decrease from 149 killings in 1992; in the West Bank, the phenomenon continued a downward trend begun in 1992. During the October to December period, there were credible reports of IDF inaction during several Settler attacks, which occurred usually in retaliation for the killing of a settler, on Palestinians and their homes and property. In late December the IDF appeared to investigate Settler incidents more vigorously two separate incidents in which Palestinians were killed, reportedly by settlers, and it appeared that by the end of the year the IDF had begun taking stronger measures to protect Palestinians from settler attacks. These measures included the provision by the IDF's Judge Advocate General to IDF officers of a 14-page handbook on how to deal with disturbances involving Israeli citizens in the occupied territories. According to that guidance, soldiers were authorized to arrest Israelis if they were breaking the law. Israeli authorities prosecute Palestinians accused of killing other Palestinians as well as those accused of killing Israelis, and, although there is no capital punishment, sentences are severe. Palestinians suspected of killing Israelis and alleged collaborators have been a principal target of undercover unit operations. The Government also prosecutes Israelis accused of killing Palestinians, though sentences given to Israelis are generally much lighter than sentences handed down to Palestinians convicted of killing either Israelis or Palestinians. [s]

42022. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 05: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (d) Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. As of the end of 1993, a total of 9573 Palestinians were incarcerated in IDF (5308) and prison service facilities. Of those, roughly 68% had been tried and were serving sentences, 29.6% were awaiting charges or trial, and 2.3% were detained administratively, i.e., sentenced to a specific period of detention without formal charge or trial. In October Israel released 617 Palestinian prisoners as a goodwill gesture following the signing of the Declaration of Principles. At the end of the year, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were discussing the timing and numbers of additional releases. Since the beginning of the intifada in late 1987, Israel has routinely transferred Palestinian prisoners from the occupied territories to detention facilities within Israel especially to the Ketziot camp in the Negev desert and Megiddo prison near Afuia. This practice, which continued in 1993, contravenes Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Estimates of the number of Palestinian residents of the occupied territories incarcerated within Israel range up to 7000. In late 1993, there were indications that Palestinian prisoners were being transferred from detention centers in Gaza to facilities in Israel prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza scheduled to begin on December 13. The use of administrative detention for alleged security reasons without formal charges or a full opportunity for detainees to defend themselves continued in 1993. As of October, 277 Palestinians were held in administrative detention, compared to 620 held at the end of 1992. Detention periods are for a maximum of 6 months and are renewable. Evidence used at hearings frequently is declared secret and unavailable either to the detainee or his attorney. Israeli officials state that administrative detention is used only when IDF legal advisors have determined that there is sufficient evidence to detain a person and that the evidence has been corroborated by two sources. They assert, however, that the evidence cannot be presented in open court because to do so would Compromise the method of acquiring the evidence, which is often provided by informers whose lives would be jeopardized if their identities were known. Human rights monitors contend that administrative detention is often used when evidence against a suspect would not stand up in court. District military commanders may order administrative detention without formal Charges. Detainees may appeal detention orders or renewal of detention before a military judge.
Attorneys may question security service witnesses concerning the general nature of that evidence. The Supreme Court may review rulings by military Judges and may examine secret evidence. Any soldier may arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense. Persons over age 12 are treated as adults by the court system. Persons arrested for common crimes are usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an attorney, and a preliminary hearing. In the Occupied Territories, these opportunities are sometimes delayed. Bail is rarely available to those arrested for security offenses. Special summonses are reportedly issued to Palestinians wanted by authorities for security reasons. Israeli Military Order 1369 allows authorities to sentence to 7 years' imprisonment any person who does not respond to a special summons that is delivered to him or a family member or is posted in the Civil Administration office nearest his home address. Persons may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours and then must be released unless a warrant is issued. A warrant may be issued by a police officer for two periods of 7 days each. For extensions beyond 18 days from the date of arrest, the detainee has to be brought before a military judge, at which point he is entitled to defense counsel. In 1992 Israeli authorities shortened this period to 8 days for minors and those accused of less serious offenses (such as stone throwing). A military judge may extend the detention for a period of no longer than 6 months from the date of arrest. If there is no indictment during this period, the detainee must be released. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite detention until the end of the trial, though the detention may be appealed. In theory a detainee has the right to see a lawyer as soon as possible. In the cases of security detainees, however, officers routinely issue a written order to delay access to counsel for up to 16 days for reasons of security or to conduct the investigation. Higher ranking officials or judges may extend this period by up to 76 more days for the same reasons. In June the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to consult a lawyer required the Government not only to inform a detainee of his right but also to advise the detainee of any orders preventing him from seeing a lawyer. Israeli regulations also permit prisoners to be held in isolation from family and from other detainees during interrogation. Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post notification of arrest within 48 hours. Palestinians assert that families and lawyers are normally notified much later and generally locate the detainee through their own efforts. Notification to the US Embassy or Consulate General of detained Palestinian-American citizens has almost always been through the family. The ICRC attempts to help by passing on to families (by telephone) the information it receives from Israeli prison officials. A senior officer may extend for up to 12 days denial of notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular officials. A military commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time. The Israeli authorities acted in a number of areas to improve prison conditions in the occupied territories after Palestinian prisoners staged an 18-day hunger strike in September and October 1992 to protest prison conditions. Implementation of the specific measures, however, was not uniform throughout all detention facilities. In 8/1993, prisoners at Hebron prison staged a hunger strike to protest lack of water for toilet and bathing facilities. The Israeli Supreme Court agreed to consider a petition presented by the prisoners but, as of October, the case had not been resolved. In the meantime, Israeli authorities reportedly agreed to truck in water supplies to meet prisoner needs. In September the Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court to close the Ketziot Military Detention Camp in Israel because of inferior conditions of imprisonment." The petition argued that the conditions at the camp, which reportedly houses 4900 Palestinian security detainees, violated the Geneva Convention. Overcrowding (26 inmates to a tent), inferior diet, lack of adequate medical care, and lack of arrangements for religious worship were cited as key problems. At the end of the year, Ketziot camp was still in use.

According to the IDF Judge Advocate General, the IDF has been granted a postponement to study the report of an advisory panel. Consideration of the case by the Supreme Court has been postponed until 3/1994. In 12/1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 799 which called for the immediate return of 416 Palestinians who had been deported to South Lebanon earlier that month because of their alleged association with Hamas—the Islamic Resistance Movement and the largest Islamist organization in the occupied territories—and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel agreed in March to a two-phase plan to return the deportees. In 9/1992 deportees returned from the edge of the Israeli-declared security zone in South Lebanon where they were interned and then returned to their homes in the Occupied Territories. Upon their return, the deportees were investigated by the Israeli authorities and some were freed while others were placed in administrative detention. In mid-December, the remaining deportees returned except for about 16 deportees who reportedly elected to remain outside the occupied territories to avoid imprisonment. Like those who had returned in September, the 197 who returned in December were subject to interrogation and investigation. As of the end of the year, approximately 60 remained in detention In addition to the deportees in southern Lebanon, Israel allowed 30 pre-intifada deportees to return to the occupied territories in May as a confidence building measure. Among those who returned was one former West Bank mayor elected in 1976 and later deported to Jordan. [2]


Estimates vary on the number of casualties caused by use of excessive force in the occupied territories. Figures compiled from press, Palestinian, international organizations, and Israeli government sources indicate that a total of 184 Palestinians were killed by security forces in 1993, compared to 158 in 1992. Estimates of the numbers of Palestinians wounded vary, the number could be as high as 4120. IDF figures report approximately 890 Palestinians were injured as of September 1 by the security services. Forty-nine Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed by Palestinians in 1993 in the occupied territories, and estimates of Israelis killed were about 386. Extremists associated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were responsible for many of the lethal attacks on Israelis. After May it appeared that both the security forces and Palestinian activists pursued less confrontational policies in order to reduce violent clashes. The killing of an Israeli settler near Ramallah in October began a cycle of killings and reprisals which had not ended as of late December. Many of the IDF observation posts erected in camps and cities throughout Gaza, which had provoked violence, were removed in August. Of the total number of Palestinians killed, the Israeli human rights group B’tselem estimates that 37 were children aged 16 or under, 33 of whom were killed between January and June. Many of these children were involved in demonstrations or were near the sites of confrontations or incidents at the time they were shot. In July, however, a soldier reportedly shot 10-year-old Ezrak Shalviar while the boy was flying a kite in an open field. In a June report on IDF killings of Palestinian children under age 16, B’tselem charged that the IDF pursued a deliberate policy of opening fire in situations in which soldiers were not in mortal danger. Citing the IDF’s rules of engagement for dispersing demonstrations and pursuing suspects which allow, in the last resort, use of live fire, B’tselem declared that “the many instances in which Palestinians in the territories have been killed by soldiers . . . are unequivocal Proof of the danger inherent in such orders and of the need to change them.” B’tselem acknowledged that the IDF had no deliberate policy to kill children but contended that “in hundreds of instances security forces had the option of refraining from shooting, at the risk of having suspects the vast majority are demonstrators or stone-throwers) escape, in order to ensure that innocent people would not be hurt.” In its response to the B’tselem report, the IDF stated that soldiers were under orders to act with the greatest care in dealing with “riots” in which women and children participated and noted that opening-fire regulations
prohibited shooting at children. Children were injured, the IDF said, because they were near or among rioters or armed terrorists who endangered the lives of IDF soldiers. The IDF statement attributed the increase in deaths to the escalation of violence in the first half of 1993. Until April, IDF regulations permitted the use of live ammunition only when soldiers’ lives were in immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, or to disperse a violent demonstration. In April the IDF issued an amended version. The regulations permitting the use of live ammunition were based on intelligence received that certain suspects were in the houses. In practice, IDF soldiers used live fire in situations other than those described above and often shot suspects in the upper body and head. Uniformed soldiers police, and undercover units used live fire in several instances, including deaths and shootings of head and body. Uniformed soldiers police, and undercover units also shot inflamed bystanders (including children) by live fire, rubber bullets, or beatings while pursuing suspects. During 1993 the IDF continued the practice of using various heavy weapons, including rockets to destroy houses in which soldiers believed suspects to be hiding. These demolitions took place almost exclusively in Gaza. Although the IDF stated that no figures were available on the number of houses damaged in these operations, human rights groups count up to 220 houses in which suspects were either destroyed or partially damaged by the IDF. By the course of military operations in pursuit of suspects. Israel defended this practice as a necessary military operation and a measure to save the lives of Israeli soldiers. The Israelis assert that the operations were based on intelligence received that certain suspects were in the occupied territories. In practice, IDF units regularly evacuated houses in which they believed suspects to be hiding and then fired rockets into the buildings. In several instances, no suspects were found in the houses. Since late 1952, 177 Palestinian claims have been filed for damages to homes by the security forces. Sixty claims have already been settled to the sum of approximately $500000 (1.5 million NIS). On a number of occasions, security forces forcibly removed Palestinian suspects undergoing medical treatment from hospitals or prohibited Palestinians in need of medical care from crossing roadblocks or going out during curfews. The Israeli Government asserts that a patient is removed only after a doctor certifies a patient is fit for transfer, the transfer must be made with a doctor present. [=] 42024. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 12: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, (Including Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended, February 1994. The escalation in violence both in the occupied territories and inside Israel during the first 3 months of 1993 led the Government to seal off indefinitely the West Bank and Gaza from Jerusalem and Israel on March 29. By inhibiting the free movement of goods and people, the closure caused deterioration in economic conditions in the occupied territories and disrupted patterns of religious, educational, cultural, and family life as well as access to medical care. The March 29 closure constitutes the longest period during which the Israeli security forces have employed this measure, which was first used in 1991. Closure severely constricted Palestinians’ freedom of movement between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, between the northern and southern sections of the West Bank, and between Gaza and the rest of the occupied territories. As during previous periods of closure, any Palestinian wishing to enter Jerusalem or Israel must obtain a special permit issued by the Civil Administration. Any Palestinian found in Jerusalem without such a permit is subject to a fine (usually the equivalent of about $160) or arrest. Because most main roads pass through Jerusalem closure effectively divides the West Bank into two parts, with the result that Palestinians from the north may not travel to the south without special permission, and vice versa. In addition, Gazans may only travel to Jerusalem and the West Bank if they are able to obtain permits. The closure had a serious effect on the economy of the occupied territories. Of the 120000 Palestinians who prior to March 29 worked in Jerusalem or Israel only about half had received permits to work in Jerusalem or Israel prior to March 29. Palestinians in the occupied territories, having lost their markets in Jerusalem and Israel, were unable to pay their workers. Unemployment rates in the West Bank were estimated at 25% before closure and are now estimated at 40%. Palestinian businesses and institutions in Jerusalem suffered because their West Bank clients were unable to enter the city. The IDF states that the number of Palestinian women who have been issued permits since closure (about 52000), added to the number of Palestinians exempt from the permit requirement who work in Jerusalem (15000), is roughly equal to the number of Palestinians (70000) who had been legally permitted to work in Israel and Jerusalem before March 29. The IDF maintains that only Palestinians who had been working illegally in Israel and Jerusalem lost their employment. After closure, however, the Israeli Government significantly reduced the number of permits issued to unskilled Palestinian day laborers allowed to work in Israel or Jerusalem. Permits to enter Jerusalem and Israel were valid for periods varying from a few hours to 3 months. Permits were denied for a variety of reasons, including security concerns and non-payment of taxes. As of October, the CIVAD had issued 268,309 temporary permits of varying duration for various purposes to Palestinians from the occupied territories who were not employed in Israel or Jerusalem. In April Palestinian and Israeli human rights groups issued a joint statement in which they condemned the closure. The statement described closure as an illegal collective punishment of the population of the occupied territories and as "disproportionate to any legitimate security concern." Many Muslim and Christian Palestinians were denied the right to worship at holy places associated with their faith because of closure. The closure also affected the movement of health care personnel and prevented or slowed the provision of health care services to some emergency and critically ill patients in the West Bank and Gaza strip. In October Israel eased certain restrictions on access to Jerusalem as a goodwill gesture." At the end of March 1994, Palestinian and Israeli camps than in previous years. Curfews were still used extensively in Gaza in 1994, including the continued imposition of a night-time curfew in effect since 1987. Human rights groups criticized the prolonged curfews, which do not apply to Israeli settlers, as a form of collective punishment. AU Palestinians need permits, which require several clearances, in order to travel outside the occupied territories, and Israeli authorities have imposed travel restrictions on certain political activists. However, thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories travel abroad each year. In 1991 Israeli authorities announced that bridge-crossing permits to Jordan could be obtained at post offices without a screening process. In July Israel announced that the requirements for Palestinian males relaxing the bridge into Jordan to remain out of the occupied territories for 9 months no longer applied to men above the age of 25. The requirement remained in effect, however, for Palestinian males between the ages of 16-26. In late 1993, Jordan tightened restrictions on entry, with the result that Palestinians granted permission to travel by Israeli
authors were sometimes denied permission to enter Jordan. Obstacles to emigration include the inability to obtain a travel permit and the fear of losing residency. Restrictions on residence, tourist visas, reunions, and family reunification have applied only to Palestinians resident in the occupied territories. Israel sometimes refuses to renew laissez-passer of Palestinians from the occupied territories who live or work abroad, on the grounds that they have abandoned their residence; even though they may not have acquired foreign citizenship. Palestinians who obtain foreign citizenship ordinarily are not allowed to resume residence in the occupied territories, those who acquire the right to residence elsewhere or who remain outside the occupied territories for over 3 years are often not permitted to resume residence. They are permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are denied entry entirely. These restrictions do not apply to Israeli settlers resident in the occupied territories. Israeli authorities have limited family reunification for demographic political, and economic reasons. Most Palestinians who were abroad during the 1967 war (estimated to be one-fourth of the Palestinian population at that time) or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons are not permitted to return to reside permanently with their families. Permanent residency permission or family reunification has usually been denied to foreign-born spouses and children born in the occupied territories to nonresident mothers, although they were generally allowed to reside as temporary residents with renewable permits. In August the Israeli Government announced a change in its policy on family reunifications. Following the presentation by human rights groups of a series of petitions to the Israeli Supreme Court, Israel decided to expand its policy on family reunification for residents of the West Bank and Gaza by offering to consider the cases of 6000 immediate family members who had arrived and applied for visitors’ visas between 6/1990 and 11/1992. As of the end of August, the Israeli authorities had considered 3249 applications from residents of the West Bank and Gaza for family reunification, of which they had approved 723 and denied 861. Still pending were 781 applications, including 116 held over from previous years. Israel also announced it would consider 2000 new cases annually, allowing the return of up to 5000 persons. However, immediate family members of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were excluded from the new policy. [=]

42025. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Palestinian women living under military occupation face similar human rights problems as do men in their contact with Israeli authorities. In addition, many Palestinian women face poverty, lack of education, and social repression. Palestinian society is only now coming to recognize the problem of violence against women. A major difficulty in dealing with this hostile sensitive issue is lack of resources: women's organizations are working to raise consciousness and provide help and intervention when needed but funds are not available for shelters or centers. The CIVAD has made no significant attempt to relieve the situation, and Palestinian social institutions have so far failed to focus on the issue. Palestinians are governed by a mixture of Jordanian and Egyptian law, British mandate law, and Israeli military regulations. There are no laws guaranteeing women's rights in the workplace. Palestinian women often work outside the home and are prominent in many professions, including medicine, law, and teaching. Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a (Islamic) law. Women have certain rights regarding marriage and divorce, inheritance, property ownership, and children. Many women's rights activists believe, however, that many women are not aware of their rights and often fail to demand what is guaranteed to them by law. Women's rights groups are active throughout the occupied territories, dealing traditionally with social issues (children, health, education) but have more recently begun to venture out into practical training, women's rights education, advocacy work, and political activism. The major concern of women's groups is that women who have contributed significantly to Palestinian political efforts will be relegated to traditional roles in the interim period. [=]

42026. DS. “Near East and North Africa: Occupied Territories: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children”, in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There is no pattern of societal abuse of children. Palestinian children have, however, probably suffered disproportionately from the effects of military occupation and the intifada. Since the uprising began in 1987, schools, which are often overcrowded and underfunded, have been subject to frequent closings by both the Israeli authorities and by Palestinian activists enforcing strikes. Political tensions and lack of funding have closed most of the few sports and recreation facilities that existed for children. Encouraged by political rhetoric and the example of older sibling children have been drawn into street violence and have frequently provoked it by throwing stones. During 1993, credible sources report that 37 children (aged 16 and under) were killed by Israeli security forces. While some had been involved in demonstrations or rock-throwing incidents, others had been merely in the vicinity of clashes when killed. [=]
Government has not responded to requests by the US Government and human rights organizations for a list of names of those amnestied or otherwise released. Members of Ba'thist organizations and the banned Party for Communist Action (PCA) were reportedly among those released in recent years. The Government released at least eight political prisoners in 6/1993. In addition, of the six women taken into custody in late 1992 and early-to-mid 1993, three were released in late 1993. According to the Government, the eight persons released had not been exacted for human rights content that these three still remain in detention. Releases in 1993 included alleged members of the Kurdish Workers Party as well as members of the Party for Communist Action. One alleged PCA member had been detained previously for 5 years, released, and rearrested in June. There were also unconfirmed reports that the Government released in November at least 20 members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood after long periods of detention. It is possible that some of those released had been tried and found guilty by the State Security Court and then released because they had already served the periods of incarceration imposed in their sentences. The majority of detainees still held are reputed member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other detainees are connected with factions of the Ba'th Party, the Islamic Unification Movement claimed that 120 of its members were being detained. The Government has used the possession of material from banned political organizations as a frequent pretext for detention. The Government is known to have detained the relatives of suspects in both criminal and security cases as a means of compelling individuals being sought by authorities to surrender. Although the Government has exiled persons in the past, there have been no reported instances of exile for several years. [-]

42029. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Syria: Part 06: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: (e) Denial of Fair Public Trial", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993, Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The court system comprises separate civil courts, penal and criminal courts, whose jurisdiction includes economic crimes- and religious, military, security, and constitutional courts. There are major differences between the types of Syrian courts in terms of respect for human rights. Persons charged with security or political offenses fall under the jurisdiction of the military-controlled State Security Court, established in 1968. Defendants in this court have few safeguards of their rights; court sessions are generally closed (although an international observer was allowed to attend the sentencing portion of a prominent trial in 1992, and Amnesty International representatives attended sessions of some trials in 5/1993); defendants have no say in the selection of a lawyer, who is chosen by the court; defense attorneys are unable to consult with their clients outside the courtroom or to call witnesses to refute prosecution charges- and the Government does not allow for independent medical examinations of the defendantsto determine whether physical abuse has occurred during pretrial detention. The Government does not generally release information on the trial or sentencing but relatives with influence in the Government sometimes succeed in obtaining information and even effecting the release of the accused. The sentences are not subject to appeal, but the President may nullify, alter, or confirm State Security Court sentences. A special military Field Court, created during the period of the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in the early 1980s, reportedly still exists to deal with serious security offenses. As part of the Government's general crackdown on smuggling, the Field Court reportedly tried cases involving arms trafficking in 1993. The accused is not permitted legal representation at Field Court proceedings, which are held in secret. Regular civil and criminal courts are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The accused in a criminal case is detained provisionally upon the accusation of the public prosecutor, then remanded to a judge for arraignment. The judge may either dismiss the charges on the basis of insufficient evidence or refer the case to a criminal court. Defendants in civil and criminal courts are entitled to legal representation of their choice. If they cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed by the court. These courts impose no restrictions on lawyers representing their clients. Defendants are either released, convicted, or sentenced, but the Government does not allow for independent medical examinations of the accused. Defendants in criminal cases are allowed to present evidence and confront their accusers. Trials are public, except for cases involving juveniles or for crimes such as rape. Cases are tried before a judge; there is no jury system. The slow and cumbersome legal system can leave suspects languishing in prison for months. Following the fire in Hassakeh prison in May, the alleged perpetrators were rapidly executed, raising questions as to whether they had been afforded due process. According to the Constitution, the High Constitutional Court investigates and rules on petitions submitted by the President or at least one-fourth of the members of the People's Assembly challenging the constitutionality of laws or legislative decrees. It has no appellate jurisdiction over cases from the civil or criminal courts. Human rights groups estimated that in 1993 some 330-600 cases of political detainees were brought before the State Security Court. Many of those tried in 1993 reportedly had been imprisoned for 10 or more years before trial. One human rights group estimated that the State Security Court handed down about 60 sentences between 7/1992-5/1993. The defendants in many of these trials were reportedly accused of membership or participation in the activities of banned political organizations whose activities the Government claims include the forcing of political change through violence. Some of the alleged activities do not include violence but rather opposition to the objectives of the Ba'th Party or the dissemination of false information which could weaken the people's confidence in the objectives of the Ba'th revolution. At least 34 defendants were found guilty of disseminating false information, receiving money from abroad, or withholding information from the authorities. Those tried in 1993 included members of a Syrian human rights group, the Committee for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights in Syria (CDF), and those accused of membership in the banned Party for Communist Action. While the defendants in the 5 CDF cases tried in 1993 had not yet been sentenced at year's end, the 10 CDF members found guilty in 1992 received sentences ranging from 5-10 years. Some sentences specified the "deprivation of civil liberties" after prison sentences are completed; such deprivations reportedly include prohibitions on foreign travel and holding government positions. Twenty-four members of the PCA were also found guilty and sentenced to between 10-16 years in prison, some with forced labor. The Government charged that the PCA sought to change the Government by violence and opposed the objectives of the Ba'thist Revolution. One CDF defendant, the writer Nizar Nayyuf, was convicted for his alleged activities in the CDF and for having circulated a leaflet reportedly questioning the legitimacy of the 1991 presidential referendum. The court found him guilty of disseminating false information that would undermine public confidence in the Ba'th revolution. Nayyuf was awarded one of the Pen Freedom to Write awards in 5/1993. Another trial involved an engineer, Sayih Khayr Bek who had been detained since 1980 when the regime cracked down on professional associations that had organized a national strike to protest the state of emergency. The Government does not release information on the number of persons detained or imprisoned for political or security offenses, but credible estimates run from 3800-9000 (including persons held in Syrian detention facilities in Lebanon). The Government continues to contend that persons are detained not because of their political beliefs but because of criminal acts or actions that violate the state of emergency. It is clear, however, that many persons have been jailed without charge or as a result of unfair trials for nonviolent opposition to the regime. In June and July the Government released at least eight political prisoners, several of them prominent figures. These
included four former ministers and at least three Jordanian members of the Ba'th Party—February 23 Movement (supporters of former Syrian Leader Salah Jadid who was imprisoned after the coup that brought Hafiz Al-Asad to power in 1970). The Jordanians, Majli Nasrawin, Hakim Al-Fayez and Yusuf Al-Buri, had spent 23 years in prison. One human rights group says that seven Ba'th Party political prisoners remain in a special wing of Mezze prison. All reportedly continue to be allowed monthly family visits under guard in government rest houses in Damascus. Other female political prisoners taken into custody in late 1992-1993 three were reportedly released in late 1993. Although human rights organizations contend that the other three were still being held in Duma women's prison at the end of 1993, the Syrian Government claims that these three were released earlier. The Government does not permit access to prisoners by international humanitarian organizations. [4]

42030. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Syria: Part 12: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Syrians do not have the ability to change their government legally and peacefully. President Asad and his senior advisers effectively control all aspects of political and economic life. The ruling Ba'th Party, which emphasizes socialism and secular Arabism, is dominated by the military. In recent years, the Party has served principally to legitimize President Asad's rule. Although the Government seeks to build national rather than ethnic identity, ethnic, religious, and regional allegiances remain important. Members of President Asad's own sect, the Alawis, hold most of the important military and security positions. President Asad's fourth 7-year term will expire in 3/1999. Women play a significant but not a leading role in government. Two of the 29 ministers in the present Cabinet are women, 21 of 260 parliamentarians are women. Women are also active in Ba'th party "popular organizations." [4]

42031. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Syria: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Syrian law stipulates that the State is to provide equal opportunity to women and is to remove impediments that hinder the development of women and their full participation in society. Government policies include equal pay for similar work and encourage the enrollment of women at all levels of education. Nonetheless, traditional concepts of male guardianship of women continue to prevail in many segments of the society. These concepts often limit a woman's rights in matters of marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and personal decisions. Moreover, the Government accords religious authorities or courts the right to rule on the majority of matters involving social and interpersonal relations. Under Islamic laws of inheritance, the male offspring receive a disproportionate share of the inheritance. Wife beating and other physical abuse of women are known to occur, but conservative social mores in Syrian society discourage public discussion of the issue, making it difficult to estimate the extent of the problem. There are no official or unofficial statistics on domestic abuse. Under the legal system, women have access through the courts to redress any grievance caused by violent acts against them. There has been an indeterminate, although almost certainly small, number of court actions involving spousal abuse. The vast majority of incidents involving abuse probably go unreported because of the social stigma attached to such proceedings in such cases. Incidents are usually handled within the family where a husband's physical abuse of his wife is criticized and viewed with shame. Outside the family and the courts, the Syrian Women's Federation also offers a mechanism to help solve individual family problems. [4]

42032. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Syria: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Syrian law stresses the need to protect children and ensure conditions favorable to the development of their faculties. The Government mandates education through the sixth grade and provides optional but tuition-free education at higher levels. Although the quality of health care varies among regions and facilities, children are provided treatment free or at relatively nominal charge. The Government attempts to enforce legislation restricting child labor and to protect the institution of the family, although violations of these laws still occur. Violence against children warrants tough legal penalties as well as social stigma. [4]

42033. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Syria: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The minimum age in the public sector is 14, though it is higher in certain industries. The minimum age varies more widely in the private sector. The absolute minimum is 12 with parental permission required for children under age 16 to work. Children are forbidden to work at night. The Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor is responsible for enforcing minimum age requirements but lacks an adequate number of labor investigators. In February, a Syrian newspaper reported frankly on the widespread use of child labor in several factories in one of Syria's largest cities. The report noted that Syrian law prohibited such practices and called for Ministry of Social Affairs officials to investigate. Work hours of young employees are limited, compared to those of the regular work force. [4]
conflict, or partial to sectarianism. Censorship also affects films available at foreign cultural centers. The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. There are no privately owned newspapers. The Ministry of Information censors the televised news programs to ensure they follow the government line. The Government does interfere with radio or television broadcasts from neighboring countries. The Government prohibits citizens from owning satellites receiving dishes. In early 1994, security forces began to confiscate satellite-dish components but later halted the practice. Although ownership remains illegal, citizens resumed installing satellite dishes without any apparent government action. However, in November the Government announced that it would fully implement the ban on private dishes and create a monopoly to distribute satellite programs to selected consumers. Nonetheless, there was greater openness in 1994 in the media's coverage of regional developments, including the peace process. The Government aired extensive coverage of the peace agreement reached between Arab parties and Israel, e.g., the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Government also permitted more media criticism of government performance. Several newspaper articles highlighted government malfeasance and low-level, but not high-level, corruption. Public school teachers are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy, although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at the university level. [=] 42035. Coached. Hans. "Israelis Protests In Assa's Syria: Small Potatoes and Derivative. The documentary, which is sanctioned by the Government, is intended to align its laws more closely with international conventions on inheritance than male heirs. Spousal abuse against women occurs, but conservative social mores discourage any public discussion of the issue. There is no evidence that spousal abuse is widespread, but there are no official statistics. Battered women have the legal right to seek redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma attached to such an action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services to battered wives to remedy individual family problems. [=] 42037. Donnelly, John. "Conference No-Shows May Suffer: Anti-Terrorism Parley Expected To Boost Ties", in Seattle Times, March 12, 1996. p. A3. [TXT] [Photograph shows Bassam Shawahneh, father of a 1-month old Palestinian baby [terrorist baby?] that died in an ambulance that was led by Israeli soldiers while the baby died of pneumonia, as part of a crackdown on the 465 Palestinian enclaves that, among other retributions, bars medical treatment to the Palestinians.] When the world's leaders climb up on a stage tomorrow in an Egyptian resort town on the Red Sea, the most noteworthy fact won't be who is denouncing terrorism. It is who isn't-Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. [note: actually, less than 10% of the nations in the world will be represented at the summit, which is widely viewed as more linked with the Clinton and Peres re-election campaigns that 'terrorism'] The article concludes by observing that: 'Israel is furious at Syria', but that is scarcely news. [TXT] 42038. Greenberger, Robert S. "Rock and Roll Seems Here To Stay In Assad's Syria; Small Potatoes and Derivative. It Has State's sanction If It Steers Clear of Politics", in Wall Street Journal, January 21, 1994, p. A1. [TXT] Rock is widely played in Syria in both live performances and in recorded form as long as it is as apolitical as it is in the West. Using the media for dissent speedily ends the careers of performers, in Syria as elsewhere. Many rock performers supplement their music income by having other jobs (one prominent rocker, Ammar Alani, is a dentist). Elvis is king, but local black-fingernailed rocker Sally al-Shreikh gave a dramatic performance at the Russian Cultural Center. Her group, More Guts, plays songs by NIRVANA, Ozzy Osborne and Metallica. Her goal is an all girl group. The grandfather of Syrian Rock is Rockestra, which pioneered the use of lights, smoke machines and large speakers. In the 1960s, the major bands were Dynamite and Bluebats. In 1968, Johnny Komives, a Hungarian-Syrian drummer, started a rock band named Tigers; he had learned the styles of the Beatles, Presley and Bill Haley and the Comets in Beirut. Syrian markets are filled with bootleg audio CDs, ranging from Bob Dylan to Meatloaf. The Syrian rock scene is drug free, but beer flows freely; most of the musicians are dedicated amateurs (many loaning each other the very expensive musical equipment). Some musicians are mild peace activists, hoping for a peace with Israel. At the same time, a quarter of music requests to Damascus TV show 'Letters & Songs' are for rockers such as Elton John, Iron Maiden and Guns'n'Roses, local photographers Hallah al-Faysal has shocked people with nude self-portraits, and Damascus talk radio features people denouncing higher prices. 42039. Katz, Lee Michael. "On Way To Top, Albright Made Her Own Way: Nation's First Female Nominee For Secretary of State Boasts a Unique Style and a Powerful Personal History", in USA Today, December 6, 1996. p. A6. With her appointment hailed by Patricia Ireland of the National Organization of Women as a 'historic moment for women', Albright has been named to be the first woman Secretary of State. Claiming to be a refugee from Hitler and Stalin [sic: actually she spent WWII in London and the United States], she is seen as being filled with hatred toward Syria, unlike Warren Christopher. Katz describes Albright as "a powerful communicator", citing her contemptuous sneers at the United Nations that Castro has no balls ("a "line that shocked some colleagues but was a hit with Clinton"), and unquoted insults at Saddam Hussein: "Albright slings one-liners about Saddam Hussein's brutality and policy topics with such zeal that he whole body reverberates like a baseball pitcher delivering an unhittable fastball". 42040. Lebrecht, Hans. "Israeli Communists Protest Attacks in
Lebanon", in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), May 4, 1996, p. 14. The Israeli Communist Party concerned the Israeli attack on Lebanon in a statement that read, in part: "The Labor-Meterz government loaded celebrations for the 48th Independence Day with the heavy burden of a dreadful war in Lebanon [which killed] hundreds... Contrary to what the government alleges, this war is endangering the lives of the residents of Galilee. Therefore, the CPI calls upon all Jewish and Arab Peace forces to act with all their might to stop the war in Lebanon, to [remove] the Israeli army from Lebanon, and struggle for peace without occupation to be negotiated with Syria and Lebanon. The CPI, together with her front-partners of Democratic Hadash, in common with [those] concerned about the future of the peoples [of the Middle East] will tirelessly act for rescinding the closure that starves the Palestinian population in the 'territories', for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the capital of which will be eastern Jerusalem, side by side with the state of Israel. The CPI will continue to head the struggle for a democratic, just and equal society, fight against the privatization as well as against curtailing the rights of the working masses and women, and struggle for full equal rights of the Arab population in Israel." The statement as condemned the Israeli government for "driving out 500000 Lebanese from their homes as well as for the horrible massacre of refugees at the Kana-Kaf [Qana] UNIFIL camp." [TEXT]

42041. Monastersky, Richard. "The Case of Global Jitters; Even in Seemingly Stable Times, Climate Can Take An Abrupt Turn", in Science News, March 2, 1996, p. 138. Around 2200 BC, northern Mesopotamia suffered from a severe drought, agricultural communities along the Euphrates River died, refugees from the drought zone flooded into major southern cities, and the Akkadian civilization crashed. This scenario was mapped by Yale University archeologist Harvey Weiss in 1993 based on studies done at northeastern Syrian sites. While this regional, and perhaps global climatic fluctuation seems very clear, it conflicts with the long held belief that climate has been stable in the 11000 years since the end of the last Ice Age, the period termed Holocene.

Ice cores from Greenland have provided a 100000 year record of climate: the initial attention given to the dramatic climate changes that accompanied the beginnings and end of the Ice Ages were studied; now more attention is being paid to climate instability in the Holocene. Suzanne O'Brien of University of New Hampshire has found the concentration of sea salts and land dust indicate four dramatic climatic coolings in the last 10000 years. The most recent cooling was the Little Ice Age of the 15th-19th century; the Little Ice Age was preceeded by rapid climatic changes in 1400-1420. Previously coolings were recorded in 6100-500 years ago, 3100-2400 years ago, and 8800-7800 years ago. This pattern reveals a 2600-year cycle of coolings. Oceanic sediment studies between Iceland and Greenland have roughly corroborated this time series. However, it is impossible so far to determine the scale of the climatic coolings: there is no indication of the Mesoptamian cooling in the Greenland ice cores. [TEXT]

42042. Radhakrishnan, M. G. "On a Collision Course", in India Today, March 15, 1995, p. 93. Kerala's Syrian Christian Church is about to face off with its women members over a 1986 Supreme Court judgement that gave women equal inheritance rights and made them retroactive to 1951. The state and church are trying to pass legislation removing the retroactivity clause. In response many women's groups are planning a massive rally led by the Forum of Christian Women for Women's Rights and joined by the All India Women's Conference, All India Democratic Women's Association, YWCA of India, and Kerala Christian Women's Forum.

42043. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 97: Israeli Policies in Lebanon: Part 1 of 2. Israel, March 8, 1992. "Two points need to be stated firmly at the opening of this report: First, the assassination of Sheikh Mussawi, together with his family and others who happened to be in his company, was no more than an episode in a new, more aggressive and more far ranging Israeli policy in Lebanon, which also implies an adoption of a tougher stance towards Syria. This is why the assassination cannot be perceived as in any way connected with the preceding successful Palestinian guerrilla attack on an Israeli army camp. Coincidence of the two events in time has no deeper meaning. According to all the better informed Israeli military correspondents, the timing of the Mussawi's assassination depended on his known regular attendance of a yearly memorial meeting held at the tomb of Sheikh Bader (also assassinated by the Israeli secret forces, to [remove] the Israeli army from Lebanon, and struggle for peace without occupation to be negotiated with Syria and Lebanon. The CPI, together with her front-partners of Democratic Hadash, in common with [those] concerned about the future of the peoples [of the Middle East] will tirelessly act for rescinding the closure that starves the Palestinian population in the 'territories', for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the capital of which will be eastern Jerusalem, side by side with the state of Israel. The CPI will continue to head the struggle for a democratic, just and equal society, fight against the privatization as well as against curtailing the rights of the working masses and women, and struggle for full equal rights of the Arab population in Israel." The statement as condemned the Israeli government for "driving out 500000 Lebanese from their homes as well as for the horrible massacre of refugees at the Kana-Kaf [Qana] UNIFIL camp." [TEXT]

The new Israeli policy in Lebanon was designed by the army. Alex Fishman ("Pity that we did not think about it beforehand", Hadashot, February 21, 1992) reports that "it took the army much time to persuade the political authorities that their negotiations with Hizbollah were a waste of time", and that "a policy change could have already been detected in January", on the basis of unprecedented Israeli activities outside the Zone, like threatening to shoot at anyone on sight, and thereby forcing the villagers to flee the area en masse. Avi Benayahu ("The circle of the Lebanese mud", Al Hamishmar, February 21, 1992) likewise says that "the [Israeli] decision to hit Mussawi was reached by a senior army echelon, faithful to the doctrine of high frequency strikes at the interests of terrorist organizations, whenever and wherever available intelligence data allow them". (The peculiarities of a language in which the murder of a child of 5 is referred to as a "strike at the interests of terrorist organizations" will be discussed in a separate section of this report).

What reasons dictated the adoption of the new policy? The avowed Israeli rationale, faithfully reiterated by most Western media, was the failure of negotiations for the release of an Israeli navigator, Ron Arad. It does not deserve to be treated seriously. Even according to the official Israeli announcements, Arad is in Iranian hands, not Hizbollah's. Apparently no other Israeli captive remains in enemy's hands. Several other names regularly mentioned in this context refer to soldiers missing since 1982, whose families, on the basis of very slender evidence, persist in believing that they are still in "somebody's" captivity. In any event, after it was stung by massive critique of the 1985 "Jibril deal" by which over a thousand Palestinians had been freed in exchange for a handful of Israelis, the Israeli government decided to never again go to such lengths in order to secure freedom for its POWs. This is why the new Israeli policy can be assumed to stem from deeper strategic considerations concerning the Zone, the Lebanese hinterland behind, and especially the Israeli aims in Lebanon and Syria.

Some light on these strategic considerations has been shed by Ran Edelist ("The Israeli northern front includes southern Lebanon as well", Yerushalaim, January 17). Although a relative dove, Edelist has good access to all branches of the Israeli Intelligence: perhaps better than any other Israeli correspondent. During and after the war in Lebanon, he successively served as a mouthpiece for one Mossad clique in rivalry with another which disingenuously advised Sharon to trust the Falangas, of Aman (the Military Intelligence) in rivalry with the entire Mossad, and of both agencies in rivalry with Shabak over its exporting its interrogators to Lebanon in order to torture the captured Lebanese. Unlike all other Israeli journalists barred from visiting the Zone since June 1985 on the spurious excuse that Lebanon is a sovereign state, Edelist did tour not only the Zone but also the areas beyond it in the company of Uri Lubrani, who as the Israeli "Coordinator of Activities" in Lebanon, acts under the authority of the Prime Minister, not of the army. According to Edelist, one of the reasons behind the new Israeli policy was the wish to offset the adverse effects of the Madrid Conference, such as the Lebanese euphoria over its putative achievements. According to Edelist, during the period of that euphoria, Lubrani "made a vague hint which could be interpreted as raising the possibility of some sort of [Israeli] withdrawal from Lebanon. Plenty of people in Southern Lebanon heard rumors to this effect, and the earth began to quake under the feet of whoever had collaborated with Israel". Even though the Fundamentalist broadcasting station "The Voice...
of the South" which actually serves Israel. "was working overtime" to explain Lubrani's statement away, the damage was done. Its effects needed to be contained, and it was thought that only a new and tougher Israeli policy could reassure the collaborators and convince other Lebanese that Israeli meant to occupy the Zone and control adjacent areas indefinitely.

For this, however, radio broadcasts obviously could not suffice. From mid-November the Israeli press kept reporting the massive desertions from the ranks of the Israeli-controlled "South Lebanese Army" (SLA), in spite of pay rises. According to these reports, it was not easy to find replacements for the deserters, even through "usual Israeli methods", like telling the extended families to deliver a specified amount of recruits, with collective punishments befailing families for their non-compliance, and distribution of permits to work in Israel as a reward for their compliance. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities considered the former commander of that army, general Antoine Lahad, no longer fit to carry out the new tough policy, and therefore, as Edelist reports, decided to grant Lahad an Israeli army pension (but for colonels, not generals!) to enable him to quietly retire in Paris, supposedly in order to guarantee a better education for his 13 years old son. "Lahad will probably be replaced by one Akel Hashem, about 40, a picturesque personality, who for an extended period of time headed the SLA security system*. Since that "system" is notorious for brutally torturing thousands of people, and for atrocities in its concentration camps, the consequences of this appointment - which, as it seems, has already taken place without being formally announced - can be predicted. Edelist's account of Akel Hashem's pursuits and of the security system under his command deserve a closer scrutiny.

The security system of the SLA is, according to Edelist, "manned mostly by the Sunnis", who are a rather small minority in the Zone, inhabited preponderantly by the Shi'ites and Maronite Christians. The latter are not admitted to the security system. Akel Hashem himself is a Palestinian, and therefore a stranger to the whole security system under his command. By contrast, the SLA itself has 40% Christians and 20% Sunnis. From other sources it is known that many Shi'ites serve in its ranks. So do some Lebanese Druzes, some of them recruited from villages located outside the Zone. The contrast between the denominational composition of the SLA and of its security system is an example of the Israeli "divide and rule" methods, which in the not too remote a future may well be applied to dominate bigger Arab territories, by the way of exploiting rivalries within the population of Lebanon. (To all appearances, the Zone and the adjacent areas of Lebanon already serve as a testing ground for future Israeli conquests.) Edelist describes the methods of the SLA as ferocious in the extreme, comparing them to massacres in the style of Sabra and Shatilla. He recounts how an Israeli colonel G. commanding some Israeli forces stationed there, once attended "a briefing" with SLA officers. His reaction was that "we just cannot keep up with such standards". Yet the security system of SLA commanded by Akel Hashem is according to Edelist prepared to commit even worse atrocities than the army, not just in interrogatory torture, but also in military operations aimed at "softening the population". In one case recounted by Edelist, "Akel's group carried out several operations" earning a distinction of being named by local residents as "savage animals of a heretofore unknown species". But, comments Edelist, "in the Israeli army nobody knows nor wants to know", about such exploits.

In addition to dealing with all varieties of Israeli stooges, Edelist describes the role performed in Lebanon by the Israeli army. According to what he seems to be saying between the lines, and according to other information available in the Hebrew press. Israeli soldiers are stationed in Lebanon in quite impressive numbers, both in the Zone and beyond its boundaries. Israeli forces present in Lebanon are of two kinds: the circumstances, the Israeli army began to rely on two strategies. The first one in Lebanon in quite impressive numbers, both in the Zone and beyond its attack Hizbollah bases, because none exist". Under those circumstances, the Israeli army still seems to believe that it can occupy large Arab-inhabited areas, provided it relies on "right" occupation methods, now tested in South Lebanon, with results considered positive. The assault helicopters, especially the Apaches, perform a crucial role in terror operations conceived of as an essential ingredient of this new occupation tactic. In this context it needs to be recalled that, as described in report 89, the Israeli army in 1991 acquired huge quantities of Apache helicopters from the U.S., considerably exceeding in the process the entire amount of the U.S. annual military aid. It needs to be recalled as well that the American reaction to the murder of Mussawi was perfidious enough to be interpreted as its approval. Can it be presumed that the American military establishment has a stake of its own in learning about this new tactic of indirect domination of densely inhabited territories? An affirmative answer to this question cannot be precluded in advance.

Edelist's facts convey an impression that not only the Lebanese Army in the area indirectly controlled by Israel, but also the Lebanese government in Beirut always comply with Israeli instructions, either right away or after being suitably threatened. This impression is reinforced by many facts on the ground, and by hints of other Israeli correspondents. The Lebanese appeals for American protection, conveyed either directly or via Syria, have totally failed. An apparent Israeli reason to admit at once the responsibility for the murder of Mussawi was to demonstrate to the Lebanese how firmly the U.S. supports everything Israel does. And the supportive attitude of the U.S. seems to entrench the Israeli army in its belief that it has indeed found a tactical solution to the problem of occupying large densely inhabited areas in a maximally cost-effective way.

While casting doubt on the official "anti-terror campaign" excuses, Edelist's facts seem to point to two other Israeli reasons for the attack on the Hizbollah. The first reason was that Hizbollah had been the only force in Lebanon earnestly opposing the indirect Israeli occupation of large chunks of Lebanon. The second reason was the high respect of the Israelis for Hizbollah's military capabilities.

According to Edelist, Hizbollah leaders began by protesting to the Lebanese government against the incidents marking the Israeli reoccupation of Southern Lebanon. Only when the Lebanese government had ordered its army to stay aloof, the Hizbollah proceeded to attacking the Israeli and Israeli-commanded forces, both outside and inside the Zone, but without crossing the borders of the Lebanese state. In this, they apparently had some successes. The above mentioned Israeli colonel G. "has only praise for the operational capabilities of Hizbollah. Unlike the fecklessly performing PLO guerillas, Hizbollah men know what they do. They have a superb Intelligence and are good in planning. They don't knock their head up the wall. They don't attack right where the Israeli or SouthLebanesetroops are stationed in force, but study the area and prepare their actions carefully. They operate in cells, they know what field and communication security mean and their sabotage charges are nasty and murderous. Their fighters are local inhabitants. One cannot attack Hizbollah bases, because none exist*. Under those circumstances, the Israeli army began to rely on two strategies. The first was the random terror aiming at the entire population of the area. It has been been reported in the media, whether under the name of "softening" activities, or otherwise. The second strategy, first adopted in response to the rather successful Hizbollah's katyusha strikes at the Israeli territory after Mussawi's murder, was to prod Syria to extend its control over Hizbollah by mounting the threats of unspecified but devastating Israeli "hits", which were conveyed to Damascus via the Americans. This fact
has been reported by several Israeli military and political correspondents, of whom some, e.g. Alex Fishman (“If just happened to them”, Hadashot, February 28) noted with relief that “we were lucky that the Americans indeed intervened with Syria and obtained the cease fire, since we had lost control of the situation”. The Israeli public appreciated this cease fire, regarding it as the Israeli army's success, after the week of uninterrupted katyusha attacks had brought a reversal of the mood: from martial exultation (fed by official propaganda seconded by many press commentators) to despondency. As for the army and the minister of Defense Arens, they confined themselves to expressing their satisfaction with the results of the new Israeli policy in Lebanon, the Missawi assassination included. It can be safely predicted that this policy will be pursued in Lebanon also in the future, probably on an increasing scale, and in all likelihood also elsewhere. [c]

42044. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 97: Israeli Policies in Lebanon: Part 2 of 2. Israel, March 8, 1992. Reactions of the Israeli public to the events of the week, which began with the murder of Missawi and ended with the cease fire deserve a further comment. There were three fundamental kinds of reactions: of those who can be regarded as expressing in the name of the Israeli Security System, of the better informed military or political correspondents who, after sharing the initial euphoria, later had some wary misgivings about the military establishment’s wisdom on strictly pragmatic grounds, and finally a handful of principled critics of Missawi murder who were allowed to express themselves in print. In a sense, the reactions of the first listed kind are the most important, because they are quite unknown outside Israel, and because they can be assumed to faithfully reflect the viewpoints of the commanders of the Israeli army, concretely of its Chief of Staff, general Ehud Barak, and his Deputy, Amnon Shahak (no kin of mine!). In all probability, the two were responsible for designing the new Israeli policies in Lebanon and for the Missawi murder, which began to be implemented after being cleared by the minister of Defense Arens and by the Prime Minister Shamir. Some elements of the reasoning behind the new policies were provided - or rather hinted - in TV talks of the generals in active service. Also, the military correspondents were allowed to describe “the euphoria”, or “the contentment” of the generals, especially during the first days after the murder. But more thorough explorations of the subject were reserved for ex-generals and ex-intelligence insiders.

One of them was general (reserves) Yossi Peled, the Commander of the Northern Command (and thereby in charge of the Lebanese affairs) for five years until he retired from active service early in 1991. General Peled (“To keep the initiative”, Yedioth Ahronot, February 21) wants to continue such feats of arms as “hitting Missawi” or kidnapping Sheikh Obeid. He thinks the Israeli public should not be overly concerned about hardships of the residents of northern areas exposed to the Hizbollah’s katyushas, because “as those residents told me when it was my duty to tour the area... that they have learned to cope with their hardships splendidly”. His assessment of the Missawi murder from the military point of view is filled with superlatives. “I believe that hitting Missawi was an extraordinary achievement, for which the Israeli army can only be congratulated in exalted terms, because it proved truly extraordinary qualities of both the execution and its preparation by army Intelligence”. Peled indicates that an operation on such a scale “must have been prepared for many months or even years ahead”. The rather down-to-earth truth is that the “operation” involved no more than the use of a most modern assault helicopter against an ordinary car, and that according to Fishman (February 28) the Army Intelligence learned “from the Beirut papers of Thursday” that Missawi had intended to visit Jibshit explanations are needed”. It is enough to assume that “one terrorist less from the military point of view is filled with superlatives. “I believe that of unqualified successes, culminating in the halting of the katyusha attacks, which, in his view was possible only because the measures taken by the Israeli army “had proved our resolve to escalate them further to ensure that shooting stops”. He refused to provide any details of the procedures by which he was recently dismissed by Foreign Minister David Levy, apparently because of his hawksishness, too extreme for Levy’s tastes. Merhav lists four factors with which Israel has to contend in Lebanon: Iran, Syria, the Lebanese government and the Shi’ites. As for the first two, he advocates a mixed approach, alternating pressures with negotiations until they halt “the flow of money and other facilities” to Lebanon, with the effect of “speedily strangling the Shi’ites”. Unless it follows Israeli dictates, the Lebanese government faces the threat of losing “the little that remains of its sovereignty” in the South. In regard to the Shi’ites Merhav is highly optimistic. In his opinion Missawi was murdered principally because “the Zone has recently found itself under continuous Shi’ite pressure”. However, “the blow they thus received convinced them that they were left with no choice except to lick their wounds and acquiesce. The [Israeli] message can be assumed to have been absorbed by them, at least for a time, even though they are still likely to do a thing here or there. After what we did to them, we can proceed to building up good relations with the Shi’ites of South Lebanon, since, in conformity with the best existential traditions of the Lebanese communities, the Shi’ite community included, they now know that they have no other choice if they want to survive and to prosper”. This is why Merhav wants Israel to keep behaving “as it has done”. In saying all this Merhav undoubtedly represents the viewpoint of the Israeli “security system”, which can be also presumed to be supported in this design by its American counterpart. Consequently, the policies Merhav advocates can be presumed to be pursued in the future on a larger scale than heretofore. The Israeli “security system” may be mistaken in its assessment of suitability and efficacy of such methods, but there can be little doubt that this is what it genuinely believes in.

Such conclusion finds its confirmation in an authoritative interview provided by Moshe Arens to Ron Ben-Yishay (Yedioth Ahronot, February 28). Arens evaluates the Israeli activities in Lebanon as a chain of unqualified successes, culminating in the halting of the katyusha attacks, which, in his view was possible only because the measures taken by the Israeli army “had proved our resolve to escalate them further to ensure that shooting stops”. He refused to provide any details about those “measures”, but he admitted that American pressure on Syria, and indirectly on Iran, had played a role in producing the cease-fire, after Israel had “asked the Americans to approach Damascus and Beirut” with an explanation what may happen in its absence. According to Arens “in the struggle against terror no arguments, excuses or intricate explanations are needed”. It is enough to assume that “one terrorist less means a little less of terrorism, because it means that other terrorists will run for cover in fear, with their lines of command thus disrupted”. Like all the official and semi-official Israeli spokesmen, Arens mentioned neither the son of Missawi, nor his wife, nor other civilians killed in Lebanon. Presumably the expression “one terrorist less” encompasses them as well.

Thus far I have been reporting the writings which can be presumed to be authoritative reflections of the views of the Israeli
Security System. But it needs to be pointed out that the press and especially the electronic media have been filled by gems of wisdom quite similar to the just quoted. In my opinion, their impact on the Jewish public was considerable. At the same time, that public was being influenced by really crass accounts of Divine miracles neutralizing the destructive effects of the katyushas. Professor Yermiyahu Yuvali ("The concept of luck is outdated, long live the miracle!" Yeddoth Ahronot, March 21) observed that "listening to radio broadcasts from Syria. The media have made the katyusha attacks into a sort of script in a way hardly indicating any deep faith of theirs in the acts of Divine Providence, we can only get an impression that such a downpour of certified miracles as occurring right now has not blessed Israel since the Exodus from Egypt... It is no longer permissible to say that any Israeli could have just been lucky". The miracles are supposed to occur whenever anybody avoids being hit by a katyusha. But when a Jewish girl of 5 was killed by a katyusha, the Hizbollah were blamed rather than God. With irony, Yuvali says that "this cooccurrence of so many miracles must itself be a miracle", and he reports a miracle "which God performed just for me", namely "to make me still prefer the word 'luck' and be lucky enough to have this preference shared by some other Israelis". For all its crassness, the miracle talk did have an impeding effect on criticism of the army's policies, even of the most pragmatically-minded and half-hearted sort. It began only after the effect of katyusha attacks could no longer be disguised, even though the attacks in themselves were a phenomenon without precedents since 1982.

All in all, the army criticism thus far voiced has not amounted to much. Consequently, there is no need to devote much space to reporting it. Yoel Marcus and Ze'ev Shift, two most prominent Israeli commentators, writing in the same paper on the same day (Haaretz, February 21) can be seen as prototypes of the kind. Shift praises the Israeli army for "lurking in wait the Hizbollah leader, identifying his car and settling the account with him". He attributes the success of the operation "to the intellectual prowess of the high command of the Israeli army", and to "its great success in intelligence gathering", and so on. Still, Shift's adulation has it limits, because the failures of other army units, e.g. the roughly concurrent attack on an army camp in which three soldiers were killed, are also mentioned by him on this occasion. Marcus goes a little farther. After praising "the liquidation of Mussawi as an exemplary handbook in coordinating a military operation with intelligence", he asks whether between the design and the implementation of the operation was there enough time to consider all its possible consequences. The reason for his concern lies in the fact (confirmed by other commentators writing on the same day), that "the ultimate decision was reached over the phone between Shamir and Arens", who apparently "failed to take the possibility of [retaliatory] katyusha attacks into consideration". He says that "he does not feel it's exciting because "our real problems remain unsolved. One Abbas [Mussawi] is gone, another Abbas is going to replace him, while the Hizbollah, which in itself is a product of the War in Lebanon, will continue to annoy us". Amnon Denkner (Hadashot, February 21), shares this point of view but expresses it more vulgarly. He criticizes the army, because "after killing one important Arab, the katyusha attacks managed to disrupt life in the North for almost a week". But he gives vent to a sense of personal satisfaction. "One does not need to be a bloodthirsty chauvinist to feel mightily pleased by the sight of a Hizbollah leader blasted up into the air and falling down in pieces. One can assume that the image of a bearded fellow with black turban on his head being accurately hit by an Apache helicopter missile must for an average Israeli be quite thrilling, especially in view of all the contrast thus demonstrated between their qualities and ours. O army, how gorgeously thou performest!" Denkner is relativly dovish, so he can be relied upon for sensing what the feelings of "average Israelis" on such occasions are, at least during the first day of two after the event.

This style of analysis finds its best practitioner in the person of Uzi Benzman ("A long-term account", Haaretz, February 28). He is a correspondent who can be presumed to reliably report the real thinking of the Israeli government. According to Benzman, during the katyusha attacks and the consequent massive deployment of the army forces in Lebanon, "the atmosphere [in Jerusalem] was traumatic". But after the cease fire the mood shifted into that of relief. "Right now, both in Jerusalem [the location of the Prime Minister's Office] and in Tel Aviv [the location of the ministry of Defense] those responsible for the killing of Abbas Mussawi and for the army's retaliations to the hail of katyushas perceive the whole affair as best evidence of Israel's profound political and strategic wisdom all the way through". The highest manifestation of this wisdom was the Israeli threat "of multi-directional strikes", duly reported by the media. Making this threat are perceived as unequivocally beneficial. "Those who made it are self-contended to the point of assuming that the entire sequence of events from Mussawi killing up to the return of the Israeli force to its bases is now going to directly influence the negotiations between the Israelis and the Syrians and Lebanese in Washington... By this logic, the wheel of violence is presumed to have succeeded in setting the wheels of the political [process] in motion after nothing else had worked. This success, claim the self-contended men in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, will from now on propel the progress toward an ultimate stabilization of the entire Middle East". Benzman remains skeptical. He notes that the negotiations in Washington have been hardly leading anywhere. He admits that the Lebanon border is now, "thick, but attributes it, in my opinion rightly, primarily to inclement weather. It can be safely predicted that, when the weather improves, especially in the coming summer, "the self-contended men in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv" will rush to "propel the progress toward an ultimate stabilization of the entire Middle East", in the Israeli style.

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Vietnamese to restore the country after so many years of war. They have contributed more than two million roubles for the construction of a medical centre in Hanoi. The Committee supplies Vietnamese child-care establishments with literature on pre-school education published in the Soviet Union in the Vietnamese language, and with beautifully illustrated children's books. Women's organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America receive from Soviet women parcels with medicines and children's clothes, textiles, foodstuffs, study aids, sewing machines, and toys. The Committee also sends equipment for women's centres and child-care establishments and organizes lectures and exhibitions on the status of women in the USSR. The Committee is taking an active part in the campaign of solidarity with the Arab peoples. It has issued statements for the radio and press condemning Israel's aggression and policy of annexation and provocation. The General Secretary of the All-Arab Women's Federation sent the Committee the following telegram: "We realize that this battle will be prolonged and bitter, but we and our brothers-fighters throughout the world will ultimately win out and attain peace, freedom and justice. We highly appreciate your assistance and we are confident that you regard our struggle as a common struggle for a common goal." The Committee sends Palestinian women and children food, textiles, study aids, typewriters and sewing machines, and all-purpose medical kits. Delegations of Syrian women have been to the Soviet Union several times at the Committee's invitation. A protocol on cooperation between the Syrian and Soviet women's organizations has been signed.

The Committee vigorously supports all measures taken in solidarity with the democrats of Chile. Soviet women have made statements in the press, on the radio and television protesting against the atrocities and lawlessness of the fascist junta. A Committee of Solidarity with Chilean Democrats has been set up. It has a women's commission whose members — public and political figures, scientists, journalists and women workers — expose the junta's crimes in the press, over radio and at meetings and demand defence of the rights of the Chilean democrats, women and children. On behalf of millions of Soviet women the Soviet Women's Committee has sent a message to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim demanding that the United Nations should intervene to stop the atrocities being perpetrated by the junta. Where does the Committee draw the money to hold the solidarity campaigns and give material aid to women's organizations in other countries? The bulk of the money is specially set aside for it by a public organization, the Soviet Peace Fund. It has individual and also collective members — personnel of plants and factories, mines, transport depots, state and collective farms, educational and research institutions. They are eager to contribute their money for the advancement of the cause of peace, social progress and a better future. The Soviet Women's Committee was one of the founders of the Peace Fund; over half of the Fund's activists are women. To raise the money for the Peace Fund industrial workers put in extra working hours, singers and musicians give special concerts, artists arrange exhibitions and sales of their works, and writers contribute their royalties. At many plants and factories the workers include the names of heroes who gave their lives for the country's freedom in the list of their team members, fulfill the extra quotas themselves and send the money to the Peace Fund.

[In 1970 a Soviet delegation visited Syria and Jordan to express solidarity.]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Tunisia

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Tunisia

44000. AID. “Appendix A: Samples of AID Projects that Integrate Women By Sector: Water: Tunisia”, in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger. United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 69-86. The Rural Potable Water Institutions Project addresses an institutional approach to the operation and maintenance of rural potable water systems. The project's training plan provides for third country and USA training in addition to extensive LOP in-country training programs which are aimed equally at men and women. Approximately 35 individuals, mostly GGT officials at the regional level, will be trained in the USA and third countries. USAID has established a biweekly joint project review committee (counterpart) meeting approach to monitor progress in meeting project objectives. These joint reviews have already determined that 20% of the US and third country participants will be women. Moreover, these review meetings will enable USAID to monitor the selection and training of participants.

In addition, construction of new water points under this project will further benefit women. It will decrease the distance women who must haul water thus freeing time for other (possibly income generating) tasks. Increased amounts of potable water will aid women in household responsibilities of cooking, cleaning and hygiene care of children.

The project's title is Rural Potable Water Institutions Project and the Mission estimates that approximately $500000 is directed at WID, including training activities. The project is funded with ESF funds. [=]

44001. Amnesty International. Press Release: Tunisia: Executions Resume. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [1991] Five men were executed on Oct. 9 in Tunisia, despite President Ben Ali's repeatedly stated personal opposition to the death penalty. Three of those executed, all suspected sympathizers of the illegal Tunisian Islamic movement Hizb al-Nahda, had originally been sentenced in May to prison terms ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment for murder and arson; these sentences were raised to the death penalty by the Court of Appeal in June. The others were convicted of rape and murder. In 11/1990, a man convicted of multiple rape and murder became the first person in Tunisia to be executed since the government came to power in 1987. At the time the government stated that this execution was an exception, carried out because of the particularly heinous nature of the crime. Amnesty International has written to President Ben Ali expressing its regret at this resumption of executions, and urging him to commute all outstanding death sentences as a first step towards the abolition of the death penalty. [=]

44002. Burns, Khephra; Miles, William. Black Stars in Orbit: NASA's African American Astronauts; Part 1: Taking Flight. San Diego, Calif.: Guiller Books, 1995. pp. 2-35. The first African American to enter space was Col. Guion S. Bluford, Jr., on 8/30/1983 on space shuttle Challenger on mission STS-8. Bluford earned a BS Aerospace Engineering, and in the mid-1970's joined NASA to train as a mission specialist. On STS-8 he conducted medical experiments in microgravity and deployed an Indian telecommunications satellites. On 9/12/1992 the first African American woman, Dr. Mae C. Jemison made her first flight into space on STS-47, which carried Spacelab-J. On STS-47 she conducted 43 major experiments; when she returned to Earth and to her hometown of Chicago she was greeted by 8000 schoolchildren.

Aviation caught the imagination of African-Americans in the early twentieth century as it did of all peoples of that period. African-Americans had aviation pioneers, such as Dale White and Chauncey Spencer, who proved Black people could fly. When WWII started, many Blacks tried to join to fly, but the Army (this was before the formation of the Air Force) tried to discourage Blacks from flying. During the war, African-Americans were racially segregated and forced to cook, dig ditches and work to clean up behind Whites, but were not allowed to fly. The NAACP challenged this policy in court, and eventually the Army created a program to teach Black recruits to fly at Tuskegee Army Airfield in Alabama. The Army organized the Black pilots into the 99th Pursuit Squadron, 332d Fighter Group and 477th Bombardment Group. Despite exemplary service in North Africa and Italy, they faced continuing discrimination.

African American Astronauts" was Col. Guion S. Bluford, Jr. on 8/30/1983 on space shuttle Challenger on mission STS-8. Bluford earned a BS Aerospace Engineering, and in 1967, Air Force Major Robert H. Lawrence was named the first astronaut designatee. He came under intense attention of the media, which sought to determine whether he was a "black militant". Lawrence faced continuing discrimination and died in a F-104 crash on 12/8/1967. [TXT]

Although it would be ten more years before another Black astronaut would be named, Col. Vance Marchbanks was designated by NASA as chief flight surgeon for John Glenn in 1962, and was director of medical and safety tests on the moon spacesuits worn by Apollo astronauts. Dr. Robert Shurney became a designer for microgravity tools and techniques, as well as of the aluminum laces for the lunar rover for Apollo 15. Georgeff Carruthers designed the camera optics for the cameras carried by the astronauts.

44003. Crotense, Barbara. "A Third-World Effort on Family Planning", in New York Times, September 7, 1994. p. A6. Cairo, 9/6/1994: 10 third world countries (Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Thailand, Tunisia, Zimbabwe) have developed a family plan program called "Partners in Population and Development: A South-South Initiative". The program is being used as a model in the UN International Conference on Population and Development, for population control in the third world. In Indonesia, health clinics have been designed without walls, to allow the community and local religious leaders to participate in providing health services. There is a shortage of doctors, and in the last 10 years, the health staff has been increasingly supplemented by midwives. 10000 to 11000 midwives will be trained in 1995. Birth rates in Indonesia have been falling since 1971, when there were 5.6 births per woman to 3.0 births by 1991. Infant mortality has also decreased. Indonesia, which is primarily a Muslim country, claims that the success with family planning is due to President Suharto's strong emphasis and diplomacy concerning birth control. Colombia has also had success with family planning and claims this is due to the many options offered, excluding abortion, which was a compromise with the dominant Catholic Church. Birth rates in Colombia have dropped from 7.1 births per woman in in 1964, to 2.9 today; population growth rate has gone from 3.4% to 1.9%. However, in northern India, population programs have failed as family planning polices are devoid of choice, and poor women are often sterilized by force. Thailand's statistics of dropping birth rates from 6.5 to 2.1 per woman in the last 25 years, is also due to government-supported family planning. Meecchai Veeravaidhayafaund a program which offers free vasectomies on the King's birthday, and has also opened a restaurant called "Cabbages and Condoms" to raise funds. [TXT]
and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. The Republic of Tunisia is dominated by President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). Ben Ali was elected to a second 5-year term in March. He was unopposed. The President appoints the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and the 23 regional governors. In the March election, the RCD won 144 out of the 163 seats in Parliament. Four nominal opposition parties hold the remaining 19 seats. In 1992 the Government banned the Islamist party, An-Nahda, after a court sentenced 265 of its members to prison for allegedly plotting to assassinate the President and overthrow the Government. The internal security forces include a paramilitary national guard-organized within the Ministry of Interior. The security services continued to be responsible for human abuses, including torture, though the number of known cases appears to have declined significantly in 1994. They were allegedly responsible for the deaths of three persons in their custody. The major sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, petroleum, textiles, clothing and other manufactured exports, and remittances from workers abroad. Despite a severe drought, the economy continued its noninflationary growth in 1994, led by a 17.7% jump in tourism. Complaints of police abuse, including torture, declined significantly in 1994, due in part to government efforts to educate its police force and prosecute offending officers. The security forces also made fewer security related arrests compared to 1993. However, significant human rights abuses continued. The Government imprisoned two self-proclaimed presidential candidates, as well as an opposition candidate for Parliament who complained to a foreign journalist about the results of the national elections. The Government also stifled freedom of speech and the press. The authorities dismissed a journalist from his government job for providing an interview with one of the unofficial presidential candidate to a foreign publication; banned two French newspapers indefinitely for criticizing the Government; declined to renew the residency of a foreign correspondent, requiring him to depart the country; denied an entry visa to another foreign journalist to cover the elections; and interrupted telephone service to one foreign press service for 1 week and instructed its resident correspondent to depart the country. The police harassed several of the 117 women who signed a petition asking the Government to move more quickly on human rights reforms. Additionally, the Government continued to seek out and arrest suspected members of An-Nahda and the banned Communist Worker's Party (POCT) and to harass their relatives and friends, including repeated interrogations and home searches without warrants. Other significant human rights problems include: incommunicado detention, the Government's refusal to publish detailed and specific information on the death of three persons in their custody, and remittances from workers abroad. Despite amendments to the Press Code, press freedom also remained restricted. Other significant problems include: incommunicado detention, police abuse of detainees, the ability of citizens to change their government. Amendments to the Personal Status Code including an amendment granting women the right to transmit Tunisian nationality even when married to a foreigner and living abroad, further enhanced women's rights in 1993. A new electoral code will ensure limited opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies to be selected in 1994 elections. The legal length of pretrial detention was reduced, forced prison labor was abolished, and some prisoners detained for membership in an illegal organization were pardoned.[=]

44006. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Part 12: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Tunisia is a republic in which the Constitution provides for a parliamentary democracy with separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. In practice, the President and his party dominate decision making at all levels. The President appoints the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the 23 regional governors. His Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (RCD) holds all 141 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The banned Islamist party, An-Nahda, was dealt a severe blow in 1992 when 266 of its senior members were sentenced to prison terms for plotting to assassinate the President and overthrow the Government. Arrests of Islamists and some extreme leftists continued in 1994. Tunisia’s internal security is maintained by civilian services which include a paramilitary national guard services continued to be responsible for widespread human rights abuses, including torture, although not on the scale of previous years. Police presence while not as oppressive as in 1991-1992, remained heavy in urban areas as on university campuses. Tunisia has a mixed economy dependent principally on revenues from agricultural products, tourism, petroleum, textile clothing and other manufactured exports, and remittances from workers abroad. It is now in the 7th year of a structural adjustment program destined to make the economy more market oriented, reduce staple food subsidies, increase the role of the private sector. Average annual real growth over the past five years has been 4.1%, but unemployment has been high and now stands at about 13%. In 1993 Tunisia enacted a number of legal reforms to enhance the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, man of the reforms have not yet been translated into real improvement, and many basic rights continued to be restricted. The Government continued to seek out and arrest suspected members of the banned Islamist party, An-Nahda, and the banned Communist Workers’ Party (POCT) and to harass their relatives and persons suspected of involvement with their organizations. The prosecution of leading members of organizations critical of the Government, as well as the Government's harsh reaction to the circulation of a petition protesting human rights abuses, had a chilling effect on freedom of speech. Despite amendments to the Press Code, press freedom also remained restricted. Other significant problems include: incommunicado detention, police abuse of detainees, the Government's refusal to publish detailed and specific information on the punishment of abusers, interference with the right to privacy, and the inability of citizens to change their government. Amendments to the Personal Status Code including an amendment granting women the right to transmit Tunisian nationality even when married to a foreigner and living abroad, further enhanced women's rights in 1993. A new electoral code will ensure limited opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies to be selected in 3/1994 elections. The legal length of pretrial detention was reduced, forced prison labor was abolished, and some prisoners detained for membership in an illegal organization were pardoned.[=]
amended to ensure representation of opposition parties. The winner-take-all system remains in place, but some 19 additional "national" seats were added to the chamber which will be reserved proportionally for parties that do not otherwise win representation in the chamber. Opposition parties that participate in the 3/20/1994, elections are assured of at least token representation in the chamber. Elections for the Presidency and the Chamber of Deputies are held every 5 years. Voting is by universal adult suffrage. All legal parties are free to present candidates. However, to run for president a candidate must gather the signatures of at least 30 members of the Chamber of Deputies or Presidents of municipalities. In 1993 there was only one person among the authorized opposition parties who was not a member of the resident's RCD. By the end of 1993, all the legal opposition parties and many professional organizations and associations had endorsed President Ben Ali for reelection. While there are no legal impediments to women's participation in government and politics, they are underrepresented and hold very few senior leadership positions. In 1993 the President promoted one woman to ministerial rank and one to the 13-member ruling party CD Politburo There are 6 female members in the 141-seat Chamber of Deputies, and a woman is the second Vice President of the Chamber. In municipal councils, 11% of the members are women. 10% of the members of the Economic & Social Council are women There is a small Berber minority, constituting about 3% of the population, which is able to participate freely in the political process. [a] 44007. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Part 13: Respect For Human Rights: Section 4: Governmental Attitude Regarding International NGO Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Several human rights organizations are active in Tunisia and are recognized by the Government, but they are subject to a variety of restrictions. The Tunisian Human Rights League was forced to suspend its operations in 1992 following amendments to the Associations Law, but was permitted to resume its activities in March pending a judicial interpretation of the law. Despite the League's resumption it has yet to recover fully from its period of suspension. The League is scheduled to hold its first congress since 1989 in early 1994. The Arab Institute of Human Rights, founded in 1989, is a collaborative effort of the Tunisian Human Rights League, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, and the Union of Arab Lawyers. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operates a regional office in Tunis. The Maghreb Human Rights League is headquartered in Tunis. In 1993 the Higher Committee for Human Rights & Basic Freedoms, formed by President Ben Ali in 1991, released a report Human Rights in Tunisia: 1991-1993. The report does not address specific problems or cases but merely lists the accomplishment claimed by the Government. Human rights monitors are skeptical of the dependence and effectiveness of offices created in 1992 to coordinate human rights concerns in the Interior, Justice, Social Affairs, and Foreign Ministries. In 1993 Al officials, including its secretary general, met with the Foreign Minister and other Tunisian officials. Another Al representative visited Tunisia and issued a report alleging that security forces were responsible for torture, widespread harassment, and sexual abuse against women relatives of incarcerated Islamists. The Government strenuously disputed the report's findings, as did several of the opposition parties and prominent women activists. [a] 44009. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based On Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Laws protecting the rights of children are included in statutes governing education, health, inheritance, adoption, and child custody. The Personal Status Code, in particular, provides important guarantees for children in cases of adoption and the right to custody of minor children in the case of death or incapacitation of the father. Education is mandatory to age 16. The Government has an ambitious plan to reduce mortality rates by reducing malnutrition, reducing the incidence of low-weight births, and reducing mortality rates and vitamin deficiencies in women. [a] 44008. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Part 14: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based On Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. In 1993 the Chamber of Deputies adopted major changes to the 1956 Personal Status Code, which established equal rights for men and women in most fields. The Chamber also amended the Penal, Labor, and Nationality Codes to further enhance and protect women's rights. These changes increased the legal rights and protection enjoyed by women and children, including allowing women to transmit Tunisian nationality even though married to a foreigner and living abroad. Criminal penalties for reducing malnutrition, reducing the incidence of low-weight births, and 1992 to coordinate human rights concerns in the Interior, Justice, Social Affairs, and Foreign Ministries. In Kentucky, laws were amended to further reduce job discrimination based on sex; and a fund was established to pay child support until delinquent fathers can be found and made to pay. Inheritance laws are still governed by Islamic law, which favors male descendant. The husband is still recognized as the head of the household, even though maintenance of the family is a joint effort and the wife's wishes are to be respected. According to the 1989 census, 48.1% of females over the age of 10 were illiterate, compared with 26.3% of males. There is a significant trend, however, toward greater educational and professional opportunities for women, and the number of women in the medical, legal, and other professions continued to grow steadily. 25% of Tunisian magistrates are women. In 1992 women comprised an estimated 20% of the workforce, a figure that probably understates their presence as many women were employed in the informal sector and seasonally in agriculture. According to figures released in 1992, 21% of civil service employees were women, who were predominantly found in the fields of education, health and social affairs at the lower or middle levels. Violence against women does occur, but there are no official statistics or studies on the subject. In 1993 the Government initiated a survey on violence against women. The media has begun to break its silence on this issue, which had seldom been raised publicly given the importance attached to family privacy in this traditional society. A woman deputy called on the Religious Affairs Minister to instruct religious leaders to address the problem in mosques to emphasize that Islam does not condone violence against women. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) operates a small office which provides counseling services to battered and abused women 6 days a week. An attorney and psychologist are on duty 1-2 days a week. However, very few women have used the organization's services. No other support groups or shelters are known to exist. A battered woman was still most likely to seek shelter with her extended family. There are several active women's rights groups in Tunisia, the most influential being the RCD-affiliated National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT), the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), and the Tunisian section of the Worldwide Movement of Mothers (MMM). [a]
manufacturing, the minimum age for employment is 15 years, in agriculture it is 13. Tunisian children are required to attend school until age 16. Inspectors from the Social Affairs Ministry check the record of employees to verify that the employer complies with the minimum age law. Despite this law, young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. Smaller enterprises in the informal sector (which employs approximately 20% of the workforce) reportedly violate the minimum age law frequently. The UGTT has expressed concern that child labor—frequently disguised as apprenticeship—still exists, principally in the traditional craft sectors such as ceramics and stone carving. Young girls from rural areas are sometimes placed as domestics in urban homes by their fathers, who collect the child’s wages. Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 are prohibited from working from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Children over 14 may work a maximum of 4.5 hours a day. The combination of school and work may not exceed 7 hours. [≡]

44011. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. The ability of citizens to change their government through democratic means has yet to be demonstrated. The ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and its direct predecessor parties, have controlled the political arena since independence. The RCD controls the Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, regional and governments, and the security apparatus. The President appoints the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the 23 Governors. The President and the RCD dominate politics at the national, regional and local levels. The Government and the RCD are closely integrated: the President of the Republic is also the president of the RCD, and the RCD's Secretary-General holds the rank of Minister of State. The largest opposition party, the proscribed Islamist an-Nadha Party, received 12% of the vote in the 1988 legislative elections, when the Government permitted its candidates to run as independents. However, the party is in disarray following the conviction in 1992 of nearly all of its leaders for plotting to overthrow the Government. In 1992 a court sentenced in absentia Raïchd Ghannouchi, the nominal head of the party, to life in prison. Ghannouchi was granted political asylum in Britain in 1993. The Chamber of Deputies has 163 seats. It has yet to establish itself as an effective counterweight to executive authority. The electoral code provides for a winner-take-all formula in legislative elections, but the Government amended the law in 1993 to add 19 additional seats to the Chamber of Deputies for parties that do not win seats. Four opposition parties that participated in the March legislative election were apportioned those seats. Elections for the Presidency and the Chamber of Deputies are held every five years. Voting is by secret ballot. All legal parties are free to present candidates. Presidential candidates must obtain the signatures of at least 30 members of the Chamber of Deputies of presidents of municipalities—all but one of whom were members of the ruling RCD party in 1994. Two persons who were not affiliated with any political party tried to announce their candidates for the presidency even though they were unable to obtain the requisite signatures. The authorities detained both of them for several months (see section 2.a.). None of the six legal opposition parties offered a candidate for president and all endorsed President Ben Ali for re-election. Women may participate in politics. Eleven women won seats in the March legislative election. Nevertheless, women remain underrepresented in government and hold few senior government posts. One woman holds ministerial rank, and a woman is the second vice president of the Chamber of Deputies. In municipal elections, 15% of the members are women. 25% of Tunisian magistrates are women. [≡]

44012. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. Laws protecting the rights of children are included in the penal code and the public health, inheritance, opposition, and child custody. The Government is committed to upholding these laws. The personal status code provides protection for children in adoption or custody cases, or in cases of the death or incapacitation of the children. There is no pattern of societal abuse against children. Criminal penalties for persons convicted of child abuse or neglect are severe. Education is mandatory until age 16, though approximately 10% of students leave school before that time. [≡]

44013. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. Although women still face discrimination in certain legal and social matters, the Government has made serious efforts to advance women's rights. In 1993 the Chamber of Deputies expanded women's rights by amending the 1966 Personal Status Code. The Government has also ensured equal employment rights for women by instituting changes in the Labor Code and signing various international treaties and conventions. In 1994 the Government enacted a law to subsidize the child-care costs for mothers employed outside the home. There is a significant trend toward greater educational and professional opportunities for women. In 1994 the National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT) was awarded UNESCO's top prize worldwide for its work in the fight against female illiteracy in Tunisia. The number of women in the medical, legal, and other professions continued to grow steadily. Women comprise an estimated 20% of the workforce, a figure which probably underestimates their presence as many women are employed in the traditional sector as well as seasonally in agriculture. According to government figures, women comprise 26% of the civil service, employed mainly in the fields of education, health, and social affairs at the middle or lower levels. Violence against women is known to occur, but there are no statistics on its extent. In recent years, the media have reported on this subject, stressing that violence against women is a serious social problem. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women operates a walk-in counseling service in Tunis for battered women, assisting about 20 women a month. Battered women generally first seek assistance from family members. Human rights monitors have said that police intervention is often ineffective because officers tend to regard incidents as family problems to be solved and by family members. Few cases of spousal violence are brought to trial. In 1993 the Chamber of Deputies strengthened criminal penalties for wife beating, requiring Judges to use more severe sentences. [≡]

44014. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Tunisia: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate and the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1995. pp. 1143-1154. The minimum age for employment in manufacturing is 15 years, in agriculture 13 years. The Government requires children to attend school until age 16. Workers between the ages of 14-18 are prohibited from working from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Children over the age of 14 may work a maximum of 4-5 hours a day. The combination of school and work may not exceed 7 hours.
Inspectors of the Ministry of Social Affairs examine the records of employees to verify that employers comply with the minimum age law. Nonetheless, young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and work as vendors in urban areas. The UGTT has expressed concern that child labor—frequently disguised as an apprenticeship still exists, principally in the handicraft industry. In other instances, young rural girls are sometimes placed as domesticics in urban homes by their fathers who collect the child's wages. [2]

44015. House Select Committee on Hunger. “Hearing: Expert Witnesses:Questions: Part 7”, in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 1-33. Chairman Leland: I appreciate the gentleman's recollection. Let me ask you, in the Third World today, there are a lot of different kinds of pressures and impositions that are being made, particularly by the Soviet Union and the US but even other countries in eastern Europe and the West. Africa and the Third World as a whole are viewed by the administration in an East-West context. To what extent does that exacerbate the problems of women in development?

There is another problem which was raised by the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Emerson: the problem of Islam and particularly the culture of Islam that imposes not even secondary but tertiary citizenship for women. These two problems that really threaten women's human rights everywhere. can you comment on this?

Ms. Smith: It sounds like you are really talking about some of the major forces that can be obstacles for women's advancement worldwide. You know, you can look at it from a pessimistic view, I suppose, but I never do. You mentioned, first of all, the whole East-West issue and how that has an impact on women in development. Out of the Nairobi conference we pounded out an agenda that really required us to come together, East-West, North-South, and that agenda went forward. Second, we have some changes going on right now between East and West, right? Those have major significance. People talking about Afghanistan are talking about humanitarian assistance supported by Russia and the US. I can imagine PVO's being part of that, and I can imagine their sensitivity in working with women would be an important ingredient.

In the area of Islamic fundamentalism, we get letters at OEF from Tunisian women's groups who are worried, now that President Borigba is no longer the head of state--and he was a man who did advance women's rights in that country--about the growing fundamentalist movement--Tunisian women want some skills so they can be reorganized to maintain the rights that they have traditionally had. It is these movements everywhere, where you have to try to support in different ways the women who feel they are being affected negatively by fundamentalism. How can you help strengthen what they are doing? That is the first thing.

The larger movement of Islam is a bigger issue, and I don't think any of us have all the answers on that, but I do feel that we have some opportunities now because there is so much change occurring in different ways in the world. We must take advantage of all those targets of opportunity. That is what strategies are all about, and what we try to do in our global network. Jodi, you may have some other thought than mine. [2]


Uganda: Year 1983: 17 AIDS-cases; Year 1987: 1138 AIDS-cases; Year 1987: 6% of prostitutes are HIV-positive.

Rwanda: Year 1981: 10 AIDS-cases; Year 1987: 705 AIDS-cases, (246 are children).

Zaire: Year 1987: 6-8% of pregnant women are HIV-positive; Year 1987: 11% of prostitutes are HIV-Positive.

Congo: Year 1987: 583 AIDS-cases.

Kenya: Year 1985: 61% of prostitutes are HIV-positive.

Tanzania: Year 1987:1130 AIDS-cases.

Cameroon: Year 1987: 1.5% of pregnant women are HIV-positive.

Ghana: Year 1987: 96 AIDS-cases.

Senegal: Year 1987: 14% of prostitutes are HIV-2-positive.

Guinea-Bissau: Year 1987: 60% of prostitutes are HIV-2-positive.

Tunisia: Year 1987: 11 AIDS-cases.

Contact: Ministry of Health, PO Box 30016, Nairobi, Kenya.

Further Reading: Report on AIDS, by the Panos Institute, 8 Alfred Place, London, WCIE 7EB, UK.


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(6) HAZARDOUS WASTES: UNCED must call for a ban on the export of hazardous wastes and dirty industries worldwide, thus fortifying existing regional waste trade bans. It must also pressure the North to solve its own toxic and nuclear waste problems. Proposals to this effect have either been rejected at UNCED or watered down to insignificance by the OECD countries.

(7) FORESTS: UNCED must address the real causes of forest destruction (tropical, temperate, boreal) globally, and promote equitable international principles. In addition, UNCED must recognize and support land and cultural rights of indigenous peoples and traditional forest dwellers. Planting new trees, as UNCED proposes, cannot be a substitute for saving existing natural forests and the cultures that live in them.

(8) NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND POWER: UNCED must call for an end to all nuclear weapons testing, and the rapid phase-out of all nuclear power plants. In the midst of nuclear disasters, weapons tests and near-accidents, these issues have been inexplicably excluded from the Earth Summit agenda.

(9) BIOTECHNOLOGY: UNCED must take urgent and binding safety measures (including, at the very least, an international code of conduct on safety in biotechnology) to control the health and environmental risks of biotechnology research and application.

(10) TRADE: UNCED must not endorse free trade as the key to achieving "sustainable development." It must reconcile trade practices with environmental protection. Social, political and environmental concerns must form the framework within which trade takes place, not vice versa.

These and other actions are fundamental if we are to address the huge environment and development problems the world faces. Positive change requires a major turn around by the US government, as well as other industrialized nations, and an intensive effort by all parties. As Non-Governmental Organizations we have been constantly pushing for UNCED to take these issues on; if all government delegates and the Secretariat were to act upon these essential points, our faith in the process would be renewed. However, it appears that the Earth Summit is failing to meet its challenge and instead moving in the opposite direction from the path it must forge to save the planet from destruction. Moreover, the gravity of the situation deepens as UNCED entrusts care for environment and development with the very institutions that are causing many of the problems in the first place. Regrettably, barring a dramatic change in course, UNCED is heading toward a failure of historic proportions that the earth and its people cannot afford.

Sponsored by Greenpeace International: The Forum of Brazilian NGOs (representing 1200 groups); Friends of the Earth International; Third World Network;

Organizational and Coalition Endorsements: Action Aid, United Kingdom; Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (an international grass roots youth network); American Baptist Church, Ecology & Racial Justice, USA; American Indian Law Alliance, USA; Arc Peace International Alliance of Northern Peoples for; Environment and Development (ANPED); Associacion Ecologica Coyoacan, A.C.BUND, Germany; Campaign for Peace and Cooperation, Sweden; Campagna Nord-Sud, Italy; Canadian Council on International Cooperation; Center for Development of International Law, USA; Center for Science & Environment, India; Conference of United Churches of Christ Environment Committee, USA; Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Defensa Ambiental, Spain; Earth Community Center & Center of Concern, USA; ENDA Inter-Arab, Tunisia; Environment and Development in the Third World, Senegal; Eurostep; Filipino Rural Reconstruction Movement, Philippines; Foro Mexicano de la Sociedad Civil Para El Medio Ambiente y: Desarrollo, Mexico; Friends of the Earth, Germany; Friends of the Earth, USA; Fundepublico, Colombia; Global Coral Reef Alliance, USA; Highlander Center, USA; International Coordinating Committee for Religion and the Earth; International Environmental Law Center, Australia; Japan Tropical Forest Action Network, Japan; MLUC; Mobilization for Survival, USA; Native American Council of New York City, USA; Native Kids Action, USA; National Toxics Campaign, USA; Nature and Youth, Norway; Naturevakt, Norway; Network for Environmental and Economic Responsibility of United Church of Christ; Netherlands Organisation for Development Cooperation--NOVIB; New Zealand UNCED Earth Summit Committee, New Zealand; NGO Forum, Japan; NOFF, Norway; Pacific-Asia Resource Center, USA; Paraguayan Island Association of NGOs (PLANOG); Paraguayan Movement; Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC), Tokyo, Japan; Pacto Latinoamericano de Accion Ecologica, Latin America; People to People Aid Movement, Yokohama, Japan; Presbyterian Church Environmental Ethics Committee; Pro Regenwald, Germany; Red de Oranizaciones Ambientalistas de Paraguay, Paraguay; Riverside Church, New York, USA; SANE-Freeze International; Sierra Club, USA; Sobrevivencia, Paraguay; Third World Institute, Uruguay; United Church Board for Homeland Ministries, USA; United Church Board for World Ministries, USA; United Church of Christ, USA; United Church of Christ, Office of Church in Society, USA; United Methodist Church Ecocide Project Network, USA; Women's Caucus at PrepComm 4;

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Tunisia

www.ReferenceCorp/net/downloads

44018. Pickart, George A. Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the Middle East: (II) Tunis: Government Position. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 104th Congress, Second Session. February 25, 1993. pp. 9-10. Tunisian officials are sensitive to criticism of human rights practices and acknowledge that room for improvement exists. The officials argue, however, that human rights critics do not give Tunisia sufficient credit for taking responsibility for and correcting excesses. The Foreign Minister, for instance, pointed out that all police stations in Tunisia prominently display specific human rights regulations, and that individual police officers must certify that they have seen the regulations before assuming duties. An official in the Ministry of Justice noted that Tunisia had researched, documented, and released a report on human rights problems associated with the Islamist trials.

Moreover, the Government of Tunisia argues that Annadha is coordinated and funded by foreign powers, and as such is a threat to Tunisia's stability. It is not, one Foreign Ministry official argued, that Tunisia opposes individual Islamists who are seeking incorporation into Tunisia's political system. Rather, the line of reasoning continues, Tunisia is opposed to Islamist agents of a "Fundamentalist International," which has its ideological headquarters in Iran, and operational centers in Sudan and Afghanistan. According to the Foreign Minister, this is a movement of "religious extremism" bent on taking power through violent means; it threatens not only Tunisia, but all of the emerging democracies in North Africa and the Middle East. High-ranking officials in the Foreign and Justice Ministries claim to have hard evidence—as yet unreleased—to support the existence of the "Tehran-Khartoum-Tunis axis."

The best answer to Tunisia's difficulties, according to Tunisian officials, is to carry out President Ben Ali's "New Project for Society," which promises to bring a new system to the country. The President, noted several government and party leaders, reaffirmed his commitment to democracy in a 11/7/1992 speech, in which he commended the Tunisian people for reaching a "level of maturity" that made their participation possible. The Tunisian people have made significant progress toward a democratic future irreversible. Such progress was demonstrated, according one official, in a gradual but unmistakable series of political and economic reforms, including: opening the Chamber of Deputies to opposition parties; improving the electoral and press codes; securing additional rights for women and children; and taking responsibility for excesses or improprieties in the administration of justice. [6]

44019. Pickart, George A. Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the Middle East: (II) Tunis: Government Position. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 104th Congress, Second Session. February 25, 1993. pp. 9-10. Tunisian officials are sensitive to criticism of human rights practices and acknowledge that room for improvement exists. The officials argue, however, that human rights critics do not give Tunisia sufficient credit for taking responsibility for and correcting excesses. The Foreign Minister, for instance, pointed out that all police stations in Tunisia prominently display specific human rights regulations, and that individual police officers must certify that they have seen the regulations before assuming duties. An official in the Ministry of Justice noted that Tunisia had researched, documented, and released a report on human rights problems associated with the Islamist trials.

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Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Tunisia

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East: (II) Tunis: Outlook. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 104th Congress, Second Session. February 25, 1993. pp. 11-12. The Tunisian Government makes a convincing argument that the country is entering a new era. Tunisia’s economic achievements, its efforts to support women’s rights, and its steps to strengthen the educational system help the government make its case. These attempts at internal liberalization are complemented by new efforts in the international arena, such as Tunisia’s recent offer to host a session of the multilateral Arab-Israel peace talks.

At the same time, there is a wide disparity of opinion between the government and its critics. The government claims to be engaged in a battle against terrorism, while its critics claim the government is using the specter of terrorism to obliterate its political opponents. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how a process of liberalization could expand much further, and it is possible to conclude that a stiffening of opposition might lie ahead.

The government, for its part, claims it will continue to implement step-by-step changes in its electoral, press, and social codes to ensure the development of a democratic process and culture. The government is painfully aware that the present lack of opposition parties in the parliament contrasts sharply with its democratic rhetoric; as one ruling party leader phrased it, “we know it is a problem.” The government thus is willing to take corrective steps, even if this means government funding of opposition parties and giving seats in the parliament to the opposition without contest. But many Tunisians question whether these steps will result in real changes. In one revealing exchange, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said offhandedly (and in an informal setting), “don't expect us to do anything we can't control.” [=]
Turkey

The Kurds have no representation in the present parliament although they received the highest votes in the north eastern provinces. The arcane election system requires that any party that does not poll more than ten percent of the national votes is not represented. Two important parties failed this test: the Kurdish nationalist Hadap (4.17 percent) and the rightwing National Action Party of veteran nationalist politician Alparslan Turkes (8.18 percent). Any party wishing to form a government must find a coalition partner or partners to reach the two hundred and seventy-six seats necessary for vote of confidence in parliament. Ciller's True Path Party and Yilmaz's Motherland Party are natural bedfellows since there is very little difference between their policies. But the two cannot work with each other despite strong pressures from the army, businessmen and the west to form a coalition to deny Refah the chance to form a government. In any case, they need a third party to reach the magic number of seats. Both Ecevit and Yilmaz strongly condemned Ciller's ill-conceived ambition to be the new prime minister, and said that they would not join a coalition under her leadership. But they are both committed to block Refah's path to power, and are afraid that their 'liberal' supporters might melt away if they join an Islamic party in a coalition government. The powerful Turkish armed forces, the self-proclaimed guardians of Mustafa Kemal's secular republic that threw Erbakan in jail for eight months during the 1980-83 military take-over on charges of trying to set up an Islamic regime, joined the fray with repeated statements that it would never allow 'fanaticism' and 'reaction' into politics. Whoever is eventually asked by president Suleiman Demirel to form a government must do so within forty-five days. By 'Crescent International' press time, Demirel had asked Erbakan to form the new government. This offer was made on 1/9/96. Erbakan has started to sound more 'moderate' than when he began his election campaign, saying he is ready for compromise, and would not take Turkey out of Nato if he became prime minister, although he would renegotiate the customs union with the European Union and would not allow his country to join the European Union. In these circumstances, there is already talk of new elections. And even if new elections are held, it is doubtful whether a strong government can emerge from it—a government that can resolve the potentially bloody ethnic confrontation between the Turks and Kurds. As the historian David McDowall suggests, in a study to be published this month (A Modern History of the Kurds, 1 B Taurus 24.50), the two peoples' best hope of avoiding such catastrophic prospect lies in a redefinition of both national identities, giving due weight to their Islamic heritage. [=]
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Turkey

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security. Other sources of danger to Germany include Islamic extremist groups and, increasingly, groups representing the antagonistic nationalities of the former Yugoslavia. Schmidbauer's report contends that 13 Islamic groups active in Germany are believed to resort to violence on occasion, but, it adds, only about 1.5% of the 2.1 million Muslims living in Germany belong to or support extremist groups. The sizeable number of Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovo Albanians and Macedonians now living in Germany, the report speculates, might come to rely on violence with greater frequency in settling their differences.

Schmidbauer's warnings were echoed in large part by Federal Prosecutor General Kay Nehm. Speaking with reporters in Karlsruhe (Baden-Wurttemberg) on 2/14/1996, Nehm said he expects the PKK to unleash a new wave of terrorist attacks in Germany. PKK General Secretary Abdullah Ocalan called off its "cease fire" in Germany late last month, according to Nehm. He also reported that a 25-year-old Kurd suspected of being a high-ranking PKK activist was arrested on 2/11/1996 in Stuttgart (Baden-Wurttemberg). She joins 20 other Kurds who are now in custody pending indictment and 54 facing criminal charges in Germany. Prosecutors are also pursuing charges against 46 individuals, Nehm said, suspected of having participated in genocidal acts in the former Yugoslavia. [ ]


46009. -------. "News in Brief: Turkey", in Crescent International, December 16-31, 1995. p. 2. The European Union gave approval on 12/7 for a formal customs union with Turkey which will be given formal approval a week later. This had been requested by Tansu Ciller, the beleaguered Turkish prime minister, who faces a strong challenge from the Refah Party in the forthcoming elections on 12/27. [ ]


46011. -------. "Number of Abortions Rising Quickly In East, Central Europe, Says Expert", in Seattle Times, September 13, 1995. p. A12. WHO specialist Assia Brandrup-Lukanov reported at the UNConference on Women that economic depression and a lack of contraceptives has led to a rapid increase in abortion. She notes that 'most women cannot afford to have children', and that Russian women have up to 8 abortions. In Rumania, there are 300 abortions for every live birth. She noted that poverty has driven many Albanian women to work as prostitutes in Italy, and Russian women to work as prostitutes in Turkey. [TXT]


46014. -------. "Turkey Passes Law Barring Smoking in Public Places [law also forbids sale of cigarettes to minors; law will take effect in days]", in Seattle Times, November 25, 1996. p. A7. [TXT]


“see what happens.”; such attitudes, may indeed scare the people, but they will not give the state an agreeable image; on the contrary it damages its reputation.” “Never forget that you represent the state.”

The book of military etiquette required the commanders to assist the poor, sick and destitute in their areas of responsibility by organizing provision of water and food, the repair of their houses and the harvest of their crops. “If you see people walking on the road, give them a ride if you have a place in your vehicle,” the book advised.

“When you have to address the people, do not assemble the people at the houses of the headman, sheikh or the wealthy, but pick open spaces as the village square, village coffeehouse, the mosque courtyard or the school garden. Politely persuade the important personages that this was meant as no offence to them.

The villagers will make you offerings to ensure that you act tolerantly. Accept the people’s offerings but sparingly. Pay back with cigarettes, tea, sugar or canned rations.

Make use of every opportunity to convince that you are sharing their joy and grief. Help them bury their dead, attend funerals, pay condolence visits. For, according to local traditions, those who visit the house of dead for condolences cannot be an enemy. Attend the mass prayers at religious occasions. Give tips to children, attend the weddings and join in the folk dances.

Have prayers recited for your fallen soldiers and invite the locals to the ceremony. In Ramadan, respond to invitation from the villagers to break the fast together. Organize fast breaking meals yourselves and make sure the village poor are invited beside the wealthy.

If you have to procure supplies locally, never haggle over prices. On the contrary, pay more than the normal price. Buy from different shops instead of taking only from one. Thus, you will not only show that you do not discriminate between the people, but at the same time you will win gratitude of the less well-to-do retailers.

“Never forget that you represent the state in the places you serve. The trust and respect you evoke in people will increase their trust, respect and loyalty to the state,” the booklet said. [=

46020. -------. “Turkish Girl Kills Herself To Emulate Kurt Cobain’s Death [a teenage fan of Nirvana’s Kurt Cobain commuted suicide in emulation of Kobain; sixteen year old Didem Ucan shot herself while playing Nirvana music in her home in Mersin; she had been depressed since Cobain’s suicide in Seattle, 4/5/1994]”, in Seattle Times, April 19, 1994. p. A11. [TXT]

46021. -------. “Turkish Government Denounced For Virginity Exams”, in Daily World (Aberdeen), JJune 5, 1994. p. A12. Human Rights Watch has denounced Turkey for allowing virginity exams on women in police custody, and sometimes on hospital patients, students and applicants for government jobs. In addition, women in police custody have been raped, stripped and otherwise sexual abused. The government denies the issue is a problem, and PM Tansu Ciller, a woman, has declined comment. [TXT]


46023. -------. “Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller Resigns [ends wobbly coalition of True Path Party (DYN) with social democrats under Deniz Baykal; resignation is seen weakening Turkish reforms, and lessening chance that EU will admit Turkey]”, in Seattle Times, September 21, 1995. p. A10. [TXT]

46024. -------. “Turkish Workers Rally in Capital”, in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), January 11, 1997. p. 14. Almost 100000 workers marched in Ankara on 1/5/1997 to call for anti-corruption measures after a traffic accident in which a car carrying a national legislator, a hit man, a police chief and a beauty queen drew attention to the collusion of government and organized crime. The gunman was fugitive Abdullah Catti, who is linked to Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk who shot Pope John Paul II in 1981. Several national government and police officials have been dismissed in the scandal. [TXT]

46025. -------. “Wave of Kurdish Violence Draws Denunciations from German Politicians, Pledges to Tighten Laws”, in Seattle Times, March 22, 1996. p. 1. Kurdish activists in Germany could face expulsion from the country following two weekends’ worth of unruly demonstrations. On consecutive Saturdays, 3/16/1996 and 3/17/1996, Kurs and German police came to blows as peaceful demonstrations for Kurdish rights gave way to street battles and outbreaks of violence. With the approach of the Kurdish new year on 3/21/1996, leaders of both Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union and the opposition Social Democrats called for decisive action against those responsible, agreeing that the guilty parties should be expelled from Germany. Authorities had granted permission for a demonstration to mark “International Women’ and Lesbians’ Day of Struggle” to be held in Bonn on 3/9/1996. Approximately 1000 Kurs from all over Germany turned up for the scheduled march, which police tried to stop after numerous banners for the separatist Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK), which German authorities banned in late 1993 after a series of attacks upon Turkish establishments in Germany, were unfurled (cf. TWIG 12/3/1993, p. 2). The police reportedly offered to allow the march to continue if the banners were set aside, but were pelted with cans and vegetables. The demonstrations thereupon degenerated into a street battle between police and demonstrators. After the disturbances on 3/9/1996, permission for a Kurdish-sponsored demonstration scheduled to be held in Dortmund (North Rhine-Westphalia) on the following Saturday (3/16/1996) was revoked by a state administrative court. Police attempted to close the borders of North Rhine-Westphalia by setting up highway roadblocks, and border patrols were similarly instructed to turn back Kurs attempting to enter Germany from neighboring countries. Nonetheless, over 2000 Kurs gathered in the center of the city, where they clashed with police trying to forestall the demonstration. Police made 232 arrests, took another 585 demonstrators into temporary custody, and issued 1796 orders to individuals to leave the scene. That same day, Kurds and police clashed in several other German cities, including Berlin, Hamburg and Hanover (Lower Saxony).

The outbreaks of violence drew sharp responses from leaders of Germany’s two largest parties. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Wolfgang Schausie, the CDU’s parliamentary leader, called for the immediate expulsion of those guilty of violating Germany’s laws and disrupting the peace. Kohl announced that his government would change the laws on foreigners to allow expulsion of any foreigner convicted of a major instance of disturbing the peace. A bill has already been prepared and will be presented to the cabinet before the end of the month, the chancellor said. Federal President Roman Herzog declared after a visit to injured police that “foreigners who spread terror and violence in Germany have lost their right to our hospitality. Organizers, instigators and those who commit violence must leave our country.” Calling on the half-million Kurds residing in Germany to disavow the PKK, the governing board of the opposition Social Democratic Party likewise said that Kurds who transgress German law should no longer be allowed to remain in the country. Federal law enforcement officials warned that they anticipated further trouble in connection with celebration of the Kurdish new year on 3/21/1996 and said that police were on special alert. Large gatherings and demonstrations were prohibited and the police took dozens of punitive PKK activists into custody. Representatives of the National Liberation Front for Kurdistan, which is believed to have close ties with the PKK, criticized these preparations, calling them an “anti-democratic provocation.” [a demonstration in Giessen (Hessen) that took place the evening of 3/20/1996 despite the prohibition turned violent, resulting in 120 arrests and about a dozen injured police. German officials believe that there may be as many as 3000 PKK members active in Germany at present, about three times as many as when it was banned. The PKK has been fighting a guerrilla war with Turkey for independence since 1984; some 250000 lives have been lost to date. [=

46026. -------. “Weekly Review, Part 5”, in Al-Fajr Jerusalem

April 22: AUTHORITIES ALLOW TOURIST SITE ON MUSLIM CEMETERY

Israeli authorities are getting ready to knock down a historic Muslim cemetery near the seashore in Jaffa to make way for a tourist site and a parking lot.

The head of the Islamic Charitable Society said he has turned many times to the Jaffa Municipality asking them to help restore the crumbling cemetery, but to no avail.

The cemetery, which contains over 10000 tombs, is still in use.

CLOSURE FORCES BUS COMPANY OWNERS TO RELEASE EMPLOYEES

Bus company owners in the West Bank issued a statement to protest Israel's closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

They said that the closure has brought over 175 buses to a halt. The buses serve over half a million people, in addition to the transport service which ferries day laborers to and from areas beyond the "green line".

The statement said that the closure was affecting the companies financially. Over 1000 workers have had to be laid off. Soon, the companies will no longer be in a position to honor their debts.

The companies are asking the authorities either to allow them to resume their work, or be compensated.

ARMENIANS REMEMBER MASSACRE

The Armenian community this weekend remembers a million and a half of its people massacred 78 years ago in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.

A memorial will be held April 24 in the presence of Patriarch Turkum Manugian at the St. Jacob Cathedral in the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem.

The mourners will then proceed to the Armenian cemetery outside the Old city walls to commemorate the tragic event at the specially erected memorial.

A statement published by the United Armenian Committee says Armenians the world over continue to ask Turkey to admit to committing the massacres. The committee called upon all peace-loving peoples to support the Armenian people in their legitimate claim.

ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS CAMPAIGN BEGINS

The Land Society for Environmental Awareness met on April 22, Earth Day, to inaugurate its latest campaign in the occupied territories. The campaign is aimed at sharpening perceptions of nature among Palestinians.

Last year, the society encouraged farmers to plant over 6926 trees throughout the territories. This was followed by workshops for children, and efforts at introducing into the environment flora and fauna.

The motto of the campaign reads: "Let's work together on behalf of the environment." [*]


46028. -------. Press Release: Demit Demir's Speech. Lambda Istanbul (P.K 103, Gotepe, Istanbul TURKEY), 1996. [Demit Demir, who won the IGLHRC award this year, is the leading personality among the In 1991 I was arrested. The reason was that they claimed I violated in my country.

It was not enough for me and I became a member of Human Rights Organisation. At first I was found odd because I was a transvestite. They were all leftists and so was I. But they were not used to homosexuals yet. I also struggled here to make people accept me. I worked to establish sexual minorities commission in HRO. HRO dealed with every kind of pressure applied on homosexuals and we gave press declarations at HRO. They also provided the lawyers for cases about homosexuals and they looked for the ones who were arrested. Because in Turkey many people get lost after they are arrested by the police. In HRO I also became the first transvestite delegate.

In 1991 I was arrested. The reason was that they claimed I insulted Ataturk. But it was not true. I was tortured by the police and they did not want me to tell it to anyone. With the order of Suleyman Ulusoy I was put into prison for two months. Human Rights Organisation took care of me. They found me a lawyer and visited me very often. Then I was released and acquitted at the court.

My relations with my socialist friends got better and their pre-80s moral views seemed to change. Radical Democratic Green Party spokesman Ibrahim Eren and I had different views and there were some separations from the movement. We have also been working for two years with Human Resources Development Foundation on ways of avoiding sexual diseases for transvestites and transsexuals.

In Ulker Sokak, where I live, police pressure has been going on for

Yes, it was hard to survive in a Moslem country and patriarchal, feudal society. I thought a lot about what I was guilty for but could not find an answer. It was impossible to match my life with religion because Islam rejects all gays, lesbians and transgendersed people. Islam, with all institutions is one of the most important factors that darkens life for homosexuals.

I asked myself how I could overcome all these difficulties. I had to be a well-cultured person and next step would be to put pressure on people to learn about sexual culture. Because in Turkey the problem is not only with homosexuality, the problem is the whole sexuality! First I had to deal with my family. They knew I was a girl and did not say anything when they saw me playing with girls all the time. But they could not accept that I was a homosexual. And even when I was still male I was sexually harassed by so-called "heterosexual" men around who wanted to sleep with me. It was my sexuality which was always emphasized about me. So I had to change many jobs.

During school years I was politically active. Again my sexual and political identities clashed. Turkish socialists before 80's could not accept homosexuality. I was arrested on 5/1/1980 at the demonstration for Labour Day. Then came the coup d'etat on the 9/12/1980. All non-heterosexual people were put on pressure. They banned all the gays and transgendered people who worked as singers. There was also big punishment for prostitution. There was no right to live.

Homosexuals who were caught by the army forces were sent to smaller towns in buses. Many of us were kept and tortured at police stations and we were sent to sexual disease hospitals. We were kept prisoners for more than 10 days.

My penalty was determined and I was put into prison in 1982. I stayed in prison for eight months. In prison I was excluded by my leftist friends because I was a faggot and I had no right to live. When I got out of prison it was a new beginning in my life. It was 1984 and I had always been a prisoner because I always had to hide myself to let other people be happy. I could not stand it anymore and at last I made my sexual revolution. First I came out to my family and started to act more feminine. It was not important for me if the society thought I was strange. I had to live for myself, not for others. I had many missions to do and I had enough political background and culture.

Homosexual movement started in 1987 in Turkey. The movement was started by transvestites and transsexuals. Homosexual group of Radical Democratic Green Party went on hunger strike and the next action was sitting at Taksim Park. Then I was not involved in the movement yet. I had some contacts in 1988 and devoted myself to the struggle for sexual rights.

In the Radical Democratic Green Party I learned about feminism, environmentalism, militarism, homosexual rights, animal rights and raised my consciousness. Every minority group rights were violated in my country.

It was not enough for me and I became a member of Human Rights Organisation. At first I was found odd because I was a transvestite. They were all leftists and so was I. But they were not used to homosexuals yet. I also struggled here to make people accept me. I worked to establish sexual minorities commission in HRO. HRO dealt with every kind of pressure applied on homosexuals and we gave press declarations at HRO. They also provided the lawyers for cases about homosexuals and they looked for the ones who were arrested. Because in Turkey many people get lost after they are arrested by the police. In HRO I also became the first transvestite delegate.
a year. There were 70 of us on our street last year but now we are only 7. Our doors were broken, one of our friends' house was burnt down by the police. These were caused by a lady called Gunogor Gider. She used to get along very well with us and most of us were living in her houses and paying her rent. But she demanded much more money than the houses cost and we objected. Since then in cooperation with the police, she provoked all the inhabitants of the street. Most of our friends had to leave their houses.

The only way the transgender can earn their living in Turkey is prostitution. And they are trying every way to prevent us from prostitution. But how are we going to survive? There is no right to live if you are different!

But we are not daunted by all these things and we are still actively working in many different areas. The only political party which talks about the rights of homosexuals in Turkey is Freedom and Solidarity Party. I work with this party and the party has made a declaration on Ulker Street with other organisations like HRO and Lambda Istanbul.

We have an art group in which there are transgendered and the students of art. We have opened an workshop and we are producing artistic pieces. We have a magazine called "Gaci" which means "woman" in transvestite slang. It is prepared by sex workers, transvestites and transsexuals. I write articles and poems for this magazine. We are trying to create our own business because this is the only chance. If not, we are condemned to prostitution.

I am also working with the queer group Lambda Istanbul which has nominated me for this award. Lambda Istanbul was founded in 1993 and it is the most actively working group in Turkey. It has around 60 members. Lambda Istanbul has a bi-monthly photocopy magazine and the only regular gay-lesbian radio show of Turkey. Although they have a severe financial problem, they keep on working.

In Turkey, so far many homosexuals were killed and police could not find their murderers. Police does not care to look for the murderers because they think homosexuals are not worth it. We have a lot of problems in Turkey and we want to live the way the heterosexuals do. I will keep on struggling for every right. Yesterday I started as a child and I am going on as a mother today. And tomorrow I will go on as a grandmother. I do not care if they kill me or put me in prison again. [=]

46032. Abadan-Unat, Nermin; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 10: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. pp. 177-194. The reforms of Ataturk for women were based on law and education and served a predominantly urban female elite; the majority of Turkish women still endorse traditional values and mores. On 2/3/1923, Kemal Ataturk proclaimed: "Turkish women shall be free, enjoy education and occupy a position equal to that of men, as they are entitled to it." As part of Ataturk's sweeping program of secularization, he sought to emancipate women in order to build a more egalitarian and modern family life. However, Ataturk's reforms were those articulated by a very small elite; while a Turkish Womens League would call for women's political rights in 1928, it would be a decree of Ataturk that would grant women political rights on12/5/1934. The success of Ataturk's reforms are due to: (1) the absence of colonial rule; (2) the long past of modernization in the Ottoman Empire; (3) the issue of women in public discourse; (4) women's contribution to the debate (in journalism and as participants in forming urban public opinion); (5) the collapse of the empire discredited the sultan-caliph model of governance; and (6) Ataturk's personality (his charisma as military leader was reinforced by his enlightened leadership of the people toward modernization).

However, the program of women's rights has not been fully achieved in Turkey. Women are still disadvantaged, especially in rural areas. In 1984, the literacy rate was 86.5% for men and 62.5% for women. The rural-urban gradient in educational achievement among women has also created a two tier labor market among women: 92% of uneducated women work in agriculture, compared to 5% of women with
secondary or more education. However, in professions, women have
time, women have more opportunities that women from comparable Western countries
(partly a product of the brain-drain), a pattern seen not only in Turkey but
in other developing countries including Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica
and India. In recent years, the most militant women’s organizations have
been Islamic: female students who have organized sit-ins, hunger strikes
and boycotts of examinations have been Islamic conservatives. The
National Salvation Party (now dissolved) and the Welfare Party have
create a new Islamic female elite in their attempt to legitimize traditional
sex roles.

46033. Abadan-Unat, Nermin; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth
[editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex
and Gender: Part 10a: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and
Educational Reforms on Turkish Women: Table 1: Percentage of
Women Students in Turkish Universities, 1927-1983. New Haven,

46034. Abadan-Unat, Nermin; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth
[editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex
and Gender: Part 10b: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and
Educational Reforms on Turkish Women: Table 2: Percentage of Female
Turkish Civil Servants, 1938-1982. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University

Figure 46033. Percentage of Women Students in Turkish Universities,
1927-1983.

1927-1928: 11.2%.
1937-1938: 16.6%.
1947-1948: 18.4%.
1957-1958: 15.8%.

Figure 46034. Percentage of Female Turkish Civil servants, 1938-1982.
Abadan-Unat, Nermin; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 10c: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women: Table 3: Percentage of Turkish Female Faculty Staff, 1932-1982. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. p. 186.

46035. Abadan-Unat, Nermin; Keddie, Nikki R. [editor]; Baron, Beth [editor]. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender: Part 10c: Modern Turkey and Iran: The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women: Table 3: Percentage of Turkish Female Faculty Staff, 1932-1982. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. p. 186.

46036. Abboud, Mounir B.; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "What Price Virginity?: Turkey". in Connexions. Sexuality in Mind and Body. As a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Turkey grants women reproductive rights. Women can obtain divorce on the same grounds as men in this secular state, where Islam is the religion of 98% of the population.

However, this big "but" emerges when it comes to sexual freedom.

For Turkish men, virginity in a woman is still at a premium, and an intact hymen "the most valuable piece of a girl's trousseau."

Although some urban families send the young couple away on a honeymoon after the wedding, most brides find themselves on their wedding night with others, in-laws and other relatives, waiting to inspect the bloodied bedsheets as proof of virginity.

A new book by Haydat Dumen, a psychiatrist, looks at sexual life in Turkish society. Currently the most extensive study on the subject, the book, which is entitled Our Sexual Problems, includes interviews by Dr. Dumen with 3600 of his own patients. He recounts cases in which indignant kin drag the bride to a doctor's office the morning after the wedding, because there was no bleeding to support the girl's tearful claim that she is "pure." What the doctors have often found is that the hymen is too elastic or too far up in the vagina to get broken.

For the groom, says Dr. Dumen, the wedding night is the supreme test of his virility. Most husbands refuse surgical intervention, get more nervous with each failure, and some end up rendering themselves impotent.

He cites one case of how one couple, acutely aware of people on the watch nearby, failed to consummate the marriage for all of three months.

A good number of Dr. Dumen's patients were "seduced and abandoned" young women contemplating suicide. There are those who ask if constipation, falling off bicycles or vigorous sports activity will deflower them.

For those who are believed to have breached the cardinal rule of purity as evidenced by the unbroken hymen, the penalty can be "inhuman," according to Dr. Dumen. In a majority of cases, the bride is sent back to her parents' home, where she will "carry her shame to her grave," getting rough treatment by her unforgiving family. If her secret gets out, she will find it impossible to marry again.

Dr. Dumen says the rule is observed to such extremes that prospective brides who have any doubts at all about their hymen being intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn.

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Dr. Dumen says the rule is observed to such extremes that prospective brides who have any doubts at all about their hymen being intact are willing to resort to deceit. They try to have the hymen sewn in the back, plan their wedding night to fall on the menstruation date, or try such ruses as placing a blood-soaked sponge in the vagina. Despite the severity of the punishment to which "incontinent" women are subjected—often no less than their virtual ruin—the men who seduced them out of wedlock are usually unconcerned and shrug off any responsibility for the act.

In fact, Turkish society even makes fun of that for which it should be ashamed. Insensitive jokes abound, exemplified by the following story as related by Dr. Dumen.

The tale goes: Fatima is not a virgin. Soon to be married, she goes to a wise old woman for help. She is advised to procure a bottle of red ink and to insist on having no lights when she is left alone with her husband. The ink is to pass for blood.

All goes well on the wedding night except that Fatima's younger sister has mistakenly substituted a bottle of green ink for the red, which she had taken to school. When the groom sees the unexpected colour, he puzzles for a moment while she holds her breath.

Then he proudly says: "Such virility! Not only did I rupture her hymen but her gall bladder as well."

Doctors complain that the attitude toward the hymen sometimes makes medical treatment of young girls impossible.

Dr. Cafer Yildiran, a urologist in an Istanbul hospital, tells of a peasant girl who came in complaining of severe cramps. Her hymen was discovered to be completely blocked, stopping her menstrual flow.

The doctors wanted to operate on the girl to open her slightly. But...
the father refused. "Let her die a virgin if she must die," he said.

The importance of a man's honour as represented by his having exclusive claim to his wife's favours is seen in the fact that at least 12% of all murders in Turkey's cities are caused by sexual jealousy. A "cuckolded" husband is also called upon to kill for his honour. One police officer killed his brother and wife when he found them in bed together. [Reprinted with permission of Peoples Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]

46037. Alemdar, Zeynep. "Turk Voters Face a Choice of Paths; Secular Europe of Islamic Principles? Aggressive Social Welfare Programs Run By Islamic Fundamentalists Have Given Them an Edge in This Weekend's Elections in Turkey," in Seattle Times, December 29, 1995, p. A17. True Path Party's Tansu Ciller seeks a Turkey tied to Europe, with the current 90% inflation dropped to single digits within four years, and a lowering of the 20% unemployment level. The most powerful opposition party, the Welfare Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, advocates Islamic economic principles, including the abolition of interest. The Welfare Party is supplementing its message with aggressive programs to give basic food commodities to the poor, as well as coal for home heating. The Welfare Party now controls local governments in 400 municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Estimates of the election results give Welfare 21-26% of the vote, True Path 14-19.5%, Motherland Party 19.5-22%. The recent split between True Path and Motherland has left many pro-secular voters unsure who to vote for to vote against Welfare. [TXT]

46038. American-Jewish Committee; Anglo-Jewish Association; Landslut, S. Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East: Chapter 9: Turkey: Jewish Influence at the Sultan's Court. A Survey Prepared for the American-Jewish Committee and Anglo-Jewish Association. London: Jewish Chronicle Ltd., April 1950, pp. 79-80. Such was the influence of prominent Jews, both at court and in the Sultan's administration, that foreign ambassadors and diplomats took special care to establish the best of personal relations with them. Jewish influence in the Empire reached its peak in the 16th century under the Sultans Suleyman (1520-1566) and Selim II (1566-1574).

The nephew of the widow of a wealthy Portuguese banker, Mendes, a certain Juan Miguez (who later became better known under the name of Joseph Nasi), was able, for instance, to induce the Sultan Suleyman to make a successful protest to the Venetians against their refusal to let the widow take her fortune with her from Venice to Constantinople. It is interesting to recall that it was the same Joseph Nasi who later became Governor of the Tiberias area in the Holy Land and was given the privilege of settling Jews there. Unfortunately, plans for large scale settlements had to be abandoned because of the hostile attitude of the local Arabs. In compensation, Sultan Selim gave Nasi the island of Naxos and all the Cyclades as his possessions, together with the title of Duke, Dux Aegei Pelagi.

In the court intrigues of the Seraglio the Jews played their part in full. But if they intrigued, it was by no means in each others' favor. For example, the friendship of Sultan Selim for Joseph Nasi evoked the emanation from the Greek minority in Smyrna, Rhodes, and other places with the current 90% inflation dropped to single digits within four years, and a lowering of the 20% unemployment level. The most powerful opposition party, the Welfare Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, advocates Islamic economic principles, including the abolition of interest. The Welfare Party is supplementing its message with aggressive programs to give basic food commodities to the poor, as well as coal for home heating. The Welfare Party now controls local governments in 400 municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Estimates of the election results give Welfare 21-26% of the vote, True Path 14-19.5%, Motherland Party 19.5-22%. The recent split between True Path and Motherland has left many pro-secular voters unsure who to vote for to vote against Welfare. [TXT]

46039. American-Jewish Committee; Anglo-Jewish Association; Landslut, S. Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East: Chapter 9: Turkey: Provocative Display: Part 01. A Survey Prepared for the American-Jewish Committee and Anglo-Jewish Association. London: Jewish Chronicle Ltd., April 1950, pp. 80-83. All in all, the behavior of some of these wealthy Jews was provocative. Their splendid palaces, their retainers, and particularly the richness of dress and jewelry of their women folk in public, aroused ill feeling among the Muslim population. All too easily were the latter reminded of the fact that these Jews were, after all, still nonbelievers whom tradition allowed to live among the true believers, but humbly and under certain conditions. When Sultan Murad's personal attention was called to these facts, he abruptly decided on draconic measures of retribution against the Jews. The project was only abandoned after Solomon Ashkenazi, with the help of the Grand Vizier, had exercised all his arts of persuasion and had liberally bribed both the Sultan's mother and the head of the Janissaries. Thereupon, the rabbis hastened to issue an order forbidding Jewish women to wear jewelry or costly clothes in public places. It is no wonder that the privileged social position of the Jews, which was so closely bound up with the whole political system of corruption and favoritism, could not last. Since the political influence of the Jews depended on the ebb and flow of personal intrigue, it quickly suffered from a change of fortune at court. In due course, it declined. But although the Jews lost their conspicuous social and political power, they still flourished in commerce, and, apart from the burden of specialtaxation which they shared with the other non-believers, they continued to live and work, on the whole, unmolested.

The episode of the false Messiah, Shabbatai Zevi, is characteristic of the broadmindedness of the Turkish authorities in general and of Sultan Muhammad 4 in particular; and it is also typical of their mature political shrewdness. Although Shabbatai Zevi had openly proclaimed that he would dethrone the Sultan and reconquer the Holy Land for the Jews, and although the uparo among the Jewish masses had already reached disturbing proportions, he was left unmolested.

When he came to Constantinople at the head of a large crowd of adherents, he was merely confined to a fortress opposite Gallipoli where he was allowed to receive visitors. And even when eventually he was denounced to the Sultan as a dangerous usurper and impostor, the Sultan, in order to render him harmless, tried the simple ruse of getting him converted to Islam, and it succeeded (1666).

Like the Greeks and the Armenians, the Jews have constituted particularly in Constantinople (Istanbul), a most lively and active element in the court intrigues has always seemed to have a special attraction for women; and the Sultan's Harim was no exception. Jewesses in the Harim, enjoying greater freedom of movement than Muslim women, were particularly useful as go-betweens.

They earned for themselves something of a reputation, sometimes of a rather doubtful character. The most famous of these Jewesses was a widow, Esther Kiera, who was on terms of great intimacy with the favorite wife of Sultan Murad 3 (1574-1595). Turkish officials, as well as foreign emissaries, offered her enormous sums of money in order to win her support. However, she was destined to share the usual fate of so many who were caught in the spider's web of the Seraglio. For when she used her influence to support one of the candidates for the office of Commander of the Cavalry, a rival candidate instigated the Sultan's bodyguard to assassinate her and, at the same time, to avoid any risk of vendetta, her three sons. [=]

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through by the revolution of 1908. In the National Assembly there were a number of Jews (as deputies of the Jewish communities of Smyrna, Constantinople, and Salonika).

But when the Turkish nationalists went so far as to adopt the Western idea of nation in its entirety, and to consider the Turkish element as the real representatives of the nation, they alienated the small number of Arabs who had formed the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood in Constantinople and with the aim of letting the Arab provinces benefit by the enactment of a liberal constitution.

When the Young Turk movement prepared for the overthrow of the Abd al-Hamid regime in Salonika, it found active support among the Jews and Donme (converted Jews). After WWI, the question of special guarantees for the protection of the non-Muslim minorities was raised by the Allies in the course of the negotiations adding up to the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne between them and the Government of Mustafa Pasha Kemal. The Jewish community, however, in a letter addressed to the Turkish Government, gave up all claim to special treatment.

The new Turkish Constitution abolished the Millet system of partial communal autonomy. Matters of personal status, such as marriage, now came under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil authorities. At the same time, the community lost its former right to levy its own taxes and, consequently, its various communal institutions became dependent entirely on voluntary contributions.

It should be stressed that these measures were not directed against the Jewish minority, but were part of the general secularization of the Turkish State. They affected all minorities and, likewise, the religious situations of the Muslims themselves.

The tendency towards a breaking up of any sense of unity among the component parts of the Ottoman Empire became sharper during WWI. It received a death blow when, not long after the end of the war, Mustafa Pasha Kemal decreed the disestablishment of Islam in the New Turkey.

Once this had happened the effects of political fragmentation were made even stronger. Each of the new Arab States sought its own level in the post-war world, while Turkey evolved a policy based on the national interests of a secular State. How far this was to take her from the Arab States is shown by the absence of any feeling of solidarity with them during the most critical period of tension over Palestine, and the fact that in due course the Turkish Government went so far as to recognize Israel.

Recently, a movement in favor of the revival of Islam has gathered some strength in Turkey. But since the days of Ataturk, the Government’s greater European orientation, its policy of abandoning any claim to the territories of the old Ottoman Empire, its abolition of the Caliphate, and the secularization of the State through the disestablishment of Islam, have all contributed to a great weakening of former cultural and political links with the Arab countries.

When the evidence is examined, it is clear that, contrary to reports published in various newspapers (including some in Israel), the Turkish Government did not take any discriminatory measures against its Jewish minority during the invasion of Israel by the Arab States; and it cannot be fairly said that the obstacles which the Turkish Government put in the way of young Jews of military age wishing to join the Israel forces constituted discrimination against the community.

Apart from this temporary restriction, the Turkish Government has certainly put no obstacles in the way of those wishing to emigrate to Israel. Such emigration, in fact, has assumed proportions so great as to reduce the number of Jews in Turkey by between 25% and 30%. Although there had already been a certain amount of Jewish emigration during the last 20 years, mostly to South America and the US, its scale was not considerable. Since the proclamation of the Jewish State, on the other hand, the stream of emigrants to Israel has grown to a flood, the fighting brought about, was encouraged to hope that this new development was the first step on a path which would finally halt torture, killings and other abuses. However, at the very time that the government was expected to enact a number of confidence building measures, including lifting the state of emergency currently in force in southeast Turkey, this optimism was thrown into doubt by the killing of 33 prisoners by the PKK in Bingöl on 24 May - an act condemned by Amnesty International. Subsequent intense military activity resulted in the PKK's
announcement on 8 June that their unilateral ceasefire was at an end. Although Amnestys International believes that the PKK and the Turkish government are reluctant to accept the return to persistent and widespread human rights abuses which renewal of the conflict would inevitably bring, we fear that both sides are being drawn unwillingly by the course of events back into a human rights crisis. These tragic consequences can only be avoided if both sides pull back from the brink and take steps to ensure the protection of human rights and basic humanitarian standards. It is for this reason that Amnesty International is appealing today to the Turkish Government, and to the leadership of the PKK, asking that every effort be made now to prevent further pain, injury and loss of life which will certainly be paid by civilians as the price of such a conflict. In making this appeal we ask that both sides remember the hundreds of women, children, civilians and prisoners who have already died at the hands of both sides in the conflict since 1984. [s]

46041. Amnesty International. Press Release: Turkey: Human Rights Situation Deteriorates. London: Amnesty International, N.D. [1993] The Turkish government has completely failed to live up to its widely-publicized commitment to improve Turkeys human rights record. In fact, the human rights situation in the country appears to be deteriorating rapidly, with continued widespread reports of torture and an unprecedented volume of allegations of extrajudicial executions. In an election speech in 10/1991, Suleyman Demirel, now Prime Minister, confirmed that torture in police custody was a serious problem and promised that under his administration "the walls of all police stations will be made of glass." But by 9/1992 his government had taken no steps to safeguard detainees in police custody. An unsatisfactory package of draft legislation, which still failed to meet international standards, was announced in 4/1992 as a solution to the problem of torture, but on Aug. 26 this was withdrawn. Meanwhile, almost anyone arrested continues to be at risk of torture or ill-treatment. There were at least nine deaths in custody during the first eight months of 1992. Moreover, reports of extrajudicial executions have increased dramatically. In 1991 more than 50 people, mainly villagers, were taken from their homes and shot, apparently by members of the regular security forces. Since 11/1991 the killings have continued but the methods have changed. More than a hundred Kurdish men, among them journalists and local politicians, have been shot to death in Southeast Turkey by unknown gunmen. Many of the victims had previously been detained, tortured or threatened by the police, and there is growing evidence to suggest that the security forces are protecting or inciting the assassins. In spite of AI's repeated appeals for the establishment of commissions of inquiry, as laid down in the United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, the government has failed to establish such commissions or any form of public inquiry. Amnesty International also repeatedly expressed concern to the Turkish government about a succession of incidents in southeast Turkey in which civilians, including women, young children and elderly people, have been killed, apparently by security forces firing indiscriminately during demonstrations, or in retaliation for attacks by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). More than 120 civilians have died during such incidents, most recently in Sirnak, where at least 15 civilians, including five children, were killed in August, allegedly by security forces who fired on civilian districts with tanks and small arms after a PKK attack in which at least one of the security forces was killed. Amnesty International has recommended that the incident be the subject of an independent inquiry and that the findings be made public. [s]

46042. Bohlen, Celestine. "Islamic Party in Turkey Warns Rivals Not To Bar It", in New York Times, June 9, 1996. p. A6. Erbakan, head of the Welfare Party, warned the Turkish political establishment that any "artificial" coalition set up simply to bar him from power would be doomed to failure. He noted that such fruitless efforts were making it more clear that the Welfare Party should form the new government. The continuing feud between PM Mesut Yilmaz and his former coalition partner Tansu Ciller strengthens Erbakan's argument.

46043. Bohlen, Celestine. "Rebound By Premier In Turkey: At Stake For Tansu Ciller is a Link to Europe", in New York Times, October 19, 1995. p. A5. Three days after Ciller failed to win approval for her minority government, she is now charged with forming a new coalition government. This startling turnaround could propitiate her strongly for the parliamentary elections to be held before next summer. Her tenure in office was clouded by poor economic conditions and a series of crippling strikes. Most serious for Ciller has been the erosion of support for her within her own party, even losing the support of Suleyman Demerli, her one-time mentor.

46044. Bowcott, Owen. "Kurdish Separatists' Bomb Victim Dies", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 3, 1994. p. 10. Joanna Griffiths, one of eight Britons wounded in a Kurdish attack on tourists in Turkey, died in Manchester without regaining consciousness. She had undergone brain surgery in a Turkish hospital. More than 200000 British tourists are expected to travel to Turkey this year: tour operators are giving clients to option to switch to other destinations.

46045. Cernaigh, Ciaran O. "Big Paris Festival Hears Sinn Fein", in An Phoblacht/Republican News. October 19, 1995. THE TORRENTS OF RAIN and slushy mud that one wouldn't normally associate with Paris in early autumn, didn't deter the hundreds of thousands of visitors who attended this year's Fete de l'Humanite, the annual French Communist Party festival in the French capital. And among that throng of humanity during the weekend of 9/15-17/1995 was a three-person delegation from Sinn Fein.

The party's renewed participation in the Fete, after an absence of a number of years, was an occasion to inform the visiting public, the French left and international delegates about the threat posed to the peace process by the British government.

Officials from the Spanish People's Communist party (PCPE), Herri Batasuna, Turkish Worker's Party and German Communist party (PDF) met the Sinn Fein representatives, while discussions with PLO delegates found them understandably preoccupied with their own domestic political situation and their expressions of confidence in that process were less than categorical.

Sinn Fein's presence also received attention in the French daily newspaper, Liberation, while the delegation members gave interviews to Humanite, the mainstream newspaper of the French Communist party, and to the Australian weekly, Green Left.

Sinn Fein's political profile was, ironically, thrown into relief by the attendance of Democratic Left. Given that party's cameo role in the Dublin government it might have been reasonable to expect them to display political literature at such a political event. Not so! Indeed from the dearth of literature available you could be forgiven for not knowing of the impending divorce referendum in the 26 Counties, let alone the Irish peace process. However, there was an element of politics which one could not fail to notice: amidst the wallpapering of Irish Ferry travel posters and Shamrock pub signs the absence, even, of the Irish national flag was paralleled by the presence of the notice "Learn the best English in Ireland".

Repeatedly, visitors to Sinn Fein's stall remarked that it was the "most political stand" in the International section.

KEBABS & RUM: Of course for many visitors politics came second to the muddy scramble for Cuba Libre, Martinique rum or Lebanese kebabs. However, the overall feeling of the 60 hour extravaganza was the expression of left wing ideas and the exchange of experiences between delegations. Every credit is due to the lively and well-organized Solidarite Irlande committee in France for enabling Sinn Fein and the socialist republican struggle in Ireland to be highlighted in such an important international arena.

The atmosphere at the Fete was lively, positive and progressive and can only have pleased the party good. However, for this it corresponded the one blemish on the weekend was the intervention of the Communist Party of Spain which prevented the Herri Batasuna representatives from having an official stand.

As they returned to Ireland through Heathrow airport, the three
members of the Sinn Fein delegation were detained by British Special Branch officers. The trio was held for around an hour during which time they were questioned about the prisoners' campaign group Saoirse and the state of the Irish peace process.

Maskey trip to Italy a major success: "IN MY OPINION this was the most successful trip to Italy yet by a Sinn Fein representative, it was spectacular," enthused Alex Maskey as he spoke to AP/RN about his recent 12-day trip to Rome.

In a series of high-powered political meetings from 9/15-27/1995 the Belfast councillor met with Signore Amari the vice-General Director for Political Affairs of the Italian government and head of the Italian Desk. According to Maskey the meeting with the Foreign Ministry representative was friendly and positive; "Amari reaffirmed a standing invitation for Martin McGuinness to visit Italy".

Maskey also had meetings with influential members of the PDS opposition party and leading trade unionists and he gave numerous radio and newspaper interviews.

"The session with Gianni Mattioli (a Green Party MP) and Carmelo Incorvaia, senior figures in the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee, was very productive."

"On Tuesday 9/26/1995, I met Piero Fassino MP the PDS International Secretary who was very positive and suggested that PDS, the biggest party in Italy, and Sinn Fein build links."

Maskey told AP/RN that until recently PDS was "lukewarm on the Irish situation and their interest now is a sign of a real breakthrough for our party". Fassino also expressed the wish for a PDS delegation to visit Ireland this year.

Mattioli and Incorvaia suggested activity within the Italian parliament and mooted the idea of a motion to parliament to debate the Irish peace process.

After his meeting with the trade unionists' delegation Maskey was the guest of honour at a concert in the Social Centre Villagio Globale where he gave a short speech to an audience of 8000. [Text]

46047. Couturier, Kelly. "Turkey Protests Drug-Deal Allegations", in Seattle Times, January 23, 1997. p. A9. The Turkish government has protested the accusation of two German judges that high Turkish officials, including Deputy PM Tansu Ciller protected heroin traffickers. A judge in Frankfurt convicted three Kurdish drug smugglers and concluded that there was evidence of Turkish government collusion. In addition to Kurdish organized crime, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) is reported by the Turkish government to be involved in the drug trade. Western officials note that Turkey has stepped up its struggle against the drug trade, but suggest that such efforts have led to some officials being corrupted by the drug syndicates. [Text]

46048. Cowell, Alan. "Istanbul Journal: Career Women Finding Elbowroom in Turkey", in New York Times, March 2, 1994. p. A7. Istanbul, Turkey: Supposedly Turkish women have had equal rights since 1923 under the new republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and in June 1993 Tanso Ciller became Turkey's first woman prime minister. During the 1980s Turkey experienced an economic boom as a result of privatization, and tens of thousands migrated from rural areas to the big cities. Since then Turkish women have undergone a form of economic liberation as more and more urban women have careers and are represented within the media as breaking out of the shell of traditional roles. An Americanized magazine, the Turkish Cosmopolitan, regularly reports on women as having sexual exploits and being promiscuous. Leyla Alton, a public relations businesswoman, says that Turkish urbanized women are becoming as sophisticated as other European women.

Professor of Womens Affairs at Istanbul University, Necia-Arat, says that women's changing roles are happening for only a small elite group, while women in rural areas are still lacking education and suffer pressure from Islamic traditionalists from pursuing equal rights. She says that this elite group only represents 1 out of every 100000 women in Turkey, but considers these women as pioneers for the liberation of all Turkish women.

Ankara journalist Nur Batur agrees that there is a giant gap between rural and urbanized women, and that Islamic beliefs brought into the country by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, have kept women from emancipation. At this date, a campaign against women's rights is underway by traditional Turkish men and Islamic fundamentalists.

Many Turks do not believe that economic liberation of women represents sexual liberation. Though women have an increasingly higher profile in public relations, computers and magazine publishing, they are hardly represented in technological and engineering fields.

Women's liberation in Turkey appears to be defined by the rising number of urbanized women with careers, and the increasing numbers of divorce, whereas sexual emancipation is still slow to come. According to Arat, the issue of sexual harassment is ignored, feminism is looked upon badly, and the majority of women must still be virgins before they marry. [Text]
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Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Women are improving their situation in Turkish society, including the professions, business, and civil service. Although primary education reached all children in 1993, but far fewer girls than boys continued their education after primary school. In 1999 Parliament passed a law increasing universal mandatory education from 5 to 8 years. The law will be implemented gradually throughout the country. For the 1994 school year, it was put into effect in several pilot regions. A delegation of women representing the Women's Studies Center of Istanbul University and numerous other private organizations presented a petition to Parliament on February 17 calling for legislation to abolish the special position of husbands as head of family. There are some seldom enforced laws that discriminate against women. Spousal abuse is still considered an extremely private matter, although it is a widespread problem, interest in which is growing. Few women go to the police, who in any case are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes. Turks of either sex may file civil or criminal charges but rarely do. Turkish law and courts make no discrimination between the sexes in laws concerning violence or abuse. In 7/1992, the Purple Roof Foundation (for battered women) opened a "hello shelter" telephone line- it attracted 3300 callers in its first 3 months, even under Transportation Ministry regulations restricting its operating hours to weekdays. The Purple Roof Foundation has since expanded its service to two lines, one of which focuses on helping battered women, and the other of which deals with a variety of other subjects. The Government also has opened shelters in major cities for abused women and their children who have left their homes. Independent women's and women's rights associations exist, but the concept of lobbying for women's rights has not gained reat currency. [-]

46050. DS. "Europe and Canada: Turkey: Part 17: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination: Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Government is committed to furthering children's welfare and is working to expand opportunities in education and health, including further reduction of the infant mortality rate. Turkey's children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in southeastern Anatolia. School closings and the decision by many families to move westward, be it for economic reasons or to escape the violence, have uprooted children to cities which are hard pressed to find the resources to extend basic, mandatory services, such as schooling. The Government is exploring the possibility of establishing regional boarding schools to help combat this problem. Although primary schooling is mandatory, many young children, ages 3-12, can be seen on the streets hawking goods or shining shoes. [-]

46051. DS. "Europe and Canada: Turkey: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Turkey's accession to the ILO's international program on the elimination of child labor (IPEC). In 1992, with technical assistance from the ILO, the Government established a child labor unit within the Ministry of Labor tasked with training labor inspectors for better enforcement of child labor laws. According to the Constitution's ban on torture, Turkey's accession to the UN and European Conventions Against Torture, and public pledges of successive governments to end torture, the practice continued. Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture state that most persons charged with, or suspected of, political crimes usually suffer some torture during periods of incommunicado detention in police station and Jandarma headquarters before they are brought before a court. The HRF and private attorneys reported that there was no indication of either the amelioration of treatment of those charged under the Anti-Terror Law or an overall decrease in the incidence of torture in 1994. In 1994 women again charged sexual abuses while under official detention by security officials. Although the implementation of the CMUK on 12/1/1992, facilitated more immediate attorney access to those arrested for common crimes, its provisions of immediate attorney access do not apply to those detained in the state of emergency region nor to those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. Some attorneys in the southeast reported that some common criminals are booked on political charges thereby depriving them of access to or by an attorney. The CMUK’s allowable, maximum prearraignment detention periods still exceed Council of Europe maximums. Human rights observers report that the system whereby the arresting police officer is also responsible for interrogating the suspect is conducive to torture because the officer seeks to obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. According to those familiar with Turkish police operations, in petty criminal cases, the arresting officer is responsible for following up on the case, whereas in major cases such as murder and political or terrorism-related crimes, "desks" responsible for the area in question are responsible for the interrogation. Commonly employed methods of torture reported by the Human Rights Foundation's Torture Treatment Centers include: high-
pressure cold water hoses, electric shocks, beating on the soles of the feet, beating of the genitalia, hanging by the arms, blindfolding, sleep deprivation, deprivation of clothing, systematic beatings and vaginal and anal rape with truncheon and, in some instances, gun barrels.

In southern Turkey, a security official boasted of having deprived a suspect of sleep for 6 days to obtain a confession. In a case in Istanbul in July, Yelda Ozcan, a former representative of the HRF stated to several human rights organizations that a chief commissioner at the security directorate had stripped and beaten her. She obtained a medical report and lodged an official complaint against the commissioner. In another case, in April a 17-year-old female student stated she had been beaten, hosed with pressurized water, and raped with a truncheon by police at Istanbul’s Bahcelievler station then released without charges having been filed. Although the Government asserted that medical examinations occur once during detention and a second time before either arraignment or release, former detainees asserted that some medical examinations took place too long after the event to reveal any definitive findings. According to the HRF, practice varies widely. In some cases medical examinations are conducted; in others, doctors sign papers handed to them; some examinations are cursory, some are done in the presence of police officials, and some doctors are at times under pressure to submit false or misleading medical certificates denying evidence of torture. Credible sources in the human rights and legal communities estimate that judicial authorities investigate only about one-half of the formal complaints involving torture and prosecute only a small fraction of those. Under the Anti-Terror Law, officials accused of torture or other mistreatment may continue to work while under investigation and, if convicted, may only be suspended. Special provincial administrative boards, rather than regular courts, decide whether to prosecute in such cases and suspects’ legal fees are paid by their employing agencies. Under the state of emergency, any lawsuit directed at government authorities must be approved by the regional governor. Because approval is rare this blocks legal pursuit of torture allegations. Under the Administrative Adjudication Law, an administrative investigation into alleged torture cases is conducted under the civil service adjudication law to determine if there is enough evidence to bring a law enforcement officer to trial. Under the CMUK, while prosecutors are empowered to initiate investigations of police officers or Jandarma suspected of torturing or maltreating suspects, in cases where township security directors or Jandarma commander are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of judges. According to the Government, in the first 9 months of 1994 prosecutors considered 963 complaints of torture or maltreatment. Of those, 314 cases were opened, 365 were in preparation, 187 were dropped. In 25 cases the court decided it did not have the authority to pursue the case, and in 47 cases the court referred the case to another court. There were 11 convictions, 22 acquittals; in one case the complaint was withdrawn. Most of these cases were in Istanbul and Ankara; few were in the southeast. In the few instances in which law enforcement officers are convicted of torture, sentences tend to be light. In July Ekrem Guner, a noncommissioned officer, was convicted of torturing two persons in Ordu in 1989, sentenced to 2 years in prison, suspended from duty for 6 months and 16 days, and fined TL375000 (roughly $12). In July the Ankara administrative court ordered the Interior Ministry to pay Medhiya Curbaz TL10 million (roughly $300) in compensation for torture she sustained in 8/1991 by the Adana police. The Adana Provincial administrative commission had refused to try the case. The Police officers involved on charges of rape and torture, despite a medical report which confirmed the charge of rape. The trial of six security officers accused of torturing Baki Erdogan (who died in custody) in Soke district of Aydin province in 8/1993 began in May and was continuing at night, unless the delay will be damaging or the search will result in the prohibition of a house arrest or other mistreatment may continue to work while under investigation or other mistreatment may continue to work while under investigation. In the few instances in which law enforcement officers are convicted of torture, sentences tend to be light. In July Ekrem Guner, a noncommissioned officer, was convicted of torturing two persons in Ordu in 1989, sentenced to 2 years in prison, suspended from duty for 6 months and 16 days, and fined TL375000 (roughly $12). In July the Ankara administrative court ordered the Interior Ministry to pay Medhiya Curbaz TL10 million (roughly $300) in compensation for torture she sustained in 8/1991 by the Adana police. The Adana Provincial administrative commission had refused to try the case. The Police officers involved on charges of rape and torture, despite a medical report which confirmed the charge of rape. The trial of six security officers accused of torturing Baki Erdogan (who died in custody) in Soke district of Aydin province in 8/1993 began in May and was continuing at night, unless the delay will be damaging or the search will result in the prohibition of a house arrest or other mistreatment may continue to work while under investigation.

As Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, Turkish citizens may file applications alleging violations of the European Convention on Human Rights with the Commission. Some 250 cases are currently before the Commission. In February the Government promised the Commission to pay compensation to the villagers of Yesilyurt in Cizre province whom Jandarma troops forced to eat human excrement in 1990. A total of 300000 French francs in compensation is to be paid. In January authorities sent a Prime Ministerial circular to the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, directing that police prepare monthly reports on the incidence of ill-treatment and torture and ensure that medical examinations are carried out carefully to provide accurate forensic evidence. While statistics generally have been submitted as required, there is no evidence that the reporting requirement has had any effect on the incidence of torture. As of September, 4149 applications claiming torture, maltreatment, or arbitrary detention had been filed with the parliamentary Human Rights Commission, since its 9/1991 inception. In each case, the Commission had written to the offices of the public prosecutor, the governor’s office, and the security directorate general, and there is no indication that these communications have had any effect or that the Commission has followed up on these cases. The HRF’s torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul reported that, within the first 6 months of 1994, they had received a total of 196 applications for treatment. Police continue to force women in custody and others to undergo virginity testing even though the state minister in charge women’s affairs condemned the practice in 1992. The tests are imposed particularly on women who file a criminal complaint alleging a sexual crime. Although legally only a court or a prosecutor may order them, police continue to impose the tests on female detainees. Though women may refuse the exams, they are rarely informed of that right. Prison conditions remained another problem area in 1994. As recently as early November, the Justice Ministry announced plans to build new prisons and upgrade old ones to deal with the increase in the number of inmates convicted of terrorist crimes. The refurbished Eskişehir Prison and four others were to reopen by the end of the year. As in 1993, groups of inmates carried out hunger strikes to protest poor conditions and their treatment by prison guards, and one inmate was killed and several injured in an October riot at Diyarbakir Security Prison. The Government promised prison reform in 1993, but at the end of 1994 Parliament had not enacted it. Torture in prisons has decreased in the last few years, but continues to occur. [ ]

46053. DS. “Turkey: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Repet for the Integrity of the Person” by Including Freedom of Religion” and “Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence”, in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5202(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print, District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person’s domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication. Government officials may enter a private residence or intercept or monitor private correspondence only upon issuance of a judicial warrant. These provisions are generally respected in practice outside the state of emergency region. A judge must decide whether to issue a search warrant for a residence. If delay may cause harm, prosecutors and municipal officers authorized to carry out prosecutors’ instructions may conduct a search. Searches of private premises may not be carried out at night, unless the delay will be damaging or the search will result in the capture of a prisoner at large. Exceptions include persons under special observation by the Security Directorate General, places where the one can enter at night, places where criminals gather, places where materials obtained through the, the omission of Crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and brothels. In the 10 provinces under emergency rule, the Regional Governor can and does empower security authorities to search without a

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warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses, associations, or other organizations. According to the HRF, the practice of security authorities in these provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons, letters, telegrams, and documents is unconstitutional. Roadblocks are commonplace in the southeast, and security officials regularly search vehicles and travelers. Security forces have compelled the evacuation of villages in the southeast to prevent villagers from giving aid and support to the PKK. Security operations have produced great fear of violence in southeastern Turkey, and village and hamlet evictions but claims they occur as the consequence of pressures by and fear of the PKK and because security operations against the PKK in the region make continued occupancy unsafe. [=]

46054. DS. "Turkey: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. According to the Constitution, citizens have the right and ability to change their government peacefully. Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which elections are held at least every 6 years based on the generalized universal suffrage for all citizens aged 21 and over. As of October, at least 25 political parties were operating in Turkey, of which 7 were represented in Parliament. The Grand National Assembly (parliament) elects the President as Head of State every 7 years, or when the President becomes incapacitated or dies. There are no restrictions in law against women or minorities voting or participating in politics, but the Government has made repeated efforts to frustrate political activities of those who emphasize their Kurdish ethnicity. As noted in Section 2.b., the Constitutional Court closed the pro-Kurdish DEP in 1994. It immediately reformed as HADEP. Additionally, the Constitution forbids students, university faculty members, and trade unionists from active participation in party politics. In February the Interior Ministry discharged three democratically elected mayors in the southeast, all from the DEP: Kozluk (Batman province) mayor Abdurrah Kaya; Kurtulan (Siirt province) mayor Cemil Akgul, and Liver (Diyarbakir province) mayor Nazmi Balkas. In September the Istanbul police sentenced Kava and Balkas to 20 months in prison each and fined them TL 210 million ($700 dollars) each for allegedly separatist statements they had given to the newspaper Ozgur Gundem. In the runup to nationwide local elections held on 3/27, there were serious threats to the safety of candidates in the southeast. A number of DEP candidates were threatened and a few killed, and party offices of several political parties were bombed. As of the end of the year, none of the perpetrators had been apprehended. On 2/24, the DEP withdrew from the elections, claiming it was not safe for its candidates. On 3/1, the PKK demanded that people boycott the elections, and threatened to kill both candidates and voters who went to the polls. The elections went forward peacefully throughout the country. Apart from banning the DEP, the Constitutional Court formally closed the small Greens party on the grounds that its executives had not submitted their financial accounts and other necessary documents for the year 1988; and it also closed the Turkish Socialist Labor Party because its platform allegedly aimed at destroying the unity of the country and its people. The Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women; however, only eight women representing three parties were elected to the Parliament in 1991. In addition to Prime Minister Ciller, there is one female Cabinet Minister. Political parties now recruit female delegates for their party conferences and electoral lists. Women’s committees are active within political party organizations, although formal youth and women’s wings are not permitted under the Constitution. [=]

46056. DS. "Turkey: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State. In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government is committed to furthering children’s welfare and is working to expand opportunities in education and health, including further reduction of infant mortality rate. Children aid and development work have resulted greatly from the country’s attempt to reduce violence in southeastern Turkey. School closings and the migration of many families, forced or voluntary, have uprooted children to cities which are hard pressed to find resources to extend basic, mandatory services, such as schooling. The Government is establishing regional boarding schools in the southeast to help combat this problem but not enough to meet the need. The HRD claims that 78 children were subjected to torture between 1/1989-7/1994.
large percentage of women employed in agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors work as unpaid family help. The arbitrary barrier to women becoming governors and subgovernors (government-appointed positions) has been breached, and women may now take the examination required to become a subgovernor. Several have been appointed subgovernors, and one governor is a woman. Independent women’s and women’s rights associations exist, but the concept of lobbying for women’s rights has not gained currency.


District of Columbia: Department of State, June 30, 1992. (1) Voluntary Agency Processing: The Department of State contracts with private voluntary agencies -- sometimes referred to as Joint Voluntary Agencies or "JVAe" -- to assist in the processing of refugees for admission to the United States. These agencies pre-screen applicants to determine if they fall within the applicable processing priorities and otherwise appear eligible to be scheduled for an INS refugee interview. In some cases, individuals who appear to qualify for immigration to the US are also advised of those procedures. In addition, prior to interview, they assist the applicant in completing the documentary requirements of the program. If approved, voluntary agency staff guide the refugee through post-adjudication steps such as obtaining a medical clearance and sponsorship assurance. Voluntary agencies are currently under contract to the Department of State at processing locations in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Pakistan, Turkey, Austria, Germany, Italy, Greece, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Kenya.

(2) Overseas Language Training and Cultural Orientation: The Department of State strives to ensure that refugees who are accepted for admission to the United States are as well prepared as possible for the significant changes they will experience during resettlement. In support of this principle, the Bureau for Refugee Programs operates pre-departure training and orientation programs for eligible refugees at selected sites around the world. In East Asia, the Bureau funds English-as-a-Second-Language and Cultural Orientation (ESL/CO) programs in Thailand and the Philippines. At these sites adult Indochinese refugees participate in a 20-week program consisting of ESL/CO, and Work Orientation. A special program for 11 to 16 year olds, Preparation for American Secondary Schools (PASS), includes instruction in English, American Studies, basic math, and school orientation. In the Philippines, a program for 6 to 11 year olds, Preparing Refugees for Elementary Programs (PREP), also provides instruction in English, basic math, and school skills. In FY 1992 over 30000 Indo-Chinese refugees, including Amerasians departing Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program, are expected to complete this training. In Africa, the Bureau conducts a short orientation program in Kenya which provides services primarily to Ethiopian refugees enroute to the United States. The Bureau also supports a small cultural orientation program in Botswana for US-bound refugees who come primarily from Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

(3) Health Services: The Office of Refugee Health (ORH), in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the focal point for all activities of the US Public Health Service in refugee health. The ORH develops health and mental health policy and identifies problem areas and solutions. Public Health Service agencies active in refugee matters include the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Health Resources and Services Administration. Close and regular consultative relations are maintained with the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice, HHS's Office for Refugee Resettlement, State and local health departments, and with international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Routine US Public Health Service refugee operations include: (a) Monitoring the quality of medical examinations provided to refugees in Southeast Asia and worldwide, through on-site visits and training conferences; (b) Inspection of each refugee at the US port of entry; (c) Notification of local health departments of each refugee’s arrival, with expedited notification of cases requiring special follow-up; and (d) Administration of a domestic preventive health program which provides for regularly scheduled health assessments locally following resettlement.

Special initiatives undertaken or completed recently have included: (a) Organizing and conducting an international medical conference on the health and mental health needs of refugees from the former Soviet Union and publication of meeting proceedings, which is a unique resource; (b) Conducting mental health training seminars for medical providers and resettlement workers for special refugee groups, including Vietnamese former reeducation camp detainees and Amerasians; (c) Evaluating reeducation camp detainee health and mental health services; (d) Directing the PHS response to Haitian migrants at Guantanarno Bay Naval Station and providing medical screening for Haitians admitted directly to the US; (e) Consulting with DOS, INS, and UNHCR on individual refugee cases presenting unique health problems; (f) Planning for an international conference on migration medicine jointly with the World Health Organization (WHO) and IOM; and (g) Participating in the development of regulations to implement the medical exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.

(4) Initial Reception and Placement and the Refugee Data Center: Under Reception and Placement (R&P) program cooperative agreements administered by the Bureau for Refugee Programs, eleven private voluntary agencies are responsible for providing initial resettlement services to refugees during their first 90 days in the United States and oversight of "free case" refugees (those without relatives in the United States) for six months. Voluntary agencies receive per capita funding ($586 in FY 1992), which is to be used along with cash and in-kind contributions from private and other sources. Refugee reception and placement services include: (a) Sponsorship; (b) Pre-arrival resettlement planning; (c) Reception; (d) Basic needs support for 30 days; (e) Counseling and orientation; and (f) Health, employment, and other necessary referral services.

In FY 1992 the Bureau's on-site monitoring of the Reception and Placement program included in-depth reviews of refugee resettlement in twelve states. As a result of the monitoring, strengths and weaknesses of voluntary agency programs have been identified, and where needed, corrective action has been recommended. In FY 1992 the domestic resettlement program will have witnessed large-scale arrivals of Soviets, and Amerasians and reeducation ex-detainees exiting Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program. Most arriving refugees join family already resident in the United States.

(5) Transportation The Department of State funds the transportation of refugees resettled in the United States through a program administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which includes funding for international and domestic airfares, IOM processing, medical screening, communications, documentation, and transit accommodations where required. The cost of the airfares (over 80% of this total) is provided for refugees in the form of a loan; loan beneficiaries are responsible for repaying a designated sum over time after resettlement. Funds provided for transportation loans and related services cover most refugees resettled in the United States. Amerasian immigrants receive services provided to refugees. Other immigrants enter the United States on prepaid tickets.

(6) Ongoing Domestic Resettlement Programs For FY 1993, the Administration has proposed $227 million for Refugee and Entrant Assistance, a 45% reduction from last year's budget. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has proposed a new, streamlined program, entitled the "Private Resettlement Program (PRP)," that ensures newly-arrived refugees who are not eligible for Federal categorical public assistance will be able to receive transitional support while also receiving intensive case management through more efficient use of resources. The proposal assumes a funded admissions level of 122000 refugees For FY 1993.
The PRP would terminate the States-administered Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) programs and would provide transitional support, through voluntary agencies, to newly-arrived refugees who are ineligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). States would continue to be responsible for administering Federal Targeted Assistance and Social Services funds. ORR would also provide funds to voluntary agencies to help refugees attain self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. The implementation of the PRP continues to be discussed among the Office of the Coordinator, ORR, the States, voluntary agencies, mutual assistance associations and the Congress. The Private Resettlement Program will provide a longer period of assistance to refugees and will help refugees obtain employment sooner than would be possible under the States-administered RCA and RMA Programs.

(7) Domestic Initiatives The Wilson/Fish Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, contained in the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution on Appropriations, enables ORR to develop alternative projects which promote early employment of refugees. It provides to States voluntary resettlement agencies, and others the opportunity to develop innovative approaches for the provision of cash and medical assistance, social services, and case management. In the summer of 1985, ORR awarded grants to California and Oregon for demonstration projects designed to decrease refugee reliance on welfare and to promote earlier economic self-sufficiency. The California project was phased out by the State in 1990. In FY 1990, ORR approved a grant to the United States Catholic Conference for a demonstration project, operated by Catholic Community Services of San Diego, which began 9/1/1990. The Oregon Refugee Early Employment Project (REEP): The Oregon project, the Refugee Early Employment Project (REEP), began its seventh year of activity in FY 1992. REEP integrates the delivery of cash assistance with case management, social services, and employment services within the private non-profit sector in an effort to increase refugee employment and reduce reliance on cash assistance. REEP encompasses a tri-county area surrounding Portland, where 85% of all refugees in Oregon initially settle. The project serves needy refugees who do not meet the AFDC or SSI categorical requirements (i.e., members of two-parent families, couples without children, and single individuals) during their initial eight months in the United States. Refugees who normally are eligible for assistance under AFDC continue to be eligible for that program and do not participate in REEP. During the past year, 835 REEP participants, of whom 96% were receiving cash assistance, entered employment. During the first nine months of the fiscal year, REEP reported a 75% job retention rate for these individuals. The employment costs were $937 per job placement and $417 per REEP participant.

United States Catholic Conference - San Diego Project: In FY 1990, USCC was awarded a grant for a demonstration project to be operated by its affiliate, Catholic Community Services of San Diego. It is the third Wilson/Fish project to be funded, and the first grant awarded directly to a private sector agency. The project serves USCC-sponsored new arrivals and provides a range of in-house services aimed at increasing the rate of refugee self-sufficiency and decreasing the average length of time on assistance. The project provides cash assistance to project participants at a level comparable to cash assistance from State-administered programs. The 125 employable refugees who were enrolled during the first four months of the project utilized cash assistance an average of 6.7 months during their first eight months in the US. 90 (72%) became self-sufficient before the end of the first 12 months in the US.

Cuban Exodus Relief Fund (CERF): In September 1991, the Cuban Exodus Relief Fund (CERF) was awarded a grant of $1.7 million for a demonstration project to resettle 1000 Cuban refugees admitted under the funded program. CERF provides medical assistance and services to newly-arrived refugees, who are excluded from accessing any public assistance for a minimum of 12 months. In agreement with the US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and ORR, CERF is also permitted to use the grant funds to provide medical assistance for up to 1000 additional refugees admitted under the Private Sector Initiative (PSI).}

Alaska Refugee Outreach (ARO): In 1/1992, ORR awarded $140000 to Alaska Refugee Outreach (ARO), a local affiliate of the Episcopal Migration Ministries, for a demonstration project to be operated in four communities in the State of Alaska. The demonstration project will provide language and employment services to approximately 100 refugees during FY 1992. This project is the third awarded to a non-profit organization and the first established in Alaska, the one State that has not participated in refugee assistance and services through a State-administered refugee program.

Discretionary Social Service Initiatives: ORR discretionary funds support initiatives aimed at aiding refugees to achieve self-sufficiency. The principal programs funded are listed below.

Key States Initiative. In FY 1987, ORR established the Key States Initiative (KSI) to provide special funds to projects to reduce cash assistance utilization by refugee families in States with high welfare utilization. Implementation of KSI has involved changes in the State systems for refugee services, as well as within the system of service providers and the refugee communities. Over $2.6 million was awarded in FY 1991 to five States pursuing innovative welfare reduction strategies under KSI. Savings from welfare reductions and terminations are now substantially exceeding the KSI grant amounts.

Job Links. The purpose of Job Links is to provide supplementary social service funding to qualifying States in which resettlement of refugees is encouraged based on the experience of refugees already in those communities, or where a special initiative is proposed to significantly improve the potential for self-sufficiency. The program seeks to link employable refugees with jobs in communities which have good economic opportunities. All States except those with KSI cooperative agreements or targeted assistance grants are eligible to apply. General program objectives include: (a) Increased employment and self-sufficiency; (b) Active job development with employers offering job opportunities at self-sufficiency-supporting wages; (c) Retention of refugees in communities with good job opportunities; (d) Initial resettlement of refugees in communities with histories of effective early employment and self-sufficiency; and (e) Promotion of secondary migration of refugees to these communities from areas of high refugee impact and high welfare utilization.

Planned Secondary Resettlement (PSR) Program: The Planned Secondary Resettlement (PSR) program provides an opportunity for unemployed refugees and their families to relocate from areas of high welfare dependency to communities in the US that offer favorable employment prospects. Secondary resettlement assistance and services are provided to refugees who participate in a planned relocation. Eligibility is limited to refugees who have lived in the US for 18 months or more and who have experienced continuing unemployment. Eligible grantees include States and public and private non-profit organizations which have had demonstrable experience in the provision of services to refugees, such as refugee mutual assistance associations (MAAs) and national and local voluntary agencies. As of the end of FY 1991, there were seven PSR grantees, with the Lao, Cambodian, and Hmong communities the most active in recruiting refugees for relocation. The average cost of resettling families through PSR is less than $8000 per family while average welfare cost savings to the government are estimated at $987 per month per family. At this rate, PSR families, on average, repay the cost to the government in just eight months.

Amerasians. A high priority of ORR is to assist in the successful resettlement of Amerasians and family members expected to arrive in the US 15000 Amerasians and accompanying family members are expected in FY 1992. ORR will extend its participation in a national planning effort for clustering free cases in selected locations. This planning effort involves coordination with the Department of State, national voluntary agencies, State refugee coordinators, refugee leaders, and various other organizations. ORR will again make funding available in localities with significant Amerasian populations. The purpose of the funding is to encourage community coordination and to provide counseling and case management services to deal with family disruption and social adjustment problems that may occur in the Amerasian
community. Former Reeducation Camp Detainees. About 21000 former Vietnamese reeducation detainees and family members are expected to arrive during FY 1992, with more expected in future years. This population is expected to have a variety of special problems, creating a need for special social services beyond the initial resettlement period. In a special initiative, ORR made one million dollars in discretionary grants available to support local community efforts to enhance services provided to former reeducation detainees from Vietnam and their families. The grants, to 16 States and counties expecting to receive large numbers of former detainees, are designed to provide enhanced orientation, peer support, peer counseling, referral, employment services and vocational English, short-term vocational training, and mental health services. Although the grants are awarded to States and counties, they are required to contract with refugee mutual assistance associations where possible for the actual delivery of services. [↩]

46058. Dingil, Fahrettin. Economic Analysis Of Child Mortality Rates By Provinces Of Turkey, 1963-1982 (socioeconomic Factors). Wayne State University, Dissertation. 1992pp. AAC 9321766. [Advisor: Leo U. Way] This study examines the socioeconomic determinants of the child mortality rates, the life table probabilities of dying before reaching age two, three, and five, in the provinces of Turkey between 1962 and 1982. The study explores relationship between the dependent variables, and the independent variables representing (1) the level of economic development, as measured by per capita real domestic product and the proportion of the population in urban areas, (2) the degree of the satisfaction of basic needs of the poor, measured by the literate proportion of population and the proportion of the literate population, and (3) the level of the status of females, measured by the literate proportion of the female population and the proportion of the female population living urban areas. The values are estimated by the Brass-Trussell method, and the East model of the Coale-Demeny regional model life tables is used. The data are collected from the Turkish population censuses for 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 and the statistical yearbook of Turkey, 1963-1985. The spatial and temporal variations in the q(x) at each province level are associated with the differentials in the independent variables. The provinces are divided into four groups according to level of income as follows: (a) richest, (b) rich, (c) poor, and (d) poorest. I propose three general hypotheses that can be expressed into one as follows: there is a negative relationship between and explanatory variables representing the level of economic development, the degree of the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor, and the status of the females. Bivariate and multivariate analysis is done with pooling time series and cross section data. I find that the independent variables significantly affect among the provinces of Turkey, and the variable, the literate proportion of the female population, representing the status of females has the greatest impact on the variations. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [↩]

46059. Elliott, Robert S. “Business Opportunities Abound in Former Soviet Republics”, in Inside Tucson Business, October 28, 1996. pp. 1, 20. Tucsonan Ursula McLoughlin was a manager at Hotel Dostyk when the coup when on in Moscow against Gorbachev. She worked there for six years rehabilitating the hotel through her Corona Hospitality Inc. Her husband, Emmett McLoughlin ships 40 tons of yeast to Georgia per month from Turkey through his Tucson-based Fair Winds Trading Co. Emmett McLoughlin had two previous trading ventures that failed: a fax service and a trade in Persian lamb skins. The McLoughlins have also represented other hotels in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There are many business opportunities in the former USSR, especially such resource based industries as timber, oil and ore in the Russian Far East. Wild changes in taxes, enormous greed, and changing rules and laws impair business development in the former Soviet Union. [↩]

46060. Frank. Andre Gunder. “Part 08: Central Asia In World History: Some Questions: Gender Relations”, in The Centrality of Central Asia. Comparative Asian Studies 8. VU Center for Asian Studies-Amsterdam. Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992. pp. 18-21. Feminist revisionism, in particular that of Marija Gimbutas and Riane Eisler, tend to attribute the rise of patriarchy to the continuing incursions of warriors from Central Asia. They argue that the ‘Aryans in India, Hitittites and Mitanni in the Fertile Cresent, Luwians in Anatolia, Kurgans in eastern Europe, Acheans and later Dorians in Greece...[as well as]...the Hebrews’ were nomadic invaders who all brought with them the social organization structures of patriarchy that enabled the to conquer these areas. Some researchers argue that women had stronger roles in nomadic societies that in sedentarized socities, but the question of gender relations in Central Asia remains little studied. [↩]

46061. Gamm, Niki. "World Cancer Week Begins", in Turkish Daily News. Turkish Embassy in the USA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2, 1996. 40% of people with cancer today can be saved but early diagnosis is critical.

ISTANBUL: Turkey began to observe World Cancer Week yesterday with meetings and a message from President Suleyman Demirel which stressed that the country was on the same level with other countries when it came to the fight against cancer.

Demirel pointed out that there were now hospitals and other health organizations and on-going research throughout Turkey and the most up-to-date equipment and techniques were readily available. Noting that it was one of the major problems affecting the whole world, he also expressed his hope that recent developments would lead to a cure. Moreover as soon as such a cure were discovered, Turkish medicine would make it available to sick people here immediately.

Turkish Cancer Society Chairman, Professor Ergun Goney, has said that the way to be saved from cancer in Turkey is through early diagnosis and treatment because the country has yet to set up centers which can deal with advanced cancer, unlike in the West.

According to data supplied by the World Health Organization (WHO), the total number of people who have cancer worldwide today is around 14 million. Of these 67% of men die and 60% of women, in other words, only some 40% of all victims are expected to survive. Cancer relateddeathsaround the world total some 5 million annually. When compared with total number of deaths around the world, 8% of these are from cancer; however in Europe, cancer accounts for 22% of deaths. The same source reports that there are 5 million more people with cancer around the world every year.

The WHO’s goal within its “Health for Everyone” program is to have reduced the number of deaths from cancer in people under 65 by 15% in the year 2005. Emphasis is to be given to early breast, cervical and skin cancer diagnosis and treatment.

The organization plans to encourage the establishment of centers which would be integrated with government hospitals. Goney emphasized in a press conference yesterday that in Turkey 200000 people are estimated to have developed cancer each year. According to Ministry of Health figures, victims living in the Marmara region of Turkey, or 53% of the country’s total population, have a better chance of advanced treatment in comparison with the rest of the country. However, again according to the figures, those living on or near the Marmara also have a far higher propensity for developing cancer.

Of the total number of people suffering from cancer, 50000 will die annually. The total is seven to eight times greater in comparison with the numbers of deaths caused by traffic accidents in Turkey. The number of people who are at risk of developing cancer is estimated at more than 2 million.

Stressing that the principal cause of cancer is cigarette smoking, Goney said that he would like to see their sale forbidden. However, failing that some of the precautions taken in western countries would help. These would include no smoking in enclosed areas and prohibitions on public transport vehicles.

[80-90% cases of lung cancer are attributable to cigarette smoking, not to mention that it also adversely effects the pancreas, bladder, kidney and uterus.]

Remedies and treatments: Finding out that one has cancer is no longer the ‘end of the line’ as it once was thought to be and encouraging treatments and gene discoveries suggest that the long years of research...
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may eventually pay off. Research in the West has emphasized the possibility of finding a vaccine which could be used either in cancer treatment or in preventing its onset.

The earlier a cancer is caught the more likely the chances of survival are. As more than one doctor has put it, if you wait until you are in pain, it's already too late. But treatment is still long, costly and usually uncomfortable to put it mildly. Some doctors and health authorities suggest regular examinations for the more common kinds of cancer and prompt medical attention to any unusual symptoms such as intestinal bleeding, wounds which don't heal and irregular, out-of-cycle bleeding in women.

For the most likely type of cancers are lung, large intestine and prostate while in women the cancer most frequently met is breast cancer.

Research has shown that in the big cities air pollution has had a major effect on cancers of the respiratory system while others are caused or seriously effected by working in unhealthy atmospheres. This includes being exposed to asbestos fibers (now outlawed in most countries) and coal dust particles. Imbibing of excessive alcohol has been shown to have a carcinogenic effect on the drinker's liver, esophagus and stomach. The groundwork for demonstrating that the effects of poor living conditions, low income and traffic problems on speeding up the cancers is also being prepared.

The Turkish Cancer Society: The Turkish Cancer Society was established in 1964 and gradually broadened the types of services which it could offer. Both chemotherapy and radiotherapy are available. Since its founding, the Society has provided early diagnosis for 350000 people. The organization is governed by university faculty members and a voluntary social committee.

For World Cancer Week, the Society is offering free diagnoses at its center in Sishane to people who are concerned that they might have cancer. It is also planning to set up cancer diagnosis centres in a pilot program in the Kırklareli region and in cooperation with the Zeytinburnu municipality in Istanbul. [=]

46062. Gowland, Rob. "United States Aids Turkey's Violation of Human Rights", in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), July 13, 1996, p. 16. The US continues to arm the Turkish military despite continuing concerns about repression. VP Al Gore justified this with a 'splendidly Orwellian piece of double talk': "It is not fair for us to urge Turkey to not only be a democratic country but to recognize human rights and them not help the government of Turkey deal with terrorism within its own borders". Pres. Clinton noted in 1994 when he welcomed PM Tansu Ciller to Washington: "Turkey is a shining example to the world of the virtues of cultural diversity". The US has provided $5 billion in military aid to Turkey in the last decade, including since 1992: 28 AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, two squadrons of F-16s, 1500 tanks, 500 armored personnel carriers, 29 F-4E fighters, 14 SH-2F LAMPS antisubmarine helicopters, 5 AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, 51 Blackhawk transport helicopters, machine guns, howitzers and cluster bombs. The Peace Onyx Program is a Lockheed coproduction deal worth $7.6 billion to produce 250 F-16s. Many extrajudicial killings are believed to be the work of organized fascists associated with the MHP or Grey Wolves.

46063. Halle, Fanina. Women in the Soviet East: Part 04: Introduction: Cultural History: The Caucasus. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1938. We will facilitate our survey by dividing the immense area of the Soviet East into three fundamentally separate parts: the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Northern Asia. In certain respects the Caucasus, the first of these three parts, is likewise the most remarkable. Itself a small continent, it belongs in equal degree to Europe and Asia, for its northern half is reckoned to the former its southern to the latter, and the dividing line between the two parts is also counted as the frontier between the two continents. That is the Caucasus mountain range" the skeleton of the Caucasian landscape, the nerve of its inhabitants' flesh and blood: "This little continent between the Black Sea and the Caspian, with its many legends, is unique alike in its landscape, its history, and its ethnology, and richly repays the interest that has always been shown in it. The prime object of interest is a pre-history handed down in the form of myths, although the heroic resistance of the Caucasians to the Russian conquerors in the last century has also found its way into the consciousness of Europe, thanks to Russian romantic literature. And the overwhelming magnificence of the scenery in "Prince of the Earth," as Lermontov called the Caucasus, where he was three times exiled, carried with a sort of a thrill an echo in the hearts of expressed Europeans. But all this is of secondary importance compared with the generally admitted significance of the Caucasus in the pre-history of the human race. The strongest and most deeply rooted associations of present-day educated people with the Caucasus have not so much to do with the names of the heroes of freedom sung by Pushkin and Tolstoi as with the legendary primordial epoch of a much more distant past. Now they cling to the rugged precipices of Elbruz, where Prometheus in chains suffered the penalty of his revolt against the gods, now to the Armenian peak Ararat, which alone, according to the Biblical legend stood out above the all-destroying Flood and served as a refuge for Noah's ark, with all its human and animals' lives, saved for the sake of a distant future. The Amazons, too, who roused the interest of antiquity, are generally supposed to have had their home in the Caucasus. The scientific exploration of the Caucasus, dating only from recent decades and now pursued with great energy, especially the study of its hitherto little known languages and peoples, has led to the most remarkable discoveries. Not only has the Caucasus been found to be the home of the Hellenic and Semitic legends which doubtless date back to the earliest times, including those which have found a place in the Bible in a form familiar to us, but these legends correspond exactly to very ancient traditions which we can trace on into a late post-Christian period in the Caucasus. Moreover, the languages of the Caucasus, which were wholly unknown until recently, and have, for the most part, no written characters, throw startling light upon the origin of these legends. The Caucasian languages which, with the exception of Georgian, had never been studied until our own day, were regarded by European linguists as a separate group, but nothing much could be made out of them. The philologists' positive fear of tackling this awkward subject matter is quite understandable. For the Caucasus, with its countless small tribes living isolated in the mountain valleys, is an ethnographical chaos almost too complex for survey. The three Caucasian Federal Republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, together with the Northern Caucasus and the autonomous Regions contained in it, only designate with their names a small fraction of the peoples inhabiting them, and these are not all genuinely Caucasian, but Turkish, Semitic, and Indo-Germanic as well. All doctors and health authorities suggest regular examinations for with a mere handful of houses. A real Babel, therefore; for obvious reasons its scientific exploration awaited the coming of a scholar of Caucasian origin, N. Marr of Leningrad, who died recently. Marr called the genuine Caucasian languages Japhetic and so claimed for them the name of Noah's third son, since the names of the two other brothers, Shem and Ham, already designated two closely cognate linguistic groups, the Semitic and the Hamic. At first Marr assumed not only the lingual, but also the ethnographical, unity of the Caucasian peoples, and spoke accordingly of a Japhetic Caucasus inhabited by Japhetic peoples. Further scientific investigation of the Japhetic languages led to results which, on the one hand, give us fuller information about the question which mainly concerns us here, that of the significance of the Caucasus to Mediterranean culture, in other words, to human culture as a whole, but on the other hand conflict so sharply with deeply rooted beliefs and prejudices of Western European scholarship that we cannot be surprised to find that they are still almost unknown outside the borders of the Soviet Union, except to a few specialists. I will only observe in passing that there are said to be over-hasty conclusions among Marr's observations,
conclusions to which he was misled by the novelty of his subject matter; but we are concerned here only with his testimony regarding the significance of the peoples and languages of the Caucasus to Afro-Eurasian culture.

One result of Marr's investigations is, at any rate, firmly established. In the extreme west of Europe, in the Pyrenean peninsula, jammed in between Spain and France lives a little mountain people with a very ancient tradition, and, especially, with its own language and Japhetic literature, who speak these languages was discovered in the idiom of the Abkhazians, living along the east of the Black Sea, whom the Greeks called Abarks. Later an eastern branch of the Japhetic languages was discovered, and it was doubtless no accident that this, too, was a mound-building fragment of the race: the Vershiks on the Pamir Plateau in Central Asia. Thus a kinship of the Caucasian peoples, dating back to the earliest times, at least in the matter of language has been established with a western mountainine race, the Basques, and a Central Asian, the Vershiks. From thence Japhetic research extends to an ever wider horizon, and opens our eyes to chains of association startling in their novelty, and overstepping the limits of philology into the wider field of general history. Long before Marr, historians regarded it as an established fact that there was a civilization in the Mediterranean area before it was colonized by Indo-Europeans and Hamo-Semites. Even in the middle of the last century the question was raised of a race neither Indo-Germanic nor Hamo-Semitic, a mysterious "third ethnical element," of whose existence throughout Afro-Eurasia evidence was repeatedly found in new archeological discoveries. These discoveries, and many more cultural and ethnical facts, offered unanimous testimony of a pre-Hellenic and pre-Roman civilization which, as the basic stratum, continued its creative contribution to the formation of the Mediterranean civilization at a time when the Afro-Eurasian area had long been colonized by Indo-Europeans and Hamo-Semites. The area covered by this homogeneous, prehistoric culture turned out to include not only the Mediterranean lands, with all the islands and peninsulas of southern Europe, especially Cyprus and Crete, but also the whole of Hither Asia and Asia Minor.

Its representatives were peoples who have handed principally their names to us in the inscriptions and monuments which are still in part undeciphered. In Asia Minor they were called the Phrygians, Lycians, and Kasites, in Palestine the Philistines, in Spain the Iberians, and in Italy and Greece the Etruscans and Pelasgians. The next deduction followed automatically. From the point of view of present-day Japhetic scholarship the Japhetic languages are not the speech of a particular type of mankind but rather the Japhetic tongue denotes a definite genetic kinship with the idioms of the modern, ancient, and archaic Caucasus, where they are spoken to this day by mountainine peoples who have remained isolated for thousands of years. In other words: there must have been a pre-historic period when there lived everywhere peoples with Japhetic languages, peoples whose territory became more and more restricted in the historic period, and was finally confined to the Caucasus, the Basque Pyrenees, and the Pamir. The Japhetic peoples who spoke these languages were not, as I have said, a particular race or type of mankind but rather the Japhetic tongues denote a definite, prehistoric stage in the development of language. Thus the extraordinary significance of the Japhetic languages of the Caucasus to present-day philology rests in the fact that in them primitive forms of speech structure long outgrown in our day, have survived. "The Japhetites have not broken away from the prehistoric basis in their speech structure," says Marr. That is to say: the pre-history of the human race survives in the Japhetic languages of that "linguistic microcosm, the Caucasus." At the beginning of the period of a few thousand years in which our written history is comprised, three ethnical elements lived in the Afro-Eurasian area: in addition to Indo-Europeans and Hamo-Semites the Japhetites, whose territory once embraced the whole civilized world, but now, at the opening of the historic era, had shrunk to the Caucasus and one or two mountain districts.

Thus the worldwide historic struggle of the West against the East represents not only, as Bachofen realized, the fight between patriarchy and matriarchy of the West, but also the fight of the West against an age that had overlaid with patriarchal peoples, Greeks and Romans, against the East, where matriarchy and the Japhetic remote antiquity were able to assert themselves much longer. In this sense, pre-history or the Japhetic phase of evolution and the matriarchal order must be interchangeable terms. In the pre-historic Japhetic West, too, inhabited by Iberians, Etruscans, and Pelasgians, matriarchy had prevailed. That is a fact placed beyond question by archaeological discoveries. It is most completely proved by the monuments of Cretan Mycenean culture, familiar to all students of the history of art. In the kingdom of Minos, in the area of Aegean culture, of which it has long been established that it was inhabited by that mysterious "primeval people, neither Semitic nor Indo-Germanic," women occupied a privileged position. Without regarding the results of research into the institution of matriarchy, H. Th. Bossert sums up the relations of the sexes as follows, basing his account solely upon archaeological discoveries (Alt-Kreta): Women played such a predominant part in the life of those times as never again, perhaps, in the whole course of the thousands of years that we can trace historically. One is really disposed to rate the part played by women in public and private life in those days so high that it even found expression in artistic style.... All images of the gods, in so far as they represented human beings, are female figures. Women dedicate themselves to the cult of the god. Everywhere women meet men on an equal footing. Not only in their own special sphere. They share joy and danger with men. They go hunting alone and fight wild beasts. And if external enemies were not reserved for men, the picture presented would lack nothing of that found in the legend of the Amazons. What is here stated about ancient Crete is true of the whole area of Japhetic civilization, or, as we should rather say, of the whole Japhetic historical period, the pre-historic era in which Mediterranean civilization took its rise; and so, likewise, of the Caucasus where, as we shall see, relics of matriarchy still survive to the present day. The heroic resistance of the Caucasian mountain tribes to Tsarist colonization, sung by Russian poets, lends immortality to the unique character of Caucasian history, where the highlands have from the earliest times provided a natural defence for the mountain tribes against alien invaders. For the coastal strip along the seashore near Derbent has always been the gate through which Asia has invaded Europe, and even Alexander the Great is said to have reached Derbent. A new element entered into the resistance to the Russian advance in that it was no longer the struggle of separate tribes, but a real war of freedom. But the love of freedom of the small mountain tribes, the Abaks and Cherkesses, was not sufficient for such an undertaking. It called for a vigour not to be found among the fragmentary Japhetic tribes, such as only an Islamized Caucasian could raise. Only so can we explain how it came about that the subjection of the Caucasus was not completed till 1864 although its partial conquest began in the early years of the previous century, and even before that; or that the two principal Islamic sects, the Shiites and Sunnites, united, and that the rising, led from the outset by the Imams, or priests, found a leader in the person of the Caucasian national hero, Shamil. He was a man whose personal courage, and whose ability as agitator, politician, and tactician, were beyond question. Nevertheless, it is difficult to join without reserve in the fervent hero-worship with which the Caucasus still regards the fierce and towering grandeur of his person. His coming, and the after all hopeless struggle that he carried on, contributed much to complete the process by which the basic stratum in the Caucasus was buried beneath the later Islamic strata. After his defeat the Cherkesses, Abaks, and other mountain peoples began to emigrate in hundreds of thousands to European Turkey and Asia, and this process, encouraged and sometimes forced by the Russian conquerors, resulted in the downfall of whole peoples. A chain of burial mounds stretches to the shores of the Black Sea, beneath which slumber Cherkesses who
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died on their way to Turkey, especially women. The colonization which began in the sixties was rather calculated to disfigure the noble aspect of the "Prince of the Earth," to uproot a living fragment of pre-history. What remained, and how that remnant influenced the position of women until the coming of the Soviets, will be discussed in another chapter. [-]

46064. Helsinki Watch; Human Rights Watch. "Turkish Violations of the Human Rights of the Greek Community", in Denying Human Rights & Ethnic Identity. The Greeks of Turkey. New York: Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch, March 1992. pp. 11-26. Greeks in Turkey continue to suffer human rights abuses. Human rights abuses include: degrading treatment and harassment by police, which is characterized by Greeks as 'systematic treatment'; limits to free expression, including censorship of the two Greek language newspapers in Istanbul, and the banning of imports of Greek language newspapers and books; denial of equality and right to control Greek schools (Greek school population has declined quickly; in 1923 there were 15000 pupils in Greek schools; in 1964, some 5000; in 1978 some 1147; in 1980 some 816; in 1992-1992 some 410), including efforts to prevent Greek children from learning Greek; limitations on religious freedom; restrictions on the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate; clontunion closed of the Halki School of Theology (the major Greek Orthodox Church institution for training priests); religious discrimination (including prevention of Greek priests from entering Greek schools); limiting the rights of charitable institutions (such as preventing elections to boards of the councils of Greek institutions and schools); and systematic denial of ethnic identity.

46065. Helsinki Watch; Human Rights Watch. "Recommendations", in Denying Human Rights & Ethnic Identity. The Greeks of Turkey. New York: Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch, March 1992. pp. 41-42. Helsinki Watch recommends that: Greeks be granted all civil and political rights enjoyed by other Turks; Greeks have freedom of expression and access to media from Greece; Turkey end degrading treatment of Greeks; accord the Greek minority educational freedom; grant freedom of religion to Greeks (reform from interevening in the Patriarchateandreopent the Halki School of Theology); and grant the Greeks rights to operate charitable institutions. Helsinki Watch recommends that the US pressure Turkey, since it provides significant military and economic aid to Turkey ($700 million in FY1992). [TEXT]

46066. Helsinki Watch; Human Rights Watch. "Appendix B: Foreign Service Dispatch 132: Damage Caused To Greek Orthodox Community Establishments During The 9/6/1955 Riots, Part 3", in Denying Human Rights & Ethnic Identity. The Greeks of Turkey. New York: Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch, March 1992. Extensive damage also seems to have been suffered by the educational establishments of the Greek community. At least 36 of the 48 schools of the community are reported to have been more or less seriously damaged. The principal victims are the Zappaion Girls College at Takeim and the Megoli Scholi Boys College of Panar, the Theological school at Heybili, and the high schools at Haskdy, Edeine Kapu, Bekeriy, Galata, Takeim and Aphasvutkyd. The elaborate dispensary of the Takrim High School and invisible. They are the women of a fourth world nation--Kurdistan, a country which has no political existence in the modern world because there was never room for independence among the claims of Arab, Turkish, and Persian nationalism. Kurdish women, tucked away in some of the most inaccessible mountain terrain in the Middle East, are beyond the westernization programs of the governments which control their territory. Modern Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish family laws such as those which have abolished or limited the practice of polygamy have no meaning for these women. They continue to live according to ancient tribal and religious (Islamic) law. If their very clothes are a threat to the faraway men who want to rule them, they are also a comfort to the men who really do rule them, much closer to home. When I lived in Urmieh, a city in northwest Iran, I spent a long time looking for Kurdish women. I could see them well enough on the street and bustling through the marketplace in bunches--they were always in bunches--but I could not meet them, could not talk with them,


[Bishop] Gennadios Arabatzoglou (age 80); place: Yenikoy: manner of death: Beaten, died of injuries.

[Priest] Name unknown; place: Edirenkapi; manner of death: Disappeared.

[Priest] Name unknown; place: Chalke; manner of death: Found dead.

[Church caretaker] Erpapazoglu; place: Pasa Bahci; manner of death: Was killed inside church which was dynamited.

[Caretaker] Name unknown: Anadoluhisar; manner of death: Was killed at the shrine there.

Abraham Anavas (age 65); place: "Moton" Store; manner of death: Was killed in store.

Olga Kimiades (age 77); manner of death: Beaten, died of heart attack.

Thanassiss Misir oglou: place: Hatzopoulos Passage; manner of death: Was killed at his store.

Hebe Giolma (age 16); place: Stegi Bragazenon Korasidon; manner of death: Was abducted, raped, killed.

Name unknown; place: Yeni Cami area; manner of death: Person described as "disrespectful Greek" by Turkish newspaper was lynched by mob.

Iasa Uludag: place: Besiktas; manner of death: Died at the school in which he was a caretaker in the fire set by the mob (Ulu dag was one of those who had changed his Greek name).

Theopoula Papadopoulos; place: Uskudar; manner of death: raped, killed (reported in a speech by MP Alexandros Hatzopoulos in Turkish parliament).

Giannis Bal Kissis; place: Bakirky; manner of death: Found dead in Street. [-]

46068. Kahn, Margaret; Peoples Translation Service [trans.]. "Behind the Invisible Veil", in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 2, October 1, 1981. pp. 4-5. Kurds in Turkey are both the most and the least visible women in the Middle East. From a distance, in the bazaars and towns of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq and Syria, and the USSR, Kurdish women stand out like exotic butterflies. Their rainbow-colored satins, velvets and brocades are famous among their Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Armenian neighbors, many of whom have opted for relatively drab western dress. In Turkey, Kurdish clothing has been effectively outlawed. Yet, the women go on wearing what they can--bits and pieces of the old finery.
could not find out the first thing about their lives.

After much effort I met some Kurdish men. I expected soon after to be introduced to Kurdish women, but the men put me off by saying, unaccountably, that they did not know any Kurdish women. (This from men with two, even three wives.) One male acquaintance promised, "I will try to find an educated woman for you to talk with," even though I protested that any woman would do. Later I discovered that there were very few educated women, since in the villages it is considered shameful to send a daughter to school.

After great perseverance I did meet the women, en masse. They were gathered in the upstairs sitting room of the house of the sheikh to whom they belonged. It took me a while to understand that at least four were married to the same man. On the first day I traveled, a little breathlessly, through the front door, up the stairs, through another door, and into the small room where they rose, clothes rustling to greet me.

These were some of the most protected women I have ever seen. Even their clothes are a kind of fortress. Needless of the day's temperature, they may wear two floor-length overdresses of nonabsorbent synthetic material, several more underdresses of the same, a slip, long pantaloons, and a headcovering. They travel and live in groups, both for the sake of their reputation (a life and death matter) and because they are used to it. They dislike being alone. A Kurdish friend used to call me up every morning and inquire about my health.

"How are you?" she would carol in throaty Kurdish. And then because there was no one else to ask after--no mother or mother-in-law, no sisters or sisters-in-law, no aunts, or cousins--she would ask, "How is your cat? And your cat's doll?" She and the other women piloted my relatively solitary state. To them the fact that I was married offered little consolation since in Kurdish women socialize only with other women.

Once I had met the group, I kept trying to separate them into individuals. As an American, I was used to dealing with people one at a time. For me, at first, there were disconcertingly many faces. I thought I would never learn their language if I had to sit there day after day with ten pairs of ears trained on my every utterance. But asking Kurdish women to meet me individually was asking them to violate every rule they knew.

The birth of a girl in Kurdistan is, in general, a less auspicious event than the birth of a boy. The reasons for this are rooted in basic aspects of the culture and economy. One concrete reason for a Kurdish mother to wish for a son rather than a daughter is the general knowledge that only a son will add to the long-term wealth and power of her household. A son can manage the land and the her. A son can bring brides to serve his mother. A daughter can bring only a bride price, which officially belongs to the father. Although in some dialects of Kurdish this is called sheer baha, literally "milk money," it goes not to the real provider of that milk but to the head of the household. Kurdish women have good reasons to keep their daughters at arms length. If the daughter is married to a tyrant or her husband's village is far enough away (in some cases over national borders) her mother may never see her again. Perhaps it is this knowledge, that a daughter absolutely ceases to be a daughter once she is a wife, that enables Kurdish mothers to accept to hideous marriages for their daughters. During the time I spent in Kurdistan I saw a 15 year old married off to an old deaf man with two other wives. Another woman, who at 18 had been given to a man older than her own father (and consequently unable to have children) said she would never forgive her mother for the role she had played in the decision.

Kurdish girls tend to be dressed like little boys until they are between the ages of seven and ten. At first they may be required to wear only headscarves. Then they are dressed in diminutive versions of the entire woman's outfit--and are thus too encumbered to participate in childish games with boys. At this point serious responsibilities begin. While boys may go off to school in the village or even in faraway towns where they live quite independently, girls are assigned to care for groups of the youngest children in the extended family. Daughters are expected to cook and clean, to tend gardens and milk animals, to serve men and guests. However, not even daughters work as hard as daughters-in-law, who are the outsiders, brought, not so much by the husband for his pleasure, but by the mother for the maintenance of her household. Daughters-in-law, who are called brides even after ten years of marriage, are the true workhorses of Kurdish villages. The two brides of a wealthy village family I knew went around daily with glum expressions and complaints of headaches. Both, before marriage, had been high spirited girls with a different attitude toward life.

Once I asked an important Kurdish sheikh why he did not send one of his younger daughters to the dentist since she had a toothache. He just shrugged. The answer was the same for why she did not attend school with other daughters. This sheikh, who had never attended school himself, was eager for his sons to go to college. But the expectation for his girls was quite different. Kurds understand that their sons must be equipped to function in the rapidly modernizing outside world. Thus, the people I knew saw nothing odd in betrothing a graduate in engineering from Imperial College in London to an illiterate girl who had never been out of her village for more than a week at a time. The fact that they were cousins and of equal social status was far more important than common interests or experience.

Kurdish women's lives are intimately tied to the welfare of the extended family. While men may disappear for years at a time, away at school, in the army, or just wandering or smuggling or fighting in a Kurdish liberation movement, the women are always in the village, carrying on. Marriage customs are particularly revealing about the true state of things. Kurdish girls speculate endlessly about marriage. They are tired of having to keep their reputations unsullied to a degree Americans would find hard to believe. But marriage very often does not bring the relief they imagine. If everything goes properly, a Kurdish bride does not see her husband before the actual wedding night. If she lives in a different village, the groom's kinsmen will come to fetch her. Her own family will stay at home weeping after she is gone. She will then be brought alone to the new village, led into a special room, and left to wait until the festivities hosted by the groom's family are over. Afterwards she will be led to her husband's bed; proof of her dewlooring is expected to follow soon.

She is not supposed to see her own family for a full year after the wedding and after that she may visit only with her husband's permission. Her life consists of two eras. The first is her childhood and early adolescence in her father's house or, if her father has one more than one wife and can afford it, her mother's house. The second era is with her husband and female in-laws. Faced with an incredible workload and the depressing knowledge that, barring unforeseen disasters, all the possibilities are now played out, many Kurdish women look back nostalgically on their girlhoods.

The degree of sameness, the lack of opportunity or variety, in a Kurdish women's life is hard for women in the West to appreciate. I had difficulty at first, sitting hour after hour in the village, in understanding why I felt so bored and oppressed. The women received me eagerly when I came. I was an extraordinary diversion. Every word I uttered was remembered and repeated. There was little else to break the monotony. When I could not stand it any more I would go over to the other side of the wall and speak with the men. They would talk to me on any subject--news from abroad, the state of the economy, the pilgrimages they had made to Mecca--anything except of the state of their women.

"Tell me about the time you and your first wife eloped," I asked the important sheikh. His wife, an old woman now, had just been recounting the story to me in the harem. The sheikh turned pale. His fifth and most recent wife was in her early twenties and currently pregnant, while the eldest wife, who had borne him only girls, must have seemed like part of a previous life.

"I cannot speak of such things," he said to me sternly.

I went back to the harem and the women continued their storytelling, half giggling in embarrassment and fear that perhaps the sheikh would hear them talking so openly about how they had been married.

"I didn't like the sheikh at all when I was married to him" the third wife revealed shyly, but refused to say more.

Later, we all went to the house of the second wife where I passed the microphone of my tape recorder around the room. A woman servant seized the opportunity to talk of how her husband had just taken a second wife. Her openly expressed bitterness shocked the other women and they
tried to shut her up.

Another time, on a return visit to Kurdistan, the same sheikh was trying to take a sixth wife, a clear violation of Islamic law and a serious threat to the welfare of his already numerous children. His eldest sons threatened to kill him if he went ahead with his plans. Yet, during a stay of two weeks only one person told me what was really going on—the daughter who would never forgive her mother for marrying her to an old man.

The Kurdish women I knew were very proud of their Kurdishness, a pride represented superficially by the clothes and on a much deeper level by a political outspokenness unmatched by anyone else I met in Iran, including Kurdish males. Some of these women recited outlawed Kurdish verse on holidays. Others were treasure stores of tribal wisdom, links in the chain of stories handed down from generation to generation.

Sometimes I think back to the day when I was sitting among those women who were faced with a husband, a father, a brother, or uncle who wanted to take a sixth wife. "He is not a real sheikh," one of the women muttered, but then I did not understand what they were talking about. The other complaints to me had always been about much less serious matters. What did I know of their sorrows and joys? I was a foreigner. A woman in a time machine.

"You are almost a Kurd," they told me as I was leaving Kurdistan after my first stay there. It was a great compliment.

But, when I returned for a visit three years after that, still childless, my teeth and skin intact, wearing jeans, and insisting on climbing a mountain with a group of men, despite the women's attempts to dissuade me, I understood better. I might become a Kurd, if I learned to aim a gun, to love the mountains, and to speak their language, but I could never, never be a Kurdish woman.


How do international norms, recommendations and rules get “translated” into domestic political culture at the national level? Are they automatically implemented, are they transformed in the process of implementation, or are they not heeded at all? What sorts of domestic political conflicts result? These questions have not yet received the attention they deserve. The international relations literature has often treated states as “black boxes”, leaving the domestic politics of compliance aside. What has not been significantly explored is the interaction between the international norms and rules on the one hand, and the particular domestic setting of the country on the other. I will argue that international norms and rules may be very influential in prompting policy changes in a particular country, but whether or not these policy changes are more than words on paper depends upon relationships between state and society.

A certain level of international pressure and the desire to avoid embarrassment in an international arena may prompt state representatives to go along with decisions taken at international conferences. For example, Tekeli (1990) found that the more links a state has to international organizations that are sensitive to women’s equality, the more progressive policies on women it tends to devise. International organizations, though, still cannot enforce compliance. According to Oran Young (1989, p. 371), the lack of well-entrenched and properly financed supranational organizations in international society ensures that international regimes must rely heavily on the ability and willingness of individual members to elicit compliance with key provisions within their own jurisdictions. Young (1989, p. 371) goes on to say: “While trade restrictions are hard enough to verify and police, it is not easy even to imagine how to implement a regime requiring the individual members to take concrete steps to control the forces causing habituation within their jurisdictions. To propose that states make changes regarding women’s roles and status creates deeper problems than just verification and policing because issue areas that propose changes in the relationship between national states and its subjects are especially sensitive. (Krasner 1985, p. 118). As Krasner (1985, p. 11 8) points out, prevailing international norms and practices place few restrictions on a state’s discretionary control over its own subjects. My interests in this paper are the norms and rules regarding women that are formulated at the international level and the extent of compliance with these norms by national governments. I will use the Turkish response to these norms as a case study to illustrate my arguments. [=]

46070. Kardam, Nuket. International Norms, the Turkish State and Women: Part 02: International Agenda on Women and the Turkish Response. G.E. von Grunebaum Center Working Paper 5. Pamphlet. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 1991. pp. 3-6. The International Women’s Movement succeeded in bringing women on the agenda, as witnessed by the conferences held under UN auspices since the 1970’s, and by the many women’s units set up within international development agencies and within governments (Kardam, 1991 and Staudt, 1990). The nature of the International Women’s Movement is reformist. As Jacques (1981, p. 8f) indicates: While UN women’s conferences, and their mix of liberals, socialists, NIEO advocates, and others spent considerable time identifying and debating the source of women’s subordination, from male prejudice to international capitalism, their solutions are limited to practical, incremental bureaucratic reform and women’s pressure activity.” The essence of the women in international development (WID) approach was defined as ascertaining what women actually want and do within a society and providing them with the opportunities, skills, and resources to enhance that participation. The WID strategy rests on creating more rational and even-handed planning which takes into account the sex division of labor, fair returns for labor, and the equitable infusion of new opportunities and resources to all members of a given community (Staudt 1985, p. 43). The ambiguous nature of demands such as more equitable development for women exemplifies this approach; yet, it is this reformist strategy that also made it possible for governments with different ideological orientations to agree to sign the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women at the UN Conference in 1985.

In order to assure the implementation of the “Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women” (adopted at the UN Nairobi Conference in 1985) at the national level, one of the recommendations stipulated that governments set up appropriate units to deal with women’s affairs. Appropriate machinery with sufficient resources and authority should be established at the highest level of government as a focal point to ensure that the full range of development policies and programmes in all sectors recognizes women’s contribution to development and incorporates strategies to include women and to ensure that they receive an equitable share of the benefits of development” (UN 1986, p. 33). What does this mean at the national levels Alvarez (1990, p. 274) points out that in the past, international feminist solidarity successfully brought pressure to bear on the international development establishment, indirectly pushing Third World states to open up some political space, however minimal, for the articulation of progressive gender discourses and policies. However, as the following account of the Turkish response to the stipulation will show, there is no way to understand what this means without an analysis of how gender discourses play out in the relationship between state and society. The demand for “more equitable development for women” is devoid of meaning unless it is made clear what it means
for particular people and why it is defined this way.

The Turkish government introduced a bill to set up a Directorate for Women's Status and Problems in 4/1990, publicly proclaimed to be a response to and in accordance with the Nairobi Conference recommendations. In the Turkish case, the interpretation of "equitable development for women" provoked fierce battles among groups and organizations competing for social control. Women's issues had not been so fiercely disputed since the 1930s when Mustafa Kemal Attaturk established hegemony over the gender discourse in Turkey. Why is it that in the 1980s and 1990s, the seemingly innocent bill to set up a unit for women's affairs within the government created such a furor? In order to understand these events, it is necessary to link international events with the domestic context and place gender discourses within the context of state-society relations.

Before we probe these issues further, it is useful to define what is meant by the state. I will adopt the definition of the state found in Michael Bratton's work (1989): "The state is an organization within the society where it coexists and interacts with other formal and informal organizations from families to economic enterprises or religious organizations. It is, however, distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding the other organizations activities". Third World states, as Migdal (1988, p. 27) points out, struggle to achieve certain goals: "the central political and social drama of recent history has been the battle pitting the state and organizations allied with it (often from a particular social class) against other social organizations dotting society's landscape. Within this context, those who make the rules acquire social control. In relatively new states, rules of the game are not necessarily agreed upon. State elites try to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and do so with varying degrees of success. For example, the seemingly inconsequential conflict in Mustafa Kemal's Turkey over the proper hat for men was in fact about who had the right and ability (religious elites or bureaucratic elites) to make rules. State leaders do not necessarily achieve predominance for the state. The most subtle and fascinating patterns of political change and political inertia have resulted from the accommodation between states and other powerful organizations in society. Such accommodating could not have been predicted using existing models and theories of macro-level social and political change." What this perspective suggests is that political life is not simply a struggle over the allocation of resources, or the competition of interest groups, but also over the rules of the game and the underlying ideology.

The best way to understand the nature and extent of the Turkish response to the Nairobi recommendation then, is to perceive it as a battle over the rules of gender discourse between the Turkish state and society. This perspective illuminates the political discourse more effectively than do the other two prevailing approaches in comparative politics. Liberal development theory lacks the historical context, while neo-Marxist analyses, because of their focus on classes, obscure the battle over rules of the game that cut across class distinctions. [4]

46071. Kardam, Nuket. International Norms, the Turkish State and Women: Part 03: State-Society Relations. G.E. von Grunebaum Center Working Paper 5. Pamphlet. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 1991. pp. 6-8. Alvarez (1990, p. 22) suggests that rules over women's status and behavior form part of the structural and ideological grid upon which state power is based. Cagatay and Soysal (1990, p. 302) contend that those groups vying for political power offer different gender policies than the ruling groups; this is one of the major ways opposing groups distinguish themselves from the discourse of the rulers. The Turkish case illustrates both theoretical points well. From its establishment in the 1920s up to the 1980s, the Turkish state controlled the rules over what women could and could not do, and this hegemony formed one important basis of the newly formed Turkish state's power. The Turkish Civil Code outlawed polygamy, gave equal rights of divorce to both partners, and permitted child custody rights for both parents in 1926. In 1934, women were granted the vote and could be elected to political office. These policies were devised to achieve international acceptance of Turkey as a "modern" or "Western state, as well as to achieve domestic control over previously central religious elites that represented Ottoman-Islamic influences (Tekeli, 1981). As a result of the state's control over the gender discourse, and the its claim of having bestowed upon women their rights, women's organizations in the 1930s were closed, claiming that there were no meaningful demands women would make on the state since the state had already given women their rights.

The hegemony of the Turkish state over the gender discourse was not absolute however. The rights given to women were implemented across the board, and benefitted mostly the elite women. The Turkish state ignored instances of polygamy practiced by clan leaders and landowners, and the continuing high number of marriages only by religious ceremony (The law required a civil marriage ceremony in order for a marriage to be legitimate). When the secular, bureaucratic state elites had difficulty penetrating society to achieve compliance, participation, and legitimation of new gender rules, they struck a bargain with local strongmen, what Migdal (1988, p. 32) calls, a "hands-off policy that allowed the strongmen to build enclaves of social control."

While the bureaucratic elites were capable of striking a bargain with the religious elites, they were less interested in engaging in any dialogue with women's groups in society. In fact, up until the late 1970s and 1980s the women's groups in society followed Attaturk's interpretation of gender issues and expressed gratitude to the secular state for having granted them their rights. A number of reasons are cited to explain the lack of independent women's movements in the Third World. These reasons, generally related to the nature of the Third World states and societies, holds true in the case of Turkey as well. (Cagatay and Soysal, 1990). It is suggested that Third World states favor nationalist ideologies that reject class, gender and ethnic divisions, and espouse some version of unity or a "classless society where everyone works for the common good." Studies from many parts of the Third World show newly independent Third World states have co-opted emerging women's movements for the above reasons, and also as a means of dismantling the old order. (Massell 1974 and Molyneux 1981).

Bratton (1989, p. 429), writing in the state-society tradition, tells us that the conflict arises when a movement or organization tries to engage the state in a political space the state elites have already occupied and intend to hold. Since the 1980s, it has been clear that the Turkish bureaucratic secular elites are no longer able to dictate the terms of the gender discourse. They share power with elites who support religious conservatism, and who have openly begun to redefine the gender discourse along their values and beliefs. This is far beyond just allowing clansmen to build their own enclaves of social control, but an open challenge to the previously accepted definition of gender roles. Meanwhile, women's groups of various ideological persuasions have proliferated and become more vociferous. In short, in the 1980s, a rising women's movement (composed of liberal, radical, and socialist feminist orientations), as well as a strengthening of the position of religious elites, brought women's issues back on the national agenda and started questioning the legitimacy and the adaptability to modern times of "state feminism" as conceived by Mustafa Kemal Attaturk. [5]
leftist ideologies were repressed, and as Marxist women became convinced that a revolution was not likely to bring about gender equality, they turned to socialist feminism. Others argue that when all political parties were closed and all groups that were perceived to be politically active were disbanded and their leaders taken into custody, space for political debate on hitherto unexplored issues opened up. It is also possible that political suppression raised the importance of informal groups to meet and discuss their issues. When Turkey returned to democracy in 1982, the new government, headed by Turgut Ozal did not feel threatened by the emerging women’s movement, partly because it allowed the government to see itself as democratic, partly because the government did not attach much importance to a few women speaking out on women’s rights, and also because the women’s groups themselves did not challenge state authority and, in fact, preferred to have minimal interaction with the state.

What were the strategies and activities of the Turkish Women’s Movement? Alvarez (1990) writes that women’s movements are deliberate attempts to push, redefine, and reconstitute the boundary between political and personal, and between natural and artificial. The movement began pushing women’s issues beyond Kemalist feminism. I use Kemalist feminism and state feminism interchangeably to mean the gender philosophy and policy established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern Turkey. Tekeli (1990) suggests that one of the first strategies of women movements is to change discriminatory laws. Turkish feminists, even though they did not attempt to claim political power themselves, did try to influence government policy. Two of the civil code items that were recently revised as a direct result of feminine pressure group activity now grant women the right to work without the permission of their husbands, and give equal punishment for rape, regardless of whether or not the victim is a prostitute. Besides activities to amend discriminatory civil codes, 6000 signatures were collected and presented to the parliament demanding the implementation of the UN Declaration of Women’s Rights which Turkey had officially signed. This declaration bound its signatories to accord citizens equal rights regardless of sex. Other activities of a number of women’s groups have ranged from the publication of books, newspapers and journals, to setting up organizations such as the Association for Discrimination Against Women, The Women’s Library and Information Center Foundation, a Women’s Culture House, ‘The Mor Cat (Purple Roof)’ Foundation which assists battered women and ‘Kadinlevre’ (The Women’s Circle), a service and consultant company whose function was to evaluate the work of women, paid or unpaid, outside or within the home, to campaigns and marches to protest against battering and abuse of women, against forced virginity tests for female civil servants, and against the sexual harassment of women on the streets (Sirman, 1989). It must be emphasized that while these activities were carried out for the most part in urban areas by educated, privileged women, all of these activities were extensions of the older, more simple, gender agenda set from above through pressure “from below”.

The gender discourse that previously lay dormant now ranged from socialist feminism and radical feminism, to the proponents of the “female sphere ideology who have been called “the turbaned feminists” by the popular press. These groups differed in their ideologies, as well as their relationships with the state. Even more important, they were groups of women, not male bureaucrats who spoke on behalf of women. Their differing perceptions of gender equality is a good way to discern their varying discourses. Socialist feminists argued gender equality would come with a socialist order accompanied by the dismantling of patriarchal practices, while radical feminists draw attention to how traditions and culture perpetuated the patriarchy and relegated all women to the position of second class citizens. The “turbaned feminists” maintain that women are already equal to men albeit in their separate sphere. They argue that capitalist development with its accompanying corrupting influence have worsened the situation of women by burdening them with both waged work and housework, and by turning them into commodities. Finally, the discourse of the Kemalist feminists emphasizes the maintenance of secularism and the upholding of the rights that Attaturk gave women against the onslaught of religious conservatism.

For Tekeli (1990, pp. 7-24), this wide ideological range of the gender discourse reflects the tremendous social changes Turkey has undergone in the 1980s. According to Tekeli, a civil society has grown and matured in Turkey so that neither the state nor the civil society is predominant anymore. This is the result of the tremendous socioeconomic changes Turkey has undergone in the last decade. Urbanization has advanced to the point where half the population now lives in urban areas. Those who work in the agricultural sector are now equal in number to the workers in the industrial and service sectors. Turkish society has become more complex and at the same time, paradoxes abound. ‘Yuppies’ and tribe members rub shoulders on the streets; the influence of westernization and integration of Turkey into the world market economy clash with the need to maintain Islamic traditions; and returning immigrant workers from Europe inevitably change Turkish society as they make their reentry. According to Sirman (1989), the 1980s is a period marked by new attempts to define and regulate the social order in Turkey through efforts to redefine modes of legitimate participation within the political domain. She continues to suggest: in the process, the very identity of the individual as a Turkish citizen was being carved into question. This search for new conceptions of democracy and individuality was (and still is) a process that involved all sections of the political spectrum and is indeed conducive to the creation of new forms of political participation. This search for ‘democracy’ can perhaps best be understood as producing a new balance between the drive toward modernization and individual aspirations for social mobility that will not be unduly disruptive of the social fabric. That such a search also includes a search for female identity has been noted by many observers.

The state elites themselves compete in proposing different discourses on women. The liberal wing of the government promotes a liberal free market economy and believes that the position of women will improve as economic development proceeds. According to this discourse, women should be given equal opportunity to achieve economic independence. The main opposition party, on the other hand, believes that equal opportunity is not sufficient, and that women need to be given special attention, such as in the form of affirmative action quotas in order to remove discrimination against them. This party also proposed a ministry for women’s affairs. Meanwhile, the conservative wing of the government has introduced a discourse called “The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”. This discourse, uncomfortable with the changes occurring in Turkish society, tries to hang on to disappearing institutions and values such as the extended family and fatalism. They claim that “industrialization, urbanization, and interaction with other cultures have harmed the Turkish family. (Ciccek, 1990, pp. 7-24). Women working outside the home have contributed to the disintegration of the family. Women are not considered separately but are called upon to reclaim their domestic roles and rebuild the traditional family. The state minister, Cemel Cecik, one of the leaders of the conservative movement, claimed feminism to be one of the major obstacles to the formation of the Turkish-Islamic family, along with the increase in premarital relations, moral degeneration caused by increased communication, and industrialism and tourism in Turkey. (Arat, 1990).

Given this wide range of discourses on women that already existed in Turkish society, how was the introduction made in the Parliament to set up a Directorate of Women’s Status and Problems in accordance with the Nairobi Conference? The following account shows that it highlighted both existing disputes and the lack of genuine communication between the state and groups within society. At the same time, the events that followed the introduction of the bill make it clear that Turkish state society relations have taken on a much more complex and open character, as compared to 50 years ago. [=]
issue as reflected in the number of public meetings, announcements and newspaper articles has been extraordinary. The revised bill finally became law on 10/15/1990, after a number of changes and an 8-hour debate in the National Assembly.

Before the analysis of the response to this bill, let me point out what it proposed to do. This bill would establish a directorate under the auspices of the prime ministry that would define the status of women in social and economic life and offer solutions to what are regarded as women’s problems. The directorate will work “to increase women’s level of education, to increase their economic participation in agricultural, industrial, and service sectors, to increase women’s security in the health, social and legal arena, to improve women’s status and to establish their deserved status as equals in social, economic, cultural and political arenas” (The Turkish Official Gazette, 4/20/1990).

Introduced by the only woman on the cabinet, İmren Aykut, then Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, it reflects the Nairobi recommendations as well as the liberal, free-market philosophy of the Özal government. Aykut, as a member of the liberal wing of the cabinet, believes in the preservation of Kemalist feminism and believes that increased opportunities for women and their integration into the development process will serve the general goal of a free-market oriented economic growth. The following points on the bill bear witness to this view: the Economic and Social Affairs Unit of the Directorate has the responsibility to a) make sure that women participate in all decision mechanisms so that they may be integrated into social life and contribute to development b) increase employment opportunities for women to ensure economic independence c) ensure women’s training and education so that they may compete for jobs in a free market economy and d) consider women in all social, economic and political decisions so that they may be fully integrated into the development process. The above arguments are the same ones made in international forums to change the norms and principles governing women’s role in developing societies.

Liberal feminism conforms to the ideals of a free market economy and political arenas” (The Turkish Official Gazette, 4/20/1990). The opposition to the bill did not stem from the general content of the bill (even though questions were raised about the ambitious nature of the goals), but rather from the use of certain words that evoked religious conservatism, and procedures that implied control of rather than cooperation with women’s groups. The items listed below were strongly criticized by women’s groups and opposition parties (The Turkish official Gazette, 10/15/1990):

- To promote cooperation and coordination among institutions who work in the area of women’s affairs, to regulate and support the activities of independent women’s associations, to observe all activities of local administrations related to women.
- To engage in appropriate activities to protect women’s status, and to prepare principles, policies and programs to solve women’s problems.
- To acquire knowledge on the activities and research of the women’s studies units of universities.
- To direct the activities of voluntary women’s associations in accordance with the national viewpoint to be formulated.

Women’s groups protested the bill’s intent to regulate the activities of women’s associations. As the English language newspaper, Dateline observed: “Several women’s associations, among them the Turkish Women Lawyers’ Association, the Association for the Promotion of Contemporary Life, the Istanbul University Center for Research into Women’s Problems, the Turkish Women’s Union, the Soroptimist Clubs Federation, and the Turkish Women’s Council issued a press release in which they objected to the decree in its present form and proposed amendments. The women’s associations objected to what Gultekin Batik, Chairwoman of the Turkish Women’s Union (Istanbul Branch) called the government’s intention to control the activities of the independent women’s associations. (Dateline, 10/15/1990).

University professors protested the bill’s intent to acquire information about all activities and research on women, claiming that this is a violation of their academic freedom.

The phrase “national viewpoint” that appears on the bill created even more outcry. In Turkey, “national viewpoint” connotes a conservative perspective as it was a slogan used by a rightist, religious party, and it is widely known to represent a conservative, religious perspective. This slogan, coupled with the public knowledge that Mehmet Keceri, one of the conservative state ministers on the cabinet, was involved in the drafting of the bill raised doubts about its liberal goals. Meanwhile, State Minister, Cemil Cevik contributed to the furor by publicly declaring the following (Dateline, 11/17/1990): “Flirting is nothing different from prostitution. Flirting, and pre-marital relationships are human beings’ rapprochement with animal instincts. According to law 41 of the Constitution, the Turkish family structure is to be preserved. This was not just a natural obligation after 1982, as it became a social obligation...Industrialism, urbanization and interaction with other cultures brought along social changes. It was the family which was harmed by these changes. We are an old nation, a family nation. At first, the family was confronted by mass communication. Satellites enabled us to watch the world’s television programs. A lot of tourists visit Turkey, and they have a certain influence on the Turkish people which is hardly positive. Family values change. Instead of taking the developments of science and technology, we are imitating the degenerated values of the West.”

Women’s groups have vehemently objected to these claims. One of the leaders called Cicek’s views “unacceptable”. She said: “They are trying to put women behind bars. There are human rights in Turkey with equality of women and men.” A member of the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Populist Party, claimed: It is useless to try to revive the model of traditional Moslem Turkish women; it is like making rivers flow upstream (Dateline, 11/17/1990): What does national viewpoint mean? As I understand it, national viewpoint has been articulated by Erbakan for 20 years [Erbakan is the leader of the religious conservative party], is this Erbakan’s national viewpoint? If it is not, since it represents a particular political party’s perspective, what is it? Does national viewpoint mean the traditional Turkish family structure where women sit at home, do not work and look after their children? Whose national viewpoint is this?

While the bill to set up a directorate articulated liberal solutions to women’s problems, conservative policies on women were being voiced by the same government. For example, a report of the Commission on the Turkish Family Structure, prepared as a reference document for the Sixth Five Year Development Plan indicates that (The Turkish Family Structure, 1989): “Turkish television should emphasize national programs. In music, literature, and folklore, the Turkish culture should be promoted and a Moslem-Turkish personality should be created.” According to this report, the Turkish family structure has been disintegrating as a result of rapid cultural changes and the roles of men and women in the family have begun to change. However, the report continues, in the Moslem-Turkish family, the father has a sacred role and women are reverred as mothers. This report implies that the disintegration of the Turkish family structure is partly due to women working outside the home and proposed ways for women to work in cottage industries in the home. One of the conservative state ministers, Cemil Cicek, heads the new Family Research Institute, established in 1989 and has been entrusted with formulating a national policy on the family.

The discussions revolving around the bill culminated in a revised version which became law on 10/15/1990 (The Turkish Official Gazette, 10/28/1990). The following revisions regarding the responsibilities of the Directorate were made:

1. Instead of “To engage in appropriate activities to protect women’s status and to prepare principles, policies and programs to solve women’s problems,” the revised version reads: “To engage in appropriate activities to protect and improve women’s status and to prepare principles, policies and programs in accordance with Atatürk’s reforms”.

2. Instead of “To acquire knowledge on the activities and research of women’s units in universities, the revised version reads: “To use the
research and publications produced by women's units in universities.

3. Instead of To direct the activities of voluntary women's associations in accordance with the national viewpoint to be formulated, the revised version is: "To provide information to voluntary women's associations who are members of international organizations on national values as reflected in Atatürk's principles and reforms.

4. Instead of "To promote cooperation and coordination among institutions in the area of women's affairs, to regulate and support the activities of independent women's associations, to observe all activities of local administrations related to women", the revised version is: "To promote cooperation and coordination among institutions who work in the area of women's affairs, to request information from them, to support the activities of independent women's organizations and to observe all activities of local administrations related to women".

The revisions respond to most criticisms by giving up the phrase regulating women's organizations and national viewpoint and guarantees adherence to Atatürk's gender discourse calming the fears of Kemalist feminists that their rights are in jeopardy. The unit is no longer called a directorate but was set up under the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare as a department. It is now structurally located within a state ministry headed by the previous Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, presumably because she is the only woman on the cabinet. At this time, it is too early to evaluate this unit's effectiveness; however, the process that led to its establishment yields some important insights about domestic compliance with international norms. [=]

46074. Kardam, Nuket. International Norms, the Turkish State and Women: Part 06: Conclusions. G.E. von Grunebaum Center Working Paper 5. Pamphlet Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, April 1991. pp. 19-23. In the 1930s, the implementation of gender policy by a secular bureaucratic elite that brought Turkish women a Western woman's status served not only as a demonstration to the international community that Turkey was becoming a "Western" nation, but also to establish control of gender role definitions within Turkish society. The wish of the state elites to appear "modern" to the international community coincided with their wish to define gender roles in their own terms (as one way to establish dominance over society). In one sense, what we see in the 1980s and 1990s is rather similar: A bill to set up a women's bureau is prepared to impress the international community and to show that Turkey abides by the international norms on women, but the vague statement of norms; that women receive an equitable share of development necessary to elicit international agreement, also leave both the content and the process of implementation open to discussion. Given the nature of state society relations in Turkey in the 1980s, the Turkish state could no longer pass a bill quietly to abide by international pressure. Furthermore, the Turkish state no longer could impose one gender discourse on Turkish society because different gender discourses were being discussed and debated with no overall agreement in sight.

This dispute has to be analyzed and understood within the context of the 1980's Turkey. Competing state elites voiced contradictory gender discourses. More importantly, within the same government, one sees contradictory gender discourses. The liberal wing promotes the integration of women into a liberal capitalist economy and, therefore there is an interest in preserving Atatürk's gender policies. The conservative wing, on the other hand, espouses patriarchal policies, and women's return to the home, in an attempt to roll back the impending change that accompanies capitalist development. Meanwhile, Turkish society has become much more complex: varied, and democratically oriented. Although a women's movement has arisen, different feminist groups are at odds with each other; moreover, they are distrustful and fearful of the state and especially of the potential move away from secularism.

Given this context, it is not hard to imagine how the introduction of a bill ostensibly to implement an international recommendation could serve as a lightning rod and become the focal point of the battle between secularism and religious conservatism that had been brewing for a long time. The introduction of the bill also highlighted the complexity of civil society and the growth of disparate voices within society. Finally, it showed the narrowed but still present chasm between the Turkish state and society that at times prevents communication. In the case of gender issues, state and society relations still require time to achieve genuine communication and interaction.

The original version of the bill didn't help to build trust between the state and women's groups because the top-down approach that permeated the bill reflected an attitude that is used to deliver services to goods, to regulate and support the activities of independent women's associations, to observe all activities of local administrations related to women. Notwithstanding the fact that the bill was introduced by the only woman minister on the Turkish cabinet, Imren Aykut, a self-professed Kemalist feminist, and alleged to be on the liberal wing of the Turkish cabinet, it was ironic and unfortunate that it was opposed by most women's groups. Even though she personally had been popular, her government has not. (Only 20% of the people claim they will vote for ANAP in the coming elections.) The increasing influence of the conservative wing in her government grew fear and suspicion that she alone would not be able to withstand the increased influence of the conservative wing of her government. Furthermore, some women would presumably find unacceptable whatever policy she introduces because they happen to support other political parties. All these arguments contributed to the opposition to the bill whose professed public raison d'être was to implement the recommendations of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies.

The presumed power or the religious conservatives in government, along with a lack of clear lines of communication between the government and women's groups moved the debate away from the bill itself into the much larger debate of secularism versus religious conservatism. The docile and quiet associations of women professionals were threatened by the wording of the bill that promised to "regulate" independent women's associations, in accordance with a "national viewpoint" which was yet to be formulated. This was especially true given the increasing influence of the conservative Wing of ANAP on government policy and in the light of the activities and public statements of the newly established "Family Research Institute" headed by Cemil Cicek, a conservative minister. The reports by the Family Research Institute alarmed most women's groups because they claimed that the Turkish family is disintegrating and becoming corrupt as a result of Western influences and as a result of women's employment outside the home. Many professional women's associations were motivated to protest the bill establishing a women's directorate partly because they realized that the rights given to them by Atatürk could no longer be taken for granted, and partly because of pressure on them to act exerted by socialist and radical feminists. They joined hands with these feminists to protest discriminatory civil codes and the barring of women and allied themselves with leftist opposition parties who promised to preserve secularism but are still not open to the democratic participation of women within their own ranks. Meanwhile, radical and socialist feminists remain distrustful of the state, preferring to work within the society to change cultural norms and practices that discriminate against women.

In short, the bill to implement the Nairobi recommendations in Turkey illustrated what compliance with international norms really means in a specific domestic context. On the surface, Turkey set up a women's unit within the government, but what does this really mean? Perhaps, compliance should not be understood in strict terms, but in the way international norms spark, provoke and change domestic debate in a particular issue area. The Turkish bill provoked and fueled the discussion of appropriate gender roles, as well as appropriate relations between the state and groups in society and highlighted that a great deal of disagreement exists regarding these issues. Looking at the Turkish case, it is apparent that the nature and extent of compliance with international norms and recommendations cannot be understood without an analysis of the existing debates in a country against the background of state-society relationships. [=]
would have cost millions of dollars to repair). Television, the institution authorized to check TVs and radios) for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant (there the safety concerns raised by Lambda Istanbul, we protest RTUK (High Committee of Radio and Television) for disregarding them.

Refused psychiatric counselling after raising safety concerns at the nuclear power plant, Kerber, Ross. "Was Therapy Used To Punish Nuclear Workers? A Nuclear Plant Engineer Who Raised Safety Issues and Was Subsequently Ordered To Undergo Psychological Testing Said, 'In Certain Societies, Psychiatry Is Used To Curb Dissent; I Think This Is What Is Occurring Here'" in Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1996, p. B1. B9. When security engineer Glenda Kay Miller questioned the reliability of a proposed security system at TVA's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant near Decatur, Alabama, she was sent to company psychologists. After confrontational interrogations by company psychologists, she was fired as 'unfit for duty' and was portrayed as a 'terrorist'. Her complaint is pending.

The week is planned to include the following: An Igbo film festival (Possibly at Beyoglu and Alkazar cinemas on Istiklal Caddesi, Taksim, Istanbul); Seminars and panels; Gay/lesbian sections in bookstores around Istiklal Caddesi, Taksim; AIDS stands, delivery of condoms and lubricants; Sale of posters, badges, t-shirts, etc.; A dance party for the benefit of AIDS prevention; A weekend excursion into the countryside.

Contact address: Ekspres GL, Tarlabasi Bulvari 60, Taksim, Istanbul. Tel/Fax: +90 (212) 256-1150. Meet organizers at the bar 5. Kat, BILSAK, Taksim Ilkyardim Hastanesi, karsisi, Istanbul, Tel: +90 (212) 293-3774. [=]

Lambda Istanbul. Press Release: Lambda Istanbul Organization Description & Contact. Lambda Istanbul Homepage, N.D. Lambda Istanbul is a liberal group for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people in Turkey. It has a stable membership of around 100.

Lambda, Istanbul is the largest queer liberation group in Turkey. It was formed by a small number of gays and lesbians as a result of a police ban on Christopher Street Day celebrations in 1993. Since then, Lambda, Istanbul has grown in membership and aims to raise its voice on behalf of the gay communities in Istanbul.

Homosexuality is not a criminal offence in Turkey, but some articles of the highly flexible police regulations can be used very easily to ban meetings and demonstrations on so-called public morality grounds. In 1995 and 1996 Lambda, Istanbul planned activity weeks which would have included gay and lesbian themed films, panels discussions, and exhibitions. On both occasions, they were banned by the police and the Governor of Istanbul, who claimed they were against public morals. The organizing committee was advised by police not to make any further attempts as the Turkish society was not yet ready for the visibility of homosexuality!

Despite this pressure and opposition, we are still carrying out our projects:

Our eighth issue of our bi-monthly magazine is out in 6/1997, it is available in alternative bookstores in Istanbul and in Ankara.

We are on air with a weekly one hour GL radio program on Acik Radio since May 1996. It is the first GL program in Turkey's history and has enabled us to reach a greater number of people.

In collaboration with the AIDS Prevention Society in Turkey we have prepared the first Safe Sex brochure addressing gay men. The current objective of the AIDS Prevention subgroup of the group is to increase the availability of water-based lubricants as well as safe condoms. A safe sex hot-line project is in process as well.

Despite the serious work we do, we are all volunteers, who come together determined to keep on working against our society's prejudices, homophobia and Turkey's anti-democratic law and regulations.

You can contact Lambda Istanbul at: PK 103 Goztepe, Istanbul Turkey, Fax: +90 212 224-3792 (Talk first to ask for connection to fax). [=]

Lambda Istanbul. Press Release: Turkish Parliament Outed. Lambda Istanbul (P K 103, Goztepe, Istanbul TURKEY), December, 1996. On the November 7th, it was announced that gay members of Turkish parliament would be declared on a TV channel called "Kanal 6". Although gay deputies were not individually outed, it was claimed that parliament has gay members.

After this declaration "Kanal 6"'s broadcast was suspended for 24 hours. The reason was that claiming the parliament has gay members was declared as an insult to the Parliament of Turkish Republic.

The issue is that the word "homosexual" is taken as an insult. As Lambda Istanbul, we protest RTUK (High Committee of Radio and Television, the institution authorized to check TV's and radios) for the...
decision. And we invite all the gays around the world to protest this humiliating action. Fax number of RTUK is 90-312-2320474 and its president is Ali Baransel.

Thank you for all your support. [Lambda.Istanbul, P.K 103, Goztepe, Istanbul TURKEY.] [=]

46080. Lambda Istanbul. Press Release: UPDATE: Report by Lambda Istanbul, on Ulker Sokak, Lambda Istanbul (P.K 103, Goztepe, Istanbul TURKEY), December 18, 1996. The harassment and the pressure against the transvestite (TS) and transexual (TV) community has always been present in Turkey, but for the last 12 months the intensity and the frequency of it has been increasing.

A 65-year old woman has moved to the Ulker Street a year ago, called Ms. Gungor (Guengoer), has been provoking all actions against TV/TS community. She has big support from the police and extremist right wing party members or organizations; radical Islamists and Nationalists.

For the couple of first months she was very friendly to and with the girls who have been living in the area for more than 20 years. She has bought some flats for very cheap prices and rented them to the girls with the normal rates. After a while she started to demand enormous amounts like increasing the rents from 20 million to 100 million TL. The girls refused to pay these rates as it is stated in the contract law that the owners are only permitted to increase the rent 60% maximum. This is the point where everything started to go down for the girls.

She has initiated a campaign of “cleaning operation”. She with her neighbours placed a desk to the street with patrols in charge to control the area day and night. She covered her head to gain support from extremist Islamists and from their organizations. She was not satisfied with the results. A few months ago she started a campaign of labelling called “Hang a Turkish Flag if you are not homosexual”. She aimed to gain support from the extremist Nationalists and she did. The organizations called “Ulku (Uelkue) Oçakları”, the youth branches of extremist right wing party MHP, took part on her side. They joined the harassment process with the premise that the homosexuals are not excepted as Turkish. They don’t belong to the race since they represent a lower form of human beings. This was told to a university student who was making a market research for an assignment.

One of the biggest support came from Mr. Suleyman (Suyeleym) Ulusoy who was chief of the Beyoglu Police Department until 1991. He came back to duty just before UN Human Settlement Conference, Habitat II. Not only he fights against homosexuals but against street children, street peddlers and gypsies as well.

Before the above mentioned conference, the police warned the TV/TS community to leave the conference area. Mr. Demet Demir and other TV/TS started several petitions but couldn’t get any response neither. Moreover, another four houses has been set on fire since, in another district of Beyoglu, but nobody applied for any legal action since they were scared and they knew through the previous example that their attempts would have been futile even if they had tried. İlhami Kaya is another TV who lives in the street who has a similar experience in which the windows of her house smashed down with stones thrown. Ms. Demet Demir’s front door has been broken for 3 times and the telephone cables were cut to prevent her from informing the solicitors and/or the press.

At this point I feel the urge to state that homosexuality is not illegal in Turkey. There is no law in force in the constitution against homosexual acts. On the other hand, torture is illegal. The current situation is ironically ridiculous when these points are highlighted. Though this is the case, Ms. Demet Demir got a criminal record which states illegal demonstration. She stayed in the jail for 8 months. After 10 years all criminal records are normally deleted. Her record still exists after 14 years to everybody’s surprise.

The police are breaking the doors with hammers and axes, forcing their way in to the houses to cause the most damage that they can. At times if they find occupancy in the house they take the person to the station to keep them under detention. A person can be kept under detention only for 48 hours the most. The police’s practical solution for this is to transfer the person to another station so that they can keep somebody for more than a week if they want to do so. The police raid the houses and the clubs to arrest. You show your ID but it is not sufficient enough. There are lots of means to an arrest in Turkey and the police forces are well prepared to teach you these means.

TV/TS community are continuously accused of prostitution and raping young boys. They are seen as potential criminals. In the year 1994 and 1995, just before the World AIDS Day the clubs were raided to bash the TV/TSs since they are believed to be the cause for AIDS. This is a very vicious cycle. Since they are seen as potential danger, criminal and always as immoral they are forced out of the society. They don’t have any means to live properly. They end up on the streets as prostitutes as this is the only thing they are permitted. If they can do this it means that there is demand as well. Then everybody becomes ethical activists when it is time to blame them, but they never talk about whom they slept with the night before.

The current situation is that the TV/TS community in this area is reduced to 7 from 70. They are left with only one solution as a consequence: to move. The clean water supplier on the street was closed down with the reason that it didn’t have any license. You start to ask how it was permitted in the first place then. The newsagent was closed down with threats as well. The hair-dresser was closed down because it was, allegedly, used as a whorehouse. All these closing downs were done by the local council of Beyoglu. Any clever person can not deny the question: “Were these places closed down because they were serving to the TV/TS community living in the area?”.

Everything that is going on around the street has to be done in secret as a result. For example, during Habitat Conference a foreign TV channel was having an interview with Ms. Demet Demir in her house. It is at this point the police broke into her house. The reporter hid the tapes and cameras otherwise they would have been taken away. Police was so determined to take them to the station but couldn’t have done it because Mr. Turgul Erbaydar from AIDS Prevention Society told this group of policemen that they were having a meeting about AIDS.

In the beginning of December one of the transexuals named Ece was beaten up by the police because she couldn’t manage to be secret enough. Although she has a house in the street she can not live there. She comes in secret to feed her dog. The last time her neighbour heard her coming and phoned the police. She was caught in her apartment. She was beaten up first in the street and then in the police station. She was beaten up so badly that her legs was bruised even after a week.

Mr. Suleyman Ulusoy has a nickname which is “Hose Suleyman”. He likes to beat, especially to the head, with plastic hose pipes and this is where his nickname comes from. There are several files in the Human Rights Association regarding these tortures. Cutting the hair, pumping pressurized cold water, beating bulllocks are the most common of these tortures in the police stations.[=]
important as it is that woman should be emancipated from her status as man’s “property”, with such possessions as she has legally the property of the man she marries—as in France to-day—important as are Marriage Bills for easier divorce, and a more rational attitude to marriage—generally, important as are all these things which are obtainable within the existing system, certain vital aspects of women’s freedom are only possible in the classless society which is the socialist ideal. Reforms of one kind or another may do much to make marriage easier and happier, but woman’s real need is for moral revolution in the society in which she lives, and you cannot get oral revolution by reformist methods; to achieve that the whole of the existing form of society must be smashed and something new fashioned nearer to the heart’s desire. The existing moral code is part and parcel of the social system, that is to say, it is determined by the controlling forces of religion, education, and economic factors. Moral training comes to us via the Church and the School; one of the first things social revolution throws overboard is religious tyranny—as in the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Spanish revolution of 1936—and a new interpretation is given to education, consistent with the new demands and ideals of the new society. The Great War, as we have seen, represented something in the nature of a moral revolution as far as women were concerned, so that not merely were they given the freedom of commerce, industry, the professions, for the first time, but something approaching sexual freedom which had hitherto been a male prerogative. We have seen, too, the freedom given women by the undermining of the power of the Church in the French Revolution and by the defiance of religious edicts in Turkey, when Mustafa Kemal separated religion and education, and “unveiled” the women. We have seen how the moral as well as the social emancipation of women has marched side by side with revolutionary movements in Ireland, China, India, Palestine. Especially in the case of Russia and Spain—both backward countries—has this moral emancipation been noticeable as a direct outcome of the Revolution, the new dignity and sense of responsibility, and of a place in society co-equal with man; in Spain freedom from the power of the priests might be said to have given women a new lease of life, restored, as it were, their souls into their own keeping. Moral freedom—in the broadest sense—is always only possible when human beings are freed from the tyranny of religious orthodoxy.

The teachings of Christ and what to-day passes or Christianity—and which is in fact Paulianity—are not all the same thing; Christ preached Life, Love, Kindness, Forgiveness, toleration of human failings; what we call Christianity, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant or any other brand, is anti-life; it preaches fear, and intolerance, and hate. (Are not the clergy the first to support the imperialist wars of their own countries as right and just?) One of Christ’s friends was a prostitute, and he consorted with publicans and sinners, and chose his disciples from humble working-folk. What to-day passes for Christianity frowns upon sex except as a means of reproduction, is puritanical about the pleasures of the flesh, and patronizes the poor. It teaches human beings to be ashamed of their bodies (supposed to be made in God’s image) and to regard sexual relations as something shameful and unclean; it demands that before men and women obey their natural impulses towards each other they take out a licence permitting them to sleep together; this licence is called a marriage certificate, and costs the same as a dog licence and rather less than a radio licence. And having insisted that Christian men and women shall refrain from sexual relations until they have obtained a marriage certificate, so that their sleeping together is sanctioned by both the Law and the Church, they make masturbation, the natural substitute for the sex act, a sin, filling human beings with fear and a torturing shame concerning it, whilst homosexuality is made a criminal offence. Men and women are required to marry without having the slightest idea as to whether they will suit each other either physically or spiritually—how is it possible to have any idea as to whether without having lived together first, to get to know each other’s bodies and minds and human habits? It is like buying a pair of shoes without trying them on, but whereas with a pair of shoes that pinch you can take them back to the shop and exchange them for something more comfortable, the Church demands that having taken on a marriage partner in the same way, you must keep to your bargain, and if there is any “pinch” you must put up with it, even though it may in the end destroy your body and cripple your soul. Men and women who cannot find permanent partners are expected to live celibately, for sex without marriage is a “sin”, a deadly sin. Better human beings should become neurotic and grow sour and bitter and perverted through frustration than that they should contravene the law of the “Christian” church. Christianity is not concerned with human beings being happy, only with them being “good”—that is to say, conforming to the anti-life edicts of Christ. The same applies to divorce. It never occurs to your orthodox Christian that if human beings can be made happy they will be good, and that this applies to grown-ups and children alike.

So Christian marriage is as pitiless as only stupidity can be; the Roman Catholic Church does not permit of divorce at all, under any circumstances (a husband may be physically cruel to his wife, may give her venereal disease, be consistently unfaithful to her, be a lunatic, but the Roman Catholicwife is expected to remain tied to him for life, however much happiness with someone else may beckon to her; she is not free to marry someone who would make her happy, and to live with him or have relations with him without marriage is a “sin”), and the rest of Christianity tolerates a clumsy and stupid machinery of divorce, regarding as immoral the idea of divorce by mutual consent. In Christian divorce to-day there must always be one unwilling party; if both partners agree that a divorce would be a good thing, that constitutes “connivance” and cannot be tolerated. In England after a divorce has been granted the person who sued for the divorce is required to live celibately for six months, however ardently he or she may be in love with someone whom, perhaps, it is intended to marry as soon as the decree is made “absolute”. Any lapse from this half a year of unnatural existence is sufficient to cause the divorce to be cancelled. Until the passing of Mr. A. P. Herbert’s new divorce bill (1937) to which Lord Drogheda added the clause enabling a petitioner to secure a divorce for three years of desertion, one person deserting another for a period of years, though it rendered the marriage null and void, was not considered to do so, and was not grounds for divorce—unless something called, unpleasantly, “restitution of conjugal rights” was sued for and failed to bring back the errant partner. The very idea of conjugal “rights” is an indictment of the existing marriage system, and again, the deserted partner of a marriage may not want these “rights” restored; such a thing might well be the last thing in the world he or she desires, all that is wanted being the solution of the unhappy marriage. But Christian morality seeks to make divorce as difficult as possible, and frowns upon divorcees; have we not just seen the attitude of the bishops to a king who dared to assert himself as a man and insist on marrying the woman of his choice, who happened to have been married previously; we have seen how the Church brought pressure to bear on the abdication of that king, and how, having forced him out of office, they denied him the Church’s blessing on his new marriage, though with more courage and imaginative sympathy and tolerance than his fellows defied the authority of the Church and in defiance of the bishops performed the marriage service. A. S. Neill, the great educationist and psychologist, says that the Devil is “the obverse side of the God coin; he is God made human—and lovable.... The glad side of life belongs to the devil—the dancing, singing love side of life. Christianity in its perversion of Christ’s message has changed God into the devil.... Calvinism worships the Devil, only it calls him God”. [In: Is Scotland Educated? (Routledge, 1936).]

At the end of the nineteenth century, the great American free-thinker, Robert Green Ingersoll, wrote “A Thanksgiving Sermon” in which, before thanking those who have enriched the world, he inquires, “What has the Church done?” He denounced it as being opposed to “the pleasures of sense, the ecstasies of love”, as making women slaves to their husbands, the property of their husbands, as teaching that “a nun is purer, nobler than a mother”, as inducing “millions of pure and conscientious girls to renounce the joys of life, to take the veil woven of night and death, to wear the habiliments of the dead”, in the belief that they were the brides of Christ, “a man who had been dead for eighteen hundred years”. He sums the so-called Christians up as “loving with their mouths, and hating with their hearts”. [This is collected in a selection of the Lectures and Essays, published by Watts and Co., 1913.]

It is upon this hate—hated of the flesh and glorification of the spirit—that
the Church establishes its moral code. What chance of freedom can there be within such a code, anti-life, rooted in fear and hate? The Roman Catholic Church even forbids women birth-control, giving them no choice between more pregnancies than they can physically and very often economically support, and an abnormal life of continence, which can only be productive of nerve-strain, ill-health, neurosis, and unhappiness, for themselves and their husbands, and strike at the very foundations of married happiness. Apart from its restrictions on human freedom and happiness in the lives of individuals, the Church has always been bound up with political intrigue, associated with the ambitions of princes and the horrors of war, and right up to the present day and the Abcication of Edward VIII we have seen its power. Social revolution does not demand that those who wish to worship an orthodox God in the orthodox way, in the Church, shall not be allowed to do so (all over Russia to-day churches which still "function", as the Russians say, are to be found, and people worshipping in them without interference) but of its very nature it does not permit of "the Church", as an institution, with power in State affairs and authority to dictate a moral code. When the moral dictatorship of the Church is abolished, as always in social revolution, and as it will be in the revolution to come, consider the vast contribution that will be made to human freedom and happiness, especially where women are concerned! Nor let that fine word freedom be confused with licence. No revolutionist advocates anything as stupid and unsatisfactory as sexual promiscuity for its own sake, nor is there any reason to suppose that human beings are so depraved that when sexual intercourse outside of marriage is no longer regarded as immoral, fastidiousness, restraint, and fidelity, will promptly cease to exist. It is a common belief that morals are very "loose" in the USSR since there are no moral taboos on "illicit" love; in actual fact sexual promiscuity is frowned upon, and always has been. In a conversation with the late Klara Zetkin, Lenin disposed of the sex-as-simple-and-unimportant-as-drinking-a-glass-of-water theory as "completely un-Marxist, and moreover, anti-social". He insisted that in love two lives are concerned, and that a third arises, and that it "is that which gives it its social interest, which gives rise to a duty towards the community". He had no patience with sexual preoccupation, and regarded dissoluteness in sexual life as bourgeois, decadent, as "a phenomenon of decay", and all such questions of morality, marriage, sexual relationships, the family, as an integral part of the woman question. He protested against "the decay, the corruption, the filth in bourgeois marriage, with its difficult divorce, its freedom for the man, its enslavement for the woman", and declared that "the repulsive hypocrisy of sexual morality and relations fills the most active-minded and best people with deep disgust". [Reminiscences of Lenin, by Klara Zetkin (Modern Books, Ltd., 1929).] [s]

46082. Marcus, Amy Dockser. "Palestinian Workers Pushed Aside In Israel By Asians and Europeans", in Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1995. p. A17. Closing the border of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to exclude Palestinians from their workplaces has led Israel to find replacements in Thailand, Ghana, Turkey and Rumania. Some 70000 temporary expatriate workers have been brought into Israel to create an apolitical workforce that can be deported at will and can permanently displace Palestinians from even the menial occupations to which they are restricted. Most of the foreign workers are men who arrive without relatives, and they have created slums and created a demand for prostitution; many have fallen prey to alcoholism, even as they are cheated out of their wages and are paid less than minimum wages. For Palestinians, this new Israeli measure has been a catastrophe, with 60% unemployment, $1 million per day in lost wages. Many Palestinians argue that the Israeli moves to destroy the Palestinian economy by bringing in the expatriates will destroy any meaningful progress toward peace. Most Thai expatriate workers are eager for the work, and have no clear idea of where they are or the political context of their work.

46083. Massell, Gregory J. The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929: Part 05: Early Soviet Actions, 1924-1927: Toward a Strategy of Engineered Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. pp. 185-191. The complex set of justifications for mobilizing women as a Soviet revolutionary stratum in Central Asia was necessary both to justify the unorthodox methods to the broader Soviet policy-making community, as well as to justify what was, in the eyes of traditional Central Asian patriarchal-feudal society, the most illegitimate possible course of social reforms. It was this environment that led the Soviet leaders in Central Asia to adopt a policy of social insurgency in the region in order to extend the effective power of the central government from urban hubs to the vast rural hinterlands. This extreme policy was seen necessary to implement a "psychological and organizational revolution at the nerve centers or a relatively intact social order."

Soviet social engineering developed three methods of implementation: 'revolutionary legalism' (revoluzionnoia zakonnost), 'administrative assault' (administrativnyi naskos), and "systematic social engineering" (sistematscheskaia rabota, 'systematic work'). Revolutionary legalism relied on the superimposition of a new judicial system for the routinization of revolutionary norms in traditional society; supplanting traditional adjudicative institutions allowed the systematic application of revolutionary principles throughout a society (operating in the intermediate term, sought retention of power and incremental change, emphasized avoided risks, was normative, focused on the provision or rights, initiated social mobilization by legislation, expected basis of mass-response through adherence to rules, emphasized consolidation of commitment through prescription, and expected breakdown of the old order through reform). Administrative assault relied on the replacement of traditional institutions and involved massive, public and dramatic violations of traditional taboos (with women, induced mass unemployment and reinforced sexual desegregation on the streets) (operating in the short-term, sought cataclysmic revolutionary overturn, emphasizing immediate payoffs irrespective of risks, was dogmatic, focused on violation of traditional taboos, initiating social mobilization by command and conscription, expected basis of mass response through outrage and obedience, emphasized consolidation of commitment through conversion, and expected breakdown of the old order by destruction).

Systematic Social Engineering called for systematic evaluation, exploitation and coordination of diverse courses of action: legal, associational, cultural and economic, recognizing the short-comings of revolutionary legalism and administrative assault (operating in the long-term, sought institutionalized social revolution, emphasized balancing payoffs and risks, was instrumental, focused on redefinition of roles and opportunities, initiating social mobilization by involvement, expected basis of mass response through self-interest and achievement, emphasized consolidation of commitment through socialization, and expected breakdown of the old order by subversion and atrophy). Soviet policy developer Cera Azar developed a hesitant, trial-and-error progression from Revolutionary Legalism (1924-1928), to Administrative Assault (1927-1929), to Systematic Social Engineering (1929-present).

46084. Massell, Gregory J. The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929: Part 06: Early Soviet Actions, 1924-1927: Towards Radical Judicial Reform: The Pattern of Revolutionary Legalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 192-212. The Soviet program to displace Muslim adjudicative institutions was based on the desire to attain complete homogeneity of state legal and administrative mechanisms, and was based on the need to accelerate disintegration of traditional patriarchal structures by judicial activism implementing a strict legalistic consistency. Initially, the establishment of the new Soviet legal system was expected to necessarily impose new legal norms simply because they embodied the law. In 1925 the First Congress of the Uzbek People with deep disgust". [Reminiscences of Lenin, by Klara Zetkin (Modern Books, Ltd., 1929).] [s]
customary tribunals, and their replacement by Soviet secular, uniform, centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchical courts, (2) decreed abolition of religious and customary law (especially relating to personal status and family matters) and replacement with a secular, egalitarian, uniform and written code of statutory laws. In 1918-1927, traditional courts were progressively undercut by growing competition by Soviet courts, by reduction in budgets (budgets set at zero in late 1923 to early 1924), by influx of judicial personnel, and by delimitation and successive amputation of judicial jurisdiction (traditional courts losing right to levy fines in criminal cases in 1923; losing all jurisdiction in criminal cases in 2/1924; losing civil jurisdiction in cases above 25 rubles; and abolition of kalyam, polygamy and forced marriage in 10/1924). In 10/1926, a new code on domestic relations invalidated all religious authority in marriage, culminating the Soviet drive for a secular, uniform code of statutory laws in family, personal status and criminal matters that would both support revolutionary norms and that would be able to address ‘crimes based on custom’. Nevertheless, while the Uzbek criminal code of 7/1926 banned traditional forms of marriage, the Turkmen code merely granted kalyam payers the right to sue payees for return of the bride-price. In 4/1928, the unified code, ‘On Crimes Constituting the Relics of the Tribal Order’, was implemented as a special supplement (Chapter X) to the RSFSR Criminal Code; within months it would be adopted in all Central Asian republics; it prescribed customary forms of inter-tribal and inter-clan relations (blood-vengeance and blood-money), proscribed bride-price, child-marriage, force marriage, marriage by abduction, rape, polygamy, levirate and all forms of traditional compulsion of females. The premises of this revolutionary legalism were that: (1) there was a direct relationship between Soviet legalism and female emancipation in Central Asia; (2) divorce rights were linked to revolutionary consciousness; and (3) female emancipation was necessary for radical socio-cultural change. 46086. Masaillides, Bobbies. “Coalition Government Collapses In Turkey”, in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), July 1, 1996, p. 3. The three-month-old coalition government of the Motherland and the True Path parties collapsed in Turkey June 6 after Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz resigned. Yilmaz stepped down in the face of a no-confidence motion put forward by Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah (Welfare) party, which is described in the big-business media as the party of “Islamic fundamentalism.” The minority capitalist coalition government was put together in March to keep Refah (RP) from power after the party came in first in December’s general election, capturing 158 of the total 550 seats in parliament. Both the Motherland Party (ANAP) and Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party (DYP) are posing as the defenders of secular Turkey. The fall of the bourgeois government in Turkey registered the crisis the rulers there face in their capacity to form a regime stable enough to impose further austerity measures on workers and farmers, and to continue their bloody war against Turkey’s Kurdish population. The insecurity felt by capitalist interests was registered by a sharp drop in Istanbul’s stock exchange. “The only news is bad news,” said Attila Yesilada of Global Securities. “But if we haven’t reached the bottom we are probably very close to it.” The Turkish lira fell to 78340 against the dollar while average annual inflation is running at nearly 60%. Since taking office, Yilmaz promised Turkey’s capitalist families, the International Monetary Fund and imperialist banks which are pushing to collect Turkey’s nearly $74 billion foreign debt, that his government will squeeze working people further. He announced a package of austerity measures that included steep tax increases, cuts in health care, and the raising of the retirement age to 65 years for men and 60 for women. He vowed to continue the privatization of state owned industries such as the Tupras oil refinery, the pharmaceutical company Pefkim, and Turkish Airlines. Half of Turkey’s manufacturing industry and 60% of its financial sector are owned by the state. Since modern Turkey emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman empire in the 1920’s, tobacco, oil, shipbuilding, and other industries became state monopolies, protected by high tariffs and import bars until the 1970’s. Austerity measures similar to those Yilmaz tried to push through, were attempted by previous governments, including the one of Ciller. These attacks faced widespread resentment among working people and provoked strike mobilizations that eventually led to the downfall of her government last October. On May Day, tens of thousands of working
people gathered at Kadikoy square in Istanbul to celebrate this international day of struggle and to protest Yilmaz’s austerity attacks. The protest, which was declared illegal by the government, was organized by the General Workers Federation Turk Is, the illegal Federation of Public Workers, the Revolutionary Workers Union Federation DISK, and the labor federation Hak Is, which politically looks to Refah. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is banned, also participated with its own banners. The police attacked the protest brutally, killing three people and wounding 45. The cops arrested some 220 unionists.

Turkey's capitalist rulers have also failed to stop the resistance of Kurds for their national rights, which is centered in the southeastern part of the country. This region is being ruled under “state of emergency” measures. Estimates of the Kurdish population range between about 20-20 million among the country’s 63 million people (no official census identifying Kurds is allowed). Poverty and the war by Turkey’s army have forced millions of Kurds from the countryside into the shantytowns around the big cities. Istanbul's population, for example, is growing by an estimated 400000 people per year, many of them Kurds. A report from the UN “Habitat Summit” held in Istanbul on June 6, said that “the migration has fostered a discontented and exploited population that is growing by the day in Turkey’s major cities.” This growing discontent among Turkey’s workers and peasants was registered in the growth of Erbakan's Welfare Party. In scattered local elections held on June 3, the Refah gained 33.5% of the vote in 41 local polls across Turkey. It increased the vote by 3.5% over what it received in the same districts in the December general elections at the expense of the ruling bourgeois coalition. The ANAP came in second with 21%, while the DYP trailed third with 12%. Refah has presented itself as the voice of the poor in the ghettos of the cities and the impoverished peasants in the countryside. Leaders of the party oppose imperialist intervention in Arab countries. They denounced the recent massive bombing of Lebanon by the Zionist regime in Israel. The party’s vice-president Abdullah Gul said on June 9 that an RP government would cancel the recent five-year military cooperation agreement between Israel and Turkey, which was backed by Washington. The government crisis was precipitated by charges of corruption brought against Ciller by Refah deputies. Motherland decided to support the corruption probes against its coalition partner. Ciller is accused of making millions for her personal coffers from sales of state-owned industries during the privatization campaign by her government. After the resignation of Yilmaz, Erbakan proclaimed victory. “By the end of June,” he said, “the RP will form a government that will receive a vote of confidence.” Erbakan called both ANAP and DYP to participate in his new government.

46087. Morden, Bettie J. The Women's Army Corps, 1945-1978: The End of the Draft and WAC Expansion: Expansion and Overseas Assignments. Army Historical Series. Center of Military History. United States Army. District of Columbia: GPO, 1990. p. 282-284. Another major challenge facing expansion planners was the need to increase the number of WACs overseas. In 6/1945, the WAC had 15908 women in overseas theaters. Though 17.5% of WAC strength, the number was only 3% of the total Army strength overseas of 4.9 million. In 1972, approximately 40% of all enlisted men and 8.6% of the enlisted women were serving overseas. The percentage of women overseas compared to total Army members overseas was still .3%. [Mattie E. Treadwell, The Women's Army Corps, US Army in WWII (District of Columbia: GPO, 1954), Appendix A, Table 7, p. 772; Strength of the Army Report (DCSPER 46), Part I. Strength by Type and Command, 6/30/1972.]

With the success of the WAC expansion, General Rogers wished to achieve a more equitable overseas ratio. Women should share with men the burden of performing overseas duty, and the number of assignments open to both could be increased. If women occupied the majority of positions in CONUS, whether in traditional or nontraditional MOSs, and were unable to serve overseas, the Army could not rotate women back to CONUS when they completed their foreign tours. Beginning in 1973, enlistment options under which men went directly overseas after much shorter tours. Because of this discrepancy and because of budget problems, the Army directed that effective 1/1/1976, single men, single women, and unaccompanied personnel would serve the same length of
overseas tour. When the Army's budget problems lessened in 1977, foreign service for all personnel was reduced to thirty-six months in long-tour areas (e.g., Europe, Japan), and twelve months in short-tour areas (e.g., Turkey and Korea). [DA Messages (DAPE-MPE-DR) 111755Z 3/1975, subject: Reduction of PCS Moves and Costs (DAPE-MPE-DR) 021805Z 1/1976, subject: Interim Change to AR 614-30, Overseas Service; and (DAPE-MPE-DR) 041314Z 11/1976, same subject. All in ODWAC Ref. File, Regulations, AR 614-30, OMG] [47]

46089. National Organisation of Women Students Australia. Press Release: Racism and Sexism: How To Fight Them. Australia: National Organisatition of Women Students Australia, July 5, 1994 Is there a connection between sexism and racism? What role, if any, should the women's movement play in the fight against racism? Questions such as these will be among the issues taken up at the National Organisation of Women Students Australia (NOWSA) conference, being held at Macquarie University in Sydney July 11-15, SUJATHA FERNANDES provides a contribution to the discussion. Racism has an economic function: it justifies the exploitation of a part of society on the basis of physical difference. This was obviously its role in connection with slavery in the United States. After slavery was abolished, the capitalist ruling class in the US still had a material interest in perpetuating racism, which maintains a layer of the working class whose super-exploitation boosts profits both directly and by putting a downward pressure on the wages of all workers. In Australia the Aboriginal population experiences institutionalised racism. Aborigines are the poorest section of the population, systematically denied access to education, employment and welfare. They make up an alarmingly high proportion of those in prison and under custodial care; they are targeted by the police and justice system, the most common "offences" being non-payment of fines, drunkenness, vagrancy and social security fraud. Institutionalised racism against Aboriginal people is part of the history of white Australia. Its function is to protect specific material interests, namely those of the capitalist class, who benefit from the appropriation and mining of the land stolen from the original inhabitants. Unlike black Americans and Maoris, Aboriginal people were initially excluded from the labour force. Later, although openly discriminatory laws were changed, racism remained to keep Aborigines deprived and excluded. Migrants in Australia often experience racism, but in a form different from that against Aborigines. For a number of historical reasons, migrants are not a homogenous group. They do not constitute a single super-exploited layer in society. The 1950s influx of migrants from southern Europe, Turkey and Lebanon provided the capitalist class with a cheap labour force at a time of large-scale infrastructure development and expansion of industry. By the 1970s, the migration pattern had changed, with many arriving from war-torn countries in South-East Asia. In both periods, this exploited labour force did not lead to the creation of a permanent under-class of migrants in the way that US capital created a black under-class. This was because the exploitation of migrants was not based primarily on physical differences, but rather on their lack of English. While Vietnamese refugees can be found in sweatshops and on factory floors along with migrants from eastern Europe, non-English speaking migrants tend to be concentrated in the lowest-paid jobs; English-speaking migrants are more commonly located in the higher paying professions. The cultural and linguistic barriers that provide the basis for the super-exploitation of migrants are overcome through the generations. Institutional barriers do not prevent second and third generation migrants, who have acquired language skills, from entering professions. The children of migrants, in other words, are native-born Australians. Aborigines, despite their tens of thousands of years in Australia, were not even legally citizens until the 1967 referendum. Racial prejudice against migrants of colour does not of course always provide a direct and immediate material benefit to someone. On arrival in Australia, many Indians and Japanese do not join the super-exploited layers of the workforce, yet they may still face some discrimination. Some interpret this prejudice as the product of another individual's ignorance. But such "personal" prejudice is a by-product of the institutionalised racism that serves material interests. If we are serious about fighting racism, we have to be willing to challenge the ruling class which uses it to divide people who have common interests. Similarly, in tackling sexism, we have to challenge the same system, which creates and perpetuates the structured inequality between men and women. The historical exclusion of women from education, the lack of publicly funded child-care facilities, which forces women to stay at home, and the systematic underpayment of women are examples of how discrimination against women is structured into the system. The historic role as the primary breadwinner and mother, capitalism profits enormously from women's unpaid social labour. Thus sexism, like racism, has a material base in the drive of capital to make super-profits. We need independent women's and anti-racist movements to challenge and change this situation. When women have organised themselves independently of the major political parties, they have been very successful in winning changes. Pressure from the second wave of the women's movement in the 1970s forced governments to introduce a range of legal reforms relating to women's wages, access to education and better employment opportunities. The Jobs For Women campaign which recently won its 14-year anti-discrimination battle against BHP shows that women organising in defence of their interests is essential for change. People of colour also have to organise together in anti-racism movements to bring about change. The mass black liberation movement in the US played a major role in raising consciousness about, and opposition to, racism. In Australia, Aboriginal people have been able to win reforms through their organisation in land rights and other movements. Focusing on personal prejudice within small groups, such as feminist collectives, does nothing to alter the power relations of society. Mass movements which challenge the structures and institutions of racism are the most effective way of breaking down the root cause of personal prejudice. It is only in this context that consciousness raising can occur on a large scale: people change their attitudes through action, not through being told how racist they are. Today, in the absence of anti-racist and women's movements, academic postmodernist theories have influenced much thinking about sexism and racism, persuading many people that mass action is irrelevant to political strategy. Postmodernists argue that the whole concept of a unified mass movement is "phallic" and "problematic". They say that solidarity and sisterhood are just another way of using "discourse" to "mask power relations", and that because women come from such different class and racial backgrounds there can be no solidarity. We need to reject romanticised ideas that seek to present all women as equally oppressed. However, we will not be able to defeat sexism and racism unless we do unite in a mass way to fight back. Sisterhood, as an expression of political solidarity, is something we can unite around. While the strength of the women's movement comes from its autonomy, this does not mean that it can fight sexism in isolation from other progressive movements. The strength of each movement for human liberation comes from other movements which also challenge the common enemy. This is the important connection between the women's, the anti-racist and the workers' movements. [=]

46089. Ozturk, Sedef; Yaras, Fusun; Kadin Cevresi; Peoples Translation Service [trans.], "Marriage: Turkey: Fathers, Imams and Ataturk", in Connexions, An International Women's Quarterly, n. 20, April 1, 1986, p. 28. [This article was written for Connexions in 2/1986 by Sedef Ozturk and Fusun Yaras, two members of Kadin Cevresi (Women's Circle), a women's group based in Istanbul, Turkey.]

When Aisha was born, her father barely hid his disappointment. Having a female child is like having no child at all. She grew up serving her family, especially her brothers, who had as much right over her as her father. She was 14 when her father started looking around for acceptable suitors. The man who had the means to raise enough money to buy her chastity would get her. When a prospective bridegroom was found, Aisha was seen and approved by him. She, however, was allowed to make only one glimpse of him.

The imam (religious officer) married them and that night she lost her well-protected virginity. Bedsheets stained with drops of blood were sent to the groom's parents the next day. Had she not been a virgin a fight would ensue. She then joined her family and entered her father-in-law's household. She bore seven children in 12 years. Her husband would say...
he had three children because only boys were worthy of that title.

Aisha and her husband toiled hard to keep the family alive. The work aged them quickly. And then came the day when her husband brought home a younger woman, a second wife. Aisha gave her consent, resentfully perhaps, but she gave it. (Hadn't the prophet allowed for four wives to each man?) She lived as her mother had done and saw to it, in her turn, that her daughters kept their virginity intact for their husbands.

And when Zeynap, her eldest daughter, was 14... Circle (Kadin Cevresi), in which women of different backgrounds with different notions of how to gain liberation have come together. We publish books, have a reader's club and organise weekly meetings and seminars.

Contact: Kadin Cevresi Yayinlari, Kloid Farer Cad. 45/36, Servet Han, Cagaloglu, Istanbul, Turkey. Further Reading: Sex Roles. Family and Community in Turkey, edited by Cizdem Kazictibai. Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1982. [Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.] [=]

46090. Peoples Translation Service [trans.], "Turkish Girl: 'Nobody Asks Me'", in Connexions. Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 2, October 1, 1981, p. 9. [Dilek is 16 years old. Six years ago she came to West Germany from Turkey. At the moment she is in the tenth grade in a West German school. She would like to stay in West Germany and learn a profession. The following is a translation of an excerpted interview from Courage's special issue on girls. Translated from Courage Sonderheft Madchen, No. 4, West German feministic publication, 1981.]

When I get out of school next year, I'll have to go to work; I don't know yet what kind of a job I'll be able to get. I would love to go to nursing school, but that's not possible because my grandmother, who lives in Turkey, doesn't want me to. My father wouldn't mind, but what my grandmother says, goes.

It's also possible that I wouldn't be able to get into nursing school because of my poor grades, and besides, they don't accept that many students. But I don't even have the chance to try. I'll have to work in a factory and do menial jobs. That's why I don't even feel like studying during this last year of school. What for? I don't pay attention in school any more. In the history classes—in one ear, out the other. I've become completely cold.

Of all the foreign women in West Germany, I think the Turkish girls are in the worst position. Their families watch them very strictly. They have to work hard at home, and they're never allowed to say anything. Whenever I want to tell my father the truth, I'm told: "Be quiet, you are stupid, and so little." My mother says: "Be quiet, don't talk back." I don't want to talk back, I just want to say the truth. They would like it best if I would not say anything at all.

After school I have to come home immediately to prepare the meals, wash the dishes, clean up, do housework. I'm never allowed to go out in the evening; that's completely impossible. During school vacation, I have to stay home all day. That's why I'm always glad when the vacation is over. At least then I can go to school.

Once a week I'm allowed to visit a German girlfriend, but only until four in the afternoon. If the others go for a hike, I'm not allowed to join them. Soon all the students will go on a field trip to the mountains. But not me. My father says I would only fuck. Ha! There are only three boys in my class and they are such weaklings one could feel sorry for them. But my father only thinks bad things. Those girls might want to do other things, like hiking, sports or games—he just doesn't believe it.

For Turkish girls it gets harder and harder the older they get. When I came to West Germany at the age of ten, things were better for me. My father even gave me money, sometimes five marks, sometimes ten. And now I don't get pocket money at all. I secretly do house cleaning for other people, so I make about 30 marks a month. If my father found out, he would beat me up badly.

Turkish girls often do get beaten. I was once beaten black and blue, and you know why? Because my shoes were broken and I had...
taken them to a shoemaker. At home I had said it would cost only nine marks, but when I went to pick them up, they cost 19 marks. I didn’t dare tell my parents. Instead, I took the money from my metal piggy bank. My father found out because the metal was bent. “What did you do with the money?” he demanded. Of course he didn’t believe me and started beating me. It lasted for two years! Again and again, he would ask me and beat me: “What did you do with the money?” They told everybody in Turkey that they had found me and done something wrong.

Turkish girls like gold–bracelets, necklaces, earrings. When I came to West Germany, I had a gold bracelet that my mother had given to me. During gymnastics I had to take it off; the teacher was very strict. And after the lesson it was gone. I didn’t know German then, so I didn’t say anything. And at home I was beaten. What had I done wrong? What crime had I committed? Ever since then I’m cold toward gold. I never wear gold jewelry anymore.

It is hard for Turks to live in West Germany. But for the Turkish girls, it is the hardest. Their parents still live “Turkish,” that means the father is the boss of the family, the mother his servant. The sons are allowed to be a bit more “German.” Perhaps they will stay here and make good money. But the daughters have to remain completely “Turkish,” because that improves their chances of finding a Turkish husband. But the parents who demand that from their daughters, send them at the same time to a German school. There, the Turkish girls see how the German girls live and what freedoms they have, and they want the same things for themselves.

I want to be free, and at home I’m kept as in a prison. What can I do? I can leave my parents as soon as I’m 18 years old. But then I won’t have a family any more, never again. That hurts. I would not survive that. The other possibility is to do what my family expects me to do: get a job as an unskilled worker; give money to my family; and get married. I would not be allowed to choose a man; I would have nothing to say.

Many Germans don’t know that in Turkey it is not the father of the girl who finds her a husband, but the parents of the boy who look for a wife for their son. Their main concern is if the girl can cook well, clean the house and if she will work hard to not only serve their son, but also them, his parents. I would have to wait until the parents of some boy would take a liking to me. Then the father would talk to my father. My father can refuse if he doesn’t like the guy or his family, but nobody asks me. And the guy is not being asked either. On the wedding night, all my needlework will be shown and also the sheet with blood. If there is no blood, the bridegroom can reject the bride on the same night. If I would marry a German man that would not be the case. I wouldn’t mind marrying a German, but my chances are nil. For German boys, Turkish girls are nothing, they are the bottom of the barrel. Sometimes Turkish boys have German girlfriends, but I’ve never seen a Turkish girl have a German boyfriend—except maybe girls who have left their families and are regarded as “bad.”

At times I think that the only way I would be free would be to marry. That way I could escape from my father. If my husband would be nice and if he would allow me my freedom, that would be good. But if he would exploit and oppress me, the same way my father does, then I could get a divorce. In West Germany, that would mean that I would be free. But in Turkey, as a divorced woman, I would have to obey my father again. That is why they want to take me back to Turkey, so that I will never be free.

At night I dream that my father is dead and my mother buried in Turkey. I would write to my grandmother to send me all my papers. Then I would finally be free.

For more information: “Ayse—Vom Leben einer Turkin in Deutschland” by Gudrun Ebert-Behr, Gerhardt Verlag, West Germany, 1980.


Kommitte der Frauen aus der Turkei, Kadiye Tozun, Hohestr. 18, 2100 Hamburg 18, West Germany, 040/765832. [Reprinted with permission of People’s Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-5505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.]
most follow their husbands or families. Couples and families cannot enter West Germany together since work permits are only issued to one person at a time. After a year's residency immigrants may bring their relatives, husbands, wives and children into the country. When Turkish wives join their husbands, most live in the big Turkish ghettos which have become part of all major West German cities. Their lives there do not differ significantly from the slum life they experienced back home, and very few have the opportunity to enter the job market. This trend changed in the early '70s when West German companies eagerly sought Turkish women for low-paid, tedious production work. But with the recession in the mid-'70s, employers returned to their earlier practice of giving employment preference to men.

Most of the estimated 500000 Turkish women in West Germany are not skilled workers, and very few are familiar with modern production processes. Over 90% of Turkish women worked in the fields back home. Consequently, only 1.5% have experience in production, and just 2.5% have experience in the service sector. In 1970, 48.6% of all Turks in West Germany were illiterate; 30.9% of them were men and 64.4% were women. Even today, girls stay home to prepare themselves for the future (married) lives and have no access to education. Turkish women who do paid work outside the home have to raise their children in addition to doing all the unpaid housework. Housework for Turkish women is particularly arduous because families cannot afford the luxuries that ease the burden of housework in a highly industrialized society. Moreover, they often live in run-down apartments that lack bathrooms and frequently even running water. The small number of Turkish women who work in factories or shops do so because of economic necessity. Their husbands would prefer them to remain at home, because they fear their wives may develop too much independence and self-awareness. This fear is especially expressed by fathers whose daughters are influenced by their contact with West German society (see related article). But the men often cannot earn enough money to feed their families, so women must supplement their husbands' wages with additional income.

Factor labor is far removed from the agricultural activities with which Turkish women are familiar, but women suffer most from general working conditions rather than their specific jobs. One woman told the West German daily, Frankfurter Rundschau, "The most difficult part for me is that I have no contact with other women while working. Nobody around here appears happy. We all seem to have lost our dignity as human beings. Work can be hard, I don't mind that, especially if the workers get along with each other. We are treated like animals, and that's what we suffer from." These conditions produce long-lasting effects on the physical and mental health of immigrant women. Many complain about frequent headaches, back pains, depression and nervousness. When asked about the reasons for these ailments, the most frequent answer is "sadness."

There are few opportunities for these women to express their dissatisfaction. One foreign shop steward said, "In unions, immigrant women are faced with many more difficulties than West German women. They have no previous union experience and are also afraid of losing their jobs as soon as they open their mouths."

West Berlin--The Largest Turkish City Outside Turkey: Recently, attempts have been made--sometimes successfully--to organize Turkish women and to bring them together both, with other immigrant and West German women.

West Berlin, which has the largest Turkish population outside of Turkey, has become the center for organizing. There are an estimated 100000 Turks living in the city, mainly in the areas known as Turkish ghettos. In the Kreuzberg district, for example, Turkish is spoken more often than German, and Turkish food is readily available on every street corner. In some schools more than half the students speak Turkish as their native language. Many of these Turks have become increasingly sensitive to what West German officials have long denied: discrimination against Turks exists in the work place, at school, and in daily urban life. Disillusioned and surrounded by hostility, many Turks in West Berlin are seeking shelter in their national subculture or in radical Islamic groups. Eighteen mosques and numerous prayer sanctuaries have sprung up in West Berlin's back alleys and in private apartments. There are also Koran schools attached to several of the mosques where instruction in the traditional teaching of the Koran includes right-wing political messages.

Some right-wing groups based in Turkey, but active throughout Europe, have established their own women's organizations. Zümrüt Turman, chairwoman of the Grey Wolves' (a fascist militia) women's organization explained: "Women's groups have been unable to deal with our problems. But we truly enlightened women will deal with these problems. The most important duty of a woman is to be a mother. In the struggle for salvation of Turkish society we have to rely on our Turkish mothers a great deal."

Grey Wolves in West Berlin have systematically attacked progressive Turkish woman. One woman who was living by herself with her three children was frequently harassed by her neighbor, who is a Grey Wolves supporter. He would stop her in the hallways and insult her. "You smell like a German woman. You don't send you children to Koran school. You don't wear a kerchief. You are no longer a true Turkish woman. I will kill you if you continue to wear Western dresses, and if you don't send your children to the mosque."

Despite such attacks and the potentially threatening presence of these right-wing groups in some ghetto neighborhoods, Turkish women have come together at conferences and in meeting centers to talk about their problems.

Immigrant Women's Conference: In 1980, a conference in Frankfurt was organized to discuss the problems of immigrant working women. One Turkish woman who attended talked about her impressions of the conference: "The new West German women's movement is very much a middle class movement, and they have very little in common with poor, rural women from Southern Europe. All they have in common is being female. But as long as the specific sexist oppression does not create a common level of consciousness, just being a woman does not lead far. For many foreign women, the women in the movement are strange, disorderly or even whores. For them, it is harder to join the women's movement than for West German working class women..."

"A few foreign women are organized in more traditional groups, like church circles. These organizations are for the most part opposed to concepts like 'feminism' or 'male chauvinism'. Nevertheless, some women's groups have been formed within such organizations, starting with cooking and sewing together, celebrating International Women's Day, and discussing problems of childrearing. While not radical, these groups are more progressive than the traditional ones."

"I share with Turkish women the same mentality, personal origin, language. We have a similar upbringing and similar experience. I find it easy to make contacts with Turkish mothers and young girls who come to my workplace. We started a group for Turkish girls. I know what it means to fight for a work permit, to fight for an extension of your visa. There is an unquestioned feeling of solidarity between us. "But when it comes to the women's movement, to feminism and lesbianism, I identify with West German women. Am I Turkish? Am I German? With Turkish women, I can discuss questions like relationships between women, feminist work, etc. And as a feminist and foreign woman, I have problems with the women at my workplace who think and live differently from me. And very often I encounter subtle hostility toward foreigners—which makes me very angry."

"Because I've always wanted to talk about my identity problems as a foreign woman, I joined a workshop in which foreign women shared their experiences. But many of the women had very different problems, partly because they were women of the first generation and not connected with the women's movement. But for me, a woman of the second generation, the problems of identity are much more of an issue. And I'm active in the women's movement. But I was still glad to talk to other foreign women about their activities."

"But at the conference nobody mentioned foreign lesbians. I was angry at myself, because I didn't say anything, either. It is very important to me, but I was afraid—I guess, because a negative reaction would have hurt me very much and would have made me feel much more isolated. That's probably why the other lesbians didn't say anything either. And I
know now that at least two other women are gay. I drove back to West Berlin with a Spanish woman who is a lesbian. She was as frustrated as I was. We want to start a group for foreign lesbians because we want to make homosexuality a public issue among foreigners, and we want to discuss it with others."

Crossroads Kreuzberg: A group for foreign lesbians is just one way to get immigrant women together and find solutions to many of their problems. A West German and a Turkish sociologist initiated the "Meeting and Information Center for Turkish Women" in Kreuzberg. Both founders worked with Turkish immigrants for several years and were familiar with their problems. The center is a place where Turkish women can meet, talk, drink tea, take courses from literacy classes to German classes—and get counseling. Many come—battered wives, women who have lost their visas or work permits, and young girls who have run away from home.

In 2/81, a group of women from the center, some Turkish and some West German, decided to invoke "squatters rights" and moved themselves into an empty house near the center. The group issued a statement which said they needed the house due to the severe housing problems they faced. By repairing the building and living in it, they wanted to set an example of how West German and Turkish families can reside together in a city with a large immigrant population. The group managed to carry out its plan, despite some bureaucratic obstacles. Due to their success, they are now searching for another empty house in Kreuzberg which can be transformed into a new information center which will house and provide a safe refuge for women from different cultural backgrounds.

Women Organizing Against Violence. An International Women's Quarterly, n. 2, October 1, 1981. p. 7. According to 1980 government statistics, almost 3 million foreign workers are registered in West Germany. 600000 of these are from Turkey, but only 151000 out of the total are women. (These figures do not include dependents. There are an estimated five million foreigners among West Germany's population of 60 million.) There are more than 600000 immigrant women from diverse nationalities employed by West German corporations. Immigrant women work on assembly lines (13.8%), in cleaning jobs (10.6%), as clerks (8.2%), in the textile industry (7.8%), and in food industries (7.4%). Of the 7.5 million West German women who are employed, 31.3% work in administrative jobs, 13.4% are salespeople, 6.5% do cleaning jobs, and 2.5% earn their living on the assembly line. (Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.)


Hungary: 27000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: United Kingdom.

USSR: 66000 refugees; Main Countries of Asylum: United States, Israel. [Source: Worldwatch Paper 43.] (Reprinted with permission of People's Translation Service, P.O. Box 14431, Berkeley, Ca 94712; Tel: (510) 549-3505. Subscription rates are US$17/year; Canada and Mexico US$20/year; Overseas US$20 surface, US$35 airmail; institutional US$30.)

46094. Pope, Nicole. "Oiling the Wheels of Turkish Diplomacy in Azerbaijan; Turkey Is Stepping Up Diplomatic Activity Over Nagorno-Karabagh and a Project for a Pipeline From Baku", in Manchester Guardian Weekly, September 19, 1993. p. 13. PM Tansu Ciller's visit to Moscow signals the continuing importance of Russia to Turkey, and follow the fall of Azeri PM Abdullaz Elchibey, who was considered to be too pro-Turkish. In that visit, Ciller raised the issues of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabagh and the proposed oil pipeline project. Turkey has been angered by the inexorable advance of Armenian forces in the fighting over Nagorno-Karabagh. While Russia has been willing to establish a hotline to Ankara, Russia has made no secret of its plan to re-establish its power in Azerbaijan without Turkish assistance. Turkey is seeking to connect Baku with the the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean, but such a pipeline would either have to pass through Iran or Armenia. [TXT]
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elsewhere be so happy? Of course, this is not what the results mean at all. The piety and religiosity of the Turkish people is beyond question. The Naqshbandi and other sufi orders flourish there as nowhere else in the Muslim world, despite decades of fervent State secularism. Even Yilmaz and Ciller were obliged to pay lip service to Islamic unity and values in their election campaigning.

All the results show is that the Turkish people know that the elections are not about Islam. They understand that they are voting for secular politicians and secular parties operating in a secular system in an equally secular State. And they choose their votes in secular terms. Had they really thought Erbakan to be an Islamic leader, and Refah an Islamic movement, Erbakan would most likely have secured 91% of the vote rather than 21%. This is not to underplay Erbakan's achievement. The leaders of Islamic Parties in other Muslim countries would give anything to achieve 21% of the vote. It is not an Islamic achievement. It is the achievement of a wily old politician who has proved a master manipulator of Turkish politics. It did not take him long to start back-tracking on even the limited Islamic tone of his campaign once the elections were over and political deals needed to be made in order to build a coalition. No Islamic leader could ever consider going into partnership with Tansu Ciller, whose personal ambitions and total lack of principles are notorious. Nor is it to deny that many of those within the Refah party, and those who voted for it, are sincere and dedicated in their commitment to Islam. But if they think that they can achieve anything through Turkey's secular "democracy," they are being simplistic. Turkey's own history shows that this is not possible. Looking further afield to Algeria and Pakistan, for example, only reinforces the point. In the almost total absence of effective government since the collapse of Ciller's regime in 9/1995, the country has been doing quite well. It is continuing to pursue its war on the Kurds, its membership of NATO, its quest to join the European Union, and its military cooperation with Israel. Turkey's bureaucracy, like that of Italy, seems to have reached the stage of the Han and Hatun, the King and Queen, who together received foreign envoys and performed the duties of state. The birth of a daughter was a "victory" for Islam. [=]

46096. Sniffen, Michael J. "Ex-Rep. Solarz's Wife Agrees to Guilty Plea in House Bank Probe", in Seattle Times, April 18, 1995. p. A5. Nina Solarz, wife of former Rep. Stephen Solarz, agreed to plead guilty to writing a $5200 bad check on her husband's House Banking Committee account. The bad check was written to a charity she headed; she then stole $7500 from the charity, American Friends of Turkish Women, of which she is president. Former Rep. Solarz will not be charged. [TEXT]


Most respectable Commander Marcos: My name is Oliviero Toscani, and for twelve years I have conceived the communication of United Colors of Benetton. For a long time United Colors of Benetton has chosen to use a large part of its advertising budget to address the most dramatic problems of this century: AIDS, war, racism, intolerance. It's a way to create a different dialogue with the 'consumers' who for us are first of all 'men and women.' We have always chosen to photograph 'true persons'-not models--in the places where they actually live. In this way, we have highlighted the beauty of the Chinese, of the Turks, of the inhabitants of a little Italian village, and, recently, of the Palestinians of Gaza.

Today, we address ourselves to you because we sense that you know that communications can be a form of struggle. We ask you to give us an opportunity to photograph you with the men, women and children of your group, the Zapatista National Liberation Army. We would like to give you a chance to show the beauty of the faces of those who struggle in the name of an idea. We believe that an ideal brightens the eyes and lights up the faces of those who fight to realize it. We do not believe in the beauty myths propagated by consumerism. For this reason, we ask you to receive us among your people and to give us the opportunity to find another way of making your lives and your history known. -- Oliviero Toscani. [=]

46098. Turkish Information Office. Women in Modern Turkey. Turkey Today 7. Turkish Information Office [444 E. 52nd. St., New York 22 NY], N.D. (1950?). It would be almost impossible for anyone acquainted only with present-day Turkey to imagine the condition of subjection in which women were forced to live only twenty-five years ago, before the advent of the Republic. Before 1923, any woman who tried to assume the personal, social, economic and political equality that is guaranteed to her by today's Constitution, would have been stigmatized as "sinsful". Complete freedom and equality for women are no considered as most natural and fundamental rights, essential to a modern Turkish society. The high degree of cultural and intellectual standing of the present-day Turkish woman, and her social and political maturity, make it even more inconceivable that only 25 years ago she possessed only the status of a household object in a masculine abode, assigned duties, but accorded not the slightest rights or responsibilities. However, five centuries of isolation, acquired social traditions intrinsically foreign to Turkish culture, and a rigid system of education rooted in obsolete religious concepts and canon misinterpretations which placed the woman behind latticed windows, did not suffice to eradicate the Turkish woman's love of freedom and liberty, or her passion for private and public responsibility. Before the Ottomans, in the earliest days of Turkish community life, women and men were free and equal. In the family as well as in the affairs of society as a whole, men and women enjoyed the same rights and privileges with, of course, an equal part in responsibilities. In the past this was a fundamental characteristic of the Turkish social order. In times of war as in times of peace, women stood beside their husbands in the people's assemblies. The early Turkish empires were ruled by grace of the Hsn and Hatun, the King and Queen, who together received foreign envoys and performed the duties of state. The birth of a daughter was a matter for rejoicing and not despair. A mother had rights over her children, and when she became a widow she was their sole guardian and the sole manager of her home. Time brought the Turks in contact with other civilizations in which women played an inferior role. In Constantinople they found veiled women who lived apart from men in the women's sections of the city. From the empire that they conquered the Turks inherited a social system which excluded women from the daily life of men. What happened to the free and happy life of early times? Now, when a girl was born, she grew up behind latticed windows, waiting for her father's choice of a husband. It frequently happened that she was not even allowed to see her husband until after the wedding ceremony. Once married, she lived in ignorance and in slavery. Only a few books on ethical subjects were allowed her, for too much book learning was considered unnecessary for women.

Her children, therefore, grew up in ignorance like herself. As far as possible she lived within the house, and when she ventured forth she was dressed from head to foot in ungodly garments that served to disguise her from view. Married, she had rival; for her husband was entitled to marry up to four times. There were also odalisques to share with her the home which was really never hers. In exchange for all these restrictions, she lived in a state of insecurity, for her husband could divorce her without recourse to legal proceedings. In matters of inheritance her brother always had the advantage over her. She was not allowed to divorce her without recourse to legal proceedings. In matters of marriage, she was their sole guardian and the sole manager of her home. Time brought the Turks in contact with other civilizations in which women played an inferior role. In Constantinople they found veiled women who lived apart from men in the women's sections of the city. From the empire that they conquered the Turks inherited a social system which excluded women from the daily life of men. What happened to the free and happy life of early times? Now, when a girl was born, she grew up behind latticed windows, waiting for her father's choice of a husband. It frequently happened that she was not even allowed to see her husband until after the wedding ceremony. Once married, she lived in ignorance and in slavery. Only a few books on ethical subjects were allowed her, for too much book learning was considered unnecessary for women.

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them riding in a carriage drawn by a horse, while three or four servants held her train. She wore a bonnet adorned with jewelry and peacock feathers. The windows of the carriage were open and the woman's face could be seen. Another woman, also escorted by her maids, was exchanging sheep and milk for perfume. The men who accompanied their wives were taken for their servants. The husband was clothed in a sheepskin mantle and wore a cap similar on his head. In the late nineteenth century, the condition of women improved somewhat. It became the fashion to allow them a certain amount of education, and a number of cultured women of letters appeared.

During the First World War, when the guns were heard at Gallipoli, the women stood ready to do their share in protecting their threatened homes. They nursed the wounded and tended the sick, cared for refugee children, ran schools and offices. Eventually, foreign warships lay anchored in the Bosporus, and the country was invaded on all sides. Then thousands of veiled women were seen everywhere, filling the streets and squares and meeting-places like a flood. In the days following the armistice of 1918, mass meetings were held in Istanbul and elsewhere. A frequent speaker at such meetings was Halide Edib, already a novelist with an established world reputation, who once addressed two hundred thousand men and women in Sultan Ahmed Square while Allied airplanes flew in and out among the minarets above.

In 5/1919 Atatürk landed in Anatolia, and the Turkish War of Independence began. Thousands of men and women escaped from Istanbul to the interior, to join the struggle. "When, in 1920, I had to flee from Istanbul to Ankara," writes Mrs. Ferid Tek, [Mrs. Ferid Tek. Well-known Turkish woman writer and authoress, especially known for her writings on the Turkish War of Independence. She is of the generation of Halide Edib.] "I took a little boat bound for Inebolu. On the bridge was a crowd of peasants with their wives. They were returning home after having sold their cattle. The Black Sea was as tough as it can be. I was ill and distressed. Suddenly, above the sound of the wind and sea rose the music of a folk song, proud and joyful. All the 'farmers' turned into officers, and when we landed at last in Inebolu I saw that the women's boxes held nothing but munitions." In Ankara, then a heap of ruins with here and there a modest house of wood and brick, Mrs. Tek was to meet Halide Edib and many other women from Istanbul who were working day and night for victory. But they were not the only ones—sturdy peasant women from all over the countryside took part in this mass movement for liberty. Countless stories are told of women who carried shields on their shoulders, who took their husbands' and sons' hunting rifles and marched to the front. "In the year 1921, we were going to Ankara by way of Inebolu. As we were crossing the solitary roads of Anatolia, the silence of the night was suddenly broken by a distant noise. It was the creaking of wheels. As a vehicle approached us we saw in it a young girl of twenty, driving a team of oxen. I shall never forget her brave countenance and gentle smile as she calmly answered, when I asked her where she was going, 'To the front'. The cart was full of munitions and we now understood why the wheels were making this dreadful noise. The scene filled us with a sense of shame and inferiority. We asked the girl whether she was not afraid to go at midnight on these solitary roads. She shrugged her shoulders and smiled, saying 'What should I fear: the mountains or the roses?' We continued asking, 'Have you any relatives fighting?' Upon which she replied, 'My father, my brothers and my lover all gone, why should I wait?'

At last the war was fought and won. Victory was sealed by the Treaty of Lausanne. Out of the ruins of the empire, the Turks built a compact and vigorous republic, and the era of reforms began. Patiently Atatürk began the task of preparing public opinion for a change in the status of women. He spoke repeatedly of the problem as he traveled over the country. "If you study Islam and Turkish history," he said in Izmir in 1924, "you will not find in them any of our present conventions. In Turkish social life, women have never been mentally inferior to men and they are even found to be superior in some cases. "Let us study the situation in our country today. We see two phases, one where women plough the fields with men, and ride to neighboring villages to sell their eggs and hens and corn, and after buying what they need, return to their villages and assist their husbands and brothers in their various occupations. The other, the legendary life behind latticed windows which is spoken of in foreign novels, is undoubtedly due to the influence of the life of the Court upon the population at large. Here are a few last words: our mothers have done their best to educate us. But what we need hereafter are men with a different mentality and culture, and this will only come through future mothers. They are, and will be, the foundations required to maintain the independence and honor of the New Turkey."

In 1926, the new Civil Code was enacted. It gave back to Turkish women their rights and the Turkish family too; a new step toward rebuilding itself. Divorce became a matter for the law courts, and the right to demand it was given to women as well as men. The new code also affected the rights of inheritance, recognizing equality between men and women in this respect as in others. It remained for women to acquire their political rights. Four years after the Civil Code, the Assembly passed a law giving women the right to participate in municipal elections. This gradual unfolding of reform was carefully thought out, to allow both women themselves and public opinion in general to become adjusted to the new scheme of things. Many women were elected to municipal councils and proved themselves conscientious and hardworking citizens. In 1935 the Assembly recognized their full political rights. At the first election after the new law was passed, seventeen women won seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Turkish Parliament. It is little short of amazing to see how quickly and securely women have made a place for themselves in every walk of public life. In its program of reconstruction, Turkey needs trained and intelligent workers and allows no sex restriction to stand in their way. Every career is open to women, every year new women judges are appointed to the different courts, and there are many young women lawyers, several of whom have won nation-wide repute. Statistics for 1948 reveal that there are in Turkey today 101 Law School-trained women judges and public prosecutors; 19 women assistant judges and 26 women law-clerks, in the various courts and tribunals. The Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir Bar Associations have among their members many women who are practicing attorneys. Many banks, industrial and business establishments, as well as a number of government ministries have for years retained the services of women legal advisers and representatives. In 1946, in Turkish schools, from elementary grades to the universities, colleges and technical schools, there were 11250 women teachers, instructors, lecturers, and assistants to professors. Under the Republic, Turkish women attend international meetings, conventions and conferences. On most Turkish delegations there is at least one woman member representing the country. Early in October 1948, two Turkish women, Mrs. Makbule Diblan, deputy in the Grand National Assembly, and Mrs. Nermin Abadan, lawyer and journalist, were in Sweden as the Turkish representatives to the Middle Eastern Women's Congress, Stockholm. On their homeward journey, they were guests of the Women's Association of Denmark. Another Turkish woman, Mrs. Tezer Taskiran, a well-known child psychologist and educational authority, now a member of the Grand National Assembly and author of many publications on education, was a member of the Turkish delegation which attended the UNESCO Third General Session, held in Beirut, the Lebanon, in 11/1948. Mrs. Mihr Pektash represented Turkey at the Conference of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, held at Lake Success early in 1/1948. Mrs. Pektash is a former deputy in the Grand National Assembly. She is an educator by profession. Turkish women participated in the Women's International Exposition, Silver Jubilee, held in the 71st Regiment Armory, New York, between 11/1/1948, 11/7/1948, exhibiting exquisite samples of Turkish women's handicrafts, particularly specimens of expert needlework.

When, in 1935, the Women's International Congress convened in the Yildiz Palace in Istanbul, hundreds of women belonging to the various civilized nations of the world expressed their appreciation of the vocations and professional achievements of their Turkish sisters, and expressed admiration for their high degree of cultural and intellectual maturity. In 1957 another woman, Professor Afet, Vice-President of the Association of Historical Research, presided with great success over the International Congress on Turkish History. There are many hundreds of women doctors practicing in all parts of the country. Their is perhaps
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the greatest satisfaction, for they are accepted with unquestioning confidence by thousands who entrust them with their lives. There are today, in European countries and especially in the United States, many young Turkish women physicians doing post-graduate work, research, and in particular, clinical study. In a flying school on the outskirts of Ankara, young girls are training for civil aviation. You see them in their trim uniforms when they come to the movies on Saturday afternoons. Many have already won their wings. Another Turkish woman some years back won the automobile races from Ankara to Athens. Today in modern Turkey, young girls are studying dancing, dramatics and singing at the Ankara Conservatory. Girls spin at Marguerite's wheel or lean against Juliet's balcony while their mothers sit in the audience, hoping that the curtain will not go down too soon. In factories everywhere, thousands of women are employed. In the Ismet Inonu Institute, many hundreds are learning useful trades, which they practice in various parts of the country. In laboratories and in offices, women are working normally, and it has become the natural thing. In the Village Institutes, thousands of girls, along with the young men of the villages, attend a seven-year course of training for leaders and teachers in Turkey's program of Village Uplift. Here they are taught everything from dancing and music to first aid and sanitation, child care and the social sciences. These girls, when their period of training is over, go to their villages and farms to become social workers and village leaders. In the literary world, Mrs. Halide Edip Adivar is perhaps the most widely known of Turkish women writers in modern prose. She is a graduate of the American College for Girls, Istanbul. A novelist of international renown, she is primarily interested in the science of pedagogy and in history. As we have seen, she served with the national armed forces and saw action during the War of Independence. She held successively the ranks of corporal, sergeant and sergeant-major. She has traveled widely in Britain, France and the United States, writing and lecturing. During 1931-32, she was visiting professor of modern Turkish thought and literature at Columbia University, New York. In 1933 she became visiting professor at Calcutta University, India. Later, she continued her lectures and conferences throughout the world. She is at present professor of English language and literature at Istanbul University. "The Turkish Ordeal", dealing with the Turkish struggle for Independence and Liberation, is one of her best known books. She has also written a two-volume history of English literature. Hundreds of names of other famous Turkish women scientists, physicians, teachers, lawyers, judges, executives, etc., could be added. Their contribution to Turkish social life is no less significant and no less glorious than that of Turkish men. With the late Kemal Ataturk, Turkish society as a whole today believes that Turkish community life has two fundamental elements of equal importance: The Turkish man and the Turkish woman.

In 1946, there were 38249 teachers in Turkey's 14615 schools of all types. Of these teachers, 11250 were women. At the same time, Turkey's schools had a total enrollment of 1522384 students, of whom 530625 were girls and women. These figures speak eloquently of the fact that Turkish women are cooperating side by side with Turkish men in the building of their country's future. In conclusion, it would be a modest tribute to state that the Turkish woman has shown herself to be a perfect mother, a cooperative and understanding wife, and a good citizen whom the whole nation holds in loving esteem. [=]


46100. US Department of State. Turkey Human Rights Practices: Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association: Gay and Lesbian Pride Conference Banned. Reprinted by Lambda Istanbul (F.K. 103, Goztepe, Istanbul TURKEY), July, 1995. A gay and lesbian pride conference scheduled for July 2-6 in Istanbul was banned at the last minute by the governor of Istanbul on July 2, apparently on the grounds that it would be contrary to Turkey's "tradition and moral values" and that it might disturb the peace. He allegedly sent men to many hotels in Istanbul, instructing them not to provide lodgings for participants. The next day, Turkey's authorities arrested 28 foreign delegates, most of them while they were on their way to participate in a press conference in protest of the ban. They were detained for over 5 hours, threatened with possible strip searches and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) tests, and deported on a Turkish airline to Germany. The organizers had previously received approval of the event from the Interior Ministry.

Associations must submit their charters for government approval, a lengthy and cumbersome process. [=]


What influenced these designers?

The Assyrian-Babylonian, Hittite, Lydian-Phrygian, Hellenistic and Ottoman civilisations are just five cultures which had existed in Anatolia. Pinar Aygun, Eynel Celebi, Bahar Korcan, Sema Gucer and Hakan Yildirim are just five of the hundreds of young Turkish designers.

When invited to design fashions for the show, Eynel Celebi chose the Assyrians, Pinar Aygun the Hittites, Bahar Korca the Lydians and Phrygians, Sema Gucer the Helenes and Hakan Yildirim the Ottomans for their inspiration.

What remains of these five civilisations for these young designers today? Museum galleries and university libraries provide a wealth of statues, reliefs, vases decorated with human figures and books. But the clothing in this fashion show illustrated that the most important legacy of these civilisations is something that mankind has always possessed: the courage to create!

Eynel Celebi chose to adapt the Assyrian woman and her clothing of 2000 BC to modern life. Based on pictures and reliefs in which warriors and their exploits prevail, she interpreted them in a process of re-creation. Her collection, named “Pocket”, left a startling and striking effect on the audience. She used the implements of Assyrian warriors as accessories for her clothes: metal leg coverings, black tasselled whips, helmets made of plush and shiny fabrics. She used plush, gabardine, lycra and silky fabrics in her creations. Every shade of brown, copper, bronze, cold and silver predominated in the collection, which features long skirts with front slashes revealing high cut shorts and tall flat-soled knee boots. Eynel Celebi was struck most of all by the fact that the Assyrians were the first to use pockets in their clothes, and almost all her outfits have large, eye-catching, conspicuous pockets. It is as if this young 20th century designer is acknowledging our debt to the Assyrians for this indispensable invention.

Pinar Aygun selected the Hittites, who colonised Anatolia around 2000 BC, because she admired the primitive simplicity of their costume. She created a three-dimensional collection from two-dimensional documents.

The colour and third dimension in the clothing derives from the designer’s own creativity and imagination. To the question about why her clothes are so often made in black fabric, she replies, “Imagination and courage!” Reddish brown is the complementary colour reflecting the fact that the Hittites were a civilisation of the soil.

Her fabrics are chiffon, fur, lycra and satin, with plenty of gold. All the clothes feature Hittite solar discs of exaggerated size, which form the most memorable accessory of the collection.

Pinar Aygun has captured the refinement of the Hittite reliefs in her clothes; simple, primitive, fine and elegant, almost intangible lines, like the Hittite civilisation. Is it the transparency of the black chiffon or the slenderness of the modes? The answer to this question lies between the darkness and lightening of the podium.

Here come the Phrygians and Bahar Korcan’s collection. The migrations which swept across Anatolia around 1200 BC, known as the Aegean Migrations or the Migration of the Tribes, brought fresh cultures into Anatolia. As a matriarchal society, the Phrygians held women in greater esteem than almost any other Anatolian civilisation.

The huge number of statues of the Mother Goddess which they produced is clear evidence of this. According to the Phrygians, women should be worshipped for their fertility and their role in creation.

The woman represents abundance, and life. Bahar Korcan was influenced by the Mother Goddess, known to the Phrygians and Lydians as Cybele. This was the perfect choice for a mixed collection entitled “The Woman in Anatolian Civilisations”.

Although the Bible declares, “In the beginning was the Word”, Bahar Korca says, “In the beginning there was stone.” She has called her collection “Stone and skin”, skin symbolising man himself, and stone the story of his creativity. The fabrics are velvet, lycra, chiffon and fur. Her models walked onto the podium wearing crowns of plain gold or silver plaques and carrying tambourines. The designer’s colours are all shades of grey and skin colour representing the ordinary woman to the Mother Goddess of antiquity. On the catwalk sounds turn to colour to civilisations. And the Hellenistic period…Sema Gucer chose the Hellenistic civilization of the Aegean which covered the period 300-30 BC. For women this was a memorable age when women poets and artists were celebrated in stone inscriptions. Sema Gucer has been influenced by Homer’s Iliad. The multitude of written documents and sculpture was an advantage for the designer. But who would choose these colours without the courage of creation? Shades of cherry, cream, maroon and brown for combinations of lycra, leather, silk and chiffon.

The outfits are worn either with sandals laced to the knees or specially designed matching shoes. From inscrutable marble statues whose clothes drop in heavy folds Sema Gucer has courageously shaped her own classical woman.

And the Ottomans. Here we come to the last civilisation represented at this event, the Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1299 to 1922.

Hakan Yildirim got the chance to interpret the Ottomans, with their readymade extravaganza of colour and design. What luck! To interpret the known and accepted, to re-create them, is the hardest job for the designer. Hakan Yildirim began with a perceptive insight into this culture, with all its splendour and ostentation. An empire which had extraordinary fabrics woven for its emperors, which used the richest colours, juxtaposed contrasting designs, and had a penchant for hundreds of buttons.

Undershirts, sleeves trailing on the ground, boleros...Ottoman turbans influenced this young designer. He has interpreted these turbans for the 20th century to embllesh to all his outfits. His shoes are a combination of the traditional “takunya” and “mest” forms. His jewelry and shoes have been especially designed and made for the collection. He has generally used upholstery fabrics with huge designs, predominantly in purple, mustard, reds verging on maroon, turquoise and yellow. The undershirts are in chiffon prints with Iznik ceramic designs. Boleros of upholstery fabric, caftan-like coats in patterned fabric with plain linings and high neckbands, long and short skirts and narrow cut trousers…In short a layered style of dress in bright colours and designs, with buttons and buttonholes.

The lights go out on the podium, but there is a light that will always shine from the Assyrians to the Ottomans - our courage to create![=]

46104. Wheeler, Tim. “Resignations and Suspensions Follow Fasist Drug Trafficking Scandal in Turkish Government”, in Peoples Weekly World (CPUSA), December 21, 1996. p. 14. The Turkish government is embroiled in a major scandal that links death squads, heroin trafficking and the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1979. The case began with a traffic accident in which three passengers were killed, police official Hussein Kocadag, fugitive and heroin dealer Abdullah Catli, and Gonca Us, a mistress of several druglords. Sedat Bucak survived the accident; he is a Kurd to receive $1.2 million a month from the Turkish government to “bankroll death squads”. This juxtaposition has led to many embarrassing questions in the press. Police have linked Catti to Mehmet Ali Agca, who attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II, in a plot by the Gray Wolves to frame Bulgaria for the assassination.

46105. Yang Zheng. “Women March into the 21st Century Together with Men-A Warm Welcome to the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW): Rabia Kadar: The Richest Woman In Xinjiang: Rabia Kadar, A Uygur Woman Having 11 Children, Has Become The Wealthiest Person In China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region-Home To A Total Of 14.54 Million People. She Is Currently Chairwoman Of The Board Of Her Company, Akdar Industrial & Trade Co. With Fixed Assets Of 100 Million Yuan: Part 2: A Steep Rise”, in Beijing Review, September 4, 1995. In 1987, Rabia rented a patch of land in South Jiefang Road in Urumqi where she opened a March 8th Store, wholesaling goods for women and helping them also to earn more money and get rich. In 1990, she built a six-storey dwelling, the first privately funded residential building in Xinjiang. In 1992, with much support from local government authorities, her March 8th Store was revamped as a modern and typical Uygur style architecture-the Rabia Building. Xinjiang has become a leader in China’s reform and opening drive since the Euro-Asian bridge, the railway linking western Pacific coast and eastern Atlantic coast, was

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opened to traffic in 1992. Deng Xiaoping-Father of China's epoch-marking economic revolution-spoke on further reform and opening that year. As a result, people-to-people exchanges between China and the countries of the former Soviet Union developed, providing still another opportunity for Rabia. In that year, her first private enterprise, the Akdar Industrial and Trade Co. which is totally operated by Uygur women, was established focusing on the border trade. The disintegration of the former republics created economic chaos in these newly independent countries, especially the lack of daily necessities. China's light industrial products, particularly cotton textile products and garments, became very popular in these countries, while their heavy industrial products were needed by China's economic construction. As smart as she was, Rabia figured that it was time to expand her businesses abroad, and she tried barter trade first, importing automobiles, steel and waste copper needed in domestic markets. At the same time, she launched a leather-processing factory in Xinjiang and set up a jointly-funded industrial and trade company with local businessmen and a Rabia Store in Kazakhstan. In 1994, Rabia established a small-scale garment factory, a knitting mill and a computer composition system. In July and August of that year, Rabia was invited to Great Britain and Turkey on business, where she attended talks on establishing joint ventures.
A court previously determined she had been raped by the man she killed, to army personnel. Several other women judges investigating human payment of blood money to the family of the man she stabbed to death. investigating several mass killings of banana plantation workers, linked Sentence", in Seattle Times, October 30, 1995. p. A2. An Islamic court curtail her legal work. Death threats also preceded the shotgun killing of lawyer who provides legal aid for political prisoners and the Domingo Siazon will investigate the working conditions of Filipinas in reason was ever given for her detention. Solema Jubilan, a Filipino lawyer urged the Confederation Generalle des Travail to “take a clear, strong and comprehensive agenda against imperialism and to define a program for a new proletarian-led social order towards genuine socialism and supplant forever imperialism’s new world order.” The Kilusang Mayo Uno also thanked the congress for passing a resolution calling for the unconditional acquittal of Filipino worker Sarah Balabagan in the United Arab Emirates. In his letter of thanks to the congress, Beltran said the resolution was a “realization of workers’ international solidarity that would make an impact on the UAE government and all concerned.” Beltran was also there to give French workers and foreign delegates to the congress an idea of the trade union situation in the Philippines. He was able to meet and exchange ideas with various trade union leaders from different countries. While in France, Beltran participated in three marches in solidarity with French Prime Minister’s Alain Juppe’s package of government subsidies and social welfare cuts. [=]

48000. -------. “1996: of Portents to Come: Kilusang Mayo Uno Chairperson Beltran Attends Confederation Generale des Travail”, in Correspondence (Kilusang Mayo Uno), November-December 1995. p. 10. Kilusang Mayo Uno Chairperson Crispin Beltran attended the forty fifth Congress of the Confederation Generale des Travail in France last 12/3-8/1995 and participated in the general strike launched by workers in the French capital. Beltran attended the congress to extend Kilusang Mayo Uno’s solidarity to the Confederation Generale des Travail, to find out the new policies the congress might pass, and to explore specific issues which the Kilusang May Uno and Confederation Generale des Travail may work on together. In his message to the Confederation Generale des Travail’s forty fifth congress, Beltran on behalf of Kilusang Mayo Uno noted that the gathering came at a time of “great workers’ upheavals in France against anti-worker government policies in conjunction with the dictates of monopoly capitalism.” “It also coincides with the Philippines’ centennial of the national democratic revolution continuously being waged by the workers and the people to win national democracy and socialism,” the Kilusang Mayo Uno statement said. Kilusang Mayo Uno recognizes the “worldwide impact” of the French workers’ one hundred years of struggle and the inspiration which it has given to working class movements worldwide. “Your experiences in victories or defeats, happiness or sorrows, are shared by many of us—all in the defence and advancement of working class interests towards a just, democratic, humane and progressive social order,” Beltran said. While aluding the congress’ calls for solidarity, full employment, democracy, alliance and unity, the Kilusang Mayo Uno said the Confederation Generale des Travail should do more. The Kilusang Mayo Uno urged the Confederation Generale des Travail to “take a clear, strong and comprehensive agenda against imperialism and to define a program for a new proletarian-led social order towards genuine socialism and supplant forever imperialism’s new world order.”

The Kilusang Mayo Uno also thanked the congress for passing a resolution calling for the unconditional acquittal of Filipino worker Sarah Balabagan in the United Arab Emirates. In his letter of thanks to the congress, Beltran said the resolution was a “realization of workers’ international solidarity that would make an impact on the UAE government and all concerned.” Beltran was also there to give French workers and foreign delegates to the congress an idea of the trade union situation in the Philippines. He was able to meet and exchange ideas with various trade union leaders from different countries. While in France, Beltran participated in three marches in solidarity with French Prime Minister’s Alain Juppe’s package of government subsidies and social welfare cuts. [=]

48001. -------. “Abu Dhabi: Filipina Maid to Be Retried For Killing Arab Employer [teenage maid was sentenced to seven years for killing an employer who raped her]”, in Seattle Times, July 31, 1995. p. A6. [TXT]


48003. -------. “Filipina Convicted of Killing Arab Employer Files Appeal [Sarah Balabagan files appeal; Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon will investigate the working conditions of Filipinas in UAE]”, in Seattle Times, September 19, 1995. p. A5. [TXT]

48004. -------. “Filipina Maid Gets Lashes, One Year In Jail As Sentence”, in Seattle Times, October 30, 1995. p. A2. An Islamic court sentenced Sarah Balabagan to 100 lashes, a year in jail and deportation on payment of blood money to the family of the man she stabbed to death. A court previously determined she had been raped by the man she killed, and awarded her $27000 compensation, but refused to accept a self-defense plea. [TXT]

48005. -------. “Filipina Maid Returns Home a Hero; Teenager Escaped Death penalty for Killing Employer [Sarah Balabagan returns from UAE where she stabbed her employer when he tried to rape her; she was released after serving 3 months of a seven year sentence]”, in Seattle Times, August 1, 1996. p. A3. [TXT]

48006. -------. “Filipina Maid, 16, is Ruled Both Victim and Criminal in UAE; She Gets 7 Years For Killing Rapest Employer [Sarah Balabagan awarded $27000 for being raped; sentenced to seven years for killing in self-defense]”, in Seattle Times, June 26, 1995. p. A7. [TXT]

48007. -------. “News in Brief: Arabian Peninsula: Emarat Oil Fires Female Gas Attendants”, in Crescent International, July 1-15, 1996. p. 2. Emarat Oil, Dubai’s oil company, has taken another leaf from western, especially American, oil companies’ policy. Emarat Oil has started firing female gas attendants to attract customers. [=]

48008. -------. “News in Brief: Arabian Peninsula: UAE to Free Sarah Balabagan”, in Crescent International, July 16-31, 1996. p. 2. Sarah Balabagan, a Filipina maid jailed for killing her employer who tried to rape her, is set to be freed by the United Arab Emirates at the end of the month, an official said on 7/6/1996. Her case highlighted the plight of Filipina maids at the hands of corrupt shaikhs and other employers in the oil producing shaikhdoms. [=]

48009. -------. “Philippine Maid’s Death Sentence Dropped; Arab’s Family Accepts Compensation Amount [charges against Filipina maid Sarah Balabagan, 16, dropped; Balabagan claimed she stabbed her employer when he raped her]”, in Seattle Times, October 15, 1995. p. A2. [TXT]


48012. Amnesty International. Press Release: Women in The Front Line. London: Amnesty International, February 1991. [In country after country, women suffer assaults on their dignity by governments which give priority to their human rights. Women, men and children are imprisoned for their peaceful beliefs and activities, tortured, denied the right to a fair trial, put in prison and “disappeared” , and both judicially and extrajudicially executed. But women are also deliberately targeted for certain patterns of abuse solely or primarily because of their gender. Again and again they are viewed by governments as second class citizens who can be ill-treated with impunity] Women from all walks of life have been targeted for human rights abuse. In many cases, the reasons are connected with a woman’s occupation or peaceful, legitimate activities. Governments detain or direct violent attacks against women who are physicians, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, teachers, housewives, human rights activists, community organizers and peasants. In the United Arab Emirates, Dhahia Khamsi-Meshair, a journalist whose published works include articles on the status of Arab women, was arrested in 5/1987. She was held without charge or trial for 10 weeks. No official reason was ever given for her detention. Solema Jubilan, a Filipino lawyer who provides legal aid for political prisoners and the disadvantaged, has been the target of death threats since 1986. The threats appear to be made by government security forces attempting to curtail her legal work. Death threats also preceded the shotgun killing of Maria Elena Diaz Perez, a Colombian judge, in 7/1989. She had been investigating several mass killings of banana plantation workers, linked to army personnel. Several other women judges investigating human rights violations attributed to military and paramilitary forces have

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received death threats.

Some of them have left the country. Women have also been targeted because of their work to protect women's rights. Cecilia Olea, who belongs to the Flora Tristan women's group in Peru, has received death threats from a paramilitary group reportedly linked to the armed forces. Flora Tristan members publicize women's issues through the media, organize educational programs, and provide legal and social assistance to working women. The author of this passage intensifies a woman's torture and ill-treatment. Whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted for the purposes such as obtaining information or punishing, intimidating, or coercing a person. Rape is used to intimidate women from pursuing particular activities and to extract information or "confessions" from them. Rape is also used as a punitive measure. In June 1986, government soldiers in Myanmar (formerly Burma) were alleged to have repeatedly raped an 11-year-old girl and her 22-year-old-aunt who were discovered trying to return home after an officially declared curfew. In India, according to official estimates, about 1000 women (many of whom belong to the disadvantaged sectors of society known as the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, formerly the "Untouchables") are raped each year. Many of these rapes are reportedly committed by police. A Times of India editorial noted in 1986 that "custodial rapes seem to be occurring so frequently that 'cop molests woman' has become an almost daily fare for newspaper readers." Women are particularly vulnerable to rape between the time of arrest and arrival at official detention centers. In some countries, law enforcement officials or military personnel have committed rape and other sexual abuses without having officially arrested the victim. However, confinement in an official place of detention does not necessarily protect women from rape or other sexual abuses. Many have reported that prison guards have raped them or threatened them with rape.

Rape is used as a form of torture because those responsible fully realize that their victims may be constrained from revealing what has occurred. A common accompaniment to rape is a perpetrator's threat of additional violence if the victim tells anyone of the assault. The shame associated with rape can be a strong inducement to silence. In Colombia, a woman who testified in 1990 that military personnel had raped her in custody so that they had told her "to forget everything because my dignity as a woman was compromised, and my husband was not going to like knowing this". She was released only after agreeing to sign a statement declaring that she had been treated well in custody. She now lives in exile. Rape often carries traumatic social repercussions, which may be affected by a woman's cultural origins or social status. In some countries, a woman who has been raped may face reprisals from her relatives for bringing dishonor upon her family. Women are also subjected to heterosexual contact falling short of rape, verbal humiliation, threats of violent attack, or forced acts intended to degrade them. All of these violate their basic human rights by subjecting them to cruelty, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In Iran flogging is a punishment for offences such as failure to observe veiling or other clothing regulations. The authorities reportedly impose this punishment inconsistently; in some cases women reportedly have been flogged on the open streets without any legal proceedings whatsoever. While men and women both fall victim to a range of human rights violations it is women who are the predominant targets of certain patterns of abuse. Many women are subjected to human rights violations merely because they happen to be wives, mothers, daughters or friends of people whom the authorities consider to be "dangerous" or "undesirable". These women are threatened, held as substitutes for their relatives, tortured or even killed as governments attempt to exert their will over those closely connected in some way with the women.

In many African countries a strong tradition of family or community solidarity has protected prisoners in vulnerable situations. This has led some governments deliberately to exploit family relations, by imprisoning, threatening and harrassing prisoners' relatives. In Guinea, under the rule of the late President Sekou Toure, wives were pressured by the state to divorce their imprisoned husbands. Family asylum was also used to intensify a woman's torture and ill-treatment. Women who give birth in detention are particularly vulnerable to threats and abuses related to their newborn infants. In Iraq, babies have been taken from their detained mothers. The women have been forced to listen to their infants' cries while being denied access to comfort or feed them. The leading human rights activists in many societies are prisoners' relatives: often wives and children, endlessly in the front line, campaigning for the prisoner's release, confronting government officials, trying to care for the prisoner. Prisoners' families bear the burden of providing assistance of all sorts - from daily meals, medicine and clothing, through to raising funds to pay legal fees, ransoms or to publicize the case. Countless women are forced to live in the shadow of their husband's "disappearance". A woman may suddenly become her family's sole source of support just at the time when she is facing the absence of a close relative and is trying to locate the "disappeared" victim. She may be effectively widowed by her husband's "disappearance", yet unable to claim state or other benefits because her husband has not been declared dead, officially or legally. Members of the National Coordinating Committee of Widows of Guatemala, an Indian group known as CONAVIGUA, have denounced their government's attitude to providing compensation. The group has repeatedly alleged that government compensation is granted only if a widow attributes her husband's death to opposition guerilla forces and if she ceases to pursue investigation into her husband's death or "disappearance". Relatives of the "disappeared" face additional, emotional suffering. Women often refuse to give up hope and search for years for husbands and children who have "disappeared", even though relatively few victims of "disappearance" are found alive. But unless or until they reappear, or their bodies are found, their families suffer years of uncertainty, unable to properly mourn their loss and thus perhaps to lay their grief to rest. In areas of civil turmoil and armed conflict, women are often subjected to punishment simply because they live in a particular location or belong to a particular ethnic group. They are often caught in the crossfire between armed opposition groups and government forces, living under the threat of violence from both sides. The rape of peasant women, either while in formal custody or when held by soldiers during counterinsurgency operations, is systematic and common. Governments often are compliant in the face of such abuse. Effective investigations into cases of rape in these circumstances are rare and few perpetrators are ever brought to justice. A majority of adults who flee their countries are women. When fleeing persecution, some women are seperated from their families and lose the support provided by a community or familiar cultural environment. With few resources to protect them from abuse or to provide the means of redress, they become victims of a range of violations. Rape, abduction, sexual harassment and physical violence remain a reality for many refugee women. In addition, many women are forced to perform sexual acts to obtain documentation papers or reliefs goods for themselves and their children. Women may face particular problems in establishing their claim to refugee status. A well-founded fear of persecution for reasons such as race, religion, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group is an internationally accepted standard for granting asylum. However, as persecution often takes the form of sexual assault, few women are able to discuss this experience with a male interviewer. As well, immigration officials may fail to recognize that rape in these circumstances constitutes torture as defined in the United Nations Convention against Torture. Catalina Mejia, a dressmaker who worked in a province of El Salvador particularly affected by the 11-year-old conflict in that country, fled to the United States in 1985. She had been raped by a solder who had accused her of being a guerilla, and on two subsequent occasions was accussed by soldiers of being a guerilla.
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Throughout the 1980's, and into the 1990's, patterns of arbitrary arrest, torture (including rape), and killings have continued in El Salvador. In denying Ms Mejia's application for political asylum in 1988, the United States immigration judge ruled that she had failed to establish that she would be at risk of persecution if returned to El Salvador. The judge stated in her decision that the rape of Ms. Mejia by a soldier who accused her of being a “guerilla” was not an act of persecution but “was because she was a female convenient for a brutal soldier acting only in his own self-interest”. Ms. Mejia's appeal against the decision, to the United States Board of Immigration Appeals, was pending in 12/1990. Women who chose not to remain silent in the face of human rights violations inflicted upon them may face barriers such as official tolerance of the injuries caused to them. If they are from disadvantaged social or economic groups, they may find that official channels of communications are closed to them.

Law enforcement officials may not listen, and they may have no place to turn. During the past decade, increasing numbers of women have spoken out for human rights protection. They have stated publicly and clearly what they and other members of their community have suffered. They have also organized community and national groups to protest against human rights abuses. In some countries their vulnerability to such abuse has increased as they have assumed public leadership roles and spoken out about the special measures needed to protect women's human rights. Despite this, they continue to make their demands heard. The Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, the Disappeared and the Assassinated, known as COMARDES, has been prominent for many years in the struggle to protect human rights in El Salvador. COMARDES continues its work today, despite repeated threats against members of the group and violent attacks such as the 10/1989 bombing off its San Salvador office. The Mutual Support Group for the Appearance of Our Relatives Alive, known as GAM, has been a target of violence in Guatemala. GAM members press government authorities to account for the “disappeared”. Several GAM leaders were abducted and killed in 1985, apparently by government agents. Other GAM members are now the target of threats. The group's leader, Nineth Montenegro de Garcia has received so many death threats that human rights activists worldwide have sent appeals on her behalf to the Guatemalan authorities on a number of occasions. Her mother, whose house was strafed with machine gun fire in 1990, appears to be at risk from government forces or people associated with them. The bullets recovered from the attack reportedly were of a calibre known to be used by the military. Susan Aniban of Task Force Detainees, a human rights group in the Philippines, was reportedly detained and tortured in 11/1988. Numerous women human rights workers there have been subjected to such abuse. Women have played prominent roles in South African human rights organizations such as the Detainees' Parents Support Committee and the Black Sash. Despite decades of repression, women activists have continued to mobilize against mass detentions, torture, and the injustices perpetrated by apartheid. The determination of women like these in the face of such persecution, along with the courage of many other women and men who continue to fight for human rights, has yielded significant results in recent years. More information than ever before is now available to the international community about the violence against women worldwide. The momentum to end patterns of abuses has increased as more women have joined efforts to publicize the facts and to press for change. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have joined in these efforts. A growing number of Amnesty International sections have established working groups and networks to carry out long-term work on behalf of women who have been subjected to human rights abuse. In February, representatives from a number of sections will meet in Geneva, Switzerland, to develop an international action plan to promote Amnesty International's work on behalf of women. [↩]

48013. Bel Fekih, Cherif Moulay. Modern Secondary Education In The United Arab Emirates: Development, Issues And Perspectives (Education Development). Temple University. Dissertation. 249pp. AAC 9316454. [Advisor: Amato, Anthony] This dissertation examines the secondary education system in the United Arab Emirates and attempts to trace its development in the following areas: goals and objectives, structure, human and material resources, students, curriculum and instruction, graduates and the differential impact it has on different groups. Major issues were identified and its future perspectives discussed. There were three stages of development of modern education in general in what is now the United Arab Emirates: (1) From 1905-1953 (2) From 1953-1971 (3) From 1971-1995. The period from 1953-1971 saw educational missions from neighboring countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It was in this period that secondary education began. Enrollments grew slowly and students were mainly male. (3) The creation of the federation in 1971 gave an impetus to secondary education and enrollments soared under a unified Ministry of Education. The turning points in the development of education in general were the setting up by Britain of the Trucial States Council in 1953, the rise of Arab nationalism under Egyptian president Nasser and the setting up in 12/1971 of the new state grouping the seven emirates of the Trucial States Council, the perfect welfare state keen to provide all kinds of social services, of which education, to its citizens. Materials gathered through interviews, primary and secondary data reveal remarkable continuity in objectives and ways of achieving them despite reorientations the system has undergone since its introduction. Despite all the components of a good system e.g., adequate financing, qualified and experienced teachers, the system is found to be plagued by low internal and external efficiency as drop out rates are high and the curriculum largely theoretical and fails to prepare students to function adequately in an economy still run by expatriates. It was found that females, expatriates and secondary level students outperform males, nationals and middle level students as measured by examination results and drop-out rates. No significant differences exist between urban and rural students in achievement. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,] [↩]

48014. Bracey, Derek. “In Brief: Filipina Sentenced to Death”, in Militant (Socialist Workers Party), October 2, 1995. p. 2. A court in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sentenced Sarah Balabagan, 16, to death on 9/16/1995 for killing her employer when he attempted to rape her. The Filipina, who was working as a maid, had been convicted on 6/26/1995 for the death and sentenced to seven years in prison. Balabagan's lawyer said he would appeal the verdict. The earlier court ruling accepted Balabagan's explanation that she killed in self-defense and awarded her $27000. It also ordered her to pay $41000 as “blood money" to his family. Balabagan's case is being followed closely in the Philippines, where up to 6.5 million workers are employed in other countries. Of 100000 immigrant maids in the UAE, 20000 are from the Philippines. Tens of thousands of Filipinos protested the execution of Flor Contemplacion in 3/1995, another worker from the Philippines employed as a maid in Singapore. [↩]

48015. DS. “Near East and North Africa: United Arab Emirates: Part 01: Introduction", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates established in 1971. None have democratically elected institutions or political parties. Each emirate retains extensive control over internal and external efficiency as drop out rates are high and the curriculum largely theoretical and fails to prepare students to function adequately in an economy still run by expatriates. It was found that females, expatriates and secondary level students outperform males, nationals and middle level students as measured by examination results and drop-out rates. No significant differences exist between urban and rural students in achievement. [Reprinted with permission of Dissertation Abstracts,] [↩]
members manage to reach top positions in the Federal Government. The is enough for the emploYee's basic needs and to secure a means of the UAE's Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few of their Social Affairs. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay offered relatively new to government service and because there continues to be Workers in the industrial and service sectors are normally employed positions, but there are few women in senior positions because they are practiced. Most of the work force is composed of foreign nationals.

other prominent tribal rulers. Women are free to hold government grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it is not choice of a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling family in consultation with Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. UAE law does not

national level Members of the Federal National Council (FNC) are sources report a low incidence of medical cases resulting from spouse abuse is rarely reported in the UAE. Knowledgeable

sensitive to the Government. [=] 48016. DS. "Near East and North Africa: United Arab Emirates: Part 13: Respect For Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Most women play a family-centered, subordinate role in UAE society because of the frequency of early marriage and traditional attitudes about women's activities. As noted earlier, husbands may bar their wives and children from leaving the country without their consent, and married women may not take employment without their husbands' written consent. In cases of divorce, Islamic law is observed. The woman receives custody of children until they are 7 years of age. After that a child usually lives with his or her father unless there are circumstances that convince judicial authorities that custody should be given to the mother. In divorce cases in which the mother is a non-Muslim or a foreigner, the court usually rants custody to the father regardless of the child's age. A woman who remarries forfeits her right to the custody of children from a previous marriage. Polygyny, in accordance with Islamic law, is permitted for men. In practice, few UAE men have more than one wife. Women are restricted from holding majority shares in most major types of businesses. UAE women employed outside the home generally receive equal pay for equal work. A woman's property is not commingled with that of her husband's.

movement to advance rapidly. Female enrollment at the UAE University, for example, now constitutes 70% of the student body, thought this is partially attributable to the fact that UAE women rarely study abroad, as many UAE men do. Opportunities for women are also growing in government service and in traditional occupations such as education and health. Women are officially encouraged to continue their education, and government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and technical training courses. The UAE military service accepts women volunteers in the officer corps and as enlisted personnel. A special military training course for women, started after the Gulf war, continues. Spouse abuse is rarely reported in the UAE. Knowledgeable sources report a low incidence of medical cases resulting from spouse abuse. However, when reported, the local police authorities take action to protect women from abuse. UAE laws also protect women from verbal abuse or harassment from men, and violators are subject to criminal action. There continue to be credible reports of abuse of female domestic servants by both UAE and foreign employers, but the authorities do take action against the offender when an incident is reported. [=] 48018. DS. "Near East and North Africa: United Arab Emirates: Part 20: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (b) The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. UAE law does not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it is not practiced. Most of the work force is composed of foreign nationals. Workers in the industrial and service sectors are normally employed under contracts that are subject to review by the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay offered is enough for the employee's basic needs and to secure a means of...
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living. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers must rely on
conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor & Social
Affairs or on special labor courts. Domestic servants and agricultural
workers are not covered by UAE labor laws and thus have great difficulty
in obtaining any assistance in resolving labor disputes. In the free port
where manufacturing takes place, the same laws and regulations apply
as in the rest of the country. [=]

48019. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section
1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c)
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United
States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In
Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. There were no reports of torture in 1994. The
Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment. Shari'a, or Islamic,
courts frequently impose flogging on Muslims found guilty of adultery,
prostitution, and drug and alcohol abuse. According to press accounts,
punishments for adultery and prostitution have ranged from 80-100 lashes.
In several cases, Muslims convicted of drunkenness have been
sentenced to 80 lashes. Non-Muslims may also be sentenced to such
punishments, but the Federal Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that
convictions do not require the imposition of Shari'a penalties on non-
Muslims. In 1994 several non-Muslims were reportedly sentenced to
lashing after their convictions for adultery and prostitution. There was no
indication that the punishments were carried out. No amputations
were known to have been carried out. [=]

48020. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section
2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement
Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in
To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the
Committee on International Relations, United States House of
Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With
Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. There are no limitations on freedom of movement or relocation
within the country, except near defense and oil installations. Unrestricted
foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male citizens except those
involved in financial disputes under adjudication. However, a husband
may bar his wife and children from leaving the country without his
permission. All citizens have the to return. There is a small population of
stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the UAE for more than
one generation. They are Beduins or the descendants of Beduins who are
unable to prove that they are of UAE origin. The Government does not
issue them passports. Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing
employment. However, foreign workers, except for primarily professional, one may not change employers without first leaving the
country for 6 months. This law is often not enforced. The government
does not have any formal procedure for accepting refugees. It may detain
persons seeking refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await
resettlement in a third country. There is no formal procedure for
naturalization, although foreign women receive citizenship by marriage to
a UAE citizen, and anyone may receive a passport by presidential fiat. [=]

48021. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section
3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their
Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United
States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In
Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. The UAE has no formal democratically elected
institutions, and citizens do not have the right to change their government
or even to form political parties. Although there are consultative councils
at the federal and emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is
in the hands of the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers,
their extended families, and those persons and families to whom they are
allied by historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most
political power in their own emirates. Decisions at the federal level are
generally made by consensus of the sheikhs of the seven emirates and
their leading families. A federal consultative body, called the Federal
National Council (FNC) consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of
each emirate. The FNC has no legislative authority but may question
ministers and make policy recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions
are usually public. The choice of a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling
family in consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By tradition,
the rulers and ruling families are presumed to have the right to rule, but their
incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their leadership and their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate rulers are accessible,
in varying degrees, to citizens who have a problem or a request. Tradition rather than law has limited the rob of women. Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in senior
positions because they are relatively new to government service and
because there is pressure in many families against women entering the
workplace. Although the small Shi'a Muslim minority has enjoyed
commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have top positions in the
Federal Government. [=]

48022. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section
5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or
Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations,
United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In
Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. The Government is committed to the welfare of
children. Children receive free health care, free education, and
guaranteed housing. There is no pattern of societal abuse of children. [=]

48023. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section
5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or
Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations,
United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In
Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520(b) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia:
GPO, February 1995. Most women play a subordinate role in society
because of the frequency of early marriage and traditional attitudes about
women's activities. As noted in Section 2.d., husbands may bar their
wives and children from leaving the country and married women may not
accept employment without their husbands' written consent. Islamic law
is applied in cases of divorce. The woman receives custody of children
until they are 7 years of age. Children older than 7 years live with their
fathers unless judicial authorities decide otherwise. In divorce cases in
which the mother is a non-Muslim or a foreigner, the court usually
grants custody to the father regardless of the child's age. A woman who
remarries forfeits her right to the custody of children from a previous
marriage. Islamic law permits polygamy for men, but they rarely
practice it. Women are restricted from holding majority shares in most
businesses. Women who work outside the home generally receive equal
pay or equal work, but do not receive equal benefits, such as housing.
Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute
70% if the student body at the UAE University, largely because women
rarely study abroad. Opportunities for women have grown in government
service, education, and health services. Women are officially encouraged
to continue their education, and government-sponsored women's centers
provide adult education and technical training courses. The armed forces
accept women volunteers. There is a special military training course for

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women which started after the Gulf War. Spousal abuse is rarely reported. When reported, the local police authorities may take action to protect women from abuse. The laws protect women from verbal abuse or harassment from men. Violators are subject to criminal action. There continue to be credible reports of abuse of female domestic servants by both UAE and foreign employers (see Section 6.e.). The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government may imprison or deport noncitizens or women if they bear children out of wedlock. In the event that courts sentence such women to prison, the local authorities will hold the newborn children in a special facility until the mothers’ release and deportation. Children may remain in this facility longer in the event of a custody dispute. [=]

48024. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (b) The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The law does not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it is not practiced. Workers in the industrial and service sectors are normally employed under contracts that are subject to review by the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay will satisfy the employee's basic needs and secure a means of living. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers must rely on conciliation committees organized by the Ministry Labor & Social Affairs or on special labor courts. Labor laws do not cover domestic servants and agricultural workers, who have difficulty in obtaining any assistance to resolve their labor disputes. In the Jebel Ali free zone in Dubai Emirate, the same labor laws apply as in the rest of the country. [=]

48025. DS. "United Arab Emirates: Respect for Human Rights: Section 6: Worker Rights: (e) Acceptable Conditions of Work", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. There is no legislated or administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation. However, according to the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs, there is an unofficial, unwritten, minimum wage rate which would afford a worker and family a minimal standard of living. As noted in Section 6.e., the Labor & Social Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve contracts that stipulate a clearly unacceptable wage. The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, but these standards are not strictly enforced. Certain types of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obligated to work longer than the mandated standard hours. The law also provided a minimum of 24 days a year of annual leave plus ten national and religious holidays. In addition, manual workers are not required to do outdoor work when the temperature exceeds 45 degrees Celsius (112 degrees F). Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or a housing allowance, medical care and homeward passage from their employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of approximately $1370 a month required to obtain a residency visa for their families. Employers have the option to petition for a one-year ban from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job without fulfilling the terms of his contract. The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, municipalities and civil defense units enforce health and safety standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not uniformly observed in the housing camps provided for foreign workers. Workers’ jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the right to lodge grievances with ministry officials, who make an effort to investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed and underbudgeted so that complaints and compensation claims are backlogged. Complaints may be appealed to the Ministry and ultimately to the courts. However, many workers do not protest for fear of reprimands or deportation. There have been reports, some published in the local press, of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, by their employers. Allegations have included excessive work hours, extremely low wages, and verbal and physical abuse. [=]

48026. Noakes, Greg [Compiler]; American Education Trust. "Issues in the News: From the Middle East Press: Big Bucks for UAE Bridesgrooms", in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (American Education Trust, Box 53062, Washington DC 20009), April/May 1993. pp. 55-57. Men in the UAE who marry local women will be offered up to $200000 to cover the cost of marriage, according to the official WAM news agency. The high costs of weddings and inflated dowries for local women have prompted many men in the emirates to look abroad when considering marriage. Labor and Social Affairs Minister Sair Al-Jarwan said the offer was designed to control the “negative results on future generations” of marriages between UAE men and foreign women. [=]

48027. Williams, Maurice. "In Brief: Philippine Maid Spared Death", in Militant (SWP), November 20, 1995, p. 2. Sarah Balabagan, a Philippine maid sentenced to death for killing a man who raped her, was spared execution by an Islamic court in the United Arab Emirates. The court sentenced her to 100 lashes, a year in prison, and deportation after she pays a fine of $41000 to the dead man's family. The judge said the 15 months Balabagan had already sent in jail would not count toward her sentence. [=]
Yemen

50000. ---. "Briefs: Inquiry Into Fate of Yemenite Children [Justice Minister David Libai given authorization to tell Knesset it supports an inquiry into disappearance of Yemenite children in the 1950’s]. 5 bills by Avigdor Kahalani (Labor), David Mena, Yeshoshua Matza, and Ron Nahman (Likud), and Eliezer Zandberg (Tsomet) have been introduced on the issue. No formal action taken, while awaiting report by commission headed by Moshe Shalage."

50001. ---. "Criminal Inequality of Today’s World", in Revolutionary Worker, July 24, 1994. p. 13. According to a new United Nations report, the amount of wealth created in the world has been increasing at a remarkable rate. Over the past half a century, total world income increased sevenfold (in terms of "real gross domestic product") and the average income per person more than tripled. The so-called "human development index"—which measures income, life expectancy, literacy, and education—doubled in developed countries and increased by 80% even in the poorest countries. This means that human society has more and more means that could be used to eliminate poverty and hunger throughout the world. But that is no happening. Increases in average income or average literacy or average life expectancy doesn't mean that no people have more money, education or life span. As one expert told the Los Angeles Times (June 14), "That's like the man- with his head in the oven and his foot in the icebox. The average temperature doesn't tell the story." The new Human Development Report, released last month by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), documents that the poor of the world are getting poorer and more desperate. The rich are getting richer. And the gap between the rich and poor is growing—not shrinking. In particular, the study confirms that most wealth is channeled to just a handful of countries. The UNDP refers to these wealthiest imperialist countries as "the industrialized countries" or "the North"—and it calls the poor, oppressed countries "the developing countries" or "the South." More and More Poverty Alongside Growing Wealth: The UNDP report shows that the world capitalism have created widespread and spreading absolute poverty—where a major part of humanity owns virtually nothing but the clothes on their backs and often does not know where their next meal is coming from. More than one billion people worldwide are surviving on the equivalent of $1 a day. More than a third of the people in the oppressed countries live below the poverty line (the minimum income that officials claim covers the basic necessities of life). The peoples of Latin America, Africa, and many parts of Asia have seen their desperately low standards of living decline even further over several decades. This worsening poverty is particularly sharp in Africa where many countries are poorer today than 30 years ago. Africa has twice the population of the United States, but the UNDP writes, "Africa's total wealth is just slightly above Belgium's." Belgium is a tiny, European country with a population the size of Ohio's. Nine of the world's ten poorest countries in the world are in Africa. The Arab country of Yemen was already one of the poorest countries in the world in 1988. But over just three years the average annual income per person dropped 14%—to $1374 in 1992. A fifth of Yemen lives in "absolute" poverty. Capitalist economics call countries like this "economically marginalized" because the world's capitalists do not see a way to make money off the masses of people in Yemen, the country is just left to stagnate. Yemen's Deputy Minister of Information told the Los Angeles Times "Yemen has its own peculiar problems, but a lot of what is happening here is like what is happening in the world. As it gets worse, we're going to witness a kind of revolution of the poor in all forms of unrest that is eventually bound to spill over into other areas too." According to the UNDP report, the majority of humanity (the poorest 80% of the world population) saw their share of world income drop between 1960-1991—while the share that went to richest 20% grew. The richest 1 billion people on earth—about 20% of the world's population—now receive almost 85% of wealth created on earth, while the poorest 1 billion receive less than 2%. This means that the top layer of world society takes 60 times as much wealth as the bottom. This gap between the richest and the poorest has doubled over the last 30 years— in the mid-'60s the top fifth of the world's population received 30 times what the bottom fifth did.

The Rich Poor Gap Within Countries: Capitalism has also widened the gap between rich and poor classes within countries. In Brazil, the top 20% earn 32 times more than the poorest today—a drop from 26 to 1 in just two years. South Africa's wealth and standard of living ranks it as 93rd in the world—right in the middle of the world's 173 countries. But if the white-settler minority within South Africa is looked at as a separate country, their living standard ranks 24th in the world, above Spain. If black South Africans are looked at as a separate country, they would rank 123rd— one of the poorest people in the world. The UNDP says that South Africa is "not just two different peoples, these are almost two different worlds." Poverty has also been increasing within many imperialist countries. Because of intense capitalist crises, between 20-70% of the populations in former Soviet bloc countries are at or below the poverty line. 40% of the population in Russia has dropped below the poverty line. In Russia, life expectancy has been dropping rapidly. Though the average per capita consumption of goods and services increased by 70% in the US over the last 25 years, fewer goods make it to those at the bottom: 15% of US children were poor in 1970, but today 20% are poor. The top 20% of the US population receives nine times as much wealth as the bottom 20%. This is the largest gap between rich and poor in the imperialist countries. The Intolerable Inequalities of This System: The workings of capitalism constantly produce criminal misuse and distribution of the world's wealth. Just one nuclear US aircraft carrier costs more than the GNP in 53 countries. Tremendous wealth is spent to enforce the world's status quo, while 20 million children in the Third World die each year from hunger and malnutrition. Stores in cities like Paris and New York routinely offer handbags and watches for $1500, while each of these luxury items costs more than the average person lives on for a whole year in over 40 countries. In the imperialist countries there is about one doctor per 400 people and an explosion of unnecessary cosmetic surgery for the rich. In oppressed countries, there is an average of one doctor for 7000 people and hundreds of millions of people die from easily preventable diseases. In short, the labor of billions of people has steadily increased the basis for eliminating poverty, hunger, and suffering—but the workings of world capitalism have systematically created more and more suffering in the midst of more and more wealth. As RCP Chaimlan Bob Avaldan points out in these quotes from his book, Bullets: "In today's world with its oppressing and lopsided social and international relations, starving children in Africa and-for that matter, the great majority of humanity, which lives only a few short steps from starvation—do not have the right to make plans for the distribution of the world's productive forces and resources in a way that could eliminate such starvation and misery and make possible a whole new life. Nor, for that matter, do the people in the 'advanced' imperialist countries have this right (or even the right to take practical, meaningful steps to forestall mass starvation in the very short run) even if they wish to do so. Such rights, and whole new visions of freedom, can become reality only through world-overturning revolution that in its ultimate achievement will sweep away the bourgeois notions of what constitute freedom and justice. To put it simply: we've reached the point now where not only is the world fucked-up, but it's upside down when it doesn't have to be any longer. If one is conscious of the fact that the world is dominated by imperialism and if one has any inkling of the consequences of this for the great majority of the world's people, then one should feel compelled to help shatter the whole imperialist system and its entire framework, to remake social relations on an international scale."
what they considered a prosecutor's insult to women during a rape case. Prosecutor Abdul Aziz al-Thawrani said the allegations by a woman and her daughter that they had been raped by policemen were baseless. [=]

50003. AID. "Appendix B: Fact Sheet: AID's Women in Development Program: Highlights of the Agency's Women in Development Actions: Portfolio Reviews", in AID and Third World Women, the Unmet Potential. House Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives. US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, May 11, 1988. pp. 87-97. USAID/Yemen has undertaken a portfolio review of projects to assist with appropriate WID interventions. The suggested interventions will be used as the basis for developing scopes of work to be carried out by Title XII consortia technical specialists and thus will not only contribute to improving Yemeni women's participation in AID development projects, but also support PPC/WID efforts to ensure that WID activities are coordinated even when carried out by a variety of AID collaborators and contractors.

USAID/Bangladesh asked PPC/WID to assist in the preparation of a "Women in Development Implementation Plan" to promote the objectives of their existing women in development strategy. ICRW was able to work with the mission's Program Office, WID Committee, Project Managers and local government and PVO counterparts to review the Mission's portfolio of projects and programs and develop concrete WID goals, priorities, and targets for every project and organize them into a coherent plan. The plan give priority to certain agricultural activities, micro-enterprise development, education and training, and to a lesser extent food-for-work and infrastructure projects. The roles and responsibilities of different staff in the Mission and counterpart agencies were included in the guidelines for implementation, as were mechanisms for tracking progress. [=]

50004. AID. Congressional Presentation, FY 1995: Part 113: Asia and Near East: Yemen. District of Columbia: AID, February 22, 1994. FY 1995 Sustainable Development Request: $10.575 million. The Republic of Yemen is one of the most populous countries in the region in the Near East region with over 12 million people and the poorest, with per capita gross national product (GNP) at approximately $540 in 1991. In development terms, Yemen has great need for economic assistance, particularly in the categories on which the USAID program focuses. It is a country faced with formidable economic problems which have reached near-crisis proportions -- inflation is over 50%, the fiscal deficit is 20%-25% of GDP, total debt is 200% of gross domestic production (GDP) and unemployment is over 35%.

USAID SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND MISSION STRATEGIES (MSOs):
(1) Broad-Based Economic Growth: Increased Participation by Yemeni women and their families in Expanded Educational, Health and Economic Services in Project Areas. Women have traditionally played an invisible role in Yemeni society. Providing women with the tools to compete in an economic environment will empower them to have greater control over their own lives as well as that of their families and provide a greater contribution to Yemen's economic and societal development.

USAID is working with a women's development nongovernmental organization (NGO) to provide training and income generation opportunities. A small loan program is also being initiated and, of those women granted loans, over 200 will still be employed 12 months after receiving their loan. 90% of the borrowers will repay their loans within the required period. In addition, 480 women will participate in NGO-provided management training by 1997, including literacy training. 22% of the NGOs' regional centers will offer a standard package of training to women in their catchment area by 1997. While the actual number of beneficiaries from this program are expected to be small, it is the demonstration nature of the program that is so important. This is the first program of its kind in Yemen. If it succeeds, USAID expects that additional resources from other donors and perhaps the Yemeni Government will be devoted to similar efforts. USAID will track those resources and related activities which its own funds are able to leverage.

(2) Stabilizing Population Growth: Increased Participation by Yemeni Women and Their Families in Expanded Educational, Health and Economic Services in Project Areas. Yemen has one of the world's highest average fertility rates (7.6 children per family) and the most dangerous child and maternal mortality rates: 190 per 1000 live births and 1000 per 100000, respectively. In addition, the country's high population growth is outpacing the economy's ability to support its population. USAID has integrated family planning with maternal and child health into the strategy to bring the size of the technical force to bear on this problem by assisting in the development of more supporting national policies and improvements in service delivery. USAID will increase the number of new family planning users at project-assisted clinics from 4500 in 1993 to over 14000 in 1997. USAID is promoting the development of an integrated model of maternal and child health and family planning services for rural clinics, and will track the diffusion of this model to centers other than those which USAID is assisting. The percentage of targetted primary health care clinics meeting quality criteria will increase from 0% to 65%. USAID will also increase the availability of contraceptives at pharmacies by 50%. In addition, treatment of diarrhea with oral rehydration salts will increase. USAID is working with the new National Population Council to develop policies that encourage the expansion of family planning.

(3) Building Democracy: More Efficient and Accountable Governance. Assistance to Yemen is provided under the Bureau's strategic objective to achieve more efficient and accountable governance. Serious social and economic upheaval followed the unification of the former North and South Yemens. In the midst of daunting problems, Yemen produced a successful experiment in democratic pluralism in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Yemen is today the only country in the Arabian Peninsula with a multiparty system, universal sufrage and a free press. The USAID strategy for this objective is being updated and will provide a new set of indicators later in FY 1994.

USAID MISSION RESULTS: USAID's current strategy began in FY 1993. USAID will not have quantified reports on performance against the strategy until late 1994 when data for 1993 become available.

(1) Broad-Based Economic Growth: Increased participation by Yemeni women and their families in expanded educational, health and economic services in project areas. USAID is working with a Yemeni NGO, the "Yemeni Women's Association," to improve and expand women-specific services offered by its branches. Services include grass-roots support to further develop older girls' and women's literacy as well as enable them to become economically independent through the creation of small and micro enterprises. Literacy training includes learning useful skills in health and nutrition, and learning how to plan and organize an economic enterprise. USAID is also helping increase the availability of selected maternal and child health services. In 1993-1991, USAID supported a nationwide immunization campaign against childhood diseases that reached over 85% of infants. Coverage has dropped since the campaign but remains around 40% in rural areas, well above the pre-campaign level of 15%.

(2) Stabilizing Population Growth: Increased Participation by Yemeni Women and Their Families in Expanded Educational, Health and Economic Services in Project Areas. While it will likely be several years before family planning programs in Yemen will show an impact on population growth rates, studies indicate that pent up demand exists for such services. In dealing with the population growth problem, USAID has assigned high priority to the improved planning of population programs and the increased availability of quality family planning services in project areas. USAID was one of the principal donors to alert the Yemeni Government to its impending population crisis and to encourage it to develop a population strategy and action plan. USAID guided the integration of maternal and child health into the strategy. This integration assures that the provision of family planning services takes advantage of institutional health facilities familiar to women and their families.

If the USAID Mission's Sustainable Development Request is funded, USAID will be able to work with the mission's Program Office, WID Committee, Project Managers and local government and PVO counterparts to review the Mission's portfolio of projects and programs and develop concrete WID goals, priorities, and targets for every project and organize them into a coherent plan. The plan give priority to certain agricultural activities, micro-enterprise development, education and training, and to a lesser extent food-for-work and infrastructure projects. The roles and responsibilities of different staff in the Mission and counterpart agencies were included in the guidelines for implementation, as were mechanisms for tracking progress.

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supported the election process. USAID has also provided a computerized
voting system and initial operation and maintenance support services for
the parliament chamber as well as enhanced administrative services to
run the system.

OTHER FY 1995 USAID-MANAGED ACTIVITIES: None.

OTHER DONORS: In 1992, the United States provided about 4% of
total donor funding. The leading donors were the World Bank, the
Netherlands, Japan, Germany and France.

FY 1995 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REQUEST: The
Administration requests $10.575 million in Sustainable Development
funds for: broad-based economic growth ($275000); population ($8.91
million); and democracy ($940000). [USAID Representative: William D.
McKinney.] [2]

50005. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 04: Respect for
Human Rights: Section 1: Respect For The Integrity of the Person,
Including Freedom from: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports On Human
Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on
Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In
 Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign
proscribes "physical punishment and degrading treatment." It is widely
believed, however, that security officials resort with impunity to force or
the threat of force to extract information from detainees. Some continued
to be reports in the Yemeni press alleging torture and mistreatment by
prison officials. Amnesty International reports that at the beginning of 1993
at least 60 of the 1000 persons arrested in anti-government riots in
12/1992 remained in detention. Some detainees were reportedly
subjected to torture, including beatings and electric shocks. Credible
reports indicate that Mansur Muhammad Ahmad Rahi, a writer and NDF
activist, who remains imprisoned, has been subjected to torture
throughout his incarceration. There was a credible report that a European
tourist was detained and tortured in July. There were no reported
instances of amputation in 1993. In seven out of eight cases in which
amputation penalties were imposed, the Yemeni Supreme Court refused
to confirm the sentences and in several cases ordered the prisoners
released upon a finding that their periods of incarceration, which ranged
up to 10 years, were adequate punishment. The eighth case was still
pending. Substandard conditions in Yemeni prisons represent a threat to
the health of inmates. Visitors from human rights organizations and local
press reports have described inadequate food, medical, and sanitary
facilities, and severe overcrowding. In the women's section of Sanaa
central prison, prisoners were in some instances unable to obtain milk
for their children who were incarcerated with them. Although they are
theoretically banned, shackles are still used in a number of Yemeni
prisons. Mentally ill persons are occasionally shackled, as are those
involved in "blood-money" cases, i.e., prisoners held until they can pay a
specified amount of compensation to the family of someone they have
killed, usually in a traffic accident. [2]

50006. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 11: Respect for
Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d)
Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration
and Repatriation", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For
1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With
Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
As Amended. February 1994. Yemeni citizens enjoy freedom of travel
within Yemen, although there are many checkpoints on major roads.
Foreigners are required to obtain permits for travel outside the capital,
but the regulations are not strictly enforced and allow the Government
to respond more quickly in case of need. Permission for most tourist travel
is easily obtainable through travel agencies, and there are no reports of
permission being denied. Most Yemenis are able to travel abroad freely
and to emigrate. In contrast to 1992, Yemeni Jews are now able to
emigrate with relatively little hindrance. The Government has taken the
stand that Yemeni Jews, like all Yemenis, are entitled to passports and
that if they follow the prescribed procedures they will be issued travel
documents. This policy is being implemented in practice. For most
Yemenis, obtaining passports is a relatively simple matter. Exit permit
procedures have been simplified, and permits are generally available at
the airport. However, young males who have not yet completed their
service sometimes are prevented from leaving abroad. Moreover, women seeking exit visas are often asked to prove that male
relatives do not object to their travel. There have been no reports of
Yemenis being denied the right to return. Following a dramatic increase
in the number of refugees (primarily from Horn of Africa countries) in
1992 from about 10000 to over 60000, the influx in 1993 was insignificant.
There are no known cases of refugees being denied asylum and there
were no reports of forced repatriation. Many of the refugees have family
or tribal ties to Yemen and have found work in Yemen. The Government
has offered Somalis without ethnic affiliation to Yemen asylum under the
care of UNHCR. The Government closely monitors all political activity
by refugees. Many of the Palestinians who arrived in Yemen from
Lebanon in 1982-1983 have departed, the remainder live in camps near
Sanaa and Aden are closely watched by the security services. Other
Palestinians are employed, often as teachers or business people, and are
not subject to significant restrictions on their freedom of movement. [2]

50007. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 12: Respect For
Human Rights: Section 3: Respect For Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens To Change Their Government", in Country Reports On Human
Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on
Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In
 Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The right of the
citizens of Yemen to change their government was successfully tested—
at least to some degree—by the holding of the new Republic's first
elections in April in which 301 members of Parliament were chosen and
which were generally judged to be free and open. All the top leaders of
the former YAR and PDRY have remained in power after unification. The
Constitution divides powers to the Parliament: these include electing
the President and the Council of Ministers. However, the President
ordered confidence from the Government, questioning the Prime Minister and other Ministers, ratifying international
agreements, and approving the budget. In its initial sessions, the
Parliament vetoed some government-sponsored bills and requested
modifications in others. Parliament has shown less independence on
issues of substance, as in the debates over constitutional amendments.
Implementation of laws passed by the Parliament has been uneven as
local government and other officials retain considerable discretion in
interpreting and enforcing the law. A five-member Presidential Council
with broad executive powers has functioned since unification. Its
chairman is the former YAR President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and its Vice
Chairman, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) Secretary General, Ali
Salen al-Bish. The Council's executive powers include the right to pass
laws by decree when the Parliament is not in session. Laws passed
by decree must be submitted for review by the Parliament within 30
days. The Council appointed Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas Prime Minister
in 5/1990, and he formed a government now comprised of 30 ministries,
divided among the three coalition members. The new Constitution
permits political parties, although by law their programs may not oppose
the Islamic religion or the goals of the Yemeni revolution or violate
Yemeni international commitments. Under the law, government financial
support must be given to recognized political parties, and parties may
establish their own newspapers. Even before unification, while technically illegal in both the YAR and the PDRY, new political parties
began to organize. There are currently 54 political parties in Yemen, but
only one has been registered in accordance with the 1991 political
parties law. Women may vote and hold office by law, although this right
is limited in practice by cultural and religious traditions. Two members of
the 301-member Parliament are women, and few women hold senior
leadership positions in the Government or political parties. [2]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Yemen

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50009. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 15: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (a) Women", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Although the Constitution provides for equality of the sexes, significant restrictions on women are imposed by tradition and law. Under current law, polygamy is allowed, husbands may divorce their wives without justifying their actions before the court, and, in case of divorce, both the family home and the children are often awarded to the husband. Until this year the relatively progressive family law from the south was still applied in Aden. Earlier this year, however, a presidential decree containing more restrictive regulations against women was issued. Since it has never been ratified by Parliament, it technically is not law. A prominent lawyer in Aden, however, cites from personal experience before the courts their enforcement of the more restrictive regulations. The institution of dowry payments is widespread. The amount of payments has continued to increase; government efforts at limiting their size have been ineffective, due to societal restraints. Societal pressures also often force women to defer to the guidance of male colleagues and the general supervision of male relatives as, for example, in seeking to travel abroad. Education of women in significant numbers began in the YAR only at the end of the civil war in 1970, although education of women in the PDRY was more advanced. It is conservatively estimated that 80% of Yemeni women are illiterate (some estimates range as high as 9%), compared to 40-50% of all men. In Aden, women work in midlevel jobs in several ministries and in banks and other businesses. Yemen's largest factory group employs women on the same pay scale as men, and women have risen through the ranks to lower management positions. There are female judges and lawyers in Aden and lesser members in the north. The Ministry of Justice has only one female employee. Wife beating and other physical abuse of women does occur in Yemeni families. Statistics on wife beating are unavailable. Although there is little public discussion of this matter, it has received increasing attention in the press. The female victim usually turns to a male relative to pressure the perpetrator to stop the abuse- she may seek a legal remedy, but social traditions usually compel women and their male relatives to seek mediation and keep the matter within the extended family. There is a government-sponsored women's association which promotes female education and civic responsibilities. [=]

50010. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 16: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (b) Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. The Yemeni Government claims to be fully committed to protecting children's rights and hosted an international children's rights seminar in 1993. In the face of continued government preoccupation with the political crisis, however defense of children's rights is a low priority. Yemen is an extremely impoverished nation and cannot provide all the health, education, and welfare benefits children enjoy in more developed countries. There is, however, a system of universal education for children, as well as Government health clinics. Child marriage remains common in rural areas. A form of female genital mutilation, clitorectomy, is practiced in the Thama Red Sea coastal region and in the region of the Hadramaut along the Gulf of Aden, especially among Yemenis of African origin. The extent of the practice is unknown. While some government health workers in the Thama actively discourage clitorectomy, there is no government directive or guidance against the practice. Conservative social mores effectively prevent public discussion or government acknowledgment of the practice. [=]

50011. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 18: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language of Social Status: (e) Religious Minorities", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. Apart from several Adeni Christian families and 20-30 underground Bahais in the north, Jews are Yemen's only indigenous religious minority. By custom, non-Muslims are not permitted to carry weapons, traditionally carried by Muslim Yemenis. With the recent lifting of travel restrictions, the most blatant form of discrimination against Jews has been removed. More subtle forms of discrimination, such as lack of political and economic opportunities, and the inability of Jewish men to marry outside the Jewish community, remain. Such discrimination is usually the result of custom rather than government policy, however. [=]

50012. DS. "Near East and North Africa: Yemen: Part 23: Respect For Human Rights: Section 5: Workers Rights: (d) Minimum Age for Employment of Children", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1993. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. February 1994. There was no minimum age for employment of children in the YAR. Labor by minors aged 12-14 was regulated by the Labor Code. In the PDRY the Labor Code prohibited the employment of children (defined as between 7 and 12 years of age) and regulated that of young persons (between 12 and 16 years of age), although these provisions were not rigorously enforced. Currently, apprentice employment of young persons aged 14 and older is permitted. This minimum age requirement is not enforced, and child labor is common throughout Yemen, particularly in rural areas. For the most part, it is sanctioned by family tradition, and it is not uncommon to see children working in workshops or stores. In the south, child labor often occurs on family, cooperative, and state farms. [=]

50013. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: (c) Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) Of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel or inhuman punishments. It states that the Government may not impose
President. The President has the authority to introduce legislation and genital mutilation, the Government has not passed any legislation or nor.

...power still rests in the hands of relatively few leaders, particularly the practice. While some government health workers discourage female child marriage is still common in rural areas. Female genital mutilation.

1993 parliamentary election. Although the Government is accountable to civil war. Moreover, the Government lacks the resources necessary to.


Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Yemeni Human Rights Organization is the only local nongovernmental human rights group. It is headquartered in Sanaa with branches in seven other cities. The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights, wasbased in Aden. After the civil war, the Government dissolved it because it was purportedly regarded as a separatist" organization. There is a human rights committee in Parliament, which has done little of significance aside from holding meetings and hosting an international

50016. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 4: Governmental Attitude Regarding International and NGO Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Yemeni Human Rights Organization is the only local nongovernmental human rights group. It is headquartered in Sanaa with branches in seven other cities. The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights, wasbased in Aden. After the civil war, the Government dissolved it because it was purportedly regarded as a separatist" organization. There is a human rights committee in Parliament, which has done little of significance aside from holding meetings and hosting an international childrens rights conference in 1993. Amnesty International and Middle Eastern Watch observe Yemen closely, especially in the wake of the civil war. There is an International Committee of the Red Cross representative resident in Yemen. The Government has given these groups relatively broad access to government officials, records, refugee camps, and prisons. [=]

50014. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 2: Respect For Civil Liberties, Including: (d) Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended, Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government does not obstruct the freedom of travel, although the army and security forces maintain checkpoints on major roads. The Government does not obstruct travel abroad or the right to emigrate and return. In recent years it has removed bureaucratic obstacles that prevented most Jews from traveling abroad. Women must often obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a passport. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of a citizen to any country. [=]

50015. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 3: Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to Change Their Government", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. International observers judged as generally as free and fair the 1993 parliamentary election. Although the Government is accountable to the Parliament, there are significant limitations on the ability of the people to affect change within their society. To date the Parliament is not an effective counterweight to executive authority it has done little more than debate issues. Decisionmaking is not transparent, and real political power still rests in the hands of relatively few leaders, particularly the President. The President has the authority to introduce legislation and promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees must be approved by Parliament within 30 days after reconvening. In theory, if the decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, very little happens if the decree is not approved. The President appoints the Prime Minister who forms the Government. The Cabinet is comprised of 27 ministers, with 16 ministers from the GPC, 9 from Islaah, and 2 independents. In northern and southern governorates, tribal leaders retain considerable discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central government authority in these areas is often weak. Some observers maintain that tribalism may promote accountable government in some ways by dramatically drawing the Government's attention to the grievances of the people. There is a functioning multiparty system. All parties must register with the Government, but such registration is routinely granted. The Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are contrary to Islam or oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution or violate Yemeni international commitments. By law the Government must give financial support to all recognized parties, and parties are permitted to establish their own newspapers. Many of the approximately 50 political parties are very small and exist on paper only. The three largest are the GPC, the Islah Party, and the YSP. The opposition is weak and divided among miniparties, except for the YSP which, even in its weakened state, still has weight, especially in the South. Although women may vote and hold office, these rights are limited by cultural and religious custom. Only 2 women have been elected to the 301-member Parliament, and few hold senior leadership positions in the Government or political parties. [=]

50017. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Children", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 520B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. The Government's commitment to protecting childrens' rights was adversely affected by the political crisis and the civil war. Moreover, the Government lacks the resources necessary to ensure adequate health, education, and welfare services for children. Child marriage is still common in rural areas. Female genital mutilation is practiced by Yemenis of African origin in the coastal areas along the Red and Arabian seas. There is no available information on the extent of the practice. While some government health workers discourage female genital mutilation, the Government has not passed any legislation or nor.
made any other effort to eradicate the practice. [6]

50018. DS. "Yemen: Respect for Human Rights: Section 5: Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language or Social Status: Women", in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. Report Submitted To The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, By the Department of State, In Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 5208(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As Amended. Joint Committee Print. District of Columbia: GPO, February 1995. Prior to 1994 the Constitution stated that no discrimination shall be practiced due to sex, color, racial origin, language, occupation, social status, or religious beliefs." However, as amended in 1994, the Constitution now states that "all citizens are equal in general rights and duties." The change has been interpreted as an attempt to weaken previous constitutional guarantees of equality, especially for women. Women face significant restrictions imposed by law and social custom. Men are permitted to take as many as four wives, provided they treat their wives equally. Husbands may divorce wives without justifying their actions before a court and, in the case of divorce, both the family home and children are often awarded to the husband. Women also have the right to divorce their husbands in accordance with precepts of Shar’a. Islamic law permit a Muslim man to marry a Christian or Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Social pressure often forces women to defer to the guidance of male relatives if they wish to travel abroad. Married women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses; but they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen of foreign-born fathers. The practice of dowry payments is widespread, despite government efforts to limit the size of such payments. An estimated 80% of women are illiterate, compared to 40-50% percent of men. In general, women in Aden are better educated and have somewhat greater employment opportunities than women in northern Yemen. Before the civil war, women in Aden worked in private business and at mid-level government jobs. Several women worked as lawyers and judges. After the civil war, the number of working women in Aden appears to have declined. Many observers say this is due to the increasing "Islamization" of Adeni society, although there is no concrete evidence of this. Although spousal abuse is known to occur, reliable statistics on its extent are unavailable, and there is little public discussion of this matter. In theory, abused women have the right to sue their husbands, but few do so. According to social tradition, battered women are pressured to keep spousal violence problems within the family. They may seek help and mediation from male relatives to halt abuse. The Government has established a women's association to promote female education and civic responsibilities, and a nongovernmental organization has also been established for the same purpose. [6]

50019. Dixon, Ruth B.; AID; DS; Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination: Office of Women in Development, WID. "Part 04: Current Evaluations of Women in Development Projects: A Review and Analysis: Background", in Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women, District of Columbia: Department of State, AID, Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination, Office of Women in Development (WID), May 1980. The Elliott and Sorsby report includes profiles of 43 projects funded by AID or by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in which women are specified as beneficiaries (in whole or in part) and, for AID projects, that have been evaluated. A number of these do not comply with the more restrictive definition proposed by AID's Office of Women in Development, however, which identifies a WID project as one designed for women only to help them "catch up" with men, or one with a strong women's component as an integral part of a general project. AID's definition, which emphasizes women's economic roles, excludes activities such as maternal and child health or family planning that do not reach women and girls, and services in the absence of training or other assistance aimed at increasing productivity or earnings. According to the Special Concerns Code for classifying AID projects, the WID category should: Include activities which will help integrate women into the economy of their respective countries, thereby both improving their status as well as assisting the total development effort. (See Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Act.) Programs and projects which are in whole or part specifically designed to afford women the opportunity to participate in the development process in a significant way are to be included in this category. Not all projects which include women as beneficiaries are to be included. For instance, population projects in which women are merely recipients of contraceptives, or health projects where mothers receive food and services for their children, are to be excluded. However, where, in addition to the provision of goods and services, women receive training or other assistance designed to increase their earning capacity or enhance their economic productivity, include the relevant portion of the funding for the women's component in this category. Where a specific women's component is designed into an integrated project, include the proportion of that component as a women in development effort. (emphasis added).

Of the 43 projects included in the Elliott and Sorsby report, 3 are reviewed here. Of the 11 that were excluded, 6 are AID agency-wide grants to US institutions for training or research in which the analysis of social impact on intended beneficiaries is not possible [Grants to Stanford University for the design of radio prototypes for teaching elementary math in LDCs; to Stanford University for curriculum development in low-cost communication; to Florida State University for the development of educational technology useful for LDCs; to the University of Massachusetts for training in non-formal education; to Oklahoma University for research in low-cost methods of water and waste treatment in LDCs; and to the American Home Economics Association for training third world home economists in family planning.]; one is an urban water project with no clear women's component [Taiz Water Rehabilitation in Yemen Arab Republic (AID/NE).]; one is a day-care center for nutritionally deprived children [Day care center for hardship children in Chile (AID/LAC).]; one is a grant for the evaluation of an educational TV system [Evaluation of education TV projects in El Salvador (AID/LAC).]; and two are clear women's projects for which documentation could not be obtained [Poultry development in Yemen Arab Republic (AID/NE).; Caritas de Honduras housewives clubs (Inter-American Foundation).]. Evaluations were obtained from AID files and from the July 1978 and January 1979 Directory of Projects Involving Women in Development, compiled by the Secretariat for Women in Development of the Organization of American States. An additional compilation of Women in Development projects can be found in the Directory.

The remaining 32 Women in Development projects are listed in Table 1 according to their respective categories. Purposes can be classified according to a number of criteria. A recipient agency --a Ministry of Education,a marketing cooperative, a women's association--receives aid on the "promise" that it will provide goods or services (directly or indirectly) to a targeted class of beneficiaries within given parameters such as budget and time constraints and through designated procedures. These goods or services are intended to achieve specific project purposes, e.g., "to increase annual net cash farm incomes over 50% in a five-year period, by adopting modern sericulture practices." One useful approach is to distinguish between projects designed primarily to increase the productivity of beneficiaries (classes of individuals, households, or localities) and those designed to improve their welfare. "Welfare," for lack of a better term, refers here to the fulfillment of basic human needs. The distinction between productivity and welfare is somewhat artificial, since material prosperity (deriving from productivity) is a basic element of human welfare, while health, education, and organizational capacity can all increase productivity.)

Projects defined as increasing productivity try to raise production, employment, or incomes among the target group(s) either directly through skills training (formal or nonformal), group mobilization, technical assistance, credit, or job creation, or indirectly through the expansion of physical infrastructures such as electricity, irrigation, and roads, or through other means. They may focus on productivity in food and...
agricultural production and distribution, on nonagricultural production and services, or on some mix of these. Included in the agricultural sector in
Table I are a palm oil purchasing and food marketing cooperative for
women in Cameroon, a sericulture project for farm families in northeast
Thailand, a pig raising project in the Republic of Korea, a land
conservation scheme in Lesotho, and a rural water systems project in
Kenya. The nonagricultural sector includes skills training and production
centers in sewing and clothing industries in Ghana; mixed income-
generating and training projects in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Zambia,
Salvador, and the Philippines. Mixed income-generating projects—the
most frequently occurring category—include a variety of small-scale
agricultural and nonagricultural production schemes for low-income rural
and urban women such as handicrafts, poultry raising, and food
production and processing.

Projects defined as improving welfare include general education in
the formal or nonformal sectors (school construction or staffing in
Uganda and Afghanistan, functional literacy and self-help activities in
Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka); health programs (health and
education in Tanzania); and support for national or local organizations for
leadership training, research, program planning, community outreach,
and other activities intended to promote citizen participation. This latter
category, the second most frequent on the list, includes seven projects in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Some projects overlap the boundaries because of the diversity of
their purposes or the phased sequence of activities. Several projects in
the community organization category, for example, have as their eventual
goal the expansion of income-generating opportunities for women
although they are still in the formative stages of leadership training or
research. An integrated rural development scheme (listed separately) of
the CARE/AID water project in Kenya. In general, however, the women-
specific projects are significantly smaller in scale than are the mixed
projects that have the potential, at least, of reaching larger numbers of
female beneficiaries.

The treatment of women’s roles as summarized in Table 2 is
analyzed under three headings: the extent of women’s participation in
decision making, either as project staff or as members of the
group; the extent of women’s direct access to project benefits; and
the immediate and long-term effects of the project on women’s social
and economic status. [For other approaches to measuring women’s
participation (or “popular participation”) in development projects,
among others] American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign
Service (1975); Cohen and Uphoff (1977), pp. 27-58; Dulansey (1977);
Mickelwait, et al. (1976); Palmer (1979).]

Participation in decision making refers to women’s involvement in
decision design, implementation, and evaluation. It is useful to distinguish
here between the role of women as staff members in donor agencies and
recipient institutions (service providers) that administer the project, and
the role of women as intended beneficiaries. First, to what extent and in
what capacity are women represented among staff members in donor
and recipient agencies responsible for decisions regarding project
planning and management? Second, does the decision-making process
within donor and recipient agencies reflect an institutionalized concern for
the interest of girls and women as beneficiaries? Third, to what extent
and in what capacity do women from the class of intended beneficiaries
participate in decisions of what to do and how to do it? How are their
needs and priorities determined and reflected in project design and
implementation? To what extent do women from the client group participate in
project monitoring and evaluation?

Access to project benefits refers to the extent to which girls and
women are represented among direct recipients of goods and services
such as vocational training, agricultural credit, or membership in
cooperaive societies. It is important to distinguish here between direct
access to project benefts, and indirect access in which it is assumed that
females benefit as members of families from activities in which males
participate. Numbers and proportions of females among beneficiaries
can generally be obtained from project records pertaining to direct client
contacts: farmers contacted by extension agents, children enrolled in
school, workers on a construction project, recipients of bank loans, and
so on. The identification of beneficiaries within this context does not
prejudge the question of whether they actually benefited, however, nor
does it assume that those without direct access to project benefits did not
benefit at all, or lose in some obvious or subtle ways.

The effects of the project on the status of women refer to the
various ways in which women’s position in the family and the community
may be affected by the projects, either in absolute terms or relative to
males. Some changes may be positive and others negative; some
changes may be immediate and others may develop over time; and
immediate effects should be distinguished from long-term impacts where possible, although most formal
evaluations are undertaken too soon to pick up long-term impacts.

In the discussion that follows, the Women in Development project
evaluations included in Table 2 are scrutinized for the adequacy of their
treatment of these three dimensions of female participation and for the
“lessons learned” regarding the achievement of their goals. [=]

50020. Dixon, Ruth B.; AID; DS; Bureau for Program & Policy
Coordination; Office of Women in Development; WID. “Part 05:
Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women: An Analytical
Framework: Background”, in Assessing the Impact of Development
Projects on Women. District of Columbia: Department of State, AID,
Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination, Office of Women in
Development (WID), May 1980. The discussion in Section II focused on
three dimensions of female participation: their role in project decision
making, their direct access to benefits, and the effects of the project on
their position in the family and the community. Information on decision
making and on access to benefits is far easier to collect from project
records and interviews with personnel at various levels than is
information on the immediate or long-term effects of the project on the
status of girls and women. Evaluation documents, on the whole, are
addressed primarily to the logistical questions of whether the project is
“on time” and functioning as planned rather than to social impacts.
Although this preoccupation with institutional support and technical
transfers (the means of development) is understandable, it obscures the
more important questions of the wellbeing of recipients (the ends of
development). What happened to trainees and their families after they
completed their courses? Did they find jobs? Where? Did cooperative
members become more productive, use the credit for intended purposes,
participate in community decision making? Who were the primary
beneficiaries of large-scale rural water supply systems, and how did their
lives change? How were benefits distributed between males and
females? Who gained, and who lost? In what ways?

This section describes an approach to performing both mid-
stream evaluations of the immediate social effects of ongoing projects,
and ex-post evaluations of long-term impacts following project
termination. By choosing projects rather than sector-level or
country-level analyses, more qualitative as well as quantitative methods of
assessing changes within and among households can be considered.
Questions raised in the evaluation framework regarding differential
effects on males and females can shape the inquiry of the preliminary
social soundness analysis and baseline data collection. Such questions
can also form a basis for project monitoring, especially if formal
evaluations are scheduled too late for major revisions of project policies
and practices affecting women.

Whether the project is a women-specific vocational training
program (“low-income women from barrios of San Jose”), a poultry
development scheme with a women’s component (“small farmers in the
Yemen Arab Republic of whom women are expected to assume a major
gerole”), or a radio education program aimed at a general population
(“16,000 illiterate highland Indians engaged in subsistence agriculture”),
the process of assessing its social impact on women and men, in both
absolute and relative terms, would address two major questions.

First, what are the direct effects on primary beneficiaries (male
and female), i.e., how has their access to important resources changed
in absolute terms as a result of the project? This target population may be
defined as classes of individuals such as malnourished children or
unemployed youth; classes of households such as tenant farm families
or members of an agricultural cooperative; or whole localities such as
villages or districts within integrated development schemes.
Second, what are the distributional effects of projects across different categories of persons both within and outside the targeted population? Of particular importance to the analysis of women's situation is the allocation of resources within households. How has the project altered the division of labor within the household, or the distribution of resources such as food or schooling, on the basis of the sex, age, or relationship to household head of family members? When families or households fall into different classes of individuals, do benefits accrue to all household members or is the domestic balance of resources significantly altered depending on who has direct access to project goods and services?

We are also interested in analyzing distributional effects of projects across households, both within and between the targeted and non-targeted populations. Are women-headed households bypassed when titles are granted in land distribution schemes, for example? Do benefits from membership in a women's marketing cooperative accrue disproportionately to those from better-off households or from dominant racial, religious, or ethnic groups? Does a project that introduces new technology in agricultural or nonagricultural production to one class of persons (e.g., men employed in modern fish freezing facilities) result in the displacement of another (e.g., women engaged in traditional fish drying and marketing activities)?

Table 3 summarizes the framework for evaluating the absolute and relative effects of projects on people's access to a wide range of resources that determine their physical, economic, and social wellbeing— that is, their position in the household and community social structure. In the following discussion, some examples are given of how projects can affect males and females differently, in some cases narrowing the gap between them in their access to important resources, and in other cases widening it. Sometimes, of course, improved access to one type of resource may impede access to another. Full-time wage employment for women, while offering badly needed cash incomes, can result in the elimination of home garden production with severe nutritional disadvantages for the entire family, the early cessation of infant breast feeding, and a critical shortage of agricultural labor during periods of peak demand, among other consequences.

The likelihood of mixed results poses a major dilemma to policy makers who must decide just what economic or social costs recipients may be expected to bear in order to achieve some other (presumably more valuable) economic or social benefit. The question of "what works and what does not in specific socioeconomic environments" is thus complicated by the fact that a project can work in one way but not another. Purposes may even be contradictory: for instance, a project might increase agricultural production more rapidly—at least in the short run—through authoritarian leadership that contradicts the goal of consciousness raising and participatory decision making.

The framework summarized in Table 3 and elaborated below includes a number of resources that determine people's physical, economic, and social wellbeing. Implied in the framework is a definition of development that includes "(1) a general improvement in living standards of living, together with (2) decreasing inequalities of income distribution, and (3) the capacity to sustain continuous improvements over time" (Kocher, 1973, p. 5). This latter element, which derives in large part from the acquisition of important social resources such as knowledge, power, and prestige, is of particular relevance to the analysis of women's situation. [=] 50022. Humphrey, Michael. "Radical Movements: Migrants, Workers and Refugees: The Political Economy of Population Movements in the Middle East", in Middle East Report, March-April 1993. pp. 2-7. The start of the Gulf Crisis saw the exodus of 1 million Asian and Arab workers, ad 460000 Kuwait refugees; perhaps 1 million Yemines were compelled to leave Saudi Arabia. During the civil war in Iraq that followed the war, 1.5 million Kurds were dislocated and tens of thousands of Iraqi Arabs fled to Iran or Turkey. In 1991, 11.2 million refugees originated in the Middle East. The emergence of a world market has created a worldwide flow of labor, beginning with the creation of the Atlantic slave trade; in the later part of the 19th century saw the creation of the coolie trade (in 1834-1937 some 30 million Indians were dispersed throughout the British Empire on labor contracts: Malaysia, Fiji, Ceylon, British Guiana, South Africa and the West Indies); some 25.5 million workers were drawn into US industrialization in 1820-1914, and industrialization in Europe drew workers in from its periphery (Britian from Ireland; France from North Africa and Spain; Germany from Poland). World capitalism, raising barriers to labor migration even as it stimulated migration, created the refugee, numbering 100 million in 1912-1969. Labor migration in the Middle East follows this general form. Migration started with Lebanese and Syrians leaving the Ottoman Empire, returning remittances. After WWII, Lebanese and Syrians went to the US, North Africans to France, and Turks to Germany. In addition, refugees have been created as nation states have been formed, especially Palestinians. The growing political activism among refugees has led to the new strategy of keeping refugees in place, as in the Northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq or in Somalia. The recruitment of oil field workers in the Gulf represents a new stage in the flow of indentured labor, representing a South-South flow. By the early 1980s, foreign workers represented 70% of the total labor force in Kuwait, 42% in Libya, 81% in Qatar, 40% in Bahrain, 85% in UAE and 75% in Saudi Arabia. Even Jordan saw
Egyptians become 40% of its workforce, as so many Jordanians and Palestinians had gone to the Gulf. The foreign workforce in the Gulf remains mainly male, although Asian women from Sri Lanka and Philippines have provided a domestic workforce.

50023. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 02: Summary. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The subject of this report is women and their integration into the development of Yemen. The roles and position of Yemeni women and society should be viewed in the context of the important social and economic changes which are taking place. The forces for change include the massive inflow of remittances from Yemeni workers abroad, the shortage of male labour, and substantial development aid from foreign countries. To understand how the roles of women in Yemen are changing, one must begin by acknowledging their roles in the traditional situation. The position of Yemeni women is, and has always been, determined by their status in law and custom, and the roles that they play in the household and outside it. Yemeni society, like other Arab societies, is patrilineally and patriarchally organized. Males have the ultimate power, and men also have the responsibility to provide for the women (and children) who are dependent on them. The dependency of women, and the duty of men to support them financially, are bases of all family laws, particularly marriage, divorce and inheritance. Women have the right to control property. The largest amounts of wealth a woman may manage in her lifetime are probably her bride wealth and inheritance, but she also can control profits from business undertakings. The financial resources of women do not enter into the family budget, and remain theirs to spend and save. The status of women is also affected by customary interpretations of the Qur'an, which tend to be restrictive and demand in some instances, veiling and seclusion. (It should be noted that the modern legal system in Yemen, while based heavily on the Qur'an, is comparatively more liberal on the question of women than other states in the Arabian Peninsula.) Women have important roles in reproduction and in production. Child-bearing and work in the home are the most important traditional roles of city women. In addition to these, rural women play important productive roles in the traditional agricultural economy. Women's work predominates, in fact, where subsistence crops are produced, and they have less extensive tasks in the cultivation of both traditional and modern cash crops. There appears to be a negative correlation between the wealth of a community and how active the women are in agricultural work. The wealth was derived traditionally from cash crops such as coffee, qat and grapes, but, the bases of new wealth are more varied due to links with the cities and internationally through employment. In any case, the families who can afford to, tend to restrict their women as a sign of distinction and a measure of status, hiring others to work their lands. While the great majority of Yemeni women are rural and participating actively in the traditional agricultural economy, urban women have the chance to participate in modern sector employment. This includes employment in the health and education fields, office work and some jobs in industry. Numerically, this group of women is small. They tend to be women and girls who have some education—a small and elite group—or poor women who are often migrants to the cities. International goals on "women in development" stress, as a first step, the provision of basic education and medical services. Though the analysis cannot cover all the different regions of Yemen, it might sharpen the sensitivity of the reader to discover specific differences in the project area where he or she is involved. There is no doubt that more sensitivity is needed by both project planners and implementors. This is illustrated in the chapter that evaluates some on-going projects in their neglect of the female population in their project areas. After a short look at international strategies for the integration of women in development and the discussion of their applicability to Yemen, some recommendations are given on project components which may directly benefit women. For the project planner, a basic check-list is suggested which elicits the necessary information on women in the project area and allows a more ready assessment of the effects of the project on women. It is very satisfactory to note that the proposal to give institutional support to the Yemeni Women's Association was presented as a request by the Ministry of Social Affairs during the Yemeni-German government negotiations on financial and technical cooperation in 3/1979, right after this study was completed. DM 1.3 million were committed for this project. This report takes the position that Yemen women should be progressively involved in the development of their country, at all levels. It does not advocate a revolution to change the roles and status of women, but demands a realistic appraisal of what is possible in the present social, economic and political framework. Matthias Weiter, Advisory Team to the Central Planning Organization, San'a'.[=]
These include: improvements in the agricultural equipment which women use, a broadened extension service which would educate men and women equally on subjects ranging from agricultural practice to nutrition and hygiene, housing improvements with more healthful kitchens, extensive use of the media for educational purposes, and more appropriate health and educational services. [Arabic Introduction not reproduced.] [x]

50025. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979.  (1) Childhood does not last long for most Yemeni girls. Their important social and economic roles are well-defined, particularly in the rural areas, giving women a self-confident outlook on the world. The girl pictured, from Jebel Sabr near Ta'izz, has been wokening in the fields. It is likely that she is married or betrothed for she displays two signs of private wealth inherent in betrothal and marriage: bridewealth jewelry and keys to unlock the chests wherein her private valuables are kept.

(2) In rural Yemen, physical strength is as necessary an attribute of a prospective bride as are her moral qualities. Girls are trained to carry heavy weights on their heads from an early age. The woman photographed is carrying an oil drum which serves as a container for petrol and kerosene, grains or water. Women, donkeys and low-status men can be observed carrying imported objects like televisions, freezers for breadmaking in traditional ovens, but more attention should be given to the possibility of alternative sources of fuel and increased distribution networks.

(3) A fully veiled woman carrying a television on her head exemplifies the visible contrasts between the old and the new apparent everywhere. Remittances from migrant relatives make imported luxury goods commonplace juxtaposed with the custom of veiling women as a protection of their honour and a measure of their status.

(4) Another effect of the inflow of remittances is the proliferation of imported foodsstuffs to even the most remote villages. Shops such as these are well-stocked with packaged and tinned foods which are used in increasing proportion to food produced locally. Increasing food imports and in particular, the use of powdered milk for infant feeding, have serious economic and health ramifications. In fact, the diet for infants and adults alike may be harmed by this trend.

(5) An essential part of every marriage contract is the bridewealth payment. Part of what each groom pays goes to the bride in the form of jewelry. Common taste has changed from silver to gold, though in some areas silver pieces are still used. This piece, which is worn on the forehead, consists of Indian and Austrian (Maria Theresa) coins, coral and beads. Yemeni women are proud of their bridewealth and regard it as high-status decoration, usefully movable and their security.

(6) The rate of divorce is high in Yemen and it is customary for children to remain with their mother after the divorce until they are teenagers. If their mother is unable to care for them or remarry, their maternal grandmother is usually given the task of bringing them up. In any case, the raising of children is always shared by the women of each traditional family, and indeed around the village.

(7) In Yemen the veil (sharshaf) is largely an urban phenomenon. Mostwell-educated young women who work in banks and offices in San'a' remain veiled during work. They wear the latest European fashions underneath. Only a small group of city women do not veil, and these would include the elite who have lived and studied abroad and the poor akhdam women from the coast.

(8) The market (suq) is an important meeting place in the public world of men. Most women do not enter the market as either buyers or sellers. In some markets, however, women sit on the periphery and sell baskets, fodder, firewood and fruits. The women pictured are selling baskets at the Suq al-Talh near Sa'dah. They barely have the skills of numeracy but deal in three currencies: Maria Theresa dollars, Yemeni and Saudi rials.

(9) Bread is the most important food in Yemen and is made in the vertical cylindrical oven (tannur) as often as twice daily. Smoke rises directly out of the tannur into the darkly lit traditional kitchen, making it an unhealthyplace for work. Simple improvements to the lighting and ventilation of kitchens would aid Yemeni women immensely.

(10) On most days the Yemeni family eat their main midday meal together. For special occasions, however, the meal is prepared and laid by the women then eaten first by the men of the household and their guests. The women and children eat separately afterwards. The meal pictured consists of cakes and warm bread, whipped fenugreek (hilba), meat and condiments like chives and radishes. In households where the men are away, the daily diet of the women and children is much simpler.

(11) Water supply is one of the most serious problems in Yemen. Women in rural areas often spend many hours per day fetching water from distant springs. This women from al-Mahabisha in the northwestern highlands needs several hours in the dry season to fetch one pail of water. In more populous southern districts women often have to wait in queues at springs for many hours during the dry season.

(12) In most villages women and children share the task of taking goats and sheep to grazing areas which are away from the cultivated lands. One family might specialize in the service. In addition, fodder for cows and donkeys in collected by women and girls and sorghum stalks and lucerne are fed to the animals by a time consuming process.

(13) Of all the tasks Yemeni women perform, collecting firewood is the most difficult. Sources are being depleted and wooded lands are being claimed as private property. In some areas wood is now purchased and delivered by the truckload, but in inaccessible areas women go on long and tiring expeditions to fetch wood.

(14) Pictured are the ploughing and planting of sorghum in the Hujariyya. The man operates the plough which is pulled by a pair of oxen, while the woman follows stepping on the seeds she drops in the furrows. She is carrying the seeds in a basket on her head. Ploughing is mechanized in parts of Yemen but generally both ploughing and planting are done by traditional methods.

(15) A Hujariyya woman applies manure to the sorghum fields in preparation for ploughing and planting. Men apply modern fertilizers, but the above task and others such as thinning, weeding and harvesting belong to women.

(16) Threshing can be accomplished by beating the heads of the grains with long sticks or, as is common in the region around San'a', donkeys can be used. In many areas low-status men are hired to do the threshing, as a supplement to family labor. Threshing is one agricultural task which may be the easiest to mechanize in Yemen.

(17) Winnowing is usually done by women in breezy areas. Often, however, members of a household share the tasks of the busy harvest season. Here an old man pours the grains while his daughter-in-law sorts the grains, taking the largest ones as seeds for the following year then clean and store them.

(18) Women of the lowest social strata have earned money in traditional ways open to them such as in healing, decorating brides, working as servants or running coffee houses with their husbands. This woman is drumming and singing at a wedding, a lucrative task but relegated to a low status person. She is chewing qat, taken more often by men than by rural women.

(19) Water is a problem in urban Yemen as much as it is in rural Yemen. Here, a girl delivers a donkey cart of water to houses in San'a. In addition to donkey carts, women also deliver containers of water on their heads and men balance two hanging tins of water across their shoulders. This is a traditional remunerative task of men and women of low social status.

(20) Young women could attend nursing school in Yemen before they could attend secondary school. The first nursing school was established in 1957 and its descendnet institution — The Health Manpower Institute—trains nurses and midwives. Nursing remains a controversial mode of employment for females however, and a serious shortage of female nursing staff exists.

(21) Status is a complex evaluation for it comprises one's birth (family name and family wealth) and also the reputation gained from the
roles a person plays as defined by sex and age. Old women can be powerful characters in their communities as well as in their households. In their households they are responsible for the work of subordinate women and children; in their community they may be a respected source of opinion and mediation.

(22) Education is stated as one of the rights of all children in Yemen yet it is not within reach of many. Only a small number of girls are ever educated because of the prevailing attitudes that it is not proper for a girl to be away from home and possibly taught bad habits. Girls contribute to the labour of the household and may not be given the luxury to study. This San'atni girl is helping her mother with the washing of clothes and fetching of water, and will most probably never receive any education.

(23) In most areas only daughters of the elite are educated. It is noteworthy that the dropout rate for girls is lower than for boys, at least at the primary level. This means that if a girl and her parents decide that she go to school, they intend that she complete the course and get the certificate. Boys may drop out when the opportunity for employment arises.

(24) In general Yemeni children are the pride of their parents. The man pictured was pleased by his four daughters, but extremely proud of the arrival of the fifth, a boy. To him the son will help him guard his family's honour. Women are aware of the pressure to produce sons yet feel fortunate to have many daughters around for it means more help around the house.

(25) Modern projects in rural areas to increase agricultural production are impressive, but analysis of planning documents has shown that the situation and roles of women have not been taken sufficiently into account though women do a major part of agricultural work. Until now, technical rather than social aspects of projects have been stressed. The picture shows an irrigation weir in Wadi Zabid.

(27) Pictured is a simple water distribution system in Haja which women who often instigate the move toward independence in residence, and entertaining rooms to maintain the household and its furnishings might be ordered from the migrant abroad with large purchases or major improvements waiting until his return. To the contrary of some assumptions, women do not appear to be moving in a wider decision-making role because of the emigration of their men. Women have always had a tremendous influence in household decision making, but this depends on the quality of the marital relationship and as yet, the males in residence have the last say. For example, women may pressure for a nuclear household residence, and women may refuse to cook with certain grains or foods, yet it is their men who have the mobility to go the market or to the bank. Most women cannot enter the public world of men. [=]

Women in an extended household are organized by seniority. The mother-in-law has a say as far as what is cooked daily and what work is done by the other women and children. These relationships are often problematic, particularly if one woman is thought to be shirking her work responsibilities or is ill continually. Household work in urban areas is less strenuous and less time-consuming than in the rural areas. The heaviest tasks are done by the younger women. These would include fetching the water if the house does not have piped water, and the washing, housecleaning and breadmaking. In the rural areas, the older women of the house do the lightest work, which includes feeding the animals and some of the cooking. Younger women perform those tasks as well as carrying water, fetching fuel and much of the agricultural work. Women depend on children for help in running the household, varying from delivering messages to doing some of the difficult work. This is especially true in a nuclear household where only one adult woman is present. Sons older than 10 years old may go to the market for their mothers. Daughters are taught to cook and clean from an early age, and begin carrying water and animal fodder from the age of 6. Both boys and girls take goats and sheep to pasture and help with the agricultural work in the countryside. In sum, women have a considerable influence on all that concerns the household, whether it be extended or nuclear. Their power is restricted in that they do not participate in the public world of the market. [There are exceptions to this generalisation, notably the Jabal Sabr women who buy and sell in the Ta'izz suq and some tribal women in the northern part of the country who sell fruits, animal fodder and fuel,] nor have ultimate control over the monthly household expenditures. All final decisions rest with the males who are responsible for the support of the household. The household is organized by a division of labour by sex and age. The younger wives and teen-age daughters do most of the work: cooking, cleaning, fetching the fuel and water. In rural areas, all the family participates in agricultural work though, again, it is the young women who have the major share throughout the cultivation season. [–]

50030. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 08: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Legal Institutions Affecting Women. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The Qur'an, and Shari'a law which is derived from the Qur'an, are the bases of all laws affecting women in Yemen. During 1970 and 1978 new legal codes for Labour and Family Law came into effect. Both are Qur'anic in spirit and do not vary significantly from previous interpretations of Shari'a (Qur'anic Law). The Labour Law affirms that women are due the same rights as men, and are afforded special privileges at the time of pregnancy and childbirth. Suggested amendments to the law increase the benefits for working women concerning maternity leave with full pay, personal leave options, breastfeeding time, time off for the mourning of the death of a husband and working hours for pregnant women. The articles of Family Law allow for various interpretations concerning age at marriage, divorce and so on. It should be remembered, however, that most disputes are settled outside the formal legal framework according to custom and popular interpretations of the Qur'an. Insofar as the new Labour and Family Laws address themselves to the status of women, they are included, in part, in Appendices VI and VII. The position of women in Yemen society is determined, to an important extent, by their status as vis a vis written law and custom. A look at the legal institutions and customs which have a bearing on women provides some information on two particular issues which are important in terms of development: economic rights and responsibilities women have, and customary constraints on women. [–]

50031. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 09: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Legal Institutions Affecting Women: Marriages. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Islamic marriage is a contract between two parties, the groom and a male wakil (deputy) of the bride. The bride's wakil is usually her father. Marriage concerns two individuals—husband and wife—but in fact has wider implications ranging from political alliances, to maintenance of class, to calculations about where their inheritances will be going. In theory, the girl should be willing to marry and should not be coerced. In practice there are always examples of marriage by force. In cases where the bride is very young, she may not be in a position to make a judgement contrary to that of her father; her silence can be interpreted as acceptance. Still, in villages boys and girls know each other by sight and reputation and often romances result in marriage. In some places, the girl is asked if she agrees to the match both at the time of the engagement and before the signing of the marriage contract ('aqd). In theory the girl should have reached puberty, but it is often the case that girls married earlier. The Myntti survey in 1977 of al-Nadhir, Jebel Razih showed that 65% of the ever married women had married before puberty. Protecting the modesty of girls, and the need to incorporate more female labour into a household are cited as two main reasons for early marriage. The new legal code proposes that the bride be not younger than 16 years of age, but these matters are very difficult to enforce. Marriage establishes reciprocal rights and duties between the husband and wife. The man is entitled to: sexual access, to have his wife live in his house, to her obedience and fidelity. The woman is entitled to: support (money for expenses and clothes), a house to live in, bridewealth and freedom to manage her own money. Shari'a law specifies that husband and wife mutually inherit to 1/8 of the total inheritance of their spouse. Every Muslim man is allowed up to four wives on the condition that he treat them all equally. Multiple marriages are not common in Yemen with the Census Report showing that only 4.3% of all males enumerated had more than one wife. (Swiss, 1978, p. 80). [–]

50032. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 10: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Legal Institutions Affecting Women: Marriages. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The transfer of money from the groom to the wakil, deputy, of the bride is an essential part of any marriage contract. Despite former government regulations and intra-tribal agreements to regulate this payment, bridewealth is costly and continually inflating. An example of how the payment has inflated is shown in the Sani'a category where Bornstein [Throughout this report, many quotes will be drawn from the works of FAO Social Anthropologist A. Bornstein which present the best information on the society of Yemen to date.] found the 1972 price to be $1330. The 1979 payment can be more than ten times that amount.

Some sample bridewealth payments are as follows:

- Sani'a:
  - Bornstein 1972: 6000 YR; US$1330.
- Zabid: 20000 YR; US$4440.
- Haja: 15000-40000 YR; US$3330-8880.

In some areas of the northern Hashid tribe bridewealth is reputed to have escalated to between 100000 and 200000 YR ($22220 – $44440). Bridewealth payments vary according to the hereditary social class (Traditional Yemeni society is divided into a hierarchy of social strata. Marriage and occupational rules have kept these divisions distinct. Sayyid: This is the hereditary religious elite. Sayyid women, particularly in Zaydi areas, do not marry out of this strata. The Sada (p) were the political elite under the Islamic system and still participate in religious, legal and administrative posts. Qadhi: This is the hereditary class of
Criminal. Theoretically every bride can have her wakal (deputy) specify that she would like the right to initiate divorce in her marriage contract, but this is never done. There are several ways man can divorce his wife, but the most common way is to go to a judge with two witnesses and simply ask for it. If he divorces his wife, he is legally bound to pay a three-month support fee. This is to make certain that the woman is not pregnant with his child, and the amount for three months does not seem much to the man, but the more prolonged, the more endemnity costs. A man is bound by law to support any children from a union which ends in divorce. Usually the mother takes the children, at least until they are ten years old, but they often stay with her until they are adults. There is some complication if the woman should remarry. If her new husband is not willing to take the children, the children would be raised by their maternal grandmother, preferred to the paternal grandmother.

Women in Yemen can initiate divorce, though the methods are not straightforward and often the financial penalties are high. First, she may return to her father’s home in protest and live there for some time. Eventually her husband may divorce her, but she will forfeit either her three month support payment and/or, with her father, have to return all or part of her original bridewealth. It appears that the return of all or part of the original bridewealth as a penalty for initiating divorce is not Islamic law but custom. After a woman is divorced she is taken in, in most cases, by her parents or a brother. If her family do not support her, she is left to her own means of support. On one hand she is pillared because she has financial insecurity but on the other she is envied for her relative freedom. (What options women have for remunerative work to support themselves is discussed in Section 2.3. on the work roles of women.) The Census figures show that only 2.1% of the female population were divorced at the time of the census, 2/1975. Qualitative information from the countryside suggests that the divorce rate is much higher but so is the remarriage rate. Thus at any one time few women are in the divorce state. The 1977 rural survey by Myntti shows that while 3.5% of the women interviewed were “currently divorced”, 17% had been divorced once and 4% twice. Divorce does not seem to have a social stigma in Yemen as it does in other parts of the Middle East, and most persons remarriage. Divorce is most common in the early years of marriage, particularly if the woman has not produced any children. Often the blame of infertility falls on the woman. If she is thought to be sterile she may marry an older man who is a widower or be taken on by another as a second wife. [-]

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50034. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 12: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Legal Institutions Affecting Women’s Inheritance. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Women in rural Yemen inherit according to the prescriptions in the Qur’an: As a daughter: half the share of her brother (as an only child: half the total inheritance). As a mother: 1/6 of the total inheritance. As a wife: 18 of the total inheritance. When Islam was founded in the 7th century AD, the fact that women could inherit and possess private property was revolutionary. Women inherit less than their brothers because they are considered to be dependent on men. If a man is responsible for his dependent wife, children, parents and even sisters—the reasoning goes—he should take a larger share of the inheritance. Most women argue in favour of this arrangement. Inheritance, an important part of any woman’s personal property, can take the form of land, buildings or parts of buildings, movable wealth such as animals and machines, and money. In some parts of the Muslim Middle East women do not inherit at all, inherit only cash or give their inheritance to their brothers. In Yemen most women can choose, like their brothers, how they would like their inheritance. Women in the Hujariyya tend to take their share in each category of wealth. It is reported that in Zabid women prefer to inherit a room in their parental house to serve as a residence in reserve. Should they be divorced. In Rida’ women may sell rooms or land inherited to their brothers, preferring movable wealth and cash. It has been noted that the personal wealth (such as inheritance and bridewealth) of a woman is never to be used for household expenses. Household expenses are the total responsibility of her husband.
Theoretically her brothers serve as her financial advisers and her wealth is kept as her security. There is some evidence in other Middle Eastern countries that this notion is changing due to economic pressures on couples, particularly in urban areas where women are earning salaries, but in Yemen a woman's wealth is her private property to do with as she pleases and in no way is she expected to help with the household finances. No statistics are available on the personal wealth of women and how many actually inherit. Inheritance among the women of the landless poor should be minimal or nothing at all. Whatever the possibilities of inheritance might be, concern over the inheritance of females is expressed in marriage patterns. Arabs in general are thought to be endogamous, that is they prefer to marry within their group, however that may be defined. The preferred marriage—patrilateral parallel cousin or Ibn 'amm (son of paternal uncle)—is the closest one can marry within the patrilateral group without violating incest prohibitions. It is the preferred marriage—it is often argued—because of inheritance, though this is a controversial issue. By marrying her Ibn 'amm, the reasoning goes, the woman's inheritance will not be alienated. Her children, part of her husband's lineage, will inherit from her wealth which has come predominantly from her father who is often the same lineage as her husband. The wealthy tend to follow this pattern more closely because they have more at stake. Father-in-law and paternal uncle are one and the same word, 'amm, in Yemeni terminology, reflective of the ideal marriage. No statistics exist to demonstrate how often this ideal is actually achieved in Yemen. In many cases it may not be possible demographically. In parts of Hujairiyah it is preferable to marry within the village only. If a woman marries into another village her inheritance from her parents will eventually be passed on to her children, belonging to a lineage of "outsiders". Political and economic problems may result. Thus there is a lot of pressure on girls to marry within the community for the sake of inheritance. Bridewealth is often much higher should the girl marry "out", which discourages marriages with men from other villages and makes them pay for the alienation of her inheritance. In sum, women benefit from Islamic law in that they inherit and can manage their private property. More research needs to be done on who inherits and how much.

It seems that the wealth of women is a reserve security; if property is in land and gold, for example, both are continually appreciating in value but the wealth is not utilized in any active capital development sense. The custom of coercive early marriages, the difficult divorce with high penalties if the woman initiates, are the most harmful practices to Yemeni women. One could argue that they are violations of human rights. [=]

50035. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 13: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Legal Institutionalizing Women: Customary Restrictions on Women. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Islamic law deals with conflicts which may be brought to the courts. Customs also exist which have the strength of law but are never settled in court. In general, these are restrictive of women in Yemen. Women are expected to behave with a certain decorum particularly in public but also within the house. Modesty in dress, quiet polite speech and submissive behavior are the ideals. An impeccable reputation within the community is essential. The issue at stake is the honour of the family. Men, by their actions in the community, can enhance as well as destroy the honour of their family. It is often argued that women cannot enhance family honour but only destroy it. Honour is a precarious social evaluation and the restricting of women is a major attempt to safeguard it. The veil is the most visible expression of modesty in Yemen. Not all rural women however, are veiled. Women tend to veil more if they are in the presence of "outsiders", or if they are from the religious elite, sayyid class. For example, village women may not veil within the bounds of their village but dress in full sharshaf (black veil worn in urban Yemen) if they are walking to the nearby town for medical treatment. They argue that the village is one a big family while the town is full of strangers. Women are veiled in rural marked towns such as: Zabid, Mawza, Turba, Rida' and al-Nadhiri, Jabal Razih. In Mahwit, the veil is a recent phenomenon and can be traced to the growth of the town from migrants from villages and the increased importance of the suq (market). Veiling connotes an air of preservation and privilege. Women see it as more sophisticated and comparatively more urban. While it may seem completely natural to be free and unveiled in a village, it is also completely natural to veil in a town. For village women, it definitely has the air of "dressing up". The veil is an urban phenomenon. The most plausible theory of its origins is that it is a Middle Eastern paracultural derivative, or a product of the Middle East and North Africa being conquered and converted to Islam. The veil was a matter of distinguishing free from slave women. Veiled women were free, usually high status and urban. Unveiled women were slaves taken in conquest or rural bedouin and peasants. The veil contains elements of class. In villages around Rida', Mawza and Razih, sayyid women are veiled as a matter of distinction. Some of these women can be seen carrying water and working in the fields with veils on. Despite the utter impracticality of this, it is an expression of their moral superiority. They are protected by their anonymity. The logical extension of this is to keep women in the house where no one can see them at all. There are women who appear in market towns unveiled. They are women of the lowest social strata, akhdam, and tribal women selling animal fodder, wood and fruits. akhdam women are often despised as "dirty". The tribal women are beyond the pale of evaluation in the town; they are from another area and are performing a traditionally recognized function. They are neither admired nor despised. Jabal Sabr women, who sell qat [Qat, lat. Catha edulis, is a shrub cultivated in highland Yemen, its leaves are chewed regularly by a large pari of the population. Its effects are described as similar to stimulant drugs.] and other produce in the Ta'izz suq, are an exception since they seem to be admired by women in Ta'izz for their wealth and freedom. Just as the veil, as one expression of modesty, may protect a woman's reputation, her visibility in a community may be limited by giving her restricted spatial boundaries.

A general problem for most rural women and many city women is their lack of mobility. Rural women are restricted to work in the fields and visiting other women within a certain distance. They do not go to markets to buy goods and many are restricted from going to town hospitals and clinics. Urban women vary in how far outside the house they are allowed to go. Some can be seen studying in schools and working in offices. Others are free to leave the house only in the afternoons when they visit other women. Still others rarely leave the confines of their houses, not even to buy provisions at a nearby shop. In some cases, the mobility of women is restricted because of heavy work load within the house and childcare responsibilities. More often than not, however, the seclusion of women functions primarily to preserve their reputation for modest behavior. Constraints on the mobility of women, as well as the general question of modesty, should be considered when planning projects dealing with women directly (such as formal and non-formal education, health services) and indirectly (such as agricultural extension work). The obstacles are not insurmountable but demand careful attention. For example, it is known that some families restrict their females from schools and clinics on the grounds that they come in contact with males and this is not acceptable. Before the slow tide of public opinion changes in favour of schooling and medical treatment for women, publicity campaigns could center on the respectability of not only working in schools and clinics, but attending them. In addition agricultural extension work has great potential for reaching people in rural areas with new ideas on farming technology. Women, as the bulk of the labour force in many areas, could contribute to this dialogue of improving agricultural production. Extension officers, predominantly young and male, should be trained in methods of educating non-schooled women, appropriately, publicly and discreetly. [=]
men and women have certain tasks, children and old people have others. What sayyid women are allowed to do may vary from what akhdam women do. In the urban setting, training and education play a part over and above the traditional criteria in what sort of work people do. The variation of tasks will be described in this section. Women are based in the household primarily because of their roles as bearers and educators of children. In Arab culture, this function of women is often praised and reinforced. The primary responsibility of men to their households, on the other hand, is the provision of adequate financial resources which takes them more and more into the public world of employment. [=]

50037. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 15: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. In addition to caring for their children, all Yemen women whether urban or rural, have the household-based tasks of cooking, cleaning and clothes washing. Many households, even in the cities, do not have piped water, so it is the job of women to fetch adequate supplies for household consumption. Caring for animals is also a female task in both urban and rural areas. Various fuels are often bought in cities and rural towns, but in areas where fuel is made or collected, it is the task of women. [=]

50038. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 16: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks: Cooking and Food Preparation in the Yemeni Kitchen. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. A Tihama kitchen consists of a designated place in the open-air courtyard of each house. Village kitchens use a simple oven made of stones, operating on the principle of the tannur or cylindrical oven of the highland areas. Bread is cooked in this oven. Simple charcoal braziers are used for preparing other foods. A highland kitchen is usually located on upper levels of the house. Bornstein describes the kitchen she encountered: “Both the kitchens and ovens have certain drawbacks, which could be remedied without much difficulty. For different reasons, sometimes ‘to prevent anyone from looking in’, sometimes ’to protect from draught and dust’, the windows and doors are kept very small and the ventilation holes are completely inadequate to let the smoke out. The women spend several hours of the day in these dark places which, when the ovens are lit, get exceedingly hot and smoky. A person who is not used to the smoke can hardly bear the atmosphere for more than a few minutes. Apart from being very unpleasant, the heat and the smoke must in the long run, have negative effects on the health of the women, especially on their respiratory organs.” (Bornstein 1974, p. 23).

Utensils: In Yemen cooking utensils are simple and few. Generally one would find: round platters for serving rice, and metal pots for cooking rice, a tea kettle, metal or clay pots for boiling meat. In the north one commonly would find stone pots for cooking. Bread is stored and served in flat baskets. Metal and wooden spoons are used to stir and serve the food. Imported thermoses, tea cups and china dishes are available and popular in both cities and rural areas. Pressure cookers and blenders are also used increasingly where butagas cookers and electricity exist. In most rural households food is eaten out of one communal dish and sometimes spoons are used. City manners in many cases, are more westernized.

The Diet: Everywhere in Yemen the staple food is sorghum and other cereals. Fenugreek (hilba), rice, vegetables and beans are eaten occasionally and the consumption of meat, dairy products and eggs depends on the economic status of the household. Meat, eggs and fresh and tinned fruits are status foods and would be eaten when men of the household are present or if guests are invited. If men are living away, women might not indulge in such special foods for themselves and their children. A recent nutrition survey in Yakhtul, 10 miles north of al-Mukha on the coast, revealed that the average daily diet is better than that of World Health Organization prescribes as minimum requirements. It was noted, however, that the food distribution is not always equal within the household with women and girls eating less than their share by giving it to the males (Martinez and Poulin, 1978). The traditional diet is not bad, particularly with protein-rich sorghum and beans consumed regularly. Nutritionally they are incomplete however, and one result is anemia particularly in women. Clearly, nutrition education is one of the most important avenues for development assistance. Trends are away from the wholesome sorghum-based diets toward more junk foods and white rice. If anything, the nutritional standard of the diet appears to become worse, not better, with the beginnings of modernization. In cities tinned/dried fresh fruits and vegetables are available but appear to be consumed by the elite or by others only occasionally. If men do the shopping and women do the cooking, nutrition education should be directed at both.

Meals and Work: In all of Yemen the midday meal is the largest and most important of the day. Breakfast of tea or coffee and bread is served between 6.00 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. depending on the region. Agricultural labourers usually get a coffee break of food (often beans, fish and bread) and tea or coffee. An evening meal is served when men return from sunset prayers at the mosque. This meal is often leftovers from lunch, or tea, bread, and beans or eggs. Yemeni cooking is frugal and less-time-consuming than food preparation in other parts of the Arab world. Three “woman-hours” maximum would be spent in the kitchen per day. In places where tannur-baked bread is not made twice a day and where butagas is used, preparation of the midday meal can take a mere half an hour. A typical midday meal in the Hijaziya is rice with a sauce of potatoes and tomato paste, nuti bread which is white and store bought, karath (chive-like onions) and tea. If men are at home, meat may be eaten several times a week. If not, perhaps once a week on Friday. Sorghum porridge, ‘asid, is sometimes substituted for the rice dish. A typical midday meal in Jebel Razih would be fresh maluj bread, fenugreek (hilba), mcalt and tea. A special bread and honey dish (fatat and bint as-sahn) might be occasionally served as a first course. Bread is the most important basic food in rural Yemen. In the northern highland areas like Razih and Hamdan, the tannur cylindrical oven is heated twice daily because warm bread is preferred at meals. Wood for the tannur is very expensive and in many areas tannur-baked breads have been reduced to once a week. In the south, fried bread (khubs tawwa) may be made once in a while, otherwise ruti is bought where possible. Lahuh, a pancake-like sorghum bread, may be made if guests are invited or during Ramadan. This bread is fried on a ceramic skillet and dungi is often used for fuel. Lahuh is the main ingredient of the festive dish, shafut, which is made with sour milk and chillies. The time spent bread-making varies throughout the countryside. The grinding of grains varies also. In the Tihama the grains are generally ground by hand. In many places village mills have been established and this saves considerable time and energy for women. Fees are nominal and all grains can be ground. In Mahwit it is reported that women prefer the taste of grains ground by hand and do not frequent the village mill. Cooking and food preparation are shared by the women and girls of the house. The making of bread is an art learned at a young age, and teen-age girls help their mothers with all aspects of meal preparation. Dairy products are processed by women, particularly older women. A hollow gourd is shaken to make butter and other milk products. Saman, clarified butter, is highly prized and so is sour milk (laban or haqin). Goat products are used more in the Tihama while cows are the main dairy animal in the highlands. These products are often shared within a large kin group or exchanged for services. Tea, coffee (bun) and the drink made from coffee husks called qishr are made and consumed several times a week. If not, perhaps once a week on Friday.
Republic: Part 17: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks: Cleaning the House. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. On the whole, Yemeni houses are given minimal care. In the morning blankets which were used during the night are aired on the roof. Mattresses and cushions in the main sitting room may be shaken and straightened. Qat leaves and other refuse from the previous afternoon would be swept out. Daughters help with this and it does not take more than half an hour. Each woman is responsible for her own bedroom, but time spent is minimal. Kitchens receive very little care; food and debris on the floor may be swept out after a meal. Bathrooms tend to be kept clean, partly due to the use of water for ritual prayer ablutions. Superficially Tihama houses appear to be better kept than highland houses. The houses are much simpler however and water is not usually a problem. The huts and surrounding courtyard are swept out. The most serious problem of cleanliness and hygiene is the disposal of human waste. Falling from open toilets and out in the open, it presents a perfect environment for bacteria and parasites which constitute a major health problem. Children play in the same areas, which may be rain-water run-off areas for cisterns also. The cistern water, needless to say, is highly polluted if the water runs off anything but a fenced-in protected area. [2]

50040. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 18: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks: Washing Clothes. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. If a woman is fortunate enough to have daughters over ten years of age, this task is often given to them. Washing of clothes can be done in the home in large, flat metal pans or at the public source of water in villages. In Mawza women wash near the wadi, or stream. In Mahwit, women wash to the rear of the mosque where there are water taps. This seems to be a pleasurable task if done communally, but not all village women are allowed such visibility. In many places the work is confined to the roof of the house. Some women in the Hujariyya have complained that this is their most tiring task. They all remember the days when the standard of cleanliness was far lower. Women used to wash clothes once every two weeks, not daily as today. Tide, Chinese soap powders and scrub brushes can be found in many rural homes. If washing is done outdoors, clothes are rubbed against a wet and soapy stone. What is very obvious watching Yemeni women wash clothes is how little water they use. With their vigorous pounding and scrubbing of the clothes, it is no wonder that cisterns say that the best examples of clean and efficient ones are to be found in Hayfan, al-Hujariyya. In an extended family, the task of fetching water rotates among the healthy younger women, while others manage household chores.

If a woman is alone in a house, or without a son and a donkey who could help in a pinch, fetching water during the winter months is a real problem. Women in a nuclear household are at a disadvantage when the water supply becomes short, because fetching water at great distances demands a cooperative effort of several women, not girls. In the mountain areas, fetching water is literally back-breaking work if it entails going down the mountain and returning with a full tanaka on one's head. In other areas where the terrain is flatter, water fetching is tiring but gathering around a village well is one of the most pleasurable activities for women. Children help their mothers with water. Small boys take donkeys and fetch water with them. Girls begin carrying small containers on their heads from rain-water off roofs and off the ground. People say that water collected during the rainy season in these cisterns is enough for the household for the year. There are problems however. In many places the water runs off filthy places with human waste and is full of disease causing bacteria and parasites. People familiar with the idea of the cistern say that the best examples of clean and efficient ones are to be found in Hayfan, al-Hujariyya. In an extended family, the task of fetching water rotates among the healthy younger women, while others manage household chores.

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brought nearer to their homes. The heavy and unhealthy burden of carrying water will be lessened, and the improved quality of the water will benefit the health of the community at large. Care should be taken, however, to incorporate those persons who traditionally have earned a living from transporting water into new schemes. [=]

50042. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 20: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks: Caring for Animals. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. If a household has cows, donkeys, chickens, rabbits, goats and camels, all but the camels fall into the female sphere of work. The care of camels by men is an old Arabian tradition Yemeni women say, because camels are too dangerous for women to handle. Urban households often keep chickens, rabbits, goats or cows in the lower floors of the house. They are fed with left-overs from the kitchen and lucerne purchased in the market. In the rural areas women and children tend to share the work: Goats are usually taken to graze by the children of the family though at times when no crops are planted they are allowed to roam freely. Goats and sheep are important sources of meat and dairy products. They are smoked to give both a special smell and also as a means of preservation. Butagas (the Arabian name for the smokehouse) has been built on the floor and kettles and skillets put on stones surrounding the fire. The latter method is common in the south, for boiling and frying. Dung cakes are made only by women. The animal dung is mixed with water and straw, formed into a cake and set in the sun to dry. The cakes can often be seen on the walls of houses. Sorghum stalks and roots are used like wood in the tannur or in an open area of the kitchen where fires are built. In the Hujariyya people buy a Toyota Stout truckload of wood for up 1000 YR (US$220) and these last several months. Because of such prohibitive costs, the villagers are decreasing the number of times per week that they eat tannur-baked breads. It is unfortunate because some of the most nutritious traditional breads are not being made as much as they used to be. Dung is used as a fuel in tannurs and open cooking areas where foods, including fried breads, are cooked in skillets, pots and kettles. Dung is an important supplement to wood in most northern areas. Sorghum stalks and roots are used like wood in the tannur or an open area of the kitchen where fires are built on the floor and kettles and skillets put on stones surrounding the fire. The latter method is common in the south, for boiling and frying. Charcoal is used in braziers (maugad) for cooking, or often to keep tea and coffee hot outside the sitting room. Butagas is used like wood in the tannur or in an open area of the kitchen where fires are built. It is often used to keep cows and sheep warm. Butagas is not expensive but it is more expensive in more remote areas. If possible, men from the household buy kerosene in larger containers in the market towns. It is undoubtedly cheaper this way and a necessary economy since kerosene is used for lanterns in villages where there is no electricity. (Electricity is spreading rapidly throughout rural Yemen. In many villages the mosque and perhaps the house of the shaykh are electrified first. In better organized villages cooperatives have been started wiring all the houses to a large, central generator. In the cases of private generators, they are run usually only at night and started by the women of the house at sunset.) Butagas is becoming increasingly popular in the country, particularly in market towns which have access to roads and cities. At 40 YR (US$0.80) for a replacement cylinder in the Hujariyya, butagas is not inexpensive but it is more convenient than traditional fuels. Mahwit town has recently had a butagas dealership established. It is not improbable that butagas is spreading to other parts of Yemen too. If such things as refrigerators, chest freezers, electric generators and televisions can be carried up mountains on donkeys so too could butagas. Needless to say, butagas is a comfort to women easier. Rice, sauces, tea, coffee and even fried breads are being made with butagas. In cities, butagas-run cookers with ovens are preferred by women and commonly used. Until other sources of cooking energy such as solar energy, become available and economical, butagas provides the most convenient benefits and social prestige of having dairy products. Clearly, there is scope for improving the practices of animal feeding. In the field of animal health and nutrition, as well as in the economics of feeding practices, applied research is needed. It is hoped that the on-going veterinary and livestock projects will make some advances in these fields, incorporating ideas and labor of local women. (An experimental dairy project east of Yarim is training "milkmaids", local women, in mechanised milking procedures with hopes of setting up small scale household-based dairy industries which will be run by women.) The implementation of technical and more economic procedures rests with the women. [=]

50043. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 21: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Household Tasks: Collecting Fuel. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Fuels vary by region, but the most common are: wood, dung, sorghum stalks and roots, charcoal, kerosene and butagas. Wood is used in the tannur ovens for most breads. In some areas, particularly in the rural northern highlands, women still go on wood gathering expeditions, often as far as the Tihama plain. They leave during the night carrying torches and small hatches, returning up to 8 hours later with 20 kilos of wood on their heads. Women of the Hujariyya remember doing this 20 years ago. Among city women and the affluent rural women, the alternative to collecting wood is buying it in the markets. While wood seems TO be available in most rural markets, people who have road access prefer to buy it by the truckload. In the Hujariyya people buy a Toyota Stout truckload of wood for up 1000 YR (US$220) and this lasts them several months. Because of such prohibitive costs, the villagers are decreasing the number of times per week that they eat tannur-baked breads. It is unfortunate because some of the most nutritious traditional breads are not being made as much as they used to be. Dung is used as a fuel in tannurs and open cooking areas where foods, including fried breads, are cooked in skillets, pots and kettles. Dung is an important supplement to wood in most northern areas. Sorghum stalks and roots are used like wood in the tannur or an open area of the kitchen where fires are built on the floor and kettles and skillets put on stones surrounding the fire. The latter method is common in the south, for boiling and frying. Charcoal is used in braziers (maugad) for cooking, or often to keep tea and coffee hot outside the sitting room. Butagas is used like wood in the tannur or in an open area of the kitchen where fires are built. It is often used to keep cows and sheep warm. Butagas is not expensive but it is more expensive in more remote areas. If possible, men from the household buy kerosene in larger containers in the market towns. It is undoubtedly cheaper this way and a necessary economy since kerosene is used for lanterns in villages where there is no electricity. (Electricity is spreading rapidly throughout rural Yemen. In many villages the mosque and perhaps the house of the shaykh are electrified first. In better organized villages cooperatives have been started wiring all the houses to a large, central generator. In the cases of private generators, they are run usually only at night and started by the women of the house at sunset.) Butagas is becoming increasingly popular in the country, particularly in market towns which have access to roads and cities. At 40 YR (US$0.80) for a replacement cylinder in the Hujariyya, butagas is not inexpensive but it is more convenient than traditional fuels. Mahwit town has recently had a butagas dealership established. It is not improbable that butagas is spreading to other parts of Yemen too. If such things as refrigerators, chest freezers, electric generators and televisions can be carried up mountains on donkeys so too could butagas. Needless to say, butagas is a comfort to women easier. Rice, sauces, tea, coffee and even fried breads are being made with butagas. In cities, butagas-run cookers with ovens are preferred by women and commonly used. Until other sources of cooking energy such as solar energy, become available and economical, butagas provides the most convenient...
alternative for Yemeni women. As long as traditional breads are preferred, wood will be necessary for the tannur ovens. Afforestation projects might provide fuels as well as general benefits to the ecology. [=]

50044. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 22: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work of Women: Rural Work: Women in Agriculture. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Yemeni women play a crucial role in the subsistence agriculture of Yemen. They perform laborious tasks year round whereas men, generally speaking, work at ploughing and threshing periods only. The dominance of women in agricultural work appears to be correlated negatively which how wealthy the community is, particularly due to cash crops. Whatever the case may be, the work that women do in agriculture is not a traditionally-defined division of labor by sex alone. Their work is dictated by age, land tenure, social class, residence and as mentioned above, which crops predominate in the area.

Age: Older women carry out the lighter tasks such as sowing the seeds, thinning and weeding. Children assist with weeding and thinning.

Land tenure: How the land is worked can vary among the following arrangements:

- Mulk: private ownership, family labour; Mulk: but with mixed family labour and day hires; Rahn: or pawning [Rahn (pawned) land is taken by the working family in exchange for a sum of money they pay to the owner. The working family pays all costs and takes all profits from the land. This is an un-Islamic practice and it is not known how common it is.]
- Family labour and/or day hires; Sharak: share-cropping, rented.
- Rent and his family only; Sharak: share-cropping with the renter and his family working along with day hires.

Women’s positions in the land tenure system are determined by those of their husbands. The wife of a landowner, the wife of a share-cropper and the wife of a man who has taken lands in pawn work according to the above mentioned divisions by age and sex. The following points are qualifications, however:

Social class: sometimes women of the elite, particularly of the sayyid strata, do not work at all or do not work on any other lands but their own. Their lands may be rented out or daily workers may be hired. If so, they are relieved of their agricultural tasks and remain at home. In some areas, like Wadi Mawza, daily agricultural laborers are recruited from the akhdam, services class. Landless qaba’il (tribemen), for example, would enter into a sharak or share-cropping arrangement rather than work on the daily hire basis. Akhdam women follow their men in these cases and doing the tasks defined as women’s work. In Wadi Mawza their wages are in kind, not cash. Residence: Women in rural towns, such as Haja, Mahwit, Zabid, Rida, Mawza and Turba, work less on the land than do women small villages. Their lands are rented out. Bornstein has argued that women in some areas of the Tihama do no agricultural work. This has been verified in Wadi Rima where women do not participate in agricultural work at all.

Crops: It seems to be a general rule that women do no significant work in cash-cropping (such as cultivation of qat, grapes and coffee). The exceptions may be cotton in the Tihama and qat from Jabal Sabr near Ta’izz. New evidence suggests that women do some of the work on family plots of vegetables in the ‘Amran area, and this is thought to be a new trend after the out-migration of males from the area and mechanized irrigation. In Rida’ women weed the qat fields only. In areas of the Hamdan tribe, qat and grapes alike are cultivated, harvested and sold by men only. It may be postulated that labour out-migration is comparatively lower from areas where men participate actively in lucrative cash crops. As owners and wage labourers there is a good economic profit from the local situation. In sum, it can be said that women are the crucial element in the agricultural work force. Their importance varies by crop and is less vital where there is cash-cropping. In areas of high out-migration of males and with sorghum cultivation, women have the most intense agricultural production roles. Since sorghum appears to be the most widely cultivated subsistence crop in Yemen, it is instructive to look at how it is cultivated in detail. There are always exceptions to every generalization that is made about the division of labour in agriculture.
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Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 23: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Work Roles of Women: Rural Work: For Renumeration. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. If a woman needs to, or would like to, there are ways in which she can be paid for her work. In rural towns (where there is modern sector work) women can work as: Hospital cleaners and staff; School teachers—formal education and Qur'anic tutoring; Bank workers; Tea shop worker, usually with husband; Women who prepares the bride, (muzayyina).

In villages and rural towns women work as:
- Seamstresses; Water carriers; Clothes washers; Bread makers;
- Basket makers; Traditional health workers: including midwives;
- Construction workers; Servants; Traders: selling gold and clothes at parties or tinned goods at home Animal tenders; Potters, weavers; Agricultural labourers. Rural women who have no support from a husband or kin are likely to work at any of the above occupations to earn payment in either cash or grains. There are many women who are not destitute but who choose to work because they like to and would like the payments to improve their lives and those of their children. Some of the above occupations vary by region and by social class. Evidence shows that only women in the southern part of the country work in construction. Women in the Hujariyya earn lunch and 25 YR ($3.50) daily for carrying water, small stones and mud at construction sites. Men working in the unskilled construction jobs earn at least twice what women do, plus qat and cigarettes. Perhaps women are employed in construction in the south because the ratio of emigration is highest from there and there is a definite shortage of male labour. In addition, due to the wage differentials it is more economical to hire women. Specialized bridal preparations take place more often in towns than in villages. The Muzayyina, from the class of barbers, does this work. Other jobs restricted to lower class women are: working in tea shops, being servants, applying mud and dung to houses (in Mawza) and drumming at female wedding parties. Handicraft work, apart from basket-making, tends to be restricted to a lower class group. Potters can include women both in the Tihama and the highlands. The trade is usually family-organized. Most weaving tends to be done by men, though women spin wool into yarn in Rida' and in the east (Shelagh Weir, 1975, pp. 65–69). Traditional healers are often from the sayyid class; this goes for men as well as women. Sayyid women who are healers earn their income by burning (against fear and chronic pains), massaging (against rheumatism and infertility) and writing holy papers as amulets and cures. Their charges are minimal 5—15 YR ($US1.10—US$3.30). Women exorcists in the Zar cult [The Zar cult is found among women in the Tihama and involves group rituals with African styled dancing and drumming.] have big earnings but are few in number. When planning rural development projects, traditional remunerative tasks of women should be acknowledged. If there is the possibility of incorporating traditional specialists into a modern framework, all the better. Care should be taken so as to avoid threatening the earning capacity of such women. [=]

50046. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 25: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: The Social Roles of Women. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. In Yemen, men have three distinct areas of social interaction: the mosque, where males gather to pray, discuss current events and make decisions; the market where important information is passed on in the arena of buying and selling, and afternoon qat parties. These represent the intensely social, public world of males. [For further insights on the male world of Manakha, a town in Jabal Haraz, see Tomas Gerholm's Market, Mosque and Mafraj.] Women, on the other hand, do not pray communally in the mosques, nor do most women participate in such activities. Rather, women meet at formal qat and tea parties in the afternoons or through informal "door step" chats with neighbours. Afternoon gatherings tend to be more formalized in town and cities. Rural women, in general, have more interaction with other women and village men through their work. Tasks like fetching fuel and water, and working in the fields are often done in groups. Working songs are sung and latest news is spread, making the tasks themselves not so tiring. Children are not only part of the labour force of a community, but socialize freely with women throughout the day. In villages this is more casual than in cities. Indeed, children are raised by the community of women in a village, not by their mothers alone. Women evaluate each other with various criteria. Some attach a high value to the amount of gold and kind of clothes other women have. If a woman displays such items of status, surely she has an attentive, generous husband and this may be envied. Women are admired for certain personal qualities, like helpfulness, dignity (not indulging in gossip) and physical strength. The most powerful characters in any community of women are usually old women. They have proven themselves through time and command respect for having raised their children well and lived an honourable life. Often the most mobile women are widows and divorcées. It is these women who might be famous for some specialization which earns them their livelihood and appear to be more free in their work and socializing. Without a doubt, city women lead a less social life than rural women. Women may not even socialize with their neighbors, particularly in newly constructed and anonymous housing areas where migrants from the countryside live. These women have a less pleasant life, and indeed, a less informed one. If they are lucky enough to have a television, it would become their main source entertainment and information. [=]

Women and Health: Access to Medical Treatment. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Even if hospitals are within walking distance, women may be forbidden to seek medical advice there. The question of modesty is part of the problem. Many Yemeni men will not tolerate that their wives be examined by a male doctor. In addition, some medical facilities do not have good reputations and no honourable woman would be allowed to be seen there. Female circumcision is practised in the Tihama and not in the highlands. A campaign should be mounted by the Ministry of Health to deal with this dangerous mutilation of the female body. [\textit{\textsuperscript{5}}]

50050. Myrntt, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 28: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Women and Health: Access to Medical Treatment. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Clearly, strong social sanctions exist against educating girls—even at the primary classes and approximately 11% each for the secondary level. Clearly, strong social sanctions exist against educating girls—even at the primary level—in the northern provinces of Sa’dah and Mahwit as well as in the eastern province of Marib. For this year, 1978/79, only 59 girls are expected to complete teacher training at the preparatory level and only 26 will complete the secondary teacher training schools. Yemeni women represent 7.7% of the Yemeni student body at the University of San’a, with a high percent female of the total enrollment in the faculty of Education (12.1%) and lowest, (3.6%) of the total enrollment in the Faculty of Law and Islamic Law. Total of 23 females were fourth year students during 1977/78. While this seems low, it must be remembered that the number of women in the university has risen from 4 to over 1000 in the last six years. The Health Manpower Institute is the only formal institute for health workers in the country. Only 13 female nurses were expected to complete the three-year course in nursing by the end of the year. Yemen suffers from the legacy of no education for females, so it will be many years before the changes occurring now, at the primary levels of the formal education system, ever so modest, can be felt. The 1975 Manpower Survey by Socknat and Sinclair predicted that about 3000 females will be completing primary school by 1984/5 and that 800 will be finishing secondary school. While it is correct that consideration for the future of Yemen demands an emphasis on bringing girls into the formal education system form their early years, there are many women in the country over 15 years of age who could profit from non-formal education. Learning basic literacy and numeracy skills as well as being educated in simple hygiene and nutrition would have wide-ranging benefits since this perceive as ideal appears to depend on what idea they have of their future. Birth attendants also may be the old women of the extended family for whom circumcision is practised in the Tihama and not in the highlands. A campaign should be mounted by the Ministry of Health to deal with this dangerous mutilation of the female body. [\textit{\textsuperscript{5}}]

50051. Myrntt, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 29: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Women and Health: Access to Medical Treatment. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Yemeni women are aware that marriage in the mid-teenage years is very important in the household of their parents, more so in the countryside than in the cities. Too, marriage in the mid-teenage years is most common and this might not permit the completion of secondary school. What can be observed from school attendance statistics is that the females are still under-represented even in the first six years of school, when their labors is not so crucial to the household nor are they about to be married. Worth noting is the rising percentage of girls in the total attendance by class at the primary stage. This indicates that if families choose to send their daughters to school, they intend that the girls stay to complete the six years and acquire the primary school certificate. Boy students may attend for a few years and drop out when employment opportunities arise. The percentage of female students in the total student population varies from governorate to governorate. As to be expected, the governorates of San’a and Ta’izz have the highest percentages of female students, 15.4% and 23% respectively for the primary classes and approximately 11% each for the secondary level. It is reported that interest is high, but that classwork has been too far from showing his daughter to study publicly, report from the Ministry of Education Women’s Project suggests that the major constraints to educating females in Yemen are “social attitudes and parental ignorance, family obligations keeping girls at home, and the pattern of early marriage” (B. Awad, 1978, p. 3). It is true that the labour of girls is very important in the household of their parents, more so in the countryside than in the cities. Too, marriage in the mid-teenage years is most common and this might not permit the completion of secondary school. What can be observed from school attendance statistics is that the females are still under-represented even in the first six years of school, when their labors is not so crucial to the household nor are they about to be married. Worth noting is the rising percentage of girls in the total attendance by class at the primary stage. This indicates that if families choose to send their daughters to school, they intend that the girls stay to complete the six years and acquire the primary school certificate. Boy students may attend for a few years and drop out when employment opportunities arise. The percentage of female students in the total student population varies from governorate to governorate. As to be expected, the governorates of San’a and Ta’izz have the highest percentages of female students, 15.4% and 23% respectively for the primary classes and approximately 11% each for the secondary level. Clearly, strong social sanctions exist against educating girls—even at the primary level—in the northern provinces of Sa’dah and Mahwit as well as in the eastern province of Marib. For this year, 1978/79, only 59 girls are expected to complete teacher training at the preparatory level and only 26 will complete the secondary teacher training schools. Yemeni women represent 7.7% of the Yemeni student body at the University of San’a, with a high percent female of the total enrollment in the faculty of Education (12.1%) and lowest, (3.6%) of the total enrollment in the Faculty of Law and Islamic Law. Total of 23 females were fourth year students during 1977/78. While this seems low, it must be remembered that the number of women in the university has risen from 4 to over 1000 in the last six years. The Health Manpower Institute is the only formal institute for health workers in the country. Only 13 female nurses were expected to complete the three-year course in nursing by the end of the year. Yemen suffers from the legacy of no education for females, so it will be many years before the changes occurring now, at the primary levels of the formal education system, ever so modest, can be felt. The 1975 Manpower Survey by Socknat and Sinclair predicted that about 3000 females will be completing primary school by 1984/5 and that 800 will be finishing secondary school. While it is correct that consideration for the future of Yemen demands an emphasis on bringing girls into the formal education system form their early years, there are many women in the country over 15 years of age who could profit from non-formal education. Learning basic literacy and numeracy skills as well as being educated in simple hygiene and nutrition would have wide-ranging benefits since this perceive as ideal appears to depend on what idea they have of their future. Birth attendants also may be the old women of the extended family for whom circumcision is practised in the Tihama and not in the highlands. A campaign should be mounted by the Ministry of Health to deal with this dangerous mutilation of the female body. [\textit{\textsuperscript{5}}]

50052. Myrntt, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 30: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Women and Health: Access to Medical Treatment. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Yemeni women are aware that marriage in the mid-teenage years is very important in the household of their parents, more so in the countryside than in the cities. Too, marriage in the mid-teenage years is most common and this might not permit the completion of secondary school. While it is correct that consideration for the future of Yemen demands an emphasis on bringing girls into the formal education system form their early years, there are many women in the country over 15 years of age who could profit from non-formal education. Learning basic literacy and numeracy skills as well as being educated in simple hygiene and nutrition would have wide-ranging benefits since this perceive as ideal appears to depend on what idea they have of their future. Birth attendants also may be the old women of the extended family for whom circumcision is practised in the Tihama and not in the highlands. A campaign should be mounted by the Ministry of Health to deal with this dangerous mutilation of the female body. [\textit{\textsuperscript{5}}]

50049. Myrntt, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 27: Yemeni Women: An Analysis of the Status Quo: Women and Health: Basic Problems. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Yemeni women are aware that marriage in the mid-teenage years is very important in the household of their parents, more so in the countryside than in the cities. Too, marriage in the mid-teenage years is most common and this might not permit the completion of secondary school. While it is correct that consideration for the future of Yemen demands an emphasis on bringing girls into the formal education system form their early years, there are many women in the country over 15 years of age who could profit from non-formal education. Learning basic literacy and numeracy skills as well as being educated in simple hygiene and nutrition would have wide-ranging benefits since this perceive as ideal appears to depend on what idea they have of their future. Birth attendants also may be the old women of the extended family for whom circumcision is practised in the Tihama and not in the highlands. A campaign should be mounted by the Ministry of Health to deal with this dangerous mutilation of the female body. [\textit{\textsuperscript{5}}]
Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Republic: Part 31: International Strategies Versus Yemeni Goals and Possibilities. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The question of "women in development" descends directly from the movement to dissect change into groups which are known to play active roles in change, and into others which are thought to be the recipients of the benefits of change. The concern springs from empirical evidence which demonstrates that "change", "modernization", and "development" do not affect all segments of the population in the same way, and can have both positive and negative impacts on parts of society. Concerned about how women fare in the process of change, many development organizations have incorporated the imperative to "integrate women into development" into their policies. In spirit this means that national development needs women—to maximize human resources—and women need development—to maximize their own personal growth. The directive "integrate women into development" has had some definitional problems, however. Taken superficially, it assumes that women are integrated into development if they participate in modern education and the industrial labor force. Development, the reasoning goes, means training women for "modern work". While this aim is important for urban Yemen particularly, it misses the whole texture and dynamics of rural, traditional Yemeni society) 90% of the population. Integrating women into development in Yemen must deal with changes going on in the countryside totally apart from the "modern sector". Thus development for women in Yemen must be two-pronged; making sure that women participate and are positively affected by changes in the traditional sector as well as integrating women into the modern sector through education, training and employment. [a]

50054. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 32: International Strategies Versus Yemeni Goals and Possibilities: The Plan of Action: Declaration of Mexico. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The first serious effort to list objectives of development for women was the World Plan of Action of the International Women's Year. It is a plan based on the consensus of the delegates to the conference in Mexico City, 1975. The document addresses basic needs and rights of women, and more philosophical issues such as the re-evaluation of sex stereotypes. The use of such a document for Yemen lies in its reaffirmation of the "basic needs first" approach. It makes the preliminary steps explicit. Let us consider some of the list of Minimum Goals which are immediately relevant to Yemen (The complete list of Minimum Goals is found in Appendix V): (1) marked increase in literacy. (2) extension of technical and vocational skills to women. (3) equal access to education at every level. (4) establishment of the infrastructural services in rural and urban areas. (5) improved provision of health education and services, sanitation, nutrition, family education and other welfare services. (6) promotion of women's organizations. These goals answer basic human needs, and development policy should address these above all, first. [a]

50055. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 33: International Strategies Versus Yemeni Goals and Possibilities: The Policy of the Yemen Government: The Five Year Plan and Opinions of Officials. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The Five Year Plan of the Yemen Arab Republic states that at the basis of economic development in the country lies the establishment of an adequate infrastructure and the maximization of human resources in the country. The full utilization of human resources in the country will result from a marked increase in literacy, equal access to education at every level, extension of technical and vocational skills to everyone and increased health. Too, the promotion of women's organizations like the Yemeni Women's Association will foster the increased personal development of women through non-formal training and other assistance. [See Appendix IV for the Yemeni Women's Association statement at The Yemen International Development Conference.] In spirit and in directives, the Five Year Plan is in harmony with "basic needs first" and the Minimal Goals of the World Plan of Action. Generally speaking, government officials feel that the situation of women in Yemen will improve as basic services such as water, health and education spread. These are fundamental human needs and must be satisfied first. To appreciate what this means in practical terms we must look to the various programmes of the government. In the Ministry of Education, a Women's Section has been established to supervise formal and non-formal education for girls and women. They have worked to establish an appropriate health and home economics curriculum for the schools. Centers have been established where older girls and women can study for the Primary School certificate, learn basic literacy skills, study home economics or be given some vocational training. The Ministry of Social Affairs gives moral and material support to the Yemen Women's Association, which also offers basic literacy and training to women in San'a'. The ministry has a Women's Bureau which organizes research on women. A study is presently being conducted on women in the modern labour force, and what rights they have as employees. The Ministry supports women to attend international conferences, and activities like Mothers' Day. The Five Year Health Programme of the Ministry of Health stresses the implementation of a wide-ranging health service which includes provision of safe water (along with the Ministry of Public Works) sanitation, better housing, and nutrition education. The Programme also stresses the implementation of a primary health care system, designed to provide rural communities with services for mothers-child health and local birth attendants. Agricultural extension is the programme of the Ministry of Agriculture which could have the most direct impact on women in the countryside. The service is not fully operational, yet it has great potential. (Extension will be discussed more fully under Section 4, and evaluation of on-going projects). In sum, the Yemen Government has established programmes with a direct impact on women in several of the ministries. Each has had its own set of problems, ranging from difficulties recruiting female staff to traditions inhibiting participation of women (particularly in health, education and work as female agricultural extension agents). Positive advances have been made, despite the constraints, and government officials believe that progress will demand patience and persistence. [a]

50056. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 34: International Strategies Versus Yemeni Goals and Possibilities: Perceptions of Yemeni Women. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Yemeni women themselves have varying perceptions about what will better their lives. Without exception, rural women identify their problems with those of the community: lack of roads, water supply, schools for their children, clinics, electricity and difficult agricultural work. If anything, one is struck by how content rural women are in many ways. Certainly they feel that they have never been economically so well off. Dissatisfaction comes from comparison, and the only comparison that rural women can make is that their lives are more comfortable now than they were even in the recent past. Many city women, however, are content with their lifestyle which is comparatively more restricted than that of rural women. Their routine of household work and afternoon socializing is what they know best. There is, however, an increasing number of women who would choose to improve themselves with education and training, or to work and earn a wage. It is ironic that rural women have always had two spheres of influence, in the home and non-formal education for girls and women. They have worked to study for the Primary School certificate, learn basic literacy skills, study home economics or be given some vocational training. The Ministry of Social Affairs gives moral and material support to the Yemen Women's Association, which also offers basic literacy and training to women in San'a'. The ministry has a Women's Bureau which organizes research on women. A study is presently being conducted on women in the modern labour force, and what rights they have as employees. The Ministry supports women to attend international conferences, and activities like Mothers' Day. The Five Year Health Programme of the Ministry of Health stresses the implementation of a wide-ranging health service which includes provision of safe water (along with the Ministry of Public Works) sanitation, better housing, and nutrition education. The Programme also stresses the implementation of a primary health care system, designed to provide rural communities with services for mothers-child health and local birth attendants. Agricultural extension is the programme of the Ministry of Agriculture which could have the most direct impact on women in the countryside. The service is not fully operational, yet it has great potential. (Extension will be discussed more fully under Section 4, and evaluation of on-going projects). In sum, the Yemen Government has established programmes with a direct impact on women in several of the ministries. Each has had its own set of problems, ranging from difficulties recruiting female staff to traditions inhibiting participation of women (particularly in health, education and work as female agricultural extension agents). Positive advances have been made, despite the constraints, and government officials believe that progress will demand patience and persistence. [a]
Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 35: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Foreign aid development projects in Yemen can be grouped into 5 general categories: (1) Technical support (providing advisers and technicians); (2) Infrastructure and capital development (building of roads, water projects, schools, hospitals and industrial projects); (3) Manpower training (specialized training institutes and fellowship programmes); (4) Agricultural projects (livestock and veterinary, agricultural mechanization, plant protection and crop experimentation) and, (5) “integrated rural development projects” which combine all of the above.

In the literature on women in development, it is often argued that any development project has a social impact—and therefore an impact on women—so must explain its objectives, and costs, in social terms. In Yemen, certainly the last four categories of projects should be liable to scrutiny. It has been shown, for example, that infrastructure development projects such as roads and irrigation schemes may have negative effects on part of the population of the area they are intended to serve. The development of small agricultural industries may also displace people who have earned a traditional livelihood from related tasks. Women and poultry production are a prime example of how traditional remunerative tasks might not fit into modern schemes. In any case, these kinds of issues should be considered in the initial planning phases of projects and checked on during later phases of project implementation. Organizations and institutions in Yemen which are involved in development have very few secondary sources on social background on which they can rely. Apart from A. Bornstein’s report on Food and Society in Yemen (1974) little exists on the private world of women. It is instructive, therefore, to look at how various projects deal with sociological variables in general, and the question of women in particular. The projects evaluated are involved in rural development work, and have comparatively large budgets. They are not a representative sample of all development projects, but demonstrate some of the problems not uncommon in other fields. They are: Southern Uplands Regional Development Project (SURDP); The Tihama Development Authority: Extension Service, Zabid; Rida’ Integrated Rural Development Project; al-Baun Project, ‘Amran; Local Resources for Development in al-Hudaydah and Haja Governarates (USAID); Yemeni-British Agricultural Engineering Project; The British Veterinary Project. [=]

50058. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 36: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: Criteria of Evaluation. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. A first criteria of evaluation is the composition of project teams. Multidisciplinary teams, including sociologists and women, would be the ideal. Sociologists are likely to pose certain kinds of questions and view the project in social terms. Women, whatever their discipline or interests may be, have access to Yemeni women by virtue of their sex. One reason why so few women come on project missions is the prevailing belief in the West that a Western woman cannot deal as a professional in a culture like that of Yemen. Enough exceptions now exist to prove this belief false. Too, Europe and America have far too few women professionals in such high-level positions anyway. Voluntary organizations are redressing this imbalance slightly, with younger professional women taking up positions in countries like Yemen. Of the projects surveyed, the general composition of project teams was economists, agronomists and various other technical personnel. Only the Rida’ Integrated Rural Development Project and the USAID Local Resources Project included social scientists in their initial teams and included women for research among the local women. A second criteria is if the project defined the social parameters of the target group or area. What sort of socioeconomic base line data were collected? Did they include information on changing agricultural patterns, division of labour, decision-making and remunerative traditional tasks? A third criteria is if the research in the planning stages of the project provided information on local priorities and “felt needs”. A final consideration, for projects in late phases of implementation, concerns evaluations of the project in social terms. Have any of the projects done this? These criteria—social parameters, felt needs and evaluations—will be discussed separately under each project description. [=]

50059. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 37: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in YemenSummary of Projects: The Southern Uplands Rural Project. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. This project, funded by the World Bank and IDA, was initiated in the Ta’izz and Ibb provinces during 1976 with the specific goals to: increase agricultural production, to improve per capita income and to reduce dependence on imports for essential foodstuffs. SURDP I depleted its funds in 1976 and SURDP II will continue the original project and complete the unfinished work in a wider geographical area. A report was prepared for the SURDP II identification mission in mid 1978 and contained facts from the 1975 census on population, agricultural cultivation and livestock, schools and hospitals. "Labour Force Participation" statistics were also presented, but are of questionable value in rural Yemen since they do not include non-wage family labour which is crucial to the understanding of agricultural production. The sociological information presented is, unfortunately, superficial. The project has had two systems of enquiry into local expectations. The agricultural extension agents, who work out of the Central Agricultural Research Station in Ta’izz and in cooperation with SURDP, have a routine questionnaire on what farmers want from the extension service. SURDP also has conducted a survey of the Local Development Associations since it is through the LDA’s that they work. An evaluation of SURDP I was made in the report prepared for the identification mission for SURDP II. "Due to flexibility shown by the project management and the high inflation rate, the projects achievements were different from those projected." (SURDP II, 1978, Annex 2 P. 2) The infrastructural development such as roads and water systems, as well as technical assistance were limited because of inflation and slow recruitment of staff. No detailed analysis was presented on who had actually benefited from the first project. One lesson, at least, can be learned from the SURDP experience: How can census figures and other statistics be used to define social parameters, and what are their limitations? The census provides valuable information on the sex and age structure of the population, emigration rates, numbers of school and hospitals. The "labour force participation statistics, on the other hand, must be used very carefully when explaining the rural economy. The census is a useful framework, but it gives a static picture and does not really explain why things are the way that they are. [=]

50060. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 38: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: The Tihama Development Authority: Extension Service, Zabid. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The agricultural extension and training department of the Tihama Development Authority was established in 1974 for services in Wadi Zabid. Its aims were to train a cadre of Yemeni extension agents for the area and to carry our research on crop varieties. Much of the socioeconomic information the project has has been gathered empirically, over time, and has never been formalized into a report. Quite a lot is known about division of labour and the role of women in the area, but the leadership of the project has been reluctant to write it down because it is not measurable or quantifiable. The needs and opinions of the people are made known in the on-going dialogue between the farmers and the extension agents. For example, women have refused to cook with a new strain of sorghum developed because it is dark in colour. The extension agents are now trying to convince the women, indirectly through male family members, that the new, dark grains are better. There has been no formal evaluation of the project and its successes and failures in social terms. It is unfortunate that the project papers concentrate on crop production outputs and other quantifiable data when it would be useful to their project in the future, and to others involved in extension and rural
agricultural projects, if more of the data on attitudes and social organization which are well-known now, would be written down. [=]

50061. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 39: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: The Rida’ Integrated Rural Development Project. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. This project has been an experiment from the beginning, using a research-oriented approach. A preparatory mission of multidisciplinary experts came to Yemen in 1977, and within six months, a Dutch team had arrived in Rida’ ready to begin work. The project objectives have not been explicit. Rather, action-oriented research into agricultural practises and the society in and around Rida’ were emphasized as a first step. Some work has been done on crop experimentation, construction of roads and water projects. Research has been the prime activity of the Dutch team and appropriate for Yemen, the team leader argues, because so little baseline socio-economic information exists. Only now do they know what messages to extend and how to communicate with the society at large. Full-time research on women has been an integral part of the project. Local expectations have proved to be problematic for the project in that the people of Rida’ expected more immediate services and visible benefits of the project. The dissatisfaction has been expressed in a variety of ways and the project has tried to adapt itself by giving more demonstration lectures. A formal evaluation of the research and project activities to date will be issued in 1979, and will make policy suggestions based on their social and agricultural studies. In sum, the Rida’ project provides an alternative approach to “integrated rural development”. Project goals are dependent on the outcomes of the research which has been a major activity of the project to date. The most extensive and systematic information on women in the country has been collected, and it is hoped that a model strategy on women in the development of rural Yemen will be devised from it. [=]

50062. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 40: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: Al-Baun, ‘Amran. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. This project is in the feasibility study phase with efforts now directed to experimentation with crop varieties, extension and demonstration and the construction of on-site housing for the project staff. The project team has already found out that the economic forecasting carried out by the identification mission had not specified the labour shortage problem nor the inflation which is already causing budgetary constraints. Aware of the need for current socio-economic information, a sociologist was recruited for a short time. In his report, he noted that women, old men and children are participating in agriculture more than before. Apart from this comment, which needs some historical perspective, the report contains no information on attitudes, the roles of women and how they might participate in the project. Much of what is being done in al-Baun is based on years of research on crop experimentation in the ‘A’in area. As yet, there has been little feedback or evaluation on what is being in the al-Baun area itself. The al-Baun area is interesting in that it includes production of subsistence crops based on rain-fed irrigation, as well as both traditional and modern cash crops which demand mechanized irrigation. It presents a microcosm of Yemeni agricultural practice and for this reason information on how production is organized and the roles of women would be extremely useful. [=]

50063. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 41: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: Local Resources for Development in the Al-Hudaydah and Haja Governorates (USAID). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. This “integrated rural development project” is in its planning stages. A multidisciplinary team conducted a socioeconomic survey of the two areas in 1978. Interest centered on local political institutions and their ability to muster support and match funds for roads and other projects. Information was collected on the LDA’s [LDA: Local Development Associations (Co-operatives)], markets, the land tenure system and agricultural practice, and the activities of women. The same socio-economic survey contained questions on what the local people regarded as their development priorities. As anticipated, roads and water are among the top priority needs, so will be concentrated on initially. Continuing evaluation is being built into the project from the beginning. A team of researchers, to include one woman sociologist, will reside in the project area, and evaluate the effects of the project at various stages. The preliminary research for this project has begun in the right directions assessing local development priorities against the ability of the Yemeni institutions in Haja and al-Hudaydah to share responsibility for the projects. It is hoped that the project will define specific development priorities for women in the Hudaydah and Haja governorates through systematic and continuous research. [=]

50064. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 42: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: The Yemeni-British Agricultural Engineering Project. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. The aims of this project are to experiment with and introduce appropriate mechanization into Yemeni agriculture. Mechanization is especially important due to the labour shortage in the country and particularly crucial during peak work periods like planting and harvesting. The project was located in Ta’izz because of the population and cultivation density of the area. An experimental project, much of their information on social organization has been collected in the field as the work is being done. For example, the team leader mentioned that the tasks which are traditionally male — ploughing and threshing — appear to be easiest and most economical to mechanize. Women’s tasks such as planting, thinning, weeding and harvesting are more difficult to mechanize, particularly on small plots. There is a continuous dialogue between the project members and the farmers of the Ta’izz region, so feedback on what is liked and disliked is constant. The project plans to hire an economist to look at the question of family labour versus daily hire and/or mechanization. The assumption is that there is more to mechanization than the machines alone. In sum, a lot of practical sociological information has been gathered in the field by members of this project. This, along with the proposed study into the economics of family labour versus mechanization, should add to the understanding of the changing agricultural production in Yemen. A positive addition to the project would be the addition of a component to improve the agricultural tools of women. [=]

50065. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 43: An Evaluation of On-Going Development Projects in Yemen: The British Veterinary Team. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. This project provides a health service for livestock and poultry throughout the country. Its activities include a vaccination program, visits to disease-ridden areas and laboratory work. While the team has an abundance of practical knowledge on how livestock and poultry are cared for in the country, none of the social background to animal production has been reported on, at least in a formal report. Local “felt needs” are articulated primarily through emergency calls to the team. Objectively, some of the animal feeding techniques are antiquated and time-consuming for women and even harmful to animals. The team members are aware of this problem, but until now, the project has not been flexible enough—both staff-wise and time-wise—to deal with the matter. In sum, the veterinary project could be useful, = harmful to animals. The team members are aware of this problem, but...
Other measures do this by quantifying health and educational services, implementation. Reasons for consideration: It is necessary to be able to but they do not give us an understanding of the real terms of development. Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study; Evaluation During succeeding can be measured in monetary terms such as GNP, GDP and traditional sector: This concerns remunerative activities which persons to make people better off. Whether or not the process of development is (5) Consideration: Wages earned by men and women in the Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Reasons for Consideration: This consideration makes clear not only the Mahwit project has concentrated on training local health workers, and Consideration: To be able to affect change, it must be known who has the planning, and evaluation. The following checklist is modest in size but not modest in demands. It demands a general understanding of fundamental social issues, and rural Yemen of the "integrated rural development" nature, yet some of the points are applicable to urban projects as well. [5] 50067. Mynitti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 46: Recommendations on How Women Can Participate in and Profit From the Development Process: Improvements in Project Planning: A Checklist. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Consideration: (1) Consideration: Degree of fit with local priorities regarding women: This is designed to check whether the project objectives are appropriate to the priorities within the country and the felt needs of the women themselves. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Project Identification. Reasons for Consideration: A project will be accepted at all levels only if the project addresses locally perceived needs. (2) Consideration: The demographic picture: Information such as the sex rates and age structure of the population in the project area can be obtained from the 1975 census. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Project Identification. Reasons for Consideration: This check makes the manpower situation and who is on the ground explicit. It will provide the project planners with knowledge of the parameters of the target population, but it may be too late to make changes. (3) Consideration: Organization of the family: This point includes data on decision-making within the family and roles of family members. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study. Reasons for Consideration: To be able to affect change, it must be known who has the decision-making power, even at the smallest unit of society, the household. The explicit statement of who does which tasks (cooking, buying food, water, fuel etc.) makes it clear where services and education should be directed. (4) Consideration: Agricultural Tasks: The Division of Labour. Variation should be noted by sex, age, social status and which crops are produced. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study. Reasons for Consideration: This consideration makes clear not only which tasks are important in agricultural production in Yemen, but who does the work. Where improvements can be made and to whom they should be directed, is necessary for the project planner. (5) Consideration: Wages earned by men and omen in the traditional sector: This concerns remunerative activities which persons in the project area have participated in prior to the project. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study: Evaluation During Implementation. Reasons for consideration: It is necessary to be able to predict the harmful effects a project might have, particularly on the wage-earning capacity of persons. Plans could be made to incorporate these.
persons into the modern scheme.

(6) Consideration: Strategies to address women: Specific steps—from recruitment of personnel to plans of activities—should be listed. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study; Evaluation During Implementation. Reasons for consideration: This point concerns the recruitment of necessary project personnel, possibly women, to meet the project's goals.

(7) Consideration: Women as participants in the project: The labor and energy of women as an important source of manpower in the country-being utilised to the fullest? Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study; Evaluation During Implementation. Reasons for consideration: There should be an awareness of how women are restricted in cultural terms and how this might negatively influence their participation in the project. Positive steps should be taken to overcome these. Possible changes in the roles of women should be explained.

(8) Consideration: WOMEN as beneficiaries of the project. Time of Consideration (Stage of Project): Feasibility Study; Evaluation During Implementation. Reasons for consideration: This general consideration should note how women are to benefit from the project. care should be taken that they are brought into the process of modernization. [=]

50069. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 47: Recommendations on How Women Can Participate in and Profit From the Development Process: Possible Project Components for Women: Agriculture. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. All developments have impact on women in as much as they affect the population as a whole. Nevertheless, there are many projects which would better suit the needs of women if some of the components were directed at women, after a careful analysis of their situation has been made.

(1) Mechanization: The question of mechanization in Yemen presents an interesting problem. As yet, it appears that the easiest tasks to mechanize are those traditionally male, ploughing and threshing. In the short term, this will help alleviate the problems due to the outmigration of males, but there is no reason why women could not be taught how to use machines, too. Threshing machines could be run by women, for example. One cannot believe that women are not strong enough to run machines when one observes other work that women do. More experimentation should be supported on the development of simple labour-saving devices which would assist women in their agricultural work. Women should not be left out of the modernization of agriculture. Projects dealing with agricultural mechanization and appropriate technology should make improvements in the agricultural tasks of women one of their primary focuses.

(2) Extension: Agricultural extension has great possibilities for bringing practical education to rural people, men and women. While it is true that in most cases women are the bulk of the labour and men are the decision-makers, this does not justify an extension programme aimed at men only. Modern techniques should be shared by everyone. If extension agents are honourable and polite in their behavior, and lectures are publicly held, there is no reason why women could not participate. In addition to lessons on improved agricultural practice supplementary courses could be given on nutrition, first aid and basic hygiene, to the entire village. Mobile units, with visual aid and use of media, could provide village-wide entertainment and education at the same time. One wonders if a special extension service for women would not be counterproductive. The “Total Village” approach is certainly more egalitarian and also more realistic given the shortage of trained, mobile females. Emphasis on home economics segregates women further and does not address other subjects, like agricultural work, which are important in their daily lives. Literacy training should be secondary, since rural women do not have the academic discipline nor the time to devote to studying and can rely on theiriterate children for reading messages and instructions. “Integrated rural development projects” might employ women (local Yemeni or wives of Arab school teachers resident in the area) for special home economics services—child care, cooking, sewing etc.—but these should be supplementary to general extension services aimed at the village as a whole.

(3) Training and employment: Women should be encouraged to participate in training courses related to agriculture and as counterparts in agricultural projects. Advertisements, interviews in schools and other publicity could be used in recruitment. Response may be low in the beginning, but each project should give women the opportunity to participate. With more and more girls receiving a formal education each year, the pool of possible candidates for training and employment is increasing.

(4) Media and agriculture: The media could also become involved in transmitting messages to improve agricultural work and rural life in general. The initiative has been taken by San’a’ Radio to establish a programme on rural life and work which would be taped in the countryside and broadcast at a later date. This service should be supported and women should be encouraged to participate in San’a’ and as contributors in the countryside. [=]

50070. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 49: Recommendations on How Women Can Participate in and Profit From the Development Process: Possible Project Components for Women: Livestock. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (1) Feeding practises: The veterinary team has noted that various rural practises regarding animals are harmful and antiquated. The custom to keep animals inside houses is harmful to their health, for example. Too, the making and feeding of “lucerne lollipops” to cows is a very time-consuming task for women. Both of these practises, and others, could be changed if a concerted effort were made and strategy of extension, directed at both women and men, were planned. The Veterinary Project or the Livestock Project within the Ministry of Agriculture could be expanded to cover these subjects.

(2) Dairy products: Women, who process all dairy products, could be taught improved methods. The Yarim experiment in training “milkm-aids” for mechanized milking and the establishment of female-run, household-based dairy enterprises will serve as a lesson on the problems and possibilities in this field. Integrated rural development projects might want to add this component to their project proposals.

(3) Poultry production: Like household dairies, small-scale poultry farms could be operated and managed by women in villages. Preliminary research must be carried out, however, on how large an enterprise can be and remain in the sphere of women.

(4) Research on animal fodder: Of indirect benefit to women would be research in experimental farms on animal fodder cultivation in rain-fed areas. If fodder which does not need mechanized irrigation like lucerne could be grown in fallow fields, it would save valuable time which women spend going far distances for fodder. It would be a useful source of food in addition to sorghum stalks. [=]


(2) The possibility of afforestation projects may provide some parts of the country with bigger supplies of wood for cooking.

(3) More research is needed on what fuels women prefer to cook with. The costs of various fuels can be calculated in terms of time, effort and money, but what is used for cooking, in the end, rests with the preferences of women. [=]

50072. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 50: Recommendations on How Women Can Participate in
and Profit From the Development Process: Possible Project Components for Women: Education. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (1) The future of the country rests with the increased participation of girls in primary education and up. Attitudes against educating daughters might be changed, or changes accelerated, through a media campaign aimed at both daughters and parents, stressing both the importance and respectability of education for girls.

(2) An advertising campaign to encourage increased participation in employment-related training institutes in health, secretarial and commercial fields should be carried out.

(3) Non-formal education: There are many females in the country over 15 years of age who have never participated in the formal education system at all. This cohort of women will be mothers and wives for some time to come, so provision of a basic education in home economics, nutrition and literacy through the non-formal system could benefit them as individuals and have positive effects on the well-being of their families. The non-formal system should be encouraged and teachers recruited from the community of Arab teachers living and working in all areas of the country. [=]


(2) Television: Regularly scheduled, locally-produced programmes which would interest women are a necessary addition to the current programmes. Any number of subjects are important: nutrition; cooking; hygiene; publicity for education, training and employment; life stories of Yemeni women; country life, highlighting women in agriculture; demonstrations on household improvements.

(3) Participation of the Yemeni Women's Association in the production of programmes should be encouraged. [=]

50077. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 55: Appendix One: List of Persons Consulted. Yemeni OFFICIALS: Central Planning Organisation: Mr. Ali Al-Bahr, Deputy Minister; Mr. Anwar Harazi, Director of Projects Department; Mr. Abdul Rabu Gerada, Head of Planning Department; Ms. Asma Basha, Loans Department. Ministry of Social Affairs, Youth and Labor: Mr. Ahmed Salih Al-Ru'ayni, Minister; Mr. Isma'il Al-Fadhil, Director, Social Affairs Authority. Ministry of Public Works: Mr. Abdul-Bari Salih, Head Rural Water Projects. Ministry of Agriculture: Mr. Muqbil, Director Planning Department. Ministry of Education: Ms. Fatima Fadhl, Director Women's Section. Yemeni Women's Association: Mrs. Sale'a Dallal, President. University of San'a: Mr. Abdul Ali Othman, Professor, Department of Sociology.

PROJECTS: MULTILATERAL DONORS: Central Agricultural Research Station, Ta'iizz: Mr. Fuad Salim, Extension Head. Livestock Credit and Processing Project: Mr. Kim Kuneman, Project Head; Mr. Arnold, Dairy Division. Ministry of Agriculture, Institutional Support: Mr. Mikhail Shafiq, Project Head; Mr. Mahmoud Salih, Planning Department; Mr. Homsi, Statistics Department. Tihama Development Authority, Zabid: Dr. Ahmed Rafa'ie, Director, Extension Division. SURDP, Ta'iizz: Mr. Hassan Huraybi, Co-manager; Mr. P.O. Tewari, Extension Expert. UNDP: Mr. Tim Howick-Smith, Programme Officer. UNESCO: Dr. Elias, Head, UNESCO project in the Ministry of Education.

Projects: Bi-Lateral Donors: Al-Baun Project (West Germany): Mr. Werner Moesbrugger, Head; Mr. Konrad Engelberger. American Save the Children: Mr. John Salamack. British Veterinary Team: Mr. Peter Heath. British Volunteers: Mr. James Firebrace. Integrated Rural
Development Project of Rada'a (the Netherlands): Mr. Rudolf Th. Wiersinga, Team Leader; Ms. Fatima Huraybi, Counterpart, Research on women. Overseas Development Ministry (UK): Mr. Hugo Haig-Thomas. Rada-Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) Clinic, Ta'izz: Mr. Lars-Johan Johnsen, Administrator; Ms. Stina Almroth, Nutritionist. San'a Radio (West Germany): Dr. Martin Schneiderfritz. Suq Al Baqr Clinic (West Germany): Dr. Jens Herrmann, Health Planner. USAID: Ms. Lee Ann (Pixie) Ross, Economic Programme Officer. Yemeni-British Agricultural Engineering Project, Ta'izz: Mr. James Williams, Project director; Mr. Abdul Ghani Ash-Shamiri, Counterpart director.

Researchers and Their Local Affiliations: Ms. Sheila Carapico, State University of New York, Binghamton, (USAID); Ms. Samar El-Daher, Queens College, University of London (Basic Services, Ministry of Health); Mr. Richard Tutwiler, State University of New York, Binghamton (American Save the Children Project. Mahwit) =

50078. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 56: Appendix III: POLicy Statements From Development Agencies Concerning Women. Germany; German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (1) Federal Republic of Germany: Memorandum (included in the summary records of negotiations signed in Bonn on 7/4/1978). The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to inform the Government of the Yemen Arab Republic that it attaches special important in its cooperation programme to projects capable of improving the situation of women and enhancing their contribution towards development. In doing so, it is acting in response to the findings of the UN World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico in 1975 and especially to the World Plan of Action adopted by consensus at this conference. Opportunities for cooperation along this line are relatively varied, for example, in areas of particular importance for family life (e.g. housing, drinking water supply, health, education, population policy). Cooperation can also help towards increasing women's contribution to the development process (e.g. specialised training, small industries and crafts, production and processing of foodstuffs, trade). Other possibilities are measures of direct benefit to women and women's activities (women's organizations, specific programmes of and for women). By drawing attention to the above opportunities, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany wishes to indicate that it is ready in principle to promote such projects. Its readiness is based on the belief that these areas are very heavily influenced by the general conditions in the country concerned and by its society and culture, and that, therefore, specific proposals and suggestions for cooperation must come from the partner. With this in mind, and considering the great importance of the participation of women in the development process, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would welcome proposals for such operation.

(2) The Netherlands: A statement was issued after the International Women's Year Conference in 1975 which stated that projects should take women into account and integrate them into the process of development.

(3) UNDP: "The Project Document: Project Identification and Preparation", from UNDP Policies and Procedures Manual. Dec. 1975. P. 8: "In addition to the pursuit of its objectives, the project may be concerned with one or more economic or social goals . . . ." Included: integration of particular groups in the population (viz women) into the development process. UNDP also published a paper in 1977: "Guidelines on the Integration of Women in Development.

(4) USAID: USAID has a congressional mandate to help the poorest of the poor, in countries such as Yemen. The Percy Amendment of 1973 is AID's guide for programme assistance to women. "Programmes shall be administered so as to give particular attention to those programmes, projects and activities which tend to integrate women into the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status in the total development effort."

(5) The United Kingdom, ODM: The ODM is committed to helping the poorest citizens of the least developed countries in the world. For this reason, they are involved in primarily rural development projects in Yemen. There is no special memorandum on women in development.

(6) World Bank: "The need to recognize and support the role of women in Development is an issue which the World Bank considers of great importance for itself and its member Governments. The Bank expects to participate to an increasing extent in the efforts of more Governments to extend the benefits of development to all their population, women as well as men, and thus ensure that so large a proportional at the world's human resources underutilized. Integrating women into Development. 1975, p. 29.=&

50079. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 57: Appendix IV: Report of the Yemen International Conference.12/1/1977:Report of the Women's Role in the Development Plan. Germany; German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (174) The representative of Yemeni Women's Association in San'a Mrs. Zal El-Ham, introducing this subject, stated that the Plan gave importance to the role of the Yemeni woman in the implementation of its economic and social programmes. It recognized the necessity of preparing women to bear their responsibilities through designing programmes for their education and training. The Plan aimed at increasing the share of women's access to all educational stages, particularly, the primary and secondary stages. It also provided them with the opportunity to join the teachers, and training institutions to qualify them for many kinds of jobs. It was estimated that 5000 women would be added to the work force during the Plan period. Through non-formal education, women will participate in literacy centres. They will also be assisted in organizing family life and obtaining health services. The Plan aimed at supporting the Yemeni Women's Association and establishing branches in the various regions with a view to improving women's living conditions, their social activities, their orientation towards their rights and duties and their production skills.[=]

50080. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 58: Appendix V: Minimum Goals. Germany; German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (1) Federal Republic of Germany: Memorandum.readiness is based on the belief that these areas are very heavily influenced by the general conditions in the country concerned and by its society and culture, and that, therefore, specific proposals and suggestions for cooperation must come from the partner. With this in mind, and considering the great importance of the participation of women in the development process, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would welcome proposals for such operation.

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(l) The promotion of women’s organizations as an interim measure within workers’ organizations and educational, economic and professional institutions;

(m) The development of modern rural technology, cottage industry, pre-school day centres, time and energy saving devices so as to help reduce the heavy work load of women, particularly those living in rural sectors and for the urban poor and thus facilitate the full participation of women in economic, social, community, national and international affairs;

(n) The establishment of an inter-disciplinary and multi-sectoral machinery within the government for accelerating the achievement of equal opportunities for women and their full integration into national life.

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Chapter One: Definitions and General Regulations (excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. [This English translation was requested by the ATCPO of Promo Services in Beirut and has not been authorized by the Yemen Government. The original legal text has many ambiguities, so allowances should be made when reading the sometimes unclear English version. The document, imperfect as it stands, might still provide useful information which until now has been inaccessible to the non-Arabic reader.]

Article 1: This Law defines the rights and obligations of the workers and employers in the Arab Republic of Yemen and regulates the relations between them.

Article 2: In applying this law, the following definitions should be abided with. (1) By worker, it is meant any person, male or female, working for an employer or under his supervision directly or indirectly, against a wage regardless of its nature and in accordance with a written or verbal contract. (2) By apprentice, it is meant any worker learning a profession or trade, being an adult or under age and working under the supervision of the employer. (3) By employer it is meant any person physical or natural who employs one or several workers against a certain wage of whatever nature. (4) By wages it is meant.. (5) By juvenile (youth) it is meant any male or female who is not less than twelve years old nor is he over fifteen. (6) [omitted] (7) By employee it is meant any person working under the supervision of an employer in accordance with a written or verbal contract, and the nature of his work is either administrative or mainly requires mental effort.

Article 3: The provisions of this law are excluded from the LabourLaw; Official Gazette dated 15 Sha’aban 1390 i.e. 10/15/1970:

Chapter Four: Individual Labor Contract (Excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 30: Considered as an apprentice is any person contracteds work for an employer with the intention of learning his profession.

Article 31: Any apprentice over sixteen years of age can conclude his training contract and determine in it his training period. The wage scale should be gradual in order to achieve in its final stages the minimum salary assigned for the workers in the specific category he is being trained in.

Article 32: The minister responsible for Industrial or Commercial establishment specified by his decree and in which he finds the necessity to train the Yemeni workers in the nature of their work, can compel those establishments to accept a number of workers for training under skilled laborers.

Article 33: The employer may break the contract with the apprentice if he has proof of his lack of capability or willingness to learn an assigned profession properly, the trainee may also terminate his employment by giving the other party at least one week’s notice of his desire to cancel the contract.

Article 34: All conditions of the labor code apply to working women without discrimination falling in the same category without breaching the rules of the following articles.

Article 35: It is not permissible to have women work between the hours 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Article 36: It is not permissible to engage women in jobs injurious to the health or had labor work or others being defined by decree of the minister concerned.

Article 37: A working woman can obtain a maternity leave of 70 days, this being the period before and after delivery. Therefore, it is not permissible to assign work to a working woman for forty days following the delivery date.

Article 38: An amount equivalent to 70% of her wages will be paid to the working woman for the maternity leave so granted.

Article 39: Every employer who employs a working woman or more should post on site a copy of the Women Labor Code.

Article 40: Youths under fifteen should not be asked to work between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. nor should they be engaged in effective work for a period exceeding 6 hours a day.

Article 41: It is not permissible to ask youths to do any overtime work, irrespective of the circumstances.

Article 42: Every employer who employs a juvenile or more: (1) Should include in the labour register a copy of the laws governing the youth work. (2) Should post in a prominent position a schedule of working and rest hours for juveniles. (3) Should submit to the Social Welfare and Labour Authorities a list giving the name, nature of work, and the date of employment for each juvenile. [=]


Article 60: The employer should bear the expenses for the repatriation of the worker or the employee to the place where he was originally engaged should the worker or the employee submit such a request under the following cases: (a) If the employer terminates the services of the worker or the employee for any of the reasons stipulated in article (50), (b) On the expiration date of the contract, (c) If the worker or the employee terminates his employment for any of the reasons reported in article (52), (d) Upon termination of the services of the worker or the employee after completing his paid sick leave entitlement and is still sick.

Article 62: The employer has no right to terminate the services of the worker or the employee during their absence on paid sick leave.

Article 63: The worker or the employee is entitled to a compensation for the services stipulated in article (51) of this Law, on the following conditions—(a) Upon termination of services of the worker or the employee, (b) If a woman relinquishes her services for reasons of marriage.

50084. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 62: Appendix VI: Yemen Arab Republic Labor Law (1970): Presidential Decree of Law No. (5) 1970; Regarding the Issuance of the LabourLaw; Official Gazette dated 15 Sha’aban 1390 i.e. 10/15/1970; Chapter Four: Minimum Scale of Wages (Excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 84: (1) The minimum scale for wages is the minimum salary payable to be worker or employee as per decree of the Wages Committee for any trade or branch thereof or profession or category of workers or employees. (4) The minimum scale of wages for juveniles, workers and employees on probation and training is determined on the basis of not less than one third of the agreed minimum wage of the same category.

Article 86: It is incumbent on the employers who are covered by the decrees of the Wage Determination Committee to post on the facade of their premises notices stating the minimum scale as decreed by the Wage Determination Committee and to keep records of wages in accordance with the directions issued by the Head of Social Welfare and Labour Authorities and the Minister.

50085. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 63: Appendix VI: Yemen Arab Republic Labor Law (1970): Presidential Decree of Law No. (5) 1970; Regarding the Issuance of the LabourLaw; Official Gazette dated 15 Sha’aban 1390 i.e. 10/15/1970; Chapter Four: Working Hours (Excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 68: It is forbidden to engage a worker in effective work for over 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week during the whole months of the year, except for the month of Ramadan Al Mubarak, whereby the effective working hours should not exceed 6 hours in any one day or 36 hours per week. The effective working hours do not include time devoted for prayer, rest and eating. It is possible to increase the daily working hours to 9 hours in certain categories of work or industries or jobs whereby the worker does not work on continuous stretch such as, official establishments, hotels, bars, restaurants and others. It is possible to reduce the daily working hours for certain categories of workers, or in some industries or in dangerous and injurious works. The categories of workers, industries, and the works referred to in this article will be determined by a decree issued by the minister concerned based on the suggestion of the Head of the establishment concerned.

Article 89: The daily working hours should include one more intervals not less than one hour to be allotted for rest, prayer and eating. In factories where the work is carried on continual night and day shifts, then the Minister by decree establishes the system of rest intervals.

Article 90: Friday is considered as a weekly day of rest fully paid. The employer however, may after obtaining the approval from the Labour Authorities, replace this day by any other day provided the total working days per week would not exceed 6 days and provided this will enable the worker under any circumstances to attend to his religious obligations.

Article 91: The employer may not be bound by the provisions of the three aforesaid articles under the following conditions: (a) Annual Inventories, Preparation of Budget, Liquidation, Closure of Accounts, Preparation for sale on reduced prices, Preparation for new seasons provided the number of days required for such preparations will not exceed thirty days per annum. (b) If work is required to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous accident or repair what has resulted therefrom or to avoid a sure loss in materials liable for deterioration. (c) If extra work is intended to meet an unusual pressure. In the two latter cases the Labour Authorities should be informed within 24 hours to assess the emergency and the period required to complete the work, and obtain a written approval thereto. (d) Feasts, Seasons, Other occasions and seasonal fluctuations which are determined by decree issued by the Minister. In any of the aforementioned conditions it is not permissible for the effective working hours to exceed 10 hours per day.

50086. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 64: Appendix VI: Yemen Arab Republic Labor Law (1970): Presidential Decree of Law No. (5) 1970; Regarding the Issuance of the LabourLaw; Official Gazette dated 15 Sha’aban 1390 i.e. 10/15/1970; Chapter Seven: Precautions and Medical Services (Excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 92: Every employer should take the necessary precautions for the protection of workers and their safety against dangers and diseases arising from the nature of the work or the equipment used. The employer should not charge the workers or deduct form their wages any amount to provide this protection.

Article 93: Every employer should adhere to the following rules: (a) The establishment should be kept in a hygienic condition, clean and free from unpleasant odours which emanate from the drains or from other sources. (b) The workshops in the establishment should be aerated, with enough space and room for breathing, in accordance with the norms and hygienic standards decreed by the Minister. (c) To execute the necessary preventive measures for the safeguard of workers from damages resulting from any gas, dust or smoke or of any refuse that may generate during the work. (d) Lighting and heating of the establishment during working hours to be in a satisfactory condition. (e) Install water closets and toilets within easy reach with an average of one W.C. for every fifteen persons or less and allocate separate W.C.'s and toilets for female workers should there be any. (f) Adequate potable water should be provided in convenient places. (g) Provision of adequate water for the easy use of workers.

Article 94: If the nature of the work exposes the worker to body injury poisoning or illness, then the Minister will issue a decree with a view to regulate the safety of the work and the means the employer should institute for the safeguard of the workers. The employer or his representatives should explain to the worker upon his engagement the dangers of his work and the precautionary measures which he should take.

Article 95: Every employer should take the necessary precautions against fire, the preparation of the technical means for its extinction and provide exits for escape which should be kept in good condition for use at any time.

Article 96: The employer should provide first aid facilities for the workers in accordance with the Standards approved by the Minister jointly with the Minister of Health Should the number of his workers exceed 50 in one particular location or one town or a sector with a ray of 15 kilometers, then he should employ a nurse, well conversed with all first aid means on full time basis and should appoint a doctor to attend to them in a location assigned for this purpose. If the number of workers increases to over one hundred under the conditions stated above, the employer would have to provide the workers with the means of treatment which may require the assistance of specialists capable of surgical operations. Should the number of workers be less than fifty, the employer should then provide a first aid box, well kept containing bandages, medicines and disinfectants as decreed by the Minister jointly with the Minister of Health in order to provide the workers with first aid services.

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assistance.

Article 97: Every employer should keep a medical file for each worker, containing the respective Labour Office of the doctor's name appointed for the treatment and the days fixed for the doctor's call to examine the workers and attend to them which should not be less than three visits per week.

Article 98: Every employer should keep a medical file for each worker, containing the results of the medical examination carried out upon his engagement, details of his sickness, the phases of treatment, the period of his absence from work and stating the kind of sickness whether normal, professional or industrial accident.

Article 99: Every employer should provide his workers with means of transportation from their residence or from an agreed upon pool to the place of work and ensure their return should their residence not be served with the usual regular means of transportation. [=]

50087. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 65: Appendix VI: Yemen Arab Republic Labor Law (1970); Presidential Decree of Law No. (5) 1970; Regarding the Issuance of the Labour Law; Official Gazette dated 15 Sha'aban 1390 i.e. 10/15/1970: Chapter Eight: Industrial Accidents (Excerpts). Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 103: In the case of an industrial accident occurring during work, the employer is under obligation to pay all medical and treatment expenses, cost of medicines, plus transport charges of the injured to hospital or to the doctor, until complete recovery or confirmation of total disability or the completion of one year from the date of injury, whichever comes first.

Article 104: Should any temporary or permanent disability or deaths result from industrial accident, the employer should pay the injured worker or his dependants the compensation due. The estimation of the extent of the injury and its confirmation should be based on a doctor's certificate issued by the assigned medical committee.

Article 105: It is conditional that the compensation should not be less than the death compensation. In case of complete disability the compensation will be calculated in the light of its causes and circumstances in accordance with this chapter by the assigned Committee for determining compensations.

Article 106: If the injured worker is temporarily disabled, he is entitled to his full pay for the first month of his absence and to 75% of his pay until complete recovery or until the expiry of one year from the date of his disability whichever comes first. And if it is medically confirmed that the temporary disability resulting from the accident turns into a permanent disability, the compensation will be paid to the injured in a lump sum in accordance with the rules of the following articles, and the employer has no right to deduct the amounts already paid by him to the injured worker during his period of temporary disability.

Article 109: If the injury results into a partial permanent disability, the compensation should be paid in accordance with the report submitted by the Compensation Committee concerned. [=]

50088. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 66: Appendix VI: Suggestions for Inclusion in the Labour Law Concerning Working Women. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. (1) Amendment of Article (38) of the Labour Law entitling the working woman to obtain the maternity leave with full pay and not 70% thereof in order to put her on equal footings with her counterpart working in the Public Administrative Office as per article 48 of Law No. 49, 1977, covering regulations for government employees which stipulates that she should be granted maternity leave with the basic salary together with a subsistence allowance.

(2) To provide the working woman upon her request in case of her husband's death a maximum leave of one hundred and thirty days from the date of death in order to put her on equal footings with her counterpart employee in the Public Administrative Office in accordance with article 48 of the Law No. 49, 1977, covering regulations for government employees obtaining such a leave with basic salary together with a subsistence allowance.

(3) To provide for the reduction of working hours for a working woman during pregnancy not to exceed 6 hours per day.

(4) After delivery the working woman has the right to use the following privileges: (a) Should be allowed one hour per day during official working hours to breastfeed her baby during the first year after delivery. (b) To grant her upon her request a two years leave from the date of delivery at half the basic salary to lock after her newly born baby.

(5) To allow the working woman two years leave without pay for special family reasons to be supported by evidence and will be subject to the assessment of the Labour Office.

(6) Forcing establishments employing a certain number of working women to establish a nursery for nursing their children who are of pre-school age.

(7) The working woman health care system should include her health supervision periodically during pregnancy and breastfeeding.

(8) A provision giving the working woman the right to combine her salary with the salary she is entitled to resulting from the death of her husband. This is a report on the conditions of the working woman which is written in the light of the Labour Law which I submit for kind consideration. (Samira Mohd. Abdo), Womens Bureau, Social Affairs Authority. [=]


Article 1: The prescriptions of the Law of the Family attached, come into effect.

Article 2: This law shall be published in the Official Gazette, and it comes into effect as from the date of its promulgation. This law was issued by the Leadership Council on 1/8/1978.

Signed: Ali Assaman Judge and Minister of Justice; Mukaddem (Colonel) Ahmad Hussein Al-Ghashmi Chairman of the Leadership Council and GC of the Armed Forces; Abdel Aziz Abdel-Ghani a member of the Leadership Council and Prime Minister. [=]


Article 1: Marriage Contract: Chapter One: Conclusion of Marriage: Part One: Fundamentals and Conditions of Marriage. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 1: Marriage is an attachment of a husband and wife under a legal pact whereby the woman becomes legitimate to a man, so that they form together a family based on proper cohabitation.
Article 2: Marriage shall not be considered as: betrothal, promise for marriage, collection of dower, acceptance of presents or likewise. In such cases either party has the right of refusal. The fiancée may nominate the immediate part of the dower at its equivalent at the time of collection, whereas the fiancée being the refusing party; shall return all presents or likewise received.

Article 3: Marriage is fulfilled in one session by utterance of the affirmative made by a non-prohibited and legally capable commissioned male agent who states that marriage has been concluded according to usage, and by the acceptance of same from his counterpart. The affirmative and acceptance must be achieved at the same time. Any condition which does not bear a purpose for either party (husband or wife) shall be neglected.

Article 4: Should the marriage involve a legally accepted condition pertaining to a purpose of either marrying party, the contract shall stand as valid and the condition as binding and revocable only with the consent of the party that set up the condition.

Article 5: The marriage may be established by utterance or by letter or message from an absentee. Such letter or message shall be read out in the session. A contract may be validated by a taciturn or a dumb through comprehensible signs.

Article 6: The establishment of a marriage contract requires the presence of two impartial moslem witnesses who shall listen to the words of the two contracting parties or of the letter or message.

Article 7: Any contract based on coercion of the major husband or wife, shall be considered as invalid.

Article 8: A mentally sick person may marry under an authorization from the Ruler, if it has been ascertained that his marriage would not harm anybody and that it would benefit his concerns, provided that it conveys the explicit consent of the other party.

Article 9: A man may marry up to four wives on condition that he is apt to being fair, otherwise one only.

Article 10: Should any non-moslem and his wife convert to Islam, their marriage shall be recognized, unless Islam does forbid it. 

Article 11: The Ma'zoun (the Sheikh) who draws up the context of the contract and the agentS representing the husband and wife must see to the registering of the certificate of marriage with the authorities concerned, in the register set up therefor, within a week from the date of the contract, or else, each one will be liable to the penalty determined in the Panel Law. If any one of the aforesaid persons has carried out the registration of the document, the others shall be discharged of such liability. [-] 

50091. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation; Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 70: Yemen Arab Republic: Family Law (1978): Law-Decree No. (3) 1978 Sanctioned by the Leadership Council For the Promulgation of the Law: Book One: Marriage Contract: Chapter One-Conclusion of Marriage: Part Two: Representative Agency in Marriage. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 12: The representative Agent is supposed to be the nearest of kin or who comes next, according to the following order: The father and upward and the son and downward, then the brothers and their sons, and next the uncles and their sons thereafter, and then the father’s uncles and their sons as well. A relative to a father comes first if he exists. If there are several relatives of the same degree, each one of them shall be entitled to the agency and the one that precedes the others in the conclusion of the marriage validates its contract. The conclusion of the marriage by those who were late in acting for its conclusion for more than one person at the same time or of the conclusion gets confused, the contract shall be invalidated.

Article 13: The rular may act as a representative agent for a person who does not have an agent, and if a woman of an unknown kinship claims that she does not have a representative agent, and her claim has not been contested, she is to be believed after an enquiry has been carried out by the Ruler, and asserted by oath.

Article 14: If the nearest of kin is of a different religion or is insane, or if it was impossible to be contacted or his whereabouts are not known, or if he showed the least defect, the agency shall pass to the next of kin. The woman’s say in the matter must be substantiated by evidence.

Article 15: The agent shall be considered as inoperative if he declines to operate the woman’s marriage while she is being adult, reasonable and consenting to her match, unless he does so intending to take his time in order to study the situation of the finances.

Article 16: One person may carry out in the session the conclusion of the marriage contract by acting for both sides, and uttering the wording of the affirmative and the acceptance.

Article 17: Proxy in marriage is valid even when the delegating agent is absent at intervals. The delegated deputy may marry himself of the woman for whom he has deputized, unless it is provided otherwise. Also, the representative agent may marry himself of the woman he is acting for if such action does not conflict with the provisions of Article 20 of this Law.

Article 18: Shall be considered as intruder whoever takes part in the conclusion of a marriage without being a representative agent or without proxy. The conclusion of such marriage by an intruder is considered as null.

Article 19: Shall be considered as invalid the marriage of a minor under the age of fifteen.

Article 20: Consent of a minor is mandatory. The silence of a virgin gives consent and the consent of a girl is by her utterance. The marriage of the adult shall not be concluded without her consent. The marriage of a minor concluded by her agent is valid, provided that she gives consent thereto at the time of wedding. The meeting with the girl in privacy is not permissible, nor her wedding for consumption of marriage unless she is not less than sixteen in years and is apt (fit) for intercourse. Whoever violates the provisions of this Article shall be liable to a term of prison, not less than one year and more than three years, plus an indemnity for what felony would have been committed and what fine that may entail. [-] 

50092. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation; Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 70: Yemen Arab Republic: Family Law (1978): Law-Decree No. (3) 1978 Sanctioned by the Leadership Council For the Promulgation of the Law: Book One: Marriage Contract: Chapter One-Conclusion of Marriage: Part Three: Preventives of Marriage. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 21: The kinship prohibited to a person: His forebears and offsprings and their wives and the descendants of his father, and the descendants of his forebears at the first degree and the forebears of his wife once his marriage of her has been concluded, and her offsprings after the consummation of her marriage. The prohibition of the forebears and offsprings provides that the kinship must be the outcome of a valid marriage.

Article 22: What is prohibited by kinship is prohibited by sucking. The prohibition from the sucking woman and her husband is established as the sucking takes place, and the sucking is established by the sucking of the infant from the breast of the sucking woman during the first two years, five separate sucklings.

Article 23: The man is prohibited to marry a woman in the following cases: (1) Being of a different religion unless she belongs to scriptural one. (2) Who defected from Islam. (3) A wife of another person. (4) Who exchanged excommunication with whom he excommunicated. (5) Whom he divorced completely unless she has consummated marriage with another husband and completed her period of waiting. (6) Whom he divorced and wanted to remarry while she is in the period of waiting from another divorce or separation. (7) Prohibited by pilgrimage or Omra (pilgrimage of the season). (8) Being a hybrid or of cross-breed. (9) Being the wife of a missing person before abrogation of the marriage has been decided.

Article 24: If a man marries two women together and it was found out that one of them happened to be a male, he is prohibited to keep the other one.

Article 25: The man is prohibited to keep in his custody more than four wives, and if one of them is in the period of waiting from a
restitutional divorce she is to remain in the custody of her divorcing husband until the completion of the period of waiting.

Article 26: A moslem woman is prohibited to marry an non-moslem. [=]

50095. Mnrtt, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 73: The Family Law: Book One: Marriage Contract: Chapter Two-Prescriptions of Marriage: Part Three: Good Cohabitation. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 37: The husband has the right of obedience of his wife concerning what may realize the interest of the family especially in such matters as: (1) Moving with him to the matrimonial home, unless the contract of marriage stipulates that she shall remain in her own house or in her parents' house and then she will be required to enable him to live with her and consummate their marriage. (2) Enabling him to reach her and have legitimate intercourse with her in privacy. (3) Obeying him and carrying out her house work as others do. (4) Not to go out of the matrimonial house without his permission, whereas the husband is not supposed to prevent her from going out for a legitimate excuse or for what usage may allow, without prejudicing the honor or her duties towards him, and in particular, going out for improving her concerns or carrying out her function. An excuse which is considered as legitimate for a woman is serving her helpless parents who have nobody else to attend to them.

Article 38: A wife is considered as rebellious if she goes back on her obedience to her husband by leaving the matrimonial house. The wife is not considered to have gone back on her obedience to her husband except in the following cases: (1) If the husband refuses to give her urgent dower. (2) If he does not provide for her a legitimate habitation. (3) If she does not feel secure, with him for herself or for her possessions. (4) If he refuses to spend on her (to subsist her) and it has not been possible to execute the court decision for her expense because he has no obvious money available.

Article 39: Requirements on the husband towards his wife are as follows: (1) provide her with a legitimate house (home) which becomes her and becomes her or his like. (2) to provide her with expense and clothing like her or his like. (3) to treat her fairly as he treats his other wives, as to expense, boarding and mid-day nap if the wives live together in the same house.

Article 40: The legitimate home must be independent so that the wife has security for herself and her possessions (money, jewelry etc.), considering the husband's situation, the habitation of his equal and customs of the town, without harm to the wife the husband may live with his wife and children from her and from another wife if they were adults; and to his parents and any other woman he is supposed to provide them with a dwelling-place, provided that the house is large enough to accommodate them and that no harm is caused to the wife, unless the contract does not provide otherwise. [=]


Article 42: The dissolution of marriage must be denoted by word or by indication.

Article 43: The marriage shall not be dissolved except by order from the Ruler. If dissolution is for a reason which makes the woman illicit to a man, their matrimonial association shall cease and their separation shall be mandatory until it has been decided under all circumstances, if the dissolution takes place after consummation the period of waiting shall be required once dissolution has been ordained.

Article 44: If there is between husband and wife a cause for prohibition, the dissolution of marriage shall be ordained.

Article 45: Both husband and wife may ask for dissolution if either one finds out a personal defect whether it existed before marriage or happened thereafter. Insanity and leprosy are considered as defects in both husband and wife. Shall be considered as sexual diseases in the woman such as a gland plug in the pelvis or sterility. The right to claim dissolution is forfeited if the defect is explicitly or implicitly tolerated, except in the case of insanity or leprosy, or any other incurable and contagious disease where the choice is limited, even if it preceded
women

Article 61: The divorce occurs precedently or unprecedently.

Article 62: A divorce shall not be followed by a divorce unless it has been resisted in the meantime verbally or actually.

Article 63: The divorce connected with a number, small or big, effect one occurrence only:

Article 64: The divorce occurs immediately if it is not limited by condition or time.

Article 65: The contingent divorce depends on its condition, negatively or affirmatively.

Article 66: The restitutional divorce is that which occurs during the period of waiting and after real consummation and it does not entail conclusion of a new marriage or a financial recompensation or a benefit, provided that it was not completed (three divorces). If the period of waiting was completed and no restitution took place the divorce becomes a temporary separation which entails a new marriage and a new dower. If [Ban ouna Sughra] the divorce was completed (three divorces) it becomes a [Ban ouna Kubra] permanent separation which requires for restitution that the divorce be married to another man and then be divorced by him with a period of waiting of three months (to make sure she is not pregnant).

Article 67: The restitutional divorce does not do away with matrimony and the husband may contact his wife for restitution during the period of waiting. If such period has been completed and no contact has been made the divorce becomes a final separation.

Article 68: A divorce (at less than three instances) with a temporary separation eliminates matrimony immediately. Such divorce of temporary separation does not prevent the divorcing husband from marrying his divorcee under a new contact concluded during or after the completion of the period of waiting, and it entails a new dower. On the other hand, if the divorce is final (three instances) and with permanent separation the divorcee shall be prohibited to him unless she marries another man and actually consummates marriage with him. The first husband may restitute her under a new contract of marriage for a new dower provided that she has been divorced by her new husband and has completed the period of waiting.

Article 69: If the husband and wife agreed on occurrence of divorce but disagreed whether it is restitutional or of permanent separation, the party denying the latter shall have the say unless the husband has admitted that he divorced her completely (three instances) and then the say shall be his. If the woman comes under prohibition and remains so while being unable to produce evidence, she will be considered as rebellious. If the husband and wife disagree as to the occurrence of divorce in the past, the say shall be to the denier of the occurrence, whereas, the husband shall have, at the present or in the future, the say as to its occurrence or denial. If they disagree on the occurrence of condition, the denier shall have the say if in the affirmative, whereas, the claimant shall have the say, if it is in the negative. If they disagree as to the nature or description of the condition the husband shall have the say whereas the denier of condition shall always have the say.

Article 70: Disengagement is a separation between husband and wife against recompensation from the wife or from others, in terms of money or benefit, even if it exceeds what the contract requires, or if it is unknown.

Article 71: Disengagement occurs between husband and wife with mutual consent or by indication denoted in the contract or by condition. Disengagement requires what has been stipulated in the divorce and that the wife shall have the right of disposition with regards to the recompensation.

Article 72: Disengagement is considered as a divorce with a provisional separation (right of restitution under a new contract of marriage) unless the divorce has become complete (three instances) with a final separation (restitution requires consummated marriage with another husband and her divorce of him and completion of the period of waiting. Also, disengagement requires the discharge of the recompensation by the wife).

50097. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 75: The Family Law: Chapter Two: Part One: Divorce and Dissolution. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 57: Divorce is a specified statement which conveys the disengagement of association between husband and wife and which is to be clear and does not bear the probability of other than the constitution of an information and its admission and declaration, even if it is meant to be a hoax or metonymy for a probability of divorce or so forth. It is provided that such statement should convey intention both in word and sense. The divorce occurs in Arabic or in any other language of a person who knows its meaning, and in writing or by a comprehensible sign if the person is inarticulate.

Article 58: The husband is entitled towards his wife, to three utterances of divorce ("you are divorced"), renewable when another husband has consummated actually his marriage of her.

Article 59: The husband or his proxy may effect divorce. The Ruler may authorize the folks of an insane or an idiot to effect divorce on his behalf, if he finds out that there was a reason therefor and that an advantage would be realized.

Article 60: The divorce by a drunk who lost his head or the power of discrimination, does not occur, if such a condition is evidenced by his words or actions.
The husband is prohibited to marry such woman who is prohibited to stated by an articulate husband or by a representative agent and it shall of her husband. (4) Incumbency of habitation. (5) Incumbency of expense. Article 99: Prohibition by adjuration requires that the oath shall be clear

Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 97: Atonement of prohibition by comparison in absence of his wife before atonement, the prohibition shall not be annulled and his wife remains prohibited to him and he will be prohibited to continue bedding

Article 95: The wife may apply to the Ruler for the cessation of her until he has atoned.

Periods of waiting for the non-pregnant, is as follows: (1) Three periods of menstruation for the menstruant, excluding that period during which she was divorced. (2) Three months for the non-menstruant, such as a minor. If the minor becomes mature by menstruation during this time, the period of waiting is three periods of menstruation. (3) For the woman who has irregular interrupted periods of menstruation, for a cause, she has to wait for three months. If she did resume menstruation during the period of three months, her period of waiting comes to an end. In case menstruation comes back to her she has to resume three periods of menstruation. (4) The period of waiting for the woman who resumed her menstruation is three periods in case she remembers their dates and number, if not it will be for three months. If the husband dies during a period of waiting resulting from a restitutions or death. The period of waiting under a provisional divorce or under a complete divorce has six requirements: (1) Period of waiting. (2) No inheritance. (3) Going out without the husband's permission. (4) Non-cumbency of habitation. (5) Non-cumbency of expense or alimony. (6) Permissibility of marrying such a woman prohibited to him because of his wife's marriage.

Republic: Part 76: The Family Law: Chapter Three: Part One: Restitution. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 73: Restitution takes place by utterance even as a hoax or by action. It is not limited by time or so forth, and it becomes valid without consent of the wife or her next of kin. Article 74: If the wife is restituted by utterance, the husband is required to have it testified by witnesses and to inform the wife thereof. If she is illegitimate or insane, her guardian is to be informed.

Article 75: If the husband and wife, disagree after the expiration of the waiting as to the fulfillment of restitution, the say shall be to the denier. Article 76: If the woman claims (without being contested) that her period of waiting has expired she shall be believed under oath unless doubt prevails as to her telling lies. [=] 50099. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 77: The Family Law: Chapter Three: Part Two: Period of Waiting and Absence of Pregnancy. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 77: The period of waiting takes place either by divorce, dissolution or death.

Article 78: The period of waiting following divorce or dissolution does not become incumbent except after consummation of marriage and it begins in divorce from the date of its occurrence, provided that the woman has knowledge of the divorce, and if not, the period begins from the date of its coming to her knowledge. As for dissolution, the period begins from the date of its being ordained. The period of waiting after death, occurs before and after consummation and it begins from the date of the death of her husband once the death becomes known to her. The deduction in consummation, is required in case of suspicion and it begins from the date of knowledge of the deterrent.

Article 79: The period of waiting, for the pregnant, expires under all circumstances, after delivery. In the case of non-pregnancy, the period of waiting after the death of her husband, is four months and ten days. Article 80: Periods of waiting by divorce for the non-pregnant, is as follows: (1) Three periods of menstruation for the menstruant, excluding that period during which she was divorced. (2) Three months for the non-menstruant, such as a minor. If the minor becomes mature by menstruation during this time, the period of waiting is three periods of menstruation. (3) For the woman who has irregular interrupted periods of menstruation, for a cause, she has to wait for three months. If she did resume menstruation during the period of three months, her period of waiting comes to an end. In case menstruation comes back to her she has to resume three periods of menstruation. (4) The period of waiting for the woman who resumed her menstruation is three periods in case she remembers their dates and number, if not it will be for three months. If the husband dies during a period of waiting resulting from a restitutions or death. The period of waiting under a provisional divorce or under a complete divorce has six requirements: (1) Period of waiting. (2) No inheritance. (3) Going out without the husband's permission. (4) Non-cumbency of habitation. (5) Incumbency of expense. (6) The husband is prohibited to marry such woman who is prohibited to him because of the marriage of his wife. (7) The husband is prohibited to marry a fifth wife. (8) Resumption of period of waiting in case of

restitutions or death. The period of waiting under a provisional divorce or under a complete divorce has six requirements: (1) Period of waiting. (2) No inheritance. (3) Going out without the husband's permission. (4) Non-cumbency of habitation. (5) Incumbency of expense or alimony. (6) Permissibility of marrying such a woman prohibited to him because of his wife's marriage.

Article 81: In disengagement, the woman completes her period of waiting by one period of menstruation if she is menstruant, and if not the period of waiting shall of three months.

Article 82: The period of waiting in disengagement is as follows: (1) Such woman who was illegally married will complete her period of waiting by one period of menstruation if she is menstruant and if not, by three months. (2) Other disengaged women will have the same to fast, atonement will occur by the feeding of sixty poor persons. [=] 50100. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 78: The Family Law: Chapter Four: Prohibition of Comparison by Adjuration: Part One: Prohibition By Comparison. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 83: In such a case where the completion of the period of waiting occurs in one period of menstruation, the woman shall have the say under oath if she claimed completion of the period of waiting otherwise, if she claims not to have completed it, a period of menstruation each month shall be required.

Article 84: The period of waiting under a restitutions or death. The period of waiting under a provisional divorce or under a complete divorce has six requirements: (1) Period of waiting. (2) No inheritance. (3) Going out without the husband's permission. (4) Non-cumbency of habitation. (5) Incumbency of expense. (6) The husband is prohibited to marry such woman who is prohibited to him because of the marriage of his wife. (7) The husband is prohibited to marry a fifth wife. (8) Resumption of period of waiting in case of

restitutions or death. The period of waiting under a provisional divorce or under a complete divorce has six requirements: (1) Period of waiting. (2) No inheritance. (3) Going out without the husband's permission. (4) Non-cumbency of habitation. (5) Incumbency of expense or alimony. (6) Permissibility of marrying such a woman prohibited to him because of his wife's marriage.

Article 86: The woman pregnant from adultery shall be at discharge of adultery by delivery; whereas the non-pregnant shall be at discharge by one period of menstruation if she is menstruant and if she is not after a period of three months. Article 87: If a woman has embraced Islam she is at discharge if pregnant, if not, she will be at discharge by one period of menstruation if she is menstruant and if she is not she will be at discharge after a period of three months. [=] 50101. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 79: The Family Law: Chapter Four: Prohibition of Comparison by Adjuration: Part Two: Prohibition By Adjuration and Its Prescriptions. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 88: Prohibition by comparison occurs when a husband who compares or likens his wife to his mother or sister and so forth and it takes place by a clear utterance or in writing, and it can be absolute or temporary. Article 89: It is required that the prohibition by comparison is to be from a legally capable moslem husband to his wife and it requires the presence of intent, in absence of intent requirements are not applicable. Article 90: Prohibition by comparison occurs by such utterance as saying "I compare you or you are compared to my mother" and it can be in writing. The comparison of his wife to his mother or sister or aunt, etc. or to a part of his mother, will be of a temporary prohibition by saying for instance "You are prohibited to me by comparison for one month". Article 91: Prohibition by comparison may occur even if it is limited by time or condition. Article 92: Prohibition by comparison requires the prohibition of the husband of bedding his wife or what may lead to it. The wife under such prohibition may prevent him of having sexual intercourse with her. Article 93: Prohibition is removed by atonement after he has shown intent for sexual intercourse. If he has had intercourse with his wife before atonement, the prohibition shall not be annulled and his wife remains prohibited to him and he will be prohibited to continue bedding her until he has atoned. Article 94: Temporary or conditional prohibition comes to an end by the expiration of its time or by the cessation of the conditions, but before that it has to be ended by atonement.

Article 95: The wife may apply to the Ruler for the cessation of prohibition and then he will require from the husband to atone or divorce, and if he does not, the Ruler will confine him until he has atoned or divorced. Article 96: Atonement increases in number as the number of prohibited wifes increase, even if the prohibition in their respect occurs by one utterance and it does increase in number by the increase of the number of utterances, before intercourse.

Article 97: Atonement of prohibition by comparison in absence of emancipation requires two months of fasting, and if the husband is unable to fast, atonement will occur by the feeding of sixty poor persons. [=] 769
conjects the prohibition of another wife, the prohibition occurs on the second wife by conjunction.

Article 101: The adjuration shall be clear and shall express that he will not bed the wife adjured during the time of prohibition and it shall be adequate as to express that he will not approach her or share his pillow with her.

Article 102: The adjured may require from his wife to come back to him and to resume their matrimonial life as it was in the past, and if he actually does that, he shall atone because of breach of oath.

Article 103: The wife may wait for four months as from the time of adjuration, and if the husband does not come back during this time, she will submit her claim to the Ruler, for his return, and the Ruler shall require from him his return or his divorce. Should the husband refuse the Ruler then will confine him until he has returned or divorced.

Article 104: The return may come from the husband who is able to carry out sexual intercourse, but he is required to atone for breach. Further, the return is to come from an articulate husband and, thence his atonement shall be required only if he beds his wife.

Article 105: If husband and wife disagree, the say shall be to the one who denies the prohibition by adjuration or by the expiration of the time limit. The evidence shall be required from the one that claims the occurrence of the adjuration or by the expiration of the time limit. [=]

50102. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 80: The Family Law; Chapter Four: Prohibition of Comparison by Adjuration: Part Three: Sworn Allegation of Adultery and Its Prescription. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 106: Sworn allegation of adultery is that allegation made under a swear by a legally capable husband alleging the commission of adultery by his wife who is apparently chaste and who is fit for sexual intercourse and who is still kept by him true marriage and if she has a child the husband cannot avow to be his or prove that he is unlawful by adultery. Such allegation eliminates the marriage by a decision from the Ruler.

Article 107: The husband or the wife may apply to the Ruler who shall advise them and urge them to make it up between them, and if they refuse, the Ruler shall adjure first the husband four times by repeating "By God Almighty, I am truthful in alleging you of adultery and I disavow your child" and a fifth one shall be added thereto by repeating "May the curse of God fall on me if I were untruthful" then the woman in turn also shall be adjured four times repeating that her husband is untruthful in alleging her of adultery and in the fifth time that may the curse of God fall on her if he is truthful. If the woman was adjured first, and unless the husband was adjured, then she shall be adjured once more after her husband.

Article 108: If the oath is taken as prescribed in the preceding article, the Ruler will order the separation of husband and wife and the disavowal of the child's relation to the husband and the elimination of marriage, hence, the punishment by whipping of the husband will be discarded and the wife shall be prohibited to him forever.

Article 109: If the man refuses to take oath even once, he will be liable to punishment by whipping, for defamation, and if the woman also refuses she will be liable to punishment for adultery.

Article 110: If the man goes back on his disavowal of the child such going back becomes valid and the child will be in his keeps. On the other hand, the man remains liable to the punishment by whipping for defamation while the prohibition remains for ever. [=]

50103. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 81: The Family Law: Chapter Four: Prohibition of Comparison by Adjuration: Part Four: The Missing Husband and the Prescriptions in This Regard. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 111: The Ruler shall adjudge the death of the missing husband after the elapse of seventy years since his birth unless the missing husband has gone away at a circumstance susceptible to death such as a war and so forth. In such a case he shall adjudge his death after four years of absence. However, an enquiry shall be carried out in all ways to determine whether he is dead or alive.

Article 112: If after the husband has been declared dead, it was found that he was still alive, while in the meantime the wife got married to another man, the wife shall be his unless the Ruler has ruled the dissolution of the first marriage and thus she will remain the wife of the second husband. [=]


Article 114: The filiality of a child to his mother is established simply by the establishment of delivery (even with absence of admission or avowal and without condition).

Article 115: The filiation of a child of unknown relation and the certain conception are established by the person who avows his filiation even at death, bed under the following conditions: (1) Not to be belied by reason, custom or law. (2) Not to be admitted by a man that he was a wedlock. (3) Not to be repelled by his avower if her is adult and not berepped by him after maturity if the child was minor. If the avower is a woman, married or in period of waiting, and the conditions of the relation of her husband were not satisfied as prescribed in article (113) the relation of the child to his father is not established without his confirmation.

Article 116: If an illegitimate person of an unknown father or mother admits his relationship to another person, such relationship will not be established for an avower unless it has been approved the latter and provided that it has not been belied by reason, custom or law, and that the person has not admitted that the child is a wedlock.

Article 117: If a wedlock admits his relationship to another person, such relationship is not established in favour of that person, unless it has been recognized by same and that it has not been belied by reason, custom or law, and provided that such relationship has not been admitted to be the outcome of adultery, with the satisfaction of the provisions of article (116).

Article 118: If the relation is established by admission of a person of an unknown father and mother, there will not be a going back on it and it will be subject to all the prescriptions connected with the relationship.

Article 119: The man is considered to be adult, if he claims the attainment of puberty with probability, and if he was ten years old or more whereas the woman is considered adult is she claims the attainment of puberty, with probability and if she was nine years old or more. Under all circumstances, the person is considered to be adult if he or she is fifteen years old or more and in case of disagreement on the probability of puberty or on the evaluation of age because of absence of a formal proof, the help of a specialized doctor shall be asked.

Article 120: The least period of pregnancy is six months and the most is nine months with no limit for the most, if there are proofs which indicate its continuation, supported by a specialized doctor.

Article 121: If the woman gave birth to a child and she claimed that there remained another pregnancy, with proofs which support her claim, and with the confirmation of a specialized doctor, the second child shall related to the husband.

Article 122: If the woman gave birth to a living child before the completion of the period of waiting connected with a restitutional divorce, the relation of the divorcing husband as established; whereas the child born before the completion of the period of waiting connected with a complete divorce of a second marriage, shall be related to her second divorcing husband if she conceived of the child since the day of the second divorce and within the period prescribed in article (120). If the woman conceived of a child after she has admitted the completion of the
period of waiting, being less than six months since her admission, the child shall be related categorically to her divorcing husband under the restitutinal divorce and shall be related to same if she conceived of the child since the day of the second divorce from the second marriage after a complete divorce from her first husband while the conception has happened within the period of pregnancy prescribed in article (120), the child shall be related to the second husband.

Article 124: If the two husbands agreed that the wife will be returned to her first husband, the child shall be related to the second husband if she conceived of the child for six months from the day of the husband's probable bedding; whereas if she conceived of the child for less than six months, the child shall be related to first husband.

Article 125: The child shall be related to the deceased husband if she conceived of the child since the date of death within the period of pregnancy prescribed in article (120).

Article 126: The child will be related to the husband by a marriage which has not satisfied its fundamentals and conditions and was actually consummated with the wrong woman and that woman conceived of the child within six months or more and before separation. If she conceived of the child after separation, the child shall be related to the husband, if the conception occurred with the period of pregnancy prescribed in article (120).

Article 127: Adoption does not establish the relation even if the adopted child is of an unknown relation. [=]

50105. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 83: The Family Law: Book Three: The Relation and Its Prescription: Chapter One: Relation, Relationship or Kinship and Suckling and Custody: Part Two: Suckling and its Prescriptions. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 128: The mother is required to suckle her child if there was no other suckler available. The mother is more entitled to suckle the child unless she claimed a wage which exceeds that which is usually applied for her or his likes. If the child was sucked by another woman, the suckling will be at the mother's home unless she has lost her right of suckling. The suckler merits expense and clothing similar to that of her or the child's like, for a period which will not exceed two years from the date of suckling. Such expense will be considered as a debt which will become null by satisfaction or discharge. [=]

50106. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 84: The Family Law: Book Three: The Relation and Its Prescription: Chapter Two: Relation, Relationship or Kinship and Suckling and Custody: Part Three: Custodianship and Its Prescriptions. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 130: Custody is the function of a custodian who is supposed to take care of the child and to bring him up and protect him from what may cause his death or living in harm, provided that it will not conflict with the right of his custodian, such right which is not surrenderable.

Article 131: The period of custody is seven years unless the Ruler raises it up to ten years.

Article 132: The custodian is supposed to be mature, active and guard for the youngster, and capable of bringing him up and of protecting him. Further, if the custodian is a female, she is not supposed to be a non-moslem and shall refrain from scornful Islam before whosoever is adverse to it. Also, she is not supposed to go out of the house, away from her custodianship duties, unless she finds somebody to act for the child. If the custodian is a male he must be of the same religion.

Article 133: The mother is entitled to have the custody of her child provided that she proveS to be qualified therefor. If the mother surrenders her right, such right shall not cease unless the child accepts another custodian, as he has the right to do so. Meanwhile, the other husband, through a second marriage, cannot refuse such situation if there was not another custodian available. The non-virtuous mother cannot be denied the right to be the custodian of her child until he is five years of age.

Article 134: If the mother passes away or if her custody of her child has ceased, such custody is passed over in the following order to: her mother, grand mothers, child's aunts moslem father, husband's mother and grandmother; wife's mother and grandmothers, sisters; cognitive aunts and their daughters; brothers' daughters and their daughters; agnate cousins; father's aunts and their daughters and daughters of the father's uncles. If the women are not available, custody passes in the following order to taboed cognitive next of kin males; tabooed cognates and if unavailable, non tabeoed next kin males and if not available, tabooed agnates. Shall come first for each wife, those on the mother's side before those on the father's side and if they are unvirtuous, the custody shall pass to the more fit, and if they are fit, the Ruler will decide and the Ruler may overlook the order of custody as he may deem appropriate for the child.

Article 135: The custody shall pass from a custodian to another in the following cases: (a) Insanity and so forth —Leprosy —Blindness —Negligence —Adultery —Carelessness towards the child -- Marriage if not of a person cognate to the child.

Article 136: The father and any other member of the family may remove the custody of the child to another person under the following two conditions: (1) The second custodian be like the first as to caretaking and upbringing or even better. (2) If the custodian has asked for wages more than those of her like, and the evidence shall come from the person in charge.

Article 137: The custodian is required to carry out what is good for the child, except the expense and its incidentals, which are required from the person on charge according to the expenses indicated under the Part of Expenses. The custodian may remove the child to his town provided that it will not prejudice the child financially or morally. Should the child be in the custody of a parent of his, the other has the right to see him in the manner agreed upon by both sides or by what the Ruler may deem fit.

Article 138: The custodian is entitled to a wage for the custody that comes from the child's money, if available, or from the person in charge, as indicated in the Part of Expenses. The wage for custody is estimated according to the situation of the person obligated thereby. The custodian shall not be entitled to a wage if the custodian is in the custody of the father. If the father cannot afford, such wage will be paid from he mother's money without being recoverable, whereas, if the money is not paid from the mother's money but from another source it will be recovered by an order from the Ruler.

Article 139: The custodian is responsible if he neglects knowingly any wrongdoing of the child, and the responsibility for such fault by ignorance shall be that of the family. [=]

50107. Myntti, Cynthia; Weiter, Matthias [editor]; German Agency for TechnicalCooperation. Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic: Part 85: The Family Law: Book Three: The Relation and Its Prescription: Chapter One: Relation, Relationship or Kinship and Suckling and Custody: Part Four: Sponsorship After Termination of Custody. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 140: If the child, whether male or female, becomes mature, and his father and mother are in disaccord, he is to make the choice between them as his interest requires. If those who have the sponsorship other than his father and mother disagree, thereon, the Ruler shall select a sponsor who after taking the opinion of the child, is appropriate, as the child's interest requires. [=]


Prescription: Chapter Two: Expenses and Prescriptions: Part One: Wife's Expense. Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., 1979. Article 142: Expense is due to the wife regardless of her situation with her husband and according to how things have been since the conclusion of marriage; the expense as to food, clothing, habitation, furniture, medical care and services, with consideration of the circumstances of the husband whether straightened or pleasant.

Article 143: The husband shall provide an alimony to his wife, divorced by him restitution an to his pregnant divorcee, until the period of waiting has been completed.

Article 144: Considering the provisions of Article (38), alimony will not fall due for the mature and soundminded rebellions not confined wrongly. The obedient and soundminded woman shall have the say in reluting rebellion in the past and during its period.

Article 145: The wife's right does not become void by procrastination, in the past nor by discharge in the future. The wife may discharge the husband of the alimony that was due to her in the past and if somebody contributed to the wife's alimony, the alimony will not cease unless the contributor acted for the husband.

Article 146: If the husband abstained from spending on his wife or if he absented himself and it was ascertained that he did not subsist her, the Ruler shall decide that the alimony be effected from the husband's money according to the provisions of article (143) and she shall have the say as to past expense.

Article 147: If the woman could not obtain the alimony from the husband, she shall have her means of living from such person who was in charge before her marriage. The wife may borrow on the alimony fixed for her judicially or by consent, from a person not responsible therefor. The lender in either case may ask for the reimbursement of the money borrowed and the wife in turn, will return to the husband for the payment of same. [=]


Article 149: The alimony for a needy or insane child whether he is well off or impoverished is due on the father and then on the next of kin. If the father is impoverished or unable to earn his living the alimony will be due on the well off mother and next of kin or other relatives according to the provisions of article (155) of this Law. If the child is well off the alimony will be due on him.

Article 150: The alimony of a child who is mature and of a sound mind, and impoverished and capable of earning his living, and who seeks for education at a secondary level, and did not exceed twenty years of age, such alimony will be due on his well off parents, two parts on the father and one part on the mother as provided for in the case of inheritance. If one of the parents is impoverished, the alimony will be due on the other well off parent, but if both are impoverished, and they have a well off son, the alimony will be due on him. The Rule for the alimony of an unmarried mature girl who is impoverished and capable of earning her living but not doing so, will be the same applied to the minor and provided for in the preceding article.

Article 151: The affluent father is required to marry his impoverished son to one wife only if needed.

Article 152: The alimony of the impoverished father and mother, even if they are capable of earning their living, is due on their well off son and if not, it will be on the next of kin whether male or female, old or young, and it will be divided between the well off children of the same class. The alimony of the mother and then of the father has priority on the alimony of other relatives.

Article 153: The alimony of the wife of an impoverished father is due on the son and in the case of several wives, the alimony will be due for one only. The well off son shall help his impoverished father if he is to many again. If the father is old or sick and needs a wife or a servant to attend to him the well off son will take care of it.

Article 154: The impoverished father may spend from the money of the minor or the insane according to his need even in case of sale, without authorization from the Ruler. The impoverished father is permitted to spend from the money of the son whether present or absent without an authorization from the Ruler.

Article 155: The alimony of an impoverished relative being unable to earn a living, is due on the well off and inheriting relative in case of the former's death. If the inheriting relatives are numerous, the alimony on each one of them will be according to his share of the inheritance. The provision of a servant for a relative is required only in the case of disability or old age.

Article 156: The alimony of a relative for a past period becomes void if it has not been claimed for, unless the relative concerned is a father or a minor or insane. The Ruler shall not decide thereon in the case when the claim was made more than two months before prosecution.

Article 157: Concerning alimony, the person is considered to be well off, if he has the means which exceed his needs, whereas the person is considered as impoverished if the case is contrary to the preceding premises, except when he has the means for one day and one night.

Article 158: If the two relatives disagree, the evidence will be required from the claimant if there is a confusion as to affluence and lack of means of living.

Note: The word Ruler stands for Judge. [=]


Women in the Middle East and North Africa
Yemen
www.ReferenceCorp.net/downloads
Economies. Department of Tourism: 1 woman.

villages in the Yemen Arab Republic. Ministry of Local Administration: 0.

Agriculture and Mother and Child Care. Ministry of Supply: 2.


Tewari, P.O.: 1974 Y.A.R. Agricultural Extension. The Central Agricultural Research and Training Center Project. [=]


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Yemen

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Department of Sewerage & Water: 3.
Civil Service Commission: 3.
C.O. Control & Audit: 3.
Finance & Administration Organization: 1 woman.
National Office for Food: 1 woman.
Highway Authority: 3.
Yemen Bank for Reconstruction: 0.
Central Bank of Yemen: 60.
Other Banks: 0.
Central Planning Organizations: 12.
Textile Factory (San'a'): 0.
Biscuit Factory (Taizz): 0.
Tricot Factory (San'a'): 0.
Pharmaceuticals Co.: 0.
Foreign Trade Co.: 0.
Yemen Airways Corp.: 4.
Other Private Companies: 0.
Total: 1146. [=]


Ministry of Education: 1000.
Ministry of Health: 300.
Ministry of Finance: 24.
Ministry of Municipalities: 18.
Ministry of Communication: 47.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 10.
Ministry of Supply: 4.
Ministry of Public Works: 8.
Ministry of Agriculture: 10.
Ministry of Economy: 10.
Ministry of Local Administration: 0.
Ministry of Social Affairs: 0.
Ministry of Justice: 0.
Ministry of Interior: 0.
Department of Customs: 0.
Department of Min & Petrol: 0.
Department of Tourism: 0.
Department of Civil Aviation: 0.
Department of Civil Aviation: 0.
Department of Sewerage & Water: 0.
Civil Service Commission: 0.
C.O. Control & Audit: 0.
Finance & Admin. Organization: 0.
National Office for Food: 0.
Highway Authority: 0.
Yemen Bank for Reconstruction: 20.
Other Banks: 0.
Central Planning Organizations: 10.
Textile Factory (San'a'): 800.
Biscuit Factory (Taizz): 300.
Tricot Factory (San'a'): 18.
Pharmaceuticals Co.: 15.
Foreign Trade Co.: 15.
Yemen Airways Corp.: 10.
Other Private Companies: 100.
Total: 2589. [=]

50119. New American View. "Crazy-Quilt Society", in New American View-Monitoring the Special Relationship Between the United States and Israel, Vol.3(14). October 15, 1988. A veteran reporter from a major New York newspaper told New American View: "It's a crazy, mixed-up place. It's nothing like it is advertised to Americans by its big fans in the Jewish community." The journalist had recently returned from Israel, where he had spent three weeks on a fact-finding mission with other writers on his paper. "You have Orthodox religious fanatics throwing rocks at the secular types because they are driving cars or going to the movies on the Sabbath," he said. "You've got gunslinging settlers in the West Bank acting like they're playing cowboys and Indians in the old West. And in the cities, especially Tel Aviv, you've got a disco, singles-bar society like we had here several years ago. "In the cities and at the seashore resorts," he continued "there are some impressive displays of wealth. Maybe ostentatious is a better word. There are expensive homes and lavish condos, flashy cars—all the trappings of the good life. There are supermarkets, McDonald's-type fast food outlets, classyboutiques—everything that you see in the US and Western Europe. Everybody looks well-heeled." But off the beaten track, some of the urban neighborhoods

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Women in the Middle East and North Africa

Yemen

are run down, close to being slums. And in the rural areas, particularly in the Negev region in the south, you see a lot of ordinary people—many Oriental Jews and Arabs—struggling to make a living. Things there aren't so nice as Tel Aviv. It's almost like being in Syria or Egypt. And it's a lot different from the Israeli of Jerusalem and the kibbutzim that the American Jewish organizations promote in their public relations campaigns. Commenting on the impact of the Palestinian uprising on Israeli society, the veteran reporter said, "The environment there reminds me a lot of the US during the Vietnam War years. There's a lot of debate over the military necessity for retaining the Arab lands and a lot of discussion over the moral implications of the bloody repression of the revolt. "You see pro-peace demonstrations, and you see the angry animosity they evoke from the anti-peace crowds. Anybody who demonstrates for peace with the Palestinians is called a traitor or worse. The women demonstrators are called whores and other vile names. It gets pretty nasty, ugly. "Another thing that is similar to the Vietnam era is that, except for the occasional pro-peace demonstrations, there is little sign of the 'war' at home, in Israel proper. You don't see a lot of soldiers. Even those who have been called up for temporary duty stay out of uniform if they are on leave. The 'war' is being fought over there, in the 'war' is being fought over there, in their country, in the West Bank and Gaza. But somehow it's always present, just beneath the surface in everybody's life." The journalist provided numerous other examples of internal Israeli social conflict, all of which are diligently avoided by pro-Israeli advocates when promoting the Jewish state to Americans. "There is a surprisingly high level of crime in Israel," he said. "In fact, the prisons are full, and there is a good deal of public pressure on the government to build more facilities. Most of the criminals are Jews. "And drugs are a big problem, too. There's a lot of hashish from Lebanon and cocaine from Iran on the market. Ironically, the dope epidemic started with the invasion of Lebanon; the returning Israeli soldiers brought the stuff home with them. "But the biggest problem ispace faces is the demographic one. It's growing fast. But I'm not talking about the 'Arab problem' although that is important, too. In another 10 years, the Palestinians will outnumber the Jews in the combined areas of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. "I'm referring to the 'changing face' of Jewish Israel. The Oriental Jews are already about 60% of the Jewish population, and they are multiplying at a much faster rate than the European Jews. This, along with the pitifully small number of Western Jews emigrating to Israel and the expanding brain-drain of the educated Israelis to the West, is turning the country into an Oriental Jewish nation—sort of another mini-Middle Eastern state. And these people are really anti-peace and down on the Palestinians. They tend to follow wild men like Meir Kahane." As he concluded the interview, the veteran journalist said, "You get some sense of the shifting demographics when you see how popular Yemenite food is becoming. Ethiopia was undertaken: in 1935-1941 the population of Asmara increased 600%. The Italians pushed Eritrean men into gold and platinum mines, and women into domestic work and prostitution: this proletarianization of Eritreans saw the beginning of their resistance. Italians kept Eritreans at a very low level of work skills: all trades and occupations were restricted to Italians, Eritreans were forced to remain illiterate, as well as the generally low status of women. [>] 50121. United States House; House Committee on International Relations. Middle East Overview and US Assistance to the Palestinians: Appendix: Prepared Statement by Terrence J. Brown, Deputy Asst. Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development:Yemen. Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. District of Columbia Government Printing Office, April 6, 1995. p. 33. USAID also has a small program in Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the world. USAID's assistance program is designed to help Yemen deal with the related problems of extraordinarily high fertility, maternal mortality, and female illiteracy, as well as the generally low status of women. [>]

50122. Warburton, David. "Despots and Democrats: Political Change in Arabia: A Campaign Rally At Sana", in Middle East Report, November-December 1993. p. 12. Dr. Raufa Hassan Al-Sharqi (f) campaigned outside the walls of the old city of Sana in a poor neighborhood. Her speech about the importance of women in Yemeni history received intermittent applause from men and women. She carefully explained the lawfulness of voted for a woman to be in parliament. The rally was peaceful, as her supporter's and those of her opponents distributed leaflets. [Warburton is director of the American Institute of Yemeni Studies in Sana.] [TXT]

50123. Wilson, Amrit. Women and the Eritrean Revolution: The Challenge Road: Part 02: Mabrat's Story. Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1991. pp. 9-32. Women were involved in the Eritrean revolution from the beginning, even if ignored in standard histories of the revolution written by men. Mabrat fled an arranged marriage to Asmara at 13 (ultimately she would be surgically sterilized without her knowledge by an Italian gynecologist who was pursuing one Italian initiative to address the Eritrean population problem). There the Italian buildup for the war with Ethiopia was undertaken: in 1935-1941 the population of Asmara increased 80%. The Italians pushed Eritrean men into gold and platinum mines, and women into domestic work and prostitution: this proletarianization of Eritreans saw the beginning of their resistance. Italians kept Eritreans at a very low level of work skills: all trades and occupations were restricted to Italians, Eritreans were forced to remain laborers. Significantly, there was such a surplus of European labor that even road construction was reserved for them. Many Eritreans found work in the production of cotton, castor-oil seeds, peanuts, coffee and sugarcane. Italians treated Eritreans with contempt, calling them 'flies', 'slaves', fachyanera [blackface] or merde [shit]. Segregation was practice in restaurants, with the entire Caserma Mussolini area in which Eritreans would be arrested on sight. Rape of Eritrean women by Italian men was common, and Italian women often forced Eritrean women into prostitution. The death of an Eritrean when hit by a car driven by an Italian was seen as an insignificant matter, with informal compensation for such a death set at 30 francs. After WW II, British Military Administration of Eritrea would be even more brutal and racist than the Italian rule. The British used Eritrean resources with abandon, and allowed many Italians to maintain themselves in a sub-imperial role, as managers of the Eritrean masses. It was during the British occupation that the first resistance party was established, the Party of Love of Country (PLC) was established. The PLC program called for the abolition of the feudal system; the British
response was to set Christian Ethiopians against Muslim Eritreans by whipping up anti-Muslim sentiments (PLC was expressly based on Christian-Muslim unity); in 1944 the Society for the Unification of Ethiopia & Eritrea (SUEE) was established by Ethiopia to combat the PLC. British also set local groups against each other (starting conflict between Geberti, Tigrinya-speaking Muslims, and Jebelli, people originally from Yemen), or set Muslim Sudanese Defense Force soldiers against Christian Coptic Eritreans (in the infamous Sudanese Defense Force Incident, the soldiers killed 40 Copts). In 1946 the PLC would dissolve into the Muslim League, Pro-Italian Party, National Muslim Party of Massawa and others.

In 1952, the UN granted Eritrea to Ethiopia as a spoil of war. In 1963, a US telecommunications base was established in Eritrea by the US. Popular resistance started to Ethiopian rule: women protesters played a very important role since women protesters were not attacked by the police (as would later happen when local Eritrean police were replaced by Ethiopian police). In 1958, the Group of Seven (also called the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)) was established: it was the first revolutionary group in Eritrea. It led to the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961. The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of armed resistance by the ELF and the EPLF. [=]